7th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research, Design, and Operation

WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Tammy Reynolds – Deputy Project Manager Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC

Washington, DCSeptember 7-9, 2016

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Background The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in New Mexico began construction in the early

1980’s

Receipt and disposal of Contact Handled (CH) waste began in March 1999

Receipt and disposal of Remote Handled (RH) waste began in January 2007

Between March 1999 and February 2014, WIPP safely and compliantly: Received 11, 894 shipments and disposed the waste in the u/g,

90,627 cubic meters of CH TRU waste, 357 cubic meters of RH TRU waste

In February 2014, WIPP operations were paused when a fire and a radiological event occurred in the underground

Recovery from the events is in progress and planned to be complete by the end of calendar year 2016. Commencement of waste emplacement activities will begin as soon as it is safe to do so.

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Fire Event

February 5, 2014 a fire occurred in the u/g involving a salt haul truck 86 workers in the u/g at the time of the fire were safely evacuated Investigated by both DOE and NWP DOE Accident Investigation Report issued on March 13, 2014

Radiological Event February 14, 2014 an exothermic reaction involving the mixture of the organic materials (absorbent and/or

neutralizer) and nitrate salts occurred inside a drum. Pressurization of the drum, failure of the drum locking ring, and displacement of the drum lid TRU waste propelled from the drum up into the polypropylene magnesium oxide (MgO) super sacks on top of the containers and onto adjacent waste containers. (Note: MgO is an assurance feature to ensure consistent and favorable chemical conditions are maintained in the brines after final facility closure by reacting with any carbon dioxide produced by the decay of organic carbon in the waste and waste emplacement materials.) Radiological Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) alarm received; ventilation interlocked to filtration mode Small amount of leakage bypassed the HEPA filters and released into the atmosphere DOE Accident Investigation Report Phase I (response to the event) – issued on April 22, 2014 DOE Accident Investigation Report Phase II (cause of the event) – issued on April 16, 2015

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned Nuclear Facility vs Mine Culture

Although WIPP is a nuclear facility, there was a mining culture in place vs a nuclear culture Difference in expectations between waste handling and non-waste handling vehicles (combustible buildup, manual vs auto fire detection/suppression)

Operability and recognition of impaired critical safety equipment Fire protection program not adequately implemented at the WIPP facility No controls or programs in place for control of combustible materials or maintaining of fire

protection support systems Maintenance program not effectively implemented

– Combustible buildup on salt haul truck; chaining open ventilation doors; inoperable ventilation fans; inoperable mine phones, obscured evacuation reflectors, disabling of auto fire suppressions system; no overall method to understand status and impact of impaired mine safety related equipment

Mindset of production over maintenance based on complex wide priorities to accelerate shipments from generator sites in support of individual site milestones and regulatory agreements

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned Training and drill programs

Emergency management/preparedness and response programs not effectively implemented Limited drills, inadequate donning of self-rescuers or SCSRs during training or drills, or hands on training with portable fire extinguishers Inconsistencies between u/g fire response procedures and drills/training (shifting ventilation during evacuation)

Expectations and capabilities of the Facility Shift Manager to manage all aspects of an emergency or abnormal event

CMR response (evaluation and protective actions) was less than adequate Identified problems with communications and alarms during the fire/evacuation delaying egress

National TRU Program not robust enough to identify incompatible waste

Communications to the community and regulatory stakeholders was not timely Ensures trust is maintained rather than rebuilding that trust

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

WIPP Recovery Managed as a Project

• Baseline established • Scope, schedule, cost and risks reflected in the recovery baseline• Primavera detailed schedule developed• Progress tracked in Plan of the Day and Plan of the Week meetings• Critical Path calculated on weekly basis

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Radiological and Ground Control Recovery Radiological release event in February 2014

Prevented underground access for several months; required “catch-up” bolting in areas that had not been maintained during that period

Created radiologically contaminated areas – complicating all operations including bolting and other ground control

Ground control catchup efforts in the radiological clean areas is complete. Ground control efforts are now focused in the radiologically contaminated areas 180K sq. ft. has been recovered and are

unrestricted 130K sq. ft actively being worked 50K sq. ft. “Restricted” 10K sq. ft. “Prohibited Nominal bolt failure rate 40/week Bolt installation rate 110/week based on 11 shifts of bolting/week

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons LearnedFacility/Equipment Improvements New Emergency Operating Center (EOC) Remodeled training facility U/G Ventilation fan reliability improvements Hybrid bolters Maintenance backlog reduction Interim Ventilation System

Program Improvements Fire Protection Program Plan DSA Revision 5 Implemented (STD 3009-2014) Increased training for fire response and 10X increase in drills

New Emergency Operations Center

Hybrid Bolting Machine Combustible Control ZoneNew Equipment

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Enhanced Underground Safety New underground notification system U/G combustible reduction U/G localized fire suppression systems Vehicle auto fire suppression systems Improved mine stability and ground control

Aggressive Culture Change Leadership Academy Leaders Forum Focus on Values, Expectations, and Standards

Notification System Vehicle Fire Suppression

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Phase I - Interim Ventilation System

Two HEPA skids and fan units 114,000 cfm of airflow

Doubles the existing 60k cfm capacity

Ensures adequate air flow at the waste face

for resumption of waste emplacement

Increase airflow for ground control and maintenance operations

Phase II – Supplemental Ventilation

Reconfiguring mine circuits and additional fans 180,000 cfm airflow

Phase III – Permanent Ventilation System

Design and construct a new (permanent) ventilation system

Capable to provide 420,000 cfm

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

National TRU Program

DOE released the Enhanced National TRU Program Plan (June 2016)

DOE placed HOLD on certifying TRU waste for shipment to WIPP until new requirements are met

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

National TRU Program – Moving Forward

Re-Certification of Generator Sites

Specific requirements for Previously Certified Waste Chemical Compatibility Evaluation Enhanced Acceptable Knowledge Evaluation of oxidizing chemicals

Generator Site Technical Reviews

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons Learned

Prioritization of Shipments: Initial focus of WIPP will be emplacement of waste currently in the Waste

Handling Building TRU site DOE Field Managers and DOE Headquarters met in August to begin the

discussion of TRU waste shipping priorities

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WIPP Recovery and Lessons LearnedIncident Response

Investigation

U/G Recovery and Resumption of Ground Control (Bolting)

Isolation of Panel 6 and Panel 7, Room 7

Equipment Procurements and Upgrades

Interim Ventilation System

Authorization to Proceed – Commence Waste Emplacement Operations

DSA Revision and Implementation

Cold Operations

Management Self Assessment

Safety Management Program Improvements

Contractor Operational Readiness Review

DOE Operational Readiness Review – Regulator Concurrence