09 - Sensen - Human Dignity in Historical Perspective

European Journal of Political Theory

10(1) 7191

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DOI: 10.1177/1474885110386006

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E JPTArticle

Human dignity inhistorical perspective:The contemporary andtraditional paradigms

Oliver SensenTulane University, USA

Abstract

Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become increasingly prominent in

the political discourse on human rights. In United Nations documents, for instance,

human dignity is currently presented as the justification for human rights. In this paper

I shall argue that the contemporary way in which human dignity is thought to ground

human rights is very different from the way human dignity has been understood tradi-

tionally. My aim is to contrast the contemporary paradigm of dignity to a different one

that has been prominent historically from Cicero onwards. My conclusion is that if one

wants to use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannot refer to the history of

philosophy for support of this conception, and if one wants to use this history in

support, one would have to employ a different conception of dignity that uses a different

pattern of thought.

Keywords

absolute value, dignitas, human dignity, human rights, Kant, Stoic

Introduction

Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become increasingly prominentin the political discourse on human rights. To take one important example, humandignity is currently said to be the justication for human rights in United Nationsdocuments. In this paper I shall argue that the way in which human dignity is oftenthought to ground human rights as it is implied by UN documents and contem-porary sources is very dierent from the way human dignity has been understoodtraditionally. In the following I shall rst characterize the inuential contemporaryview of human dignity, using the UN documents as an illustration. I shall then

Corresponding author:

Oliver Sensen, Department of Philosophy, 105 Newcomb Hall, Tulane University, 6823 St. Charles Avenue,

New Orleans, USA

Email: [email protected]

at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on March 13, 2015ept.sagepub.comDownloaded from

introduce a dierent paradigm of dignity that has been prominent historically.I shall refer to the views of Cicero, Leo the Great, Pico della Mirandola andKant as examples of this paradigm. Finally, I shall spell out the contrast betweenwhat I call the contemporary and the traditional patterns of thought.1 My aim inthis paper is therefore to distinguish dierent patterns of thought, and illustratetheir importance in historical context.

The contemporary paradigm of dignity

In contemporary usage, dignity when it is thought to be more than a mere con-vention is often referred to as an inherent value of human beings.2 Human dignityis seen as a term with strong moral implications; in particular, it is often said thatone should respect other people because of their dignity.3 In justifying why oneshould respect others, the good (the inherent value of the individual) is seen as priorto the right (the principle that demands respect for others), and the rights of thoseaected are seen as being prior to the duty of the agent. Accordingly, Josef Seifertexpresses the contemporary view as follows:

When we speak of the dignity of human life, we mean an objective and intrinsic value.

We speak of a value and intrinsic goodness greater than, and dierent from, a modest

aesthetic value of an ornament or the intellectual value of a chess player . . .which do

not directly impose moral imperatives on us. Instead, when we speak of human dig-

nity, we speak of morally relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral

call and an obligation to respect it.4

That is, human beings possess the objective and inherent value property called dig-nity, and because of this they can make rights claims on others. Not many propo-nents of human dignity reect on the ontological status of this value. However,scholars who do, such as Seifert, consider the value to be a non-relational property,5

that is, a property that does not change according to the dierent circumstances orrelations in which a human being nds himself. The distinguishing feature of thisproperty is a moral importance: each human being has an intrinsic and objectivepreciousness.6 Dignity is said to be a value that is incommensurably higher7 thanother values (e.g. things one values for pleasure or use). This view of dignity as anontologically distinct value property is a stark form of value realism, such as onemight nd in G. E. Moore andMax Scheler.8 The way one can detect such a value isoften said to be by intuition as direct recognition. For instance, Seifert writes: Aslife, and human life, this value called dignity is an ultimate and irreducible phe-nomenon which cannot be dened properly speaking but can only be unfolded andbrought to evidence.9 Seiferts view that the inherent value property cannot bedened is based on his interpretation of G. E. Moores intuitionism.10 Not everyproponent of the contemporary paradigm of dignity holds an intuitionist epistemol-ogy, however. For instance, a number of contemporary Kantians provide argumentsfor an absolute value of human beings.11 For now it is only important to note the

72 European Journal of Political Theory 10(1)


main structure or pattern of thought characteristic of the contemporary conceptionof dignity. Today dignity is widely conceived of as an inherent value property on thebasis of which one can claim rights from others: one has rights because of onesintrinsic and objective preciousness. In justifying human rights, the good (dignity) isprior to a principle stating what is right; and human rights as entitlements whichare justied by the good are prior to the duties of the agent.

The character and importance of this contemporary conception of dignity can beillustrated by the usage of dignity in United Nations documents. In UN docu-ments human dignity is currently said to be the justication for human rights.However, there is one important limitation to using the UN documents as anexample that has to be noted at the beginning. In documents like these keyterms are deliberately kept vague, since one can only secure an agreement amongso many dierent parties at the price of a certain ambiguity.12 If one were to specifythe meaning and grounding force of human dignity, it might be at odds with someparties deeply entrenched opinions and beliefs. In this case the whole project mightfail. Accordingly, there is no explicit attempt to clarify or justify human dignity inthese documents. However, the language that is used is perfectly in line with thecontemporary paradigm, and can to this extent be used as an illustration: The twoUN Covenants state that human rights derive from an inherent dignity of thehuman person, and the UN Charter links dignity and worth.

In 1947, in the wake of the Second World War and only two years after thefounding Charter of the United Nations, the decision was made to draft anInternational Bill of Rights. This Bill was intended to serve as the basis of free-dom, justice and world peace, and it was to consist of three parts: a non-bindingdeclaration of a general nature, a convention of more limited scope and a docu-ment of methods of implementation.13 Human dignity plays an important role inall of these UN documents: the founding Charter of 1945, the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two Covenants on Rights, draftedin 1966.14 In all of these documents human dignity is central to justifying humanrights, or is explicitly said to be the basis for them.

As scholars point out,15 the role of dignity as the basis for human rights is notunambiguous in the 1945 Charter and 1948 Declaration, as dignity and rightsare listed in them side by side. However, the view of dignity as the ground of rightsis made explicit in the Covenants of 1966.

The Introduction to the founding Charter of the UN (1945) reads:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to rearm faith in fundamental

human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of

men and women and of nations large and small . . . and for these aims . . . have resolved

to combine our eorts to accomplish these aims.16

In this document human rights and dignity are listed together, but neither of themis said to depend on the other; dignity is more closely associated with the worth ofthe human person.

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Similarly, the rst sentence of the Preamble of the UN Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (1948) places rights and dignity side by side:

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of

all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the

world . . . now therefore the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of

Human Rights . . .17

So, in both the 1945 and 1948 documents, human dignity is presentedhand in hand with rights, implying an important connection between them,but dignity is not yet made the explicit basis for rights. However, in the 1948Declaration dignity is already strengthened in its importance, as it is now namedbefore rights.

It is also noteworthy that the framers of the 1948 Declaration had more con-dence about the existence of human dignity.18 Whereas the parties to the 1945Charter express their faith in dignity, the members to the Declaration present dig-nity as an inherent fact or property that can be recognized. As I have indicated,this way of conceiving of dignity suggests that human beings are equipped withdignity as a distinct (value19) property, in virtue of which one is justied in demand-ing ones rights from others. The Declaration, though, does not give an account ofwhat this inherent (value) property is, nor of how one is able to know or recog-nize it.

The two Covenants on rights adopted in 1966, the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights, give human dignity an even more important role. Their pre-ambles explicitly state that dignity is the basis for human rights. Both Covenantsbegin their preamble with these words (my emphasis):

The States Parties to the present Covenant,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the

United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable

rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and

peace in the world,

Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person . . . ,

Agree upon the following articles: . . .20

Accordingly, in both Covenants human dignity is presented as the main foundation of

rights: rights derive from inherent dignity. The Covenants are more important than

the 1948 Declaration insofar as the Declaration is a non-binding statement of intent,21

while the Covenants put some requirements on their parties even if they include no

sanctions.22



To sum up, UN documents help to show that human dignity is of prime impor-tance for discussion of human rights. Since the UN Covenants human dignity ispresented as the justication for human rights. Human dignity is associated withworth and said to be inherent. Although in these documents dignity is neitherdened any further nor justied, the UN documents can serve as an illustration ofthe contemporary paradigm of human dignity and its prominence. In the followingsection, I shall characterize the traditional paradigm of dignity. In Section 3 I shallthen bring out the dierences between the traditional and the contemporary para-digms of human dignity.

The traditional paradigm of human dignity

There is a historically prominent way of thinking about human dignity that isdistinct from the contemporary paradigm. Because of its prominence I shall callit the traditional paradigm of human dignity. It can be argued that this traditionalparadigm was dominant throughout the history of philosophy, and that thecontemporary paradigm virtually did not exist before the 20th century.23 My ambi-tion here is not to present a full history of ideas, but to bring out clearly thestructure of a prominent alternative conception of dignity.24 I shall then illustratethe traditional paradigm in reference to the views on human dignity of Cicero, Leothe Great, Pico della Mirandola, and Immanuel Kant four prominent thinkersspanning classical antiquity, the Christian middle ages, the Renaissance and themodern age. In doing so, the primary aim is not to provide a detailed or novelreading of the thinkers in question, but to bring to light the broad similaritiesin their views of human dignity, and to formulate the traditional paradigmmore clearly.

To begin with a brief overview: human dignity, in the traditional conception, isin the rst place the answer to the theoretical question of the place of human beingsin the universe. According to this paradigm, human beings are distinguished fromthe rest of nature in virtue of certain capacities they have, particularly reason andfreedom. The term dignity is used to express this special position or elevation.Only in a further step does human dignity gain moral relevance: through the intro-duction of a further moral premise, one is said to have a duty to realize fully onesinitial dignity.25 This second stage I shall therefore call realized dignity, and therst stage initial dignity. The traditional paradigm then uses a twofold conceptionof dignity.

The traditional paradigm of human dignity is related to an older aristocraticusage of dignity. The aristocratic usage is familiar from common parlance if, forinstance, one speaks of a dignitary or a baroness who carries herself with dignity.The aristocratic usage of dignity can be seen in the ancient Roman dignitas,26

according to which dignity is an elevated position or rank. In ancient Romedignitas was a concept of political life: it expressed the elevated position of theruling class. In the aristocratic usage dignity is not ascribed to all human beingsbut is a term of distinction; it was an aristocratic conception in that it applied only

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to a few, for instance to a consul or senator. The elevated position could be gained,lost or regained. It could be gained through the political oce, which itself could begained through merit, birth or wealth. In virtue of this rank one had certain powersand privileges, but one also had duties to behave appropriately to ones rank.

The Roman dignitas is a complicated notion that has further connotations thanrank, e.g. excellence, worthiness and esteem.27 However, the additional connota-tions are not essential to dignitas. One can have the high oce without beingexcellent, worthy, or esteemed. In the late Roman Empire there was the Notitiadignitatum, a list ranking the highest oces in the empire.28 To have dignity in thissense neither presupposes excellence, nor high esteem. One simply has to have theoce, which was given out by the emperor. The essential component is that dignityexpresses a relation, an elevated standing of something over something else.

What this paradigm therefore brings out and this will be crucial for under-standing the contrast between the contemporary and the traditional patterns ofthought is that one does not have to understand dignity as a non-relationalvalue property human beings possess. Rather dignity can merely refer to rank oran elevated position. To say that something is elevated over something else there-fore does not necessarily refer to a moral order, or an order in value. In the lateRoman empire one could have dignity without being worthy (morally or otherwise)of the oce. The sense in which something is elevated over something else willtherefore have to be specied with each usage of dignity.

Cicero

It was Cicero who used the aristocratic Roman term dignitas to express the idea ofhuman beings elevated place in the universe. He thereby universalized dignitas toapply to all human beings: All human beings have a rank or elevated position innature. His thought therefore provides a clear and important example of the tra-ditional conception of dignity, as one can see by considering his discussion of thesuperiority or dignity of human beings over animals in book 1 of De ociis.29 Inparagraphs 105 to 107 he says that animals are governed only by instinct and theirsensual pleasure, while human beings have reason. Because of this superiority itwould be unworthy of humans to live a life of pleasure:

But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how far

superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought except for

sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; but mans mind is

nurtured by study and meditation. (1. 105)30

Cicero concludes the paragraph by saying that human beings are ashamed if theyare caught in living out their pleasure. He continues:

From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man and

that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; . . .And if we will only bear in mind the



superiority and dignity (excellentia et dignitas) of our nature, we shall realize how

wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness,

and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety. (1. 106)

Since one would be ashamed if one were caught indulging in pleasure, Ciceroargues, living a life of pleasure is unworthy of the elevated position humanbeings occupy. Ones superiority and elevated position demand a life in whichones lower desires are governed in accordance with reason. According toCicero, all human beings are endowed with reason:

We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were:

one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with

reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality

and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining

our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular.

(1. 107)

This is a clear example of the traditional pattern of thought. Human beings are saidto be elevated over animals in virtue of having reason. Because one is elevated overanimals, one should not behave like animals, but live a life of reason. Cicerosderivation of duty from the fact that one possesses reason is implicitly based upon ateleological premise: nature has given one reason, and one should act according tonature. Therefore, the superiority or elevation of human beings over animals is atrst only a factual description: human beings possess the capacity for reason, whileanimals do not (cf. 1. 13). It is only by adding a further premise that this fact yieldsan obligation (even if Cicero did not introduce them as two separate premises, theyare logically distinguishable). It is because nature gave one the end of self-controland restraint that one should act this way: nature has endowed us with the role ofsteadfastness, restraint, self-control, and modesty (1. 98).31 As to the reason whyone should behave in accordance with nature, Cicero claims that it would be point-less to go against it:

It is pointless to go to war with nature and to aim at something which we cannot

achieve. This is a truth which lends greater clarity to the nature of the tting; for

nothing is tting if it ies in the face of Minerva, as the saying goes, in other words if

nature confronts and conicts with it. (1. 110)

Nature, then, circumscribes the lives open to human beings, and it pointsthem toward the life that is tting for them. That life is one that accords withthe dignity or elevation of human nature: the tting is what is consistent withmans excellence in the respect in which his nature diers from all other livingcreatures (1. 96).

To sum up, Cicero gives a clear example of the traditional paradigm of dignity,according to which human beings are special in nature in virtue of possessing

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a certain capacity, namely reason. Being elevated, or having dignity, in this waywas said to yield a duty to behave in a way that is worthy of this dignity. ForCicero, human beings have this duty because nature endowed them with reason,and it would be pointless to go against nature. The duty to use ones reason appro-priately is justied with a teleological premise.

Leo the Great

Among Christian thinkers, an important example of the traditional twofold con-ception of dignity is found in the sermons of Pope Leo I (or St Leo the Great,reigned 44061). His sermons are thought to contain the earliest known usages ofthe Latin dignitas by a Christian thinker.32 In one famous passage, he says: Realize(agnosce), o Christian, your dignity. Once made a partaker in the divine nature,do not return to your former baseness by a life unworthy [of that dignity].33 Thispassage is still used today, as it is the opening sentence of the section on moralquestions in the Catholic Catechism.34 Leo also expresses the view that one is madea partaker in the divine nature by saying that one is created in Gods image:Wake up then, o friend, and acknowledge the dignity of your nature. Recallthat you have been made according to the image of God. 35

For Leo, then, human beings have dignity, which is to say that they are elevatedover the rest of nature in being created in the image of God.36 The respect in whichhuman beings are an image of God is that they have a soul, which is what elevatesthem above animals, and over the body more generally: let the soul, which prop-erly is constituted as ruler of the body under the direction of God, retain the dignityof its mastery.37 And this dignity, Leo says, consists in the souls capacity togovern itself independently of bodily desires by the use of reason that is, in notbeing determined by bodily desires:

If . . . the desires of the body are stronger, the soul will shamefully lose dignity proper

to it, and it will be calamitous for it to be a slave to what it ought to govern. But if the

mind, submissive to its Ruler and to heavenly gifts, tramples on the lures of earthly

indulgence and does not allow sin to reign in its own body, reason will hold a well-

ordered leadership.38

So, while Leo explicitly conceives of dignity in reference to God, he would agreewith Ciceros view that human beings are elevated over the rest of nature in virtueof reason and the capacity to rule bodily desires.39 Leo goes on to say that oneought to imitate God:

If we reect upon the beginning of our creation with faith and wisdom, dearly

beloved, we shall come to the realization that human beings have been formed accord-

ing to the image of God precisely with a view that they might imitate their Designer.

Our race has this dignity of nature, so long as the gure of divine goodness continues

to be reected in us as in a kind of mirror.40



A human being lives up to the dignity of his nature as long as he remains animage of God.

To sum up, Leo provides another example of the traditional twofold conceptionof dignity.41 According to this conception, to repeat, human beings are distin-guished in nature in virtue of having certain capacities that animals and non-rational nature lack, specically reason and freedom from the determination ofbodily desires. Because human beings are distinguished in possessing these capac-ities, it is said that they should make a proper use of them, and thus realize theirinitial dignity. Leos views are similar to Ciceros in this respect, but in Leosthought a providential God takes the place of a teleological nature.42 Leo expressesthis duty by emphasizing that God commands human beings to imitate divineworks: justly does God demand from them the imitation of himself, for hehas made them in his image and likeness .43

Pico della Mirandola

Human dignity emerged as a topic of particular prominence among Renaissancethinkers it even appears in the titles of several famous books from the period.44

This prominence is often seen as a reaction to a work called De Miseria HumaneConditionis by Cardinal Lothario dei Conti (or Segni), later Pope Innocent III, thatemphasized the misery of man.45

In the following I shall focus on the most salient of the writers treating dignity inthis period, Pico della Mirandola (146394),46 whose thought provides anotherexample of the traditional paradigm of dignity. In his Discourse on the Dignity ofMan (1486) Pico considers the place of man within the universal order or thechain of being47 that stretches from God to the lowest animals, and he concludesthat the initial dignity of man consists in having no xed place in that chain.Rather, the dignity of human beings lies in their capacity to choose their ownplace in that chain. At the beginning of his Discourse Pico relates a story of creationin which he has God address Adam as follows:

Constrained by no limits, you may determine it for yourself, according to your own

free will, in whose hand we have placed you. . . . It will be in your power to degenerate

into the lower forms of life, which are brutish; you shall have the power, according to

your souls judgement, to be reborn into the higher orders, which are divine.48

On Picos view, human beings are special because they were given freedom andreason: human beings have the freedom to live like brutes, but their souls alsopossess reason, through which they are able to grow toward the divine. What liftshuman beings up above the rest of nature is that they can choose their fate them-selves: even human beings who live like animals are unlike mere animals free tochoose a dierent course. In this passage the other elements of the traditionalconception of dignity are briey touched upon. Being placed in this special posi-tion is suggested to yield a duty to oneself to realize fully ones initial dignity.

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Realizing that dignity or falling short of it is presented as being equivalent tomoving upward or downward in the chain of being:

The Father infused in man, at birth, every sort of seed and sprouts of every kind of

life. These seeds will grow and bear their fruit in each man who will cultivate them. If

he cultivates his vegetable seeds, he will become a plant. If he cultivates his sensitive

seeds, he will become brutish. If he cultivates his rational seeds, he will become

a heavenly animal. If he cultivates his intellectual seeds, he will be an angel and

a son of God.49

Accordingly, it is through the cultivation of reason and intellect that human beingsrealize their dignity. Picos claim, in short, is that human beings are free to choosetheir path in life, and that this is what lifts human beings up above the rest ofnature, or gives them a dignity. Yet this freedom entails the chance to rise high orfall low. That is, human beings are superior to animals in the capacities they pos-sess, though not necessarily in how they choose to exercise those capacities. Thereason why one should choose to live according to ones superior capacities isexplained by Pico as follows:

It is in order for us to understand that, because we were born with the option to be

what we want to be, we must take most care of this; lest people say of us that, being

held in honor, we did not realize that we reduced ourselves to brutes and mindless

beasts of burden. Let us rather remember the saying of Asaph the prophet: You are

all gods and sons of the most high, unless abusing the most indulgent liberality of the

Father, we turn from benecial to harmful the free choice he bestowed on us. Let a

holy ambition pervade our soul, so that, not satised with mediocre things, we strive

for the loftiest and apply ourselves with all our strength to pursue them.50

That is, striving for the highest is what God intended one to do, what is to onesadvantage and what is the ambitious or excellent thing to do. Picos talk of higherand lower can therefore be explained against the background of the chain ofbeing. He does not refer to a value property as used by the contemporaryparadigm.51

To sum up, the conceptions of human dignity found in Cicero, Leo and Pico allshare the same basic structure. On the traditional paradigm dignity has two levels.First, all human beings are said to be elevated over the rest of nature in virtue ofpossessing a capacity for freedom or reason (initial dignity). Second, morality istied to a duty to realize fully ones initial dignity.

Kant

Immanuel Kant is perhaps the most famous modern philosopher to talk abouthuman dignity. My claim that Kant too adheres to the traditional paradigm ofdignity will be somewhat controversial. Kant is often read as adhering to what



I have called the contemporary paradigm. Many scholars allege that for Kant dig-nity is an absolute inner value all human beings possess, and that this value is thereason why one should respect others.52 Accordingly, people often refer to Kant asan inspiration for the contemporary conception of dignity.53 In the following myaim is not to prove that Kant does not hold the contemporary paradigm.54 My aimis merely to point out that Kants writings display the key features of the traditionalpattern of thought about human dignity.

In Kants view human beings have the prerogative over the rest of nature inpossessing free will.55 This freedom is inseparably tied up with the moral law (G, 4:4467), which appears to human beings as the Categorical Imperative (G, 4:41213). For Kant the Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of morality(G, 4: 392). It commands one to universalize ones maxims (G, 4: 421.), andthereby to respect others (G, 4: 4378).56 One fully realizes what the CategoricalImperative demands, if one follows its dictates not from any ulterior motive, butsimply because it is right (G, 4: 390). In this way, freedom and the CategoricalImperative yield normative requirements:

[T]his dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural beings [of being able to

regard himself as also giving universal laws] brings with it that he must always take

his maxims from the point of view of himself, and likewise every other rational being.

(G, 4: 438)

Kant uses dignity to refer to an elevated position or a prerogative. Repeatedly,Kant species dignity as elevated status or sublimity (Erhabenheit),57 by which hemeans the highest elevation of something over something else. Dignity expresses arelation: that something is higher in a certain respect. Kant does use the aristocraticconception of dignity, for instance, when he talks about the dignity of a regentand of a minister.58 However, more prominently, he uses the twofold traditionalparadigm of human dignity. Kant calls freedom the initial dignity,59 and distin-guishes it from morality as the fully realized dignity: The dignity of human naturelies only in its freedom . . .But the dignity of one human being (worthiness) rests onthe use of his freedom.60 This is a similar pattern to the one I have noted in Cicero,Leo and Pico. Human beings are said to be elevated over the rest of nature in virtueof a certain capacity, freedom or reason. But only if one makes a proper use ofones freedom (or reason), does one fully realize ones initial dignity:

. . . duties towards himself. These do not consist . . . in seeking to satisfy his cravings

and inclinations . . .But they consist in his being conscious that man possesses a certain

dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that it is his duty so to act

as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind.61

Like Cicero and the long tradition before him, Kant talks about dignity mainly inrelation to duties towards self. In virtue of the Categorical Imperative, one has aduty towards oneself not to violate the prerogative one has over other creatures.

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The emphasis on oneself is also present in the main section of the Groundwork inwhich Kant talks about dignity (cf. G, 4: 4346). Kant asks why a morally goodbeing abides by the Categorical Imperative (in the Formula of Autonomy).His answer is that such a person does so not for any ulterior motive, but fromthe idea of the dignity of someone who is morally good:

Reason . . . does so not for the sake of any other practical motive or any future advan-

tage but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than

that which he himself at the same time gives. (G, 4: 434)

A morally good being abides by the imperative for the sake of morality. Kant goeson to specify dignity as elevation (in other words, raised above), and says that it ismorality that is innitely raised above all price: Hence morality, and humanityinsofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity (G, 4: 435).Moral worth is raised above all relative worth, humanity is raised above the rest ofnature in virtue of being free and capable of morality: the dignity of humanityconsists just in this capacity to give universal law, though with the condition of alsobeing itself subject to this very lawgiving (G, 4: 440).

Even when Kant seems to talk about a requirement to respect the dignity ofothers, he connects dignity to duties towards the self. In the Doctrine of VirtueKantsays that [t]he respect that I have for others or that another can require fromme . . . is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings(6: 462). However, as he goes on it becomes clear that dignity is not the reasonwhy one should respect them. Rather it species what one should respect in others.Immediately after the rst quote Kant says that, just as one should strive to fullyrealize ones own dignity, so everyone else is under that duty towards oneself.Given that one should respect others, one therefore should respect this striving:

. . . just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would conict with his duty

of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of

others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical

way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. (6: 462)

The reason that one should respect others (and their striving for their own dignity)is not because they have a value property called dignity, but because it isdemanded by the Categorical Imperative: The duty of respect for my neighboris contained in the maxim not to degrade any other to a mere means to my ends(6: 450).

My aim has not been to prove that Kant does not uphold the contemporaryparadigm. He does, however, exhibit the traditional conception of dignity. In manyways, his views are similar to Ciceros. He does mention the Stoic conceptionapprovingly,62 and it has been argued convincingly that Kants Groundwork wasin great part a response to Garves edition of Ciceros De ociis.63 An importantdierence between these two thinkers, however, is that Kant uses the Categorical



Imperative as a normative premise, rather than the teleological conception ofnature Cicero employs. Apart from these (and other) dierences, there is acommon structure to the usage of dignity that has been prominent historicallyin such thinkers as Cicero, Leo, Pico and Kant. In the following, I shall focus onthe similarities, and point out three main dierences between the traditional and thecontemporary conception of dignity.

The difference between the two conceptions

There are three main respects in which the traditional conception of dignity I havesketched diers from the contemporary one. In the traditional conception (1) dig-nity is not conceived of as a non-relational value property, (2) dignity is not thebasis of rights and (3) dignity is primarily about holding oneself to a certainstandard.64

Dignity not a value

In the traditional conception, dignity refers to the special position of human beingsin the universe, which is grounded in the possession of certain capacities, not in aninherent value property. Dignity therefore expresses a relative status rather thanan intrinsic feature (even if the elevated status is based on an intrinsic feature likefreedom or reason). Some thinkers hold an underlying view that there is a hierarchywithin nature or creation. However, the special standing of human beings withinthis hierarchy is not based on the possession of a separate (non-relational) valueproperty in a strong moral realist sense. Rather, it is based on the fact that dierentkinds of beings possess dierent capacities.65

To understand this aspect of the traditional paradigm it is important to keep inmind its origin from the aristocratic conception of the Roman dignitas. A Romansenator is elevated in society by his merit, rank, wealth or esteem. While in thearistocratic conception one human being has an elevated status over others with-out referring to a non-relational value property Cicero took the conception ofdignitas and he universalized it, applying it to the status of all human beings withinnature again without invoking a non-relational value property. In the traditionalpattern of thought human beings are elevated over the rest of nature in virtue ofhaving certain capacities like reason and freedom.

Dignity does not yield rights

In the traditional conception of dignity, the prime emphasis is on duties, not onrights. The thought is not that one can make claims on others because one hasfreedom and reason. Instead, having reason or freedom is said to yield the duty tomake a proper use of ones capacities. As I have spelled out, ones duty to behave ina proper way does not immediately follow from having the capacities of reason orfreedom. Rather proponents of the traditional paradigm of dignity use a further

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premise: for instance, a teleological view that one ought to use the specic humancapacities with which nature (or God) endowed human beings, or KantsCategorical Imperative. If the traditional paradigm justies human rights in thesense of entitlements, then they are grounded on the further normative premise, noton dignity itself.

This is an important contrast to the contemporary paradigm. In the contempo-rary pattern of thought human rights are based on an inherent (value) property ofhuman beings. One can claim ones rights in pointing to ones absolute value. Thetraditional paradigm, in contrast, does not rest rights on a non-relational valueproperty of human beings. The dierence can again be illustrated with Kant. Kantgrounds rights on the Categorical Imperative:

But why is the doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of

duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have reference to duties?

The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral laws, and so all

rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral imperative, which is a prop-

osition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obliga-

tion, that is, the concept of right, can afterwards be explicated. (Doctrine of Right,

6: 239)

Kant places duties prior to rights. Someone can claim rights in reminding the agentof his or her duty to follow the Categorical Imperative. Accordingly, the innateright of each is a right to freedom that can coexist with the freedom of everyoneelse in accordance with a universal law.66 Ones freedom is only restricted by theCategorical Imperative. If another human being restricts ones freedom unlawfully,one can remind him of his duty to follow the imperative.

In the traditional paradigm it is therefore not dignity as an elevated position thatgrounds rights, but the further normative premise that is used to derive any duties,e.g. to fully realize ones initial dignity. This point is further supported by theobservation that rights in the sense of entitlements do not gure prominently inthinkers who use the traditional paradigm of dignity.67 One reason might be theperfectionism that is commonly connected with this paradigm.

Perfectionism

The third main dierence in the general structure of the traditional and the con-temporary conception of dignity is that, in the traditional pattern of thought, theprimary focus is not on the dignity of others, but on the realization of ones owndignity.68 When Cicero, Leo, Pico and Kant talk about human dignity, theyemphasize that the agent should realize his or her own initial dignity. In talkingabout human dignity, they highlight a privilege or capacity human beings havebeen given, and their emphasis is on how one should use that capacity. This empha-sis stems from an underlying perfectionism. The main concern of these four thin-kers in questions of moral philosophy is how one should perfect oneself, not how



one should treat others. For Kant, of course, the requirement to treat others alwaysas an end in itself is very important; however, he famously argues that withoutduties towards self, there would be no duties towards others:

For I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same

time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as

being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason; and in

being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one constraining myself. (Doctrine

of Virtue, 6: 41718)

For Kant it is the Categorical Imperative that obliges one to respect others.69

Without the duty to oneself to follow the imperative, there would be no obligationsto others. In short, in the traditional paradigm it is ones own realized dignity orperfection that is of prime concern.

Concluding remarks

In this paper I have argued that the traditional conception of dignity diers fun-damentally from the contemporary one that is currently prominent in UN docu-ments and other sources. The implication of this claim is not that the contemporaryparadigm is unfounded. If I am right that the contemporary pattern does not havethe support of a long history, it does not undermine the current view. To argue thiswould be to commit a genetic fallacy. Just because an idea is relatively new,70 doesnot mean it is not justied. In addition, the traditional paradigm has its own prob-lems: neither a superiority of human beings, nor teleology, nor the CategoricalImperative, nor duties towards self are widely accepted. On the other hand, theremight be an independent justication for the contemporary paradigm be it com-monly shared intuitions, or a plausible argument for an absolute value of all humanbeings.

My aim in this paper has not been to take sides. Rather I wanted to bring out more clearly than has been done before the most important features of twodierent paradigms of dignity. If I am right, the implication of the paper is adilemma: if one wants to use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannotrefer to the history of philosophy for support of this conception, and if one wantsto use the history in support, one would have to employ a conception of dignitythat uses a dierent pattern of thought.

Notes

For their helpful suggestions I would like to thank Jimmy Altham, Friedo Ricken, KathrynSensen, Franz Josef Wetz, Stephen White and two anonymous referees for this journal.1. Throughout the article I shall use pattern of thought, paradigm and conception

interchangeably.2. Accordingly, the German dictionary Duden describes dignity (Wurde) as a worth inher-

ent in human beings that commands respect (Achtung gebietender Wert, der dem

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Menschen innewohnt) (my tr.), see G. Drosdowski (ed.) (1997) Duden: Etymologie,

p. 821. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.3. Cf. e.g. Allen Wood (1998) Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature I,

Aristotelian Society Supplement 72: 189. Hardy E. Jones (1971) Kants Principle of

Personality, p. 130. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Herbert J. Paton(1947) The Categorical Imperative, p. 171. London: Hutchinson. David W. Ross(1954) Kants Ethical Theory, pp. 524. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Patrick .Hutchings (1972) Kant on Absolute Value, pp. 287, 290. Detroit, MI: Wayne State

University Press. . P. C. Lo (1987) Treating Persons as Ends., p. 165. Lanham, MD:University Press of America. Guido Lohrer (1995) Menschliche Wurde, pp. 124, 346.Freiburg: Alber.

4. Josef Seifert (1997) What is Life?, p. 97. Amsterdam: Rodopi.5. Cf. ibid. p. 98.6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.8. Cf. G. E. Moore (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Max

Scheler (1913/16) Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Berne:Francke. Not all forms of value realism postulate an ontologically distinct property.

More modest forms of realism might e.g. hold that value statements have a truth value,or that they refer to something independent of human beings, cf. Allan Gibbard (1999)Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaards Kantian Lectures, Ethics 110: 142, n. 3.

For some disadvantages of the Moore-style realism cf. John Mackie (1977) Ethics:Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1. New York: Penguin. The ontological and epistemicnature of this value might seem queer in comparison with natural objects. In addition,

one who holds this view would be powerless to argue against relativism, and from aHumean perspective it fails to give an account of how this value could be motivating.

9. Seifert (n. 4), p. 98.

10. Seifert (ibid.) explicitly refers to Moore on p. 95.11. The most prominent proponents are Christine Korsgaard (1996) Creating the Kingdom

of Ends, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen Wood (1999) KantsEthical Thought, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paul Guyer (2000)

Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.12. Cf. Mary Ann Glendon (1999) Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished

Business, American Journal of Jurisprudence 44: 10. Knut Ibsen (1990) Volkerrecht,

p. 642. Munich: Beck. Franz Josef Wetz (1998) Die Wurde der Menschen ist antastbar,pp. 756. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

13. See Matthew Craven (1995) The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

Cultural Rights, pp. 1617, 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.14. For further examples see James Griffin (2001) Discrepancies between the Best

Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International Law of Human

Rights, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 6 n. For a brief overview ofhuman dignity in international law more generally, see Jochen A. Frohwein (2002)Human Dignity in International Law, in D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds) TheConcept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, pp. 12135. The Hague:

Kluwer Law International.15. See Wetz (n. 12), p. 51; Glendon (n. 12), p. 2.16. (1946) Charter of the United Nations, p. 2. New York: United Nations Publications.



17. (1949) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. New York: United Nations

Publications.18. For an account of the history of the drafting process see Mary Ann Glendon (2001) A

World Made New. New York: Random House. Klaus Dicke (2002) The Founding

Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, inKretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 11120.

19. The UN Charter lists dignity and worth together (see above), thereby associating dignityand worth or value.

20. (1967) International Covenants on Human Rights, Preamble. New York: UnitedNations Office of Public Information.

21. Cf. Craven (n. 13), p. 7.

22. Parties of both covenants regularly write reports to the UN about measures of imple-mentation and their progress in these measures, and the relevant committees can thenmake recommendations. However, it is up to the individual states whether they heed

these recommendations. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights hastwo further control mechanisms (see Ibsen (n. 12), pp. 6479). Member States of theCovenant can complain about the progress of other members in front of the HumanRights Committee, which can ask for clarification and ultimately seek to mediate

between the two states. However, state parties first have to declare in general thatthey recognize the competence of the Committee (see articles 412, 28). In 1989 24member states out of 87 which had signed the Covenant had also recognized the

Human Rights Committee (see Ibsen (n. 12), pp. 648, 641). Additionally, in signingan Optional Protocol members to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can furtherauthorize the Human Rights Committee to accept complaints from individual citizens

about their state. The Committee will then give its views on the matter (see article 5 ofthe Optional Protocol). By 30 June 1995 83 states had signed the Optional Protocol outof 113 parties to the Covenant (see (1996) Encyclopedia of Human Rights, pp. 16723.

Washington: Taylor & Francis). The International Covenant on Economic, Social, andCultural Rights does not have these additional control mechanisms. For detailed infor-mation about the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights see Craven(n. 13). For a thorough analysis of different aspects of the Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights see the essay collection edited by Louis Henkin (1981)The International Bill of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press.

23. See Viktor Poschl (1969) Der Begriff der Wurde im antiken Rom und spater,

Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-histor-ische Klasse 3: 556. Heidelberg: Carl Winter. Wetz (n. 12), ch. 3; and Dicke (n. 18),p. 111. One exception might be G. W. F. Schillers (1787) Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3,

although he does not characterize dignity as value. Whitman and Appiah even arguethat the prominence of dignity in contemporary political documents results from what Icall the traditional paradigm, cf. James Whitman (2003) From Fascist Honour to

European Dignity , in C. Joerges and N. Ghaleigh (eds) The Darker Legacy ofEuropean Law, pp. 24366. Cambridge: Hart. Anthony Appiah (2001) GroundingHuman Rights, in A. Gutman (ed.) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p. 107.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

24. Several scholars have attempted to trace the history of the idea of human dignity; cf. e.g.Herschel Baker (1947) The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. W. Durig (1957) Dignitas, in T. Klauser

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(ed.) Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, vol. 3, pp. 102435. Stuttgart:

Hiersemann. Poschl (n. 23). Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1980) Menschenwurde inJ. Ritter and K. Grunder (eds) Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 5, pp.11247. Basel: Schwabe & Co. Kurt Bayertz (ed.) (1996) Sanctity of Life and Human

Dignity. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer. Maximilian Forschner (1998) Marktpreis undWurde oder vom Adel der menschlichen Natur, in H. Kossler (ed.) Die Wurde desMenschen, pp. 3359. Nurnberg: Universitatsverbund Erlangen-Nurnberg e.V. Wetz(n. 12), ch. 2.

25. However, I do not mean to suggest that all of the thinkers who follow the traditionalparadigm of dignity conceived of these as two separate stages.

26. Cf. Helmut Wegehaupt (1932) Die Bedeutung und Anwendung von dignitas in den

Schriften der republikanischen Zeit. Ohlau: Eschenhagen. Hans Drexler (1944)Dignitas, in R. Klein (ed.) Das Staatsdenken der Romer, pp. 23155. Darmstadt:Wissenschaftlicher Buchgesellschaft. Poschl (n. 23). Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988) Die

Menschenwurde auf ihrem Weg von der Antike bis heute, Humanistische Bildung 12:95107. For a sociological description of Roman society cf. G. Alfoldy (1986) Dieromische Gesellschaft. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. The archaic conception has a lot incommon with Aristotles conception of magnanimity (cf. his Nicomachean Ethics, bk

4, 1123b1125a). The Roman dignitas has many facets. Apart from (1) being excellent orworthy, dignitas could also refer to (2) the appearance of excellence, (3) standing oresteem by others, (4) a particular rank or office, cf. P. G. W. Glare (ed.) (1996) Oxford

Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. For an etymology of the Latin dignitas cf.Wegehaupt (n. 26), pp. 5, 9, and Drexler (n. 26), p. 233.

27. Again, cf. the Oxford Latin Dictionary (n. 26).

28. Poschl (n. 23), p. 36.29. Scholars believe that this is the earliest passage in which the Latin term dignitas is used

to refer to all human beings, see Poschl (n. 23), pp. 3741; Wetz (n. 12), p. 20; and

Hubert Cancik (2002) Dignity of Man and Persona in Stoic Anthropology: SomeRemarks on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105107, in Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 1940.While a similar pattern of thought was common in Greek philosophy, there was nodirect equivalent for the Latin dignitas in the Greek language, cf. Poschl (n. 23),

pp. 910. For a thorough commentary on De officiis cf. Andrew Dyck (1996)A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

30. Cicero, De Officiis, tr. W. Miller (1913). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

31. Cf. also 1. 100: If we take nature as our guide, we shall never go astray; or 1. 103:Nature has not fashioned us to behave as if we have been created for fun and games.Rather, we are moulded for self-discipline and for more sober and important pursuits.

32. See Poschl (n. 23), pp. 489.33. (1996) Sermons, tr. J. P. Freeland and A. J. Conway, 21, ch. 3, p. 79. Washington,

DC: Catholic University of America Press. To the following cf. Poschl (n. 23),

pp. 4250; Durig (n. 24); and Richard Bruch (1981) Die Wurde des Menschen in derpartistischen und scholastischen Tradition, in W. Gruber (ed.) Wissen Glaube Politik, pp. 13954. Graz: Styria.

34. Cf. (1999) Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1691. London: Geoffrey Chapman.

35. Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114). Cf. Sermons, 94, ch. 2 (p. 392): People shouldacknowledge their own dignity, and see themselves as made in the image andlikeness of their Creator. The idea that human beings are created in the image of



God is likely meant to be a reference to the Bible; cf. Genesis 1: 26, cf. 1: 278, and

Psalms 8: 510.36. Some scholars have claimed that this is a general feature of Christian views on dignity;

cf. Poschl (n. 23), p. 42; and Bruch (n. 33), p. 140.

37. Sermons, 42, ch. 2 (p. 180).38. Sermons, 39, ch. 2 (p. 1678).39. Cf. Poschl (n. 23), pp. 44, 46; Bruch (n. 33), p. 141. The Catechism of the Catholic Church

(n. 34) indicates that this is still the view of the Catholic Church today: By virtue of his

soul and his spiritual powers of intellect and will, man is endowed with freedom, anoutstanding manifestation of the divine image (1705, cf. 1934, 1730, 306). In addi-tion, Leo holds the view that human beings are an image of God in being able to do

justice and be merciful, see Sermons, 95, ch. 7 (pp. 3989).40. Sermons, 12, ch. 1 (p. 49).41. Some scholars argue that the twofold structure is a general feature of Christian thinkers;

cf. Bruch (n. 33), pp. 1489; and Glendon (n. 12), pp. 1314.42. However, in De Legibus 1. 24 Cicero too holds that the soul was created by God, and

that humans have a likeness with God in being virtuous. Cf. Poschl (n. 23), p. 42. A cleardifference is that Leo holds that the dignity of humans was forfeited in Adams fall and

restored in Jesus death: This nature, although it had been corrupted in Adam, hasnevertheless been re-fashioned in Christ. Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114), cf. 25, ch. 5(pp. 1023), 72, ch. 2 (p. 316). Poschl (n. 23), p. 48 holds that this view was a general

feature among Christian thinkers.43. Sermons, 45, ch. 2 (p. 194).44. Apart from Picos discourse De Dignitate Hominis, cf. also Bartolommeo Fazio (1450)

De Excellentia et Praestantia Hominis, and Giannozzo Manetti (1452) De Dignitate etExcellentia Hominis.

45. Cf. e.g. Bernard Murchland (1966) Two Views of Man, p. vi. New York: Frederick

Ungar. The prominence is probably a reaction to a similar emphasis in the ChristianMiddle Ages more generally, cf. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 2. 2. 9.

46. For a brief biography see Paul O. Kristeller (1964) Eight Philosophers of the ItalianRenaissance, ch. 4. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

47. Cf. Discourse, 3.6. Pico refers to the place of man in universi serie. Translations of Picoare taken from the joint research project by Brown and Bologna Universities on theDiscourse on the Dignity of Man, see: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/

Italian_Studies/pico/index.html. For the idea of the chain of being more generally cf.Arthur Lovejoy (1961) The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea.New York: Harper & Row.

48. Discourse, 4.20 and 23.49. Ibid., 6.2830. For similar themes in Leo cf. his Sermons, 24, ch. 2, 71, ch. 2, and 73, ch. 4.50. Ibid., 10.4850.

51. While the claim that one should strive for a higher level of being can be expressed interms of being better or having more worth, this does not imply a separate valueproperty in the sense of G. E. Moore or Max Scheler (n. 8). Ontologically, a higher levelonly has more being, cf. Friedo Ricken (1998) Aristotelische Interpretationen zum

Traktat De passionibus animae (Summa theologiae I II 2248) des Thomas vonAquin, in M. Thurner (ed.) Die Einheit der Person, pp. 13740. Stuttgart:Kohlhammer. Poschl traces this view back to Plotinus Enneads, cf. Poschl (n. 23), p. 51.

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52. Cf. e.g. Paton (n. 3), pp. 171, 189; Ross (n. 3), pp. 524; Lohrer (n. 3), pp. 124, 3444;

and Wood (n. 3), p. 189; Wood (n. 11), p. 115; Dieter Schonecker and Allen Wood(2003) Immanuel Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein einfuhrenderKommentar, p. 142. Paderborn: Schoningh.

53. See, for instance, Alan Gewirth (1982) Human Rights: Essays on Justification andApplications, p. 28. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bayertz (n. 25); Seifert(n. 4), p. 98; Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14).

54. I have argued for this extensively in my (2009) Kants Conception of Human Dignity,

Kant-Studien 100, pp. 309331. (Scholars who read Kant as adhering to the contempor-ary paradigm of human dignity often rely on a few passages. A different picture emergesif one takes all occurrences of dignity in Kants writings into account.)

55. Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (G in the following), 4: 438. Page numbers referto the Prussian Academy edition of Kants collected works: Deutsche Akademie derWissenschaften (formerly Koniglich Preuischen Akademie der Wissenschaften) (ed).

(1902ff.) Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: De Gruyter. References are to volumeno.: page no.. All translations are unless otherwise stated by Mary Gregor fromImmanuel Kant (1999) Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

56. My claim that the requirement to respect others is already implied by the requirement to

universalize ones maxim will be controversial, but is expressively stated by Kant himself:For, to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit mymaxim to the condition ofits universal validity . . . is tantamount to saying that . . . the rational being itself, must be

made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as ameans but . . . always at the sametime as an end (G, 4: 4378; my emphasis). If one universalizes ones maxim, one therebyrespects those over whom one universalizes; cf. KantsCritique of Practical Reason, 5: 87

8; and Julius Ebbinghaus (1998) Die Formeln des Kategorischen Imperativs und dieAbleitung inhaltlich bestimmter Pflichten, in his Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, p. 216.Bonn: Bouvier. Roger Sullivan (1989) Immanuel Kants Moral Theory, pp. 1935.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Onora ONeill (1989) Constructions ofReason, ch. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and my (2010) pp. 102118Dignity and the Formula of Humanity, in J. Timmermann (ed.) Kants Groundwork:A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

57. Cf. Oberservations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 2: 212, 215, 241; G, 4:425, 440; Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 71; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 435; Lectures onLogic, 9: 30. Sometimes Kant expresses this as something being below someones dig-

nity, e.g. in Critique of Pure Reason, 3: 419; Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 327; Religionwithin the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6: 113; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 327; Lectures onPedagogy, 9: 489. For a clarification of sublimity, cf. Critique of the Power of Judgment,

5: 248.58. Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 8: 344.59. The Conflict of the Faculties, 7: 073; my tr.

60. Reflection note, 6856, 19: 181; my tr.; cf. Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488. Kant hardly everbrings the two levels of dignity together. More commonly, he merely talks about oneaspect, e.g. when he talks about how reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despisesthe latter [inclinations] and can gradually become their master (G, 4: 411), or about the

esteem one has for morality and its dignity (G, 4: 4423).61. Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488, tr. A. Churton in Immanuel Kant (1899) Kant on

Education. London: Kegan Paul.



62. Cf. his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6: 57 note: These philosophers

[Stoics and others] derived their universal moral principle from the dignity of humannature, from its freedom (as an independence from the power of the inclinations), andthey could not have laid down a better or nobler principle for foundation. They then

drew the moral laws directly from reason, the sole legislator, commanding absolutelythrough its laws. And so was everything quite correctly apportioned. (Tr. A. Wood andG. di Giovanni in Immanuel Kant (1996) Religion and Rational Theology. CambridgeUniversity Press: Cambridge.)

63. See Klaus Reich (1939) Kant and Greek Ethics II, Mind, 48: 44663.64. This way of putting the differences is my own. I have, however, been greatly helped by

the works in the history of the idea of dignity mentioned earlier, cf. esp. Poschl (n. 23).

65. For instance, plants are capable of nutrition and growth; animals possess those capa-cities and also the capacity for perception and motion, and human beings possess notonly these, but also the capacity for reason and choice; cf. Aristotle, On the Soul,

414a29415a13; Plotinus, Enneads, 5. 2. 12; Ricken (n. 51), pp. 13740.66. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in

Practice, 8: 2923; cf. Doctrine of Right, 6: 230.67. Richard Tuck has argued that the concept of a right in the sense of entitlement origi-

nated in 12th-century property law, and that it had its breakthrough only in the 17thcentury, cf. his (1979) Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, pp. 9, 11.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cf. Jerome B. Schneewind (1998) The

Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 93. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Glendon (n. 12), p. 6.

68. Similarly Poschl (n. 23), pp. 556.

69. For a fuller discussion of this claim see my Dignity and the Formula of Humanity(n. 56).

70. The earliest passage I have found in which rights are based on dignity is in G. W. F.

Schillers Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3 (n. 23). However, Schiller understands dignity as anobility in nature, a conception akin to the traditional paradigm of dignity. I have notfound a passage in which dignity is said to be an inherent non-relational value propertybefore the 20th century although I realize that Kant is currently often read this way.

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