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Motion to Dismiss, or, plead in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment; orPlead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief

The undersigned presents the following motion with respect and deference to this

Court. Sure, it may take a form that is somewhat unusual. Many attorneys craft

beautiful looking motions that are so well formatted, spellchecked, subject verb agreed,

and footnoted, yet manage to shed very little light on the issues at hand, particularly from

a legal precedent standpoint. Its kind of like looking for deep conversation with

someone who is incredibly good looking and well dressed....lso, surely there were folks

telling Matisse or !ollock or whoever that their paintings were too blurry or not e"acting

Motion to Dismiss, or, plead in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment;

or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief#

$ach Coughlin, %s&.'evada (ar 'o) *+-#+ %. *th St. /0eno, '1 2*3#Tele) 34--242##2$achCoughlin5hotmail.comttorney for 6bligor

7I' 86'%S

6bligee,

vs.

9' :00IS

6bligor.

Case 'o)C1##4;-*9ept 'o)

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enough. This pleading and slogging through >0S and m8urs to find the most on

point e"cerpts took a lot of time and effort.

Interstate %nforcement of Child Support 6rders, - m. 8ur. Trials A-*

B6riginally published in #*22. Mr. :arris will not be able to attend the :earing set for

8anuary ;th, ;# as the airfare would be prohibitive. It really is &uite touching how

much time, money and effort he e"pends to have a relationship with his * year old

daughter 'ascia. If the undersigned was Ms. 8ones, he would probably be annoyed too

that essentially, all the custodial parents child support for 'ascia is going to airlines,

however, Ms. 8ones ought remember that 'ascia, hers, and Mr. :arrisD roots were in

'ew ?ork, and firmly established, and that moving 'ascia far from the %astern seaboard

had its disadvantages, ones which Mr. 8ones has had to deal with too. :owever, 'ascia,

like the undersigned did when he commuted between 9ayton, 6hio and 0eno, 'evada

for grades 3 and A, and 7ardnerville, 'evada and 0eno 'evada for grades # through +,

will likely benefit from an upbringing that e"poses her to two vastly different regions of

our fine country, separated by a great e"panse, necessitating the sort of travel that can be

a right of passage into adulthood and fuel a young personDs desire to broaden her

horiEons.

6ne important thing to state at the outset, %"hibit - from 2 #2 ;3 is 9ana :arrisD

!etition to %stablish Custody in 'ew ?ork. It is 6bligor and the undersignedDs position

that the 6rders and Mediation greement reduced to an 6rder make clear that when Mr.

:arris is paying for the airfare for 'ascia and Ms 8ones Bduring the chaperoned portion

fo the trip for which Ms. 8ones is, by the applicable 6rder, otherwise re&uired to pay for,

in addition to 'asciaDs airfare he IS paying Ms. 8ones child support Bits just that 8udge

9oherty and the mediator set up that arrangment wherein any inability on Ms. 8onesD part

to purchase the airfare for which she is responsible would not result in preventing a

loving father from seeing his daughter, but, rather, would affect the person whose

geographic choices and income level brought about such a situation. To look at Ms.

8onesD F!ayment :istory =or 'on Custodial !arentF Bpage A of of her F7eneral


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief

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TestimonyF attached to the initiating 'otice of Intent to %nforceGMotion to Modfy Bwhy

do my pleadings that combine things like that get Fkicked back out by %fle" all the time

as Fnot being capable of being interpreted as being Dpled in the alternativeDF but the 9Ds,

apparently, do notH Thus costing me, the solo practitioner on a shoestring another hour

of time spent making ndrew the filing office clerk happyH and see that Ms. 8ones just

puts down Eeros all over the place year after year for the !ayment :istory of Mr. :arris

is pretty low. Mr. :arris has been paying and paying, often being forced to buy e"tra

e"pensive airfare because of Ms. 8onesD stubborn insistence that ensuring 'ascia doesnDt

miss a day of school here or there Bor better still, some special tutoring session is

somehow much more important than making sure 'asciaDs father is financially stable and

not crippled by the bitter, difficult whims of Ms. 8ones, who seems to delight, at times, in

costing Mr. :arris additional e"pense and aggravation. The pril -;, ;; support

6rder in the underlying custody, visitation and support case before 8udge 9oherty was

6rdered Modified by the 6ctober -, ;; Memorandum of greement B!arenting !lan

incident to a mdeiation, thereby ratified and made an 6rder of the Court. (oth parties

signed the Mediation =ace Sheet. 'either objected within #; days. MS. 86'%S :S

=60C%9 M0. :00IS I'T6 '%%9>%SS %!%'9ITS =60 :%0 C6%T% @IT: !06!S%9 S%TT>%M%'TS T:T

S!%J T6 M69I=?I'7 1ISITTI6' ISSJ (6IM 'SCI 6' T 0%T

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the child. Mother will pick up the child at the end of the visit and pay for her trip and one

return ticket for the child. If it is cheaper to buy a r6lmd trip ticket for 'ascia or for any

reason Mother is unable to pay for 'asciaDs ticket she will notify =ather thirty days

before the scheduled trip and he will arrange for the tickets. =ather will then purchase

returning tickets for 'ascia and Mother. The tickets purchased must be financially

feasible for =ather and Mother. MotherDs portion will be reimbursed to =ather by

withholding the e"act amount of the tickets from the child support obligation.F :ow the

9 has complied with its '0C! 0ule ## duty to undertake a reasonable investigation to

ascertain that the pleadings and positions it takes before this court are based in fact and

law, and how Ms. 8ones has not committed some abuse of process or perjury, is

something I am not capable of discerning here. So, what is ne"tH Is Mr. :arris going to

get a call from @elfare that says he owes him any amounts they have given Ms. 8ones,

who was able to procure such amounts from @elfare by telling them she got nothing

from Mr. :arrisH S%T 6== IS '6T '6T:I'7...It might feel like nothing, to Ms.

8ones, but it was her own choice to have a child with someone on the eastern seaboard

only to relocate with the child Band mind you, only file a custody case here in 'evada

some - months after Mr. :arris filed one in 'ew ?ork.... in a fairly underhanded

manner, the demand that Mr. :arris, the State, the 9, @elfare, and who knows who

else rearranges reality to help make the conse&uences of Ms. 8ones choice to move her

more palatable to her. >ife isnDt a >ifetime Television Movie of the @eek where

everything is completely on message and target focused to indulge all of oneDs most

coveted assumptions and security blankets.

Statute of Limitations Prolems are !ind of An "ssue, Aren#t $hey, %hen Ms&

Jones is As'ing Mr& Harris to Be Her ()n Personal *+ui'Boo's* rom, Li'e,

All $he %ay Ba' "n .//01

In proceeding to represent a client in a child support matter, counsel should

initially determine if the arrearage is collectible from a legal standpoint by checking the

local statute of limitations. Solving Statutes of >imitation !roblems, + m. 8ur. Trials

++#. Many jurisdictions allow up to three years to collect a support arrearage. >a Civ


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief+

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Code art -+*.# allows five years to file an action to recover back child support. This

applies to both >ouisiana and foreign judgments. >a Civ Code art -3-. See also 0eed v.

0eed B#*2#, >a pp +th Cir -** So d #33. In such jurisdictions, any payment over

three years in arrears would not be collectible. This problem is more pronounced if a

payee takes no action whatsoever in three years. The filing of an action under

within -;; days of partiesD dissolution, where

of childDs birth in case at hand stated that action to rebut this presumption must be

brought no later than five years after birth, where mother in case at hand brought action

after e"piration of fiveyear period following childDs birth, where subse&uent elimination


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief3

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of five4year period by change in statute of limitations did not revive motherDs action

inasmuch as action had already been barred under original limitations provision, and

where tolling provisions applicable to actions of children themselves did not apply

inasmuch as child had not been named party in case at hand. Michigan 9epDt of Social

Servs. e" rel. 9.:. v. J.S. B#**+, Mo pp 23 S@d 3*.Jurisdition of the ourt ordering payment2 $he (riginal 344J5A (rder inding

Home State Jurisdition to e in 6evada Loo's More and More Suspet and

Suseptile to Atta' 3nder 674P 8/9: due to it eing void for la' of

Jurisidtion, Prourred $hrough raud, a 7esult of 5usale 6eglet, and Based

3pon 6e)ly Disovered 5videne

F(efore any action is taken to enforce a judgment of support or to file the

judgment for record, a complete abstract of the case file should be made to determine

whether the court had proper jurisdiction.L - Initially, the court that ordered the

periodic payments must have had proper subject matter jurisdiction and it must appear

that all parties were properly notified. 7enerally, a collateral attack upon the original

judgment based on fraud, improper service, or lack of jurisdiction can be made by the

payor when the judgment of support is used as a basis for collecting an arrearage.L-2

certified copy of the judgment awarding support is re&uired in the out of state support

action, and in some jurisdictions there must also be a special authentication by the clerk

of the court. @hen the judgment is out of state, the certified copy of the judgment

should contain an acknowledgment from the clerk that the document is from the official

records.L-* Counsel should make certain to check the re&uirements of the jurisdiction in

which the judgment will be enforced. !rior to the enactment of the a pp +th Cir +;* So d #+3O Stephens

!hoto, Inc. v. Southern !ortraits, Inc. B#*2, >a pp #st Cir ++ So d ##;;. L='-*


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing BriefA

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See, for e"ample, >a 0ev Stat -3)333O >a Code Civ !roc art #-*3. See also >ewis v.

ult B#*2#, >a pp #st Cir +;# So d #3, cert den >ewis v. ult B#*2#, >a +;* So

d A#3. L='+; See, for e"ample, >a Code Civ !roc art 3+#O >a 0ev Stat #-)++#.

L='+# See, for e"ample, >a 0ev Stat #-)++#.F

Sometimes an attorney needs to harken back to great. (old, brave moments in

judicial history. >ike the time that # maverick 8udge Schumacher applied '0C! ##

sanctions to the 9. 6ffice of @ashoe County 9ist. tty. v. Second 8udicial 9ist. Court

e" rel. County of @ashoe, ##A 'ev. A*, 3 !.-d 3A B;;; . The 9 absolutely is

subject to '0C! ##, and so is any with the @ashoe County !ublic 9efenderDs 6ffice. FIn

a case brought by the district attorney to enforce a @ashington child support order in

'evada, the district court imposed '0C! ## sanctions against the district attorney for

failing to discontinue enforcement of the support order after the district courtDs previous

ruling that @ashington had continuing e"clusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the arrearage

amount.F 9istrict attorneyDs office, as a non4party in underlying proceedings to enforce

out4ofstate child support order, did not have right to appeal district courtDs order

imposing 0ule ## sanctions against the office, and thus writ of mandamus was an

available remedy. 6ffice of @ashoe County 9ist. tty. v. Second 8udicial 9ist. Court e"

rel. County of @ashoe, ;;;, 3 !.-d 3A, ##A 'ev. A*. 9istrict judge abused his

discretion in imposing K,3;; sanctions against city manager and city attorney for their

alleged failure to participate in good faith in settlement conference and, therefore,

petition for writ of mandamus to prevent district court from enforcing sanctions would

be grantedO sanctions levied did not fit purported violations at issue. City of Sparks v.

Second 8udicial 9ist. Court In and =or County of @ashoe, #**A, *; !.d #;#+, ##

'ev. *3. !>%S% I7'60% T:% =66T%0 TIT>% I' T:% =6>>6@I'7 !7%S

'ow, the undersigned is not asking ?our :onor to order sanctions against the 9, but

rather to apply this CourtDs acumen and e"pertise to this situation as it see fit. :ow the

9 can attach Mr. :arrisDs wage, making the incredible lengths and e"penses he goes to

to see his little girl during the holidays, before he even gets a hearing, is incredible. @hat



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is more incredible is the e"tent to which 7ina 8ones has failed to pay her share of the

travel e"penses. !erhaps, Ms. 8ones really needs to consider whether a '0C! A;Bb

Motino to Set side the original 1isitation and Support 6rder would be appropriate,

given some of the things the udnersigned has heard with respect to the voidability of the

original 609%0GM6TI6' T6 S:6@ C

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such supervision as the court determines are necessary to allow the custodial parent to

go to and return from his or her place of employment. . custodial parent imprisoned

for contempt pursuant to subsection # must be released from the jail if the court has

reasonable cause to believe that the custodial parent will comply with the order for the

additional visit. Cause of ction for Transfer of ChildDs Custody (ased on Custodial

!arentDs Interfer4 ence @ith 1isitation 0ights +; C6d +#O. Mack4Manley v. Manley,

# 'ev. 2+*O #-2 !.-d 33O B;;A.

%"hibit -) ;;2 >etter to 9ana :arris closing the @C9Ds internal enforcement case or

file against him, thereby implicating a hint of res judicata or something

6onresident payor2 5nforement of a support order after the payor moves toanother state has its ompliations, %here, as Here, Mr& Harris has moved from

6e) aw makes it possible to just mail a certified letter or whatever to

someone in =lorida to affect service upon them for a

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long arm jurisdiction or continuing jurisdiction.L2 @henever possible, enforcement of

the order of support in the original court is the preferred procedure. In the latter case the

judge will be familiar with the case, will have the interests of the children in mind, and

the record will disclose the factors that led to ordering the support.L* The problem with

enforcement in the court of original jurisdiction generally lies in the ability or inability to

effect notice or service of process on the nonresident payor. :owever, jurisdiction

should be no problem as long as there were initially enough contacts and proper service

when the order was issued. There are several ways by which notice to the payor may be

given. Some jurisdictions permit service by mail, others re&uire publication through an

attorney appointed ad hoc, and still others re&uire service by the payorDs local sheriff.L#;

Counsel should check the laws of the local jurisdiction to determine the proper method

of service,L## since proper notice is essential in order to have a valid judgment that will

be the basis for future collection activity. The best situation arises when the payee and

children remain in the original home state where the order of support was granted.

7enerally, this is the jurisdiction that granted the divorce and where the parents last

resided together. %ven in this case, although jurisdiction is maintained by the court, it is

still necessary to serve the payor. more difficult situation arises when both parties take

up residence outside the original jurisdiction, although if both reside in the same new

jurisdiction, it simply is necessary to make the original order e"ecutory in the new

jurisdiction. certified copy of the original decree should be filed in the new jurisdiction

either under the

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divorce rule to show cause regarding his alleged failure to make child support payments,

even though rule arose out of re&uirements of divorce decreeO rule to show cause was

separate action that husband could not have foreseen when he waived his rights in order

to receive divorce. SoldiersD and SailorsD Civil 0elief ct of #*+;, N ;;, 3;

pp.

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The payee parent usually will want to enforce the decree in her new home jurisdiction,

which may be possible if the payor has had the minimum contacts needed with the

payeeDs new home jurisdiction. =or e"ample, visitation e"ercised in the state, and other

activities by the payor may satisfy minimum contacts.L; !ractically speaking, if the

payor has no assets at the payeeDs home jurisdiction then it may be best to make the

judgment e"ecutory at the payorDs home jurisdiction. This would allow for enforcement

on assets within the jurisdiction. 6nce the jurisdictional re&uirement has been met, an

action may be filed making the judgment of the former jurisdiction e"ecutory in the new

jurisdiction.L# 'otice on the payor is essential so that he may raise any jurisdictional

issue at that time.L fter the court recogniEes the jurisdiction, then action to enforce

the judgment can begin. C

awarded wife lump sum, child support and certain property, was enforceable against wife

in Michigan under

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found in contempt of court for failing to permit her former husband to visit their two

children, trial court in Mississippi properly e"ercised jurisdiction of custody matter

pursuant to

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therefore, >ouisiana lacked jurisdiction to modify orderO mother and child continued to

live in Te"as, 6ffice of ttorney 7eneral B67 was not tribunal, and therefore,

motherDs letter to 67 to discontinue child support collection services was not written

consent filed with Te"as tribunal, father never filed written consent with Te"as tribunal

for >ouisiana to assume continuing, e"clusive jurisdiction, and >ouisianaDs version of

., -#A [email protected] 2 BTe". pp. :ouston #+th 9ist. ;#;, rehDg overruled, B8uly 2,

;#; and petition for review filed, Bug. #2, ;#;. LTop of Section L%'9 6=

S%M%'T N *.3. 8urisdiction to modify award LCumulative Supplement

C

9igest, Child Support 3;2B+. In Colorado proceeding by mother seeking increase in

child support after partiesD rkansas divorce, which awarded custody to mother, ordered

father to pay child support, and awarded father visitation, court did not err in refusing

under

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jurisdiction, where provisions of ct relate to visitation and custody only, where issue in

case at hand was solely modification of child support, and where, contrary to motherDs

contention, stipulation did not bring issue of support within scope of

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e"ercise jurisdiction in a custody and child4support action, where after the parties

divorced and child4custody decrees were entered in @yoming, mother moved to 6hio

with the children, registered the @yoming decrees, and subse&uently sought modification

of the custody and support order, but father appeared only to contest in personam

jurisdiction, arguing that he had never lived in 6hio, although he had mailed support

payments to 6hio, because mailing support payments satisfied the minimum contact test.

:ostetler v. Jennedy B#**;, @ayne Co A* 6hio pp -d **, 3*; '%d *-. Trial

court had authority to modify child support arrearages as calculated by foreign courtO by

seeking and receiving acknowledgment of foreign child support order in state courts, and

e"ercising her right to enforce that order via her contempt petition, mother subjected

herself and her support action to rules of Commonwealth. - !a.C.S.. N ;#. !feifer

v. Cutshall, ;;+ ! Super ;A, 23# .d *2- B;;+O @estDs Jey 'umber 9igest,

!risons +3;. Increase in fatherDs child support obligation was in best interest of childrenO

child began living with father, father was named conservator with right to establish

childDs primary residence, father testified amount of child support he was re&uired to pay

was reduced because he took custody of child, mother filed motion to modify the month

in which child turned eighteen, father was potentially no longer obligated to support

child once she was emancipated, so trial court could have found her emancipation was

material and substantial change of circumstances since prior order, and child support

father was ordered to pay under prior order was below guidelines for remaining two

children. 1.T.C.., =amily Code NN #3+.#3Bb, #3A.+;#BaB#B, #3A.+;Ba, b. In re

.M.@., -#- [email protected] 22 BTe". pp. 9allas ;#; See Julko v. Superior Court of

California B#*2 +-A %d d #-, *2 S Ct #A*;. L='; See 7owins v.

7owins B#*23, >a +AA So d -O Stuckey v. Stuckey B#*2-, >a pp d Cir +-+ So d

3#-. L='# See Magnolia !etroleum Co. v. :unt B#*+- -; %d #+*, A+

S Ct ;2, #3; >0 +#- Bjudgment in workersD compensation proceeding. (ut see

Thomas v. @ashington 7as >ight Co. B#*2; ++2 %d d 3, #;; S Ct

A+ Bplurality opinion possibly overruling MagnoliaO 7jellum v. (irmingham B#*2,


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief#2

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C## la 2* =d #;3A Bdistinguishing Magnolia. L=' See 7oldstein v. 7oldstein

B#*2, >a pp +th Cir +;* So d #+3O Stephens !hoto, Inc. v. Southern !ortraits, Inc.

B#*2, >a pp #st Cir ++ So d ##;;. Section -; =ootnotes) L='- See N -#.

L='+ 0egistration and enforcement of foreign support order, - m. 8ur. d,

9esertion and 'onsupport NN #+2, #+*. L='3 See, for e"ample, >a 0ev Stat -3)333O

>a Code Civ !roc #-*3. See also >ewis v. ult B#*2#, >a pp #st Cir +;# So d #3.

!ublished in the pril #**A Communi&u, the 6fficial 8ournal of The Clark County

(ar ssociation 8ackson v. 8ackson and other #**3 cases) @hat :appened to Child

Support !redictabilityH (y Charles 8. :oskin, %s&. The =ormula 6ne of the few perks

about practicing family law is that the answers to certain &uestions remain constant.

@hen a client steps into your office and asks, Fhow much will I pay Lreceive in child

supportH,F if you know the gross income, you can answer with a certain degree of

confidence. :ere in 'evada, we do not have a comple" formula, like California, which

re&uires a computer to calculate, nor is more than the non4custodial parents income

considered. :ere, the legislature provided practitioners with a simple formula for

calculating child support with very few variations. lthough the 'evada Child Support

=ormula is simple, it is not always fair. The formula does not allow for much variation

based on individual circumstances. =or e"ample, if the parents have one child, I could

respond that support would be set at eighteen percent B#2U of the non4custodial

parentDs gross monthly income with a cap of five4hundred dollars BK3;;.;; and a

minimum of one4hundred dollars BK#;;.;; per month. See '0S #3(.;;4.;2;.

lthough the Court may consider certain factors to vary the amount established through

the formula B'0S #3(.;2;B*, the variation would not be significant enough to cause

any great concern in the original estimate given to clients. If my client Ba non4custodial

parent, for e"ample earns a gross monthly income of four4thousand dollars BK+,;;;.;;,

the eighteen percent B#2U formula would result in a child support obligation of seven4

hundred and twenty dollars BK;.;; per month. :owever, that amount e"ceeds the

five4hundred dollar BK3;;.;; cap. Therefore, prior to deviating from the formula, some


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief#*

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family court judges would look to the twelve B# factors found at '0S #3(.;2;B*,

such as the cost of transportation to visit the child or health insurance being paid by the

non4custodial parent, and reduce the seven4hundred twenty dollars BK;.;; down to

the five4hundred dollar BK3;;.;; cap. 6ther courts would begin at the five4hundred

dollar BK3;;.;; cap and deviate down from there. The starting point for deviation

varied from court to court, but could be accurately predicted once the identity of the

court was learned. The variation from court to court is no longer a problem. In 7arrett

v. 7arrett, ### 'ev. dv. 6p. #;, 8uly , #**3, the Supreme Court held that the

deviation factors, set out in '0S #3(.;2;B*, should be used to make an adjustment

from the statutory cap, rather than from the guideline percentage of support Bfrom the

K3;;.;; cap, in the above e"ample, rather than the K;.;;. Such clarity made

predicting child support easier for family law practitioners. Thus, all seemed to be well

and no changes could be e"pected from the Supreme Court on this topic in the near

future Bcan you guess where this is goingH. @hen a client, upon receiving my standard

e"planation of the statutory child support formula asks, FdoesnDt it matter that the non4

custodial parent earns three4hundred thousand dollars per year,F I would respond, Fit

doesnDt matter, the K3;;.;; cap kicks in.F @hen they ask, FshouldnDt the custodial

parentDs income be considered to determine needVO once again, Fit just doesnDt matter,

only the non4custodial parentDs gross monthly income applies.F F@hat about my e"Ds new

spouse, who earns five4hundred thousand dollars a yearHVO The response is the same) Fit

just doesnDt matter.F See >ouis v. :icks, #;2 'ev. ##;, 2+- !.d 22 B#**. Simple,

rightH @hy doesnt everyone practice family law if the answers are so easyH @ell, just

when you thought there was clarity and consistency in determining child support, you

find F8ackson.F 6n 9ecember #*, #**3, the 'evada Supreme Court entered a decision in

the case of 8ackson v. 8ackson, ### 'ev. dv. 6p. #2-. I first learned of 8ackson

through a newspaper article which lead me to believe that, notwithstanding the specific

language of '0S #3(.;;B#Ba, gross monthly income was now defined as not only

the income of the non4custodial parent, but also any income from a new spouse, a


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief;

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significant other, or, for that matter, a rich grandmother. fter thoroughly reviewing the

case, it became obvious that the Court was not redefining F7ross Monthly Income,F but

rather it was trying to add fairness Bin some degree to the calculation. Some additional

background is necessary to fully understand the CourtDs holding. I previously e"plained

that child support is based upon a percentage of the non4custodial parentDs gross monthly

income B#2U for one child, 3U for two children, *U for three children, etc.. The

presumption, at that point, is that child support will be the lesser of that percentage

amount or five4hundred dollars BK3;;.;; per month, per child. =rom the presumed

amount, the Court may perform some deviation based upon one or more of the twelve

B# enumerated factors found within '0S #3(.;2;B*. :owever, in order to withstand

the Supreme CourtDs scrutiny, it was necessary for the 9istrict Court to specifically

enumerate which of the twelve B# factors the Court is utiliEing and provide the facts to

support such a deviation in its order. The Supreme Court has been clear, however, that

any deviation from the statutory formula should be the e"ception, rather than the rule.

lthough 8ackson covers a few minor principles, such as the need to specifically

enumerate deviation factors and that a review of child support may occur at any time

Beven without a substantial change of circumstances, the ground breaking holding deals

with the consideration of a non4custodial parentDs cohabitantDs income in determining a

child support amount. ?es, you read that correctly. The court considered whether a

Flive4inF significant otherDs income changes the child support calculation. The =acts

0andy and Jristine 8ackson were divorced in 8une #**+. Jristine was awarded primary

physical custody of the parties daughter, Jellie. The parties stipulated to a 9ecree of

9ivorce which provided that 0andy should pay Jristine the sum of four4hundred fifty

dollars BK+3;.;; per month in child support. Si" BA months later, in 9ecember #**+,

Jristine decided to consult with an attorney where she miraculously learned of the

statutory formula re&uiring a non4custodial parent to pay eighteen percent B#2U of their

income for the support of one B# child. 7iven that 0andy earned appro"imately si"4

thousand dollars BKA,;;;.;; per month, Jristine filed a motion to modify the child


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief#

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support award and bring it in conformity with the statutory formula. Specifically applying

the formula would result in an award of one4thousand one4hundred thirty4two dollars

and si"ty4si" cents BK#,#-.AA per month. t the hearing, the 9istrict Court modified

the child support award, from the previously stipulated amount of four4hundred fifty

dollars BK+3;.;;, to one4thousand dollars BK#,;;;.;; per month. 0andy argued on

appeal that the 9istrict Court lacked standing to modify the award, given the short time

between the entry of the 9ecree and the filing of the Motion to Modify. :e also argued

that the 9istrict Court could not award more than the five4hundred dollars BK3;;.;; per

month cap, as specified in '0S #3(.;;. lthough the Supreme Court chided the

9istrict Court 8udge for failing to make specific findings of fact as the basis for the

deviation formula from five4hundred dollars BK3;;.;; dollars per month to one4

thousand dollars BK#,;;;.;; per monthO it is its analysis of '0S #3.;2;B*Bl which

results in, what I perceive to be, a change in the law. 0andy asserted that JristineDs

cohabitantDs income should be considered by the Court as part of the Frelative income of

the partiesF factor for deviation. '0S #3(.;2;B*Bl The nalysis The Supreme Court

correctly states that Fwhether a parentDs cohabitantDs income may be considered when the

9istrict Court evaluates the Drelative income of the partiesD pursuant to '0S #3(.;2;B*

for the setting of child support awards,F is a &uestion of first impression in 'evada. In

#**+, the Court addressed a similar issue in 0odgers v. 0odgers, ##; 'ev. #-;, 22

!.d A* B#**+. In 0odgers, the Supreme Court determined that Fthe statutory

definition of Dgross monthly incomeD does not include a parentDs community property

interest in a new spouseDs earnings.F Id. at #--, 22 !.d at - Bemphasis added.

Such an interpretation falls in line with the statutory definition of gross monthly income.

:owever, the Supreme Court also stated that the 9istrict Court may consider a parentDs

community interest in a new spouseDs income when evaluating the Frelative income of the

parties.F The Supreme Court distinguished 0odgers by e"plaining that the CourtDs

holding in 0odgers relied heavily upon an e"tension of community property law. In

8ackson, given the fact that 0andy was only cohabitating and not married, community



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when there are children of a previous relationshipH If they do choose to live together,

will the cohabitant refuse to share e"pensesH If the cohabitantDs income is sufficient to

maintain the entire household, thus rendering the non4custodial parentDs need to work

unnecessary, what will the Court FdeviateF fromH

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In 'evada, legal custody has to do with WbigV decisions in a childs life schooling,

religion, and elective medical procedures, for e"ample. !hysical custody has to do with

the actual time share the children spend with each of their parents. 0egardless of the

custodial arrangement, child support is purely statutory in 'evada. @hen one parent has

primary physical custody, child support from the noncustodial parent to the custodial

parent can be calculated by knowing the gross income of the noncustodial parent and

applying the appropriate percentage and statutory WcapV as contained in '0S #3(.;;.

'0S #3(.;2;B* provides deviation factors which can, but do not always, alter the

statutory presumptions of support as detailed in '0S #3(.;; Bbut see (arbagallo v.

(arbagallo, #;3 'ev. 3+A, * !.d 3- B#*2*, which states deviations from the

presumptive amount of child support under '0S #3(.;; should be the e"ception, not

the rule. Such deviations can be upward or downward. In joint physical custody cases,

there is a comparison of the parties respective child support obligations to one another

Bas calculated for each of them using '0S #3(.;;, subject to the aforementioned

deviation factors and presumptive child support obligations Bsee @right v. 6sburn, ##+

'ev. #-A, *; !.d #;# B#**2, but see also @esley v. =oster, ##* 'ev. ##;, A3 !.-d

3# B;;-, which states the imposition of the statutory WcapV under '0S #3(.;;B

occurs after comparing child support obligations one party to the other without

consideration of the presumptive WcapV. This section of the seminar will detail with the

nuts and bolts of custody and support in 'evada. 9etermining and Calculating Child

Support @here one party has primary physical custody of the child or children of the

parties, child support is paid from the noncustodial parent to the custodial parent. This is

logical and intuitive, since the party with more time with the children will incur more of

the e"penses associated with caring for the children. @here both parties share time with

the children e&ually, there is still usually a child support obligation from one party to the

other. =or some, this is counterintuitive, since an e&ual time share with the children lends

itself to the belief each will pay to support the children during their respective timeshares.

:owever, the 'evada Supreme Court has stated that a Wcomparison of obligationsV


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief3

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'0S #.-;.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXX In reviewing '0S #3(.;;, you can see why knowing a parents gross

monthly income is important. It will determine the statutory WcapV under which he or she

will fall. (y way of e"ample, if a parent earns K+,;;;.;; in gross monthly income, and is

obliged for the support of one B# child, then his Bor her child support obligation to the

other parent is calculated as follows) K+,;;;.;; ;.#2 Y K;.;; Bbut see '0S

#3(.;;, which WcapsV child support at K3-;.;; per month if you earn less than

K+,#A2.;; in gross monthly income. Therefore, the obligors child support obligation is

presumptively capped at K3-;.;; per month. # The parenthetical amounts are the

modified WcapV amounts for 8uly #, ;; through 8une -;, ;;2, pursuant to '0S

#3(.;;B-. :owever, if a parent earns K,3;;.;; in gross monthly income, for

e"ample, then child support would not be subject to the WcapV) K,3;;.;; ;.#2 Y

K+3;.;; Ban amount under the presumptive cap Interestingly, the WcapV essentially

rewards higher income earning obligors Bapparently to the detriment of the custodial

parent and the child, and inversely, punishes lower income earning obligors Bby making

them pay the full #2U of their gross monthly income for the support of one child.

:owever, this is what the 'evada >egislature has determined is fair and reasonable, and

presumptively Wmeets the needs of the childV. Matters become more cloudy when you

deal with a selfemployed individual. The reason this is so is because they are entitled to

have their gross monthly income calculated after deducting Wall legitimate business

e"pensesV Bsee '0S #3(.;;B#Ba. If you have ever seen a self employed ta" return,

Wlegitimate business e"pensesV can be substantial. '0S #3(.;;B#Ba is not clear as to

what constitutes a Wlegitimate business e"penseV, but a good rule of thumb is any

business e"pense permitted by the I0S. The Court could theoretically review each

business e"pense to determine whether or not it is legitimate, but denying a business

e"pense which is permitted by the I0S could be viewed as a violation

of the Supremacy Clause of the

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the minor children Bmost departments will again provide for an offset e&ual to one half

the cost of such transportation, but some have provided a total offset because the

custodial parents relocation has precipitated the e"pense. Most other deviation factors

are generally ignored e"cept in e"traordinary situations. 6ne such situation would be

where the mother is bedridden during some point in her pregnancy andGor ends up with

substantial e"penses associated with birth. In such a case, it would be reasonable for the

Court to 6rder reimbursement of some, if not all, of the e"penses associated with the

loss of work, prenatal care and birth e"penses Bsee '0S #3(.;;B-. Such an 6rder

would almost always be deemed WarrearsV, and a monthly payment on such arrears

would be added to any monthly child support obligation. The Courts attempt to set

payments on child support arrears in an amount at least e&ual to one percent of the

arrears amount. (ecause arrears accrue post judgment interest, payments of less than

one percent usually result in Winterest onlyV payments, and therefore do not decline, or

decline very slowly. '0S -#.-;B#BaB# provides the Court with the authority to set

payments on arrears at #;U of the current Bprospective child support obligation.

Therefore, if an obligors ongoing monthly child support obligation is K+3;.;;, the Court

could also 6rder payment of K+3.;; per month toward arrears on an ongoing monthly

basis, for a total of K+*3.;; per month. If arrears, penalties and interest have not been

satisfied before the minor child emancipates, '0S #3(.#;; also provides for monthly

child support Band scheduled arrears payments to continue beyond the emancipation of a

minor child at the same rate as previously 6rdered by the Court until arrears, penalties

and interest are e"tinguished. 9eviation factors are available regardless of whether there

is a primary custodian, or if the parties share joint physical custody. 9espite the dictates

of (arbagallo, supra, the Court is vested with a substantial amount of discretion in

awarding offsets or increases in child support under '0S #3(.;2;B*. It is helpful to

know which judges would permit what offsets, and in what amounts in order to attempt

resolution of child support issues, which should otherwise be simple mathematical

e&uations. n interesting e"ercise in the law may occur where two parents agree to a


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deviation of the statutory presumption of child support. @hereas the 'evada >egislature

has stated, rather une&uivocally, that only the deviation factors under '0S #3(.;2;B*

are available to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support under '0S

#3(.;;, what happens if two parents agree to a deviation, but claim the basis for the

deviation is something other than one listed in '0S #3(.;2;B* Bsuch as Wto ease the

tensions between the parents relative to money issuesV, or the basis for the deviation is

not specified Bi.e., just becauseH =irst, it is important to note the Courts are more than

willing to ratify an agreement between the parties in most instances Bas long as the Court

finds it is in the best interests of the child or children to do so. Second, the Court is

acutely aware that parties who agree do not appeal their own agreements, so they dont

mind ratifying parties agreements. Third, and perhaps most importantly, fit parents are

presumed to be acting in their childrens best interests Bsee !arham v. 8. 0., ++ egislature, '0S #3(.;2;B* must bow to the holding in !ierce, supra,

under the Supremacy Clause of the

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difference is what is paid by the higher income earning parent to the lower earning

parent. s an e"ample, mom earns K,3;;.;; per month, and dad earns K+,;;;.;; per

month. They have two B children, so the percentage to use is 3U Bsee '0S

#3(.;;B#BbB.

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deviation factors available under '0S #3(.;2;B* after capping child support in

appropriate joint physical custody cases which invoke the Wcap lastV rule as contained in

@esley, supra. t least one 9istrict Court 8udge has seen fit to disagree with my

analysis. s such, the safest

answer I can give relative to when to consider deviation factors in joint physical

custody cases and notably cases which invoke the Wcap lastV rule as enumerated in

@esley, supra, is it depends on the judge. s an aside, the decision in @esley, supra,

was not even necessary, since at the time of the @right, supra, decision, the

presumptive cap for child support per child was set at a flat K3;;.;; per month, and it

is clear from the calculations in the decision in @right, supra, that the 'evada

Supreme Court had imposed a Wcap lastV approach. Therein, dads child support

obligation, in the absence of a WcapV, would have been K#,3;#.;; per month B*U of

his gross monthly income for three children, and moms child support obligation was

calculated at K+A+.;; per month. Subtracting K#,3;#.;; from K+A+.;; resulted in a

child support obligation from dad to mom of K#,;-.;; per month, a number which is

K#.;; higher than if they had taken a Wcap firstV approach. pparently, no one on the

'evada Supreme Court, or arguing the @esley case, noticed that the 'evada

Supreme Court had already answered the &uestion of when to apply the statutory

WcapV in the decision in @right, supra. n additional matter to consider is the

minimum child support obligation a parent may have per child. 'evada has established

that even if a parent is unemployed Bthrough no fault of their own, child support

would still be set at a minimum of K#;;.;; per month. There are occasional hardship

deviations granted, but ordinarily, if the parent cannot pay even the K#;;.;; per

month, such obligation would accrue as arrears. 'evada also contemplates the

possibility of being willfully unemployed Bor underemployed for the purpose of

avoiding child support. '0S #3(.;2;B2 states) WIf a parent who has an obligation

for support is willfully underemployed or unemployed to avoid an obligation for

support of a child, that obligation must be based upon the parents true potential


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earning capacity.V The standard to establish willful underemployment for the purposes

of avoiding child support is Wclear and convincing evidenceV, and this evidentiary

standard applies to the party claiming willful underemployment, but the Courts are

generally la" in applying this standard, there being little sympathy for individuals who

want to avoid or minimiEe their child support obligations.

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analysis, you are now well e&uipped to calculate child support in a vast majority of

your cases, assuming the custodial arrangement has already been resolved. rrearage

Calculations and @age ssignments Calculating rrears The calculation of arrears

re&uires knowledge of the child support obligation, payment history, '0S #3(.;*3,

'0S #3(.#+;, and '0S **.;+;.

'0S #3(.;*3 !enalty for delin&uent payment of installment of obligation of

support. #. %"cept as otherwise provided in this section and '0S #3(.;# Bwhich

references the

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assignment. :owever, the obligor can re&uest a hearing to suspend the wage

assignment, and if your client obtains a wage withholding without just cause, the

judge will be very upset and most likely sanction the client severely. The actual

process of obtaining a wage assignment in general, and in this instance, a wage

assignment for child support, is &uite laborious. It re&uires the preparation of

numerous documents, including the wage assignment itself, a writ of e"ecution,

instructions to the constable, and a notice of e"ecution after judgment. The employer

receives a fee for processing the wage assignment, and the constable receives a fee for

serving the wage assignment.

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support using that states child support guidelines and calculations Bsee '0S

#-;.;A.

The 'evada Supreme Court has repeatedly reconfirmed that all adjustments to

child support awards, even those made for reasons of We&uity,V must be based on the

statutory list of factors set out in '0S #3(.;2;B*. 0ivero v. 0ivero, #3 'ev. XXX,

#A !.-d #- Bdv. 6pn. 'o. -+, ug. , ;;*O Jhaldy v. Jhaldy, ### 'ev. -+,

-A4, 2* !.d 32+, 323 B#**3. pplications of the statute to the situation of

minor children in more than one other household, however, have been few. In :oover

v. :oover, #;A 'ev. -22, *- !.d #-* B#**;, the court faced a situation in which

the non4custodial parent had two more children with a second spouse, and asked for a

downward modification from support of the earlier kids on that basis. The trial court

rejected his proposal to use the four4child rate and give the former spouse half of that

sum. ffirming, the Supreme Court stated that it was not WblindV to the public policy

issues that could be created by several additional children, and that a trial court could,

but was not re&uired to, deviate from guideline support under the statutory factor

referencing the Wresponsibility of the parents for the support of others.V (ut the Court

also stated that there was Wno power in the courts to devise a new formula based on

the number of children who happen to have been born to the paying parent.V The

Court punted the issue to the 'evada >egislature, which fumbled Bhas been silent on

the &uestion for the ensuing ; years. The ne"t year, the Court decided Scott v.

Scott, #; 'ev. 2-, 2 !.d A3+ B#**#, where, again, the non4custodian had two

children in a second marriage after divorce from the custodial parent. This time, the

district court granted a downward deviation from guideline support Bwithout

e"plaining the basis for the amount of the deviation. The Supreme Court affirmed

that decision too, and distinguished :oover on the e"plicit basis that the lower court

did not e"plain how the deviation was arrived at, other than to recite the facts of the

case before announcing the deviation. The following year, in >ewis v. :icks, #;2

'ev. ##;, 2+- !.d 22 B#**, the Court reversed a trial court downward deviation


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief-2

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in which the obligor had remarried and had another child. The lower court had

e"plained the basis of its deviation as having added the surplus income of the

noncustodial parent over his e"penses to the sum ordered in the prior support order.

gain the Supreme Court rejected the deviation as a Wsignificant departure from the

statutory scheme.V Somewhat schiEophrenically, the Court simultaneously cited with

approval studies finding that child support awards should Wbe easily determined for

ma"imum predictability and judicial economy,V and found that it had Wconsistently

found error where the trial court invented its own formula for calculating support

awards.V long the way, the Court noted the e"istence of the #** State (ar Child

Support Statute 0eview Committee 0eport, but only insofar as that 0eport had noted

the lack of legislative action to resolve the multi4family support situation. 'oting that

deviation could be based on Wprior or subse&uent family obligations,V the Court urged

trial courts to apply the factor WcautiouslyV so as not to lower child support payable in

Wmost cases,V stating that such deviation Wshould be the e"ception rather than the

rule.V (. 0% W=60MS,V !%0 S%, (9 T:I'7H The Court has been pretty

critical of lower courts attempting to divine a formulaic approach to modifying child

support in any way not e"plicitly called for by the child support statutes. See, e.g.,

>ewis v. :icks, #;2 'ev. ##;, 2+- !.d 22 B#** Brejecting lower courts

WformulaV of adding surplus over e"penses to prior support order as a Wsignificant

departure from the statutory schemeV. Somewhat ironically, however, that Court has

seen fit to create e"tra4statutory child support application formulas several times. See

@right v. 6sburn, ##+ 'ev. #-A, *; !.d #;# B#**2 Bcreating offset formula for

joint custody casesO 0ivero v. 0ivero, #3 'ev. XXX, #A !.-d #- Bdv. 6pn. 'o.

-+, ug. , ;;* Boverruling prior years comple" time4share deviation formula in

favor of adoption of @right offset formula in all joint custody cases. The Courts

thinking in this area seems to have evolved Q for the better. s e"plained in 0ivero,

the purpose of the decision was to bring consistency and predictability to child

custody and support proceedings. s the Court put it) 9istrict courts can use their


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discretion to make fair determinations in individual child custody cases. :owever, this

becomes unfair when different parties similarly situated obtain different results. Such

unreliable outcomes also make it difficult for attorneys to advise their clients and for

parties to settle their disputes. Therefore, the timeshare re&uirement that this opinion

establishes is both necessary to ensure consistent and fair application of the law and

proper under this courts precedent. (ut the Courts prior case law addressing the

multiple family situation runs directly contrary to the goals e"pressed in 0ivero,

reversing any court that e"plained how and why it was deciding as it did Band thus

making the process susceptible to being Wconsistent and predictableV and affirming

any result that remain une"plained. This is illogical, but it is the message of the prior

cases. So it is hard to predict whether any formulaic approach to child support

deviation in a multiplefamily situation would be affirmed on appeal Q it might come

down to whether the appellate court considered the formula an acceptable

WapplicationV of e"isting law, or a prohibited WdepartureV from the child support

statutes. The Courts more recent recognition of the importance of predictability and

certainty in child support matters as important policy goals would certainly be far

better served by creation of a multi4family formulaic approach than by telling judges

that they can WconsiderV the matter but not reveal how they are doing so.

C. !06!6S%9 =60MIC 0%S6>

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payable to the children of a later relationship, whether supported in the obligors

home, or by payments to another custodian. The majority of States apparently take

into consideration earlier support orders at the time a later support obligation is

determined. majority of States also deny modification to earlier support obligations

on the basis of the e"istence of children later ac&uired as dependents of an obligor.

Some States are &uite blunt in e"plaining why, usually along the lines of the

e"planation in the #*23 'evada 7overnors Commission 0eport. The Montana

guidelines, for e"ample, refuse any adjustment to an e"isting child support order based

upon subse&uent children) Creation of the new family is a voluntary act and that

parent should

decide whether or not he or she can meet e"isting support responsibilities and

provide for new ones before taking that step. . T:% %Z !06T%CTI6'

!!06C: 6n the other hand, some guidelines focus on the children, rather than

the choices of the parents who produce them, leading to very different results. The

dvisory !anel to the

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be treated very differently from one case to another, and from one court to another.

7iven the number of multiple4family cases, some guidance is called for in the interest

of consistency and predictability, since Wunreliable outcomes . . . make it difficult for

attorneys to advise their clients and for parties to settle their disputes.V 6f the various

potential resolutions, subtracting the sum of child support paid for an earlier

obligation from the WincomeV that can be used for the basis of a later child support

obligation seems to be the optimal means of weighing rights and responsibilities in

each dimension. 9istrict courts should consider adopting that approach, as the

mechanism for applying the statutory deviation factor of '0S #3(.;2;B*. nd,

hopefully, when the 'evada Supreme Court ne"t reviews such a case, it will

encourage, rather than strike down, a court decision e"plaining not just the WwhatV

but the Whow and whyV of its results.

The undersigned asks that all demands for arrearages be dismissed and that the

monthly child support obligation stay as it is considering the vast e"penditures for

'asciaDs dental work, airfare for her and a chaperone, etc. and the fact that :arris is in

a committed relationship with @endy 7ordon, who has two children of her own, and

that Ms. 8onesD own child support obligations have not changed in #; years, she

recieves public benefits and has a cohabitant in her own mother who apparently

contributes enough to 'ascia to attempt to claim her as a dependent Bfurther, a set off

should issue for the K3J I0S bill Mr. :arris is payingGhaving garnished as a result of

Ms. 8onesD creative accounting and interpretation of the Cour 8une -rd, ;;2 6rder

Bto put it charitably. lso, the undersigned should get a little something from

somebody in attorneyDs fees, to the e"tent allowable by applicable laws as Mr. :arris

certainly does not have enough disposable income to keep the undersigned in the

manner to which he wishes he was accustome, like say K,;;;, perhaps Ms. Cordisco

could chip in a little, considering she only makes about nine times as much as the

undersigned

'ame !osition (ase !ay (enefits Total !ay R (enefits 8urisdiction ?ear


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief+-

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Cordisco Jari >epori 9%!epori Cordisco 9%!epori Cordisco 9%!

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9evodo decisions... only to agoniEe over whether some deadline was blown due to

the inability to accurately guage whether ndrew the filing office clerk or ngelina

will look with disfavor on my attempts to practice law and Fkick back outF some

pleading...

A"7MA$"(6 Pursuant to 67S .=>B&/=/

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain

the social security number of any person.

9T%9 this 8anuary ##, ;#

XGsG $ach Coughlin

$ach Coughlin, %s&.

ttorney for 9ana :arris


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief+3

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P7(( ( S57?"45

I, $ach Coughlin, declare)

6n 8anuary #;, ;#, I served the foregoing Motion to Dismiss, or, plead in

the alternative Motion for Summary Judgmentby electronically serving via efle")

J0I >%!60I C609ISC6, 9.9..@ashoe County 9istrict ttorneyDs 6fficeChild Support %nforcement 9ivision'1 (0 / -+A!6 (6 -;;2-- 0%'6, '1 2*3;4-;2-B3 2*4#;;

nd depositing a true and correct copy in the

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"nde to 5hiits

%"hibit #. Collection of emails and documentationGproof related to determining what

support payments are disputed as owing and what amounts are entitled to be applied to a

set off. Thirty4Si" B-A pages.

%"hibit ) A - ;2 6rder adopting the Mediation agreement from #; - ; in =1;34

;+*AO 'ine B* pages.

%"hibit -) ;;2 >etter to 9ana :arris closing the @C9Ds internal enforcement case or

file against him, thereby implicating a hint of res judicata or something, 6ne B# page.

%"hibit +. 2 #2 ;3 :arris !etition to %stablish Custody in 'ew ?ork) two B pages


or Plead in the Alternative Pre-Hearing Brief+

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IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTOF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

* * *))))

vs. ))))))

FAMILY COURTMOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE

(REQUIRED)

CASE NO.

DEPT. NO.

NOTICE: THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THELAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant to chapter 125, 125Bor 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.

Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X. YES NO

1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in thiscase? If yes, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do notneed to answer any other questions.

2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed tochange a final order? If yes, then continue to Question 3. Ifno, you do not need to answer any other questions.

3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only tochange the amount of child support?

4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for

reconsideration or a new trial and the motion was filedwithin 10 days of the Judges Order?

A.

IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filingdate found on the front page of the Judges Order.

Date

B. If you answered NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YESto Question 3 or 4, you are exemptfrom the $25.00 filing fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid thefiling fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25.00 fee is paid.

I affirm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.

Date: , Signature:

Print Name:

Print Address:

1 11 2012

Zach Coughlin

1422 E. 9th St. #2

Reno, NV 89512

G na Jones, o gee

Dana Harris, obligorv -

UIFSA Master WhiteUM

/s/ Zach Coughlin

1 11 12 0204 62337 374 FV11-03779-2642511 (Points

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