1. Dual Nature and Functions

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Dual Nature and Functions

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill1247, known as Republic Act 4790 titled "An Act Creating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur whichincorporated twenty-one barrios into one municipality. Promptedby the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August15, 1967 adopting the pertinent provisions of RA 4790.

It came to light later that twelve barrios included in the Act are partsand parcel of two municipalities, the municipality of Buldon and the

municipality ofParang in the Province of Cotabato and not ofLanao del Sur. Doubtless, as the statute stands, the twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato aretransferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about achange in the boundaries of the two provinces.

The Office of the President, through the Assistant ExecutiveSecretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of thestatute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its owninterpretation, declared that the statute "should be implementedunless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari andprohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of thedetached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declaredunconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoralpurposes, be nullified.

Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated,that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace morethan one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Itwas held by the Suprement Court that RA 4790 violates the onetitle, one subject rule.

Suggestion was made by respondent that Republic Act 4790 maystill be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in themunicipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with themere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelvebarrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the otherprovince of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limitedtitle of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province ofLanao del Sur.

ISSUE: Whether or not

HELD:

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of longstanding, that where a portion of a statute is renderedunconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will beseparated, and the constitutional portion upheld. However, there isan exception to this rule. The general rule is that where part of a

statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another partis valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may standand be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must beso far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presumethat the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they hadsupposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . .Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and validstatute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The languageused in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force orefficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must expressthe legislative will independently of the void part, since the courthas no power to legislate.

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, bythe Act, to create the restricted area ofnine barrios in the towns ofButig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, ifthe twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabatowere to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in thenegative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. Theyserve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out thefunctions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency ofthe community in the administration of local affairs. It is in thelatter character that they are a separate entity acting for theirown purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the considerationof whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as anindependent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory,and income. It was apparently these same factors which inducedthe writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not ninebarrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so,is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enactedinto law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, whichis a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the

reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could theobservations as to progressive community, large aggregatepopulation, collective income sufficient to maintain an independentmunicipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out ofthe twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the saidremaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into amunicipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of anindependent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their ownfeet with the income to be derived in their community? How aboutthe peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbingquestions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer


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them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, weare afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With theknown premise that Dianaton was created upon the basicconsiderations of progressive community, large aggregatepopulation and sufficient income, we may not now say thatCongress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of theoriginal twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to

be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation ofcongressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is topass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread onlegislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditionalseparation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic

Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originallyintended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are toconstitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of thisCourt, to spell out that congressional will.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 nulland void, and to prohibit respondent Commission fromimplementing the same for electoral purposes.

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G.R. No. L-22766 August 30, 1968

SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO., INC. and ARTURO LUMANLAN,SR., petitioners,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO and HON. PUBLIC SERVICECOMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 18, 1960, Congress further amended the Public ServiceAct, one of the changes introduced doing away with therequirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessityfrom the Public Service Commission for "public services owned oroperated by government entities or government-owned orcontrolled corporations," but at the same time affirming its power ofregulation,1 more specifically as set forth in the next section of thelaw, which while exempting public services owned or operated byany instrumentality of the government or any government-owned orcontrolled corporations from its supervision, jurisdiction and controlstops short of including "the fixing of rates."

Petitioner Surigao Electric Co., Inc., a legislative franchise holder,

and petitioner Arturo Lumanlan to whom the rights and privilegesof the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred,challenge the validity of the order of respondent Public ServiceCommission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had "noother alternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentativeschedule of rates submitted by the applicant," the other respondentherein, the Municipality of Surigao.

Citing the above amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 2677in its order, respondent Commission contends that "A municipalgovernment or a municipal corporation such as the Municipality ofSurigao is a government entity recognized, supported and utilized

by the National Government as a part of its government machineryand functions; a municipal government actually functions as anextension of the national government and, therefore, it isan instrumentalityof the latter; and by express provisions ofSection 14(e) of Act 2677, an instrumentality of the nationalgovernment is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC exceptwith respect to the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in

Section 13(a)."

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal government can directlymaintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specificfranchise for the purpose and without a certificate of publicconvenience and necessity duly issued by the Public ServiceCommission.

HELD:

We sustain the Public Service Commission.

Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a government-owned or

controlled corporation. It cannot be said, however, that it is not agovernment entity.

As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon,6there has been arecognition by this Court of the dual character of a municipalcorporation, one as governmental, being a branch of thegeneral administration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate. A well-known authority, Dillon, wasreferred to by us to stress the undeniable fact that "legislative andgovernmental powers" are "conferred upon a municipality, thebetter to enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion ofits people residing within its municipality, such powers [being] intheir nature public, ..."7 As was emphasized by us in the Mendoza

decision: "Governmental affairs do not lose their governmentalcharacter by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nordoes the fact that such duties are performed by officers of themunicipality which, for convenience, the state allows themunicipality to select, change their character. To preserve thepeace, protect the morals and health of the community and so on isto administer government, whether it be done by the centralgovernment itself or is shifted to a local organization." 8

It would, therefore, be to erode the term "government entities" of itsmeaning if we are to reverse the Public Service Commission and tohold that a municipality is to be considered outside its scope.

We refer to the Local Autonomy Act,9 approved a year earlier. Itwould be to impute to Congress a desire not to extend further butto cut short what the year before it considered a laudatory schemeto enlarge the scope of municipal power, if the amendatory act nowunder scrutiny were to be so restrictively construed. Municipalcorporations should not be excluded from the operation thereof.

Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise grantedthem. Whatever privilege may be claimed by petitioners cannotoverride the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise orright shall be granted to any individual or corporation except undera condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or


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repeal by Congress. Such amendment or alteration need not beexpress; it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability,such as the one now under consideration.

Moreover, under a well-settled principle of American origin, onewhich upon the establishment of the Philippine Government under

American tutelage was adopted here and continued under our

Constitution, no such franchise or right can be availed of to defeatthe proper exercise of the police power.

Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure forthe taking over and operation by the government of public utilities,in their view "to further strengthen [their] contention", as to thecommission of this alleged error is unavailing, even if such statutewere applicable, which it is not. In the language of their own brief:"This Act provides for the procedure to be followed whenever theGovernment or any political subdivision thereof decides to acquireand operate a public utility owned and operated by any individualor private corporation." What is to be regulated, therefore, by thisenactment is the exercise of eminent domain, which is a taking of

private property for public use upon the payment of justcompensation. There is here no taking. There is here noappropriation. What was owned before by petitioners continue toremain theirs. There is to be no transfer of ownership.

Rather, a municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth ActNo. 2677, may further promote community welfare by itselfengaging in supplying public services, without the need of acertificate of public convenience. If at all then, the exercise of thisgovernmental prerogative comes within the broad, well-nigh,undefined scope of the police power. It is not here, of course, theordinary case of restraint on property or liberty, by the imposition ofa regulation. What the amendatory act in effect accomplishes is to

lend encouragement and support for the municipal corporationitself undertaking an activity as a result of which, profits of acompeting private firm would be adversely affected.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Public Service Commissionof July 11, 1963, as well as the order of February 7, 1964, denyingthe motion for reconsideration, are affirmed.

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De Facto Municipal Corporation Doctrine; Elements

[G.R. No. 105746. December 2, 1996]

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and

MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN

FACTS:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No.258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68 of theRevised Administrative Code of 1917.

Pursuant to EO No. 258, part of the territory of the municipality ofSinacaban shall consist of the southern portion of the municipalityof Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. The municipality of Jimenez shallhave its present territory, minus the portion thereof included in themunicipality of Sinacaban.

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, dated November

22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and toBarrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, basedon the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filedwith the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against theMunicipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding thatunder E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement ithad with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement wasapproved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in itsResolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed thecommon boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Boarddeclared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that theprevious resolution approving the agreement between themunicipalities was void because the Board had no power to alterthe boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that powerbeing vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and theLocal Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), 134. TheProvincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.

Jimenez filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus inthe Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. Jimenez alleged that, in

accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, thepower to create municipalities is essentially legislative andconsequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order,had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis--vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision denying thepetition. The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a defacto corporation since it had completely organized itself even priorto the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty yearsbefore the existence was questioned; that Jimenez did not have

the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, thesame being reserved to he State as represented by the Office ofthe Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenezwas estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacabanby entering into an agreement with it concerning their commonboundary; and that any question as to the legal existence ofSinacaban had been rendered moot by 442 (d) of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of thisCode shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existingmunicipal districts organized pursuant to presidential


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issuances or executive orders and which have theirrespective set of elective municipal officials holding office atthe time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities.

On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of thedecision but its motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this

petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Sinacaban legally exists.

HELD:

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was notvalidly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v.

Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations isessentially a legislative matter and therefore the President waswithout power to create by executive order the Municipality ofSinacaban. We have since held that where a municipality createdas such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts

are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer bequestioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez,Sr.,] this Court considered the following factors as having validatedthe creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallityof Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the Presidentbefore the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that fornearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality hadnever been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling inPelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of theexecutive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that themunicipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality,organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part ofa legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the

House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whateverdoubt there might be as to the de jure character of themunicipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the localGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of whichprovides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidentialissuances or executive orders and which have their respective setsof elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of thisCode shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer onSinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation inthe sense that its legal existence has been recognized andacquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been inexistence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was

decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it wasonly 40 years later that its existence was questioned and onlybecause it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired forits revenue. On the contrary, the State and even the municipalityof Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans corporateexistence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13, 1978of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary Reorganization

Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part ofmunicipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlierrecognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with

it regarding their common boundary. The agreement wasembodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of MisamisOccidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of theOrdinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioninglegislative districts throughout the country, which consideredSinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis

Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of sanNarciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in thecreation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of thisCode shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existingmunicipal district organized pursuant to presidentialissuances or executive orders and which have theirrespective set of elective municipal officials holding office atthe time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is

AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON et al. petitioners,vs.HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR et al., respondents.

FACTS:

On 20 August 1959, Executive Order No. 353 was issued creatingthe municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating fromthe municipality of San Narciso of the same province certainbarrios along with their respective sitios.

Executive Order No. 353 was coursed through the Provincial Boardof Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, in itsResolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, themunicipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to

have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. Theexecutive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipaldistrict into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 wasapproved by the House of Representatives."

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petitionforquo warranto with the Regional Trial against the officials of theMunicipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration ofnullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondentlocal officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanentlyordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their


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respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.Auditor General,the petitioning municipality contended thatExecutive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpationof the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of theconstitutional principle of separation of powers.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition,

averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that since itwas at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality ofSan Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No.353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped fromquestioning the creation of the new municipality; that because theMunicipality of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, itscorporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that,considering the petition to be one forquo warranto, petitionermunicipality was not the proper party to bring the action, thatprerogative being reserved to the State acting through the SolicitorGeneral.

The trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss and

to deny a judgment on the pleadings. The Municipality of SanAndres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case hadbecome moot and academic with the enactment of Republic ActNo. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT

The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, readingthusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivityof this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.Existing municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and whichhave their respective set of elective municipal officialsholding office at the time of the effectivity of this Codeshall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER

The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending thatthe above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality ofSan Andres since the enactment referred to legally existingmunicipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had beenvoid ab initio.Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipalitycreated by a null and void presidential order may be attacked eitherdirectly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights areaffected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates nooffice and is inoperative such as though its has never beenpassed.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic ActNo. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres intoa de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the

petition forquo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of saidlaw, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek thenullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to applySection 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce beviolative of due process and the equal protection clause of theConstitution.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

The lower court finally dismissed the petition for lack of cause ofaction on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State,adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation ofmunicipal districts by the President pursuant to presidentialissuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment ofR.A. 7160. The same court denied petitioner municipality's motionfor reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."

ISSUE: Whether or not the promulgation of the Local Government

Code of 1991 accorded respondent Municipality a de jure status.

HELD:

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider hadthe case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, oron 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finallydecided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In themeantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, ofSan Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers andauthority of a duly created local government unit. In the samemanner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster orthe right of another to hold a position within a one-year period canabrogate an action belatedly filed,so also, if not indeed withgreatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailingthe lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised.Public interest demands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullityfor being the result of an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in thiscase hardly could offer a choice other than to consider theMunicipality of San Andres to have at least attained a statusuniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact

attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San

Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor Generalwas promulgated. Theruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of theunconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to bethe case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointedto the State's recognition of the continued existence of theMunicipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as amunicipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified theMunicipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having


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surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No.1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known asthe Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipalcircuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in thecountry, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuitsorganized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978,issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537.

Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres hadbeen covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of themunicipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House ofRepresentatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, theMunicipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of thetwelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of theprovince of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of theLocal Government Code to the effect that municipal districts"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders

and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officialsholding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shallhenceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretensionof unconstitutionality per seof Section 442(d) of the LocalGovernment Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such apretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to createpolitical subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congressdid just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in theCode. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, andaimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalidunder existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usualqualification against impairment of vested rights.

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andresin the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariis herebyDISMISSED.

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G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through itsSanguniang Bayan and Mayor, petitioner,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA,BOHOL, respondents.

FACTS:

The trial court declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within theterritorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol,herefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality.

On appeal, the respondent Court reversed the decision of the trialcourt stating that 'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf theentire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam,Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of theMunicipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territoriesfar exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her.The respondent Court concluded that said barrios are undisputedly

part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265creating the latter.

The respondent Court also found that the survey plans submittedby petitioner and respondent are inadequate insofar as identifyingthe monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and theMunicipality of Mabini (which barrios created the Municipality of

Alicia). The respondent Court, after weighing and considering theimport of certain official acts, including Executive Order No. 265dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipality of Aliciafrom out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and ActNo. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903(which set forth the respective component territories of the

municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that "BarrioBulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned asone of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellantMunicipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahatforms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by therespondent Court, petitioner came to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not

HELD:

We noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on thejuridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984(or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first cameinto existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. Itappears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitionerasked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presentingits evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality.Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by PresidentQuirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality isnull and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised

Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based,constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to thePresident of the Philippines, and was therefore declared

unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs.AuditorGeneral.

In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipalityof San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., which will be found veryinstructive in the case at bench. As was held in that case:

Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was acomplete nullity for being the result of anunconstitutional delegation of legislative power, thepeculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardlycould offer a choice other than to consider the


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Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained astatus uniquely of its own closely approximating, ifnot in fact attaining, that of a de factomunicipalcorporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it tobe otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of ExecutiveOrder No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres hadbeen in existence for more than six years when, on

24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor Generalwaspromulgated. The ruling could have sounded the callfor a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case.On the contrary, certain governmental acts allpointed to the State's recognition of the continuedexistence of the Municipality of San Andres .

At the present time, all doubts on the dejure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)apportioning the seats of the House ofRepresentatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution,

the Municipality of San Andres has been consideredto be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composingthe Third District of the province of Quezon. Equallysignificant is Section 442 (d) of the LocalGovernment Code to the effect that municipaldistricts "organized pursuant to presidentialissuances or executive orders and which have theirrespective sets of elective municipal officials holdingoffice at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shallhenceforth be considered as regular municipalities."No pretension of unconstitutionality per se ofSection 442 (d) of the Local Government Code isproffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, evenif made, would succeed. The power to create political

subdivisions is a function of the legislature.Congress did just that when it has incorporatedSection 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which inessence are retrospective, and aimed at giving"validity to acts done that would have been invalidunder existing laws, as if existing laws have beencomplied with," are validly accepted in this

jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification againstimpairment of vested rights.

Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikinglysimilar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondentmunicipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No.

265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres,and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen yearswhen Pelaez vs.Auditor Generalwas promulgated. And variousgovernmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State'srecognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. Forinstance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, theMunicipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal CircuitCourt of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under theOrdinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of

Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District ofBohol.

Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situatedas the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit fromthe effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, andshould henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorariis herebyDENIED.

_____________________________________________________

G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,vs.THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THEINTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUSREGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE,DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSIONON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSEof REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE),respondents.

FACTS:

Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several ExecutiveOrders3creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao.

Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created byvirtue of Executive Order No. 107.

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for thecreation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to passCongress.President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation ofthese municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the

Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President EmmanuelPelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging inmain that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370, and said ordersconstituting an undue delegation of legislative power.

After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that thechallenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five

justices ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Codedid not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation oflegislative power to the executive branch, while three justicesopined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of theenactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power ofthe Chief Executive over local governments.

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No.107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, thecore issue presented in the present petition is the continuedefficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong.

The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003,issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of theDepartment of Interior and Local Government (DILG).The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certifiedas "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18)
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municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong,whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. Thesemunicipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog inZamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas inZamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella inDavao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur;Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and

Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG"in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and innot including said municipality in its records and official databaseas [an] existing regular municipality." He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen(18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason ofPelaez.

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of ExecutiveOrder No. 107. He argues that Pelaezhas already been modifiedby supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and

jurisprudence. Particularly cited is ourDecision in Municipality ofSan Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23wherein the Court affirmed theunique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a"defacto municipal corporation."24Similar to Andong, themunicipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order,precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared asunconstitutional. Moreover, SanNarciso cited, as Camid does,Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis forthe current recognition of the impugned municipality.

ISSUE: Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiatwas previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in theabsence of any curative or reimplementing statute.

HELD:

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed.

It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist byprescription where it is shown that the community has claimedand exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge andacquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption orobjection for period long enough to afford title byprescription.These municipal corporations have exercised theirpowers for a long period without objection on the part of thegovernment that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed

that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that theircharters had been lost.

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of thecontinuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporatepowers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the otherinstrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunityto make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstancesbefore this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camidsplaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntletand, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Courtof Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the

necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming ignorance ofthe principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies andhierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of thepresent petition, cannot be countenanced.

It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camidspresent action. The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by

the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear theauthority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, theannulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serveCamids ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither doesthe Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong stillexists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on thepresent status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailedbefore this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than along-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulledthrough the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of theCertificationto Camids central argument is forlornly strained.

Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared

"null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along withthirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio"means "from the beginning,"30"at first,"31"from theinception."32Pelaezwas never reversed by this Court but rather itwas expressly affirmed in the cases ofMunicipality of San Joaquinv. Siva,33Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34and Municipality ofKapalong v. Moya.35No subsequent ruling by this Court declaredPelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation hasbeen passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Giventhese facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andongdoes not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

To understand the applicability ofMunicipality of San Narciso and

Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation ofAndong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of ourdecision in Pelaez.

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaezwas that thePresident was then, and still is, not empowered to createmunicipalities through executive issuances. The Court thereinrecognized "that the President has, for many years, issuedexecutive orders creating municipal corporations, and that thesame have been organized and in actual operation . . . ." However,the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33)municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-

President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. Nopronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which hadbeen previously created by the President in the exercise of powerthe Court deemed unlawful.The ruling in Pelaez was expounded insubsequent cases as Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva ,Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v.Moya.

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality ofSanNarciso in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudentialtreatment of municipalities created through presidentialissuances. In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the
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merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legalstatus of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not presentin the case at barthat San Andres was in existence for nearlythirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court didnot declare the executive order creating San Andres null and void.Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was acomplete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led

to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status ofa "de facto municipal corporation."51It noted that Pelaezlimited itsnullificatory effect only to those executive orders specificallychallenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could havevery well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres aswell.52This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading ofSanNarciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had beendeclared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutionaldelegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) of theLocal Government Code of 1991. The Court clarified that thepower to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporatedSection 442(d) in the Code. The Code was deemed to have curedany defect on the legality of the existence of the municipality inquestion. The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmedin Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals and Municipality ofJimenez v. Baz

From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather theapplicable rules. Pelaezand its offspring cases ruled that thePresident has no power to create municipalities, yet limited itsnullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challengedin actual cases before this Court. However, with thepromulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legalcloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created byexecutive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto statusof such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacabanwas recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the LocalGovernment Code deemed curative whatever legal defects totitle these municipalities had labored under.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a defacto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminentdifferences between Andong and municipalities such as SanAndres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact thatthe executive order creating Andong was expressly annulledby order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongsdefacto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite itsnullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a validorder of this Court.l^vvphi1.netCourt decisions cannot obviouslylose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the partiesaggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions,Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requiresthat in order that the municipality created by executive ordermay receive recognition, they must "have their respective setof elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the

effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admitsthat Andong has never elected its municipal officers atall.60This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was

judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our rulingin Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize theexistence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds,and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void

municipality.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence ofelections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquentindicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of thetown. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve thepurpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, bo th thesecertifications qualify that they were issued upon the request ofCamid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of theMunicipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61thus obviously concedingthat the municipality is at present inoperative.1awphi1.nt

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended tothe 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied uponin Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportionedthe seats of the House of Representatives to the differentlegislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the variousmunicipalities that are encompassed by the various legislativedistricts. Andong is not listed therein as among themunicipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province forthat matter.62On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres,

Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part ofQuezon,63Bohol,64and Misamis Occidental65respectively.

How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified

in Pelaezbut certified as existing in the DILGCertification presented by Camid? The petition fails tomention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislationwas enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66It is thusnot surprising that the DILG certified the existence of theseeighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are amongthe municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended tothe Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablishedthrough statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are validorganic statutes passed by legislation recreating theseeighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accorda different legal treatment to Andong as against theseeighteen (18) other municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of theLocal Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm orreconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such asAndong, which had been previously created by presidentialissuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legalpersonalities only of those municipalities such as SanNarciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been createdusing the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enoughnot to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, themunicipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez,San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless
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recreated through specific legislative enactments, as donewith the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from thepresidential issuances or executive orders which originallycreated them or from Section 442(d), but from the respectivelegislative statutes which were enacted to revivethem.1a\^/phi1.net

The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaezwas torevert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into theiroriginal municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan,Butig and Tubaran.67These three municipalities subsist to this dayas part of Lanao del Sur,68and presumably continue to exercisecorporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.

If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution ofAndong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicialconfirmation of void title.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

_____________________________________________________

Method of challenging existence of municipal corporation

G.R. No. L-28113 March 28, 1969

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, andAMER MACAORAO BALINDONG, petitioners,vs.PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG,HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE

MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABAINDAR LAO. respondents.

FACTS:

Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang,having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 ofthe then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of thelatter municipality.

The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullifyExecutive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipalofficials from performing the functions of their respective office

relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. AuditorGeneral2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.

Pelaez v. Auditor General

In Pelaezthis Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice)Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [BarrioCharter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power tocreate barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of thepresidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies anegation of the biggerpower to create municipalities," and (2) that

section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives thePresident the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a)because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and(b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of theConstitution, which limits the President's power over localgovernments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up itsdiscussion: "In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of

legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part ofthe Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917,must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of theConstitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistentwith said statutory enactment."

Contention of Respondents

On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the factsalleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announcedin Pelaezcan have no application in this case because unlike themunicipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan isat least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color

of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officershaving been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itselfhaving discharged its corporate functions for the past five yearspreceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a defacto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quowarranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual likethe petitioner Balindong.

ISSUE: Whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attemptedorganization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute issubsequently declared unconstitutional.

HELD:

This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courtsin the United States. Thus, some hold that a de facto corporationcannot exist where the statute or charter creating it isunconstitutional because there can be no de facto corporationwhere there can be no de jure one, while others hold otherwise onthe theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned asunconstitutional.

An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers:

The following principles may be deduced which seem to

reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:

I. The color of authority requisite to the organization ofa de facto municipal corporation may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face,which has either (a) been upheld for a time bythe courts or (b) not yet been declaredvoid; providedthat a warrant for its creation can
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be found in some other valid law or in therecognition of its potential existence by thegeneral laws or constitution of the state.

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unlesseither directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation isauthorized by some legislative fiat.

III. There can be no color of authority in anunconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which isapparent on its face.

IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to takethe place of an existing de jure corporation, as suchorganization would clearly be a usurper.

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation wasrecognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating itwas later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made torest on the consideration that there was some other valid law

giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the caseat bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a timewhen the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivablymake it a de facto corporation, as, independently of theAdministrative Code provision in question, there is no othervalid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "Anunconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes noduties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legalcontemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board ofcommissioners created under an invalid statute were

unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say,however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in theexercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executiveorder "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it hadnever been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is"an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief JusticeHughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District v. BaxterState Bank:

The courts below have proceeded on the theorythat the Act of Congress, having been found to be

unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and henceaffording no basis for the challenged decree.It is quiteclear, however, that such broad statements as to theeffect of a determination of unconstitutionality must betaken with qualifications. The actual existence of astatute, prior to such a determination, is an operativefact and may have consequences which cannot justlybe ignored. The past cannot always be erased by anew judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequentruling as to invalidity may have to be considered invarious aspects with respect to particular

relations, individual and corporate, and particularconduct, private and official. Questions of rightsclaimed to have become vested, of status of priordeterminations deemed to have finality and actedupon accordingly, of public policy in the light of thenature both of the statute and of its previousapplication, demand examination.

There is then no basis for the respondents apprehensionthat the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabaganwould have the effect of unsettling many an act done in relianceupon the validity of the creation of that municipality.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanentlyrestrained from performing the duties and functions of theirrespective offices.

1. Dual Nature and Functions

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Transcript of 1. Dual Nature and Functions