06-16 SOSO NL vol VI

No. 06-16 Apr 06

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NEWSLETTERNEWSLETTER

Tactics, Techniques, and ProceduresTactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

FOREWORD

This is the sixth newsletter in a series of products focused on company-level operations. It offersobservations, insights, and lessons learned, along with tactics, techniques, and procedures fromUnited States Army and United States Marine Corps sources on tactical marksmanship andsniper/countersniper operations.

Steven MainsColonel, ArmorCenter for Army Lessons Learned

Company-Level Stability Operations and Support Operations:Tactical Marksmanship and Sniper/Countersniper Operations

IntroductionMr. Thomas P. Odom

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Section I. Tactical Marksmanship

Chapter 1: The U.S. Army Squad Designated Marksman (SDM) Training ProgramsMr. Scott Blaney

1

Chapter 2: Marksmanship and the Warrior EthosSGT Frank J. Downard

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Chapter 3: Master Marksmen in the Light InfantrySFC Kenneth Wolfe

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Chapter 4: Preparing a Battalion for Combat: MarksmanshipLTC William C. David 21

Chapter 5: The Building Blocks of Military Operations in Urban Terrain: AdvancedMarksmanship and Special Equipment1SG Jon Dinsmore

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Chapter 6: Enhancing Lethality Across the Force: The Integration of Combat OpticsTechnologies and the Designated Marksman ConceptMAJ (RET) Charles Pavlick

37

Chapter 7: Making a Case for the Military ShotgunCSM (RET) Robert Brizee 43

Section II. Sniper/Countersniper Operations

Chapter 8: Countering Urban SnipersMr. Thomas P. Odom

47

Chapter 9: Conventional Sniper Operations in the Asymmetric FightSFC Michael W. Glancy

59

Chapter 10: Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifle, Extract from "A Summary of CollectedLessons, Observations, Interviews, After-Action Reports, and Relevant Documents,"Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 1 March 2005

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COMPANY-LEVEL STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, VOL. VI

Suggested Reading: Designated Marksman, Precision Rifle Fire in the Marine Squad,MCWL X-File 3-15.31, United States Marine Corps (USMC) Warfighting Laboratory,<http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/x-files.cfm>

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Director Colonel Lawrence H. Saul

Managing Editor George J. Mordica II

Project Analyst (JRTC) Thomas P. Odom

CALL Analyst Ralph D. Nichols

Editor Jenny Solon

Graphic Artist Mark Osterholm

Labels and Distribution Carrie Harrod

CALL has many products of interest. We invite you to visit our Web site at:

http://call.army.mil

The intent of this CALL publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impartlessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinalproduct. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publicationare written by Soldiers for Soldiers. Please send relevant TTP to Mr. George J. Mordica II,Managing Editor (COM: 913-684-9503/ DSN: 552-9503, FAX: DSN 552-9583, email:[email protected].) Articles must be submitted in Microsoft Word format.Graphs, slides, and photos must be submitted separately in their original form in either TFF, PSD(Adobe Photoshop), or high-resolution JPEG format.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary inthe transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds forprinting this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters), such asARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the Global War onTerrorism and should not necessarily be construed as approved Army policy or doctrine.

This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defensepurposes only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protectionas such information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to be revealed toanother country or international organization without the written consent of the Centerfor Army Lessons Learned.


ii FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction

Thomas P. Odom, Joint Readiness Training CenterObservation Detachment

This product is the sixth in a series of newsletters focused on company-level operations. The firstsection of the newsletter concentrates on the core function of not only the infantry but of allSoldiers: tactical marksmanship. A number of articles concerning marksmanship and trainingfocus on improving and sustaining marksmanship skills in tactical units. We must put a highpremium on the ability of all Soldiers to place precision small-arms fire against the enemy. Thatpremium is equally shared by the ability to hit only the intended targets. The same holds true inurban operations.

The first section also describes the various squad designated marksman programs and the use ofcombat optics by the U.S. Army.

The second section on sniper/countersniper operations offers insights, observations, and lessonslearned on the sniper threat and countersniper efforts from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A shortpaper from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned on the use of semi-automatic sniperrifles is also included. It draws on collected lessons, observations, after-action reports, and otherrelevant documents concerning semi-automatic sniper weapons in recent operations in Iraq.

Finally, we recommend that this newsletter be used in tandem with other related CALL products,especially CALL Handbook No. 03-22, Don’t Rent the Night, Own the Night 2; CALLNewsletter No. 03-32, Weapons Effects in Urban Operations; and CALL Newsletter No. 03-4,Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Urban Operations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii


Chapter 1

The U.S. Army Squad Designated Marksman (SDM)Training Programs

Scott Blaney, LTC (RET), U.S. Army

The American Soldier is trained to successfully engage enemy targets from 0 to 300 meters (m).The school-trained and equipped sniper team is able to successfully engage targets from 600 mand beyond. However, until recently, a “no-man’s land” existed between the American Soldier’ssuccessful engagement at 300 m and the sniper team’s successful engagement at 600 m. Intoday’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Soldiers routinely encounter enemy dismountedweapon systems between 300 and 600 m. These deadly threats can engage Soldiers with theshoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) with a range of 500 m, or the 7.62 x 54-mmDragunov sniper rifle with an effective range of 800 m and maximum ranges of 1200 m (opensights) and 1300 m (optical 4X sight). Anti-coalition forces commonly use these two weaponsystems in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

These two threat systems easily cover the “no-man’s land.” The enemy employs them in rangesfrom 300 m to 800 m. While coalition U.S. Army snipers are trained to routinely engage enemyfrom 600 m and beyond, there are not enough trained and equipped Army snipers to accompanyeach combat formation/unit conducting operations in the GWOT. Moreover, in a stabilityoperation or counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, precisely aimed fire is at a premium.

The SDM fills the requirement to kill the enemy in the “no-man’s land” of 300 m to 600 m. TheSDM helps protect Soldiers from threats originating in the “no-man's land.” The SDM can beschool-trained or trained at home station by an SDM school-trained trainer. Currently, there arefour U.S. Army SDM programs. This article examines the benefits of each program.

Common Aspects

SDM programs all derive their purpose and general concepts from FM 3-22.9, RifleMarksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 Carbine, April 2003; Chapter 7, Section VI,Short Range Marksmanship; paragraphs 7-29 (Mission of the SDM), 7-30 (SDM SkillsProgram), and 7-31 (SDM Skills Progression).

According to FM 3-22.9, “The primary mission of the SDM is to deploy as a member of the riflesquad. The SDM is a vital member of his individual squad and not a squad sniper. He fires andmaneuvers with his squad and performs all the duties of the standard rifleman. The SDM hasneither the equipment nor training to operate individually or in a small team to engage targets atextended ranges with precision fires. The secondary mission of the SDM is to engage key targetsfrom 300 to 500 meters with effective, well-aimed fires using the standard weapon system andstandard ammunition. He may or may not be equipped with an optic. The SDM must, therefore,possess a thorough understanding and mastery of the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship as wellas ballistics, elevation and windage hold-off, sight manipulation, and range estimation.”

SDM requires consideration of a number of factors:

• Solid marksmanship performance defined as qualifying two consecutive times assharpshooter or above.

• A clear understanding of the SDM mission, which is to detect, engage, and destroy keytargets from 300 m to 600 m.

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• An understanding of ballistic complexities and fundamentals and the ability to applythese fundamentals consistently during dry-fire and live-fire training.

• Retention sufficient to benefit the SDM and the unit.

• Dependability and excellence in combat.

Soldiers who attend these courses must have good marksmanship skills. Little time is spent onfundamentals. If a Soldier cannot pass the initial shooting test, he is sent back to home station.

The SDM program includes combat support and combat service support Soldiers. Because of thenature of the GWOT, all Soldiers must be riflemen first and then warfighter supporters orwarfighter sustainers. Combat engineers, field artillery, and air defense artillery units deploywith a warfighter mission similar to light infantry. Because of their extensive combat convoytravel requirements within the GWOT areas of operation, other warfighter supporters (signal)and warfighter sustainers (transporters) need SDM as well.

Currently, there are four SDM programs conducted by various active and reserve-componentestablishments.

• The National Guard (NG) SDM Course.

• The U.S. Army Recruiting Command’s Army Marksmanship Unit (AMU), FortBenning, GA.

• The 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC), FortBenning, GA.

• First Army’s Small Arms Readiness Group (SARG), Fort Gillem, GA.

All four courses use FM 3-22.9 as the doctrinal foundation for their programs of instruction(POI). Each course trains unique aspects of marksmanship that they feel produce the best SDM.All four courses graduate SDM that are also qualified as trainers, who bring their skills back totheir units and conduct SDM training. The cost in time and materiel is insignificant relative tothe benefits of having a high number of SDM-trained Soldiers.

All four programs have five phases (extracted from FM 3-22.9):

• Phase I: Position Evaluation. Phase I of the training consists of assuming the properfiring positions and demonstrating the ability to consistently assume each position. Theproper positioning of the Soldier is vital in completing his mission of deliveringaccurate, well-aimed fire.

• Phase II: Dry-Fire Training. During the dry-fire portion of training, the Soldier mustdemonstrate that he can apply the fundamentals of marksmanship correctly. SDMsmust have a solid grasp of the fundamentals to successfully engage targets at longerranges.

• Phase III: Range Estimation and Sight Manipulation, 100 to 500 M. SDMs mustuse range-estimation methods to determine the distance between their position and thetarget.


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• Phase IV: Hold-Off, 100 to 500 M. Hold-off is shifting the point of aim to achieve adesired point of impact. Certain situations, such as multiple targets at varying rangesand rapidly changing winds, do not allow proper windage and elevation adjustments.This technique is used only when the SDM does not have time to change his sightsetting.

• Phase V: Field Fire, 100 to 500 M. Field fire consists of both a Record Fire I and aRecord Fire II course. The field-fire events test the individual’s marksmanship, rangeestimation, and target detection skills.

The SDM skills gained during training at these four courses are highly perishable, andsustainment training is necessary. FM 3-22.9 recommends that sustainment training beconducted semiannually, at a minimum. SDM-trained Soldiers should be allowed sufficienttraining ammunition, ranges, and time to keep their skills fresh, and be encouraged to train otherSoldiers in their units. Commanders should develop an SDM sustainment program. SDMsustainment is a critical skill that will pay great dividends in combat.

Currently, the Army is considering an additional skill identifier (ASI) when a combat-armsSoldier completes a formal SDM course.

Highlights of SDM courses

NG SDM Course

The NG SDM course, taught by the National Guard Marksmanship Training Unit (NGMTU),Camp Joseph T. Robinson, North Little Rock, AR, trains Guardsmen from all 50 states and fourterritories and active-component Soldiers and sister-service marksmen. The NG SDM Course isthe only SDM course listed in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS)(https://www.atrrs.army.mil/default.asp). This course is open to active, National Guard, Reserve,and sister services E-2 through E-7 and O-1 and O-2s. Classes are limited to 24 students. Thecourse features two weeks of intensive SDM training. Students fire over 1,000 rounds ofammunition during the course. This “train-the-trainer” instruction provides training in ballistics,mounting, and zeroing the advanced combat optical gunsight (ACOG) onto an M16A4 rifle;range estimation; engaging moving targets; alternate firing positions; and the role of thesquad-designated marksman on the battlefield. The NGMTU focuses on three areas that havedirect application in combat:

• SDM data notebook

• Manual unknown-distance range estimation

• Elevation and windage hold-off

One unique aspect of the NGMTU course is its unknown distance range. The range is 1,200 mlong and can accommodate 30 marksmen. What makes this range unique is that the targets aremade of ½” to ¾” steel E-type (20” x 40”) and F-type (20” x 20”) silhouettes hanging by twochains on steel frames that are moved around every day at varying distances for each firing orderof marksmen. The student SDM must first manually estimate the ranges of all 20 targets, enterthe estimated range for each target in his target data notebook, and create a range card. Studentsare taught how to estimate range using the front sight post of the M16. Iron-sight training ismandatory because the one-station unit training (OSUT) basic rifle marksmanship does not meetthe needs of the SDM who must kill targets using iron sights out to 600 m. This training isnecessary to enable the SDM to make iron-sight shots past 300 m where external ballistics have



a much greater effect on point of aim and the point of impact. Later, students return to the firingline and are assigned ten targets (one at a time); they engage each target when called out by aninstructor. The course conducts two sessions on these target sets, an hour apart. Studentsparticipate in this exercise nine times during the course. Unknown distance range trains amultitude of necessary SDM skills:

• It forces the student SDM to become proficient at manual range estimation. Theinstructor/observers have laser range finders to accurately range each target, so afterthe session, the students can compare their estimated ranges with the exact lased rangeto each target.

• It compels the student to record the data in their data notebook.

• As each target is assigned, the student SDM must quickly consult his data for thattarget and apply the appropriate hold-off.

• Students must successfully make the shot into a vital area of the target. Each target isconfigured so that the observer can quickly assess the hit or miss and the area hit onthe silhouette.

The NGMTU includes the realities of urban operations and the close-quarters combat Soldier’swill likely encounter in the current theater of operations. Each student SDM has an ACOG on hisM16A4. Each ACOG is equipped with a commercial Pride and Fowler back-up sight, which isspecifically designed for engagements from 0 to 100 m. These back-up sights have anilluminated red dot that, when coupled with the close-quarter combat reflexive firing (also calledsnap-firing) technique, will equip the SDM with the ability to confidently kill any target from 0to 600 m. The last day of training involves the removal of the ACOG, firing with back-up ironsights, then reinstalling the ACOG and firing at the same targets to demonstrate that theweapon’s zero does not change whenever sights are changed/removed. All NGMTU training isconducted without slings attached to the weapon and shooting with the magazine on the ground.

For units going to Afghanistan where SDMs are equipped with M14 rifles, the NGMTU iscapable of integrating the M14 into the course. The course is run entirely with M14s, with POIchanges as required for the weapon and the 7.62 x 51-mm ammunition it fires.

Soldiers selected to attend the NGMTU must meet the qualifications in the ATRRS description.The course will issue each Soldier an M-16A4 with ACOG and spotting scope; they must bringtheir field gear (TA-50).

The NGMTU also has a mobile training team (MTT). With 90 days notice, the MTT can come toan installation and conduct an SDM course. The 90 days allows the team to prepare and permitstime for the installation to set up and schedule the ranges, targets, ammunition, and personnelnecessary to conduct a quality SDM course. The NGMTU can be reached at 501-212-4520/4521,<http://www.arguard.org/mtc>. Most instructors are combat veterans who served in SDM roleswhile deployed for OIF II and are currently members of the All Guard Combat CompetitionTeam.

AMU SDM Course

The AMU SDM course is five days of instruction conducted at Fort Benning, GA. Units can alsorequest an MTT to conduct the course at home station. The AMU course is designed to trainnoncommissioned officer (NCO) and junior officer leaders using “train-the-trainer” methodologyto engage and destroy targets to 550 m/600 yards with the M16 or M4. Instructor candidates aregiven all training resources and live-fire practical exercises to assess, identify, and train unit



SDM. The AMU SDM course is designed to eliminate two of the three variables associated withSDM challenges: equipment and ammunition. The AMU SDM course supplies both. Rifles arespecially constructed in the AMU’s gun shop, where they are fitted with a commercial upperreceiver with a floating match barrel and an ACOG. Ammunition is match-grade, 77-grain,open-tip 5.56-mm, which consistently produces superior accuracy. The elimination of these twovariables leaves the AMU time to focus on the third variable, the student. The AMU SDMcourse consists of five phases:

• Phase 1: Demonstrate proper prone supported and unsupported position and the abilityto consistently assume each position.

• Phase 2: Demonstrate application of fundamentals of marksmanship correctly; zerorifle within 18 rounds.

• Phase 3: Correctly judge distance ± 50 m on 6/6 targets from 100 to 700 m; correctlyadjust rear sight to all targets.

• Phase 4: Engage 16/20 targets from 100 to 600 m using sight manipulation.

• Phase 5: Engage 16/20 targets from 100 to 600 m using hold-offs.

The AMU POI covers both iron sights and the ACOG scope (to include both the standardnational stock number scope and those fielded under rapid fielding initiative). The AMU uses theloop sling to assist the student SDM with steady-holding techniques. Students engage targetsfrom the standing, kneeling, and prone positions. The major difference between the NGMTUrange and the AMU range is that the AMU range has no movable targets that can be set atvarious distances.

The AMU also has an MTT available to train units at home station. As a rule, allow 90 days tocomplete the MTT planning and preparation process. The AMU trains over 800 designatedmarksman instructors per year in the rifle competition off-season from September throughMarch.

The AMU has received more requests to train SDM than they can handle. To solve this problem,the AMU has enlisted the aid of the Civilian Marksmanship Program (CMP). The U.S. Congresscreated the CMP prior to the United States’ entrance into World War I. Its original purpose wasto provide able-bodied civilians an opportunity to learn and practice marksmanship skills so theywould be skilled marksmen if later called on to serve in the U.S. military. The U.S. Armyadministered the CMP from 1916 until 1996. The National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1996 (Title XVI) created the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and FirearmsSafety, Inc. to take over administration and promotion of the CMP. The CMP directorshipenlisted the aid of CMP military rifle instructors (MRIs) who are highly trained and qualifiedcompetitive high-power rifle shooters. Many MRIs hold military and civilian DistinguishedRifleman status, and many have placed in the President’s Hundred at the annual NationalMatches. Prior military experience is preferred, and they must demonstrate and be evaluated ontheir instructor skills. Teams are formed with two or three AMU NCOs (who are the militaryleads and in charge of the team) and four CMP MRIs. These teams have conducted training atFort Hood, TX; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Drum, NY. The U.S. AMU pointof contact (POC) can be reached at 706-545-5279.



2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment SDM Course

The third SDM course is conducted by the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment of the USAIC.This course is organized and structured similar to the NGMTU at Camp Robinson. Their focus isthe OSUT Soldiers graduating from infantry basic training and advanced individual training atFort Benning, GA. The battalion MTT travels to unit locations and trains SDM trainers andSoldiers. Infantry are the only units that have assigned SDM (designated by the A3 ASI) in theirmodification tables of organization and equipment. Non-infantry units still need SDM, at leasttwo per squad. Units should always select their best marksmen to undergo SDM training. Courserequirements:

• All selected Soldiers should be qualified “expert” and have no history of disciplineproblems.

• Soldiers must have correctable vision to 20/20.

• Soldiers must score at least 70 points in each Army physical fitness test (APFT) eventand present a physical training card from their unit.

Once Soldiers complete the SDM MTT POI, they should be listed as the SDM on the battleroster as long as they remain in their squads. Allow 90 days for the MTT to arrange for thetraining. The MTT can train 90 Soldiers and needs a known-distance range of at least 500 m anda 300 m pop-up range. The training ammunition for the POI and the 40 Soldiers is 22,600 roundsM85, 5.56-mm. The MTT prefers that Soldiers train with their deployable weapons fitted withthe ACOG, equipped with the commercial Pride and Fowler back-up sight, which must bepurchased from unit funds. The MTT does not encourage the use of any sling. The 2nd Battalion,29th Infantry Regiment’s Course does not yet have an ATRRS course number.

The POI includes the following:

• 100 hours of training and range time over 10 training days.

• 15 hours of classroom time.

• 50 hours of range time.

• 30 hours of range-estimation and target-detection time.

• Five hours for mentoring.

• Intense focus on range estimation and shooting (target elimination).

• Strong emphasis on hold-off and accounting for weather (wind) from the shooter tohalf way to target (the ACOG has no easily manipulated elevation and windageadjustments).

FM 23-10, Sniper Training, provides the fundamentals for visual cues for wind direction andvelocity; how to read a mirage; target detection in the urban environment; decoys (fakeweapons); enemy uniforms/equipment; and enemy sniper information.

The instructors use commercial hand-held wind-measurement devices and laser range finders tocompare the student’s estimations with actual target ranges.

The 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment POC can be reached at 706-545-2051.



First Army’s SARG SDM Program

The SARG is responsible for training the Army Reserve and National Guard forces in all mattersrelating to small-arms marksmanship (approximately 24 different weapon systems and optics).The SARG SDM program is trained at all First Army mobilization sites and Armypower-projection platforms (PPP) on demand. Recent changes have assigned all mobilizationtraining requirements to the First Army. Currently, the SARG has 90 instructors supporting sixPPPs full time and provides instructors to other locations on demand.

Presently, the SARG has 10 certified SDM instructors and is in the process of certifying 50more. SDM training is focused on Soldiers who have been activated and are at the PPPs. SDMtraining to the troop program unit (drilling Army Reserve units) is provided upon request.

Some of the unique aspects of the SARG SDM training are the following:

• Unaided and aided (optics/thermal sights), such as the PAC-4C, PEQ-2A, AN/PAS-13,AN/PVS-4 and AN/PVS-14, and ACOG night fire in low-light conditions.

• COIN live-fire events, where Soldiers move down a live-fire lane and detect, range,engage, assess, and then continue moving down the lane. Soldiers use all variations ofthe prone, standing, kneeling, and sitting firing positions. Targets are arrayed atdistances from 25 to 300 m.

• A timed four-man fire team assault course where the team starts prone, on line, with a10-round magazine in the weapon. The team stands, sprints (locks and loads whilesprinting) to the firing line, and engages 10 steel targets out to 200 m. This is a timedevent and requires fire team coordination as they move down the lane. They fire fromthe prone, standing, kneeling, and sitting positions.

• SDM target-engagement training is balanced between iron sights/optics and hold-offtechniques.

• The SDM trainer course requires 10 training days and 800+ rounds. The SDM courserequires 7 training days and 654 rounds. The SARG can accommodate 32 students ineither course.

The SARG must accommodate Army Reserve and National Guard units that have a widevariation of training ranges and resources. Because of these realities, the SARG is adept atproducing quality SDM training with unit-supplied resources. There are no special range,equipment, or weapon requirements. They will train SDM with any series of M16 rifles andcombination of optics. To date, the SARG have trained about 4,500 SDM and SDM trainers.

SARG POC information: SGM SARG 404-469-7914.

Sights

Both the NGMTU and the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment recommend the installation of aclose-quarters combat (0 to 100 m) back-up sight on the ACOG. Their sight of choice is thePride and Fowler, Special Operations Compact-1 sight with a five minute of angle (MOA) reddot compact light-emitting diode (LED) sighting system (http://www.rapidreticle.com/soscauto.html). The sight is not Army-issue and must be purchased with unit funds. This back-upsight allows the shooter to hit targets quickly from 0 to 100 m.



Innovative features of the sight include:

• A three-position switch: on, auto-on, and off. In the auto-on position, the pulse LEDadjusts to ambient light and goes to sleep when the cap is placed on the sight; thisfeature allows for use with current night-vision devices.

• The sight’s battery can be changed without removing the sight from the ACOG,obviating the need to re-zero.

• There are two types of mounts available for each type of ACOG currently issued:

º The older-type ACOG with the back-up iron sights requires the TA-01 mounts.

º The newer-type ACOG with the fiber optic tube on top requires the TA-31mounts.

• Both mounts wrap around the tube and provide a positive and semi-permanent mount.

• The main features of the Special Operations Compact-1:

º Body made of 6061 T6 aluminum, anodized black finish.

º Screen made of coated laminated parabolic glass.

º Lens 10/16" high by 14/16" wide; body of sight is 1 to 7/8" long.

º 1" wide at base, 15/16" high at front lens.

º Five MOA pulse LED.

º Weight is 26.4 grams with battery (less than one ounce).

º One #1632 battery included.

º Sight protective cap included.

º Two sight-adjustment wrenches included.

º Installation and sighting in instructions included.

º Waterproof and shock resistant.

Summary

This article describes the various SDM programs that are available to U.S. Army units today. Ina COIN environment, precision, aimed fire (out to 600 m) is a combat multiplier and a vitalcomponent of force protection for small units and detachments. As most U.S. Army units do nothave organic sniper teams, the SDM provides these essential capabilities. Although the SDM isnot intended to duplicate/replace sniper team capabilities, they will enhance your unit’s combateffectiveness. The importance of trained SDM cannot be overstated.

For further information regarding the designated marksman (DM) from a recent Marine Corpshistorical perspective, log onto <http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/x-files.cfm> and select



X-File 3-15.31, “Designated Marksman: Precision Rifle Fire in the Marine Squad” or go to<https://call2.army.mil>, click on Warfighting, Urban Operations, and select this study under theUSMC Urban Operations Articles. This X-File contains significant information on topics, suchas an effective rifle combat optic, marksmanship, ballistics, and night-vision devices. The seriesof Marine Corps DM experiments proved the outstanding value of the rifle combat optic, in thiscase the ACOG. The Marines subsequently equipped all ground combat element riflemen of theMarine Air-Ground Task Force with the ACOG. Recent combat experience in Operation IraqiFreedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has validated that decision. As a result, the Marineshave chosen not to implement a DM program.



Chapter 2

Marksmanship and the Warrior Ethos

SGT Frank J. Downard

Marksmanship is fundamental to combat, and not just to the infantry. Soldiers not only need toknow how to shoot, they need to be trained to shoot accurately and consistently. Precisionmarksmanship is important for several reasons. It is a force multiplier; properly trainedmarksmen and observers provide both critical battlefield information and surgical shooting.Precision marksmanship is also a psychological weapon. Snipers are often (and deservedly so)the most feared enemies on the battlefield. Their ability to engage targets calmly and preciselyfrom long distances, often from positions nearly impossible to detect, inspires fear and is aproven deterrent. Benefits of precision marksmanship include increased Soldier confidence,reduced collateral damage (increasingly important in the current area of operation), andincreased Soldier survivability.

Combat arms Soldiers take weapons proficiency for granted. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs)are the subject matter experts when it comes to these weapon systems. The Army trains tostandard. As long as we meet that standard, it is assumed we will be effective in combat.Unfortunately, this is not the case. Training standards are low when it comes to riflemarksmanship. Current garrison weapons training is potentially positioning Soldiers for failure.

The Army continually trains Soldiers to plan and execute missions, move to contact, recon,patrol, or take actions on an objective. Will commanders be confident that assigned objectiveswill be effectively taken by force when needed? Will Soldiers be able to deliver rounds on targetduring a patrol when necessary? Will one or two qualifications at the range each year inspiremarksmanship confidence and effective use of weapons? Though U.S. Soldiers are historicallybetter marksmen than their enemies, they are nowhere near their potential.

The Squad Designated Marksman (SDM) course teaches NCOs responsible for training Soldiermarksmanship what they need to know about marksmenship. Not knowing some ofmarksmanship’s most basic principles is a sobering experience. The Army needs to reevaluatethe way it prepares Soldiers to carry out their fundamental purpose—to fight and win theNation’s wars by establishing land force dominance. This reevaluation needs to be accomplishedquickly. Changes need to be implemented as soon as possible to prevent loss of American livesand collateral damage. The following are initial observations from the SDM course, pre-snipercourse, and sniper school mobile training team.

Psychology

The psychology of handling and shooting a weapon is a basic marksmanship issue. Weaponswith live ammunition intimidate Soldiers under current training practices. Safety is of paramountimportance in any military operation.

The micromanagment approach to range and weapons handling results in Soldiers who do notlearn to do what needs to be done when it counts -- when the stress is on. Rods are required to bein their weapons on and off the range, muzzles are pointed up and down range at all times. Alane safety officer must inspect the chamber before the Soldiers go down range to check theirtargets. Everything is controlled and regimented. Not only does this take all responsibility awayfrom the individual Soldier, it creates a fear of live ammunition. One sees the result of this incombat. Trainers are not available to clear a Soldier’s rifle chamber after every firefight. Trainerscannot check to make sure the weapon is on “safe” when Soldiers are rushing from one position



to another. In a 360-degree, non-linear battlefield, there is no up and down range, only muzzleawareness.

Training should teach Soldiers to take responsibility for their own weapons from day one.Soldiers must be able to maintain muzzle awareness, trigger safety, and weapons status on theirown. Appropriate training builds proficiency and teaches responsibility. Team confidence resultsfrom knowing every Soldier properly employs his weapon without constant supervision. Safetyis always a primary consideration. Soldiers create a safer environment by emphasizing increasedindividual awareness, as opposed to relying on select individuals to ensure the safety of thegroup.

Training to Hit Versus Training to Shoot

Proper marksmanship training is important to produce superior Soldiers. There is no magic toprecision shooting. Marksmanship relies on basic principles. According to FM 23-10, SniperTraining, two key elements of shooting are pointing the barrel at the target and firing the roundwithout moving the rifle. It sounds like a simple concept; it takes five weeks of training at FortBenning to convey just how complex it is.

There is a time and place for volumes of suppressive fire. Developing that volume is not difficultto execute. Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom are not the environmentsfor a storm of suppressive fire. Soldiers are not storming the beach at Normandy. Soldiers arelooking for two men in the crowd of people outside a mosque who are armed with Chinese andSoviet-era produced light machine guns and/or automatic rifles. Soldiers are looking for the manwith the rocket-propelled grenade who is running down a crowded alley.

A squad of trained marksmen will deliver volume fire on a target, if needed. On the other hand,Soldiers with minimum marksmanship training find it difficult to deliver precision fire on atarget. If the Army is to be a truly agile and adaptive force, it must recognize this and rethink theway it trains Soldiers to shoot. Common knowledge suggests that it is harder to “unlearn”something and be retrained than it is to train correctly from the beginning. Marksmanship is notrocket science. Marksmanship is something every Soldier should learn. Given the propertraining, every Soldier has the potential to shoot like an SDM. This philosophy has beenemployed in the U.S. Marine Corps for years with great success.

Shooting fundamentals and their application cannot be adequately discussed on paper.Fundamentals require hands-on training, repetition, and sending rounds down range. Soldiersneed to see the result of their actions and training. No amount of classroom instruction replacesrange experience, of which there is not enough. Shooting pop-up targets at known distances andlooking for hits or misses does not teach precision shooting. Pop-up targets do not teach Soldiershow wind affects round trajectory. Pop-up targets do not indicate whether a Soldier hits a targetat center mass or barely grazes the edge, nor do they take into account the variables of humidity,light conditions, ammunition, or other important considerations.

Initial Entry

Soldiers are not taught how to shoot properly from the beginning. They get rounds on paper atthe “zero range,” and they hit pop-up targets at the qualification range (or maybe not, if it is a“buddy” range). Few Soldiers understand what they are doing or how their weapon actuallyworks. There is a difference between the training and experience of the average Soldier and thatof a “sniper” or “designated marksman.” Snipers and designated marksmen understand howtheir weapon and sights work. They have the fundamentals of marksmanship down. They applythem with every shot. All Soldiers need to learn is how to make every shot count.



Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Soldiers need training in marksmanship fundamentals. Training includes classroom instructionon weapon operation, ballistics, and shooting fundamentals, as well as practice. Classroomtraining precedes days of range firing at known distances. Soldiers learn the effects of applyingthese fundamentals. Soldiers learn to collect data from each specific rifle, how it shoots, and howto adjust the sights for different distance and wind values.

Soldiers work in teams of two: one shooter and one spotter. They coach each other. They learn to“call the shot” to tell the spotter where the cross hairs were placed when the trigger wassqueezed. The spotter learns to “read trace.” The spotter learns to read the disturbance of aircaused by a supersonic bullet traveling down range. Using this trace, the spotter accuratelypredicts the strike of the round and gives corrections to the shooter for a follow-up round, ifnecessary. At the range, Soldiers keep data books and document environmental conditions, thepoint of round impact, and other pertinent information.

Soldiers need to move away from the “spray and pray” attitude and learn to record every shot.They should learn to make every shot count. They should analyze performance and understandwhy they hit or missed the target. They should also know how to be successful when engagingtargets under the same conditions later. Slow is smooth, and smooth is fast. These first rangesteach Soldiers how different factors, including altitude, wind speed, humidity, and temperature,affect their shooting. Soldiers should learn to read and correctly adjust sights to accommodatewindage, which is the biggest environmental factor affecting marksmanship.

Shooting at moving targets must be included in any training program. The probability ofshooting moving targets in Iraq or Afghanistan is extremely high and is a challenging task if theSoldier has not been trained. After training at known distances, Soldiers will be able toaccurately engage targets out to 500 meters (m) with the standard-issue M4 and advancedcombat optical gunsight (ACOG).

Once trained at known distance shooting, Soldiers move to range estimation and unknowndistance shooting. They will not have a laser range finder to range every target in Iraq orAfghanistan. They must be able to estimate range with a reasonable degree of accuracy to besuccessful engaging the targets, especially during long-distance shooting. Small errors infundamentals or range estimation will have a dramatic impact on the strike of the round. Themost common cause for misses at long range is improper distance estimation. The Soldierapplies the knowledge and data during known distance shooting to engage targets successfully atunknown distances. This type of range training is invaluable for teaching shooters rangeestimation, hold-offs, and other important aspects of marksmanship.

Traditional pop-up ranges are still useful in forcing Soldiers to apply fundamentals quickly.Extend range distances beyond the standard 300 m. Once the Soldier is properly trained, a 300 mtarget presents little challenge. Soldiers need practice to engage targets from standing andkneeling positions.

The importance of alternate shooting positions should not be overlooked. Training shouldinclude aggressive movement, kneeling postures, and bracing against walls. One of the mostoverlooked aspects of marksmanship training is a system of methodical magazine changes.These skills need to be rehearsed to the point where Soldiers can accomplish them in a matter ofseconds in the dark. Stress lanes include all of these aspects. In addition, moving targets requireanother Soldier to move. Stress lanes include alternate shooting positions, range estimation,weak-hand firing, magazine changes, and obstacles. Soldiers climb ladders in buildings and fireat various sized targets from improvised positions behind walls. Targets may be concealed inwindows or on rooftops. This training is timed. Other actions or obstacles add to the stress.



Stress lanes should only be run after the Soldier is properly trained in a relaxed environment andhas displayed the ability to perform all required tasks to standard.

Close quarters battle training helps prepare a unit immeasurably for tasks it will likely conduct.To be successful, training needs to be reinforced in an realistic environment. Continued trainingin realistic scenarios is the only way to improve proficiency. Actions of an entry team need tobecome second nature. They should become fluid, precise operations conducted with totalconfidence. An urban area is likely the worst fighting environment for Soldiers. Being inside abuilding brings the fight even closer. To counteract this, refined and adaptive entry teams musthave the confidence that only comes from experience.

Use of reactive targets, such as balloons, ripe melons, full-liquid containers, or mannequins, isrecommended. Mannequins dressed in real clothing with simulated faces make the experience asrealistic as possible, increasing the Soldier’s chance of being able to perform the same actions ona human target without hesitation.

Equipment

The stock Colt M4 is a three to four minute of angle (MOA) weapon. One MOA equals one inchat 100 yards. To shoot a one MOA group means at 100 yards a shot group would have to bewithin a one-inch circle. Thus, at 200 yards it would be a two-inch group, and at 300 yards itwould be a three-inch group.

The M4 is a three MOA rifle. It cannot be expected to shoot a group that is smaller than threeinches at 100 yards. At 500 yards, this equals a 15-inch group. A four MOA weapon is expectedto shoot a 20-inch group at 500 yards, assuming the shooter is trained and conditions are perfect.The weapon as issued is not designed or expected to shoot any better. This performance isunacceptable for precise shooting.

A number of modifications may make these weapons more accurate. Modifications includefree-floating the barrel, sensitizing the trigger assembly, upgrading to heavy or match-gradebarrels, and using add-ons. Add-ons include commercial products such as Accuwedges. OtherSDM equipment includes bipods, M1 rifle slings for improved stability, and tripods that providea stable shooting platform in a number of situations where none would otherwise be available.

Sniper and SDM Specific Observations

In units such as cavalry squadrons, the modification tables of organization and equipment doesnot include snipers or designated marksmen, making it difficult to get a program up and running.Snipers have specific requirements that must be addressed. Scout platoon leaders and platoonsergeants in infantry battalions are good sources for information about setting up asniper/designated marksman program and are usually designated the sniper employment officersin a light-infantry battalion.

Snipers need to be present at company level for operations order (OPORD) input for anyassigned mission. Officers are not specifically trained to employ snipers. Snipers are the subjectmatter experts on their abilities and employment. In infantry battalions, the scout platoon leaderlearns this job over time. Snipers need to be present for the mission OPORD at the highest levelpossible. They need to know what every element on the ground is doing at all times. Thisknowledge is critical to the success of the sniper’s mission and prevents possible fratricide.Snipers need to inform and advise the commander so they are employed correctly. Snipersrequire special equipment that cavalry squadrons do not have.



Suggestions

1. Independent tests on the free-floated M4s and M16A2s show M4s outperform M16s. The M4is recommended for Soldiers going to sniper team and SDM training. A calibrated M4 would becritical for the sniper team in case the main weapon (the M14, which is not a sniper rifle andrequires modification) goes down for some reason. A calibrated M4 enables teams to deliverprecision fire and continue the mission and allows sniper or SDM teams to be reconfiguredquickly (as part of an entry team), if needed. The commercial Olympic Arms PCR-1 Ultra-matchis capable of shooting sub-MOA groups (guaranteed by the company) and mount any militaryoptic. It is reasonably priced and comes with an outstanding warranty. For units in a financialbind, the upper-receiver can be purchased and mounted to a standard M4/M16 lower. Thismodification results in improved accuracy. The M4s should be equipped with bipods andACOGs.

2. A combination binocular/laser range finder for each sniper team (as stated earlier, the biggestcause of long-range misses is incorrect range estimation) costs a few hundred dollars and willsignificantly aid the sniper team. They are more user-friendly than carrying the mini-eye safelaser infrared observation set. If nothing else, a smaller pair of binoculars should be issued toreplace the cumbersome models in current use.

3. Camera tripods can be modified into a shooting platform, which can be used in any number ofsituations. Shooting tripods require no modification and are available. Shooting mats create astable platform and aid the shooter by providing comfort. Mats also help keep the rifle in place,prevent dust from obscuring optics, and prevent giving away positions.

4. Not all ammunition is created equal; different ammunition is used for different purposes. TheM855 5.56-mm ammunition was created to be used in machine guns, where accuracy issacrificed for volume of fire. If a unit trains and employs SDMs, it needs to provide them withequipment and ammunition tailored to their mission. Match-grade 5.56-mm ammunition isapproved by the Army and is readily available to the unit. This ammunition should be issued toanyone in an SDM position.

5. Accuwedges cost about five dollars each. These devices keep the upper and lower receiver ofthe M4 tight and stable and improve consistency and accuracy.

6. M1 slings issued to all Marines during “boot camp” are essential for stability and accurateshooting. Using the sling is one of the marksmanship fundamentals of shooting, not justsomething to keep the rifle from hitting the ground.

7. Tac-Latch provides a modification to the charging handle, making charging the weapon orapplying slap, pull, observe, release, tap, and shoot much easier, especially when the Soldier iswearing gloves. These devices are available at any number of commercial vendors, includingAimtech.com and Olympic Arms.

8. Drag bags help the sniper carry and conceal his rifle and equipment.

9. When placed over windows, cheesecloth helps snipers conceal themselves in buildings.

10. Snipers also require additional information the average Soldier does not consider. They needto know the measurements of buildings, windows, and streets for range estimation. Targetfolders of specific people, buildings, or high-value targets should be part of every mission andshould include all pertinent information and pictures. A booklet with photographs of the differenttypes of enemy weapons is also required. Snipers recognize targets of opportunity when they



present themselves. Normal citizens should not be included on booklet distribution. Get thisinformation from the S2 in the infantry battalions.

Summary

There is no magic solution to precision shooting. Consistency equals accuracy. Slow is smooth,and smooth is fast. Precision marksmanship is so important that basic training programs shouldbe extended to include it. This is not training that is left to the final weeks before deployment.The warrior ethos harkens to this training philosophy; a Soldier is a warrior skilled in the tools ofhis trade. Marksmanship is fundamental to all Soldiers. Replicating more realistic marksmanshiptraining at home station translates into a more lethal, combat-effective Soldier and unit,enhancing mission success.



Chapter 3

Master Marksmen in the Light Infantry

SFC Kenneth Wolfe

Previously published in Spring 2002 Infantry Magazine

Infantrymen today continue to struggle with marksmanship, especially under combat conditions.Trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) continue to document that soldiers do notengage targets effectively. Until unit leaders make marksmanship a command focus instead of abiannual requirement, it will continue to be unrealistic, less cost effective, and in many casesunsafe. Consider the precious training hours and dollars spent on leadership development andunit training. All of that time and money is wasted if soldiers cannot effectively engage targets.

I recommend that all light infantry battalions designate a Master Marksman, and make himresponsible for establishing and directing a comprehensive marksmanship program within theunit. The Army’s mechanized infantry and armor units as well as the Marine Corps have suchprograms in place. The results have been superbly trained individual marksman and gun crews.The Master Gunner programs work.

With the support of his commander, a battalion Master Marksman would improve marksmanshipproficiency in the light infantry battalions. A Master Marksman would be the battalioncommander’s subject matter expert on all weapons organic to the battalion. That alone wouldprovide a single point of contact for improving the unit’s corporate knowledge of its organicweapons and their sighting systems. That is no small task, considering that the inventoryincludes night vision devices (NVDs), laser and optic, 9mm, M4, M203, M249, M240B, M24,M2 .50 caliber machinegun, and Mk 19 grenade launcher. But it is through training that theMaster Marksman would really come into play as a combat multiplier. He would plan thebattalion’s consolidated weapons training in each training cycle and prior to the assumption ofany Readiness Force mission, or deployment for war or operations other than war.

The assistant S-3 NCO would be a good candidate for this job. The light infantry battalionmilitary table of organization and equipment (MTOE) already allows for two sergeants first classin the battalion S-3 shop, and one of them should be able to fill this role. As senior NCOs, thesesergeants are experienced with all weapon systems within the battalion. Being in the S-3 shop isideal. They are also placed where they can draw on the knowledge represented in theDepartment of the Army school system as well as local small-arms schools. The MasterMarksman would have direct contact with the S-3—the most important training officer in thebattalion. He would interact daily with the battalion training area and ammunition NCO toprocure ranges and Class V. Moreover, the Master Marksman would become an integral part ofthe battalion’s training and support meetings along with the battalion and company XOs.

The duties and responsibilities of a battalion Master Marksman would closely resemble those ofa mechanized infantry or armor Master Gunner. He would establish the battalion training planfor all Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) qualification and small arms training. Suchduties would encompass scheduling, preparing, and running the ranges. The Master Marksmanwould attend preliminary marksman instruction, qualifications, zero ranges, and known-distanceranges. He could offer instruction on the fundamental elements of marksmanship, shadowbox,dime-washer drills, Weaponeers, dry firing exercises, and other subjects.

As the battalion became more proficient at these tasks, the Master Marksman could transitioninto more advanced techniques of fire, close quarters marksmanship (CQM), close quartersbattle, reflexive and quick fire, as well as the four positions for firing on a known distance



range—sitting, kneeling, off-hand prone, and rapid fire. Flat 25-meter ranges would be used toteach controlled pairs, automatic fires, turning and running techniques—all a part of his duties.As the soldiers and leaders became skilled in marksmanship, the battalion Master Marksmanwould take marksmanship to the next level, which might include engaging targets in rooms,hallways, and stairwells. These make up a unique phase of CQM. Point-man and quick-reactiondrills for patrolling should be incorporated and emphasized. Ranges for crew-served weaponsshould meet more than the requirements of zero and qualification, and should also includetargets with depth, linear, oblique, and enfilade engagements. Traversing and elevationmanipulation and the understanding of the traversing bar on a tripod would all be within hissphere of responsibilities. The battalion Master Marksman should establish qualifying standardsin each of these tasks so that live-fire exercises would become more meaningful.

Where does the battalion Master Marksman gain the knowledge to accomplish all theserequirements? He should already have these skills due to his rank and experience. SniperSchool would be a tremendous asset for the pure fundamentals of marksmanship. M249 andM240B courses from the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning would be another avenue to explore.Mobile training teams (MTTs) could easily be laid on from the Special Forces community or theArmy Marksmanship Unit for more advanced shooting at minimal cost to any unit.

Every issue of Infantry Magazine offers training tips and notes. Several civilian handgunsmagazines offer different insights on weapons training that would be beneficial to a battalionMaster Marksman. An extensive library of field and technical manuals will be maintained inorder to complete the plan, particularly with crew-served weapons. Additionally, the Center forArmy Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter would also be helpful.

A battalion Master Marksman would and should use his expertise everyday. Most units operateon three cycles: Field training (combined arms live fire exercises, range training); deploymentreadiness force and combat training center deployments; and support (post details, schools, andleave).

In the field, the battalion Master Marksman would observe units during live-fire exercises(LFXs), make recommendations to commanders, and attend after-action reviews. The battalionMaster Marksman would focus on improving the hit-to-miss ratio during LFXs and the properdeployment of crew-served weapons.

In range training, the battalion Master Marksman would oversee the battalion’s consolidatedweapons training. As the battalion commander’s subject matter expert, he would ensure thatranges are being run to standard. He would reinforce the proper execution of all tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs), in accordance with the battalion commander’s intent. Thebattalion Master Marksman would use feedback from OICs and NCOICs to improve weaponstraining.

The support cycle would be the most important one for the battalion Master Marksman. Usingcompany and platoon marksmanship training plans, he would consolidate those programs andadd his own ideas. That would make him the battalion’s coach, teacher, and mentor on allaspects of marksmanship. He would train the units’ trainers and set the battalion up for futuresuccess.

In addition, the battalion Master Marksman could help make the marksmanship training safer,more realistic, and more cost effective in several ways. First of all, a constant focus on the useof weapons would make marksmanship training safer. Soldiers who have weapons in their handsall the time tend to be more comfortable with them. Soldiers with a solid understanding of thefunctions and capabilities of their weapons are more confident with them. Fully versed in thelimitations and capabilities of his weapon system, a soldier is more prepared to execute safer



more realistic LFXs. Coupled with a regular shooting regime, a superbly confident and safemarksman will emerge.

Engaging the enemy in combat will not be done from behind two sandbags, nor will it be from aculvert buried in ground overlooking a perfectly manicured range. This is not realistic, and ourtraining should reflect the threat. As more of the world becomes urbanized, the distance andreaction times of our engagements will decrease. Our marksmanship training should reflect thisas well. In the city or the jungle, a light infantryman’s fight starts at his muzzle. He may beprone, kneeling, or standing, all in a matter of seconds. Realistic marksmanship trainingencompasses those scenarios. The battalion Master Marksman would enforce reality, insistingthat units train for combat marksmanship—training as they fight.

A light infantryman must qualify twice a year, which requires 160 rounds of 5.56mm. At 22cents a round, this amounts to $35.20 per man per year. If a soldier hits the target only 100times, that is a loss of $13.20 in training funds. Multiplied by the 600-man strength of a lightinfantry battalion, the loss comes to $7,920.00. Taking this analogy even further, let’s look atthe company LFX, including breaching the wire to clear a trench and bunkers: Each riflemanstarts with 210 rounds, M249 gunner with 600, and M240B gunner with 900. When it is addedup, nearly 30,000 rounds will be expended. If only half of these rounds hit targets, are we trulygetting the best use out of our training dollars? In the beginning, a battalion Master Marksmanprogram may use up more ammunition, but over time a command focus on marksmanshiptraining will save training dollars. During the Gulf War, for example, effective marksmanship inthe mechanized divisions was attributed to a Master Gunner Program.

Looking at it from another angle, consider all of the training, leader development, and materialcosts involved in putting a soldier out on the line. We owe every one of our soldiers a fightingchance to survive in combat. If he can’t hit what he’s aiming at, we as leaders have failed.



Chapter 4

Preparing a Battalion for Combat: Marksmanship

LTC William C. David

Previously published in July-August 1995, Infantry Magazine

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is the second in a series of four. The author commanded the 2dBattalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), in Somalia in late-1993, andwrote the series at the encouragement of the division commander.

The first article in the series, on physical fitness and mental toughness, appeared in theMay-June 1995 issue of INFANTRY; the two remaining articles, on maneuver live fire trainingand leadership lessons learned, will appear in subsequent issues.

Marksmanship is linked to the very essence of a light infantry battalion; it is the mostfundamentally important individual combat skill for light-infantrymen. When soldiers lackconfidence in their buddies’ ability to provide them with accurate covering fire, there is no fireand movement. And without fire and movement, the effectiveness of the scheme of maneuveralso begins to disintegrate. No matter how well-conceived a plan may be, or how well it iscoordinated and rehearsed, mission success depends upon solid marksmanship skills at the pointof attack.

Close combat continues to be a fight that is won or lost at squad and platoon level, where theimpetus for fire and movement is found in the acts of individuals. Skill in marksmanship -- andthe confidence in one’s weapon that comes with it -- is the enabling tool that overrides asoldier’s natural inclination to go to ground under fire. It can transform a group of otherwisepassive individuals into aggressive squads and platoons with the skill and will to win.

To win this close fight, light infantrymen must be consistently able to acquire and hit difficulttargets that are partially exposed or camouflaged, stationary or moving, day or night. They mustbe cross-trained on all platoon weapons so that they will have the confidence to man key systemsin the event of crew casualties.

Confidence in marksmanship is also the most important mental ingredient commanders can givesoldiers for overcoming their personal fear in combat. In close combat, where a soldier can oftensee his enemy, that fear is even more intense. Even if the enemy’s physical form is not clearlyvisible, the flash of his weapon usually is, and the rounds can be heard snapping overhead.

It is very sobering to lie in the prone position with your face in the dirt and enemy fire allaround. Men you’ve never met and will never know are trying to kill you. The future is nowmeasured in terms of the ability to kill before being killed. For a flash, it seems strange andwrong somehow that the sum total of life’s experiences should come to this.

Fear is therefore a natural reaction; it has weight that can slow or stop the sturdiest of men. Butwhen their marksmanship is developed to a high level, soldiers gain an intangible psychologicaledge that keeps paralysis from taking over. It gives them the capacity to act in the face of greatdanger.



Close combat continues to be a fight that is won or lost at squad and platoon level. Towin this fight, light infantrymen must be consistently able to acquire and hit difficulttargets.

For all of these reasons, when I took command of the battalion, I viewed marksmanship as one ofthe essential core performance areas for light infantry operations. High performance inmarksmanship would always give the battalion a key tactical advantage; and once we had thisadvantage, it would be ours to keep. This was one area in which we could control our own fate.

Training Guidance

Every division uses weapon qualification statistics as one of its primary tools for assessingcombat readiness. Without question, qualification is important, but a soldier has to master thefundamentals of marksmanship before he can qualify with an individual or crew-served weapon.Then, qualification tables will provide a consistent standard against which to evaluateperformance and measure progress.

Standard weapon qualification provides the start point for the development of combatmarksmanship skills. To kill efficiently and effectively in combat, however, a light infantrymanhas to be a better shot than the marksmanship tables require him to be.

Weapon qualification is conducted on fixed ranges with clear fields of fire, with targets that onlymove up and down and are usually clearly visible. Qualification isn’t conducted as part of fireand movement and, except for the noise of the firing line, there are no distractions, such asindirect fires, smoke, or attack helicopters. Most often, weapons are fired from the prone positiononly, and qualification may not be conducted frequently enough to keep skills truly sharp.

Against many competing demands for time and resources, units sometimes tend to beoverwhelmed by the crush of events. Unless they are careful, units may discover that they’respending most of their time on the range just keeping up with reportable weapon qualificationrequirements.

Marksmanship should be one of our major strengths, and focusing on weapon qualification alonewon’t develop high performance in combat marksmanship. To reach this high level, units mustdo more in their training.

To duplicate what the soldier will find on the battlefield, commanders must make conditionsmore challenging and realistic. And to provide soldiers with opportunities for steadyimprovement in their marksmanship skills, firing must be more frequent. These two steps willdevelop combat marksmanship, giving soldiers both the skill and the will to overcome theirnatural fear in combat and to kill a determined enemy.

Getting the Ten-Percent Difference

After assuming command and making an initial assessment, I discovered that the battalion’smarksmanship was in pretty good shape. The units had achieved basic weapon proficiencyacross the board, and all training management standards had been met. Nevertheless, I knew thiswas no guarantee that we would be able to perform at peak levels in combat; like any unit, wehad room for improvement. This core performance area therefore became a focus of attention.

Combat marksmanship is the area in which we sought to gain our ten-percent improvement. Wewanted to hone a variety of important battlefield shooting skills to a high level. Doing this would



give our soldiers the skills they needed to overcome their natural fears in combat and kill theenemy.

Any unit can make dramatic improvements in marksmanship. No hard-sell is required.Noncommissioned officers and soldiers fully understand that their survival in combat is directlytied to their ability to shoot. This is one combat skill in which they want to excel.

My personal role in this process was simple. First, I made targetry and feedback onmarksmanship a priority in all collective training, whether it was force-on-force or live-fire.Second, I gave company commanders the freedom to use their initiative in conductingnonstandard marksmanship training on the range. These two fine-tune adjustments were all thatwas required to put a series of actions into motion to give us the ten-percent improvement wewanted.

Qualification is important, but a soldier has to master the fundamentals ofmarksmanship before he can qualify with an individual or crew-served weapon.

For all maneuver live-fire exercises, targetry was always a key item of interest to me. Forlive-fire exercises conducted at company level and below, it was one of the areas that requiredmy personal approval during the company commander’s pre-execution briefing. I wanted to besure that target arrays were realistic and that they accurately depicted enemy situationaltemplates appropriate to the training scenario. The targets on the range had to be laid out asbriefed. Problems that could be fixed were fixed on the spot.

The same rules applied to any maneuver live-fire range run by the battalion. The S-3 had to getmy personal approval on the targetry plan at the concept briefing. Before execution, I walked theground with either the S-3 or the assistant S-3 to confirm the plan and make any adjustments thatmight be needed. It didn’t take the battalion long to figure out that I had a real interest intargetry. If they didn’t have a good plan, they would be sent back to the drawing board, alongwith an impromptu class on the relationship between targetry and training realism.

Eventually, our targetry became more sophisticated. We gradually replaced silhouettes withtarget mannequins (in the style of those at the Joint Readiness Training Center), constructedwithin the battalion. The battalion S-4 coordinated with the Defense Reutilization and MarketingOffice for expendable uniforms and equipment to make our targets and objectives as lifelike aspossible. One ambitious company commander did the battalion staff one better and riggedmoving dummy targets on a squad react-to-contact live-fire range.

We got started in the right direction and, after a while, momentum took over. Enhancing realismon the range became an area of constructive competition within the battalion, and the payoff washigher quality training for the soldiers.

Target hits were always counted on maneuver live-fire situational training exercises to grademarksmanship. Soldiers were allowed to see the effects of their weapons by walking over theobjective as part of the after-action review. Seeing a splintered mannequin whose uniform theirfire had just torn to shreds helped them appreciate the deadly power they had at their fingertips.

Without exception, all force-on-force training was conducted with the soldiers wearing MILES(multiple-integrated laser engagement system) gear. While MILES is far from perfect, it helpsget soldiers accustomed to shooting at moving targets and targets above ground level. It is alsothe best system available for honing individual movement techniques (IMTs) under fire. Most ofour live-fire exercises were also conducted with MILES, and even in these exercises,



observer-controllers had the authority to score “kills” on soldiers who had failed to executeIMTs according to standard.

Combat marksmanship is the area in which we sought to gain our ten-percentimprovement. We wanted to hone a variety of important battlefield shooting skills to ahigh level.

The greatest advances in individual combat marksmanship training, however, resulted fromcreativity and ingenuity at company level and below. These efforts made marksmanshipchallenging and, at the same time, sustained the soldiers’ enthusiasm by making training fun.

The following are a few of the techniques our units employed:

• To give soldiers practice at hitting moving targets, units constructed simple framesfrom 2x4s and hung plastic bottles or balloons from the cross-members. The windalone was enough to cause movement in the targets.

• In Somalia, one company took target practice on water bottles in the ocean, allowingnatural wave action to move the targets. At night, chemical lights were put inside thebottles to aid in identification, and the soldiers received immediate feedback on theirhits.

• The same company ran timed squad marksmanship competitions in which each squadwas issued identical loads of ammunition. Each squad trained its weapons on a vertical4x4 post planted in the ground, the object being to determine which squad could cut itspost in half the fastest. Ties were settled on the basis of the fewest rounds expended.

• Another company drilled fire teams and squads on marksmanship as part of fire andmovement by creating live-fire lanes where targets were randomly changed betweeniterations. The fire teams or squads with the most target hits were appropriatelyrewarded.

Skill in marksmanship is the enabling tool that overrides a soldier’s natural inclinationto go to ground under fire.

Because I wanted members of the chain of command to use imagination in seeking better waysto train, I did not standardize combat marksmanship training into a formal program. Instead,units shared information on training techniques that worked well -- and those that didn’t -- atweekly training meetings. I saw it as a perfectly legitimate use of time and resources for platoonsto go out to the range and shoot, without turning it into a standard qualification range. I didn’thave to sell its importance to anyone.

It was relatively easy to get the ten-percent improvement in marksmanship. Two fine-tuneadjustments did the trick:

• First, we made marksmanship a consistent priority in all collective training andestablished simple internal feedback mechanisms to assess our progress.

• Second, to improve individual combat marksmanship skills, I left it to the chain ofcommand to figure out the best way to get the desired results.



Once they knew they were free to experiment, the noncommissioned officers really took overand ran the show, and the payoffs were dramatic. The soldiers developed exceptionalmarksmanship skills arid became extremely confident with their weapons. When the battaliondid conduct weapon qualification, about 75 percent of the soldiers scored Expert.

The 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, became a high-performing unit that could flat-out shoot; theproof of this was demonstrated in all the battalion’s later combat operations in Somalia.

Payoffs in Combat

The focus on combat marksmanship enabled the battalion to deliver well-aimed, accurate fireduring urban combat operations in Mogadishu. After squeezing the trigger, a soldier could seethe enemy drop. If fire was received from the dark recesses of a room, that fire was soonfollowed by silence after a 40mm round or a burst of machinegun fire went through the window.

Soldiers discovered they had the tools to beat the enemy in his own back yard. It quickly becameclear to them which side had the better force. Once a unit was in contact, the paralysis of fearnever had a chance to take hold. In its place were confident soldiers, doing their jobs the waythey had been trained.

Once a unit was in contact, the paralysis of fear never had a chance to take hold. In itsplace were confident soldiers, doing their jobs the way they had been trained.

The typical Somalia National Alliance militiaman was a poor marksman. Instead of usingwell-aimed shots, he preferred to spray areas with automatic weapon fire. While this techniquewas certainly an attention-getter, our soldiers could see that it was not an effective way to kill.By contrast, most of our fighting was conducted from point-blank range out to 200 meters, andon those occasions when the enemy exposed himself for a direct shot, our soldiers got immediatefeedback from their well-aimed fire.

All of this gave the soldiers exceptional confidence, which was instrumental in maintainingmomentum in the attack. They were never hesitant to fire their weapons and were confident inthe ability of their buddies on the right and left to deliver accurate covering fire. Squad and fireteam leaders identified targets with tracers, and then the enemy was eliminated. Fire andmovement worked just like the book said it would, and high performance in individual combatmarksmanship made it possible.

The soldiers made each round count. From their training, they were familiar with shooting atmoving and partially exposed targets from a variety of firing positions. On the basis ofpost-battle reports from UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) headquarters by boththe International Committee for the Red Cross and human intelligence sources, enemy casualtiesin each of the task force’s engagements exceeded friendly casualties by factors of 10 to 20.

This helped make the ammunition-intensive nature of urban fighting less operationallyrestrictive. During engagements ranging from five to seven hours, our companies never ran outof ammunition. This meant we never had to conduct an ammunition resupply under fire-theimportance of which cannot be overstated. The soldiers had the discipline to shoot only at targetsthey could clearly identify. The repetition in training had given them confidence in their abilityto use well-aimed shots instead of a heavy volume of poorly aimed fire.

Because marksmanship is a core performance area and the essence of light infantry operations,this was an area in which I felt a ten-percent improvement would give us a decided edge, and



combat proved that it did. All battalions, if committed to the effort, have the resources to achieveresults that are just as good. Doing two simple things consistently in all training did the trick forus:

First, marksmanship was an area of constant command attention in all collective trainingconducted in the battalion, whether live fire or force-on-force.

Second, the companies were given the freedom to use their initiative in implementingnonstandard instructional techniques designed to improve marksmanship skills.

Marksmanship is a task in which soldiers and leaders truly want to achieve excellence; nooutside help is required, and its payoff in combat cannot be overstated.



Chapter 5

The Building Blocks of Military Operations in Urban Terrain:Advanced Marksmanship and Special Equipment

1SG Jon Dinsmore

In few other professions is the cost of being unprepared so high, yet many Army units who trainat the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) are ill-equipped to successfully completethe military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) mission. Soldiers have encountered MOUTduring peace support and combat operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, andit is the foremost concern for units conducting operations in Iraq. It is irresponsible to send a unitinto combat without all of the tools and training necessary to successfully complete this mission.

Many professional articles have been written about lessons learned in MOUT, and severalexcellent resources are available for leaders to use to prepare for this difficult task (e.g., theCALL Web site at <http://call.army.mil> and new Army field manuals: FM 3-06.11, CombinedArms Operations in Urban Terrain [previously FM 90-10-1], and FM 3-22.9, RifleMarksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4 and M4 Carbine [previously FM 23-9]). Time is ourmost limited resource. Therefore, commanders must begin with a methodical training plan tomake the most of available time. This article focuses on unit training conducted prior to MOUToperations. It offers a way to accomplish advanced marksmanship training, and identifies thetools and special equipment necessary to help set the conditions for success.

Implementing a solid marksmanship plan prior to conducting MOUT training is essential. Manyunits associate semi-annual zero and qualification ranges with marksmanship training, but thesetechniques provide very little real target feedback besides target hits or misses. Strictly zeroingand qualifying is not practical for combat marksmanship training. Every round fired from aSoldier’s weapon is of great consequence. Once a round leaves the chamber, it can travelthrough rooms and walls until hitting something, possibly resulting in collateral damage orworse, fratricide. To reduce the risk of fratricide, marksmanship programs must ensure that everySoldier can accurately engage targets while moving and make every round count. The tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) for advanced marksmanship are significantly morecomplicated than those required on a qualification range and must be well rehearsed.

The following sample seven-day training plan provides commanders with a comprehensive,progressive, sequential unit program, beginning with engaging targets on a known distance (KD)range to safely executing a well-rehearsed night live fire in a MOUT environment. This plan is aguideline tool -- not all inclusive -- for units to accomplish specific training objectives. Itprovides an intensive, doctrinally-based plan to begin battle-focused MOUT marksmanshiptraining. The challenge for commanders is to ensure adequate time is dedicated for MOUTtraining. (See "MOUT and the U.S. Army: Give Us Time to Train," by MAJ Brett C. Jenkinson,CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 01-9 at <http://call.army.mil>). Basic rifle marksmanshipand primary marksmanship instruction must be conducted prior to MOUT training.

Advanced Marksmanship Sample Training Plan

DAY 1: KD Range (FM 3-22.9, Chapter 5)

The three objectives of the KD range are to fire tight shot groups, make sight adjustments atrange by adjusting for the effects of wind and gravity, and marksmanship testing. The KD rangeprovides precise feedback for each bullet striking the target. This is the primary marksmanshiptraining range for many infantry units and the U.S. Marine Corps. Being able to accurately



engage a moving target is critical in MOUT. Score and record the results of the KD training forfuture reference. The five events to be conducted on day one follow:

200 Meter (M). M68 close combat optic (CCO). (FM 3-22.9, p. 2-15)

• Fundamentals of marksmanship.

• Grouping drills at 100 to 300 m.

Note: A 200-m zero is more accurate than a 25-m zero, and it provides the shooter with actualfeedback from a known distance. It provides a good average or mean range when conductingshort-range marksmanship at predominantly 100 m or less. There is less change in trajectoryfrom point of aim to point of impact, requiring fewer range adjustments when engagingshort-range targets. Each Soldier will better understand the adjusted point of aim for targets atdifferent ranges. This technique takes more time than a 25-m zero, but should be used if facilitiesand time permit.

Moving Target Fundamentals. Moving target fundamentals are extremely important foraccurately engaging targets in a MOUT environment (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-31).

• The target detail uses a silhouette on a 10-foot stake or a half-silhouette to represent aside profile from behind the KD range.

• The target detail uses moving targets at varied speeds and engagement times.

º Lead requirements: (FM 3-22.9, Figure 7-29).

º Tracking: This is a more accurate technique for use by experienced firerscontinuously tracking the target or moving the weapon with the target (FM3-22.9, p. 7-37).

º Trapping: Setting an aiming point in front of a moving target and firing whenthe target comes into the sights.

Alternate Firing Positions. Sitting, kneeling, standing. (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-2)

Night 200-M Zero.

• AN/PAQ-4C infrared (IR) laser.

• AN/PEQ-2 IR target pointer/illuminator/aiming light.

Night Grouping Drills. Engage targets using night-vision and laser-aiming devices duringlimited visibility:

• Primary means of engaging targets outside of buildings.

• Grouping (same as day iteration).

• Movers (same as day iteration).



DAY 2: Advanced Marksmanship (FM 3-22.9, Chapter 7)

Rapid magazine changes, weapon malfunction drills, moving with a weapon, and targetengagement drills are critical to success in MOUT and must be continually rehearsed. Based onunit weapons proficiency, weapons should remain loaded, with a heavy emphasis placed onmuzzle awareness and weapons safety (FM 3-22.8, p. 7-44). Train as you fight. Develop a unitstanding operating procedure (SOP) for malfunctions, magazine changes, and immediate andremedial actions; apply the SOP during range training.

Short-Range Marksmanship (SRM). (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-39)

• Isosceles stance (boxing). Feet shoulder-width apart, knees bent (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-39).

• Low or high ready position (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-40).

• Aiming techniques: (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-41)

º Slow aimed fire: Slowest, most accurate for 25-plus m.

º Rapid aimed fire: Focus on target, 0 to15 m.

º Aimed quick kill: Preferred, fastest, most accurate to 12 m.

º Instinctive fire: Least accurate; only for emergencies.

º Lethal shot placement (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-42).

º Controlled pairs: The ability to place two rapid, well-aimed shots in the lethalzone (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-43).

Reflexive Firing. Reflexive firing involves the practical application of the four fundamentalskills of SRM (weapon ready positions and firing stance, aiming technique, aim point, andtrigger manipulation). Reflexive firing should be conducted as refresher training as often aspossible. This refresher training is a great opportunity for Soldiers to get familiar with firing inclose proximity to one another (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-25).

• Multiple-targets, multiple ranges from 5 to 25 m.

• Timed engagements.

• Engage targets while moving.

º Left, right, and rear turns.

º Walking forward and away from the target (180-degree turn and shoot).

º Walking left to right, right to left, and parallel to the target.



MOUT Barriers. (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-5)

• Firing with the non-firing hand around an obstacle.

• Firing around a high wall, around and over a low wall, under a low wall.

• Firing from a window or door.

Target Discrimination. Target discrimination is the act of quickly distinguishing betweencombatant and noncombatant personnel and engaging only the combatants. U.S. forces engage inprecision room clearing to apply discriminating combat power and limit unnecessary casualtiesamong noncombatants. Target discrimination is vital in precision room clearing. If there are nononcombatants, there is less need for selective engagements. However, even if an area is knownto be free of noncombatants, other Soldiers moving through the area may be mistaken for theenemy and engaged unless clearing team members are disciplined and well-trained in fire controland target discrimination (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-46; FM 3-06.11, p. 3-24).

Firing from a Vehicle. Firing from slow or stationary vehicles is a common combat scenariothat is very seldom rehearsed. Soldiers must apply leading techniques similar to those learnedfrom firing at moving targets on the KD range to compensate for vehicle speed. Combat-armsand support personnel are frequently engaged by opposing forces and are often unable tosufficiently return fire to break contact.

DAY 3: Advanced Marksmanship

Physical Training (PT). Units must develop a PT program that focuses on tasks necessary for aMOUT environment: climbing in windows, climbing over walls, moving across rooftops, etc.These are tasks that require increased attention on upper-body strength and conditioning.

• Obstacle course with assault uniform, weapon, and equipment.

• PT can be incorporated into a range drill; run through the course and move directly onto the range.

Combat Assault Drills. Timed stress test incorporating all advanced marksmanship skillslearned from day one and two.

• Validates each firer’s abilitiy to safely engage targets.

• A variable of this is to send two or more Soldiers together through a drill, practicingreflexive fire and target discrimination as a buddy team; this reinforces firing in closeproximity to others.

Marksmanship Qualification. (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-47)

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Fire. Firing in various levels of the mission oriented protectiveposture (MOPP) (FM 3-22.9, p. 7-19).

Night Reflexive Firing. (Same as day, with under-gun lights)

Night Target Discrimination. (Same as day, with under-gun lights)

Night Marksmanship Qualification. (Same as day, with under-gun lights)



DAY 4: Demolitions Range

Ballistic Breach Training (Shotgun). One technique is for the firer to place the end of theshotgun at a 45-degree angle, between the doorknob and the frame as close as possible to thedoor without touching it, and fire one round into the jam. The firer shoots, reloads, and assessesthe door, and prepares to fire a second round if needed. Once the lock is defeated, the firer kicksthe door open for the clearing team to enter, then rejoins the trail of the team. Breaching isprogressive, and the technique used is based on the situation. Do not establish obvious patterns(FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Figure 3-26).

Mechanical Breach Training. (FM 3-06.11, p. 3-20)

• Sledge hammer.

• Halligan tool (see special equipment on page 35).

• Broco cutting torch (see special equipment on page 35).

• Bolt cutters.

• Quickie saw.

• Chain saw.

Explosive Breaching. Explosive breaching is an excellent technique to create surprise or regainmomentum (FM 3-06.11, Chapter 8).

• Flex linear, rigid linear, door knob, general purpose charge.

• Breach doors, walls, window frames.

DAY 5: Clearing Buildings

Each element conducts day and night instructor-evaluated dry-fire and blank-fire iterations priorto each live-fire task. A life-size mock-up rehearsal site must be constructed with engineer tape,plywood, or target cloth.

Basic Ground-Fighting Techniques. These dominant body positions are used to physicallycontrol noncombatants and enemy prisoners of war (EPW) (FM 3-25.150, Combatives).

Four-Man, Single-Team, Single-Room Clearing. Enter and clear a room:

• Sectors of fire, point of domination.

• Command and control.

• Incorporate breaching, flash-bangs, and target discrimination.

(FM 3-06.11, p. 3-21; FM 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, Battle Drill #6).

Single-Team, Multi-Room Clearing. (Flow drills from room to room)

Hallways. (FM 3-06.11, p. 3-25)



Stairwells. (FM 3-06.11, Figure 3-42)

Multi-Team, Multi-Room Clearing. (Flow drills)


Multi-team, multi-room clearing, incorporating the following variables:

• Furniture. Incorporated in the rooms.

• Reporting. Key leaders send required reports.

• Breaching. Incorporate mechanical, ballistic, and explosive breaching.

• Flash-bangs. Incorporate M84 diversionary flash-bangs.

• Casualty evacuation. Rehearse treatment, processing, and evacuation.

• Non-combatants and EPWs. Incorporate into scenario.

• Limited visibility. The end state of all training is successfully executing the MOUTmission during the hours of limited visibility.


Conduct force-on-force collective training at platoon and company level using simunitions (seespecial equipment on page 35) or the multiple integrated laser engagement system. CollectiveMOUT training is a recorded weakness for many rotational units at the JMRC because unit homestation training seldom progresses beyond single-team, single-room scenarios. Leaders andcommanders should develop detailed tactical scenarios for every mission to ensure each Soldierfully understands the mission.

Most units observed conducting MOUT exercises at the JMRC are capable of clearing rooms.However, most units are not properly equipped to execute the various supporting or sub-tasksassociated with MOUT, such as breaching. The following force protection uniform and specialequipment items can increase a unit’s mobility, survivability, and lethality. Leaders mustcontinue to closely monitor each Soldier’s load to avoid overburdening Soldiers in a veryphysically demanding environment.

Uniform and Equipment

The items on the following lists reflect the opinion of the author. Many non-standard items maybe obtained through local purchase and represent commercial off-the-shelf technology. To viewphotographs of commercial equipment, go to the Web sites indicated. Listing of non-standard orcommercial equipment and Web sites does not constitute official endorsement of any particularitem or manufacturer and is provided only to illustrate types on non-standard or locally procuredequipment recommended by the author.



Individual Soldier Uniform Items

Highly Recommended Items Other Items

CCO Soldier’s assigned weapon with combat sling(M4/M203/M249)

IR laser aiming device and illuminator(AN-PAQ-4C, AN-PEQ-2)

ACOG <www.trijicon.com>

Under-gun light, overt white lens (withtouch pad and IR cover)

Self-Luminous Aiming Systems<www.trijicon.com>

AN/PVS-7D or AN/PVS-14 night-visiongoggles with a 3-day supply of batteries

M40 protective mask; MOPP gear for weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) missions

Ballistic eye protection Magazines (7-10 each)

Modular assault vest: SOTECH tacticalvest <www.tacticalshop.com>; issuedRanger Rack<www.specialtydefense.com>

Smoke grenades (signaling and screeningmovement between buildings in MOUT)

Ear plugs M67 anti-personnel grenade

Gloves: NOMEX aviator MK3A2 offensive grenade (concussion grenade):This grenade can inflict serious injuries whilereducing collateral damage

Knee and elbow pads Lensatic compass

Ranger Body Armor Level IIIA (GSAcontract #GS-07F-6041A with plates)<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/rba.html>

Signal mirror

Flak vest with integrated webbing loopsfacilitates attaching equipment, magazines,or chem lights and can eliminate the needfor the assault vest<http:/www.specialtydefense.com>

Binoculars



Individual Soldier Uniform Items (cont)

Highly Recommended Items (cont) Other Items (cont)

Hydration system or canteens (Camelbak,Hydrastorm)

Maps, minimal graphics or sketch, imagery, penand paper

Safety line (tubular sling with a snap-link)or aircraft riggers rescue belt<http:/www.blackhawkindustries.com>

DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report) and DAForm 1157 (Witness Statement)

Knife Rules of engagement (ROE) card, blood chit card

Flex-cuffs to restrain enemy Soldiers ornoncombatants

First-aid kit with additional bandages,Kurlex bandage wrap, and one intravenous(IV) per Soldier

3-day assault pack for special equipment<www.blackhawkindustries.com>

M84 diversionary flash-bang stun grenade(see example at right). Incorporate intolive-fire training; a "charge bag" (NSN1330-01-454-0132) worn on the left legprovides easy access



fig 2-5w

M84 stun hand grenade(FM 3-23, Chapter 1

Special Equipment (Offensive)“If you want the job done right, use the proper tool.”

Highly Recommended Items Other Items

SKEDCO casualty litters<www.skedco.com>; tactical folding casualtylitter (NSN 6530-01-452-1651)<http:/www.narescue.com>

Demolition kit and supplies necessary tobuild charges

Shotgun (Remington 870) Pepper spray (for non-lethal use, based onROE)

00 buck or Hatton 12-gauge ammunition;Hatton Round is specially developed for usein close-quarter battle situations, effectivelydestroys surrounding woodwork, and ceasesto be a missile on impact

Global Positioning System (GPS) per team

Breach tools: 12-pound sledge hammer orHalligan breaching tool (many local fire andrescue organizations are good points ofcontact for breaching equipment and TTP)

Combat lifesaver bags or emergency medicaltechnician kits

Broco man-portable cutting torch<www.brocoinc.com>

Planning: terrain model kits

Folding ladders <www.foldableladder.com> Engineer tape for rehearsals

Bolt cutters Unit SOP signals and markings: VS-17panels, chem lights, pyrotechnics, paint,markers, and Wolf tail marking kits (FM3-06.11, Appendix I-3)

Simunition: a realistic, non-lethal MOUTtraining system that uses non-toxic markingammunition <www.simunition.com>

Antitank weapons (LAW, AT-4) for hardtargets (not the preferred items for breachingwalls)

Multi-purpose "100 mph" tape and550-parachutist cord



Summary

MOUT is one of the most difficult missions Soldiers will be asked to perform. If given thenecessary time and training to prepare for MOUT, Soldiers will be able to successfully completeurban operations and minimize unnecessary friendly casualties. Before execution of MOUT,Soldiers must be able to accurately engage targets with confidence. Accurately engaging targetsis accomplished through a comprehensive advanced marksmanship training plan. Additionally,research, testing, purchasing, and training with the special equipment available will help Soldiersexecute more efficiently.

The necessary training and tools give Soldiers the confidence to fight and win in MOUT. It isdifficult to replicate all of the tasks involved with MOUT during force-on-force training atJMRC; for example, it is not practical to use demolitions and flash-bangs during force-on-forceexercises. Therefore, adequate time, equipment, resources, and facilities are needed prior toexecuting MOUT exercises.

This article lists just some of the many training and equipment resources available to help unitsdevelop the building blocks of MOUT. In recent years, training and technology have immenselyimproved the TTP for MOUT, but leaders must continue to research training techniques andequipment to find out what works to give their Soldiers every opportunity for success. The bestSoldiers in the world deserve the best training and equipment available -- anything less would beirresponsible.

References

Army Regulation (AR) 350-41, Training in Units, 19 March 1993.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (<http://call.army.mil>).

FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.

FM 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.

FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 Carbine.

FM 3-23.30, Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals.

FM 3-25.150, Combatives.

FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training.

Technical Manual (TM) 9-1240-413-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual(Including Repair Parts and Special Tools List) for M68 Sight, Reflex, w/Quick Release Mountand Sight Mount.

TM 11-5855-301-12&P, Operator's and Unit Maintenance Manual (Including Repair Parts andSpecial Tools List) for Light, Aiming, Infrared AN/PAQ-4B, AN/PAQ-4C.

TM 11-5855-308-12&P, Operator's and Unit Maintenance Manual (Including Repair Parts andSpecial Tools List) for Target Pointer Illuminator/Aiming Light AN/PEQ-2A.

Training Circular (TC) 90-1, Training For Urban Operations.



Chapter 6

Enhancing Lethality Across the Force:The Integration of Combat Optics Technologies and

the Designated Marksman Concept

Charles Pavlick, MAJ (RET), U.S. Army

Previously published in September-October 2005, Infantry Magazine

This article first appeared in the Fall 2005 issue of the National Infantry Association’s InfantryBugler.

Recent after action reviews (AARs) and theresults of post-combat surveys conducted by theDirectorate of Combat Developments, U.S. ArmyInfantry Center, attest to the applied effectivenessand lethality of small arms combat optics ingeneral, and the effectiveness of designatedmarksmen (DM) during Operations EnduringFreedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF).

The Close Fight

The M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) is the mostprolific individual weapon optic that has beenfielded in-depth across Infantry formations andnow to combat support (CS) and combat servicesupport (CSS) organizations on the brigade andbelow battlefield. The fundamental advantage ofthe CCO is rapid, simplified sighting. The CCO’ssimple red-dot-on-target replaces the iron sight’smore complex front-sight-on-target and rear-sight alignment procedure, as well as the ironsight’s requirement for consistent, cheek-to-stock placement. Like iron sights, the CCO has nomagnification, but the CCO’s parallax-free, unlimited eye relief allows for greater flexibilitywith cheek-to-stock placement and enables aimed or reflexive fire with a both-eyes-open field ofview, thus contributing to improved situational awareness/target acquisition and effectivemulti-shot/multi-target engagements. The CCO’s lack of magnification, however, limits itsutility across all battlefield applications.

The Mid-to-Long Range Fight

The limitations regarding the CCO are primarily associated with rapidly changing operationalscenarios with associated multiple target profiles and, at times, engagement distances beyond300 meters. Target engagements beyond 300 meters with the CCO require the shooter toestimate range and apply an estimated hold-off/hold-over point of aim to effect target hit. Opticswith magnification (which may include range estimating reticles) significantly enhance theshooter’s capability to detect, recognize, and engage targets at longer ranges. Additionally,small profile targets such as bunker apertures, sniper loopholes, prone targets and targets that arepartially covered or concealed at mid-range distances may also be engaged with a greaterprobability of hit with the aid of magnified optics. The most common (optic dependant)downsides to using magnified optics include restricted field of view, limited eye relief, andassociated one eye vs. two eyes open aiming issues.



Private First Class Keith Carter from the501st Parachute Infantry Regiment scansfor enemy activity during an exercise inAlaska.

Current Small Arms Optics and Designated Marksman Initiatives

Historically (Civil War to present), American combat units as well as individual Soldiers havelong recognized the lethal capabilities that magnified optics bring to the fight, and OEF/OIF isno exception. Primarily associated with the designated marksman concept, the Army (BrigadeCombat Teams and other tactical Army organizations) has fielded and/or is in the process ofprocuring an array of optic applications and multi-combination “solutions” that include, but arenot limited to the following: variable power scopes bought from local gun shops mounted onM4s and M16s; M14s with variable powered scopes and/or with Advanced Combat OpticalGunsights (ACOGs); match-grade M16A4 conversions; and match-grade M14 conversions; aswell as several different optics and accessories issued via the Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative(RFI). Additionally, the use of both 5.56 M855 (green tip) and/or 5.56 Mk 262 match-gradeammunition is in use. Designated marksman training has been conducted via mobile trainingteams (MTTs), new equipment training teams (NETTs), division schools, Sniper School and theU.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU). Based on AARs and post-combat surveys, as well asDepartment of the Army involvement to address and fund optics and weapon-related UrgentRequirements (UR), Operational Need Statements (ONS), and RFI initiatives, a need wasidentified to develop a comprehensive (DOTLMPF — doctrine, organization, training,leadership & education, material, personnel and facilities) U.S. Army Infantry Centerstrategy/path-ahead regarding designated marksman capability requirements.

The DOTLMPF Review

An integrated concept team (ICT) consisting of Infantry School/Center staff representatives wasestablished to formalize a comprehensive DOTLMPF strategy/path-ahead regarding DMapplication to infantry formations as well as the potential integration of DM capabilities acrossall Army units.

Soldier Performance and Weapon’s Technical Capabilities

The U.S. Army Soldier Battle Lab (SBL) conducted a DM experiment to provide supporting dataand analysis for DOTLMPF refinement. Experiment Soldiers/shooters were provided by 1stBattalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and technical,instrumented shooting/shooting data was provided by USAMU. During the experiment (afterDM training), Soldiers provided with an M4 or M16A4 with ACOG, and bipod and standardM855 “Green Tip” ammunition, were able to achieve a cumulative .50 probability of hit orhigher out to 600 meters. Current standard weapons and ammunition provide the technicalcapability for 600 meters engagements. However, training/trigger time remains the linchpinfactor when it comes to exploiting the technology and improving the Soldier’s accuracy/lethality.

Soldiers also fired USAMU modified (accurized) M16A4s equipped with ACOGs and withmatch-grade Mk 262 ammunition. The experiment results indicate that the modified weaponswere technically more accurate with match-grade ammunition, and that shooter performance wasimproved, particularly at the longest range targets. It should be noted that the experiment resultsalso indicated that both the standard M16A4 and M4 were more accurate than theUSAMU-modified M16A4 when all weapons fired standard M855 ammunition. Finally, the DMexperiment included standard 7.62mm M14 rifles enhanced with an ACOG and bipod. The M14was the least effective weapon in all categories that included overall Soldier preference,technical accuracy (USAMU fired) and hit probability (1-30 IN fired) from close quarter battle(CQB) distances to 600 meters.

The pictured targets (Figure 1) provide a visual context regarding the technical capabilities ofboth accurized (left target) and current standard (right target) 5.56mm weapons and ammunition



and further reflect the direction of Small Arms Division, Combat Development initiatives for theimprovement of Army individual weapons and ammunition capabilities.



ACOG ImprovisedButtstock

Bipod

Designated Marksman + RFI

Both riflemen (not Squad Snipers) trained and equipped toengage targets 0 - 600 meters

Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) Supports DM:

Weapon: Squad-common M4/M16

Ammo: M855 Green-Tip, M993 AP

and/or MK 262 (77gr Match)

Figure 2

U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit Targets

Technical Capabilities: Left target - UASMU modified M16A4 w/Mk 262 Ammo,Right target - M16A4 w/m855 Ammo at 600 yards (9 ring = 20 inches diameter).

Figure 1Technical capabilities: Left target - USAMU-modified M16A4 w/Mk 262 ammo.Right target - M16A4 w/M855 ammo at 600 yards (9-ring = 20 inches diameter).

DOTLMPF Recommendations

The complete DOTLMPF review and recommendations is on file at Small Arms Division/DCD.The summary below provides an outline of the materiel aspects of the DOTLMPF reviewrecommendations and Small Arms Division initiatives.

Immediate

• Riflemen/DMs employ squad-common M4 carbine or M16A4 rifle and investigate apolished “drop-in” trigger modification to M4/M16.

• Current M855 ammunition exceeds MilSpec minimum. Issue Mk262 match-gradeammunition if available.

• Continue ACOG and accessories fielding via RFI.

Near-Term

• Pursue an ACOG-like capability via the “Spiral Integration” initiative and MagnifiedCombat Optic (MCO) Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) and investigate potentialapplication of DM-type capabilities to other-than-Infantry combat, CS, and CSS forcestructure. The MCO requirement document (in staffing) reflects a basis of issue thatincludes C, CS and CSS formations.

Objective

The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) family of weapons systems includes anaccurized DM (by design) variant with optics/fire control and accessories.



Designated Marksman + C, CS, and CSS Formations

Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) Supports DM

Integrates M68 CCO and MCO Capabilities: CQB to 600+ meters

Basis of issue includes: Combat, Combat Support, and Combat

Service Support

XM150 Magnified Combat Optic (MCO)

M68 CCO

ACOG

=XM150

MCO+

Figure 3

Summary

Small Arms Division’s individual weapons, optics, and ammunition initiatives reflect long rangeobjectives analysis, as well as an institutional recognition and response to post-combat surveys,to AARs, and to initiatives already developed by combat forces during CONUS training andproven effective against threat forces during OIF/OEF. The USAIC path-ahead strategyprovides for a basis of issue to current and future combat, combat support, and combat servicesupport formations to enhance lethality across the force.



Chapter 7

Making a Case for the Military Shotgun

Robert Brizee, CSM (RET), U.S. Army


Our deployed Soldiers have engaged in almost continuous combat operations during theirmissions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these combat operations have been conducted inurban, “house-to-house” environments. Long gone are the days of entrenched Soldiersexchanging volley rifle fire across several hundred meters of open ground. Today’s Soldiersoften face an enemy that appears from behind a vehicle or in a window opening just long enoughto fire an automatic weapon or rocket-propelled grenade. The majority of our regular forces facethis enemy with one of several versions of the issue M16A2 rifle with which they have zeroedand qualified. The M16 family is a proven series of weapons, but in my opinion our Soldiers arenot armed as efficiently as they could be for some close-quarters operations in urbanenvironments. This article will introduce the 12-gauge military riot shotgun as a valuablesupplemental weapon for close-quarters urban combat.

The military rifle, carbine (the M4 for example), and the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon areall designed to accomplish offensive and defensive tasks in a variety of situations and terrain. Assuch, they cannot be perfectly suited to every possible task. The military shotgun, however, ismuch better suited to urban patrol, checkpoints, and guard mission confrontations that are quiteoften defensive in nature. Outside of the Special Operations community, the shotgun is rarelyused in the offense. The military shotgun has several characteristics that make it the right choicefor guard and urban patrol operations. These characteristics include high first round hitprobability, reliable lethality within likely engagement range, simple and safe operation, ballisticversatility and high visibility and deterrent value. NOTE: These observations pertain to themilitary shotgun as a stand alone weapon. The new Lightweight Shotgun System (LSS)suspended underneath an M4 carbine should be considered a specialized breaching tool. TheLSS does not share many of the positive attributes of the conventional military shotgun and inmy opinion has yet to prove its worth.

Combat shotgun marksmanship involves simpler skills than those required for the high speedaerial targets of trap, skeet, and sporting clays. The military shotgun is simply pointed from theshoulder, underarm or hip, held firmly, and fired. The high first round hit probability is due inpart to the multiple projectiles available in a single round of shotgun ammunition. Theprojectiles, known as “shot,” are available in many sizes from quite small to well over aquarter-inch in diameter. The bore of the military shotgun barrel is much less constricted or“choked” than that of civilian sporting shotgun barrels. This openness of choke contributes to thespreading pattern of multiple projectiles. Within combat shotgun distances, arms reach toapproximately 30 meters, the average Soldier who keeps his or her eyes open is highly likely toachieve first round hits on a stationary or moving human target. Most military shotguns featurenonadjustable bead sights that are not zeroed to an individual. A given shotgun can therefore befired with equal effectiveness by multiple Soldiers without concern for the last firer’s “zero.”The latest military shotguns feature an adjustable “ghost-ring” type aperture and post sights.Shotguns equipped with these sights and zeroed initially with the issue ammunition will alsoshoot to the same point of impact for a variety of firers. A company-size unit could arm theirpatrols from a pool of shotguns issued as required. Shotguns require only a few rounds offamiliarization fire rather than a full qualification. A shotgun familiarization course of fire iseasily accomplished on any 25meter range with full-sized silhouette targets such as the paper M9pistol target. The short barreled, straight-stocked military pump shotgun when fired with fullpowered, multiple lead projectile ammunition does offer more significant recoil than the M16A2



or M4 firing ball ammunition. The newest military self-loading shotguns such as the M9200 andthe M1014 offer reduced but still noticeable recoil. However, recoil management skills can beeasily taught and practiced during the familiarization course of fire.

The military shotgun is safe and simple to operate. With a few exceptions, the majority of U.S.military shotguns for the last 100 years have been slide or pump operated. For those unfamiliarwith the slide action shotgun, its operation is similar to that of a trombone. The pump handledoubles as a forward hand grip that surrounds a tubular magazine underneath the barrel. Pullingthe hand grip smartly and fully to the rear brings a live round out of the magazine tube, extractsand ejects any round in the chamber, and cocks an internal hammer. Pushing the hand grip fullyforward chambers the new round and locks the action closed, ready to fire. The safety mayremain in the “ON” (safe) position throughout this process. From port arms or from a firingposition, the shotgun with an empty chamber and ammunition in the magazine tube can be madeready to fire in approximately two seconds. The M16A2/M4 weapons with an empty chamberand loaded magazine inserted may be charged as quickly.

However, one hand must be removed from a firing grip to operate the charging handle. With thepump shotgun, both hands maintain a proper firing grip on the weapon throughout the chargingprocess. The newest issue self-loading shotguns are also quite fast and easy to manipulate butrequire one hand to operate a bolt handle or release the bolt to chamber a live round. Of course,any of these weapons would likely be carried with a round already chambered in a combatenvironment.

The military pump shotgun features a simple, sturdy design and manual operation that is notdependent upon the performance of the ammunition to function. In the unlikely event of amisfired round, the pump action required to clear a malfunction is the same action required tooperate the weapon normally. The malfunction clearing procedure known as “ImmediateAction” is therefore easy to teach and learn. The military pump shotgun is a very reliableweapon since it is manually operated. The mechanism is uncomplicated and easy to disassemblequickly for field cleaning. The large diameter shotgun bore does not hold water by capillaryaction as does a smaller diameter rifle bore. The newest self-loading military shotguns are alsoquite reliable but remain dependent upon serviceable ammunition as do any other self-loadingweapons. The loaded military shotgun averages a few ounces lighter in weight than the loadedM16A2. The exterior of the pump shotgun is relatively free of projections. The only controlsother than the trigger are the safety button and a disconnector button that allows unlocking of thebolt and safe “unchambering” of a live round. Some issue shotguns feature a magazine cutoffbutton. When activated, the magazine cutoff holds ammunition in the magazine tube while othertype ammunition can be manually loaded, fired, and ejected. All controls are within easy reachof the firing hand. Military pump shotguns as well as the M9200 and M1014 self-loaders aredevoid of any recoil system in the stock. As such, they can be adapted to special purposes andmade more portable with the addition of a folding stock or pistol grip.

There are commercial adapters available that allow the fitting of an M4-type telescopingbuttstock on the military Mossberg M500/M590 shotguns as well as the military RemingtonM870. The streamlined exterior and reasonable weight of the shotgun make it a weapon that canbe carried during a patrol or guard shift with minimal fatigue and manipulated quickly whenneeded, even with gloved hands. This is not to imply that the shotgun is in every way superior toother weapons. For example, the modern M16A2/M4 magazine carries at least 30 rounds ofammunition while the military shotgun carries nine rounds at best. The shotgun magazine tube isalso slower to reload because it is not readily detachable. It must itself be reloaded whileinstalled on the shotgun. The most obvious disadvantage of the military shotgun is its limitedeffective range.



Careful consideration should always be given to any ammunition issued to our Soldiers. Thelong range and potential penetration of a poorly aimed or accidentally fired round of rifleammunition can have catastrophic consequences in populated urban combat environments.Excessive range and penetration are not a problem with conventional shotgun ammunition.Shotgun projectiles are usually spherically shaped and made of soft, unjacketed lead. The roundlead shot possesses inefficient ballistics and will not travel with the velocity, range or flattrajectory of jacketed military rifle ammunition. Shotgun pellets usually deform and loose energyquickly upon impact with any hard surface. They are much less likely to ricochet for that reason.Stopping an enemy or a dangerous intruder to a guarded area does not necessarily require killingthe individual. It may at times be desirable to capture enemy combatants for interrogation.Nonlethal projectile technology has existed in shotgun ammunition for several years. A fullpowered round of 12-gauge ammunition loaded with a small number of .30 caliber rubber ballsor one large rubber projectile will still incapacitate an attacker. The nonlethal ammunitionrepresents an even lower threat to nearby citizens while still maintaining the energy to take thefight out of an attacker at reasonable combat shotgun distances. The most modern militaryshotguns accept the complete range of this and other special purpose ammunition without astutter. The magazine cutoff can be used to hold full powered rounds in reserve while specialpurpose ammunition may be loaded singly, fired and ejected. Modern shotgun ammunition witha high metal base and plastic hull is much more reliable and waterproof than earlier ammunition.The all brass shotgun shell of World Wars I and II would grow verdigris once exposed tomoisture. The verdigris would collect dust and cause chambering and extraction failures. Thecommercial-type paper shotgun shells of the same era would swell with moisture makingchambering difficult and allow contamination of the powder charge.

Although the military shotgun enables the trained Soldier to effectively defend against aclose-quarters attack, not being attacked in the first place is desirable. The presence of theshotgun on guard or patrol can be a significant deterrent to a violent threat. American policehave long since learned that even an enraged attacker will think twice before confrontingsomeone armed with a riot shotgun. The deterrent value to an attacker comes from facing the.72caliber/12-gauge bore with the realization of the devastating wounding potential of a singleround of full powered ammunition. It is likely that terrorist threats against our Soldiers on patrolsand at checkpoints are preceded by clandestine observation of the readiness posture of ourforces. The adoption of shotguns at checkpoints and on patrols would be immediately noticedand interpreted as readiness to engage a threat.

This article did not intend to address all the possible administrative, tactical and logistical issuesregarding the selection of weapons for our Soldiers in the arena. The objective was to introducethe many attributes of the military shotgun and to perhaps stimulate further professionaldiscussion of the subject.



Chapter 8

Countering Urban Snipers

Mr. Thomas P. Odom, JRTC Observation Detachment

Insurgents in Iraq continue to closely observe their targets and adapt their tactics in an attempt todefeat our defenses. Just as he does in planning improvised explosive device (IED) operations,the enemy looks for patterns in planning sniper operations. Consider the following incidentreported by a personal security detachment:

A principal was invited to an “important” meeting, and his team executed a routinetransit plan. They planned their route and used a countersniper team to establishsurveillance prior to entering the building. When the team arrived, they found themeeting had been cancelled without notice. As the countersniper team was coming downfrom its position and as the principal’s party was about to exit the building the same wayit had entered, the personal security officer suddenly had second thoughts. He sent thecountersniper team back up for one last check of the neighborhood, and they immediatelyspotted an ambush being set up along the proposed exit route. The terrorists had learnedthat American contract protective details often left the scene of a meeting along the sameroute they used to travel to the meeting. The terrorists also learned to observe thecountersniper teams and had apparently watched them carefully and waited until thecountersniper team stood down before setting up their ambush. The personal securityofficer quickly improvised and used an alternate route to avoid the ambush.

Evolving Tactics - Some Lessons From Iraq

Sniping Attacks in Iraq

While the reporting of attacks by insurgent snipers has been low, sniping has been used againstcoalition forces with greater effect in recent months. Despite the advantages accrued to snipers inassassination-style attacks (distance, concealment, accuracy, and timing) compared tosmall-arms and IED attacks, insurgents have made relatively little use of snipers except inFalluja in November 2004. However, insurgents are not averse to using snipers against coalitionand Iraqi Security Forces.

Common Sniper Targets in Iraq

As of June 2005, sniper fire is ninth on the list of causes of combat deaths, with 25 killed inaction (KIA) out of a total of 1900+ KIA. The most common targets of sniper attack include:

• Soldiers on stationary guard posts/checkpoints.

• Vehicle crews without adequate armor protection.

• Maintenance/service personnel repairing IED-damaged vehicles.

• Soldiers without protective body armor and helmets.

• Soldiers having gaps in their body armor protection.



Analyzing the Threat

Recent information suggests that insurgents in Iraq are becoming more professional in theirapproach to sniper training. Insurgent snipers are taught to carefully select targets. Their primarytargets include officers, vehicle commanders, pilots, communications officers, and SpecialForces. They see chaplains and doctors as acceptable targets that will have a psychologicalimpact on coalition forces; however, they avoid civilian targets or situations where civilians arepresent and might be killed. In analyzing the sniper threat, consider the following observations:

• Snipers are part of the insurgent capability in Iraq.

• Limited use to date may have to deal with the extensive training required to produce awell-trained marksman.

• Sniper rifles, notably the “Snaiperskaia Vintovka Dragunova” (commonly referred toas the “Dragunov SVD”), are available in Iraq from former regime stockpiles.

• Sniping attacks are good for specific missions, but they do not create the sensationalistimpact on public opinion as IEDs or small-arms attacks.

• Sniper rifles are capable of firing armor-piercing ammunition that can penetrate Kevlarbody armor but not small-arms protective insert (SAPI) body armor plates.

• Sniper doctrine is outlined in the al-Qaeda terrorist handbook and recent insurgenttraining briefs.

• As long as quantities of explosives to manufacture IEDs are available, sniping willremain a modest threat to coalition forces.

• Sniping will likely be used to harass and demoralize coalition forces troops and not asa decisive weapon for the insurgents.

Who is a Sniper?

Urban snipers in an operational environment such as Iraq or Afghanistan can come from avariety of backgrounds. They may be former competitive shooters, trained military snipers, orsimply civilian irregulars seeking targets of opportunity. In any case, they are a threat to be takenseriously.

Trained Sniper

The most dangerous type of sniper is specially trained. A professional sniper who is part of a unitwith a legitimate mission is a far cry from a cold-blooded killer who roams an urban battlefieldseeking to target anyone to kill. The professional sniper uses his training and field craft in ahigh-risk situation to accomplish his mission. He is flexible and comfortable in a multitude ofcombat environments, and he assesses his environment and uses his skills to control it.

He (or she depending on the area) is specially selected, trained extensively, and equipped with amodern, scope-equipped sniper rifle. Such snipers are expert shots, effective out to 1,500 meters(m). They are trained to use terrain; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and field craft toachieve their goals. They typically select key individuals as their targets and are trained tosurvive and kill again.



Trained Marksman

The trained marksman is the most common sniper in urban combat, with usually anabove-average shot effective out to 200 or 300 m. His most common role is on an enemy’sperimeter where he can provide early warning and disrupt approaching friendly forces. Equippedwith a standard issue weapon, he normally has fair to good field craft skills and is difficult todetect in the urban environment. He may be employed individually or in teams to createconfusion among friendly forces, cause casualties, or harass and disrupt the tempo of operations.

Armed Irregular

The armed irregular has little or no formal military training as a soldier, much less as a sniper.He may have extensive experience in urban combat, he may even be a good shot, but as anirregular, he will go to great lengths to avoid identification as a sniper. Generally, the armedirregular will be capable of inaccurate harassing fires.

The Professional Sniper as Compared to the Amateur

• The Professional:

º Pre-selected for sniper training based on psychological evaluation and naturalskills.

º Completes a rigorous training and evaluation program.

º Skills include marksmanship and sniper field craft; patience and ability to focusare a must.

º Must be able to operate independently and make decisions based on situationalawareness (SA).

º Must be pro-active, not merely an observer of significant events.

• The Amateur:

º Not evaluated for the job at hand or trained for the task.

º Will randomly shoot at targets with no thought towards overall mission orramifications.

º Marksmanship skills and field craft are lacking; takes unnecessary chances toengage a target of opportunity.

º Not proactive in the way a professional “thinks on his feet.”

º May be a “disposable asset” left behind to delay.

Sniper Attack Capabilities

Sniper attack capabilities are a function of both training and equipment. Assuming a competentlevel of training is constant, equipment becomes the discriminator in capabilities.



Medium Caliber Weapons (.270 up to .50 calibers)

• 300-600 m range attacks are the norm.

• 800-1,000 m attacks are the exception.

Heavy Caliber (.50 and greater)

• 1,200-1,500 m ranges are more common, especially with .50-caliber systems.

• Such systems are available world wide.

• Many are marginally accurate; some are very accurate.

• They are valuable psychological weapons.

Overall Trends in Sniper Equipment

• Night-observation devices are common, with widespread commercial availability.

• High-quality, direct-view optical sights are the norm.

• Silencers/suppressors available.

• Heavy sniper rifles increasingly common.

• Laser detection devices in use.

The Law of Land Warfare: On Snipers

Snipers and countersniper operations are covered under the laws of land warfare; therefore, it isvital that commanders and leaders understand the law. The intense stress and psychologicalpressures of urban warfare exacerbate that need for understanding. Remember:

• The laws of land warfare are not restricted to declared wars.

• They apply in all cases of armed conflict.

• They apply to snipers, including armed irregulars.

• Civilians can be detained and tried by an appropriate court.

Remember as well the three principles governing the use of lethal force:

• Avoid unnecessary suffering.

• Use the minimum force necessary.

• Use the rule of general proportionality.



Improving Sniper Awareness

Sources on Sniper Activity

The very first step in any countersniper program is sniper awareness. Is there a sniper threat inthe area? Do you know about it? Do your Soldiers know about it? As units shift areas ofoperation (AOs) or transfer authority to other units, sniper awareness should be part of thatprocess. A unit should have a good picture of sniper activity in its and the surrounding units’AOs. Often, just a knowledge (and awareness) of who enemy snipers are targeting can go a longway in preventing unnecessary casualties. Examples of targets include:

• Officers.

• Other unit leaders.

• Inexperienced troops.

• Crew-served weapons personnel.

• Radio operators.

• Tank commanders.

Information on snipers can come from a variety of sources. Generating such information shouldbe part of the intelligence surveillance and information plan and, as such, fully integrated intothe effects planning cycle. A sample of sources would include:

• Host nation military, security, and government bodies.

• U.S. Embassy and associated elements such as the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), consulates, U.S. Information Service (USIS), or othergovernment agencies.

• Allied/coalition special operations forces (SOF), coalition forces, and governmentagencies.

• U.S. SOF operating in the AO or greater area of interest (AI).

• United Nations agencies and forces in the AO or AI.

• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or agencies.

• Local militias.

• Contractors.

• Local civilians and their extended families (do not overlook children).

Sources of Sniper Expertise

Common sense dictates that the best base for effective countersniper operations is a solidknowledge of sniper operations. On the military side there are any number of sources. Infantryand specialized military police (MP) units have trained snipers. U.S. SOF, including Special



Forces, Rangers, and U.S. Navy sea, air, land teams (SEAL), incorporate snipers into theiroperations. Law enforcement agencies use special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. You mayfind elements from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), U.S. Secret Service, or other government agencies in your AO or AI duringstability and reconstruction operations.

Countersniper TTP

Based on a sound knowledge of sniper operations and mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and timeavailable (METT-T), units can standardize and tailor their countersniper TTP to their AO andAI. Generally, there are two categories of countersniper TTP: active countermeasures andpassive countermeasures. Units should develop, practice, and enforce use of countersniperimmediate action drills, blending both active and passive countermeasures when facing a sniper threat.

Both Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) are stability operations andsupport operations and, as such, are semi-permissive operational environments. In denselypopulated urban environments, the techniques used to react to a sniper in a high-threatenvironment will rarely be effective against the sniper, but will cause substantial casualtiesamong non-combatants, increasing support for enemy forces, and ultimately resulting in greaterfriendly casualties. The use of a “mad moment” or “recon by fire” will likely cause substantialcollateral damage while increasing confusion and the likelihood that the enemy sniper cansuccessfully escape.

Active Countermeasures

Active countermeasures are those actions units can initiate to defeat, disrupt, or destroy a sniperthreat in their AO. They are largely the same type of operations involved in the counter IEDfight, with additional TTP added as necessary. Some include:

• Observation posts (OPs) and aerial observers:

º Maintain a large number of OPs. To be effective, a sniper must get into a firingposition without detection. Establishing OPs and briefing observers to watchfor anyone with a weapon; pointing out obvious sniper positions; and makingsure that each OP is equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices (NVDs),and thermal sights (when available) helps reduce the chance of an enemy sniperworking into position.

º Clear and occupy all buildings around checkpoints and OPs to eliminatepotential sniper positions.

º Supplement ground observation with aerial observation. Kiowa Warriors areideal, but even UH-60 crews can add to the aerial observation pool.

• Active patrols should be maintained, especially in areas covering OP dead space.These patrols should watch for obvious armed personnel and/or evidence that peoplehave moved into or fired from positions.

• Countersniper operations:

º Engage the enemy sniper. Once spotted, the enemy sniper must be forced tosurrender or be killed. Allowing the enemy sniper to fight another day ismission failure.



º In stability operations and support operations, the best weapon to use against anenemy sniper is another sniper; however, friendly snipers are not alwayspresent at the site of an enemy sniper attack. The first and last rule of engagingthe enemy is to use maximum force against the sniper. This force must bebalanced against collateral damage considerations. The intent of the attack maybe to goad the friendly force into overreacting and inflicting noncombatantcasualties. Next, coordinate different aspects of defense. OPs, patrols,ambushes, friendly snipers, fire support, close air support, and deceptionmeasures should all be brought together at the moment the enemy sniper isspotted, either in his position or moving into or out of position.

º The use of friendly armor to maneuver against an enemy sniper neutralizes hislethality.

º Use smoke or riot control agents to obscure and suppress hostile sniper fires.

º Use organic fires to overmatch or preempt hostile sniper fires. Weapons notnormally considered as countersniper should be considered if they are withinrules of engagement (ROE) guidelines and support the commander’s intent.MK 19 grenade launchers; Dragons (anti-tank missiles); tube-launched,optically-tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOWs) (especially if there is noanti-armor threat); and .50-caliber machine guns in single-shot mode allowU.S. forces to out range the enemy sniper.

º Helicopters can be used to keep surveillance over the area suspected to beoccupied by the sniper and to deny him movement along rooftops.

º The TOW, Hellfire missiles, 30-mm cannon, and other helicopter-mountedweapons may be considered as countersniper weapons if they meet ROEguidelines and support the commander’s intent.

Passive Countermeasures

Passive countermeasures are essential for force protection planning and include the following:

• Limit exposure. Do not establish obvious routines such as holding formations atstandard times, issuing equipment or rations in a manner that causes Soldiers to line upfor extended periods, and grouping large portions of the chain of command in one area.Other helpful actions include not saluting, removing rank insignia, camouflaging, andoperating during limited visibility conditions.

• Wear protective clothing. Body armor and Kevlar helmets do not work unless they areworn and worn properly.

• Use armored vehicles.

• Erect screens and shields. Construct barriers and shields around checkpoints and OPsto protect Soldiers. Shields and screens can be used in cantonment areas to block asniper’s vision as he scans for targets.

• Deny use of key terrain.



• Use smoke hazes and smoke screens.

• Avoid public displays of leadership functions (conspicuous saluting, staff huddles,very important personnel [VIP] groups in open areas, etc.) whenever possible.

Countersniper Immediate Action Drills

Unit countersniper standing operating procedures (SOPs) should include the following:

• Use speed to avoid being hit and to rapidly engage the enemy sniper.

• Avoid setting predictable patterns.

• Use smoke or other obscurants to cover friendly movements. (Note: The NorthVietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces in Hue soon realized that Marine forces usedsmoke for this purpose and successfully engaged friendly infantrymen “through thesmoke” where they thought a unit movement was taking place.)

• Avoid shadowing and silhouetting.

• Use planned routes based on prior reconnaissance, and always have a planned escaperoute from each point during a unit movement.

Detecting Sniper Operations

What do you do if you think there is a sniper in your AO? The first step is to confirm yoursuspicion, remembering the general categories of “sniper” discussed earlier (trained sniper,trained marksman, and armed irregular). Some clues are obvious:

• Random bursts, relative inaccuracy. A sudden burst or series of bursts out of the blueor in concert with other fires such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) or an IED doesnot indicate a sniper. Most likely it comes from insurgents (armed irregulars) using theopportunity provided by the ambush or IED attack.

• Measured series of shots, relatively accurate. Such patterns indicate a trainedmarksman and are consistent with the idea that trained marksmen are there to disruptmovement into or through an enemy area. If the shooting stops, slows, or shifts as youreact, a marksman or a team of marksmen are moving, shifting, or withdrawing afterdisrupting or halting your movement.

• Single shot eliminations. You take fire that is not only accurate, but also targetsleaders, weapons teams, or other high-value targets. Pay attention to each shot that isbeing fired. Single shots should stand out as odd. If there are Soldiers complainingthey never saw where the shot came from, chances are there is a sniper working inyour AO. If the same type fires continue beyond initial contact, those chances arenearly certain.

Finding the Sniper

Once you determine you have a sniper or a sniper team in your AO, your unit should implementcountersniper immediate action drills. You need to find the sniper or the sniper team.



• Look at the angles. Chances are a single shot will help locate the sniper. Track himfrom there. At what angle did the shot come from? Where is the best hide site fromthat direction, knowing the range of the average marker?

• What is his kill zone? Snipers are direct fire extremists. If the sniper has placedaccurate fire in a large area, then he must have direct line of sight to every point in thatlarge area. This relates to angles, especially in an urban area. The larger the kill zone,the closer he has to be or the higher he has to be to cover that area. Smaller kill zonesmean a narrow if not linear line of sight. In such cases, he could be close or he couldbe far. He will be along a linear line of sight, be it a road, an alley, or inside a building,shooting through a window, doorway, or other opening.

• Aural and visual indicators. Actually firing a weapon is the professional sniper’sgreatest moment of risk; it offers the best opportunity to locate him or his team. Theacoustic and infrared (IR) signatures associated with the projection of the bullet fromhis rifle are his greatest vulnerabilities.

º Listen for muzzle blast. The muzzle blast can be detected with acoustic sensorsat ranges from several hundred meters out to more than a kilometer.

º Look for muzzle flash and dust. The muzzle flash can be detected with IRsensors out to a kilometer or more, but the sensors must have line of sight to theweapon and the flash can be suppressed. Often muzzle flash and blast canthrow dust into the air.

º Listen for bullet shock wave. The bullet’s shock wave is a minisonic boomresulting from the bullet traveling at a speed faster than sound. It can bedetected acoustically at ranges from hundreds of meters out to more than akilometer.

• Backtrack sounds, sights, and angles. The backtracking process in the city iscomplicated by buildings that may obstruct the view of the sniper’s window.Backtracking is not easy; nevertheless, this is where you put the relationship of shotangles, kill zones, sight, and aural indicators to work. Experience and training play amajor role in accurate backtracking.

• Insertion Points. Watch the enemy insertion point -- where he came in. He has to goout somewhere, go to ground, or remain in his firing position. Chances are youropponent is going to hang out for a while and rack up as many kills as he can.

• Pay attention! You will need some luck in order to get a fix on the sniper’s position.You may only get one chance, so you have to be focused and listen.

After You Find Him

• Set the conditions. The hardest part about eliminating a sniper will be putting him intoa situation where you have shooting superiority. You also want to eliminate or at leastreduce his targets. Figure out his kill zone and stay out of it. If you remove his targets,you curtail his mission success. He will need to move or at least adjust his position toremain effective. Remember that setting traps in a scenario game is a dangerous task.Do your homework and be very aware of your surroundings.



• Going deep. “Going deep” is a slang term that refers to the technique of rapidlylocating, fixing, and maneuvering behind an active enemy sniper to ultimately kill orcapture him. How this is done is completely situation dependent. When contact ismade, the on-scene commander needs to rapidly calculate the disposition of his forces,the quick reaction force (QRF), and adjacent friendly forces and factor in time/spaceconsiderations to determine how to neutralize the threat. Because of the fleeting natureof the threat, it is often preferable for the on-scene commander to begin to maneuveragainst the hostile sniper with an unengaged portion of his own force rather than waitfor a QRF.

• His movement is your goal. His movement is what you need to watch for. You mustbe very attentive to the slightest changes in the scenery. Snipers operate in very slowand calculated movements. The movement the sniper makes may not be easilydetected. Keep your eyes peeled.

• Fire Support. If you normally run with a team, radio to them and have them probe thearea where you suspect the snipers are located. This may flush out the snipers with alesser constitution than most.

• Trick Shot. If your sniper is one that can keep a level head under fire, it means youwill have to do the job yourself. Fire a single shot striking a location behind the sniper.This will raise suspicion. He will either get nervous that there is someone behind himor get greedy and want another elimination.

Taking Him Out

• Make it count! When you locate him, make your shot(s) count. The rest is up to you.Keep your cool, remember to breathe, and do not get nervous. The major advantageyou have over him is the fact he does not know he is being tracked.

• Remember whom you are shooting at! Remember that you are shooting at anothersniper.

• Assume nothing! U.S. snipers operate in teams, typically two or three depending onthe mission. The enemy can choose to do likewise. Sniper teams can and do operate inconcert with each other. Just because you have one sniper down, do not assume theimmediate threat is gone.

• Confirm that the enemy sniper is dead. This step is necessary so that forcescommitted to the operation can be released and to ensure the enemy is not going toreturn at some future date to disrupt operations or cause more casualties. Even a deadenemy sniper can be a valuable source of intelligence.

• Consider sniper hunting with another sniper. Throughout history, many unitsengaged in urban combat often employed direct and indirect supporting arms, close airsupport, and/or large numbers of ground forces to counter urban snipers. However, theRussian and German forces of World War II found that the best solution to a sniperthreat was the employment of their own snipers in a countersniper role. Advantages tousing a trained sniper to counter enemy snipers include:

º Two-man teams to counter the sniper threat rather than a squad or more ofinfantry.



º The relative ease of movement over the urban battlefield of a sniper teamversus that of a larger ground formation.

º Countersnipers who “know the habits and modus operandi” of their enemycounterparts.

º The ability to deliver “precision fire” and the resulting reduction in collateraldamage and/or civilian and friendly casualties.

Following are a few examples of deceptive measures for snipers to utilize whenemployed in a countersniper role:

º Dummy hides and/or positions.

º Obvious final firing positions.

º Dummy tracks.

º Fake optics and weapons barrels.

º Deceptive camouflage of buildings.

A Forecast for the Future

This article has attempted, in limited fashion, to lay out the major considerations in dealing withthe sniper threat in Iraq (and by extension Afghanistan). In an operational environment such asIraq, the threat of sniping is not new. Indeed, the Arabs’ popular mythology regarding the lonerifleman is not unlike that of the American West. Saddam -- seeking to capitalize on thatmythology -- often appeared in public with a rifle, portraying himself as a deadly marksman. Putin perspective, however, the threat from snipers has been much lower than that of other weaponssuch as IEDs. Leaders, Soldiers, and units must be prepared to react accordingly to that threat.This article offered some baseline thoughts on how best to do just that.

What follows is a forecast of likely insurgent use of snipers in Iraq by the Army Training andDoctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT):

• Sniper activity will continue to rise in Iraq, although not as spectacularly as with IEDs.Snipers are ideally suited to guerilla-style tactics by small, cellular organizations.

• Insurgent snipers are likely gaining in quality of training and experience; significantlosses to coalition countersniper operations have forced insurgents to makeimprovements in sniper operations and TTP.

• Insurgent snipers may be adapting tactics from successful U.S. snipers (Army andMarine Corps).

• Propaganda releases indicate the insurgent leadership understands the psychologicalimpact snipers have on their opponents and will continue their use.



Chapter 9

Conventional Sniper Operations in the Asymmetric Fight

SFC Michael W. Glancy


From March 2003 until February 2004, snipers from Task Force Vanguard operated out ofForward Operating Base (FOB) Danger in Tikrit, Iraq. The 11-man Sniper Section conductedmore than 1,000 sniper missions from as far south as Samarra to Mosul in the north.

The snipers from 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, were usedextensively as a force multiplier. The snipers occupied sniper positions and observation posts(OPs), established sniper ambushes, and supported cordon and raid operations.

Most often Vanguard snipers operated in urban environments but also conducted missions in thedesert to establish ambush positions at ammunition supply points (ASPs) and along the lines oftravel used by insurgent forces and key intersections. They conducted missions along the heavilyvegetated banks of the Tigris River to disrupt enemy indirect fire capabilities and to reconpossible cache sites.

Sniper teams generally worked in a three-man team consisting of a spotter, a primary shooter,and an RTO (radio-telephone operator). When missions were planned to last more than 48 hours,four-man teams were often used to facilitate a rest plan. Two-man teams were used on occasionfor short duration missions. The two-man teams were used in conjunction with other teams thatwere mutually supporting and capable of direct fires to support each other. The two-man teamswere also used in support of squad and platoon operations during SOI (sphere of influence)engagements, dismounted patrols and at traffic control points (TCPs).



Sergeant Robert Crosthwait observes for Specialist Bryan Adams in Iraq.

Photos by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Glancy



Sergeant Robert Crosthwait watches for insurgent activityduring a mission in Iraq.

Courtesy photo

A quick reaction force vehicle prepares to inserta sniper team during a mission in Iraq.

Infiltration

In the beginning of our tour of duty, Vanguard snipers operated primarily at night establishingobservation posts and sniper positions in the city to enforce curfew and to maintain situationalawareness for the commander. By planning carefully, the sniper teams could move about the citydismounted and undetected. This movement gave the snipers a very thorough knowledge of thebuildings, homes, businesses, streets and back alleys, greatly reducing the enemy’s home fieldadvantage.

Infiltration techniques were dependent upon the distance to the target area, terrain, and time ofday. The most preferred option was to infiltrate by foot into the city. When using this technique,it was imperative to make complete coordination with the quick reaction force (QRF) that was insupport of the teams. At a minimum, it is important to cover the routes during infiltration andexfiltration, the target area, most likely position of the team and alternate position, pick up gatesfor quick exfils, call signs and frequencies, and visual identification signals.

Often, combinations of wheeled and dismounted infiltrations were conducted. When using amounted patrol to cover the insertion of a sniper team, the patrol should not move through theplanned target area. In an urban environment, we generally dismounted a minimum of threeblocks away from the proposed position. While working in more rural terrain, the distancemoved by foot would be dependent upon the vegetation and terrain but would range from one tosix kilometers.

All possible means of transportation were used to facilitate both insertion and extraction ofsniper teams. The use of these assets enabled teams to move into remote locations or along themain supply route (MSR) without the threat of compromise that was often experienced whenusing HMMWVs.

Moving in an urban environment makes it is very difficult to avoid being compromised. Gettingto the proposed sniper positions involved moving through multiple courtyards, across roofs, andseveral changes of direction to avoid predictability. The teams were able to infiltrate withoutcompromise through careful planning and coordination.



A sniper team from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantryscans for insurgent activity.

Compromise

Snipers were a part of the Information Operation campaign; therefore, compromise was notnecessarily a bad thing. The populace knew who we were and our capabilities when they saw asmall element moving with the “big painted gun” strapped to an assault pack. Compromiseduring movement would let the population know when snipers were in the city; this added to ahigher sense of security and acted as a deterrent for insurgent activities.

The strength of snipers is their ability to hide from the enemy; therefore, compromise in or nearour position was another situation that put the teams at a risk. Intelligence has shown that sniperteams were and continue to be actively hunted by the enemy. Security in a sniper position has tobe maintained at all times. Positions were chosen not only for their ability to observe a targetarea, but also because they are easily defendable. Early warning devices were employed. Batteryoperated door alarms that were locally purchased, broken glass on the floor, and/or something assimple as boards propped up against a door were used to provide early warning.

Establishing a sniper position included making radio contact with the tactical operations center(TOC), informing them of the location, and establishing a no fire area. Once the position wasestablished, the team members would rotate roles. One sniper would maintain observations in thetarget area; another would monitor the radio and assist in observation, while the third wouldmaintain security to the rear. Compromise at this stage of the operation gave the sniper teamleader a few different courses of action. If the mission was to observe a specific targetedindividual or a future raid objective, the team could detain the compromising individual. In suchcases, each sniper carried pamphlets and cash. The pamphlets were in Arabic and explained thesniper’s purpose and expressed appreciation for the detainee’s cooperation in supporting a freeIraq. Cash was also given to the detainees to compensate them for their time. Each compromisewas treated as an SOI engagement. Compromise during a mission to maintain situationalawareness in the city would usually result in moving to an alternate position or extraction by theQRF.



Soldiers from the 1-18 Sniper Section practice theirmarksmanship skills at a range in Iraq.

Exfiltration (Exfil)

Exfil is the time when the sniper team is most vulnerable, especially after a compromise.Ambushes have been placed along likely exfil routes and improvised explosive devices (IED)have been discovered in doorways of occupied buildings. Exfil routes should never be the sameas the infiltration route. Exfil should also always be conducted as discretely as possible. If timewas an issue, exfils were kept relatively short in distance and in conjunction with the QRF. Exfilgates were established as well as emergency extraction points. Occasionally, teams of sniperswould operate in unison and use a bounding technique with teams over watching other team’smovement.

Our QRF was a HMMWV section of three or four vehicles from the unit whose sector we wereworking in. Coordination between the QRF and the sniper team was very important andconducted before every mission. Mission, routes to and from the sniper position, exfil andextraction gates, target area, frequency and call signs, recognition signals, and ourcommunication SOP were covered. Seating for the sniper team must also be planned for. Apossible way to do this would be to have the pickup vehicle empty with the exception of thedriver, TC, and gunner. This would allow room for two sniper teams. The use of armoredHMMWVs did not allow for a quick exfil.

Actions on Contact

When the sniper team initiated contact, QRF would immediately respond to the site of the target.The sniper team would remain in position to over watch the target area and the target. Thisallowed the team to reduce any other threats in the area and quickly guide the QRF to the site.

Contact was never initiated against us during an infiltration. However, contact was made on anumber of occasions during exfil. Contacts during movement were treated as a battle drill. Thekey is to immediately return fire.

Conventional snipers are a valuable asset to the commander in the asymmetric fight of Iraq.Snipers can be used as a force multiplier to allow platoons and companies to refit and focusoperations in mass or in other sectors. Snipers can maintain situational awareness for thecommander and provide eyes on the objective — real time intelligence. The psychological effect



that our snipers had on the populace was evident in the drop of insurgent activities when sniperswere employed. A sniper presence gave the local populace a heightened sense of security andwas welcomed by most. Snipers deterred insurgent activities and reinforced the InformationOperations throughout the AO.

Task Force Vanguard redeployed to Schweinfurt, Germany, in February 2005. The sniper sectionis now in the process of rebuilding the section to fill losses from Soldiers that PCSed and ETSed.Physical fitness and expert marksmanship are not the only qualities needed for new snipers.Discipline and intelligence are the most important factors. Discipline, I believe, is what kept mysnipers alive. Snipers have to be able to react quickly in the most demanding of situations inaccordance with the ROE and commander’s guidance.



Chapter 10

Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifle

Extract from “A Summary of Collected Lessons, Observations, Interviews, After-ActionReports, and Relevant Documents,” Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned,

1 March 2005

Prologue

The observations, analyses and assessments summarized in this document are based on thecandid comments and reports of the men and women who fought the battles, supported theforces, and led our Marines. The high level of professionalism and military aptitudedemonstrated by individual and unit performances during OIF/OEF were a hallmark of theseconflicts. The Marine Corps has an enviable reputation for innovation and adaptation, andmaintains the highest standards of excellence in the art of warfare. It is with a conscious intent tomaintain this reputation that the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned offers theobservations and commentary within this report.

Comments and feedback are welcomed and encouraged. It is recognized that what works in onearea of operations (AO) may not be effective in another AO or conflict. Just as the enemychanges their TTPs, we too must quickly change and adapt to the fight at hand. Please take theinformation provided, build on it, and report back on its applicability. It is of the utmostimportance that individuals and units continue to provide their lessons and observations so wecan ensure the next unit to deploy has your documented hard earned experience prior to crossingthe line of departure. Getting your observations and lessons into the Lesson Management Systemearly enough to impact pre-deployment training is crucial to increasing the effectiveness offollow on units and saving the lives of our Marines.

This is one of many documents and briefings covering a wide variety of topics that have been puttogether by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. These collations of lessons andobservations are not sole source or authoritative, but are intended as a means of informing thedecision making process and effecting needed changes in our institution.

M. E. DunardColonel, United States Marine Corps ReserveDirector, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

Executive Summary

MROC Decision Memorandum 18-2004 directed that MCCLL “…compare the performance ofthe semi-automatic and bolt-action sniper rifles during OIF II to determine if the procurement ofsemi-automatic sniper rifles should be expanded in the future.” EFCAT collections andassessments focused on operator feedback regarding the requirement for a semi-automatic sniperrifle capability, the performance of the DMR, and required capabilities for snipers in an urbanenvironment. MCCLL efforts in support of this IOR consisted of the following collection tasks:

• Six weeks (April 17 – May 31, 2004) in the Afghanistan Area of Operations (AO)interviewing snipers and their unit commanders.

• Interviews of Snipers in Camp Fallujah, Iraq during June 2004. Collections in Iraqwere subject to the availability of snipers in and around Fallujah despite ongoingcombat operations.



• Collection and review of available After Action Reports from Sniper Teams deployedin Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Initial Observations that follow are the basic data and information that have been obtainedthrough MCCLL collection efforts. These are the facts as observed or reported in the field andwill sequentially address the following four topics:

• The SR25 Semi-automatic sniper rifle

• The M40A3 in an urban environment

• The Designated Marksman Rifle

• Other Sniper Capability Requirements

Information on other topics is available in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System(LMS) at:

SIPRNET: www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil

NIPRNET: www.mccll.usmc.mil

Initial Observations

The following Initial Observations are the basic data and information that have been obtainedthrough MCCLL collection efforts. These are the facts as observed or reported in the field andwill sequentially address the following four topics:

• The SR25 Semi-automatic sniper rifle

• The M40A3 in an urban environment

• The Designated Marksman Rifle

• Other Sniper Capability Requirements

The SR25 Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifle

I don’t think it's coincidence that the Sniper carrying the SR-25 has 18 kills to date,the next closest has 5.

--3rd Battalion, 1st Marines After Action ReportFirst Lieutenant Jason W. Milbrandt USMC

Scout Sniper Platoon Commander3rd Battalion, 1st Marines

The following are extracts from unit After Action Reports (AARs):1

“Aside from the experience we have in the Platoon, I’d like to think we have someadditional creditability with this one due to the fact that we have (8) M40A1s which wepicked up from the unit we replaced during the RIP, (8) M40A3s that are T/E to the



Platoon and an SR-25 we were fortunate enough to have sent to us fromMARFORSYSCOM. I won’t belabor the data here now, but the SR-25 far outperformedthe others for several reasons:

(1) With the can off, it is nearly impossible for the average person to distinguish it froman M16 - especially considering almost every Marine has some type of scope, whetherpersonally purchased or an ACOG. If you don’t think this is important then I invite youto walk down the streets of Fallujah with an A1 or A3 with an infantry Platoon. The pointwill quickly become apparent when that feeling that everyone’s looking at you sets in.

(2) The A1 and A3 aren’t nearly as maneuverable in an urban environment as the SR-25due to their length and weight. Although this would seem to be a less-important point, thestack of M40A3 Battle Clubs that aren’t being employed has grown as the Snipers haveturned in those weapons for the relatively lighter and more maneuverable A1 (with theSR-25 already assigned - everything’s relative).

(3) The distinct signature of an A1 or A3 being fired immediately compromises theSniper’s position which in-turn draws fire. I don’t think more elaboration is required onwhy this isn’t a desirable effect.

(4) Snipers are taught rapid bolt manipulation and some are damn good at it, but thefastest Sniper isn’t going to be able to shoot, rack the bolt and reacquire the target toreengage as fast as the Sniper that can shoot, reacquire and reengage....simple math -you’re taking out a step. One shot, one kill sounds great but our friends are shootingthemselves up with adrenaline and god knows what else and then coming out to fight.There’s been multiple occasions that we’ve had Snipers put a round in the center of thechest and they keep coming - I wouldn’t believe it until it kept happening.

(5) The weight, lack of maneuverability, restrictive firing capacity and longer targetacquisition time combined result in the Snipers being required to carry an M16 to coverthese gaps...the only Marine in the Platoon not carrying an additional weapon is the oneassigned the SR-25.

(6) Furthermore, I don’t think it's coincidence that the Sniper carrying the SR-25 has 18kills to date, the next closest has 5.

(7) Finally, I’m sure someone will say that if we’re going to go semi-automatic then aMarine equipped with an ACOG on an M16 will be able to accomplish the same thing.Negative. While I’d agree that the urban fight is closer in for your average infantryMarine, not a lot changes for the Sniper except that he maneuvers into a position toobserve and engage down the long axis two blocks away where the fight WILL BE. 500yard shots in the Platoon are the norm here and we’ve reached out and touched as far as950 with the SR-25 and 1,400 with the SASR...in the city. The Marine with an M16 and4X ACOG simply isn’t equipped and doesn’t have the training to influence that fight.”2

The SR-25 proved itself as what is needed for a sniper rifle in an urban environment.Multiple target engagements in the narrow windows our position provided wereattainable because of the gas operated rifle. Something that would not have been affectedwith a bolt gun.

(1) We used the MK11 kit which comes complete with 10 mags, suppressor, cleaninggear, bipod, sling, and a completely railed fore end, flip up rear and front sights, and case.We used the Leopold 3.5-10x cammed for the 175gr AA11LR ammo. We used the



universal night sight for our night optic. This being a complete kit that CRANE tests anddistributes and modifies as needed makes it ready to go out of the box.

(2) These guns allowed us to maintain and control the streets of NAJAF. Having 10 magsand a gas operated gun eliminated the need for multiple weapons for the snipers owninternal security.

(3) The universal night site allowed to control the night in the same manner we controlledthe day. We also were able to put the universal night site on the SASR.

(4) Having all the guns suppressed again was invaluable. Being able to conceal flash andsound allowed us to operate out of the same position for longer durations to support theadvancing unit’s offensive. I Can’t Stress Enough How Important Supressed GunsWere.

3

“The Scout Sniper Platoon must have 4 to 8 “SR-25 type” Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifleswith variable power scope with external parallax adjustment, as well as a night clamp-ondevice to augment the M40A3. The scope needs to have variable power in order to have alarger field of view in urban environments. For night vision there must be three to fourpound clamp-on device in front of the scope so that the sniper does not have to changethe zero of the weapon system between day and night shooting.”4

Semi-auto Sniper Rifle – We have a real requirement for a semi-auto precision weapon.This should not be a replacement for the bolt gun, but rather a weapon that can be usedby an observer or by the sniper for situations that require this capability.5

The arrival of the SR-25 to the scout/sniper platoon opened many opportunities for thesniper teams in terms of employment and mission accomplishment. The rifle iscompletely unrecognizable to the average, untrained individual. Many times infantryMarines would ask where my sniper rifle was while traveling to insert points. It lookslike a regular M16 style weapon, and with the current optics and accessories available tothe infantry Marine to mount on his weapon, the SR-25 blends in effectively. This allowsthe sniper team to blend in with the surrounding infantry, enabling the sniper team tocomplete more clandestine insertions and extractions. (The insert/extract is the mostcrucial part of any scout/sniper missions’ success)

The SR-25 also enables the sniper to move with one weapon, vice two. (The M16A4 tobreak contact with and the M40A3 for precision fires) The SR-25, being magazine-fedwith 20 round magazines, is effective at both precision fires and suppression if needed.The SR-25 also weighs considerably less than the M40A3 while providing the same levelof accuracy with rapid follow-up shot capability that is absolutely necessary in urbancombat environments. The SR-25 also breaks down to allow much more in-depthmaintenance on the operator’s level than the M40A3, allowing more thorough cleaning toensure flawless functioning in all environments.

While accompanying Alpha Male 1-2 on a mission that required the reduction of enemytargets posing a threat to Iraqi Nationals hired as workers and interpreters, it provedhighly effective with its suppressed capability. When the team leader of Alpha Male 1-2engaged (a positively identified individual conducting surveillance of friendly forces)with the suppressed SR-25, none of the surrounding Iraqis had any idea that a shot wasfired. This allowed the sniper team to remain uncompromised and to continue its mission.Should that shot had been taken without a suppressed weapon; the team surely wouldhave been compromised, as it was only 300 meters from the objective.



The SR-25 also has a full-length M1913 Picatinny rail system that allows the mountingof the Universal Night Sight (UNS), as well as a PEQ-2. The SR-25, or another type ofsemi-automatic, 7.62mm NATO, precision fire weapon, should be issued to allscout/sniper platoons Marine Corps wide. This would give the sniper teams the ability toselect the proper “tool for the task”. The SR-25 should be issued to augment the currentTO/E of the M40A3.”6

“Recommend four MK11-MOD0’s per platoon which would give one per sniper team.These weapons are durable and provide an added capability that would compliment theM40A3. “7

The following are excerpts from interviews conducted by MCCLL in support of this report:8

“Semi-auto capability is important in order to be able to switch from the short fight in anurban environment to the long fight in a rural environment. The ability to engagemultiple targets at 1000 yards is not as important as at 200 yards.”9

“For urban hide in Taliban country I would want the DMR. Once in position the M-40 isgreat for single target engagements. As general purpose primary sniping weapon wouldprefer SR-25 (match grade heavy barrel 308 caliber, integral suppressor, M-16 basedrifle…not going to shoot out to 1000 yards with it but 9 out of 10 times not going to do itwith M-40 either ….Definitely in urban situations the semi-auto significantly increasesthe lethality of the Marine Sniper.”10

“SR-25…no problems out to 900 yards, excellent for spotter, same troubleshooting andclearing malfunctions as M-16, good box-style magazine; AR-10 malfunctions every 5rounds … When operating in six man teams, semi-auto capability is not as important …Only one rail system on DMR, SR-25 has additional rails for PEC-2 for instance, forclose-up targets.11

“Re-loading takes too long with a bolt-action 10 round magazine … (I’m) looking for asemi-auto sniper rifle to replace M-40 and SAM-R…something that can deliversuppressive fire and long range precision fire.”12

The M40A3 in an Urban Environment

The Scout Snipers of 2/1 effectively employed the M40A3 weapon system in numerous combatsituations, however its use brought a number of deficiencies to light. The weapons weight(18.5lbs), made it difficult to attain any unconventional shooting positions, which was the normin the urban fighting experienced in Fallujah. In addition, the bolt action and limited roundcapacity made it extremely difficult for the Scout Sniper to engage multiple enemy targets (ofwhich there were many instances). Furthermore, the time required to re-rack the bolt did notallow the Scout Sniper the ability to re-acquire. The following are extracts from unit AfterAction Reports (AARs):13

The M40A3 - there are so many reasons why it simply isn’t the best (or even better than the A1)weapon available. The weapon is too long, too heavy, and too identifiable. It is not suppressedand requires a dual weapon (M16) due to its restrictive magazine capacity and longer targetacquisition time.14

There were numerous occasions during Operation VALIANT RESOLVE that 1/5 Snipers wereunable to kill more of the enemy due to the limitations of the M40A3. With an internal magazineof only five rounds, the sniper would shoot his rounds and still have more targets to engage.From this point the sniper would load his M40A3 a round at a time, thus losing time and



accuracy on the targets that appeared. With the Unertl scope there is only a ten foot field ofview; this makes it challenging for snipers to engage targets that appear and disappear rapidly aswell as acquiring a target in a three dimensional environment. Having a variable powered scopewould allow the sniper to adjust his field of view anywhere from ten to thirty feet, thus allowingthe sniper to more easily acquire and kill multiple targets.15

During the occupation of TCP 7 and 8, sniper teams encountered enemy targets at distances of1200-1400 yards. The M82A3A SASR is incapable of consistent accuracy at those distances toreduce man-sized targets, and the M40A3 has the level of accuracy, but suffers from limitationsin maximum effective range. This situation resulted in missed opportunities of reducing enemytargets with precision fires. The M40A3 is also impossible to disguise while being employed indirect support of infantry units. A common tactic that sniper teams used to insert themselves wasa leave-behind from an infantry squad. This tactic was impossible to accomplish during thedaylight hours due to the civilian populous identifying the sniper rifle and compromising theteam. This severely limited the sniper teams’ ability to insert and observe undetected at primetimes of enemy activity. While engaged in urban combat during the assault on the city ofFallujah, snipers were forced to move with the M40A3 slung across their backs, using theirM16A4 as a primary weapon. Without having the firepower of an automatic weapon in such anenvironment, this severely limits the sniper team’s ability to move independently on thebattlefield to best support their Supported Unit Commander (SUC). Also, by having the M40A3slung across your back, it immediately identifies the sniper team to the enemy, and this iscounter-productive to all sniper tactics and doctrine. Once the Mk 11 Mod 0 (SR-25) wasbrought to our platoon, this enabled the sniper team to blend in with the infantry and accomplishmissions that would have been impossible due to compromise with the M40A3.16

The requirements for a Scout Sniper’s T/O weapon, in both urban and conventional fighting areas follows:

• Weight should be no more than 14.5 lbs, to include all optics

• It should have a 3x17 variable power scope

• Semi-automatic with a 10 round magazine (minimum)

• Hold 1 minute of angle at 1000 yards.

• Preferred round would be a 300 Winchester mag, as its flatter trajectory and higherspeed will make it less susceptible to wind changes and small errors in rangeestimation.

The fast paced urban combat situations experienced by 2/1 have made it evident that a newsniper rifle would greatly improved the lethality and effectiveness of Scout Snipers in anybattlefield situation. The M40A3 is an outstanding and irreplaceable rifle for many tacticalsituations; however, there are numerous situations that required a more robust weapon systemwhich can deliver rapid, accurate fire from a variety of positions. It is highly recommended thatat least one rifle meeting the above requirements be allocated to each Scout Sniper Team.17

This rifle is notoriously fragile and maintenance intensive…Due to the nature of operations, therifle is exposed to a certain amount of abuse. Teams are constantly riding around in HMMWV’sduring inserts, extracts and patrols. The rifle gets knocked around, even with the carefulprecautions taken by the teams. This abuse severely affects the rifles zero. Durability of the rifleis a problem. We have also experienced a problem with the signature that is left when an M40A3is fired in a desert or urban environment. In the desert there are not many places for snipers tohide. In an urban environment snipers are extremely close to other people. Sniper teams,



especially team leaders and assistant-team leaders, find themselves carrying three weaponsystems on a mission: M40A3 (usually strapped to his pack during insert, extract, andmovement), M16A4 used when moving and on patrol, and M9 as a secondary (once the M16A4has been strapped to his pack while in a hide).18

"The M40A3 stayed in the pelican case the whole deployment."

--Gunnery Sergeant Vincent M. Palucci USMCMCSOCOM Detachment One

The Performance of the Designated Marksman Rifle


During operations in Iraq, Grim Reaper 10 (GR10) had a direct support role throughalmost the war’s entirety. Requiring rapid advance and assaults, GR10 had little time inOP’s or in defensive positions during its time with Echo Co. The M40A3 is a veryeffective weapon system and is tactically sound, but a need for semi-automatic fire is stillneeded in a sniper role. A DMR would provide a sniper team more fire-power , range andmutual support for a M40A3. On many occasions GR10 missed opportunities to engagehostile forces because of the bolt-action rifle. Not because of rate of fire but the ability topatrol with rifle platoons as an integrated member of a squad. DMR rifles give the sniperthe firepower of an assault rifle and the range and accuracy of a bolt action sniper rifle. Insupport of rifle platoons both are needed to be effective. An allotment of DMR’s to ScoutSniper platoons are needed for future combat operations. Issues surrounding the DMRneed to be addressed because the rifle is very effective, and compliments the existingbolt-action rifle. Compatible ammunition and range give an obvious choice to use theweapon system, besides the fact that the rifle is based on a tried and true M-14.20

The following are excerpts from interviews conducted by MCCLL in support of this report:21

Asst Tm Ldr carries the DMR…opts not to take it in urban terrain, because it’s a longgun, and difficult to climb through windows into buildings with …. Only one rail systemon DMR, SR-25 has additional rails for PEC-2 for instance, for close-up targets.22

“…the DMR…it’s a great weapon system [but] it’s not a sniper rifle. It’s great formultiple target engagements, even out to a thousand yards, but the durability of the DMRis not very good, especially out here in the sand…we’ve had problems withlubrication…and if the gas rings are not cleaned properly then they’ll go down. It’s agood weapon, but I do not recommend it for being out here…it’s too heavy…along witha lot of the other weapons that we’re carrying right now…anyone operating it, not justsnipers, needs to be extremely light going through these mountains. The terrain is justterrible.23

“Every time I break apart [the DMR] I loose accuracy. [After] I re-BZO the weapon I’moff by a minute, half-minute, and when we’re talking about hitting a target at six, sevenhundred yards away, that’s a considerable difference that you have to compensate forwhich you shouldn’t have to…it should be dead on as soon as you BZO the weapon.”24

“[The DMR] could work very well as a spotter’s weapon or a secondary sniper rifle. Ofcourse it couldn’t replace the accuracy of the M40 at longer distances, but it would be



nice to have another tool. If we would have had them in Iraq we could have employedthem well in the urban environments on patrol. It would allow for a higher rate of fire ifyou were engaged in an urban firefight, in addition to allowing you to engage targets at adistance. The Corps needs a weapon for the sniper to carry while on patrol that allows usto engage the enemy accurately, quickly, and sometimes with a heavy volume of fire aswell. We cannot waste time pulling our M40 out of a drag bag or unslinging it from ourback before unleashing precision fire. Although the DMR is a very good weapon, itshould not replace the M40; instead it should be added to our toolbox in order for us to beeven more of a force multiplier on the battlefield.”25

“I think that the DMR needs to be an additional asset, and not a replacement (much ashow the SASR is issued and employed). This seems to be the consensus so far and it fitswith discussions we’ve had as a platoon in the past. Different guns for different missions.Minimum of 2 per platoon – perhaps 4 since maintenance seems to be an issue (similar tothe SASRs).”26

“Both weapons (M40A1/A3, and the DMR) should be organic to the SSP. Ideally, thesniper should be able to choose which weapon is more appropriate to the environmentand situation he will be operating in. Both have strengths and weaknesses that must beweighed during the planning phase of the mission for proper weapon selection.M40A1/A3: Undoubtedly the more accurate of the rifles. It is best used when extremeranges are anticipated against a limited number of targets or when absolute pinpointaccuracy is needed; for example; having to kill a target mingling with civilians. Eventhough it does not have the pinpoint accuracy of the M40, the DMR is a better“all-round” choice for the environments we are finding ourselves in. The DMR should bein use in the urban environment we are currently facing in Iraq. The shorter engagementranges and the potential need to kill multiple targets quickly make the DMR the obviouschoice in an urban environment. Additionally, team self defense is enhanced by thehigher rate of fire.”27

“The DMR is a great weapon system for a trained squad or Company DesignatedMarksman, not a Sniper. The following are some of the reasons:

(1) Accuracy – Although the DMR and the M40A1 or A3 are highly accurate at shortranges (less than 600 yards), the bolt action is much better at longer ranges. One reasonfor this is that semi-autos do not seat the round in the chamber at the same place everytime (due to the variable pressure caused by the gas forcing the bolt to the rear and thespring tension). This causes slight fluctuations in the head spacing of the round in thechamber which then causes huge problems for accuracy at long range. This can beminimized by the 2112s at Quantico through precise machining of parts, but then if theweapon gets dirty (battlefield dirty, not range firing dirty) the inconsistencies return.

(2) Durability – Even though Snipers ideally are supposed to have their weapon spotlessall the time, reality is that is impossible. Semi-autos with their moving parts already havea huge probability for malfunction or jamming and the introduction of dirt into thosemechanisms will increase exponentially. The bolt gun is a much, much simpler weaponsystem that has very, very few problems with malfunction and none with jamming. Therebuttal to this point is that we have riflemen with M-16s and they deal with thosemalfunctions. The counter point to this rebuttal is a Sniper’s mission is entirely differentthan a rifleman’s. A sniper may only get a couple of rounds off and they have to count.The sniper’s weapon must be highly reliable. A semi-auto may be rifleman reliable, butnot sniper reliable.



(3) Historically – Although the DMR is not the exact weapon system that the Army usedin Vietnam, its basic weapon (the M-14) is. The M-14 has been given a new fiberglassstock, new scope, and the 2112s worked them over. The weapon is still the same. TheArmy had so many problems with the M-14 as a sniper rifle in Vietnam that it switchedto the current bolt-action M-24 afterward. Some of the reasons for the switch should bereviewed. These reasons stated above do not mean that the DMR is not an excellentweapon, they mean that the DMR should be used in a mission other than the primaryweapon of the sniper.28

The DMR can be used and will be readily accepted by all snipers in battalion sniperplatoons if they do not replace the bolt guns. Suggestions for including the DMR into thebattalion level sniper platoons are:

(1) The DMR would be an excellent weapon for the Assistant Team Leader. With theaddition of a second scoped .308 rifle into a team that has the multi-shot capability of theM-14, the Team Leader’s options for which way to employ his team tactically wouldgreatly increase.

(2) The DMR could be a supplementary weapon for the sniper, which he only takes oncertain missions. This is done in some sniper teams with SAWs. They are missionspecific weapons in this option.29

The suggestions that were offered would deal with the Marine Corps’ issue of having sniperswith multi-shot capability for an urban environment. The bigger issue that snipers have withurban terrain is not multi-shot capability, but a variable power scope. The fixed 10x Unertyl orAmerican Optics scope greatly diminishes the field of view at short ranges. The urbanenvironment may present targets at 30-50 yards and at that range a man’s head takes up theentire scope. The speed of acquisition and target identification would increase dramatically witha variable 3X-10X scope. This would also help with moving targets, which are the majority of allcombat shots.”30

Additional Combat Capability Requirements


I’m not sure whose basket this monster falls into, but there needs to be an adjustment toan Infantry Battalion’s T/E to reflect that Scout Sniper Platoon’s exist. Some Platoon’sare in Weapons Co and others are in H&S...neither Companies T/E accounts for this. It isa reoccurring battle EVERY cycle to find and equip the Platoon with the gear theyneed...valuable time that could otherwise be spent training. I got an email earlier thisweek from one of my former TLs who’s now a Scout Sniper Platoon Sergeant deployingin less than two months saying that he can’t even get NVGs for all of his Marines...sad.We regularly task these Marines with missions to go forward of friendly lines in 2-4 manTeams, we owe them the basic equipment to set them up for success.32

Suppressors – This is something that we have been putting on the back burner for toolong now. Our snipers should have a suppressor option available for every one of theirweapons they carry. Even when using supersonic ammo with most suppressors it is reallyhard to tell where the firing is coming from and with most weapons a suppressor willeliminate most if not all of the visible muzzle flash. If we had suppressors out here I thinkit would have really hindered the enemy’s ability to tell where we were firing from andpossibly avoided some casualties and saved some lives.33



The ACOG is a very useful sight. We currently have two ACOGs per team which meansthat both spotters in the team have a scoped weapon. The ACOG works very well in lowlight. The ACOG is also effective in darkness when there is even a small source ofambient light. The range finding reticule is not the most ideal, but once the sight istrained with, the Marines are able to employ the sight efficiently. The sight is durable andcleans easily. When removed, we have found the sight to be within at least two minutesof angle when properly refitted to the weapon…Recommend at least two ACOGS perfour man sniper team. If possible, get an ACOG with a crosshair type reticule vice achevron. A crosshair is much more user friendly and most Marines are more familiar withthis style of reticule.34

The following are excerpts from interviews conducted by MCCLL in support of this report:

Sniper rifles must be outfitted with suppressors. Though the need for sub-sonic ammodoes not present itself as the problem, enemy TTP’s have changed to counter USMCsniping tactics. This was seen in Operation Al Fajar. The time between the first andsecond attacks on Fallujah, foreign fighters studied Marine sniper tactics. After a sniperfired one round, enemy fighters identified the over-watch position and concentrated fireupon it. Suppressors would not reveal the sniper’s hide. Even if the round is still supersonic as it hits the target, the enemy is not able to determine the angle/direction of firethus not compromising the Marine’s hide.35

Emerging Issues

As a result of these initial observations, the following inferences are made:

• The consensus of Marine snipers in Iraq favors a semi-automatic sniper rifle over thetraditional bolt-action M-40, particularly when employed in the urban combatenvironment. The M40A3 is too long, too heavy, and too identifiable in an urbancombat environment. The distinct signature of an A1 or A3 being fired immediatelycompromises the Sniper’s position which in-turn draws fire. It is not suppressed andrequires a dual weapon to be carried due to its restrictive magazine capacity and longertarget acquisition time.

• The M-40A3 is a very effective weapon system and is tactically sound, but precisionsemi-automatic fire is still needed in a sniper role, particularly in a target rich urbanenvironment. The bolt action and limited round capacity made it extremely difficult forthe Scout Sniper to engage multiple enemy targets, of which there were manyinstances. Furthermore, the time required to re-rack the bolt did not allow the ScoutSniper the ability to reengage moving targets darting in and out of alleyways. Therewere reports that snipers were unable to kill more of the enemy due to the limitationsof the M40A3.

• The weapons weight (18.5lbs), made it difficult to attain any unconventional shootingpositions, which was the norm in the urban fighting experienced in Fallujah. The lackof maneuverability, restrictive firing capacity and longer target acquisition timecombined result in the Snipers being required to carry an M16 to cover these gaps.Sniper teams, especially team leaders and assistant-team leaders, find themselvescarrying three weapon systems on a mission. The M40A3 is usually strapped to thepack during insert, extract, and movement. The M16A4 is used when moving and onpatrol, and the M9 is used as a secondary weapon as the M16A4 is usually strapped tothe pack while in a hide. Without having the firepower of an automatic weapon in such



an environment, this severely limits the sniper team’s ability to move independently onthe battlefield to best support their Supported Unit Commander (SUC).

• The M40A3 is impossible to disguise while being employed in direct support ofinfantry units. While engaged in urban combat during the assault on the city ofFallujah, snipers were forced to move with the M40A3 slung across their backs, usingtheir M16A4 as a primary weapon. With the M40A3 slung across the back, itimmediately identifies the sniper team to the enemy, counter to all sniper tactics anddoctrine. In urban combat, a common tactic that sniper teams used to insert themselveswas a leave-behind from an infantry squad. This tactic was impossible to accomplishduring the daylight hours due to the civilian populous identifying the sniper rifle andcompromising the team. This severely limited the sniper teams’ ability to insert andobserve without being detected during prime times of enemy activity.

• The M40A3 is notoriously fragile and maintenance intensive. Due to the nature ofoperations, the rifle is exposed to a certain amount of abuse. In an urban environment,teams use HMMWVs and other vehicles during inserts, extracts and patrols. The riflegets knocked around, even with the careful precautions taken by the teams. This abuseseverely affects the rifles’ zero. Durability of the rifle is a problem.

• A big issue that snipers have with urban terrain is a variable power scope. The fixed10x Unertyl or American Optics scope greatly diminishes the field of view at shortranges. With the Unertl scope there is only a ten foot field of view; this makes itchallenging for snipers to engage targets that appear and disappear rapidly as well asacquiring a target in a three dimensional environment. The urban environment maypresent targets at 30-50 yards and at that range a man’s head takes up the entire scope.The speed of acquisition and target identification would increase dramatically with avariable 3X-10X scope. This would also help with moving targets, which are themajority of all combat shots.

• The DMR is a great weapon system for a trained squad or Company DesignatedMarksman, not a Sniper. DMR rifles give the shooter the firepower of an assault rifleand the range and accuracy of a bolt action sniper rifle. The Designated MarksmanRifle (DMR) is not considered a sniper rifle, and does not meet the requirement forone. Marine Snipers view it as an interim fix pending the fielding of a truesemi-automatic sniper rifle. It is a welcome addition to a sniper’s tool-box, yet doesnot qualify as a replacement for the M-40. There is only one rail system on the DMR,while the SR-25 has additional rails for the PEC-2 for instance, for close-up targets,crucial in an urban combat environment.

• Marine snipers in Afghanistan have fared better with the M-40 and have expressedsome doubts about a semi-automatic rifle with its inherently more complex operatingsystem being able to withstand extreme conditions presented by weather, terrain, andoperations, and to match the accuracy of a bolt-action rifle. The DMR received goodmarks from Marines employing them in clean, static environments, yet received poormarks from Marines operating in dirty, urban, mountainous, and extremeenvironments.



Potential Lessons

The following are potential lessons that may be drawn from the observations above:

• The fast paced urban combat situations experienced by the Marine Corps in OIF havemade it evident that a new sniper rifle would greatly improved the lethality andeffectiveness of Scout Snipers in any battlefield situation. The M40A3 is anoutstanding and irreplaceable rifle for many tactical situations; however, there arenumerous situations that required a more robust weapon system which can deliverrapid, accurate fire from a variety of positions. The Corps needs a weapon for thesniper to carry that allows him to engage the enemy accurately, quickly, andsometimes with a heavy volume of fire as well. While the urban fight is closer in forinfantry Marine, not a lot changes for the Sniper except that he maneuvers into aposition to observe and engage down the long axis two blocks away where the fightwill be. The Scout Sniper Platoon must have 4 to 8 “SR-25 type” Semi-AutomaticSniper Rifles with variable power scope with external parallax adjustment, as well as anight clamp-on device to augment the M40A3. The scope needs to have variablepower and night vision capabilities in order to have a larger field of view in urbanenvironments and low light situations.

• The Marine Corps has a real requirement for a semi-automatic precision weapon. Thisshould not be a replacement for the bolt action weapon, but rather an additionalweapon that can be used by an observer or by the sniper for situations that require thiscapability.

º Semi-auto capability is important in order to be able to switch from the shortfight in an urban environment to the long fight in a rural environment.

º Definitely in urban situations the semi-auto significantly increases the lethalityof the Marine Sniper.

º Even the fastest Sniper isn’t going to be able to shoot, rack the bolt andreacquire the target to reengage as fast as the Sniper that can shoot, reacquireand reengage with a semi-automatic weapon.

• The SR-25 proved itself as what is needed for a sniper rifle in an urban environment.The SR-25 opened many opportunities for the sniper teams in terms of employmentand mission accomplishment. It proved highly effective with its suppressed capability.With the suppressor off, it is nearly impossible for the average person to distinguish itfrom an M16 - especially considering many Marines are now equipped with combatoptics such as the ACOG. This allows the sniper team to blend in with the surroundinginfantry, enabling the sniper team to complete more clandestine insertions andextractions. The insert/extract is the most crucial part of any scout/sniper missions’success. SR-25 also enables the sniper to move with one weapon, vice two.

º The SR-25 also has a full-length M1913 Picatinny rail system that allows themounting of the Universal Night Sight (UNS), as well as a PEQ-2. The SR-25also breaks down to allow much more in-depth maintenance on the operator’slevel than the M40A3, allowing more thorough cleaning to ensure flawlessfunctioning in all environments.



º Ultimately, the increased effectiveness of the SR25 in the urban environmentwas demonstrated by the significantly higher kill rates within the same unit,obtaining over 300% higher kills than the next most effective sniper (18 vs 5).

Recommendations

• The Marine Corps should equip teams with different weapons for different missions.Both weapons, the M40A1/A3 and the SR25 should be organic to the SSP. Ideally, thesniper should be able to choose which weapon is more appropriate to the environmentand situation in which he will be operating. Both have strengths and weaknesses thatmust be weighed during the planning phase of the mission for proper weaponselection.

º The M40A3 is best used when extreme ranges are anticipated against a limitednumber of targets or when absolute pinpoint accuracy is needed. For example,having to kill a target mingling with civilians.

º The SR-25, being magazine-fed with 20 round magazines, is effective at bothprecision fires and suppression if needed. The SR-25 also weighs considerablyless than the M40A3 while providing the same level of accuracy with rapidfollow-up shot capability that is absolutely necessary in urban combatenvironments.

• The Marine Corps should immediately procure a 7.62 mm semi-automatic sniper rifle,preferably with the same variable power day optic as the bolt action sniper rifle for the2 man sniper team that can be used in both the urban and open areas. The SR-25, oranother type of semi-automatic, 7.62mm NATO, precision fire weapon, should beissued to all scout/sniper platoons Marine Corps wide. This would give the sniperteams the ability to select the proper “tool for the task”. The SR-25 should be issued toaugment the current TO/E of the M40A3.

• All sniper weapons should be suppressed. Being able to conceal flash and soundallowed sniper teams to operate out of the same position for longer durations tosupport the advancing unit’s offensive. The USMC should procure a compensatorand/or suppressor for the sniper rifle to reduce recoil and increase capability of 2ndround shots and to add survivability and minimize the chances of compromise onceshots are fired by the sniper teams.

• The Marine Corps should immediately field a variable powered scope that would allowthe sniper to adjust his field of view anywhere from ten to thirty feet, thus allowing thesniper to more easily acquire and kill multiple targets. It should have a 3x17 variablepower scope. The scope should provide for night vision capabilities within theeffective range of the weapon system. For night vision there should be a three to fourpound clamp-on device in front of the scope so that the sniper does not have to changethe zero of the weapon system between day and night shooting.

• The USMC should issue M4 rifles with ACOG scopes for the sniper that carries a boltaction sniper rifle or .50 caliber SASR to increase survivability and allow the Marineto maneuver on the battle field.



Endnotes:

1. (U) These reports were obtained by MCCLL from the Marine Corps Scout Sniper School,MCB Quantico, Virginia following the conclusion of the USMC Scout Sniper Symposium,December 2004.

2. First Lieutenant Jason W. Milbrandt USMC, Scout Sniper Platoon Commander , 3rdBattalion, 1st Marines, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines After Action Report, cited hereafter asMilbrandt, 3/1 AAR.

3. Gunnery Sergeant Palucci USMC, MCSOCOM Detachment One, Marine Corps SpecialOperations Command Detachment One After Action Report.

4. First Lieutenant Timothy J. Murray USMC, Scout Sniper Platoon Commander, OPERATIONValiant Resolve, Scout Sniper Platoon After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 2 May04, cited hereafter as Murray, 1/5 AAR.

5. Staff Sergeant Justin Olson, Team 2, 4th Platoon, 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company, SniperAfter Action Report, OIF August – November 2004, 8 December, 2004, cited hereafter as 2ndForce Recon Company Sniper AAR.

6. Staff Sergeant Caylen E. Wojcik USMC, Scout Sniper Platoon, OIF II After Action Report,3rd Battalion 1st Marines, cited hereafter as Wojcik, 3/1 AAR.

7. First Lieutenant C. R. Richardson, Scout Sniper Platoon, Battalion Landing Team 1/2, OIF IIMid-Deployment After Action Report, July – October 2004, Battalion Landing Team 1/2, 24thMarine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), 20 Oct 04, cited hereafter as Richardson, BLT1/2 AAR. Thereporting period covers Scout Sniper Platoon combat operations out of Camp Iskandariyah, Iraqfrom 19 July 2004 to 21 October 2004. The Scout Sniper Platoon remained in general support ofBLT 1/2 which is attached to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1st Marine Division, I MEF.The platoon operated in the Northern Babil province mainly in BLT 1/2’s area of operation.During the reporting period, the Platoon focused on offensive operations such as identifying andeliminating enemy threats along Route San Juan, Route Sheryl, ASR Jackson, Hateen MunitionsComplex, North Haswa, and the old Republican Guard ASP. The platoon also supported theFOB defense manning Observation Post 2 as well as towers 4 and 5. Finally, the platoon alsoprovided over-watch during larger scale battalion driven operations.

8. These interviews are the result of six weeks (April 17 – May 31, 2004) in the AfghanistanArea of Operations (AO), and on intermittent periods in Camp Fallujah, Iraq during June 2004.Collections in Iraq were subject to the availability of snipers in and around Fallujah because ofongoing combat operations.

9. Chief Warrant Officer-3 Christopher Harris USMC, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines BattalionGunner, interview conducted by Captain Howard Eyth USMC, MCCLL, in Baghram,Afghanistan, April 2004.

10. Sergeant Jess Murphy, Scout Sniper Team Leader, L Co, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, TaskForce Tarawa during OIF in Iraq and Team Leader, K Company Sniper Detachment to U.S.Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, interview conducted by Captain Howard Eyth USMC, MCCLL,May 2004.



11. These comments were extracted from interviews conducted by Captain Howard Eyth USMC,MCCLL of Snipers from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, Fallujah, Iraq, during June 2004, citedhereafter as Eyth, 1st Recon Interviews.

12. Sergeant J. M. Clarke, Scout Sniper 2/2, interview conducted by Captain Howard EythUSMC, MCCLL, Fallujah, Iraq, in June 2004.

13. (U) These reports were obtained by MCCLL from the Marine Corps Scout Sniper School,MCB Quantico, Virginia following the conclusion of the USMC Scout Sniper Symposium,December 2004.

14. Milbrandt, 3/1 AAR.

15. Murray, 1/5 AAR

16. Wojcik, 3/1 AAR.

17. First Lieutenant Adam Z. Pace USMC, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines Scout Sniper PlatoonAfter Action Report, 28 June 2004.

18. Richardson, BLT1/2 AAR.

19. (FOUO) These reports were obtained by MCCLL from the Marine Corps Scout SniperSchool, MCB Quantico, Virginia following the conclusion of the USMC Scout SniperSymposium, December 2004.

20. “Grim Reaper 10”, Scout Sniper Platoon Team Leader, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 15thMarine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), OIF I After Action Report, 18 March – 28 April 2003, 9 May2003.

21. These interviews are the result of six weeks (April 17 – May 31, 2004) in the AfghanistanArea of Operations (AO), and on intermittent periods in Camp Fallujah, Iraq during June 2004.Collections in Iraq were subject to the availability of snipers in and around Fallujah because ofongoing combat operations.

22. Eyth, 1st Recon Interviews.

23. Sergeant Hutchinson USMC, BLT 1/6 Scout Sniper, 22nd MEU, interview conducted byCaptain Howard Eyth USMC, MCCLL, Afghanistan, May 2004.

24. Corporal Lees USMC, BLT 1/6 Scout Sniper, 22nd MEU, interview conducted by CaptainHoward Eyth USMC, MCCLL, Afghanistan, May 2004.

25. Sergeant Goldsmith USMC, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, interview conducted by CaptainHoward Eyth USMC, MCCLL, Iraq, June 2004.

26. Staff Sergeant J.J. Lovett, USMCR, Scout/Sniper Platoon Sergeant, 2d Battalion 25thMarines, 4th Marine Division, interview conducted by Captain Howard Eyth USMC, MCCLL,Iraq, June 2004.

27. Sergeant Nguyen USMC, Scout Sniper who served with both 3rd and 4th LAR during OIF,interview conducted by Captain Howard Eyth USMC, MCCLL, Iraq, June 2004.



28. Sergeant Catagnus USMCR, Scout Sniper, interview conducted by Captain Howard EythUSMC, MCCLL, Iraq, June 2004, cited hereafter as Catagnus Interview.

29. Catagnus Interview.

30. Catagnus Interview.

31. (FOUO) These reports were obtained by MCCLL from the Marine Corps Scout SniperSchool, MCB Quantico, Virginia following the conclusion of the USMC Scout SniperSymposium, December 2004.

32. Milbrandt, 3/1 AAR.

33. 2nd Force Recon Company Sniper AAR

34. Richardson, BLT1/2 AAR.

35. Gunnery Sergeant Michael A. Ritchie USMC, MCCLL, interview of four StaffNoncommissioned Officers from 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Iraq, 24 Dec 2004.



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06-16 SOSO NL vol VI

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