1 Asian Financial Integration: Next Steps Andrew Sheng 10 May 2006.
-
Upload
frank-walsh -
Category
Documents
-
view
212 -
download
0
Transcript of 1 Asian Financial Integration: Next Steps Andrew Sheng 10 May 2006.
1
Asian Financial Integration:Next Steps
Andrew Sheng
10 May 2006
2
Contents of Presentation
Review of Progress to Date
Review of Literature and Views to Date
Assessment of situation
Roadmap to Integration
Risks and Opportunities
3
Regional IntegrationSource: Padao-Schioppa (2005)
Closed or Open Regionalism?Path to Global Integration
Consensual ASEAN way – “muddling through”
Sequencing
Centripetal forces do not clearly outweigh centrifugal forces
Risks
Gains from trade obvious and some studies show East Asia is an Optimum Currency Area
Gains
No clear objective in AsiaMotivation
4
Current Status: Four PillarsKuroda ( ADB, Dec 2005)
Sub-regional Cooperation – connecting through bridges, ports, roads
Money and Finance – Chiangmai Initiative (CMI); ABF1 & 2
Trade and Investment - FTAs
Provision of Regional Public Goods – funding is lacking
5
Regional Features Compared:Japan’s financial assets are twice rest of Asia put together
Japan accounts for 57% of regional GDP and 65% of total financial assets
Germany accounts for 22% of regional GDP and 19% of total financial assets
Concentration
1513 + No. of members
US$7 trnUS$10.1 trnGDP
15 mn sq. km.3 mn sq. kmArea
2 billion420 mnPopulation
East Asia
(ASEAN+3)
EURegional Features
6
Evolution of Economic Integration:Mario Lamberte (ADB, 2005)
7
Degrees of Integration
Political Integration – the EU Route
Trade Integration – NAFTA Route
Financial Integration – Harmonization or
Mutual Recognition?
Monetary IntegrationACU basket of Asian currencies or
Single currency?
8
Financial Integration still early daysde Brouwer and Corbett (ANU, Oct 2005)
Financial Infrastructure improving, but still disparateSavings still bank dominatedThree advantages for financial integration:-
Internal and external pressure for financial reformOpportunities to improve access and reduce transactions costs for households to global instrumentsStronger voice in global forums and policy-making
Need to engage private sector in financial sector development and reform directions
9
Capital Market Integration: next stepsde Brouwer and Allan (Australian Treasury 2005)
Three steps in advancing cross-border activity:
Create transactions platform for cross-border financial tradeAgree on common standards and principlesRemove legal or informal restrictions
Three ConstraintsLack of political willReluctance of private sector to be involvedLimited capacity to analyze, formulate and implement any consensus on direction, sequencing and process
10
Market-Driven Regional IntegrationSakakibara and Yamakawa (Keio Jun 2003)
Integration in Europe and Asia followed different paths. EU was politically drivenRegional integration is being driven by market driven supply chain integration, rather than explicit policyJapan and China have central roles in this production networksAsian crisis demonstrated vulnerability of Asian financial system and lack of global lender of last resortCrisis demonstrated that IFIs + APEC/ASEAN not much help in stopping contagion
11
Need for Regional InstitutionSakakibara and Yamakawa (Keio 2003)
Asian institution will be countervailing force to non-Asian dominance of IFIs and increase global voice and competitionMarket fundamentalism in IFIs lack local knowledgeRegional institution can push necessary structural reforms essential for regional integration [EU institutions are strong example to transform projects into reality]If there is no credible global lender of last resort, and sole reliance on reserves is inadequate, regional cooperative solution can helpAsia needs to integrate to balance strong EU and NAFTA politically and economically
12
Consensus Building ASEAN-way
Consensus decision-making, accommodation of interest of others,
Non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbours
Enhancing political stability and neutrality
13
Benefits of Asian Bond MarketsMasahiro Kawai (ADB Institute Oct 2005)
Deep and liquid Asian bond market can solve “double mismatch problem” – currency and maturity mismatchesLocal East Asia currency bonds rose from US$356 bn in 1997 to US$1.2 trn by 2003, but only 3% of global local currency bond marketABF development initiative of EMEAP, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, APEC Finance Ministers and Asia Cooperation DialogueBIS involvement key to technical cooperation
14
ABF1 & 2
ABF1, June 2003 – US$1 bn, invested in sovereign and quasi-sovereign USD bonds issued by 8 members (exc. JP, AU & NZ)ABF2, Dec 2004 – US$2 bn, Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) investing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign local currency bond funds issued by 8 membersFund of Bond Funds with 8 country sub funds, open to investment by public4 ASEAN+3 working groups working on new securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee mechanisms, fx transactions and settlement issues, rating systems.
15
Financial Integration challenges
No mechanism to involve regulators in regional integration issues [securities regulators not involved in ABF1 & 2]Unintentional barriers against each other stronger than against non-Asian financial firms [e.g. Irish bonds and Luxembourg mutual funds can trade anywhere in Asia, but not Asian bonds and Asian registered mutual funds]IOSCO standards exist, but APRC still trying to devise implementation strategy, shortage of fundingASEAN beginning to look at exchange cooperation and market integration issues, with ministerial working groups set up.
16
Asian Bond Corporation (Beyond ABF)Prof. Taka Ito (Euro 50 Group, Jun 2003)
Asian Basket Currency (ABC) initiative - Asian currencies issue local currency bonds. Asian Bond Corporation would buy these bonds, funded by ABC bonds. Japanese investors would like regional basket bonds because of yieldAs ABC moves forward, introduction of ACU would be more feasible.Outside currency share in ACU basket would be reduced and Asian currency share would be increased.
17
Asian Monetary Institute as precursor to AMFK. Fukushima (NRI, Feb 2004)
Functions of AMIProvide intellectual infrastructure for ASEAN+3 cooperation
Study and make proposals for financial cooperation
Educate public and disseminate information
Hub of a network
Eventual creation of Asian Lender of Last Resort (Japan willing to take that role)
18
What Next? 6 Degrees of Separation
Sharing of InformationArrangements to lend moneyImproving local financial infrastructureStabilize Exchange RatesDomestic policies adjusted to meet explicit exchange rate goalsMonetary union – single ACU
Glenn Stevens (RBA, Oct 2005) – we are currently in steps 1-3.
19
Chinese ViewsYu Yongding (KIEP/PRI, Dec 2004)
AMF 1997 was stillborn because of lack of communication
China cannot consider serious regional monetary or financial integration until capital account is liberalized and internal financial fragility resolved
Complete liberalization of capital account should be final step of China’s economic transformation. If liberalization before financial house is put in order, the 5% swing of Chinese household saving deposits would be sufficient to trigger a currency crisis in China (Goldstein 2004)
Main function of East Asian financial architecture should include exchange of information, promoting transparency and providing rescue packages.
20
Chinese MoF/CASS studyYu Yongding (Dec. 2004)
Focus of efforts in promotion of exchange rate coordination in East Asia should shift to construction of fundamentals, while studies of coordination are continued:-
Formal and regular dialogue on exchange rate policy should be introduced ASAPRegional exchange rate stability should be jointly announced. More stable exchange rate between USD and Yen should be achieved through US-Japan bilateral effortsSet of financial integration arrangements and domestic financial reform plans can be introduced e.g. ABFRegional investment bank can be introducedEstablishing ACU would be ultimate goal, but this implies that East Asians are aiming at Asian Economic Union. This is beyond economics.
21
Hong Kong viewsTony Latter (HKIMR, Jun 2005)
Joseph Yam noted possibility of monetary union to strengthen regional financial stability (Oct 2004), but AMU not formally on agenda.
Greater regional role
Help international balance
Larger financial market
Possible costs of defense of AERM
Eliminate competitive devaluation
No capital controlsCollective discipline
Higher risk of contagionStabler prices
Loss of monetary autonomyGreater trade
Case AgainstCase For
22
Korean viewsYung Chul Park (Korea University, Jun 2003)
Liquidity arrangements under CMI cannot be taken seriously as means to fend off future crises. CMI must move towards AMF despite EU/US opposition.Two basic problems in deciding whether Asian Monetary Integration is desirable:-
No tradition of integrationist thinking in AsiaStatus of any Asian monetary integration in world economy (stumbling block or building block in global integration?)
Difficult to see China-Japan military conflict - rivalry between two will be defined by economic interests and politics will be put aside.
23
Thai viewsThirachai (Bank of Thailand, Jun 2003)
Five points:Events not leading towards monetary union from Thai point of view. Economic integration is not as tight - Asians are still more competitors than cooperative membersFinancial integration is already high, even though economic integration is not. CMI insufficient to deal with capital flows, but local bond markets will help.ABF is to get local bond markets to become viable alternative to capital flowsReal benefits of ABF will come from local currency bond issuance.
24
AMU: Next StepsTony Latter (HKIMR Jun 2005)
Should focus only on three issues:Construct operating framework for AMS as first step to AMUMake institutional preparations for Asian monetary institutionsExamine what sort of monetary regime might prevail
Three possible approachesAn “outside” currency basketA “major” currency basketAn “internal” currency basket
25
A Modular Approach to CooperationMario Arturo Ruiz Estrada (June 2005)
26
SWOT Analysis
Threats:
Continued local crises and destruction of retirement savings
Weaknesses: Fragmented markets, NPLs, lack of local skills, protectionist tendencies
Opportunities:
Third global time zone capital market – Asian currency zone
Strengths: High growth and high savings, key global time zone
27
Realistic Next Steps
Discussion cannot outrun the politicsCurrently no political will, no leadership nor widespread support for AMUCommon grounds:-
Fear of another crisisWant more say in global architectureBut in reality, Non-Asian trade still more important than intra-regional trade
Hence, more jaw-jaw and movements at the margin e.g. ABF3 or political agreement to accelerate regulatory “mutual recognition” as basis for financial integration
28
Roadblocks
Japan-China dialogue; US/EU viewsWill the Asian Lender of Last Resort please stand up?Too many internal silos and institutional rivalries [MoF, Central Banks, Financial Regulators, Local Lobbies]Private sector hardly brought into pictureNo pan-Asian NGO to play catalytic role of researching and stimulating debate [Asian Monetary Institute?]
29
Network Perspective
Three layers: Code, Infrastructure and Network BehaviourGlobal Codes are now available: Asians can implement Global Codes [e.g. Basle II, IOSCO Principles etc] through mutual assistance and mutual recognition [not harmonization]Infrastructure: Again, implementation of CPSS/G30, mutual recognition of Asian products (e.g. ETFs and ABFs) to facilitate regional marketNot clear that ACU will prove to be superior standard vs. Euro or USD. Hence, leading components of ACU basket have to be prepared to offer substantial benefits to others for links to ACU to occur.
30
Bottom-Line Assessment
Conditions for AMU are not quite ready, but financial and trade integration already proceedingAsians need to define:-
Real benefits of AMUObjectives and realistic outcomesStrategic assessments of “global fit”
Reform is a process, but for it to succeed, time has arrived to put issues on the table and to map out “process to manage the roadmap, where final destination is still not clear”.
31
Thank you. Q & A