1 Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Environment Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns...
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Transcript of 1 Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Environment Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns...
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Evaluation of TEWA in a Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Ground Based Air Defense
EnvironmentEnvironment
Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns
Supervisor: Prof. Jan van Vuuren
2
Overview
• Context and motivation
• Evaluation Overview
• Modelling TEWA components
• Simulation evaluation of TEWA
• Proposed measures of performance
• Demonstration
• Status / Further Work
3
Context and Motivation• Forms part of TEWA program underway at the University of Stellenbosch.
• Aim: To evaluate a fully fledged TEWA system in a GBADS environment.
• High-stress environments of particular interest in GBADS application
• Collaborators: RRS, IMT, UDDC, CSIR…
– Duvenhage B & le Roux WH, A Peer-to-Peer Simulation Architecture, Proceedings of the 2007 High Performance Computing and Simulation Conference, pp. 684-690, 2007.
– le Roux WH, Implementing a Low Cost Distributed Architecture for Real-Time Behavioural Modelling and Simulation, Proceedings of the 2006 European Simulation Interoperability Workshop, Stockholm, pp. 81-95, June 2006.
– Roux J & van Vuuren JH, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, Orion Journal of Operations Research, Submitted June 2007.
• Evaluation of TEWA models to date an imperative step in producing an effective system:– Investigation of computational costs (i.e. line of sight calculations)– Effectiveness and relevance of various model sub-components
• Prototype testing often infeasible due to high cost.
• Evaluation of large complex systems in the design phase often involves simulation: – Repetition (statistical certainty)– Variation (realistic scope traversal)
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Evaluation OverviewObjectives:
– Demonstrate workability of system– Evaluate performance of various TE and WA methodologies in
different contexts– Evaluate system performance as a whole and identify focus
areas for future development
Overview:1. Model TEWA components
• Threat evaluation models• Combining threat lists• Weapon assignment models
2. Simulate scenarios using repetition and statistical variation• Robustness of components• Performance of components
3. Performance measure analysis
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1. Modelling TEWA Threat Evaluation (TE)• Flagging Models / Qualititive• Deterministic / Quantitive
– Projected Passing Distance– Bearing towards Assets– Course towards Assets (2D & 3D)– Time to asset
• Probabilistic [Jacques du Toit & Willa Lotz, Jaco Roux & Jan van Vuuren]
Weapon Assignment (WA)• Rule Based / Heuristic [Francois du Toit & Cobus
Potgieter]
• Mathematical / Computational [Grant van Dieman]
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TE: Flagging Models • Provide information regarding major changes in attributes of
monitored threats:– Speed (Afterburner)– Altitude (Pitch)– Course (Maneuvers)
• Binary output
• Calibration options:– Absolute– Dynamic
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TE Models
• Course
• Projected Passing Distance
• Course Variation
• Bearing
• Estimated Time-To-Weapon-Release
(TTWR)• Determine threat values between 0
(minimum) and 1 (maximum)
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TE Model Threat Lists
Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1
2
3
4
Coursea
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.9
2 c 0.8
3 b 0.4
4 d 0.0
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TE Model Threat Lists
Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1
2
3
4
PPDa
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.8
2 c 0.7
3 b 0.1
4 d 0.0
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TE Model Threat Lists
Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1
2
3
4
Course Variationa
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 c 0.9
2 a 0.4
3 d 0.3
4 b 0.0
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TE Model Threat Lists
Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1
2
3
4
Bearinga
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 b 0.9
2 a 0.4
3 c 0.2
4 d 0.1
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TE Model Threat Lists
Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1
2
3
4
TTWRa
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 b 0.9
2 c 0.7
3 a 0.6
4 d 0.1
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Combined Asset Threat List
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 d 0.8
2 b 0.5
3 c 0.3
4 a 0.1
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 d 0.9
2 b 0.7
3 a 0.4
4 c 0.1
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 c 0.8
2 a 0.7
3 d 0.6
4 b 0.2
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.9
2 c 0.8
3 b 0.6
4 d 0.0
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.8
2 c 0.7
3 b 0.5
4 d 0.0
Course PPD CV Bearing TTWR
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.8
2 c 0.7
3 b 0.5
4 d 0.0
Asset
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Combined System Threat List
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 d 0.9
2 c 0.7
3 d 0.3
4 b 0.1
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.8
2 c 0.7
3 b 0.5
4 d 0.2
Asset a Asset b
Rank Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.9
2 c 0.7
3 d 0.3
4 b 0.2
System
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System Threat Lists
Systema
dc
b Threat Rank
Aircraft ThreatValue
1 a 0.9
2 c 0.7
3 d 0.3
4 b 0.2
1818
Combination Procedures
• Maximize Agreement Heuristic, Distance-Based Solution, Additive Model, Analytic Hierarchy Process
• Adapted from inustrial applications to be applied to TEWA
• TE model importance and Asset priorities taken into account by weighting
• Aim to maximize flexibility to satisfy end-user requirements
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2. Simulation of TEWA• Constructive discrete event simulation
– Hill RR, Miller JO & McIntyre, Applications of discrete event simulation modelling to military problems, Proceedings of the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference, 2001.
– Clymer JR, System design and evaluation using discrete-event simulation with artificial intelligence, Proceedings of the 1993 Winter Simulation Conference, 1993.
• System components– Defended Assets– Weapon sensors & effectors– Terrain– Monitored Threats (Fixed wing aircraft)
• System track (3D)• Attack technique [Jacques du Toit & Willa Lotz]
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3. Performance Measures• Asset preservation• Resource utilisation
– Weapon cache / asset preservation ratio• Threat evaluation accuracy
– Intent vs action– Estimated capability vs actual capability
• Assignment optimality– Temporal optimality– Weapon allocation optimality– Weapon assignment optimality
• Expert analysis
Challenges:– Performance measures difficult to quantify!
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Status / Further Work
• TE: Flagging model and deterministic model infrastructure implemented for multiple assets and multiple aircraft.
• Threat list generation and system threat calculation implemented.
• Probabilistic threat models, WA, and discrete event simulation of multiple aircraft and multiple assets in various attack scenarios will follow thereafter in order to evaluate TEWA models.
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ReferencesDuvenhage B & le Roux WH, A Peer-to-Peer Simulation Architecture, Proceedings of the 2007 High Performance Computing and Simulation Conference, pp. 684-690, 2007.
le Roux WH, Implementing a Low Cost Distributed Architecture for Real-Time Behavioural Modelling and Simulation, Proceedings of the 2006 European Simulation Interoperability Workshop, Stockholm, pp. 81-95, June 2006.
Roux J & van Vuuren JH, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, Orion Journal of Operations Research, Submitted June 2007.
Hill RR, Miller JO & McIntyre, Applications of discrete event simulation modelling to military problems, Proceedings of the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference, 2001.
Clymer JR, System design and evaluation using discrete-event simulation with artificial intelligence, Proceedings of the 1993 Winter Simulation Conference, 1993.