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1 / 41 Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen How to Study Risk Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen University of...
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1 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
How toStudy Risk
Michael Beer & Gabe MythenUniversity of LiverpoolInstitute for Risk & Uncertainty
2 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGE & OPPORTUNITY
Research and Education in the Institute for Risk & Uncertainty
Exploration of risk in the intersection of 8 disciplines
Architecture
Engineering Environmental Sciences
Economics and Finance
Financial andActuarial Mathematics
Computer Science
Psychology
Social Sciences
Primary goalsresearch and develop new risk and uncertainty theories, methodologies andapplications (e.g. for vague and imprecise information, expert knowledge, etc.)
deliver postgraduate education and training at Master and PhD levels inRisk and Uncertainty (multi-disciplinary Master Programme and PhD projects)
provide research, consultancy and training services to Government, Businessand Industry (e.g. software, courses, consulting, tailored graduates-PhD etc.)
3 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGE & OPPORTUNITY
Research and Education in the Institute for Risk & Uncertainty
Research focus areas
uncertainty quantification and robustness assessmentmethodologies & techniques for estimation, processing, simulation,assessment of risk; tools and software for industry (COSSAN-X)
financial & economical network analysis and banking risksinvestment risks, stability and failure risk on all kinds of systems; earthquake and tsunami risk; insurance matters
communication of risktranslating the understanding of risk between disciplines, societies and authorities; high stake consequences, terrorism, disaster management
environmental risk and mitigationclimate change, droughts, floods, landslides, earthquakes; energy networks; nuclear system failure & mitigation; supply system reliability
project risks and managementrisk and uncertainty from human action and natural environment (climate change) to construction processes and operation of products
4 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Network for Uncertainty and Risk Quantification
Reliable computing,Verified numerical simulation
Computer Science
Environmental Sciences
Climate change,storms, floods, …,
load patterns
Economics
Systemic banking risks
Financial Mathematics
Investment risks
Engineering
Reliability, Robust design
Global collaboration with academic andindustrial partners: e.g. Swiss Re, Car industry, …
Generate synergy on a common mathematicaland computational basiswith different but associated application areas
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGE & OPPORTUNITY
Research and Education in the Institute for Risk & Uncertainty
5 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
GENERAL SITUATION
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
» close to reality» numerically efficient
Endeavor
numerical modeling − physical phenomena, structure, and environmentprognosis − system behavior, hazards, safety, risk, robustness,
economic and social impact, ...
Deterministic methods
deterministicstructural parameters Reality
deterministiccomputational models
Uncertainty ?
Consequences?Variability ?
Vagueness ?
Indeterminacy ?
Fluctuations ?
Imprecision ?
Ambiguity ?
6 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
SOME QUESTIONS
ofimprecise and rare data
Is thereliability analysisstill reliable ?
Is it safe ?statistical analysis
Effects on Pf ?
reliabilityanalysis
F(x)
model
Pf
~
~
set of plausible s
[Pf,l, Pf,r]imprecisionreflected in Pf
Sensitivity of Pf to imprecision ?
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
7 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
How precise will it be ?
modeling, quantification, processing, evaluation, interpretation ?
SOME QUESTIONS
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
8 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
FUZZY RANDOM VARIABLES
fuzzy realizations generated by elementary events
x(5)~
x(4)~
x(3)~
(x)
1.0
0.0
1
2
3
4
5
realizations
fuzzy numbers
x X =
random elementary events
original Xj
» real-valued random variable X that is completely enclosed in X
~
representation of X» fuzzy set of all possible originals Xj
~
random -level sets X
x(2)~
x(1)~
-discretization
X: F()~
Mathematical model
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
9 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
FUZZY PROBABILITIES IN RELIABILITY ANALYSES
structural parametersFailure probabilityFuzzy parameters
X~
acceptable Pf
Pf0
i
µ(x)
1
x
Pf
~
probabilistic model parameters
acceptableparameter interval
sensitivityof Pf w.r.t. x
0
i
µ(Pf)
1
mapping
X~
Pf
~
coarse specifications of design parameters & probabilistic models
attention to / exclude model options leading to large imprecision of Pf
acceptable imprecision of parameters & probabilistic models
indications to collect additional information
definition of quality requirements robust design
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
10 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
EXAMPLE 1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Fixed jacket platformimprecision in the models for» wave, drag and ice loads» wind load» corrosion» joints of tubular members» foundation» possible damage
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
11 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
EXAMPLE 1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Probabilistic model (After R.E. Melchers)
» c(t,E) corrosion depth» f(t,E) mean value function» b(t,E) bias function» (t,E) uncertainty function (zero mean Gaussian white noise)» E collection of environmental and material parameters
c t E b t E f t E t E, , , ,
f(t,E)b(t,E)
Modeling ?
(time-dependent corrosion depth, uniform)
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
12 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
EXAMPLE 1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
dimensions» height: 142 m» top: 27 X 54 m» bottom: 56 X 70 m
Monte Carlo simulation with importance sampling and response surface approximation
loads, environment» T = 15C, t = 5 a» random: wave height, current, yield stress, and corrosion depth c(t,E)» beta distribution / interval for b(.) [0.8,1.6]
Reliability analysis
Failure probability
7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Beta (q=r=1)
Beta (q=r=2)
Interval
Pf (×10-7)
9.499.60 9.73
7.0 8.0 9.0 Pf [107]
9.739.499.60beta, CI
beta, CIIinterval
b(.) = 1.0
Fixed jacket platform
Nb = 114Nb = 2000
NPf = 5000
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
13 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
EXAMPLE 2 COLLAPSE SIMULATION
fuzzy random variables» material behavior
fuzzy stochastic structuralanalysis
» Monte Carlo simulation with response surface approximation
σ
εεuε2ε1
σ2
σ1
f(σ1)~
f(ε2)~
f(εu)~
fuzzy random function
X(σ1, ε2, εu)~
fuzzy probability distribution
function F(t) for failure time~
t = τ, criticalfailure time
t0
1P(t<τ)~
(P(t<τ))
Controlled demolition of a store house
(DFG Research Unit 500)
Risk & Uncertainty in Engineering
14 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
RESUMÉ
How to study risk
rapidly growing dimension and complexity of problems
need for a change in strategy to approach risk
Multi-disciplinary challenge & opportunity
key is multi-disciplinary communication & collaboration
great opportunitiesand mutual benefits
small effort
Let’s contributeto the evolution of
research approaches.
15 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
.... The Second Half
Policy Impacts of the Turn to Risk
Risk as a Technology of Control
Limits to Risk in the Policy Arena
Example: Counter Radicalisation
16 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Uses and Abuses of Risk
Tracing the Risk Turn
Political Discourse
Media Representation
Theoretical Application
Policy Formation
Ideology and Power
17 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Recent Research
Impacts of Counter-Terrorism Policies on Muslim Minority Groups
Mythen, G. (2012) ‘Contesting the Third Space? Identity and Resistance Amongst Young British Pakistanis’ British Journal of Sociology, 63(3)
Mythen, G., Walklate, S. and Khan, F. (2012) ‘Why Should We Have to Prove we’re Alright?’ Counter-Terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities’, Sociology, 46(4)
Mythen, G. (2012) ‘Who Speaks for Us?’ Counter-terrorism, collective attribution and the problem of voice’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3): 1-16.
18 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Present Research (with Walklate and Peatfield)
Counter-Radicalisation: Discourses, Evidence and Elisions
Which discourses of risk are present in political debates about radicalisation?
Who is thought to be at risk from radicalisation and why?Which risk-based strategies are utilised in policy to counter radicalisation?How reliable is the evidence surrounding the process of radicalisation?
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Managing Risk: Context
Nichtwissen
Imperfect Knowledge
Centrality of Terrorist Risk
Combating Terrorism
Pre-emptive Interventions
20 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
‘The ultimate deadlock of risk society ... resides in the gap between knowledge and decision: there is no one who really knows the global outcome - at the level of positive knowledge, the situation is radically ‘undecideable’ - but we none the less have to decide ... so risk society is provoking an obscene gamble, a kind of ironic reversal of predestination: I am accountable for decisions which I was forced to make without proper knowledge of the situation’
(Beck, 1999:
78)
21 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
David Cameron (2010): Munich Security Conference
‘The biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens... we should acknowledge that this threat comes in Europe overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse, warped interpretation of Islam, and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens’.
22 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Combating Terrorism
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Pre-emptive Interventions
Detention Without ChargeControl OrdersSection 44 and Stop Search PowersGlorification of Terrorism
24 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
The Terrorist as Tabula Rasa?
Vulnerable? Naive?Marginalized?
Neuropathological?Anomic? Brain-washed?
25 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
The Problem of Radicalisation
Axial in Security Policy
Imprecise Definition
Stakeholders and Turf-markers
An Industrial Pursuit?
26 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Counter Radicalisation Industry?
‘Today, counter-radicalisation is a career, as young scholars enter the mini-industry of national security think-tanks, terrorism studies departments, law enforcement counterterrorism units and intelligence services to work on modelling radicalisation’
(Kundnani, 2012: 7)
27 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Imprecise Definition
‘Radicalisation is the process of increasing readiness to pursue changes - possibly by undemocratic means - and to encourage others to do so’
(Dutch General Intelligence Service, 2007)
28 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Explaining Radicalisation
An Ideological Process
(Silber and Bhatt)* A Misguided Religious Cause
(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman)* A Psycho-Social Condition (Laqueur) An Assumed Identity (Wiktorowicz)
29 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Sources of Evidence
Classified Reports and Intelligence Services Data
Court Data Interviews with Radical
Activists, Convicted Terrorists and ‘de-radicalized’ Individuals
30 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Silber and Bhatt (2007)
31 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Radicalisation: Theological Cause
Process of Incubation
Influence of Charismatic Leader(s)
Acceptance of Islamist Ideology
Exposure to Jihadi Propaganda
Convicted to Need for Violence (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009)
32 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Risk Modelling Radicalisation?
‘If a set of religious beliefs can be identified that terrorists share with a wider group of radicals, but which ‘moderate’ Muslims reject, then a model can be developed in which such beliefs are seen as ‘indicators’ of radicalisation, a point along a pathway to becoming a terrorist’.
(Kundnani, 2012: 11)
33 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Preventing Violent Extremism
A ‘Hearts and Minds’ Approach?
Building Partnerships
Challenging Radicalism
Identifying ‘at risk’ Individuals
Early Intervention
34 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
The Channel Project
Teachers, Youth Workers, Health ProfessionalsPreventing ‘Recruitment’?1120 Vulnerable Individuals: 90% MuslimsSurveying Suspect PopulationsThe ‘biggest spying programme in Britain in modern times’ ?
35 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Problems and Issues
Industry Without Evidence? Merged Assumptions: What Goes
on Before the Bombs Go Off?Illusion of UnderstandingEmphasis on Theological
ContortionsFixation with Muslim Extremism*
36 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Unknowable or Overlooked?
37 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Elephants in the Room?
Western Imperialism
Neo-Colonialism
Foreign Policy
Military Interventions
Racism, Discrimination and
Inequality
38 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Siddique Khan: Martyrdom Video‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation’.
39 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
UK ICM Poll (2006): British Muslims
One fifth of respondents had ‘some sympathy with the feelings and motives of those that carried out the London attacks’
Representative of the Views of 350,000 British Muslims
Conflating ‘Radical’ Views and Violent Methods?
40 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Conclusions
Primary Empirical Foundation
Policy Based Evidence Making?
Climate of Suspicion
Restricting Expression
Iatrogenic Policy Making*
41 / 41Michael Beer & Gabe Mythen
Risk Reduction or Risk Production?
‘The question of whether anti-terrorism laws have in themselves become a significant factor in violent radicalisation in Europe remains an open question – a question with obvious policy implications’
(Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010: 800).