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The psychology ofstuff and thingsChristian Jarrett on our lifelongrelationship with objects

social support following stroke 566the voices others cannot hear 570managing to make a difference 576why are effect sizes still neglected? 580

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Many years ago, my best friend and I were so convinced that life wasincreasingly becoming about ‘stuffand things’ that we registered the internet domain namewww.stuffandthings.com. Like manyof my possessions – DVD boxsets I will never watch, books awaitingthat elusive relaxing beach holiday,enough Lego to start a shop – this is now gathering dust. As CharlieBrooker has said, we live in a stuff-a-lanche, and I want less.

Yet even in these austere times,many of us continue to accumulategoods, defining ourselves to varyingextents by what we own. We usethings to signal who we want to beand where we want to belong. Theybecome our legacy. On p.560, ourjournalist Dr Christian Jarrettconsiders this lifelong relationshipwith objects.

If you’re a fan of shiny tech things,have you tried out The Psychologiston tablet, smartphone and Kindleyet? It’s available to Societymembers by logging in viawww.tinyurl.com/yourpsych. It’searly days and development of ouronline presence remains in thepipeline, but good things come tothose who wait!

Dr Jon Sutton

THE ISSUE

Social support following strokeCamilla Cookson and Joe Casey discusspsychological and functional outcomes

The voices others cannot hearSimon McCarthy-Jones and EleanorLongden look at what they mean and,for people who want support, what is tobe done

Interview: Managing to make adifferenceJon Sutton talks to occupationalpsychologist Emma Donaldson-Feilder

Methods: Why are effect sizes stillneglected?Peter E. Morris and Catherine O. Fritz

letters 542public protection; DCP, diagnosis and DSM; unknown unknowns; neuro-linguisticprogramming; media ethics

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careers and appointments 596we hear from Ian Gargan, CharteredPsychologist and new Chair of theSociety’s Representative Council; fromNHS to private practice; and working inthe College of Policing

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the usual mix of books, TV, radio, exhibitions, radio and film

looking back 612

reviews 604

understanding amnesia: is it time to forget HM? John P. Aggleton questions thevalue of the famous case study.

beating the odds of addiction: Dana Smith with the latest in our series for buddingwriters (see www.bps.org.uk/newvoices for more information)

one on one 616…with Pat Lindley

news and digest 5523D brain mapping; poor reporting practices; impact factors; adult neurogenesis;perinatal mental illness; the latest nuggets from the Society’s free ResearchDigest service (see www.researchdigest.org.uk/blog); and more

society 586President’s column; new PsychologyEducation Board Chair; Special Groupfor Independent Practitioners; Disaster,Crisis and Trauma Section; and more

new voices 610

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The psychology of stuff andthings Christian Jarrett on our lifelongrelationship with objects

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Wrongful convictions aredisturbingly common. In theUSA alone, over 1050 innocentpeople who were found guilty incourt have subsequently beenexonerated. A new study, thefirst to systematically studystigma towards convictedinnocents, finds that the oldadage is true – mud sticks.

Kimberley Clow and Amy-May Leach surveyed 86psychology students in Canadaabout either ‘people who havebeen wrongfully convicted of acrime’; ‘people who have beenconvicted of a crime that theyactually committed’; or ‘peoplein general’.

The students ratedwrongfully convicted people in a similar way to offenders,including perceiving them asincompetent and cold, andhaving negative attitudestowards them. Although thestudents desired less socialdistance from the wronglyconvicted compared withoffenders, they preferred tohave more distance from themthan people in general. Andwhile they expressed more pityfor wrongly convicted peoplethan offenders, this didn’ttranslate into greater supportfor giving them assistance suchas job training or subsidisedhousing. In fact, the studentswere more in favour of givingmonthly living expenses topeople in general as opposed tothe wrongly convicted.

‘A wrongly convictedindividual should be viewed asany other non-convicted citizen,’

Exonerated but for evertarnished?

In Legal and CriminologicalPsychology

‘She works by intuition and feeling,’ wrote the US psychologist G. Stanley Hall of the typical woman;‘fear, anger, pity, love, and most of the emotions have a wider range and greater intensity [than inmen].’

That was in 1904. Fast forward more than a hundred years, what beliefs do modern-dayEuropeans still hold about the intuition of men and women? Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleaguessurveyed 1016 men and women in Germany and 1002 in Spain to find out.

Overall, the participants didn’t see either sex as having more intuition than the other. But that’s because they held stereotypes about the intuitive strengths of the sexes in different domains. In both Germany and Spain, the majority of participants believed that women’s intuitions are betterwhen it comes to personal life. For instance, 63 per cent of Germans believed that women’sintuitions about choosing the right romantic partner are superior (and the figures were almostidentical in Spain).

Gigerenzer’s team said there could be some validity to a related stereotype held by theirparticipants: the idea that women are better at understanding other people’s intentions. After all,

there is evidence, the researchers said, that womenare better at recognising emotional displays thanmen.

In relation to intuitions in a ‘professional socialcontext’, there was no overall sex-relatedstereotype about leadership intuition (this may alsobe an accurate reflection of fact, since studies showcompanies with more women in leadershippositions do at least as well, if not better, thanthose with fewer women). Both countries showed a weak preference for believing that men have a better intuition for choosing a business partnerand in politics.

Beliefs about intuitions in the last domain of‘professional individual tasks’ were stronger andexposed the greatest differences between thecountries. In Spain the majority of men and womenbelieved that the sexes have equally good intuitionfor scientific discoveries; in contrast, in Germanyonly one third felt the same, with most peoplefavouring men. This study can’t speak to cause andeffect, but it’s notable that a greater percentage ofscientists in Spain are female.

Participants in both countries also endorsed the stereotype that men have better intuition for dangerous situations, but this was almost entirely down to the beliefs held by men! In bothcountries, men and women further endorsed the stereotype that men have better intuition forinvesting in stocks. This actually flies in the face of research that has found women to be moreeffective at portfolio investment.

Across the whole study there was evidence of ingroup bias – men and women tended toattribute more credit to the intuition of their own sex.

Intriguingly, there was no difference in beliefs with age group. This led the researchers tosuppose that people’s beliefs about the intuitive skills of the sexes is based on the current socialcontext rather than the past. If the past had had more influence you’d expect older participants toendorse more traditional stereotypes.

Related to this, it was curious that gender stereotypes were more often endorsed in Germanyeven though this country has been a liberal democracy for longer than Spain and is said to valuegender egalitarianism more strongly. The researchers said this may reflect the fact that Spain iscatching up fast and may be even overtaking Germany. We already discussed Spain’s femaleadvantage in science. Despite Germany having a female Chancellor, it’s also a fact that there is a larger percentage of female politicians in Spain.

All in all Gigerenzer and his team concluded their study shows ‘widespread stereotypes aboutmen’s and women’s intuitions still exist even a century after the first president of the AmericanPsychological Association made his infamous statement’.

In the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology

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authenticity and inauthenticityregardless of their personality.

Hundreds of people werealso recruited to write abouteither a time they had felt mosttrue to themselves, or a timethey felt like they were beingfake. Experiences of self-authenticity tended to involvefun, familiar places or people,close others, helping someoneor being creative. They werealso associated with ‘lowarousal’ positive emotions likecontentment and calmness, andthe fulfilment of personal needs,especially self-esteem,relatedness to others andautonomy. ‘I was with mygirlfriend and three best friendsand we stayed there [at themillpond in Cambridge] latedrinking, chilling out, andtalking about our lives andchildhoods,’ said oneparticipant. ‘I was really happyat that moment in life and feltrelaxed, honest, that nothingelse mattered or would everchange.’

Episodes of inauthenticity,by contrast, were associatedwith difficult events, being

evaluated by others,demonstrating a lack of socialcompetence, feeling isolated,failing one’s own standards andfeeling ill.

The ‘signature’ emotion ofbeing phoney was anxiety, andthere was a sense of failing tofulfil any personal needs. ‘Thebuildings were completelyunrecognisable as were thepeople,’ said one person of theirfirst day at university. ‘I felt asthough I was alone and had lostmy sense of self.’

One particularly intriguingfinding – participants describinga time they’d felt authentic, asopposed to phoney, tended tosay the experience overlappedfar more with their ideal self.There’s an obvious contradictionhere. If they were beingthemselves, how come theyresembled their ideal self, whichis likely to be influenced bysocial expectations?

One possibility is that whatwe really mean by ‘be true toyourself’ is ‘be the person youwant to be’.

This recalls an intriguingstudy published in 2010 byWilliam Fleeson and JoshuaWilt, in which people reportedfeeling more authentic whenthey were behaving in anextraverted, agreeable andopen-minded way, regardless ofwhether this matched their ownpersonality. Behaving this wayusually means certain needs arebeing met, including closenesswith others and being competent.Another possibility, then, is thatby ‘keeping it real’ we reallymean – satisfy the basic humandesire to connect with othersand be a creative, good person.

said Clow and Leach. ‘Ourfindings, however, suggest thatthis does not occur… Wronglyconvicted persons are notperceived as other citizens.’

These results are only atentative step towards greaterunderstanding of this issue. It’sunsafe to generalise confidentlyfrom a student sample, and wehaven’t learned much about whythe participants stigmatised thewrongly convicted. It’s possiblethe students held a generalbelief that wrongly convictedpeople are likely to be guilty ofother crimes, or they believedthem morally contaminated bytheir time in prison.

Despite its limitations, thenew study chimes withanecdotal evidence. Considerthe case of the unfortunatelynamed Kirk Bloodsworth. In1993, after nearly nine years inprison, Bloodsworth was a freeman thanks to DNA testing thatshowed he was not guilty ofraping and killing a nine-year-old girl – the first time thescientific technique had beenused in this way. Yet despite hisrelease, Bloodsworth continuedto be vilified, including having‘child killer’ scrawled in dirt onhis truck.

From Ancient Greek philosophyto humanistic psychology tomodern-day rap songs, there’s a long tradition of espousing thebenefits of being true to yourselfor ‘keeping it real’. Despite thisinterest, a new study by AlisonLenton and colleagues is one of the first to investigate whatbeing true to oneself actuallyfeels like, how often it happensand in what circumstances.

Lenton and her colleaguesbegan by surveying 104participants (average age 35; 66 women) on the AmazonMechanical Turk website thatpays people for completingtasks online. The participantssaid they experienced a state of authenticity one to two timesper week, and experiencedinauthenticity nearly every twomonths. They were stronglymotivated (5.8 on a scale of 1 to 7) to be their true selvesand similarly motivated to avoidinauthenticity (5.2 on the samescale). The state of being true to oneself was different fromthe personality trait of being a ‘genuine person’ – peoplereported experiencing both

A preliminary psychology of ‘keeping it real’In the Journal of Personality

The material in this section is taken from the Society’s Research Digestblog at www.researchdigest.org.uk/blog, and is written by its editor DrChristian Jarrett. Visit the blog for full coverage including references andlinks, additional current reports, an archive, comment and more.

Subscribe by RSS or e-mail at www.researchdigest.org.uk/blog

Become a fan at www.facebook.com/researchdigest

Follow the Digest editor at www.twitter.com/researchdigest

a man’s Self is the sum total of allthat he can call his

William James (The Principles of Psychology, 1890)

S tuff everywhere. Bags, books,clothes, cars, toys, jewellery,furniture, iPads. If we’re relatively

affluent, we’ll consider a lot of it ours.More than mere tools, luxuries or junk,our possessions become extensions of theself. We use them to signal to ourselves,and others, who we want to be and wherewe want to belong. And long after we’regone, they become our legacy. Somemight even say our essence lives on inwhat once we made or owned.

Childhood and adolescenceOur relationship with stuff starts early. The idea that we can own something,possess it as if a part of ourselves, is onethat children grasp by the age of two. Andby six, they exhibit the ‘endowment effect’,placing extra value on an object simply byvirtue of it being, or having been, theirs.Although children understand ownershipfrom a very young age, they think about itin a more simplistic way than adults. Astudy by Ori Friedman and Karen Neary in 2008 showed that aged between twoand four, kids make the assumption thatwhoever is first in possession of the objectis the owner, regardless of whether theylater give it away.

With ownership comes envy. Whenyoungsters play with friends, they soon

discover other people’s toys they’d like to get their hands on. Or they experiencethe injustice of being forced to share whatthey had assumed was theirs alone. In his1932 book The Moral Judgment of theChild, Jean Piaget observed that evenbabies express jealousy over objects,giving signs of ‘violent rage’ when a toy is taken from them and given to another.When Batya Licht and her colleagues in2008 filmed 22-month-olds playing withtheir peers in day-care, nearly a quarter of all sources of conflict were overpossessions – where the ‘child eitherdefended his or her objects from anotherchild, or wanted to take an object fromanother child’.

Most children have an unusuallyintense relationship with a specific‘attachment object’, usually a favouriteblanket or a soft toy. In an intriguingstudy by Bruce Hood and Paul Bloom, themajority of three- to six-year-old childrenpreferred to take home their originalattachment object, as opposed to aduplicate made by a ‘copying machine’.To the prospect of taking a copy, ‘the most common response was horror,’ saysNathalia Gjersoe, who helped run thestudies. ‘A few very sweet and obedientchildren said okay but then burst intotears.’ Four of the children even refusedfor their attachment toy or object to becopied in the first place. That’s despite thefact they were happy enough to take acopy of an experimenter’s toy. It’s as if thechildren believed their special object hada unique essence, a form of magical

thinking that re-appears in adulthood in our treatment of heirlooms, celebritymemorabilia and artwork.

Some experts refer to children’sattachment objects as ‘transitional objects’because it is believed they aid thetransition to independence. Consistentwith this, there’s evidence that childrenmake less use of such objects if theirmothers practise so-called ‘attachmentparenting’, involving co-sleeping andfeeding on cue (Green et al., 2004). Thereare also cross-cultural findings showingthat fewer children have attachmentobjects in Tokyo, where children moreoften sleep in the same bed or bedroomwith their parents, than in New York,where co-sleeping is less common(Hobara, 2003).

As children mature into teens, we seepossessions starting to act as a crutch forthe self. In 2007, Lan Chaplin and hercolleagues interviewed participants agedbetween eight and 18 and found that‘materialism’ (identified by choosingmaterial goods in answer to ‘What makesme happy?’) peaked at middleadolescence, just when self-esteem tendedto be lowest. In a follow-up, materialismwas reduced in teens who were givenflattering feedback from peers to boosttheir self-esteem. ‘Giving children oradolescents a sense of self-worth andaccomplishment seems to be quite aneffective antidote to the development of materialism,’ the researchers said (seebox ‘Is materialism all bad?’).

Through adolescence, possessionsincreasingly reflect who people are, or at least how they would like to seethemselves. In his seminal paper‘Possessions and the extended self’ RussellBelk quotes from novelist Alison Lurie’sbook The Language of Clothes, in whichshe observes: ‘…when adolescent girlsexchange clothing they share not onlyfriendship, but also identities – theybecome soulmates.’ Similarly, ininterviews with teens, Ruthie Segev atJerusalem College of Technology foundevidence that selecting and buying giftsfor their friends helps adolescents achieve


The psychology of stuff and thingsChristian Jarrett on our lifelong relationship with objects

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Belk, R.W. (1988). Possessions and theextended self. Journal of ConsumerResearch, 15, 139–168.

Belk, R.W. (2012). The extended self in adigital world. Manuscript submittedfor publication.

Bloch, P.H. (1982). Involvement beyond thepurchase process: Conceptual issuesand empirical investigation. Advancesin Consumer Research, 9(1), 413–417.

Carver, C.S. & Baird, E. (1998). The

American dream revisited: Is it whatyou want or why you want it thatmatters? Psychological Science, 9(4),289–292.

Chaplin, L.N. & John, D.R. (2007).Growing up in a material world: Agedifferences in materialism in childrenand adolescents. Journal of ConsumerResearch, 34(4), 480-493.

Cockrill, A. (2012). Does an iPod makeyou happy? An exploration of the

effects of iPod ownership on lifesatisfaction. Journal of ConsumerBehaviour, 11, 406–414.

Cova, B., Kozinets, R. & Shankar, A.(2007). Consumer tribes. Oxford:Butterworth-Heinemann.

Cushing, A.L. (2012). Possessions and selfextension in digital environments:Implications for maintaining personalinformation. PhD thesis University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Derbaix, C. & Decrop, A. (2011). Coloursand scarves: An ethnographicaccount of football fans and theirparaphernalia. Leisure Studies, 30(3),271–291.

Fraine, G., Smith, S.G., Zinkiewicz, L.,Chapman, R. & Sheehan, M. (2007).At home on the road? Can drivers’relationships with their cars beassociated with territoriality? Journalof Environmental Psychology, 27(3),

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a sense of identity independent from theirparents, and that the mutual exchange ofthe same or similar gifts between friendshelps them to create a feeling ofoverlapping identities.

In the transition from adolescence to adulthood, it’s the first car that oftenbecomes the ultimate symbol of a person’semerging identity. Interviews with carowners conducted by Graham Fraine andcolleagues in 2007 found that youngdrivers, aged 18 to 25, were particularlylikely to make the effort to personalise

their cars with stickers, unusual numberplates and seat covers, as if marking outtheir territory. Earlier research conductedin the 1980s made the complementaryfinding that the more young men sawtheir cars as extensions of themselves, themore trouble they took to wash, wax andcare for them (Bloch, 1982).

AdulthoodAs our lives unfold, our things embodyour sense of self-hood and identity still

further, becoming external receptacles forour memories, relationships and travels.‘My house is not “just a thing,”’ wroteKaren Lollar in 2010. ‘The house is notmerely a possession or a structure ofunfeeling walls. It is an extension of myphysical body and my sense of self thatreflects who I was, am, and want to be.’

How much we see our things as anextension of ourselves may depend inpart in how confident we feel about whowe are. When Kimberly Morrison andCamille Johnson led European Americans


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Is materialism all bad?The prevailing view in psychology is that materialism is bad forour well-being. Research by Tim Kasser (at Knox College) andothers has revealed an association between holding materialistvalues and being more depressed and selfish, and having poorerrelationships. Kasser has previously called for a revolution inWestern culture, shifting us from a thing-centred to a person-centred society. Other research by Leaf Van Boven, ThomasGilovich and colleagues has shown that the purchase ofexperiences leaves people happier than buying material products.In another study of theirs, materialistic people were liked lessthan people who appeared more interested in experiences.

How can we square this literature with the idea of things beingpart of our ‘extended selves’, a vital receptacle for our memoriesand identities? A clue comes from the theorising of a group led by L.J. Shrum at the University of Texas at San Antonio. Theypropose that materialism isn’t bad per se, it depends on people’sbuying motives. To the extent that acquisitions are motivated byintrinsic goals such as affiliation, belonging, pride and self-reward, they predict that materialism will improve well-being.Even when it comes to signalling identity to others, they predictno adverse effects of materialism if the signal is true to the self.

‘We are not suggesting that materialism has no detrimentaleffects,’ says Shrum. ‘We are just arguing that it should not beconsidered wholly detrimental apriori, or by definition, butdependent on the underlying motives.’ He and others areplanning research to test these ideas but there’s already someevidence they might be on to something. The 1998 paper ‘TheAmerican dream revisited: Is it what you want or why you want it that matters?’ showed that financial and material aspirationswere linked to positive well-being when the motives underlyingthose aspirations were ‘self-determining’, for example based onthe desire for fun or freedom (see also Srivastava et al., 2001).

204–214.Friedman, O. & Neary, K.R. (2008).

Determining who owns what: Dochildren infer ownership from firstpossession? Cognition, 107(3),829–849.

Green, K.E., Groves, M.M. & Tegano, D.W.(2004). Parenting practices that limittransitional object use: Anillustration. Early Child Developmentand Care, 174(5), 427–436.

Hobara, M. (2003). Prevalence oftransitional objects in young childrenin Tokyo and New York. Infant MentalHealth Journal, 24(2), 174–191.

Hood, B.M. & Bloom, P. (2008). Childrenprefer certain individuals over perfectduplicates. Cognition, 106(1), 455–462.

Kasser, T. (2003). The high price ofmaterialism. Cambridge, MA: MITPress.

Kim, K. & Johnson, M.K. (2012). Extended

self: Medial prefrontal activity duringtransient association of self andobjects. Social Cognitive and AffectiveNeuroscience, 7(2), 199–207.

Kovach, A. (2007, 27 October). What firecouldn’t destroy. Washington Post.Retrieved 4 June 2013 from:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/26/AR2007102601774.html

Kroger, D.J. & Adair, V. (2008). Symbolic

meanings of valued personal objectsin identity transitions of lateadulthood. Identity: An InternationalJournal of Theory and Research, 8(1),5–24.

Licht, B., Simoni, H. & Perrig-Chiello, P.(2008). Conflict between peers ininfancy and toddler age: What do theyfight about? Early Years, 28(3),235–249.

Lollar, K. (2010). The liminal experience:

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to feel uncertain about themselves using false feedback on a personalityquestionnaire (telling them: ‘theconsistency of your responses is not highenough to construct a clear picture ofwho you are’), they responded by ratingtheir belongings as particularly self-expressive – as saying something aboutwho they are. The same result didn’tapply to Asian Americans or other USparticipants with a collectivist mentality,perhaps because they are less concernedby threats to their sense of self.

In a follow-up, those participantsscoring highly in individualism (asopposed to collectivism), who wroteabout an object that reflected their self-concept, subsequently scored particularlyhigh on a measure of self-certainty. It’s asif reflecting on our things restores afragile ego. The results could help explainsome of the behaviour we associatewith a mid-life crisis, such as whenthe angst-ridden fifty-somethingfinds solace in a new Porsche. A related line of research by DerekRucker and Adam Galinsky at theKellogg School of Managementshowed that participants who feltpowerless (induced by recalling atime when someone had controlover them) were more willing to payfor a silk tie and other high-statusproducts.

From a neural perspective, this absorption of objects into self-identity may be more than meremetaphor. In 2010, Kyungmi Kimand Marcia Johnson scannedparticipants’ brains as they allocatedobjects to a container marked as‘mine’, imagining that they weregoing to own them, or to a containermarked with someone else’s name.Extra activity was observed in themedial prefrontal cortex (MPC) inresponse to the sight of ‘owned’items, compared with control itemsallocated to others. The same area ofMPC was activated when participantsrated how much various adjectivesdescribed their own personality.

‘Areas of the brain that are known to beinvolved in thinking about the self alsoappear to be involved when we createassociations between external things andourselves through ownership,’ says Kim.

SignalsAs well as shoring up our sense of identity,our possessions also allow us to signalsomething about ourselves to other people.In a romantic context, there’s evidence formen using the purchase of showy items –known as ‘conspicuous consumption’ – asa display of status and availability towomen. A study led by Jill Sundie showedthis was specifically the case for meninterested in casual liaisons, and moreover,that women interested in casual sex wereattracted to these overt displays of costlyconsumption.

Conspicuous consumption can alsoconvey status and importance outside of romantic contexts. A study at TilburgUniversity showed that people wearing a luxury branded shirt (Tommy Hilfigeror Lacoste) were perceived as wealthierand higher status (than people wearing a non-branded or non-luxury shirt); more successful at getting passers-by to complete a questionnaire; more likelyto be given a job; and more successful atsoliciting money for a charity (Nelissen & Meijers, 2011). Crucially, these effectswere only present when it was clear thanthe wearer of the luxury shirt actuallyowned that shirt. ‘Insofar as luxurydisplays advertise nothing but wealth or possession in general, the ensuingbenefits, particularly financial ones, can… be considered perverse,’ theresearchers said.

Like a uniform, ourpossession of specific objectsand brands can also signal ourmembership of social groups,both to others and toourselves. The success of theApple brand has beenattributed in part to people’sdesire to show that theybelong to a consumer tribewith connotations of‘coolness’. Increasingly itseems people will do whateverit takes, be that queuing forhours or paying premiumprices, in demonstration oftheir brand loyalty andmembership. ‘Consumerculture theorists definitely find a strengthening of thephenomenon,’ says RobertKozinets (York University,Toronto), co-editor ofConsumer Tribes. ‘They tend to posit, with psychologistslike Philip Cushman andsociologists like RobertPutnam, that as people findless satisfaction andcommunity in traditionalsources like family, country


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Nelissen, R. & Meijers, M.H. (2011).Social benefits of luxury brands ascostly signals of wealth and status.

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Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment ofthe child. New York: The Free Press.(Original work published 1932)

Price, L.L., Arnould, E.J. & Curasi, C.F.

(2000). Older consumers’ dispositionof special possessions. Journal ofConsumer Research, 27(2), 179–201.

Radford, S.K. & Bloch, P.H. (2012). Grief,commiseration, and consumptionfollowing the death of a celebrity.Journal of Consumer Culture, 12(2),137–155.

Rucker, D.D. & Galinsky, A.D. (2009).Conspicuous consumption versusutilitarian ideals: How different levels

Fans described how important the wearing of their teamcolours was to their identity

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and religion, they turn instead to alternatesources in the marketplace.’

The use of possessions to conveygroup membership is most obvious whenit comes to sports fans. Christian Derbaixand Alain Decrop explored this ininterviews with 30 fans from majorfootball teams across Belgium, France andSpain, some of whom owned dozens ofitems of club paraphernalia. The fansdescribed how important the wearing oftheir team colours was to their identity, asa way to gain acceptance from other fans,and to their feeling part of the community.‘Believe me’, said an RC Lens fan, ‘when I say that the one who doesn’t have his/herscarf looks a little bit silly ... [B]randishingthe scarf means “I exhibit my club andraise it to the top… I’m just honouringit”. For me, the scarf means everything!’

Loss and disposalAs our belongings accumulate, becomingmore infused with our identities, so theirpreciousness increases. People whosethings are destroyed in a disaster aretraumatised, almost as if grieving the lossof their identities. Photographs from theaftermath of Hurricane Sandy, whichstruck the US East coast last year, showpeople standing bereft, staring in shockand bewilderment at all they’ve lost.Reflecting on the fire that took her home,Lollar says it was like ‘a form of death’.Alexandra Kovach, who also lost her homein a fire, wrote in The Washington Post in2007: ‘It isn’t just a house. It’s not thecontents, or the walls, but the true feelingof that home – and all that it represents.Our homes are our foundations, retainingin their walls our memories and all theexperiences that happen within them.’Victims of burglaries and vandalism reportfeeling violated, the psychological impactof loss greater than the financial burden.

Yet there are many times when peoplewilfully dispose of things. This oftenhappens at a key juncture, such as whenleaving student life behind, moving home,or during divorce, and can be experiencedas a chance for a new start. Old

belongings are shed like a carapace,fostering the emergence of a new identity.In the film Fight Club, the troubledcharacter Tyler Durden sees theconflagration of his flat as liberating. ‘It’s only after you’ve lost everything thatyou’re free to do anything,’ he says.

Another time for a symbolic clear-outoccurs when parents throw out the babyclothes and toys belonging to theirchildren. Based on in-depth interviewswith 13 mothers, Barbara Phillips andTrina Sego distinguished between

‘keepers’ and ‘discarders’ (preferring theseterms to the labels ‘packrat’, ‘hoarder’ and‘purger’ that others have used). Keepersstruggled to dispose of their children’sbelongings because of their emotionalmeaning, and they often employeddelaying tactics to keep things as long aspossible (see ‘Hoarding’). Discarders, bycontrast, felt weaker ties to theirchildren’s things. Intriguingly, bothgroups experienced guilt around theirdecisions – keepers because they felt acultural pressure to be organised, and


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Hoarding There are people so reluctant to dispose of their belongings that it becomes a seriousproblem. In extreme cases, mountains of clutter accumulate posing a fire hazard andmaking free movement around the home impossible. In 2011 Channel 4 told the story ofRichard Wallace, an extreme hoarder who had accumulated 60 tonnes of rubbish in hisgarden and whose kitchen was only accessible by crawling on all fours through a narrowtunnel of junk. Awareness of problematic hoarding is growing and ‘Hoarding Disorder’ willbe included as a new condition in the next edition of US psychiatry’s diagnostic code, DSM-5,due for publication this year.

Part of the problem with making such a diagnosis is distinguishing hoarding from benigncollecting. A British study published in 2012 compared a group of 29 people who met theproposed diagnostic criteria for hoarding disorder with 20 collectors (Nordsletten et al.,2012). Although both groups shared a reluctance to dispose of their belongings, thehoarders were less discriminate, more impulsive, and more extreme in theiraccumulations, all of which caused them problems with work and relationships. Hoarderswere also more likely to have one or more other psychiatric diagnoses and to be takingpsychiatric medication. Previous research suggests that hoarding behaviour is associatedwith a distinct way of thinking about possessions, including wanting to sustain control overthem and feeling an exaggerated sense of responsibility for them (Steketee et al., 2003).

of power shape consumer behavior.Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 45(3), 549–555.

Schindler, R.M. & Holbrook, M.B. (2003).Nostalgia for early experience as adeterminant of consumerpreferences. Psychology andMarketing, 20(4), 275–302.

Segev, R., Shoham, A. & Ruvio, A. (2012).What does this gift say about me, you,and us? The role of adolescents’ gift

giving in managing their impressionsamong their peers. Psychology &Marketing, 29(10), 752–764.

Shrum, L.J., Wong, N., Arif, F. et al. (2012).Reconceptualizing materialism asidentity goal pursuits: Functions,processes, and consequences. Journalof Business Research.doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.08.010

Srivastava, A., Locke, E.A. & Bartol, K.M.(2001). Money and subjective well-

being. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 80(6), 959–971.

Steketee, G., Frost, R.O. & Kyrios, M.(2003). Cognitive aspects ofcompulsive hoarding. CognitiveTherapy and Research, 27(4), 463–479.

Sundie, J.M., Kenrick, D.T., Griskevicius,V. et al. (2011). Peacocks, Porsches,and Thorstein Veblen: Conspicuousconsumption as a sexual signalingsystem. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 100(4), 664–680.Van Boven, L., Campbell, M.C. & Gilovich,

T. (2010). Stigmatizing materialism:On stereotypes and impressions ofmaterialistic and experientialpursuits. Personality and SocialPsychology Bulletin, 36(4), 551–563.

Van Boven, L. & Gilovich, T. (2003). To door to have? That is the question.Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 85(6), 1193–1202.

discarders because they felt there wasan expectation for mothers to protectand preserve their children’s identities.

Later life and beyondOlder people don’t just form bonds withtheir specific belongings, they seem tohave an affection for brands from theiryouth too. Usually this manifests in ataste for music, books, films and otherentertainment from yesteryear, but thesame has been shown for fashions andhairstyles, it has been hinted at forperfumes, and in a study published in2003 by Robert Schindler and MorrisHolbrook, it was found that it alsoextends to the car.

Dozens of participants aged 16 to92 rated their preference for theappearance of 80 cars, ranging fromthe 1915 Dodge Model 30-35 to the1994 Chrysler Concorde. Among men,but not women, there was a clearpreference for cars that dated from theparticipants’ youth (peaking aroundage 26). This was particularly the casefor men who were more nostalgic andwho believed that things were better inthe old days. What other examples mightthere be? ‘Children of both sexes tend tohave strong feelings about foods they like as they grow up,’ says Schindler.‘Although we haven’t studied food, I would expect both men and women tohave a lifetime fondness for foods theyenjoyed during their youth.’

As with human relationships, theattachments to our things deepen withthe passage of time. Elderly people areoften surrounded by possessions thathave followed them through good timesand bad, across continents and back. In2000, Linda Price at the University ofArizona and her colleagues interviewed80 older people about their decisionsregarding these ‘special possessions’. A common theme was the way cherishedobjects come to represent particularmemories. ‘I can look at anything [in thishouse] and remember special occasions,’recalled Diane, aged 70. ‘It’s almost like a history of our life.’

These possessions can be a particularcomfort for older people who have toleave their homes and enter supervisedresidential care. In interviews with 20such people in New Zealand, Jane Krogerand Vivienne Adair reported thatcherished possessions often provided a vital link to memories, relationships and former selves, helping foster a senseof continuity. ‘I love having this plate tokeep me company,’ one woman, aged 86,said of a ceramic plate that reminded herof her mother.

After a person dies, many of theirmost meaningful possessions becomefamily heirlooms, seen by those leftbehind as for ever containing the lostperson’s essence. This idea is also seen in the behaviours that follow the death of a celebrity. In a process that Belk calls‘sacralisation’, possessions owned by a deceased star can acquire astonishingvalue overnight, both sentimental andmonetary. This is often true even forexceedingly mundane items such asPresident Kennedy’s tape measure,auctioned for $48,875 in 1996. A studyby George Newman and colleagues in2011 provided a clue about the beliefsunderlying these effects. They showedthat people place more value on celebrity-owned items, the more physical contactthe celebrity had with the object, as iftheir essence somehow contaminated theitem through use. A related phenomenonis seen in consumer behaviour after a creative star dies, with the massconsumption of their music, books orfilms or other associated items. Considerhow Steve Jobs death in 2011 wasfollowed by mass demand for tops in his trademark black turtle-neck style.

The futureOur relationship with our stuff is in themidst of great change. Dusty music andliterary collections are being rehoused inthe digital cloud. Where once weexpressed our identity through fashionpreferences and props, today we can

cultivate an online identity with a carefullyconstructed homepage. We no longer haveto purchase an item to associate ourselveswith it, we can simply tell the world viaTwitter or Facebook about our preferences.The self has become extended, almostliterally, into technology, with Googleacting like a memory prosthetic. In short,our relationship with our things,possessions and brands remains asimportant as ever, it’s just the nature of the relationship is changing.

Researchers and people in general are gradually adjusting. The psychologyof our stuff is becoming more inter-disciplinary, with new generationsbuilding on the established researchconducted by consumer psychologists.For her thesis completed this year at theUniversity of North Carolina at ChapelHill, Amber Cushing – an informationscientist – interviewed people aged 18 to 67, finding that the youngerparticipants readily saw their digitalpossessions as extensions of themselves,much as older generations see theirphysical things.

Twenty-five years after he publishedhis seminal work on objects and the‘extended self’, Russell Belk has composedan update: ‘The extended self in a digitalworld,’ currently under review. ‘Thepossibilities for self extensions have neverbeen so extensive,’ he says.


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I Dr Christian Jarrett is The Psychologist’sstaff journalist. [email protected]

Older people don’t just form bonds with their specific belongings, they seem to have anaffection for brands from their youth too

iv vol 26 no 8 august 2013

www.researchdigest.org.uk/blog

Research. Digested.

The British Psychological Society’s free Research DigestBlog, email, Twitter and Facebook

‘Easy to access and free, and a mine of useful information for my work: what more could I want?I only wish I’d found this years ago!’Dr Jennifer Wild, Consultant Clinical Psychologist & Senior Lecturer, Institute of Psychiatry

‘The selection of papers suits my eclectic mind perfectly, and the quality and clarity of thesynopses is uniformly excellent.’Professor Guy Claxton, University of Bristol

lobes. Along with HM, one other case had the most ‘radical’ surgery, intended to remove the full extent of thehippocampus. In six of the remainingcases the surgery was more restricted as it was intended to reach only the front of the hippocampus or only midwaythrough the structure. Within this groupof patients, HM was unique as his was theonly surgery for the relief of epilepsy. Theother patients received psychosurgicaltreatments intended to relieveschizophrenia (n = 7) or bipolardepression (n = 1). The failure ofScoville’s surgeries to reduce thesepsychiatric symptoms inevitably posedproblems for their cognitive assessments,and the formal testing of three of theseschizophrenic cases was incomplete.Added problems would have arisen fromthe fact that schizophrenia is itselfassociated with appreciable memory loss.

Despite these issues, several featuresof the original study on HM seem tocreate a compelling case for theimportance of the hippocampus. Mostcritically, comparisons among all ninepatients revealed that severe memorydeficits were only seen after radicalresections involving most of thehippocampus. Unfortunately, the realextent of the surgeries could only besubsequently determined for HM, forwhom there is structural MRI data(Corkin et al., 1997). We are, therefore,reliant on Scoville’s surgical notes for theother eight patients. In fact, we nowknow that Scoville failed to remove thecaudal 2cm of HM’s hippocampus, despitehis intention to do so (Figure 1). (Moreprecise information will become availablewhen HM’s post-mortem findings arepublished.) It is, therefore, notunreasonable to suppose that there wereinconsistencies between the intended andactual extent of tissue removal in theseother eight cases.

There are additional concerns.Scoville’s surgeries approached the medialtemporal lobe from its front (i.e. via thetemporal pole), an inevitable consequenceof which was the removal of tissue in

The amnesic HM is the most famoussingle-case in neuropsychology, andpossibly the best known case in all

of psychology. Over one hundred studieshave been published involving HM, andwhen he died in 2008 it was worldwidenews. Interest in Henry Molaison (as wethen discovered) was so high that whenhis brain was sectioned the procedure wasfilmed for the internet, prompting, amongother things, a stage play. Ironically, HMalways remained unaware of his fame(Corkin, 2002). The question posed hereis whether it is time for us to reciprocate –should we forget HM?

Almost every introduction into theneural basis of memory describes how in 1953 the surgeon William Scovilleremoved tissue in both medial temporallobes of HM’s brain in an attempt to treathis epilepsy. Immediately thereafter, HMdisplayed severe anterograde amnesia –a failure to retain new day-to-day events –which remained throughout the rest of hislife. This catastrophic outcome ensuredthat HM’s surgery was not repeated, somaking him unique.

As has been often described, HMshowed preserved IQ despite his loss of long-term memory. He also showedpreserved short-term memory (e.g.immediate memory span) and a goodknowledge of past factual information.(episodic memory). Subsequent researchrevealed his spared ability to learn newperceptual-motor skills, e.g. mirrordrawing (Corkin, 2002), discoveries thathelped to establish emerging distinctions

between explicit and implicit learning.Much of the impact of HM arises,however, from Scoville’s surgery and howthat inadvertently established theimportance of the hippocampus forlearning and memory.

Given this impact it seems churlish toquestion the legacy of HM Indeed, it mustbe made clear that this article is not acriticism of research on HM (which hasconsistently been of an exceptional leveland deservedly praised); rather itconcerns how key elements of this hugelyinfluential body of research have beenmore generally interpreted and reported.

Does hippocampal pathologycause anterograde amnesia?The Russian neurologist Bekhterev isoften credited as the first person to signalthe involvement of the hippocampus inmemory. Bekhterev’s research was,however, suppressed after his death, quiteprobably on the orders of Stalin who mayhave had Bekhterev killed (Lerner et al.,2005). It is, however, indisputable thatScoville and Milner (1957) drew newattention to the importance of thehippocampal formation for long-termmemory, and did so in a way thatprofoundly altered neuroscience.

It is because HM is regarded as uniquethat his case has had such influence, yetin their landmark paper, Scoville andMilner (1957) described eight cases inaddition to HM who received bilateralremoval of tissue in the medial temporal


Aggleton, J.P. & Brown, M.W. (1999).Episodic memory, amnesia and thehippocampal anterior thalamic axis.Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22,425–466.

Bachevalier, J., Parkinson, J.K. &Mishkin, M. (1985). Visual recognitionin monkeys: Effects of separate vs.combined transection of the fornixand amygdalofugal pathways.Experimental Brain Research, 57,

554–561.Brown, M.W., Warburton, E.C. &

Aggleton, J.P. (2010). Recognitionmemory: Material, processes, andsubstrates. Hippocampus, 20,1228–1244.

Corkin, S. (2002). What’s new with theamnesic patient H.M.? Nature ReviewsNeuroscience, 3, 153–160.

Corkin, S., Amaral, D.G., Gonzalez, R.G. etal. (1997). H.M.’s medial temporal

lobe lesion: Findings from magneticresonance imaging. Journal ofNeuroscience, 17, 3964–3979.

Diana, R.A., Yonelinas, A.P. & Ranganath,C. (2007). Imaging recollection andfamiliarity in the medial temporallobe: a three-component model.Trends in Cognitive Science, 11,379–386.

Lerner, V., Margolin, J. & Witztum, E.(2005). Vladamir Bekhterev: His life,

his work and the mystery of hisdeath. History of Psychiatry, 16,217–227.

Mishkin, M. (1978). Memory in monkeysseverely impaired by combined butnot by separate removal of amygdalaand hippocampus. Nature, 273,297–298.

Murray, E.A. & Mishkin, M. (1998). Objectrecognition and location memory inmonkeys with excitotoxic lesions of

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Understanding amnesia –Is it time to forget HM? 55 years since the famous amnesic’s case was first described, John P. Aggletonquestions its value when debating the neuroanatomical basis of memory

front of the hippocampus. This tissueincluded most of the amygdala andpyriform cortex. The surgeries alsoproduced variable amounts of tissue lossin other regions adjacent to thehippocampus (the ‘parahippocampalregion’, which includes the entorhinal andperirhinal cortices – see Figure 1). Thereis no shortage of evidence that additionaldamage to these adjacent areas canexacerbate memory deficits (Aggleton &Brown, 1999; Diana et al.,2007). A closely related issueconcerns the consequences ofany white matter damage inHM as the surgical techniqueused by Scoville would havedestroyed both white and greymatter. White matter damage ispotentially very important as itmight disrupt the functions ofsites far removed from thehippocampus.

While MRI data (Corkin etal., 1997) indicate that Scovilleprobably spared the tractimmediately lateral to thehippocampus (the temporalstem), he would have removedfibres linking the temporalpole with the frontal lobe.Other tract damage in HMwould almost certainly includethose temporal stem fibres thatleave the temporal lobe bypassing directly through thelateral and dorsal amygdala.Studies with monkeys haveshown that cutting these fibresadds to cognitive impairmentsin tasks such as recognitionmemory (Bachevalier et al.,1985). It can, therefore, beseen that HM did not sufferselective hippocampal loss andthat damage to adjacent areasis very likely to havecontributed to his memoryproblems. As a consequenceHM does not confirm that hippocampalcell loss is either ‘necessary’ or ‘sufficient’for temporal lobe amnesia.

Subsequent comparisons using othercases with more localised hippocampaldamage (Spiers et al., 2001) have, in fact,often supported the principal insightsdrawn from HM as these later cases alsosuffered clear losses of long-term memorythat contrasted with spared semanticknowledge acquired prior to the amnesia.That said, HM’s amnesia appearsappreciably denser than that in cases with more circumscribed hippocampal

damage. While there are several possibleexplanations for this difference, includingthe extent of hippocampal damage in

HM, it remains highly likely that thecombination of additional white matterdamage and the loss of tissue instructures adjacent to the hippocampus(e.g. the amygdala) added to his memoryproblems. Finally, his long-term use ofanti-epileptic drugs may have causedcerebellar atrophy (Corkin, 2002).Consequently there are numerous reasonswhy the amnesia in HM may have beenparticularly dense, and these reasons

reflect more than just hippocampalcell loss.

Hierarchical models of medialtemporal lobe functionConsult almost anyneuropsychological text and there willbe a figure highlighting those medialtemporal lobe connections moststrongly linked to memory. This figurealmost always comprises a series ofconnected boxes, with thehippocampus placed at the top (Figure2, overleaf). Such figures inevitablyconvey a hierarchy with thehippocampus overseeing all othermedial temporal lobe memoryfunctions.

Although such depictions ofmedial temporal lobe anatomy werenot created by research on HM, thepersistent emphasis on hippocampaldysfunction in HM has surelyreinforced and maintained thishierarchical view of medial temporalfunction. This perspective is all themore understandable when it isappreciated that the dominant modelof medial temporal lobe memorysystems has been one in which othertemporal lobe structures are primarilycritical for the ingress and egress ofinformation to and from the medialtemporal lobe, but it is thehippocampus that orchestrates thisinformation (Squire et al., 2007;Wixted & Squire, 2011). This

influential view of medial temporal lobeorganisation now looks increasinglyuntenable.


looking back

the amygdala and hippocampus.Journal of Neuroscience, 18,6568–6582.

Scoville, W.B. & Milner, B. (1957). Loss ofrecent memory after bilateralhippocampal lesions. Journal ofNeurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry,20, 11–21.

Spiers, H.J., Maguire, E.A. & Burgess, N.(2001). Hippocampal amnesia.Neurocase 7, 357–382.

Squire, L.R., Wixted, J.T. & Clark, R.E.(2007). Recognition memory and themedial temporal lobe: A newperspective. Nature ReviewsNeuroscience, 8, 872–883.

Tsivilis, D., Vann, S.D., Denby, C., et al.(2008). A disproportionate role for thefornix and mammillary bodies inrecall versus recognition memory.Nature Neuroscience, 11, 834–842.

Vann, S.D. (2010) Re-evaluating the role of

the mammillary bodies in memory.Neuropsychologia, 48, 2316–2327.

Vann, S.D. & Aggleton, J.P. (2004).Themammillary bodies – two memorysystems in one? Nature ReviewsNeuroscience, 5, 35–44.

Wixted, J.T. & Squire, L.R. (2011). Themedial temporal lobe and theattributes of memory. Trends inCognitive Science, 15, 210–217.

Figure 1. HM’s surgery and the medial temporal lobe. Theupper level shows views of the underside of a brain (withthe cerebellum removed). The brain on the left indicatesthe intended extent of the medial temporal surgery in HM(region in brown). The dashed line shows approximatelyhow far back Scoville’s surgery actually went according toMRI evidence, leaving an area of potential sparing in theposterior hippocampus. The solid line shows the level ofthe coronal sections in the lower part of the figure. Thecoronal section on the left indicates the suspected area oftissue loss in HM, which clearly extends well into theparahippocampal region.

The pivotal issue is the extent towhich other temporal lobe structureshave memory functions independent ofthe hippocampus. Much of this debateoriginally centred on therelative importance of thehippocampus and theparahippocampal region forrecognition memory (theability to detect when an eventis repeated). One highlyinfluential model supposesthat the hippocampus isequally important for bothrecall and recognition,consistent with its position atthe top of an anatomicalhierarchy (Squire et al., 2007;Wixted & Squire, 2011). Thismodel assumes that damageimmediately beyond thehippocampus produces moreof the same dysfunction,reflecting this sharing offunctions. This concept is verypertinent because it directlyimplies that any extra-hippocampal damage in HMdisrupted processes thatprimarily depend on thehippocampus, and so do notmaterially affect his core status as a hippocampal amnesic.

Other models have challenged this view. One class of model supposesthat while the hippocampus is vital forrecognition memory based on the explicitrecall of past experiences, adjacentregions including the perirhinal cortex areindependently important for recognitionbased on the feeling of familiarity(Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Diana et al.,2007). These ‘dual-process’ modelspredict that amnesics with pathologyrestricted to the hippocampus will havedisproportionate deficits in recall, asrecognition can be partially supported byfamiliarity. Such cases do exist (Brown etal., 2010). In addition, there is muchevidence that the parahippocampal regionhas cognitive functions independent ofthe hippocampus (Diana et al., 2007).

With regard to HM, he repeatedlyfailed to recognise near-neighbours andfriends who became acquainted with himafter his surgery. HM was impaired onboth verbal and non-verbal recognition,and for both yes-no and forced-choicetasks (Corkin, 2002). Consequently, thereseems little reason to suppose that HMshowed a relative sparing of recognitionmemory. Unfortunately HM’s amnesia isso strongly identified as beingfundamentally hippocampal, and hisdeficits for recall and recognition sowidely described, that these two

impairments have become fused. The problem with conflating these

impairments is beautifully highlighted bya pair of experiments with monkeys that

sought to replicate the combinedamygdala plus hippocampal surgery inHM. When the tissue was removed usingScoville’s surgical approach the monkeyswere very severely impaired on objectrecognition memory (Mishkin, 1978).When the same targets were removed byinjecting a chemical that kills neurons butspares white matter, the animals wereunimpaired on object recognition(Murray & Mishkin, 1998). Thiscontrasting pair of findings underlines thesignificance of dysfunction in HM beyondthe hippocampus, and its likelycontribution to recognition memory.

Looking beyond thehippocampusOne legacy of HM is that he reinforcedthe notion of different brain structureswith different roles in processinginformation, so supporting a modularapproach to memory. A related legacy isthat the hippocampus has become thekeystone for research into long-termmemory. One consequence is thatresearch into neurological disordersassociated with memory loss, includingdementias, remains dominated byhippocampal analyses, despite thepotential significance of other areaswithin the temporal lobe.

Damage beyond the temporal lobe can also cause anterograde amnesia. In

fact the first convincing evidence thatdamage to a specific brain site can causeamnesia concerns the mammillary bodies(the most posterior part of the

hypothalamus), not the hippocampus(Vann & Aggleton, 2004). Remarkableclinical cases, such as BJ who had asnooker cue forced up his nose,damaging the base of this brain, havealso specifically implicated themammillary bodies (see Vann &Aggleton, 2004). Likewise, a large-scale study of memory after tumors inthe middle of the brain has highlightedthe importance of the mammillarybodies (Tsivilis et al., 2008).

A number of other sites have beenalso implicated in amnesia (e.g. theanterior thalamic nuclei, parataenialthalamic nucleus, medial dorsalthalamic nucleus, retrosplenial cortex),and the fact that many of these

structures are directly interconnectedwith the hippocampus has been givengreat significance. The assumption hastypically been that these other regions areof secondary importance, and that theprimary memory influences begin andend with the hippocampus. While suchmodels are anatomically plausible, theyhave an inherent weakness if they fail toexplain why the hippocampus mightbenefit from such a return circuit. Theanswer is surely that these otherstructures provide new informationcritical for temporal lobe function.Indeed, recent research shows that itmight be more insightful to see theseother sites as primarily upstream, notdownstream, from the hippocampus(Vann, 2010), i.e. reversing the traditionalviewpoint. Such findings again emphasisethe need to move to a more balancedview of memory substrates.

In many respects, HM remains theprototypical amnesic. (In fact, it could beargued that HM came to define what isnow meant by the term amnesic.) Thereis little doubt that HM was unique, butthat uniqueness is a double-edged swordgiven the multitude of special factors thatmay have influenced his memoryperformance. It feels almost sacrilegiousto criticise the impact of HM, especiallygiven the quality of the associatedresearch. Nevertheless, the resultantnarrow focus on the hippocampus formemory and memory disorders couldwell have excessively biased our thinking,with far-reaching, unwittingconsequences.


looking back

I John P. Aggleton is in the School ofPsychology, Cardiff [email protected]

Figure 2. Potentially misleading hierarchical diagramportraying the interconnections between thehippocampus, entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex, andparahippocampal cortex. The cortical regions at thebottom provide sensory information to the region. Thethickness of the arrows reflects the strength of thevarious connections.

‘big picture’ pull-out www.thepsychologist.org.uk i

7-9 May 2014International Conference Centre, Birmingham

Annual Conference 2014Our themes for the conference are:l Psychology and warl The psychology of family, parenting and caringl The psychologist as expertl New directions in human

neuroscience

Call for submissions opens:

1 August

www.bps.org.uk/ac2014

‘The conference allows you to keep up todate with the latest research, networkwith individuals from all over the world,and feel part of a strong community’

BIG

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The words ‘such tender years’ were taken from aletter within a certificate for a three-year-old boyat the time of his admission to a lunatic asylum, asa ‘person of unsound mind’. It’s also the title of anew book covering the admission of over 100 under14-year-olds to lunatic asylums in Leicestershiremany decades ago. More than 20 of the youngsterswere aged six years and under.

The book’s author, Diane Lockley, has writtenfor The Psychologist about life in Leicestershire’sfirst lunatic asylum (see ‘Looking back’, June 2012:tinyurl.com/houseofcure). She has been scouringthe medical records, which outline the detailed diagnosis –both clinical and mental – which took place at the time ofentry. ‘Line after line of individual case book entries gaveclear insights into the various patterns of treatment,’ shesays. ‘Warm relationships with both staff and fellow patientshelped to make the new environment a form of home fromhome. Everything was generally done to ensure that timewithin the walls was as well spent as possible.’

From the turn of the century, the admissions usuallyincluded a photograph. Lockley says that ‘the images

inevitably draw any reader closer to the young patients. It is questionable as to whether any of the youngsters wereprepared for the studio camera session, as at times thecropped hairstyles and the uniformity of the clothing led tothem already having a rather institutionalised appearance. A couple appear to be delighted to be posing in front of a camera, whereas others look alarmed and much moreapprehensive.’

Such Tender Years is available from the University ofLeicester bookshop (see tinyurl.com/tenderyear).

Such tender yearsImages courtesy of the Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicesterand Rutland, with commentary by Diane Lockley

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