Lecture 11 Multinationals and International Capital Movements Econ 340.
1 © 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited Christopher Michael Trent University...
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Transcript of 1 © 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited Christopher Michael Trent University...
1© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Christopher MichaelTrent University
Managerial Economics – Econ 340Lecture 8
Price and Output Determination:
Oligopoly
2© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Topics
• Cournot Oligopoly
• Collusion versus Competition
• Price Leadership
• Kinked Demand Curve
• Oligopolistic Rivalry and Game Theory
3© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Overview • Oligopolistic Market Structures
» Few Firms• Consequently, each firm must consider the reaction of rivals to
price, production, or product decisions• These reactions are interrelated
» Heterogeneous or Homogeneous Products
• Example -- athletic shoe market» Nike has 47% of market» Reebok has 16% » Adidas has 7%
4© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Nokia’s Challenge in Cell Phones
• The market shares of oligopolists change. In 1998, the market leader in cell phones was Motorola with 25% market share and Nokia second with 20%
• In 2002, leadership reversed: Nokia held 37% of the market and Motorola 17%
• However, technology in phones is changing, bringing wireless web, photos, and other high-speed G3 technologies
• Entry of other firms and new products, such as Dell, Palm, NEC and Panasonic pose threats to Nokia’s profit margins
• Nokia must decide whether or not to invest heavily in the 3G technology for the future.
• Being a leader in a oligopoly does not mean that you remain the leader for long.
5© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
The Cournot Oligopoly
• Models vary depending on assumptions of actions of rivals to pricing and output decisions.
• Augustin Cournot (1838) created a model that is the basis of Competition Policy.» Relatively simple assumption: ignore the
interdependency with rivals» This makes the math easy
Cournot
6© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
A Numerical Example:Competition, Monopoly, and Cournot Oligopoly
• IN COMPETITION» P = MC, so 950 - Q = 50
» PC = $50 and QM = 900
• IN MONOPOLY» MR = MC, so 950 -2Q = 50
» QM = 450 so
» PM = 950 - 450 = $500
• IN DUOPOLY
» Let Q = q1 + q2
D
PM
Pcournot
PC
QM QCournot QC
450 600 900
$500
$350
$50
Let: P = 950 - Q and MC =50
7© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Cournot Solution: Case of 2 Firms (Duopoly)
• Assume each firm maximizes profit
• Assume each firm believes the other will NOT change output as they change output.» The so-called: Cournot Assumption
• Find where each firm sets MR = MC
8© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Let Q Q = q1 + q2
P = 950 - Q = 950 - q1- q2 and MC = 50
TR1 = Pq1= (950- q1-q2)q1 =950q1 - q12 - q1q2
and TR2 = Pq2= (950- q1-q2)q2 =950q2 - q2q1 - q2
2
Set MR1= MC & MR2= MC
950 -2q1 - q2 = 50
950 - q1 - 2q2 = 50
2 equations &2 unknowns
9© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
With 2 Equations & 2 Unknowns: Solve for Output
950 -2q1 - q2 = 950 - q1 - 2q2
So, q2 = q1 Then plug this into the demand equation
we find:
950 - 2q1 - q1 = 950 - 3q1 = 50.
Therefore q1 = 300 and Q = 600
The price is: P = 950 - 600 = $350P Q
Competition 50 900Cournot 350 600Monopoly 500 450
Cournot’sanswer is
between theother two.
10© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
N-Firm Cournot Model• For 3 firms with linear demand and
cost functions:
» Q = q 1 + q 2 + q 3
» In linear demand and cost models, the solution is higher output and lower price
QCournot = { N / (N+1) }QCompetition
QC
N
N
PC
THEREFORE, Increasing the Number of Firms increases competition. This is the historical basis for Competition Policy
11© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Example: Cournot as N Increases
• If N = 3 Triopoly
• P = 950 - Q & MC=50
• Then, Q = (3/4)(900)• Q = 675• P =$275
• If N = 5• P = 950 - Q and MC
= 50• Then Q = (5/6)(900)• Q = 750• P = $200
N = 3 N = 5
12© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Collusion versus Competition?
• Sometimes collusion succeeds
• Sometimes forces of competition win out over collective action
• When will collusion tend to succeed?»There are six factors that influence
successful collusion as follows:
13© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
1. Number and Size Distribution of Sellers. Collusion is more successful with few firms or if there exists a dominant firm.
2. Product Heterogeneity. Collusion is more successful with products that are standardized or homogeneous
3. Cost Structures. Collusion is more successful when the costs are similar for all of the firms in the oligopoly.
4. Size and Frequency of Orders. Collusion is more successful with small, frequent orders.
5. Secrecy and Retaliation. Collusion is more successful when it is difficult to give secret price concessions.
6. Percentage of External Orders. Collusion is more successful when percentage of orders outside of the cartel is small.
Factors Affecting Likelihood of Successful Collusion
14© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Oligopolies & Incentives to Collude
When there are just a few firms, profits are enhanced if all reduce output
But each firm has incentives to “cheat” by selling more
MC MC
P
q
D
QM
incentiveto cut price
MR
Representative firm Industry
15© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Examples of Cartels • Ocean Shipping • De Beers -- diamonds• OPEC - oil cartel, with Saudi Arabia making up
33% of the group’s exports• Siemens and Thompson-CSF -- airport radar
systems• Major League Baseball
16© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
PRICE LEADERSHIP
• Barometric: One (or a few firms) sets the price
• One firm is unusually aware of changes in cost or demand conditions
• The barometer firm senses changes first, or is the first to ANNOUNCE changes in its price list
• Find barometric price leader when the conditions unsuitable to collusion & firm has good forecasting abilities or good management
B arom etric P rice L ead er D om in an t F irm P rice L ead er
17© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Dominant Firm Price Leadership
• Dominant Firm:
large market share.• No price or quantity
collusion
• Dominant Firm (L) expects the other firms (F) to follow its price and produce where
MC F = PL
DT
MC F
DL
Net Demand Curve: DL = DT - MCF
leader’sdemand
18© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
• Find leader’s demand curve, DL = (DT - MC F)
• Find where MRL = MCL
DT
MC F
DL
MRL
Graphical Approach to Dominant Firm Price Leadership
19© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
• At QL, find the leader’s price, PL
• Followers will supply the remainder of Demand: (QT - QL) = QF
D
MC F
DL
MRL
MCL
PL
QL
Graphical Approach to Dominant Firm Price Leadership
20© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
• Followers will supply the remainder of Demand: (QT - QL) = QF
D
MC F
DL
MRL
MCL
PL
QL QT
Graphical Approach to Dominant Firm Price Leadership
21© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Implications of Dominant Firm Price Leadership
• Market Share of the Dominant Firm Declines Over Time» Entry expands MC F, and Shrinks DL and MRL
• Profitability of the Dominant Firm Declines Over Time
• Market Share of the Dominant Firm is PROCYCLICAL» rises in booms, declines in recessions
TIMEprofits
22© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Numerical Example of Dominant Firm Price Leadership
Aerotek is the leader, with 6 other firms, given the following:
1. P = 10,000 – 10 QT is the market demand
2. QT = QL + QF is the sum of leader & followers
3. MCL = 100 + 3 QL and
SMCF = 50 + 2 QF
23© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
• From 2, QL = QT – QF and From 1, QT = 1,000 - 0.1P• Since followers sell at P=MC, From 3, P = 50 + 2 QF, which
rearranged to be QF = 0.5P - 25• So, QL = (1,000 - .1P) – (0.5P - 25) = 1,025 -0.6 P, which
can be rearranged to be P = 1,708.3 – 1.67 QL • MRL = 1,708.3 – 3.34 QL • And MRL = MCL where: 1,708.3 – 3.34 QL = 100 + 3QL
• The optimal quantity for Aerotek, the leader is QL 254 • P = 1,708.3 – 1.67 QL = 1,708.3 – 1.67(254) $1,284.
What is Aerotek’s Price and Quantity?
24© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve
• Belief in price rigidity founded on experience of the great depression
• Price cuts lead to everyone following» highly inelastic
• Price increases, no one follows» highly elastic
everyonefollowsprice cuts
no one follows a price increase
a kink at the price
P
25© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
A Kink Leads to Breaks in the MR Curve
• Although MC rises, the optimal price remains constant
• Expect to find price rigidity in markets with kinked demand
• QUESTION:» Where would we more
likely find KINKS and where NOT?
P
D
D
MR
MC2
MC1
26© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Oligopolistic Rivalry & Game Theory
• John von Neuman & Oskar Morgenstern—» Game Theory used to describe situations where individuals
or organizations have conflicting objectives
» Examples: pricing of a few firms, strategic arms race, advertising plans for a few firms, output decisions of an oligopoly
• Strategy—is a course of action» The PAYOFF is the outcome of the strategy.
» Listing of PAYOFFS appear in a payoff matrix.
• A Strategy Game – involves decisions with consciously interdependent behaviour of two or more participants.
27© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Two Person Game
• Each player knows the alternatives of all players
• Preferences of all players are known
• Single period game
• Each player can invade the territory of the other (Maraude) or Guard own territory
• Kahn’s payoff is given first, Randle’s payoff is second.
• Randle ranks Guard above Maraude.
• Randle has a Dominant Strategy: a decision that maximizes welfare independent of the other player’s strategy choice
• Knowing what Randle will do, Kahn decides to Guard as well.
• An Equilibrium—none of the participants can improve their payoff
ASSUMPTIONS
28© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Randle
Kahn
Guard
Maraude
Guard Maraude
Better, 1st Worst, 4th
Worse, 2nd Best, 3rd
We will get to {Guard, Guard}which is an Equilibrium
Two Person Game
29© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Six or Seven Territories?
• Sharp and Xerox compete in copiers. Payoffs for Xerox are in the lower triangle
• The payoffs depend on the number of territories in which they compete
• Sharp has a dominant strategy of 6 territories.
• What should Xerox do?• We see we get to {6, 6}
as the iterated dominant strategy.
Sharp
Xerox
6 territories 7 territories6 territories 7 territories
$40 $70 $35 $55
$30 $60 $45 $45
30© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Other Strategic Games
• These are viewed as single period, but businesses tend to be on-going, or multiple-period games
• These are two-person games, but oligopolies often represent N-person games, where N is greater than 2
• Some games are zero-sum games in that what one player wins, the other player loses, like poker
• Other games are non-zero sum games where the whole payoffs depend on strategy choices by all players.
31© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
The Prisoner’s Dilemma• Often the payoffs vary
depending on the strategy choices
• The Prisoner’s Dilemma» Two suspects are
caught and held separately
• Their strategies are either to Confess (C) or Not Confess (NC)
» a one-period game» Suspect 1 in lower triangle
(Bold Red)
• Noncooperative Solution» both confess: {C, C}
• Cooperative Solution» both do not confess {NC,NC}
• Off-diagonal represents a Double Cross
suspect 2
suspect 1
NC
C
NC C1 yr 0 yrs
15 yrs 6 yrs
1 yr 15 yrs
0 yrs 6 yrs
32© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited
Paradox?• The Prisoner’s Dilemma highlights the
situation where both parties would be best off if they cooperated
• But the logic of their situation ends up with a non-cooperative solution
• The solution to cooperation appears to be transforming a one-period game into a multiple-period game.
• The actions you take now will then have consequences in future periods.