1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV...
-
Upload
lionel-andrews -
Category
Documents
-
view
220 -
download
0
Transcript of 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV...
![Page 1: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
1
CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Topics:
• 30.1 Background
• 30.4-30.5 Synergy
• 30.6, 30.7, 30.9 NPV Analysis of Mergers
• 30.10 Defensive Tactics
• 30.11 Empirical Evidence
This set of slides is a brief introduction to Chapter 30.
![Page 2: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
Background
• Merger: Companies A and B become one company (A+B) via an agreement which is – Negotiated between the firms’ boards
– Subsequently voted on by shareholders
– Company B receives some number of company A shares, plus also (perhaps) some cash.
![Page 3: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3
Background
• Acquisition: One company (or individual) A buys a controlling stake of company T.– Management/board approval not required– No shareholder meeting/vote required– Accomplished by tender offer: a public offer made to each
shareholder independently. May be cash, stock or some combination thereof.
• Tender offers are typically conditional.– E.g., if more than 50% of shareholders do not tender, then offer is
canceled.
• Usually the parties can be classified as: acquirer & target• In most cases, a substantial premium is paid• M&A activity has been quite extensive in the past two
decades.
![Page 4: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4
Types
• Friendly vs. hostile– Mergers are almost always considered friendly
– Acquisitions may be hostile: resisted by the target’s management and board.
• Cash vs. stock merger
![Page 5: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
Common defensive tactics in Hostile acquisition • Supermajority agreements (approval of a specified majority
(usually 2/3 or ¾) of the acquired firm’s shareholders)
• Poison Pill Agreement (Shareholder rights plans)– Existing shareholders are given the right to acquire shares at half-
price.
– Acquirer’s rights are cancelled.
• Greenmail: payoff to acquirer to drop the bid
• Golden parachutes
• White knight
• Proxy contest: One group of shareholders attempt to gain controlling seats on the board by voting out the board of directors.
– A response to defensive tactics
![Page 6: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6
The Inco M & A case: The players• INCO
– Primary products: Nickle, 2005 sales: $4.5 billion US. Based in Toronto
• Falconbridge– Primary products: Copper and nickle, 2005 sales: $8.1 billion US. Based in
Toronto
• Xstrata – Copper, coking coal etc, 2005 Sales: $8 billion US. Based in Switzerland.
• Phelps Dodge Corp. – Primary products: copper, 2005 sales: $8.3 billion US. Based in Arizona
• Teck Cominco– Primary products: zinc, metallurgical coal, coper, 2005 sales: $4.4 billion
Cdn. Based in Vancouver
• Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD)– Largest global producer of iron ore and pellets. Based in Brazil.
![Page 7: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
Case cont’d: From Hunter to Hunted
Oct. 2005: Inco announced a friendly takeover to buy Falconbridge for $12 billion
Xstrata submitted a hostile takeover bid for Falconbridge
May 2006: Teck Cominco submitted a hostile takeover bid to purchase Inco for $16 billion if it agreed to abandon its takeover of Falconbridge.
June 2006: Phelps Dodge submitted a friendly takeover to buy a combined Inco and Falconbridge for around $40 billion; offer withdrawn due to the failure of the Inco-Falconbridge merger.
August 2006: Brazilian mining company CVRD extended an all-cash offer to buy Inco for $17 billion. Now Inco becomes CVRD Inco.
The Xstrata bid was successful, but not before Falconbridge employed a poison pill to delay the acquisition, raising its share price from $28 to $62.50. (firm value:$23.8bn)
![Page 8: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
Why merge?
• To justify a merger we need to show that
PV(A + B) > PV(A) + PV(B)
• If so, there are synergies:
Synergy = PV(A+B) – [PV(A) + PV(B)]
• NPV of merger to acquirer = Synergy – Premium
![Page 9: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
Sources of synergy (see section 30.5)
• increased revenues
• reduced costs– Including replacing ineffective managers
• tax benefits– Net operating losses
– Unused debt capacity
• reduced cost of capital– Economies of scale
![Page 10: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
Valuation of Synergy
• In principle, synergy can be determined using the standard DCF approach:
• In practice, it is difficult to determine synergy– it is hard to estimate incremental cash flows precisely
– discount rate – should reflect risk associated with use of funds
– there are also costs to consider (e.g. transaction costs)
T
1t tt
)r1(
CFsynergy
![Page 11: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11
How to pay for the target: Cash or stock?
• assuming that synergies have been calculated (i.e. the PV of the benefits of a merger), the next step is to assess the costs involved
• simple when cash is paid - the value of the merger to the acquiring firm is simply the synergies minus the PV of the costs
• with a stock offer, the costs depend on the gains because the post-merger stock price depends on the gains
![Page 12: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12
Example
Before a merger announcement:
Suppose that synergies have been determined to be $4,750,000 (due to cost savings)
Firm A Firm B Market price per share $75 $15 Number of shares 1,000,000 600,000 Market value of firm $75,000,000 $9,000,000
![Page 13: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13
Example cont’d: Cash offer
Cash offer: Assume that A will pay $12 million for B. Then the premium paid is $3 million and
NPVA =
However, this assumes that B’s current market price accurately reflects its value as a separate entity. What if takeover rumours have already increased B’s share price by $2?
![Page 14: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14
Example cont’d: Stock offer
• Suppose that A will offer 160,000 shares instead of $12 million cash. The apparent premium being paid is
• However, note that the total value after the merger is
• This means that the new share price will be:
so the real premium is
• How can the terms be set so that the premium is really $3 million?
![Page 15: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15
Cont’d: solution
Premium = 3m = Pnew x Nb – 9mα = % of merged firm owned by B’s S/Hα = B’s value/total firm value post merge =
= B’s shares/total shares =
NB =
Pnew =
Verify: Premium = 76.75 (156,352) – 9m = 3m
![Page 16: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16
Choice of cash or stock
• If A’s management believes its shares are undervalued by the market, then it will tend to prefer a cash offer.
• Conversely, if A’s management believes its shares are overvalued, it will tend to prefer a stock offer– B’s S/H will likely figure this out if A makes a stock offer
signal that A’s shares are overvalued B’s S/H will want better terms
– With a stock offer, B’s shareholders will share in any subsequent gains (if the merger ultimately proves to be very successful) and any subsequent losses (if it doesn’t).
![Page 17: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17
Empirical evidence• Do acquisitions help shareholders?
– most evidence suggests that shareholders of target firms gain substantially, but shareholders in bidder firms do not
– bidder firm results are lower for stock offers than cash offers
– on average, the combined market values of bidders and targets do increase around the time of merger announcements
– diversifying acquisitions had positive bidder returns in the 1960s, but negative returns since then
• Do defensive tactics help target shareholders?– evidence is mixed – on average, target stocks decline in value
but there are many exceptions• e.g. greenmail is most often viewed negatively, but if it is seen
as giving management more time to find a better offer, it can be viewed positively by investors.
![Page 18: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18
Who captures the value of synergy?
---Table 30.9 Stock Price Changes in Successful U.S. Corporate Takeovers
![Page 19: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19
Realities of M&A
• Warren Buffet:
“Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders… We've observed many kisses but very few miracles.”
• Buffet is right!– In practice, targets almost always capture synergies
![Page 20: 1 CHAPTER 30: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Topics: 30.1Background 30.4-30.5 Synergy 30.6, 30.7, 30.9NPV Analysis of Mergers 30.10 Defensive Tactics 30.11Empirical.](https://reader035.fdocuments.in/reader035/viewer/2022062422/56649ec75503460f94bd3838/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20
• Assigned problems: # 30.1, 5-6