PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST

(2nd Exam)

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner Cecila Zulueta is the wife of respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. On March 25, 1962, petitioner, with the presence of her mother, a driver and secretary of his husband, entered the clinic of the latter and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband, taking 157 documents consisting of greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs, to be used as evidence in a case for legal separation and for Dr. Martin’s disqualification from the practice of medicine. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents obtained by petitioner Zulueta from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 174689. October 22, 2007 FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. On November 22, 2003, he filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (from male to female) in his birth certificate. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé. On June 4, 2003, the RTC rendered in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance with the principle of justice and equity. The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity and that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of sex and first name on the ground of sex reassignment and afterwards be legally capacitated to enter into marriage with another man. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that a change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his

name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. The Supreme Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The Supreme Court denied the petition.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate. Jennifer Cagandahan, registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth suffered from clitoral hypertrophy during her childhood years and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She has no breast nor menstruation. She was also diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person, thus petitioning at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff. RTC granted respondents petition. OSG seeks reversal of the decision. ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted. HELD: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VERSUS ALBIOS

Facts: On October 22, 2004, Fringer an American Citizen married Liberty Albios a Filipina. Two years after Albios filed before the RTC the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Fringer for the grounds that after their marriage, they never lived as husbands and wife because they have no intentions to comply with the essential marital obligations. The purpose of Albios in marrying Fringer is for her American Citizenship and it becomes futile. The RTC ruled that their marriage is voide ab initio for it lacks consent and they have married each other for convenience only. The Office of the Solicitor General through the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals and it affirms the RTC's ruling that the case was a Marriage in a Jest or it is a pretended marriage. The marriage was just for personal gain. OSG's contention is that,2 parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage even if the purpose of Albios is for American Citizenship is futile.they knew the consequences and the benefits but still they pursue the marriage. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not Albios marriage is void ab initio? Ruling: NO, the marriage of Albios to Frederick is not void ab initio. The union of Albios and Fringer is Marriage in Fraud Immigration that it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. In fact in the case at bar, there is consent when the herein petitioner and Fringer entered into marriage. It was conscious and intelligent, as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage. They willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. The marriage of Albios and Fringer is not a marriage in jest that they have no intention into an actual marriage. Although the respondent attempts to utilize marriage for dishonest purpose it cannot declare it void neither it can be fraud as stated in Article 45 of the family code, the conditions are not present in this case.

Our constitution declares that marriage as inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Therefore, Respondent's marriage was not void.

PERSONS: FAMILY CODE Art 3 – Formal Requisites of Marriage. Par (2) A

valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

FACTS: Benjamin alleged that he was married to Azucena in Caloocan sometime in 1973, and they had three children; During their marriage, Benjamin had a romantic relationship with Sally Go who was a customer in his auto parts business. He further alleged that in 1981, Azucena left for the USA; and in 1982, he and Sally lived together as husband and wife and begot 2 children, Bernice and Bentley. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Despite Sally’s knowledge of Benjamin’s marriage with Azucena, she brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. This was done so as to appease Sally’s father. Their relationship ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage / declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage, there being no valid marriage license. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous, but was void ab initio nonetheless because of the lack of a marriage license, and that the marriage was non-existent. Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. The CA ruled that the Trial Court did not err in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void ab initio. ISSUE: (1) W the marriage (Marriage in jest) entered into by Benjamin and Sally is void ab initio. (2) W their (Sally & Benjamin) marriage was bigamous.

RULING: (1) YES, as it lacks the formal requisites of marriage – Marriage License. It was established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office, as certified by the Registration Officer - Local Civil Registrar, Pasig and Civil Registration Department of the NSO. The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage. The court held that They see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

(2) NO, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In

this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Sy v. CA (300 SCRA550)

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000

Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage last November 15, 1973 in Quezon City and of legal age, 22 years old. The union was blessed with 2 children. As a family, they established residence in 3 different places. Subsequently, they operated a hardware and lumber business. One day, Fernando, left their conjugal dwelling and they lived separately. The custody of the children remains with Filipina. Filipina filed a civil case against Fernando of legal separation and later it was amended to petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband left her without just cause, that they have lived separately for more that 1 year, that they entered into Memorandum of Agreement. Judgment was rendered in her favor. She filed a separate criminal case of parricide. Alleged incident was documented with a medical certificate issued by certain Dr. James Ferraren. Fernando was convicted of slight physical injury the RTC of Manila She filed another civil case of legal separation on various grounds; violence, infidelity, threat against her life and abandonment.

Lastly, she file an absolute nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity of the part of Fernando. RTC of Pampanga denied her petition. She elevates the issue to CA and trial court’s decision was affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy was void from the very beginning without having one of the formal requirements, marriage license? Ruling:

YES, the marriage of Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy was void from the very beginning. Supreme Court said, though she did not categorically states that there was an incongruity of important dates in their marriage. The celebration of marriage was November 15, 1973 while the date in marriage license was September 17, 1974. This evidence indubitably shows that the marriage done on November 15, 1973 in Quezon was lacking with one of the formal requirements of marriage. A marriage license is a formal requirements; its absence renders marriage void ab initio. Article 80 of the Civil Code also validates that marriage of Fernando and Filipina Sy was void from the beginning.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND CASTRO 236 SCRA 257

FACTS: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were

married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. The marriage contract states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple decided to live together. Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the states. She consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. However, it was then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly declared in default. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig in order to apply for a license neither did she sign any application therefore. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970.

The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage or private respondent to Edwin Cardenas? Held: The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”, a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of

the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The petition is Denied there being no showing of any reversible err.

JAIME O.SEVILLA vs. ARMELITA N. CARDENAS

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

Facts:

In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter’s father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that

they “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,” for the reason that “the employee handling is already retired.“ With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties’ marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it “failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered.” Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

Issue:

WON the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Mariiage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage null and void ab initio. Held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records

of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.”

NOLLORA V PEOPLE, GR NO 191425

FACTS: The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. “That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.” Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret. ISSUE: w/n Nollora complied with the requirements under muslim personal laws before contracting subsequent marriage and be charged for bigamy HELD: The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives.

Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines). Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read: Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied with: (a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given; (c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and (d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen. x x x. Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third. Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized: (a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded; (b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or (c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties. Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties. that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

MORIGO VS PEOPLE

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. After 1978, they lost contact, but in 1984, Lucia sent a card to Lucia, and after exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. Barrete, who had been working in Canada, proposed to petition Morigo, and so they got married in August, 1990. Barrete went back to Canada the following month.In 1991 she filed a petition for and was granted divorce in Ontario Canada. Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in 1992, and subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his mariage with Barrete on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. A bigamy case was filed against Morigo but he petitioned to move for suspension of arraignment since the pending civil case posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. He pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio since no ceremony took place and because he contracted the second marriage in good faith, as he considered the divorce valid. The civil case was decided--- that the marriage between Morigo and Barrete was void ab initio while the Bigamy case was pending. ISSUE: Whether or not Morigo must have filed the declaration for the nullity of his marriage to Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case HELD: No. Morigo did not need file the declaration for nullity since his marriage to Barrete was declared void ab initio due to the absence of two formal requisites of marriage as stated in Article 3 of the Family code. Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Morigo and Barette's marriage had: a. no ceremony, and b. no solemnizing officer when Morigo and Barette signed their marriage contract In the case at bar, the court ruled that the petitioner did not need to file for the judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage before he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago, since there was no marriage to annul in the first place, and since there was no first marriage, then the crime of bigamy was not committed by Morigo when he married Lumbago.

Morigo was found not to have committed bigamy.

ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA (GR NO. 167746)

Facts:

Rosita Alcantara, respondent, filed a petition for annulment of marriage against petitioner, Restituto Alcantara. She alleged that on Dec. 8, 1982, she and petitioner went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them without securing the required marriage license. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony on March 26, 1983, still without a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procuring in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham. They were never a resident there and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar. In 1988 respondent and petitioner parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the marriage contract.

Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Respondent has 2 children with petitioner, Rose Ann Alcantara born on 1985 and Rachel Ann Alcantara born on 1992. Petitioner has a mistress and with whom he has 3 children. Petitioner filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Respondent has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the MTC. Respondent prays that the petition for the annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

Issue: WON the marriage of the petitioner and respondent was with a valid marriage license. Ruling:

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. The wedding took place at the stairs in the City Hall and not in the chapel. That he and respondent did not go to Carmona to apply for a marriage license and assuming that the marriage license was issued to them, he nor the respondent were residents of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Cavite cannot be given weight because the certification states that marriage license number 7054133 was issued in favor of the petitioner and respondent but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved having been solemnized on Dec. 8, 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was in effect at that time. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage in the maintenance of which general public is interested.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982. This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in

any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

COSCA vs PALAYPAYON JR. FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

ARANES VS. OCCIANO – 380 SCRA 402

Facts:

Aranes filed for Gross Ignorance of the Law against Judge Occiano for solemnizing her marriage with her late husband without the requisite marriage license and outside of the judge’s territorial jurisdiction. Because the marriage was null, Aranes was not able to get his husband’s pension and other properties. The judges’ contention was that he agreed to solemnize the marriage after he was assured that all the required documents were complete. However, the parties requested the judge to hold the solemnization of their marriage to Nabua (which is outside of the judge’s jurisdiction), Camarines Sur, because the groom just suffered from a stroke and cannot travel far. Further, the judge argues that before he started the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him and refused when he learned that they lack the requisites. But due to the persistence of the parties and a promise to deliver the documents that same day, he solemnized the marriage. Hence, the judge contended that it was the fault of the parties due to their own fault and negligence. Issue: Is the judge liable for solemnizing a marriage without the license and outside of his jurisdiction? Held: Yes the judge was administratively liable. His territorial jurisdiction is only limited to the municipality of Balatan. His for act of of solemnizing the marriage in Nabua is contrary to law. He was also liable for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.

ABBAS VS. ABBAS G.R. NO. 183896

Facts: Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria Goo-Abbas, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married in 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in 1992 and in January 1993, Syed was at the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria. He was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo. Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Syed. Syed allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura. To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo. To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas. However, Abbas presented a certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite (where the marriage license was allegedly obtained by Felicita’s party) which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas and held that no marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed. It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where the marriage license was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas and that ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married. Issue: WON the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio. Ruling: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage, as laid down in Article 3 of the Family Code, which is the issuance of a valid marriage license. According to Article 4 of the Family Code: The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio except as stated in Article 35 (2). Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter. The resolution of the present case, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar in Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. Annent the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his Marriage to Gloria, although it seems that he seeks annulment only to evade the bigamy suit, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by the petitioner. Thus, under the above cited provisions of the Family Code, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.