G.R. No. 95237-38 September 13, 1991DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Facts: Petitioner is one among the more than five hundred (500) water districts existing throughout the country formed pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 768 and 1479, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973." It authorized the different local legislative bodies to form and create their respective water districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. Petitioners' argue that they are private corporations without original charter, hence they are outside the jurisdiction of respondents CSC and COA. Respondent CSC however asserts that PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of … all water districts in the country and thus come under the coverage of CSC. Henceforth, all appointments of personnel of the different local water districts in the country shall be submitted to the Commission for appropriate action.

Issue: WON water districts are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters thus under the jurisdiction of CSC and COA?

Held: Yes. The Court reiterates its ruling in Tanjay case declaring water districts government- owned or controlled corporations with original charter. That the Court already ruled that a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special law — P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.

From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision

G.R. No. 85611 April 6, 1990VICTORIANO ZAMORAS, vs.ROQUE SU

Facts: Petitioner Zamoras was employed by respondent Roque Su as overseer of the land since 1957 up to and ntil hiss termination from the service sometime in Setenber 1981. Meanwhile, Su obtained a loan from Anita Su Hortellano and that he authorized her to harvest the coconuts from his property "while the loan was outstanding". Su informed Zamoras in writing of the said loan. Su sent Zamoras a letter informing him that he was being laid-off temporarily until Su could obtain a loan from the DBP with which to pay Anita. However, Zamoras was not allowed anymore to work as overseer of the plantation. Thus Zamoras filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Zamboanga City a complaint against Roque Su, Jr. and Anita Su Hortellano for illegal termination and breach of contract with damages. The Labor Arbiter held that the dismissal of Zamoras was without just cause, hence, illegal. On Appeal, NLRC reversed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras complaint for Illegal Dimissal.

WON the petitioner was an employee or tenant of the private respondents.

Held: Yes. It is the NLRC, not the Court of Agraraian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras’ complaint for illegal dismissal since Zamora was an employee, and not a tenant of Su.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between landlord and tenant (Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January 26, 1989; Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, 142 SCRA 138).The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs. CA, 163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by himself or with the help of his household. Thus making him an employee and not a tenant of Su.

G.R. No. 79762 January 24, 1991FORTUNE CEMENT CORPORATION vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ANTONIO M. LAGDAMEO

Facts: Lagdameo is a registered stockholder of Fortune Cement Corporation (FCC for brevity). At the FCC Board of Directors' regular monthly meeting, he was elected Executive Vice-President of FCC. Some 8 years later, at subsequent regular meetings the FCC Board approved and adopted a resolution dismissing Lagdameo as Executive Vice-President of the company, effective immediately, for loss of trust and confidence. , Lagdameo filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against FCC. FCC moved to dismiss Lagdameo's complaint on the ground that his dismiss as a corporate officer is a purely intra-corporate controversy over which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Labor arbiter granted respondents motion. On Aooeal, NLRC set aside Labor Arbiter’s order. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a corporate executive vice-president for illegal dismissal, resulting from a board resolution dismissing him as such officer.

Held: No. A complaint filed by a cororate executive vice- president for illegal dismissal, resulting from a board resolution dismissing him as such officer is within the jurisdiction of the SEC, not of the NLRC. In PSBA vs. Leaño (127 SCRA 778), this Court, confronted with a similar controversy, ruled that the SEC, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction: “This is not a case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared vacant, and of Tan's not having been elected thereafter. The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking, the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist.”

The issue of the SEC's power or jurisdiction is decisive and renders unnecessary a consideration of the other questions raised by Lagdameo. Thus did this Court rule in the case of Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission (145 SCRA 211) which involved a similar situation: “It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks other reliefs which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, because a closer look at these — underpayment of salary and non-payment of living allowance — shows that they are actually part of the perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately linked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.”

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992SEAFDEC-AQD vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA

Facts: . SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country. Private Respondent Juvenal Lazaga was an employee of SEAFDEC-AQD. He was thereafter terminated due to financial constraints being experienced by the department and that he is entitled to separation benefits. Petitioner failed to pay private respondents separation pay thus a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Petitioners alleged that NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization. The Labor arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay private respondent full payment of h separation ay and other benefits. NLRC affirmed labor arbiters decision except the actual damage and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.

Issue: WO NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.

 

G.R. No. 80767 April 22, 1991BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Facts: Private respondents Fortunato C. Esquerra, Roberto O. Malaborbor, Estanislao M. Misa, Vicente N. Evangelista and Marcelino P. Garcia, had all been rank-and-file employees of petitioner Boy Scouts of the Philippines ("BSP”) The Secretary-General of petitioner BSP issued Orders addressed separately to the five (5) private respondents, informing them that they were to be transferred from the BSP Camp in Makiling to the BSP Land Grant in Asuncion, Davao del Norte. These orders however were opposed by private respondents. A complaint for illegal transfer was filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment against BSP. Private respondents continued pertinaciously to disobey the disputed transfer orders despite warning of termination of employment. BSP imposed a 5 day suspension on the 5 private respondents. Subsequently, they were ordered terminated. Private respondents amended their original complaint to include charges of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner BSP. The Labor Arbiter ordered the dismissal of private respondents' complaint for lack of merit. NLRC reversed Labor arbiter’s order.

Issue: WON the Labor Arbiter and NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

Held: No. While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of entity, combining aspects of both public and private entities, we believe that considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX. (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code. It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. It follows that the employees of petitioner BSP are embraced within the Civil Service and are accordingly governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hold that both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondents in NLRC Case No. 1637-84; neither labor agency had before it any matter which could validly have been passed upon by it in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs.HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG, SALVADOR NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO OLIVA, WILFREDO CABAÑAS & FULGENCIO LEGO

Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. The petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents. It was however dismissed. Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company. As a result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and a and decisions manded reinstatement with damages. In addition, they also instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution. The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. It was granted. On reconsideration, the complaint was reinstated, saying it was "distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts." Hence petitioners came to this Court for relief.

Issue: WON the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 149578            April 10, 2003EVELYN TOLOSA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO ASIS

Facts: Petitioner Evelyn Tolosa (hereafter EVELYN), was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa (hereafter CAPT. TOLOSA) who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc., (ASIA BULK for brevity), to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. CAPT. His contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health. During the trip he had a slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death. Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN filed a complaint before the POEA. The case was then transferred to COLE, NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. The NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter filed by petitioner. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. The allegation in the complaint determine the nature if the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the court. After carefully examining the complaint/ position paper of petitioner, the Court is convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi-delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.

While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still he based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.