1 Macariola vs Asuncion

7/27/2019 1 Macariola vs Asuncion

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Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

EN BANC

[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs. HONORABLEELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,

respondent.D E C I S I O N

MAKASIAR, J p:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola

charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First

Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with"acts unbecoming a judge."The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971

of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals

now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case

was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:"Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of

Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, RupertoReyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerningthe properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,the common father of the plaintiff and defendant."In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs.Macariola alleged among other things that: a) plaintiff

Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceasedFrancisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of thedeceased were defendant Macariola, she being theonly offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyeswith Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs whowere the children of the deceased by his second


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marriage with Irene Ondes; c) the properties left by thedeceased were all the conjugal properties of the latterand his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no propertieswere acquired by the deceased during his second

marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,those conjugal properties should first be partitioned intotwo parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely todefendant it being the share of the latter's deceasedmother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is theshare of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to bedivided equally among his children by his twomarriages.

"On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondentJudge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

"'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a

preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds,

and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the

plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,

Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyesas the only children legitimated by the subsequent

marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez;

(2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to

have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes

Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,

5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as

belonging to the conjugal partnership of the

spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras;(4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.

3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes

Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)

Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging

exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz;


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(6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.

Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of

her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner

of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,

4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remainingone-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474,

4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half

(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as

belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;

(7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive

owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-

half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the

remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and theremaining one-half (1/2) of one fourth (1/4) of Lot

No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco

Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition

of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a

manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as

surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a

hereditary share of one-twelfth (1/12) of the

whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in

relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and

the remaining portion of the estate to be divided

among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.

Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,

Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant

Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the

extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.

Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the

equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share ofany or each of the other plaintiffs and the

defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the

latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary

estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;

Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);


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(9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after

this judgment shall have become final to submit to

this court, for approval, a project of partition of

the hereditary estate in the proportion above

indicated, and in such manner as the parties may,by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable

to them taking into consideration the location,

kind, quality, nature and value of the properties

involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R.

Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to

pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-

third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3)

by the second named; and (11) Dismissing allother claims of the parties [pp. 27-29 of Exh. C].

"The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack ofan appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project ofpartition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which ismarked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the projectof partition was not signed by the parties themselvesbut only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and

defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Orderdated October 23, 1963, which for convenience isquoted hereunder in full:

'The parties, through their respective counsels,

presented to this Court for approval the following

project of partition:

'COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in

the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court

respectfully submit the following Project ofPartition:'1. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506

shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes

Macariola;


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'2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of

the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.

Macariola;'3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be

awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;'4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

1,834.55 square meters along the western part of

the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa

Reyes-Bales;'5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided

equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita

Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla

Reyes in equal shares;'6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot

No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under

item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz

Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto

Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equalshares, provided, however that the remaining

portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively

to Priscilla Reyes.'WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the

Project of Partition indicated above which is made

in accordance with the decision of the Honorable

Court be approved.'Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMOAtty. for theDefendant


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Tacloban City'(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETEAtty. for the PlaintiffTacloban City'While the Court thought it more desirable for all

the parties to have signed this Project of Partition,

nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of

the respective parties to this Court that the Project

of Partition, as above-quoted, had been made after

a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and

the defendant approving the above Project ofPartition, and that both lawyers had represented to

the Court that they are given full authority to sign

by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,

therefore, finding the above-quoted project of

Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby

approves the same. The parties, therefore, are

directed to execute such papers, documents or

instrument sufficient in form and substance for thevesting of the rights, interests and participations

which were adjudicated to the respective parties,

as outlined in the Project of Partition and the

delivery of the respective properties adjudicated

to each one in view of said Project of Partition,

and to perform such other acts as are legal and

necessary to effectuate the said Project of

Partition.'SO ORDERED.'Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October,

1963.'(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION


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Judge'"EXH. B."The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on

November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authorityto the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the

corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective

adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see

Exh. U)."One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition

was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of

15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision

was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes,

was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs

Luz, Anacorita, Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed

Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was

approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184

to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to

1184-E inclusive (Exh. V)."Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, astenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.

Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfercertificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds ofthe city of Tacloban (Exh. 12)."On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a

portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq.

meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion

(Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter

for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

"On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spousesGalapon conveyed their respective shares and interest


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in Lot 1184-E to 'The Traders Manufacturing andFishing Industries Inc.' (Exh. 15 & 16). At the time ofsaid sale the stockholders of the corporation wereDominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime

Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife,Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as thePresident and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of 'The TradersManufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.' which weshall henceforth refer to as 'TRADERS' were registeredwith the Securities and Exchange Commission only onJanuary 9, 1967 (Exh. E)" [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 theinstant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes ofaction, to wit:[1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring bypurchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of thoseproperties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] thathe likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code ofCommerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwiseknown as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canonsof Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the TradersManufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and aranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instanceof Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostorand acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizingwith a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publiclyadvertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in

fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is nota member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpabledefiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondentJudge (pp. 1-7, rec.).Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to

which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In


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Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice

Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report

and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice

submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent

Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the firstcause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of

action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is

prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth

causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be

exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp.

481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court

of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,

versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as

Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition

made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders

issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition

of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears,

however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For

one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he

was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 wasfiled, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E

to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to

the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the

case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground

that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid

Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her

and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on

August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina

Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing

Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo

Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and


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Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of

complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First

Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 bythe then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of

National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No.

4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as

follows:"A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.

ASUNCION"(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First

Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity

of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the

two Orders [Exhibits 'C' and 'C-3'] approving the

partition;"(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.

Asuncion;"(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R.

Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.

Asuncion,"(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;"(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS [P200,000.00] for exemplary

damages;"(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS

[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and"(d) the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS

[P10,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.


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"B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT

MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR

THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO

VILLASIN"(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants

Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased

Gerardo Villasin;"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants

Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo

Villasin the cost of the suit."C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT

SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE

PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010"(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants

Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.

Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and

Ruperto O. Reyes."D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO

RAMO"(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;"(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant

Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit."SO ORDERED" [pp. 531-533, rec.].

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was

elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal onFebruary 22, 1971.IWE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant

Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent


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Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New

Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which

was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010.That Article provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by

purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person

or through the mediation of another:xxx xxx xxx"(5) Justices,judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks ofsuperior and inferior courts, and other officers and

employees connected with the administration ofjustice, the property and rights in litigationor leviedupon an execution before the court within whose

jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respectivefunctions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiringby assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respectto the property and rights which may be the object ofany litigation in which they may take part by virtue of

their profession" [italics supplied].The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale orassignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the

persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that ". . . for the

prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take

place during the pendencyof the litigation involving the property"(The

Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979]; Rosario

vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6,1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which

he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the

parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the

lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the

time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23,


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1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the

October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963

decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said

orders.Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March

6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.

Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E

from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and

Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.

3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half

thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,

Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of

partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot

1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964

to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register

of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of

said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for

taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by

spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and

interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing

Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife wasthe secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil

Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein

approving the project of partition.While it appears that complainant herein filed on or aboutNovember 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of FirstInstance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking toannul the project of partition and the two orders approving the

same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequentconveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a

portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the

finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case

No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and


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November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of

litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No.

4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that thequestioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was

effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid

decision or orders.Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge

having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in

Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of

partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no

violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of

Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and

Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and

unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for

the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree

with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:"And so we are now confronted with this all-importantquestion whether or not the acquisition by respondentof a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transferof the whole lot to 'TRADERS' of which respondent wasthe President and his wife the Secretary, was intimatelyrelated to the Order of respondent approving the projectof partition, Exh. A."Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation

in the transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons

concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no

evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in

the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his

wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx


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"On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no

evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon

acted as a mere 'dummy' of respondent in acquiring Lot

1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this

investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, andI believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in

good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses

without any intervention of, or previous understanding with

Judge Asuncion" (pp. 391-394, rec.).On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted

illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed

by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating

Justice, as follows:"1. I agree with complainant that respondent shouldhave required the signature of the parties moreparticularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project ofpartition submitted to him for approval; however,whatever error was committed by respondent in thatrespect was done in good faith as according to Judge

Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, thecounsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, that he wasauthorized by his client to submit said project ofpartition,(See Exh. B and tsn. p. 24, January 20, 1969).While it is true that such written authority if there wasany, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nordid Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement ofrespondent, his affidavit being the only one that waspresented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations

of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe thatshe knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A,and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to thefollowing documents:

"1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No.

19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban


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Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco

Reyes holds a '1/4 share' (Exh. 9-a). On this

certificate of title the Order dated November 11,

1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition

was duly entered and registered on November 26,1963 (Exh. 9-D);

"2) Exh. 7Certified copy of a deed of absolute

sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on

October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector

Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco

Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the

vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of

said one-fourth share, the same having been

adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her

father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the

Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.

3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly

registered and annotated at the back of OCT

19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e)."In connection with the abovementioned documents it isto be noted that in the project of partition dated October16, 1963, which was approved by respondent onOctober 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order onNovember 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof wasadjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October22, 1963, several days after the preparation of theproject of partition.

"Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however,that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 byvirtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and notbecause of the project of partition, Exh. A. Suchcontention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,it is clear that one-half of one-fourth of Lot 1154


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belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz whilethe other half of said one-fourth was the share ofcomplainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words,the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-

fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs.C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of theentire one fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of theproject of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariolasold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no otherreason than that she was well aware of the distributionof the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. Aand B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs.

Macariola admitted during the cross-examination thatshe went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale ofLot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn. p. 92, November 28, 1968)from which we can deduce that she could not havebeen kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010relative to the project of partition."Complainant also assails the project of partition because

according to her the properties adjudicated to her were

insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant,

however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to

prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and

distribution of the real properties when she could have easily

done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind,

the assessed and market value of said properties. Without

such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that

there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of

complainant's father" (pp. 386-389, rec.).

Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph

5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a

portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,

however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be

reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires


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that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of

impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in

the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should

be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice:

". . . it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to havepurchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had

been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a

corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of

such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has

the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the

citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest

and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and

mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In thisparticular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over

Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion

and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was

no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a

third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should

nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it

to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to

avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or

another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of

respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers

practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and

fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp.

395-396, rec.). LexLibII

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that

respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code ofCommerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing

and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said

corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article

provides that:


19/99

"Article 14 The following cannot engage incommerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can theyhold any office or have any direct, administrative, orfinancial intervention in commercial or industrial

companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, ortowns in which they discharge their duties:

"1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and

officials of the department of public

prosecution in active service. This provision

shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal

judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys

nor to those who by chance are temporarily

discharging the functions of judge orprosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx"5. Those who by virtue of laws or special

provisions may not engage in commerce in a

determinate territory."It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is

incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commerciallaws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political

law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain

public officers and employees, like justices and judges.Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals

with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the

State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its

territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be

recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public

corporations, administrative lawincluding the law on public officers and

elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes

more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the

conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to

engaging in business; hence, political in essence.


20/99

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish

Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the

"Comision de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was

extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and

took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and

later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article

14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated

because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the

former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new

sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-

enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311

[1912]) that:"'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territoryby one nation to another, either following a conquest orotherwise, . . . those laws which are political in theirnature and pertain to the prerogatives of the formergovernment immediately cease upon the transfer of

sovereignty.' (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899)."While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in

conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force

without the express assent or affirmative act of the

conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law,

chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior

sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or

institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force

if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of thecommander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time

of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.

220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins.

Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L.

Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:


21/99

'On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never

been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each

other undergo any change. Their relations with their

former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are

created between them and the government which hasacquired their territory. The same act which transfers

their country, transfers the allegiance of those who

remain in it; and the law which may be denominated

political, is necessarily changed, although that which

regulates the intercourse and general conduct of

individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-

created power of the State.'"Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court

stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition

of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally

abrogated."There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the

effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after

the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to

the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code ofCommerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the

respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate

Justice of the Court of Appeals.It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated

paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:"Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. Inaddition to acts or omissions of public officers alreadypenalized by existing law, the following shall constitutecorrupt practices of any public officer and are herebydeclared to be unlawful:xxx xxx xxx


22/99

"(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniaryinterest in any business, contract or transaction inconnection with which he intervenes or takes part in hisofficial capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the

Constitution or by any law from having any interest."Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph

because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in

his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders

Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the

business of the corporation in which respondent participated has

obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business

of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes

part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was heldin one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal

Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly

or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it

is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official

to be subject to this crime: it is necessary that by reason of his office, he

has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official

who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his

office cannot commit this crime" (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.

11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code,

p. 1174, Vol. II [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation

gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of

respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited

in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is

undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the

Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was eitherparty plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled

"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"

wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the

aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No.

4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on


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November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent

Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of

his interest therein on January 31, 1967.Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph becausethere is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the

Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members

of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also

known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to

that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal

judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the

practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the districtjudge concerned.Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges

from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated

automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,

because it is political in nature.Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil

Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before thecourt within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply

to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took

place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as

his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was

no longer subject of litigation.In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules

made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or

employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,

agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from

the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the

purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a


24/99

prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having

any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or

regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or

employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business

without a written permission from the Department Head may notconstitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section

12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil

Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules

promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not

apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No

officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,

vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,

agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from

the Head of Department . . ."It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of

the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,

otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article

X, 1973 Constitution.Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judgeswas then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the

Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely,

serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of

the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or

upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct

the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines

the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of

judges.And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only

the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as

other personnel of the Judiciary.


25/99

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The

Commissioner may, for . . . violation of the existing Civil Service Law

and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the

service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service,

demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without payor fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a

violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action

against civil service officers and employees.However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service

officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the

Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not

the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised

Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state

that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.

20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the

Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1,

Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule

XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against

judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be

adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated,

Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for theirremoval, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the

Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive

jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after

submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and

employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to

have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and

suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, andefficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards,

guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"

(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-

competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential

appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE


26/99

have already ruled that ". . . in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act

No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees

who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs.

Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710, 713 [1965l, Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA619 [1963]).Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private

business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,

Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the

provisions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule

XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil

Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly

unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

expressly declares that:"A judge should abstain from making personalinvestments in enterprises which are apt to be involvedin litigation in his court; and, after his accession to thebench, he should not retain such investments

previously made, longer than a period sufficient toenable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It isdesirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible,refrain from all relations which would normally tend toarouse the suspicion that such relations warp or biashis judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind inthe administration of his judicial duties. . . ."

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and

his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid

corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and itappears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in

any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the

different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time

of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on

March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the


27/99

eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said

corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their

shares in the corporation only 22 days after the in corporation of the

corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their

interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for

their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and

before it became involved in any court litigation.

IIIWith respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant

alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in

disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance ofthe law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the

recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be

exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and

WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:"The basis for complainant's third cause of action is theclaim that respondent associated and closelyfraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and

publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (seeExhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact saidDominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of

Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar ascertified to in Exh. K.The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan

was an 'impostor' and claims that all the time he believed that

the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason

for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has beenshown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan

represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the

extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words

'Attorney-at-Law' (Exh. I and I-1) to indicate his office, and it


28/99

was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter

to have accepted that statement on its face value.

"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that

respondent is guilty of fraternizing with DominadorArigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be agodmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guiltyof violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as hisfriendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family didnot influence his official actuations as a judge wheresaid persons were concerned. There is no tangibleconvincing proof that herein respondent gave anyundue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tanor that the latter benefitted in his practice of law fromhis personal relations with respondent, or that he usedhis influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the otherbranches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan."Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the

judiciary to refrain as much as possible frommaintaining close friendly relations with practising

attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoidsuspicion 'that his social or business relations orfriendship constitute an element in determining his

judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), butif a Judge does have social relations, that in itself wouldnot constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless itbe clearly shown that his social relations beclouded hisofficial actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his

friends" (pp. 403-405, rec.).In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice

of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase

a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in

business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as

judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to


29/99

be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his

conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized

with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THECOURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE

DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez,

Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.Fernando, C.J. Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., took no part.Barredo, J., I vote with Justice Aquino.Aquino, J., I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114SCRA 77Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their

inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and

Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit

rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the

parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the


30/99

parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But

her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as

counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision

became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold

the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncionwith acts unbecoming a judge on the ground that he bought a property

(formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case

decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be

against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even

at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of

another:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and

inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the

administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied

upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory

they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act


31/99

of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to

the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in

which they may take part by virtue of their profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment.

Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned by her and that

what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the

parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The

judge bought the property in 19652 years after his decision became

final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of

the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then

sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted

as a dummy of Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in

the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.


32/99

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more

discreet in his personal transactions.

You might also like: FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB,

INC. G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002 Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991 In re: Albino Cunanan, G.R. No. L-6784. March 18, 1954 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007

---------------

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011
http://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/cayetano-vs-monsod-201-scra-210.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/cayetano-vs-monsod-201-scra-210.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/legal-ethics-case-digest-in-re-albino.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/legal-ethics-case-digest-in-re-albino.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/rommel-jacinto-dantes-silverio-vs.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/legal-ethics-case-digest-in-re-albino.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/09/cayetano-vs-monsod-201-scra-210.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.htmlhttp://philippinecasedigests.blogspot.com/2010/08/francisco-m-alonso-vs-cebu-country-club.html


33/99

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and inrepresentation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OFAUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJIMUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T.

ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAMALUH SAUPI,Petitioners,vs.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its PresidentJUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thruSPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,

PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President ExecutiveSecretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, andROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,Petitioner,

vs.SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of theCommission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in hiscapacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget andManagement, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity asExecutive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacityas Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in hiscapacity as Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197221


34/99

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,Petitioner,vs.PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the ExecutiveSecretary, and the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA,and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN(PDP-LABAN),Petitioners,

vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inhis capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department ofBudget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in hiscapacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THEPRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.OCHOA, JR.,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197392

LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO,Petitioner,vs.


35/99

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVESECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS,Petitioner,vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,Respondents-Intervenor.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J .:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act

Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with theNational and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" wasenacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of

August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three(3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular nationaland local elections. The law as well granted the President thepower to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of theRegional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the

Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall performthe functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials dulyelected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified andassumed office."


36/99

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No.10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House BillNo. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitionsfiled with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153

was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions inMuslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim

Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common anddistinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures, and other relevant characteristics within the frameworkof this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well asterritorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to

enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretelycarry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for eachautonomous region with the assistance and participation of theregional consultative commission composed of representativesappointed by the President from a list of nominees frommultisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basicstructure of government for the region consisting of the executive

department and legislative assembly, both of which shall beelective and representative of the constituent political units. Theorganic acts shall likewise provide for special courts withpersonal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with theprovisions of this Constitution and national laws.


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The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective whenapproved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units ina plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite

shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734,thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanaodel Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the

ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 daysafter its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand theOrganic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,

Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act

Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, asAmended") was the next legislative act passed. This law providedfurther refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in theoriginal organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMMregional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMMRA No. 91401-on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular electionsoriginally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. Itlikewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than

August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM onthe same date.
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RA No. 93332was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the

ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, andon the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional electionsshould have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begunpreparations for these elections and had accepted certificates ofcandidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMMelections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national andlocal elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives asHouse Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the

ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, withone hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its ownversion, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011.

Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senateamendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came througha petition filed with this CourtG.R. No. 196271

3- assailing the

constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, andchallenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-

compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filedanother petition4also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELECstopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave
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rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against itsconstitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition5filed by Rep. Edcel

Lagman as a member of the House of Representativesagainst Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the ExecutiveSecretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6filed by Atty.

Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC,docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction andPreliminary Injunction

7filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against

the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8filed by JacintoParas as a member of the House of Representatives againstExecutive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,

docketed as G.R. No. 197454.Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Canaas registered voters from the ARMM, with the PartidoDemokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party withcandidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition andMandamus

9against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.

197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No.

9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights ForumPhilippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed theirown Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention andComment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011,
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the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Courtordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to theconstitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, andRA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit theirrespective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and orderingthe incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to performtheir functions should these cases not be decided by the end oftheir term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, haveto comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirementsprescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in

order to become effective.The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it isunconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-readingrequirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Alsocited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrageof the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the"elective and representative" character of the executive andlegislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners

challenged the grant to the President of the power to appointOICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officialsuntil the officials elected under the May 2013 regular electionsshall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that thepower of appointment also gave the President the power of


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control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues wererecognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of

August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates thesynchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section

26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires asupermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regularelections constitute an amendment to Section 7, ArticleXVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote foramendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violateSection 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealablelaws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only inthe creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted tothe ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:


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A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections isconstitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presentedabove.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD theconstitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues thatthe Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of thisposition, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory

Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress underthis Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determinedby the President, which may be simultaneous with the election ofthe Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all

Members of the city or municipal councils in the MetropolitanManila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House ofRepresentatives and the local officials first elected under thisConstitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.


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Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelveobtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year andthe remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,for purposesof synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President underthis Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,

1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress hasto synchronize national and local elections, the clear intenttowards this objective can be gleaned from the TransitoryProvisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,

10which show the

extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately

making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,sought to attain synchronization of elections.

11

The objective behind setting a common termination date for allelective officials, done among others through the shortening theterms of the twelve winning senators with the least number ofvotes, is to synchronize the holding of all future electionswhether national or localto once every three years.

12This

intention finds full support in the discussions during theConstitutional Commission deliberations.

13

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with theprovisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, allserve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
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synchronized national and local elections, starting the secondMonday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization

of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. InOsmea v. Commission on Elections,

14we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitutionthat the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House ofRepresentatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, dateand year noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentionedSections that the term of synchronizationis used synonymouslyas the phrase holding simultaneouslysince this is the preciseintent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day oroccasion.This common termination date will synchronize futureelections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution ofthe Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House ofRepresentatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)will have to be synchronized with the election for President andVice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident fromthe x x x records of the proceedings in the ConstitutionalCommission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should beincluded among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"

election based on the wording and structure of theConstitution.1avvphil

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words usedshould be understood in the sense that they have in common useand given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms
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are employed, in which case the significance thus attached tothem prevails.

15As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,

16"[a]s

the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its languageshould be understood in the sense that it may have in common.

Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except wheretechnical terms are employed."

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers tosomething that primarily serves the needs of a particular limiteddistrict, often a community or minor politicalsubdivision.17Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions ofgovernor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives

obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to theelected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions areconsidered one of the forms of local governments, as evidentfrom Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government."

Autonomous regions are established and discussed underSections 15 to 21 of this Articlethe article wholly devoted toLocal Government. That an autonomous region is considered a

form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X ofthe Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republicof the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, andbarangays. There shall be autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contentionthat the synchronization mandated

by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of theARMMunmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in thecourse of our discussions below, as this concept permeates theconsideration of the various issues posed in this case and mustbe recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
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II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity ofRA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),

Article VI of the Constitution18

which provides that before billspassed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, theymust pass through three readings on separate days. Theexception is when the President certifies to the necessity of thebills immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,19

explained theeffect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the followingmanner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement notonly of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessityof its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifiesthe two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] thebill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it hasbeen printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is

finally approved.

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That upon the certification of a bill by the President, therequirement of three readings on separate days and of printingand distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari

jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate

version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on secondand third readings in the House of Representatives on the sameday [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by thePresident as urgent.
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I

1 Macariola vs Asuncion

Documents

Transcript of 1 Macariola vs Asuncion