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John KriendlerProfessor of NATO and European Security IssuesGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security

IssuesNATO Wide Executive Development Program

14 January 2013

John KriendlerProfessor of NATO and European Security IssuesGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security

IssuesNATO Wide Executive Development Program

14 January 2013

NATO: Key Issues at Chicago and Beyond

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OverviewOverview

• Chicago• Collective Defense• Afghanistan• Smart Defense• Partnership• Missile Defense• NATO-Russia• Nuclear Policy• Enlargement• US engagement• Conclusions

• Chicago• Collective Defense• Afghanistan• Smart Defense• Partnership• Missile Defense• NATO-Russia• Nuclear Policy• Enlargement• US engagement• Conclusions

“New Improved NATO”

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Chicago SummitChicago Summit

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Collective DefenseCollective Defense

ARTICLE 5“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and . . . each of them . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. ”

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OperationsOperations

NATO Support to the African Union

ISAF

Support to EU Operation ALTHEA

KFOR

Balkans Defense Reform

ACTIVE ENDEAVOR

Air Policing

NATO Training

Mission - Iraq

Ocean Shield

CAUTION: CHART SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR NAVIGATION

UNIFIED PROTECTOR

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AfghanistanAfghanistan

Flight from Kabul to Jalalabad, 17 Dec. 2011

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2011 Defense budget as % of GDP

2011 Defense budget as % of GDP

Country % of GDP

Albania 1.5

Belgium 1.1

Bulgaria 1.4

Canada 1.4

Croatia 1.5

Czech Rep. 1.1

Denmark 1.4

Estonia 1.7

France 1.9

Germany 1.4

Greece 2.1

Hungary 1.0

Italy 1.4

Latvia 1.0

Country % of GDP

Lithuania 0.8

Luxembourg 0.5

Netherlands 1.3

Norway 1.5

Poland 1.7

Portugal 1.5

Romania 1.3

Slovakia 1.1

Slovenia 1.3

Spain 0.9

Turkey 1.9

UK 2.6

US 4.8

Source: NATODPP DivisionCaveat: As allies include different items in their defense budgets, these figures are not strictly comparable.

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Smart DefenseSmart Defense

• Consult• Prioritize• Cooperate• Deepen connections• Maintain strong defense industry,

transatlantic cooperation• NATO Forces 2020

o Retain capabilities for core taskso Modern, tightly connected, equipped, trained,

exercised and commanded to operate together

• Consult• Prioritize• Cooperate• Deepen connections• Maintain strong defense industry,

transatlantic cooperation• NATO Forces 2020

o Retain capabilities for core taskso Modern, tightly connected, equipped, trained,

exercised and commanded to operate together

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PartnershipPartnership

NATO - Ukraine (28+1)UKR

BEL BGR CAN

LUX

LVASVKROUPRTPOLLTU

NLD

NOR

SVN

ESP

TUR

GBR

USA

NATO - EU (34)

AUT

SWE

CYP

FIN

IRL

MLT

ISR

DZA EGY

JOR MRT

MAR TUNMediterranean Dialogue (28+7)

BHR

AREKWT

QAT

IstanbulCooperation

Initiative (28+4)

RUS

NATO - Russia (29)

CZE DNK EST

FRA

DEU

GRC

HUN

ITA

ICE

FIN SWE AUT MLT

CHE

ALB

IRE BLR

BIH KAZ MKD ARM

KGZ AZE GEO UZB

MDA UKR RUS

HRV

TJK TKM MNE SRB

EAPC (50)

NATO (28)

GEO

NATO - Georgia (28+1)

Global Partners

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Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

• Strategic Concepto Develop capability “to

defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense.”

o “actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.”

• Chicagoo Interim BMD capabilityo If threat reduced, adapto Remain committed to

cooperation with Russia

• Strategic Concepto Develop capability “to

defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense.”

o “actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.”

• Chicagoo Interim BMD capabilityo If threat reduced, adapto Remain committed to

cooperation with Russia

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NATO-RussiaNATO-Russia

• Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 1997

• NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 2002

• Russo-Georgian War (2008)

• Strategic Concepto Strategic

importance/partnershipo Enhance cooperation on

missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and promotion of wider international security.

• Chicagoo No Putino “True strategic partnership”o Difference s and common

interests

• Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 1997

• NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 2002

• Russo-Georgian War (2008)

• Strategic Concepto Strategic

importance/partnershipo Enhance cooperation on

missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and promotion of wider international security.

• Chicagoo No Putino “True strategic partnership”o Difference s and common

interests

The Russian cruiser “Moskva” (forefront) training with NATO ships in the Ionian Sea, 14 February 2006

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• NATO nuclear policy: main elementso Strategic nuclear forceso Sub-strategic nuclear

weaponso Burden sharing

• Debateo Global zeroo US weapons in Europe: pros and conso Russian “tactical” nuclear weaponso Declaratory policy

• Implementing Chicago decisions

• NATO nuclear policy: main elementso Strategic nuclear forceso Sub-strategic nuclear

weaponso Burden sharing

• Debateo Global zeroo US weapons in Europe: pros and conso Russian “tactical” nuclear weaponso Declaratory policy

• Implementing Chicago decisions

Nuclear PolicyNuclear Policy

B 61, three views

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Theater Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

Theater Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

• Currentlyo 200 B61 gravitybombs o Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkeyo DCA: Tornados, F 16s

• Planned upgradeo B61-12 precision guided gravity bombs deliveredby F-35’s

• Currentlyo 200 B61 gravitybombs o Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkeyo DCA: Tornados, F 16s

• Planned upgradeo B61-12 precision guided gravity bombs deliveredby F-35’s

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ARTICLE 10: ...by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area ...

Enlargement

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U.S. and NATOU.S. and NATO

Center for European Reform: “All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO”

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ConclusionsConclusions

• Progress• Issues continue

to evolve.• Adaptability• NATO’s future

• Progress• Issues continue

to evolve.• Adaptability• NATO’s future

"It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent; it is the one that is most adaptable to change."

Charles Robert Darwin (1809-82)

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Questions/CommentsQuestions/Comments

Smarter Defense Funding?

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Back Up slidesBack Up slides

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Emerging Security Challenges

Emerging Security Challenges

• Piracy• Cyber• WMD proliferation• Terrorism• Energy• Environmental and resource constraints• Ballistic missile proliferation

• Piracy• Cyber• WMD proliferation• Terrorism• Energy• Environmental and resource constraints• Ballistic missile proliferation

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NATO, ISAF: Public SupportNATO, ISAF: Public Support

• Public support

• Publics do not perceive security threats

• Strong support for NATO

• Support to maintain defense budgets

• ISAF: majorities want reduced troop levels or withdrawal

• Public support

• Publics do not perceive security threats

• Strong support for NATO

• Support to maintain defense budgets

• ISAF: majorities want reduced troop levels or withdrawal

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NATO’s FutureNATO’s Future

• “It depends”• Exogenous and endogenous

o Security environmento Global economyo Global governanceo Climate changeo Operational successo Solidarity/Commitmento Defense spendingo TA relations

• “It depends”• Exogenous and endogenous

o Security environmento Global economyo Global governanceo Climate changeo Operational successo Solidarity/Commitmento Defense spendingo TA relations