04 TRI Type Specific Documentation

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1/136 Airbus TRI Type Specific Course Notes This document relates specifically to the Airbus TRI Type Specific course. It shall not be used outside of the context for which it has been prepared. A WELCOME BRIEFING (01:30) ......................................................................... 3 B AIRBUS DOCUMENTATION ( 00:15) ............................................................. 3 C The MMEL and MEL ........................................................................................... 6 N.01 COCKPIT PREPARATION (00:20) .......................................................... 8 N.02 DEPARTURE BRIEFING (00:10) ............................................................. 9 N.03 ENGINE START (00:15) .......................................................................... 10 N.04 PUSH BACK (00:05) ................................................................................ 11 N.05 TAXIING (00:10) ........................................................................................ 12 N.06 TAKE-OFF AND INITIAL CLIMB (00:25) .............................................. 14 N.07 CLIMB (00:05) ........................................................................................... 17 N.08 CRUISE (00 :20) ....................................................................................... 19 N.09 DESCENT AND APPROACH (00:15) ................................................... 21 N.10 ARRIVAL (00:15) ...................................................................................... 27 N.11 ILS APPROACH (00:15) ......................................................................... 30 N.12 RAW DATA ILS (00:10) ........................................................................... 32 N.13 GLIDE SLOPE FROM ABOVE (00:15) ................................................. 34 N.14 NON PRECISION APPROACH (00:25) ............................................... 35 N.15 CIRCUIT & VISUAL APPROACH, (00:10) ............................................ 40 N.16 CIRCLING APPROACH (00:15) ............................................................. 42 N.17 LANDING (00:10) ...................................................................................... 44 N.18 GO-ROUND (00:15) ................................................................................. 47 N.18 DIVERTING (00:10) ................................................................................. 49 T.01 PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS ................................................. 51 T.02 FLYING REFERENCES (00:15) ............................................................. 60 T.03 USE OF ATHR (00:10) ............................................................................ 61 T.04 USE OF AP and FD (00:10) ................................................................... 63 T.05 MODE REVERSIONS AP & FD (00:10) ................................................ 65 T.06 FLIGHT CONTROLS (00:15) .................................................................. 68 T.07 RECOVERY FROM APPROACH TO STALL (00:20) ......................... 73 T.08 ECAM (00:30) ............................................................................................ 74 T.09 FMS NAVIGATION (00:20) ..................................................................... 79 T.10 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING (00:20) .......................................... 83 T.011 VAPP DETERMINATION (00 :10) ...................................................... 89 F.00 INTRODUCTION TO THE FAILURE PHASE ...................................... 91 F.01 ENGINE ABNORMAL STARTS (00:15) ................................................ 91 F.02 ENGINE FAILURES REJECTED TAKE-OFF (00:15 + video) .......... 93 ENGINE FAILURE OR FIRE AFTER V1 (00:20) ................................................. 94 ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE (00:10) .............................................................. 100 ALL ENGINE FLAME OUT (00:20) ..................................................................... 102 ENGINE RELIGHT IN FLIGHT (00:10) .............................................................. 103 F.03 DUAL FMGS FAILURE (00:15) ........................................................... 104 F.04 TOTAL FCU FAILURE (00:15) ............................................................ 106 F.05 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE (00:25) ................................................ 107 F.06 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION (00:20) .............. 110 F.07 NO FLAPS OR NO SLATS (00:20) ..................................................... 113 F.08 NO FLAPS PLUS NO SLATS (00:15) ............................................... 115 F.09 DUAL RADIO ALTIMETER FAILURE (00:10) ................................... 116 F.10 UNRELIABLE SPEED / ALTITUDE (00:10) ..................................... 117 F.11 COCKPIT SMOKE (00:15) ................................................................... 119 G.01 WINDSHEAR (00:20) ............................................................................ 120

Transcript of 04 TRI Type Specific Documentation

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1/136 Airbus TRI Type Specific Course Notes

This document relates specifically to the Airbus TRI Type Specific course. It shall not be used outside of the context for which it has been prepared.

A WELCOME BRIEFING (01:30) .........................................................................3 B AIRBUS DOCUMENTATION ( 00:15) .............................................................3 C The MMEL and MEL...........................................................................................6 N.01 COCKPIT PREPARATION (00:20)..........................................................8 N.02 DEPARTURE BRIEFING (00:10) .............................................................9 N.03 ENGINE START (00:15) ..........................................................................10 N.04 PUSH BACK (00:05) ................................................................................11 N.05 TAXIING (00:10)........................................................................................12 N.06 TAKE-OFF AND INITIAL CLIMB (00:25) ..............................................14 N.07 CLIMB (00:05) ...........................................................................................17 N.08 CRUISE (00 :20) .......................................................................................19 N.09 DESCENT AND APPROACH (00:15) ...................................................21 N.10 ARRIVAL (00:15) ......................................................................................27 N.11 ILS APPROACH (00:15) .........................................................................30 N.12 RAW DATA ILS (00:10) ...........................................................................32 N.13 GLIDE SLOPE FROM ABOVE (00:15) .................................................34 N.14 NON PRECISION APPROACH (00:25) ...............................................35 N.15 CIRCUIT & VISUAL APPROACH, (00:10)............................................40 N.16 CIRCLING APPROACH (00:15) .............................................................42 N.17 LANDING (00:10) ......................................................................................44 N.18 GO-ROUND (00:15) .................................................................................47 N.18 DIVERTING (00:10).................................................................................49 T.01 PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS .................................................51 T.02 FLYING REFERENCES (00:15).............................................................60 T.03 USE OF ATHR (00:10)............................................................................61 T.04 USE OF AP and FD (00:10) ...................................................................63 T.05 MODE REVERSIONS AP & FD (00:10)................................................65 T.06 FLIGHT CONTROLS (00:15) ..................................................................68 T.07 RECOVERY FROM APPROACH TO STALL (00:20).........................73 T.08 ECAM (00:30) ............................................................................................74 T.09 FMS NAVIGATION (00:20) .....................................................................79 T.10 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING (00:20) ..........................................83 T.011 VAPP DETERMINATION (00 :10)......................................................89 F.00 INTRODUCTION TO THE FAILURE PHASE......................................91 F.01 ENGINE ABNORMAL STARTS (00:15) ................................................91 F.02 ENGINE FAILURES REJECTED TAKE-OFF (00:15 + video) ..........93 ENGINE FAILURE OR FIRE AFTER V1 (00:20).................................................94 ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE (00:10) .............................................................. 100 ALL ENGINE FLAME OUT (00:20)..................................................................... 102 ENGINE RELIGHT IN FLIGHT (00:10) .............................................................. 103 F.03 DUAL FMGS FAILURE (00:15) ........................................................... 104 F.04 TOTAL FCU FAILURE (00:15) ............................................................ 106 F.05 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE (00:25)................................................ 107 F.06 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION (00:20) .............. 110 F.07 NO FLAPS OR NO SLATS (00:20) ..................................................... 113 F.08 NO FLAPS PLUS NO SLATS (00:15) ............................................... 115 F.09 DUAL RADIO ALTIMETER FAILURE (00:10)................................... 116 F.10 UNRELIABLE SPEED / ALTITUDE (00:10) ..................................... 117 F.11 COCKPIT SMOKE (00:15) ................................................................... 119 G.01 WINDSHEAR (00:20) ............................................................................ 120

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G.02 TCAS (00:10) ......................................................................................... 127 G.03 USE OF RADAR (00:10) ..................................................................... 128 G.04 WET RUNWAYS (00:05) ..................................................................... 130 G.05 FLIGHT IN SEVERE TURBULENCE (00:05)................................... 131 G.06 GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (00:15)....................................... 131 G.07 RVSM AIRSPACE (00:05)................................................................... 134 S.01 SIMULATOR INFORMATION............................................................. 134

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A WELCOME BRIEFING (01:30) Trainees newly arrived in our Training Centre need to complete our documentation for recording purposes, to be introduced to the facilities and to be introduced to Airbus documentation. The Welcome Briefing should be scheduled in a classroom, but if it is conducted for a single crew can be performed in a Briefing Room. For each crew you will need their Course schedule, Trainees’ files, Golden Rules Card, and the Welcome “PowerPoint” presentation either on the Airbus Network or on CD for your laptop. Prepare the classroom and initialise the Briefing from the Network or from CD. Meet the Trainees in the Welcome room where the Hostess gives an Introduction to Toulouse and the Training Centre. She usually finishes by taking photos and the Trainees are ready for you around 09:00 (but this depends on how many there are on a particular day). Escort your trainees to the classroom (or Briefing Room) and commence by getting the trainees to complete their files with licence number, passport information and flying experience. On completion check each file for correct compilation. Explain the role of the course coordinator. You now present the “Welcome Briefing presentation” which introduces the Training Centre, the Courses and their phases, the schedule and training equipment. The Golden rules video introduces some Airbus concepts. Hand out the paper explaining the FCOM contents and ask for any questions After the “Welcome Briefing” you carry out the Training Centre walkaround. During your tour of the Ground and First Floors emphasise the position of toilets, prayer room (if applicable), Trainees lounge, Gift Shop, Restaurant, briefing rooms, Training Devices and Simulators. Take the Trainees to the FAST office where they collect their laptops and then to the VACBI room where you hand them over to the GSI. Take the completed files to the Trainees Office.

B AIRBUS DOCUMENTATION ( 00:15) To explain the generic Airbus documentation used during the course you will need the Trainees Booklet, FCOM Volumes l to 4 and the QRH, and the Loft and Skill Test Supplement Booklet The Trainees Booklet is the trainees personal file while undergoing training and contains the syllabus for his course. It must accompany him for all sessions.

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The generic FCOM contains a full and in depth description of the generic aircraft technical systems and associated procedures from a pilots point of view.

A. FCOM VOLUME I This manual contains a technical description of the aircraft systems. A list of abbreviations and symbols used in all documentation is included at the beginning of the manual. At the beginning of each chapter there is a contents list. Each chapter covers a specific system. The main components, controls and indications are described. The cautions and warnings associated with each system are included in each chapter as is the electric bus distribution. In volume 1 the chapter numbers correspond to the ATA (Air Transport Association) 100 BREAKDOWN chapter numbers. This represents the official reference for the classification of airplane systems and/or functions. The ATA breakdown consists of six digits, the first two of which refer to a particular aircraft system. The full six digits are used in the MEL and the MMEL. The list below details the ATA chapter numbers used in FCOM Vol. 1. Chapter System 21 Air Conditioning, Pressurization & Ventilation 22 Auto Flight 23 Communications 24 Electrical 25 Equipment 26 Fire Protection 27 Flight Controls 28 Fuel 29 Hydraulic 30 Ice and Rain Protection 31 Indicating & Recording Systems 32 Landing Gear 33 Lights 34 Navigation Systems 35 Oxygen 36 Pneumatic 38 Water &Waste System 49 Auxiliary Power Unit 52 Doors 70 Power Plant The classification of the systems is in alphabetical order apart from the last three systems. This volume will be of use in the Ground phase of the course to reinforce and compliment the lessons learnt on the CBT. However the CBT should be considered the prime source of technical information. Once the CBT phase is successfully completed Volume 1 will become the prime source of information on aircraft systems.

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B. FCOM VOLUME 2 This manual contains information on loading, performance and pre-flight planning. Also included is performance information for special operations (contaminated runway, ETOPS etc.). This volume is of use during the performance course, and during Line Orientated Flight Training (LOFT) exercises. It will continue to be of use in line operations.

C. FCOM VOLUME 3 This volume contains chapters on Operating Limitations, Abnormal and Emergency procedures, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Supplementary Techniques, in-flight performance and single engine operation. It is used in all Training sessions and in flight. a. Operating Limitations: This chapter inc ludes limitations required by the regulating Authority and contained in the Flight Manual. b. Abnormal and Emergency Procedures: This section is a complete list of all the ECAM failure messages and other failures requiring the use of the QRH. Each section in the main body of this chapter corresponds to the relevant ATA chapter number. In the chapter introduction there is information on ECAM use and task sharing. The section on operating techniques contains information on such topics as rejected take-off, engine failure after V1 etc. Within each ECAM procedure there are notes which amplify the procedure. These do not appear on ECAM and it is not necessary to consult this volume during ECAM procedures. c. Normal Procedures: This chapter contains all information on Airbus Standard Operating Procedures and techniques required for the conduct of a normal flight. d. Supplementary Techniques: This chapter begins with a definition of operating speeds etc. The rest of the chapter contains information concerning systems and operational situations. Most of the sections conform to the ATA 100 breakdown. e. In Flight Performance: Contains information on performance for use in flight. f. Single Engine Operations: This chapter details the possible strategies following an engine failure in flight. Further information is given to assist in planning and preparing for a single engine landing. g. OEB’s: These are used as the fastest way to advise operators of revised or significant new technical information, flight crew procedures or changes to limitations. OEB’s are not approved by the airworthiness authorities and will be superseded by a modification or service bulletin. Some OEB’s may have an impact on the safe conduct of flight operations and these are reproduced in the QRH. The generic FCOM used in all our training does not (normally) contain any OEB’s. h. FCOM Bulletins: Are used to provide supplementary operational information normally falling outside the content of the FCOM. Each bulletin may deal with one or more subject. Only bulletins applicable to the generic aircraft are included.

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D. FCOM VOLUME 4 This volume provides in depth information about the FMGS principles, procedures and interface. It may sometimes duplicate the information already contained in Volumes 1 and 3, however the aim is to have all the information regarding the FMGS in one book.

E. FCOM REVISIONS As the documentation is generic it is not subject to revisions.

F. QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH) Most Abnormal and Emergency procedures are presented to the crew on ECAM. The QRH contains checklists which cannot be presented on ECAM and additional emergency and abnormal procedures which may be required by ECAM. At the front of the QRH there is an important note concerning task sharing and ECAM procedures. Normal procedures and task sharing are detailed. Also included are in flight performance, operational data and OEB’s. The normal checklist is printed on the back of the QRH along with the ON GROUND EMERGENCY EVACUATION checklist. All training sessions require the QRH.

G. LOFT AND SKILL TEST SUPPLEMENTAL BOOKLET This booklet contains RTOLW charts for all airports involved in the Loft and Skill Test scenarios and extracts from the Master Minimum Equipment List to cover potential need during these sessions.

C The MMEL and MEL The MMEL is the Master Minimum Equipment List published by the A/C manufacturer (Airbus). The MEL is the Minimum Equipment List published by the operator and approved by the local authorities; it is necessarily at least as restrictive as the MMEL. The MMEL (before delivery to an Airline), or the MEL (once accepted by an Airline), allows an aircraft to be dispatched with some items of equipment or some functions inoperative. In certain stated cases specific limitations or procedures apply, or maintenance actions are required before dispatch. The document consists of 4 sections: Section 1 – List of pieces of equipment which may be inoperative for dispatch, and the rectification interval applicable. Section 2 – Associated operational procedures. Section 3 – Associated maintenance procedure. Section 4 – List of ECAM warnings associated to the dispatch conditions. Each item or piece of equipment listed in the MEL is identified using the ATA 100 format (Air Transport Association 100); as fo r FCOM, the full six figures of

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this breakdown are used: for example 21-52-01, 21 refers to the Air Conditioning – 52 to the Air cooling system – 01 for the Air Conditioning Pack. Not to be confused with the MMEL/MEL is the "Configuration Deviation List" (CDL) in the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) where allowable missing items are detailed. The MMEL/MEL refers to items that are inoperative, as opposed to missing. If a particular item is not mentioned in the MMEL/MEL then dispatch is not allowed. If a particular item is not mentioned in the CDI then dispatch is not allowed. General Operational Rules for the MEL: 1. If a failure occurs or a component or a function is inoperative up to the commencement of the flight (being the “point at which an aircraft begins to move under its own power for the purpose of preparing for Take-off” JAR-MMEL/MEL.005(d) ie commences to taxi), the crew must refer to MEL. If a failure occurs during the taxi phase before the start of the take-off roll, any decision to continue the flight shall be subject to pilot judgement and good airmanship. The commander may refer to the MEL before any decision to continue the flight is taken This is particularly true for those failures which might affect the take-off performance (e.g. loss of spoilers, brake failure, loss of EPR mode with N1 rated mode…). Check at the end of MEL chapter 0 (General) the ATA summary, in order to identify the ATA number associated to the failed system, or use the list of ECAM caution titles in Chapter 4 to identify more precisely the full six figure ATA number related to this failure. 2. Go to MEL chapter 1 and carefully identify the item associated with the failure: - If the failed item is NOT mentioned in the MEL, the dispatch is NOT possible with the failed item. - If the failed item is mentioned, read carefully the description provided as well as the conditions under which the DISPATCH is, or is not possible. - If the DISPATCH is POSSIBLE, check whether . The Rectification interval (CAT A, B, C or D) is not yet expired, and/or . A placard is required (*) and/or, . A specific OPERATIONAL procedure or limitation applies (O), and/or, . A specific MAINTENANCE action applies (M). 3. In case an OPERATIONAL procedure or limitation applies, refer to MEL chapter 2. Enter chapter 2 with the ATA number, and check: - the potential Applicable Performance Penalties (e.g. MTOW, FLX …), - the potential Flight Domain Limitations (e.g. SPD, CONF …), - the potential Applicable Special procedures (e.g. MAN ENG START …) and - some systems which must be turned off.

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4. If a PLACARD or MAINTENANCE actions is required, call for the maintenance specialist and refer to MEL chapter 3 to determine the necessary actions. NOTE: When the MEL asks for both a maintenance and operational procedure, the maintenance action has to be performed before applying the operational procedure. Be aware that in case of an ETOPS sector, some items are mandatory for ETOPS dispatch. This is specifically mentioned in the MEL. During the training, the MMEL will be used for LOFT exercises only; some extracts will be provided when necessary for specific simulator exercises.

N.01 COCKPIT PREPARATION (00:20) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Detailed information on preparing the cockpit for departure is to be found in the FCTM and in Volume 3. In order to save time we use the Transit Cockpit Preparation for our usual procedures, even when the simulator has not been left in the correct Transit configuration. Initially you can help you trainees when the configuration is incorrect but after a few sessions they should be able to do it themselves.

INSTRUCTION On entering the simulator the trainees commence the preparation and you commence the setting up of the simulation. Don’t let yourself become fixated on the IOS to the point you don’t follow the trainees in their procedure. In order to heighten the reality aspect think of the order in which you initialise the simulation. As the Trainees get settled into their seats set up the obvious things they can see first like disarmed slides and open doors. Then set up the environment according to the session guide (you don’t have to follow the guidelines exactly to the letter … the Trainees should listen to the ATIS as broadcast and not on the session guide to know if it is summer or winter!). Finally, finish refuelling the aircraft. You are now ready to put on your Pursers Cap and ask if it is ok to close the door as the pax are all on board. Buzz the cockpit from the ground to ask if you can disconnect the ground power and finally close the cargo doors before push back.

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From the above you can see that your Preparation from the IOS does not involve your continual attention during the approximately 20 minutes it should take a crew to prepare for engine start, so you can devote time to monitoring the Trainees while they carry out their preparation. The Take-off Briefing is to be completed prior to engine start. Use the different MCDU pages to brief while the other pilot cross checks with the relevant documentation. The trainees should work towards completing the Transit preparation in 20 minutes (Full preparation 30 minutes) to the point where they are ready to start the engines. Task sharing and areas of responsibility need to be clearly explained. Ensure good crew communication and mutual cross-checking.

N.02 DEPARTURE BRIEFING (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The objective of the Take off briefing is for the PF to inform the PNF of his intended course of actions during Taxi, Take-off and initial climb, in normal and abnormal situations. The briefing must be LOGICAL and CONCISE. It should be done before Engine Starting when the workload is low so that both pilots have a clear understanding of what they are about to do. Should the take-off conditions change after engine start, then a short briefing concentrating on the main changes should be carried out.

INSTRUCTION Listen to the Briefing to make sure you understand what is said. Beware of a Briefing that is too generic because each take off is an individual event and should be covered by the specifics of that procedure. The following KEY ITEMS shall be mentioned:

- Pushback and Engine Start considerations. - Expected taxi path - Normal departure

When specific data is mentioned it shall be cross-checked on the associated peripheral (V speeds, FLX, SID etc).

- Specific runway / weather condition. Use of Anti Ice and APU. - Essential points of the ATC clearance - initial cleared altitude and

trajectory. - Transition altitude - MSA – any Constraining SID ALT CSTR. - Use of the Radar …

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- Reminder of major NOTAM, MEL or CDL item. - Abnormal situations. If T/O is rejected then who calls STOP, and who

actually STOPS the A/C, plus If the T/O is continued the EO ACCEL ALT, Minimum initial climb altitude (MSA, or Visual Circuit altitude and expected procedure etc)

- Take–off Alternate procedure (as applicable) - Potential overweight landing with associated configuration (QRH).

As the PNF is a vital crew member in Normal and Abnormal situations he should be in a position to devote his attention completely to the Briefing so he will be in the loop at all times. Therefore ensure he is not distracted during your briefing. As the training scenarios frequently involve much repetition, once your crews have achieved a good level it may not be necessary to give a complete briefing if the main points have been well understood during the previous exercise. Look out for Briefings that are incomplete, not in sequence, too long, or generic in nature.

N.03 ENGINE START (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The engines are normally started using the AUTO START procedure. The MANUAL START procedure is used in some specific cases. During an AUTO START procedure the FADEC protects the engines against a HOT start, a HUNG start, or a STALL. It detects these phenomena and takes the appropriate action (reducing the fuel flow, or cutting it off, cranking the engine, attempting a new start etc. …). During a MAN START the FADEC ensures a PASSIVE monitoring of Engine parameters, with potential warnings, and it is up to the pilot to initiate a shut down if parameters are about to be exceeded. Some Common Errors to highlight are: APU Bleed not on. Bleed pressure not checked. Hand not on the ENG MASTER switch for a manual start. Stopwatch not used or not started at ENG MASTER SW ON ENG MASTER switch ON below max. motoring speed during a manual start. ENG START selector left at IGN/START after start completion.

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INSTRUCTION When the Engines are stabilised after the starting sequence the crew perform their “After Start Scans”. As Airbus philosophy is for the Flying Pilot to carry out the engine start as the PF there is a rôle reversal for the scans depending on who has started the engines. This can take a few sessions for trainees to get correct so be aware of this problem.

N.04 PUSH BACK (00:05) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Aircraft like the A320 are usually parked at an Air Bridge and thus require a Push Back prior to taxi. We normally do not have the ability to simulate a “Power Push” where the nose wheel steering is pressurised and the CM1 is told by the ground crew what steering inputs to make while the aircraft is moved by pushing with a rotating wheel against the left main wheels. The usual procedure is with a tug.

INSTRUCTION Depending on the type of simulator you have will dictate whether you have a dedicated NWS Disconnect / Connect function. If this function is present simply disconnect the NWS at some convenient stage during the cockpit preparation and connect the NWS after the Parking Brake has been applied after pushback. If this dedicated function is not present we have to cheat the system into displaying a NWS Disconnect ECAM message before pushback. Normally the message appears as a result of initiating a push back so what is required is to insert the Wheel Chocks and (with doors and hatches still open if desired) and initiate the Push Back. The Wheel Chocks prevent movement but now we have an ECAM message NWS Disconnect. When cleared for pushback by ATC and the ground crew asks the pilots to release the brakes you only have to remove the Wheel Chocks by deselecting them and the Push Back will start. Monitor that their feet are on the floor as they should not apply any braking effort during push back. The Push Back tractor will automatically disconnect when the Push back is complete. Monitor the Ground Speed for the termination of the Push Back and when the value is zero ask the pilots to apply the Park Brake straight away as failure to do this at once will result in the aircraft moving forward under idle thrust.

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N.05 TAXIING (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The Nose Wheel Steering is “taxi by wire” and all turn demands are computer controlled. The relationship between the tiller and the nose wheel angle is not linear, but the force on the tiller is light and independent of the deflection.

This graph shows the relationship between input on the tiller and the resulting nosewheel deflection. You can see that a large tiller deflection near the Zero position results in a small nose wheel deflection, but as the deflection increases the effect is multiplied. Consequently, when taxiing in a straight line it is easy to make small corrections. However when the nosewheel is at a large angle to the fuselage a small tiller deflection results in a large turn demand from the steering computers which will result in jerkiness. If this occurs release some pressure on the tiller and thus reduce the turn demand. When taxiing in a straight line the rudder pedals can be used in order to relax the “steering hand” however all turns should be initiated with the tiller (max speed 10 kts). The brakes are carbon brakes. Considerable wear and rise in temperature can occur during taxi due to successive brake applications. With Carbon Brakes at each brake release there is (almost instantly) a small amount of oxidation of the surface which is removed at the next brake application. This is where the wear occurs (from removing the oxidized material and exposing a clean surface, which then immediately oxidizes). Effectively, one continual application from 130 kts down to taxi speed will cause the same amount of wear as one short application to slow from 15 to 10 kts.

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During taxi the brake temperature should not generally rise above 150°C before T/O for proper RTO. Thus consider using brake fans during taxi if the wheel temperature gets closeto that value. Don't use brake fans during T/O. If during any stage of taxiing they have to stop and remain stopped (at the Holding Point for example) ensure they apply the parking Brake. When the parking brake is engaged, pressing the pedals has no effect. If braking problems are encountered during taxi release the foot brake and select the A/SKID - NWS switch to OFF. Then use pedal braking with care by modulating the pressure. NWS is then lost as well, so use differential braking to steer the aircraft. Before crossing the Holding point the Before T/O checklist should be completed down to the line. Crossing the Holding Point is the cue for the PF to call for the checklist below the line. When a packs off take-off is planned, the packs should be switched off just prior to completing the before take-off checklist. If the T/O has to be performed with the PACKS OFF for performance reasons, and Air Conditioning is desired during the take-off the APU BLEED may be used with the PACKS ON; this gives both the required engine performance and at the same time passenger comfort. (In case of an APU auto shutdown during T/O, the engine thrust is frozen, until the thrust is manually reduced.) If they are going to use APU bleed for take off only select APU bleed on just before take off as there is a possibility of fumes entering the cabin during taxi. A 180° turn on the runway requires a specific procedure provided in FCOM Volume 3. They should not let the G/S drop below 8 kts during the manoeuvre in order to avoid stopping. Differential thrust is allowed and can assist during the turn (to a maximum of 55%N1 or 1.05EPR) Differential braking is not to be used due to the possibility of undue stress of the undercarriage components. When exiting a sharp turn, anticipate the steer out. If the ATC modifies the take-off or departure clearance, this must be reflected on the MCDU, FCU (possibly RMP) and a short briefing conducted to confirm those modifications.

INSTRUCTION Before taxiing, confirm NWS is available by checking NW STREERG DISC amber MEMO is not displayed on ECAM. The Flight Control check can be performed before taxiing commences. If this check is carried out during the taxi it must be done in an uncongested area as one pilot will be “head down” during the check. Monitor that when cleared to taxi they switch on the Taxi light. Monitor speed during turns to less than 10 kts.

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If you wish to insert a Loss of Braking do it where you will not get involved in negative training. This means you should not fail the brakes when they are facing the terminal, but wait until they have a straight unobstructed taxiway in front of them.

N.06 TAKE-OFF AND INITIAL CLIMB (00:25) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION EXTRA INFORMATION HEAVY WEIGHT CROSSWIND

BACKGROUND While turning onto the runway, it is important not to waste any runway length lining-up so a rolling take-off is recommended. If ATC requests you to maintain runway centre li ne, simply turn the HDG selector and select the desired HDG target. NAV mode will disarm and RWY TRK mode will engage on the FD after lift off and will guide the A/C on the runway centre line. Set the power in two stages by allowing the engines to stabilise at approximately 50% N1 / I.05 EPR, before setting FLEX or TOGA power. The engine page will be automatically displayed on the SD. Ensure FMA annunciation’s are called (including the Flex ºC) and a check of the FM position update is performed. FLEX or TOGA thrust must be achieved before reaching 80 kts. The PNF is to check power is set correctly according to the called out FLEX ºC and to call “Power Set” before 80 kts. The FADEC converts the Flex temperature entered on the Takeoff Performance page into an N1 or EPR value. The achievement of this specific value (N1 or EPR) as shown on the Upper ECAM screen is what the PNF checks to ensure that the Power is “Set”. At VR, rotate the aircraft smoothly at 3º / second towards 10º nose up, and when airborne continue rotation towards 15º to follow the SRS. During this time the control laws will blend into flight mode. The FD does not provide a rotation rate order, but a pitch order to fly the T/O speed profile once airborne. Early rotation, over-rotation and excessive pitch rate (or any combination) may all cause a tail strike (refer to FCOM bulletin). In the event of a tail strike an immediate return to land should be considered. Use the rudder pedals to steer the A/C once you aligned with the runway centre line. The Nose wheel steering effect of rudder displacement reduces with increased speed and at 130 kts rudder control is purely aerodynamic.

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In case of low visibility take off visual cues are the primary means to track the runway centre line. If there is an active Localiser for the departure runway, the PFD yaw bar reproduces the LOC and provides assistance in case of fog patches. The FMA annunciation RWY is confirmation of LOC reception for this function. The PNF should monitor the altimeter, VSI and RA for confirmation of positive climb, and when confirmed from these three sources should announce “Positive Climb” at which call the PF commands “Gear Up” The default values for THR RED and ACCEL ALT are both 1500 ft AGL in the FMS but in cases of noise abatement are modifiable by the pilot as required. At thrust reduction altitude, the message LVR CLB flashes in the FMA Thrust Column until the thrust levers are placed in the CLB detent. Reduce aircraft pitch attitude, and with a positive speed trend, reduce thrust to the climb detent. Reaching the ACCEL ALT, the target speed is set automatically to initial climb speed. (by default 250 kts below FL100) so there is a significant pitch down order on the FD bar. Retract Flaps when the IAS>F with a positive speed trend. Retract Slats when the IAS>S with a positive speed trend. (The F and S speeds are the minimum speeds for flap retraction and not speeds at which retraction is essential. Ensure a positive speed trend before flap retraction). Once established in departure complete the after take-off items and then the after take-off checklist. If a packs off take-off was carried out, PACK I should be selected on at thrust reduction and PACK 2 when the slats have been retracted

INSTRUCTION A rolling takeoff is recommended where possible, so if the take-off is commenced from a standstill monitor that they place their heels on the floor with toes on the rudder pedals. If you clear them to takeoff from the holding position apply sufficient thrust to move forward and turn into the takeoff direction (about 8 kts ground speed) and without any action on the brakes set the thrust for takeoff. Beware of the following common errors. Runway wasted during line-up and initial power setting. Aircraft held on the brakes during power application. Use of nosewheel steering tiller during take-off roll. Not starting the CHRONO. FMA callouts incomplete, late, or missed.

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FMA callouts not acknowledged. “Power set” call missed or made before parameters stabilised and checked. Half forward stick not applied. “Positive climb” call made without confirming on altimeter, VSI and RA. Forward side stick above 100 kts, and consequent overcontrolling at rotation

EXTRA INFORMATION 1. More information about the SRS function: A simplified description is that with all engines operative, the SRS commands a pitch leading to an IAS = V2 +10 and, that with one engine inoperative, it commands a pitch giving the greater of the current speed or V2. The guidance law also includes attitude protection during take-off (18º, or 22.5º in windshear) and flight path angle protection ensuring a minimum vertical speed of +120 ft/min. This is why the IAS actually flown is neither V2 + 10 (All Engines Operating) nor V2 (One Engine Inoperative). The take-off SRS mode provides a pitch command to fly a given speed schedule during the take-off segments, but during rotation it is not intended to provide pitch rate command. 2. The recommended flap configuration to provide best tail clearance at take off is CONF 2. It is therefore to be used whenever performance allows. A further consideration is that when CONF 1 + F is chosen, take off close to V2 mini may have to be achieved. In order to avoid a tail strike, rotate at VR (not before) and input a constant and smooth rotation without any aggressive or abrupt aft action on the side stick (particularly when a positive attitude has been achieved already).

HEAVY WEIGHT TAKE-OFF A significant problem with a Heavy Weight Take-Off compared to a Take-Off performed at a normal “Training Weight” is that after initiation of rotation the main undercarriage wheels remain in contact with the ground for a measurable amount of time. This in itself should not create a problem except where the “Gear Up” call is made too soon after the “Rotate” call (in other words before the “Positive Climb” call). If an engine were to fail after the “Rotate” call there will be a measurable delay before the aircraft is safely airborne and the undercarriage can be retracted (with the additional drag occasioned by the opening of the Gear Doors).

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CROSSWIND TAKE OFF A specific technique is used to set the take off thrust when there is a crosswind greater than 20 kts, or a tailwind component. In a Normal Take off the thrust is set to 50% N1 (1.05 EPR) and the aircraft commences rolling and accelerating due to the applied thrust. As engine response is slow below 50% N1 (1.05 EPR) but relatively fast above this value we check to see if both engines have reached this value corresponding to the TLA before advancing both thrust levers to the take off setting. This means that the aircraft will be moving along the runway with the thrust equivalent to about half thrust while we check that both engines are giving the same amount of thrust. In a normal situation this is acceptable but in a tailwind, or crosswind, we don’t want to consume runway without the correct thrust set. We therefore adopt the following strategy. Commence setting the thrust in the same manner as a normal take off but with full forward side stick. As the thrust increases towards the 50% N1 (1.05EPR) value move the thrust levers to approximately 70% N1 (1.15 EPR) and, as the thrust indication passes the 50% N1 (1.05 EPR) mark place the thrust levers in the FLX or TOGA detent before 40 kts. (This procedure prevents the thrust from plateauing at 50% N1 or 1.05 EPR during the aircraft acceleration phase). Keep the stick full forward until 80 kts and then progressively release your input to neutral by 100 kts. In a conventional aircraft the ailerons are applied “into wind” to counteract the extra lift developed by the into wind wing. As the aircraft speed increases this into wind aileron is reduced so that at rotation the ailerons are neutral. However with an Airbus FBW aircraft the placing of the side stick “into wind” will result in raising the spoilers on the into wind wing and so effect performance and controllability. For this reason only a very limited amount of into wind side stick is used. Simulator motion limitations may make the crosswind takeoff seem as if the aircraft is not tracking the runway centreline but once rotation is commenced this limitation is transparent. On rotation the side stick is centralised so as not to give a roll demand.

N.07 CLIMB (00:05) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The transition to CLIMB phase occurs at the ACCEL ALT when SRS mode disengages and the speed target goes to the initial climb speed. The managed speed profile takes into account GW, CI, CRZFL, Altitude and Speed constraints so Managed Speed is the best speed for economy climb. Selected speed can be used in climb as required. In the previous FMS phase (Take off) the Climb speed may be pre-selected on the FMS Performance

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page. If you are already in the Climb phase a speed is selected on the FCU. Reasons for this may be as follows: - ATC requests a specific speed, so pre-select, or select that speed - a tight turn after T/O, so pre-select the speed you want. - a high angle of climb is required after T/O for noise or obstacles, so pre-select the speed you want. - Prolonged turbulence, so select the turbulence speed according to the QRH When selected speed is used, the predictions on the FPLN page assume the selected speed is kept until the next planned speed modification in the FPLN. If 200 kts is pre-selected for initial climb (retaining the normal SPD LIM of 250kt until passing FL100 in the flight plan), then the predictions on the FPLN page assume that 200 kts is maintained from the ACCEL ALT up to 10.000 ft (the SPD LIM) where managed speed is supposed to be resumed. If at a higher altitude the pilot selects a turbulence speed (e.g. 275 kt) and there is no SPD CSTR or SPD LIM till top of climb (TOC), 275 kts is predicted to be maintained until the next phase (TOC in this example). The PERF CLB page provides predictions to a given FL in terms of time and distance assuming Managed Climb mode; all constraints are considered in these predictions. The given FL is either defaulted to the FCU target altitude, or it can be manually inserted. In most areas of the world, whenever ATC clears you to climb to a FL, you can select STD, even when below the Transition Level. In other areas such as in the US, this is not allowed. Apply local regulations. Climb mode management The recommended AP/FD modes in climb are CLB if ATC clears the aircraft along the FPLN, or OP CLB if ATC gives radar vectors or clears you direct to a given FL, disregarding any ALT CSTR. If ATC requires you to expedite your climb through a given FL: - select a lower speed on the FCU for best speed / altitude trade off, - or use a higher V/S (but beware of the reducing IAS). Typically, with all engines operative, turbulence speed may be considered as best rate of climb speed, and green dot as best climb gradient speed. If ATC gives you a small level change (e.g. from 7000 to 8000) use the V/S mode for smoother guidance and less thrust variation. Other drills: - When crossing 10.000 ft, it is a good practice to look at the ECAM MEMO so as to ensure that some items have not been omitted: e.g. LDG LT OFF / SEAT BELTS OFF (according to flight conditions). You can also clear any manually inserted navaids on the NAVAID page, so as to allow full autotuning, select ARPT on EFIS Control panel and COPY the ACTIVE FPLN into the Secondary. - During CLB adjust the RADAR TILT for the conditions. If used at T/O, the tilt was around + 4°. During climb, tilt the antenna down so as to get ground returns on the top of the ND.

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INSTRUCTION The session syllabus gives a runway direction for the session and it is up to you to manage the session so that there is no wasted time flying to a Convenient position to start the next exercise. Try to avoid a 180º radar vector after takeoff but instead use a combination of SID’s to give practice in various manoeuvring and constraints to contend with. A few zig zag radar vectors will maintain the reality. Do not ever freeze the simulator position if the crew can realise the fact. It is much more realistic to give a variety of vectors.

N.08 CRUISE (00 :20) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND At the top of climb set TCAS to ALL, (or BELOW if within 2000 ft of FL 390), and periodically throughout the cruise, conduct a check of the ECAM system pages. Navigation accuracy should be checked regularly and monitored using raw data as required. If FMGS navigation performance is unsatisfactory, use selected guidance and navigate using raw data. See also G.06 “Global Positioning System”. Selection of cruise altitude and speed will depend on several factors including the overall sector length, cost index and aircraft weight. For short sectors the most economic cruise altitude is not necessarily the achievable maximum. (FCOM 3.05.15 In Flight Performance has a graph enabling selection of the best cruise altitude on short sectors). Optimum altitude (OPT) is the altitude at which the aircraft covers the maximum distance per kilogram of fuel according to the aircraft current GW, CI, deviation from ISA, winds at different levels and a minimum of 5 minutes in the cruise. Recommended Maximum (REC MAX) altitude ensures a 0.3 g buffet margin and a minimum rate of climb (300 ft/min). It is limited to FL 390 and is not a function of the CI. The REC MAX ALT indicates the present climb capability of the aircraft. The FMGS PROG page gives an optimum altitude and a recommended maximum altitude. Recommended maximum altitude is limited to FL 390. Selecting a cruise altitude not more than 2000 ft above optimum will maintain fuel efficiency and a sensible manoeuvre margin. Cruise Altitude Profile For efficient performance try to fly close to the OPT FL during the cruise. The OPT FL is provided on PROG page function of (GW, CI, WIND …). This is the current OPT FL. A single Step Climb (SC) can be inserted in order to optimise

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the profile for high gross weight conditions. A Step Climb will not be accepted if it does not ensure at least one minute of flight time at the new altitude. If you have to descend to a lower CRZ FL, the ALT CRZ is usually updated except if within 200 NM from destination. So when reaching a lower FL, check ALT CRZ on the FMA. If it is not displayed, insert the current level as CRZ FL on PROG page. The Cost Index is a number through which the economic strategy of the flight is determined. The cost index takes into consideration the price of the fuel and the flight time. Many Airlines fly with a fixed CI as the variation in the price of fuel is difficult to keep current. The cost index determines the speed/Mach profile for all flight phases (climb, cruise, descent), and is called ECON SPD/MACH. - If fuel consumption is the essential economical factor on a given sector, the CI is then a low figure. CI = 0 represents Maximum Range. - If flight time is the essential economical factor, CI is a high figure. CI = 999 represents minimum time. The Cost Index is computed by the Airline Flight Operations department. It can be assigned to each CORTE in the FMS data base. In such a case, when inserting the Co Rte on INIT A page, the CI comes up automatically. Once the CI is inserted along with the FPLN, GW, CRZ FL etc. …, the FMS computes the ECON SPD/MACH PROFILE for CLB/CRZ/DES. The MANAGED SPD PROFILE includes the ECON SPD/MACH as well as the ATC restrictions such as SPD LIM (250 kt/10.000 ft) or SPD CSTR. It is recommended to fly MANAGED SPD/MACH during cruise. The crew must be aware that the target Mach will vary not only as a function of GW, FL but also as a function of headwind component and ISA variations. Flying MANAGED SPD/MACH in cruise ensures the best economical flight. If ATC requires a FIXED MACH, this is a tactical clearance. This FIXED MACH is to be SELECTED on the FCU, or if known while in Climb phase can be pre-selected in the cruise phase.. All predictions are updated accordingly down to the next S/C or T/D. They are therefore realistic. It is important to have the FMA altitude annunciation ALT CRZ at the initiation of cruise for fuel efficiency. This ensures that the proper initial cruise Mach Number is targeted and with the A/THR in MACH mode, the AP altitude control is SOFT which allows the aircraft to deviate +/- 50 ft from the target, thus minimising thrust variations. This minimizes the fuel consumption and is more comfortable for the passengers. In order for the FMGS to enter the cruise phase (ALT CRZ) and for the F-PLN page predictions of fuel on arrival (destination and alternate) to be correct, the cruise altitude in the PROG page and the FCU altitude must be the same. Forecast winds and temperatures should also be entered in the F-PLN at appropriate points along the route so that accurate predictions will be calculated. To do this determine the waypoints where a wind or temperature entry is necessary, according to the following rule:

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- at the first waypoint in cruise, insert wind DIR/SPD, and the temperature at the initial CRZ FL. - at the next waypoint where wind differs by 30° or 30 kts and temperature by 5°. Additionally any step climbs should be included in the F-PLN. Having done this review the FUEL predictions. Periodically check the FUEL ESTIMATES. EFOB at Waypoint & Destination, XTRA fuel, and FOB + Fuel Used = Initial Fuel (in order to detect a leak). When checking fuel, check correct fuel distribution, balance, and temperature. Selection of a higher altitude on the FCU than that entered in PROG will automatically update the PROG page with a new cruise altitude. Periodic Drills to be achieved in cruise - Review the main ECAM pages: MEMO and ENG / BLEED / ELEC / HYD / FLT CTL / FUEL, and note any significant parameter deviations. - Cross check the FMS NAV ACCY using available raw data. If GPS is primary, this check is not really necessary, unless an amber navigation message comes up. In RVSM airspace, the validity of the altitude reading has to be checked periodically (between ADR1, ADR2 and ADR3 on the PFDs, and also on the stand-by altimeter). Repeat these drills approximately every 45 minutes If there is weather, use the LATERAL OFFSET function to determine how many NM left or right of track are required for avoidance. Once cleared by ATC, insert the o ffset into the FPLN. All predictions will then be meaningful, and automatic sequencing of the FPLN will occur. Adapt ND range to circumstances and modify the RADAR TILT as a function of the ND range. Select CSTR (for MORA) on the PF EFIS Control panel and ARPT on the PNF side.

INSTRUCTION There are not many occasions for flight in cruise during training. Ensure the concept of ALT and ALT CRZ is well understood.

N.09 DESCENT AND APPROACH (00:15) BACKGROUND DESCENTS INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND Before reaching the Top Of Descent (TOD) position as computed by the FMGS we have to prepare for the expected Arrival and carry out a Briefing so the PNF is aware of what to expect during the Approach, Landing (or possible Go-Around), Roll Out and taxi to the parking stand. During the cruise the crew should make themselves aware of any NOTAMs that will affect their arrival. From the METAR and TAF they should know what sort of weather conditions to expect and this will be confirmed from the ATIS. One pilot (normally the pilot who will carry out the landing) now programs the FMGS for the arrival procedure (the PF can however ask the PNF to do this for him). In order to the programming he hands over control during the FMGS preparation. To avoid “two heads down” during the briefing the pilot who is not flying the aircraft carries out a briefing using his approach charts and FMS. When he has completed his briefing he takes control of the aircraft and the other pilot now checks what is in the FMS with his approach charts. Any errors are thus exposed. It is important that planned procedures are briefed rather than making a generic brief.As for the T/O briefing, F.PLN data is cross-checked on ND PLAN and on the charts, whereas specific data is checked on MCDU or other peripherals. FCOM 3.03.16 details the items to be Briefed. Ensure they include the date and page numbers of the charts you are using, visibility requirements, go around procedures and any special requirements that apply. If required a navigational accuracy check should be carried out prior to commencing the descent or 50 NM from destination at the latest. Be watchful for late, rushed descent and approach preparation and briefing which can lead to important items being omitted. If no data is inserted for the approach 200 NM from the Destination, an ENTER DEST DATA message comes on the MCDU to remind the crew to prepare for the arrival. Having prepared for the Descent and Approach and carried out the Approach Briefing we are now ready to commence our descent. The FMS computed TOD has taken into account all constraints. So we will either initiate descent when it suits us (at the FMS computed TOD position) or ATC will require an early or late descent initiation.

DESCENTS A. MANAGED DESCENT

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Managed descent (DES) makes the best use of A/C speed within the target range and of thrust (Idle or Speed mode on A/THR) to meet the descent profile and is the normal method of initiating a descent. The corresponding FMA readings are THR DES / DES, THR IDLE / DES, SPEED / DES. The managed DES mode guides the A/C along the FMS pre-computed descent profile and so will meet all constraints on descent to the FCU selected altitude in the Flight Plan. Therefore DES mode is available if NAV is engaged. The AP/FD guides the aircraft on the pre-computed profile, according to the pilot’s entries for descent speed and wind as well as any altitude constraints. However the actual external conditions might not be as predicted and if Anti Ice is used the idle thrust is increased. Consequently when DES mode is engaged with Managed Speed, the A/C speed is allowed to vary within a given range around the Nominal Target Descent Speed ??by 20 kts (limited to VMAX) to give some flexibility to DES mode and keep the A/C on path when external conditions vary.

Case a): If the trend is to get below the desired path, the current speed decreases towards the lower limit of the speed target range to keep the A/C on path with IDLE thrust. If the speed reaches the lower limit, then SPEED mode engages on the A/THR, to keep the A/C on path at that lower speed. Case b): If the trend is to get above the desired path, the current speed increases towards the higher limit of the speed target range to keep the A/C on path with IDLE thrust. If the speed reaches the higher limit, the ATHR remains at THR

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IDLE but the AP will not allow the speed to increase more than the higher limit to track the descent path. Thus the VDEV will slowly increase. If DES mode is engaged and then the speed is selected, the descent profile is unchanged. Consequently DES mode will do its best to keep the A/C on the descent profile but the speed will not deviate from its target. However, if ATC requires an early descent, DES mode will guide the A/C on a shallow descent converging towards the descent profile (1000 ft/min or less depending on the circumstances) with the ATHR in SPEED mode. The intercept point is then at a fixed position along the flight plan on the ND and it indicates the location where the descent path will be intercepted.

If descent is delayed and we pass the computed TOD point a DECELERATE message appears in white on the PFD (this message can be cleared by using the FMGS CLR key). If the Descent is delayed a decrease in speed (subject to ATC) towards green dot will let us loose altitude more quickly once descent commences (as we resume normal speed). Once you are cleared to descend you will have a prediction of where you will intercept the profile from the computed TOD point by the blue symbol. It assumes the extension of ½ SPD BRAKE. So if speed brakes are not extended, the INTCPT point will slowly move away from you until it gets close to an altitude constrained waypoint and then the EXTEND SPD BRAKE message appears on the PFD. This technique allows an altitude constraint to be matched with minimum use of speed brakes. Therefore when HIGH ABOVE PATH, monitor VDEV and the symbol to recover the descent path.

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If (when above the profile) it is computed that the required profile will not be regained, a white MORE DRAG message is displayed. Monitor progress of the descent on the PROG page and on the ND. At lower altitudes the energy circle is useful. If a speed increase is required (maybe due to ATC) then using a selected speed in excess of optimum will command the autothrust to speed mode, as the aircraft applies power to keep on profile. If, for any reason, an increased rate of descent is required, OPEN DES must be selected and speedbrake used as appropriate. Selecting only speedbrake in DES mode will not achieve an increase in rate of descent, as power will be applied to maintain the aircraft on profile and at target speed. If HDG is pulled, DES mode reverts to V/S. In other words, selecting a Heading does not induce any change in A/C pitch behaviour. It is then time for the pilot to increase / decrease the V/S target or select OPDES depending on circumstances. B. OPEN DESCENT Selecting OPEN DES (by pulling the ALT knob) will command idle thrust and no constraints will be considered on descent to the FCU selected altitude. The speedbrake has no effect on the thrust, which remains at idle but has an effect on pitch attitude and V/S. By monitoring the ND, the level off point can be found and the PROG page gives the deviation from the planned profile C. RECOVERING IDEAL PROFILE If you are below the desired profile in OPEN DES, the simplest way of regaining the profile is to select and reduce the V/S. Once the profile has been regained, adjust the rate of descent by selecting and varying the speed or V/S, or resume OPEN DES. If you are above the desired profile in OPEN DES, you need to reduce your energy level so maintain your speed, (or increase it subject to ATC), and consider speed brake usage. Don’t try to reduce speed during descent as with

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idle thrust this will only move your level off point away from you. When in ALT*, or ALT the aircraft will slow up more efficiently. D. OVERVIEW In all modes the ideal profile is tracked by the VDEV indicator on the PFD. At all times bear in mind terrain and MSA considerations. The procedure for terrain checking is especially important with thrust at idle. A rule of thumb calculation for descent is that track miles to run should equal three times your height in thousands of feet. Exact figures are given in QRH chapter 4. The effects of engine and wing anti-ice on descent profile can be marked, as the idle NI / EPR is increased, thus giving a shallower descent profile. If already in the descent, and anti-ice is used, it is usual to see an increase in speed in DES mode. If speed increases to the upper bracket, speedbrake can be used. If in OPEN DES mode a higher selected speed is advisable. Alternately, in OPEN DES mode, half speedbrake will counteract the effects of the added thrust due to the anti-ice. Conditions requiring the use of anti-ice are listed in FCOM 3.04.30 E. HOLDING PATTERNS If ATC requires the A/C to hold, insert the holding pattern in the F.PLN. The FMS computes the holding at green dot speed taking into consideration the ICAO holding speed limits function of altitude (subject to holding table):

230 kts up to FL140 240 kts between FL140 & FL200

265 kts above FL 200 If managed speed is used, the A/C will automatically decelerate to the holding speed at a point indicated by the speed change symbol when in NAV mode. Clean configuration is recommended for fuel considerations. The Last Exit Time and Fuel details are accessed by making a Lateral Revision at the Hold and then selecting the HOLD prompt. The holding pattern is not included in the descent path computation since the FMS does not know how many patterns will be flown. Once the A/C enters the holding pattern, the yoyo indicates the instantaneous VDEV between the A/C current altitude, and the altitude the A/C should fly at the exit fix of the holding pattern so as to be there on the descent path; all other predictions assume one pattern. DES mode guides the A/C down at -1000 ft/min, while in the holding pattern. F. Various Drills during the descent Before TOD, select destination VOR/DME needle, press CSTR button on EFIS CTL panel, and set TCAS to BELOW. At 10.000 ft, LDG Lights / Seat belts / ILS button as required. If RADAR is to be used, adjust the TILT up along with descent progress. Select Radar on the PF side and TERRAIN ON ND on the PNF side.

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INSTRUCTION Avoid giving radar vectors that cause the crew to rush their preparation or briefings. On the other hand you must be aware of how long they need to prepare so that they are in a good geographical position for the next exercise when they have finished their preparation. ATC does not know what is being said in the cockpit at a given point of time. However, when you are training you can ensure that ATC only talks to them at suitable times. Once the training part of the given sequence is complete you can then give ATC instructions at any time, as in real life.

N.10 ARRIVAL (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND All approaches can be divided into 3 segments. 1. the Initial Approach, from IAF to the activation of approach phase indicated by the (DECEL) pseudo waypoint, 2. the Intermediate Approach from (DECEL) to FAF and 3. the Final Approach from FAF to landing or minimum. In each of these parts there are various actions required which have to be carried out irrespective of the approach from which the landing follows.

INITIAL APPROACH a) FM NAV ACCY check using raw data (only if GPS is not primary).

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The result of the NAV ACCY check determines the strategy on how to conduct the approach, and as a consequence which display mode will be used on the ND’s and which guidance modes may be used with AP/FD. E.g., if check is positive or GPS is Primary the PF and PNF ND on ARC or ROSE NAV, AP/FD Lateral/Vertical managed modes may be used and EGPWS set ON. b) Select the BEST FLYING REFERENCE for the approach. The FPV is strongly recommended for Non Precision or Visual Approaches. Attitude associated to FD crossbars is used to fly ILS approaches. c) Activate the APPR Phase Activate the Approach to commence speed reduction to Green Dot. Speed control now passes to the Flap Lever handle. There are two approach techniques and their use is dictated by the type of approach to be carried out. - the decelerated approach where the A/C reaches the FAF in CONF1 and S speed. Then, below 2000 ft AGL, the pilot will continue the deceleration and configuration changes so as to be stabilized at VAPP in Landing Configuration by 1000 ft (IMC, 500 ft VMC). This is the normal procedure for an ILS Approach. - the stabilised approach where the A/C reaches FAF in Landing CONF and at VAPP. This is the normal procedure for all approaches other than an ILS. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH The Intermediate Approach is required to guide the aircraft onto the correct final trajectory having decelerated to the correct speed, altitude and configuration to the FAF. a) Deceleration The FMS computes a pseudo waypoint (called DECEL) (indicated by the symbol on the FPLN shown on the ND), indicating where to start the

deceleration towards approach speed VAPP. is computed assuming a decelerated approach technique. Hence, if you wish to fly an NPA (or a stabilized approach), insert VAPP as a SPEED CSTR at the FAF, in order to get a valid (DECEL) waypoint. When NAV mode is engaged, the Approach phase activates automatically

when sequencing the position. When HDG mode is selected (e.g. for radar vectoring), you have to manually activate the Approach phase to cause the deceleration. As the position has to be placed on a flight plan leg a problem can arise when being radar vectored to a final intercept with no valid FROM point. An example of this could be when on radar headings the flight plan is sequenced to the FAF by deleting the intervening positions so that our flight plan looks like this-

PPOS F-PLN DISCONTINUITY

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CI14R FI14R LFBO14R

As the DECEL point can only appear superimposed on the flight plan it will in this case be coincident with the commencement of the flight plan, which in this case is CI14R and as such may not be correct. b) Configure Once the Approach has been activated speed control passes to the flap lever handle. This means that we will decelerate to Green Dot speed but after this speed reduction has taken place we will maintain Green Dot until we take the first stage of flap which reduces our speed to S speed. Therefore if we want to achieve VAPP at the FAF we need to be conscious of the distance required to slow up to that speed and configure accordingly. If ATC requests you to maintain a given speed you can select any speed down to VLS. If desired you can select flap to give yourself a larger margin above VLS (which will reduce as you configure). c) Final axis intercept Refer to applicable raw data (LOC, needles or XTK). If ATC clears the interception of the Final approach trajectory along the FPLN route, use NAV mode if FM ACCY CHECK is OK. Once cleared for the Approach by ATC, ARM the APPR (for ILS or a Managed NPA). FINAL APPROACH a) Monitor the Final Approach mode engagement of G/S * or FINAL, or select Final descent path FPA reaching FAF. If the capture or engagement is abnormal, take over by selecting the correct FPA. b) Monitor the Final Approach using raw data by monitoring the LOC - G/S deviation symbols for ILS, VDEV - XTK and FPLN for managed APPR (GPS primary), VDEV - XTK + needles / DME / ALT for NPA (non GPS primary) and Needles / DME / ALT / Time for NPA when FM NAV ACCY check is negative. c) Managed speed is recommended to benefit from the GS MINI SPEED function. The Aircraft must be stabilised in Landing CONF at VAPP by 1000 ft (IMC, 500 ft VMC) If there is a significant change in tower wind before reaching 1000 ft AGL ask the PNF to modify it on PERF APPR. If the A/C has a tendency to be fast and/or high on final, EXTEND LANDING GEAR earlier, preferably below 220 kts. Don’t use SPD BRK on final, which have little efficiency at low speed, and auto retracts when A319 and A320 Flaps are full, A321 flaps are 3 or full Keep your hands on the thrust levers when the A/THR is engaged on final, so as to be ready to react, when needed. If for any reason the speed drops below VAPP significantly, push the levers forward above the CLB detent (but below MCT) until the speed trend arrow indicates acceleration. When the speed has recovered bring the thrust levers back into the CLB detent.

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Be aware that if you move thrust levers to the TOGA position, SRS / GA TRK will engage. Go around altitude must be set on the FCU. To standardise this procedure for all applications we set the go round altitude when the A/C current altitude is below the Go-round altitude. In case a major navigation problem occurs such as loss of raw data, or loss of FM NAV ACCY the approach should be discontinued and a go around made. If visual on reaching the MDA or DH disconnect the AP (and FD’s for NPA), and continue to land if the A/C is properly established. If not visual Go-round. At very light weights the use of managed speed may produce speeds slower than desirable in a radar or procedural pattern in which case the use of selected speed is recommended. The final approach phase is one in which pilot incapacitation is both more likely and more critical, therefore the PNF should closely monitor the performance of the PF and be ready to take control if necessary.

INSTRUCTION Your radar vectors should give the trainees some little time to settle down before making their Approach and Landing. Enforce the correct sequencing of the Flight Plan. Because of the nature of our training this is one area that needs to be monitored well.

N.11 ILS APPROACH (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Prior to commencing an ILS all the required navigation aids should be identified, and displayed as necessary. Check ILS IDENT so that if there is no ident, or a wrong display, they should check the audio ident. As always the FMGS position should be checked against raw data. Two useful gates in descent are 250 kt at 9000 ft AAL, 30 NM from touch down and 250 kt at 3000 ft AAL, 15 NM from touchdown. From 250 kt in level flight deceleration to S speed with extension of CONF I will take approximately 5 NM. The energy circle is a useful indication of distance required to touchdown. The normal approach is a decelerated approach (when there are no constraints) with glideslope interception occurring at S speed and flight continuing to 2000 ft AAL (minimum) at this speed at which time the aircraft should be configured for landing. In our training in the simulator the aircraft is frequently in a state where a stabilised approach is the wisest choice (in

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Alternate Law for example) so ensure your trainees use a suitable technique according to circumstances. In order to train for the “worst” situation the pilots should refer to the ILS deviation scales ONLY on the PFD. This increases their situational awareness by having the Flight Plan in view on the ND. If the Glide Slope is being captured at or below 2000ft AAL select Conf 2 when one dot below the Glide Slope. CAT l will be displayed until a valid Radio Altimeter signal is obtained. After glide slope capture, and below the missed approach altitude set the missed approach altitude on the FCU, and check that a blue go-around procedure is displayed on the ND. If there is no go-around procedure displayed, or an incorrect procedure displayed, the FPLN may be incorrectly sequenced or the go-around will have to be flown using selected modes. A check of the TO waypoint will indicate that the FPLN is correctly sequenced. There are two types of ILS failures to be considered: 1. Loss of ILS 1 + 2 receiver, in which case immediately go round (RED LOC and GS flags - ILS scales removed – AP trips off - FD goes to HDG. 2. Ground transmitter failure, in which case the AP/FD will remain ON with LOC and GS modes and this is because such a failure is most commonly transient. In such a case, LOC and GS deviation indexes are lost, ILS scales and FD bars flash. If R/A < 200 ft, Red LAND warning is triggered. If the failure lasts more than several seconds, or in case of Red LAND warning, go round. The PNF should monitor the aircraft flight path during the final approach and call out any V/S greater than 1000 fpm, airspeed deviation of +10 kts or -5 kts, or LOC / GS deviation of more than 1 dot. The aircraft should be stabilised in the approach configuration by 1000 ft AAL (500 ft in VMC) or a go around should be performed. There is normally no technical reason why an Autoland should not be performed with a CAT I ILS however this requires proper visual references (at least CAT I), proper monitoring and immediate take over if anything seems abnormal. As the requirements of Low Visibility Procedures are not in force for CAT 1 operations there is a possibility of unstable signals below the CAT 1 minima. A stabilised approach is recommended where the Glide Slope angle is greater than 3.5°. At training weights the aircraft may not decelerate fast enough so in this case extend the gear before Flap 2. When you disconnect the autopilot avoid the temptation to make inputs on the sidestick. The aircraft will be stabilised and tracking towards the runway.

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Avoid the tendency to “duck under” the glideslope or to turn towards the runway as in a crosswind as you will be blown off the final path.

INSTRUCTION Ensure the trainees arm the correct mode! If you only clear them for LOC capture they should only arm the LOC. Conversely, if you clear them for an ILS then the Approach push button should be pressed arming the G/S and LOC for capture. Engagement of LOC* and LOC should always be monitored carefully by the crew to confirm the inbound course is correct. If the clearance is given at a large distance, or large angle from the axis, beware of false captures. Ensure your trainees are aware (by the end of their training) that our aircraft are very efficient! This can be emphasised by making a decelerated approach with a tail wind. In this case they will probably have to lower the gear before taking Flap 2.

N.12 RAW DATA ILS (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND A requirement of the Skill Test is for the Trainee to perform a CAT l ILS using raw data. Raw data is defined as without the Auto Pilot, Flight Director, or Auto Thrust. Reinforce the basic premise that speed is controlled by the thrust levers and profile is controlled by the side stick. To enhance situational awareness the ND should display the flight plan and the ILS deviation scales are viewed on the PFD. To gain benefit from our glass cockpit the Flight Path Vector (Bird) should be used for this approach. Describe the specific indications on the PFD (FPV, Speed trend, selected track index, V/S scale and finally the LOC and GS deviation scales). Anticipation of LOC interception is through the cross track information on the ND. Consequently aim for small, smooth corrections in pitch and bank to maintain FPV in the desired position. As the Flight Directors are selected off you will see (on the horizon line) the blue track index corresponding to the selected TRK. A. INITIAL APPROACH - Select FPV as flying reference

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B. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH - Select TRK to ILS course in order to display the blue track index on the PFD horizon line. - Activate the Approach in order to get the Managed Speed information on the Speed scale of the PFD and so reduce the PF workload in that his speed target is automatically correct for the flap setting. - Decelerate so as to reach FAF in CONF FULL at VAPP - For LOC intercept use the ND information such as cross track error, and pointer movement. - When the LOC begins to move fly the FPV to the blue TRK index. If, when flying the FPV onto the TRK the LOC is not centred then make an adjustment to your flown track to come back onto the correct path. - If the LOC does not remain centred after you have established on it make small changes to your track to regain it. The blue TRK index should remain on the LOC course for reference, as once you are established on the LOC the TRK index should remain directly above the FPV and in line with the Track made good index. C. FINAL APPROACH - When 1/2 dot below the GS, initiate the interception of the GS by smoothly easing the FPV down to the GS flight path angle of –3º. - If LOC index starts to deviate, fly the FPV in the direction of the LOC index relative to the blue TRK index on the horizon - Once on the LOC, fly the FPV back to the blue TRK index on the horizon - If the GS index starts to deviate, fly the FPV 1º up or down to recover. Once re-established, fly the FPV back to the GS flight path target. - Only CAT I approaches can be flown with such a technique. - As the A/THR is not used for this approach, the speed trend arrow is an excellent aid in maintaining the correct approach speed. The BIRD is computed out of IRS data. Thus it may be affected by IRS data drift amongst others (TRK). A typical TRK error at the end of a flight is 1° to 2°.

D. GO AROUND If a go around is required, push thrust levers to TOGA and proceed as usual. The Flight Director will come up automatically. The PF calls for GOROUNDFLAP and the PNF retracts one stage of flap and monitors the

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climb by reference to the Radio Altimeter, VSI, and Altitude and when a climb is confirmed by all three instruments calls “Positive Climb” at which the PF commands “Gear Up”.

INSTRUCTION Watch out for the following Common Errors Poor scanning leading to over controlling in pitch and roll in order to chase the LOC and GS Use of FPV as “primary” reference for pitch corrections. Failure to follow instrument flying techniques common to all aircraft.

N.13 GLIDE SLOPE FROM ABOVE (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Irrespective of the reason the aircraft finishes above the glide slope, but established on the LOC. This can be due to an ATC requirement, or late vectors, or slow response from the pilot or the aircraft. The LOC must be captured (LOC* or LOC) for GS capture to take place. When we are authorised to descend prompt action is required to capture the GS and to be established in stable flight before 1000ft AAL. Usually such a situation can be foreseen and the pilots should configure so as to be in a high drag situation when cleared to descend (to reduce the acceleration effect of the subsequent steeper than normal descent). The sequence of events can be dictated by specific events but generally is as follows – 1. On the FCU set the aircraft altitude above you (to prevent undesired ALT* due to the balloon effect of extending flap) 2. Pull the V/S knob and select minus 1500 fpm 3. Arm the GS (if not already done). 4. Monitor the descent. It is a requirement to be stable by 1000 ft AAL. If the Intercept point as shown by the blue bent arrow symbol on the ND is too close to the runway consider going around. It is important that there is good crew communication in the cockpit so that the PF intentions are clearly understood by the PNF. The maximum descent path is obtained in CONF FULL. Nevertheless, the rate of descent should be carefully monitored to avoid exceeding speed limits and high sink rate GPWS warnings. Too high a descent rate can result in the

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speed either reaching VMAX and a resulting mode reversion or an excess of speed in the later stages of the approach.

INSTRUCTION When you give radar vectors for this exercise there is always the possibility that they will either be too high when established on the LOC to be stabilised by 1000ft, or you will get GS* and LOC* at the same time. For both these reasons it is more desirable to have them established on the LOC but not cleared to descend until almost full scale fly down indication. Tell them to maintain their altitude and do not descend for whatever reason (helicopter, or light aircraft crossing the approach path below them, for example). Point out the symbol where they will regain the profile and ensure it is at least 3+nm from the threshold.

N.14 NON PRECISION APPROACH (00:25) BACKGROUND MANAGED APPROACH SELECTED APPROACH LOCALISER APPROACH INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Non Precision Approaches can be broadly separated into two groups. The first is the conventional VORDME, ADF and LOC approaches where ground based information is used as the primary source of information for lateral navigation and vertical navigation is controlled by the pilots inputs. This is the case where the pilot adjusts the Heading of the aircraft to counter the effect of wind so that the aircraft flies along a path that is fixed in relation to the ground based aid. Vertical navigation is performed by controlling the vertical speed, or Flight Path Angle, so that the aircraft is at a given height at a given distance from the ground based aid. If the ground based signals were removed there would be no information in the cockpit with which to continue the approach. An enhancement of this first group of approaches is where the lateral and vertical parts of the approach are encoded so that the FMS can fly the same approach using the GPS to ensure the aircraft is in the correct position at all times. This is the “Managed Approach” that we demonstrate to our trainees and our progress must be confirmed by reference to the “Raw Data” which is the ground based information (inbound Radial – VOR, or Relative bearing – ADF, and DME). If we suspect an error we can always revert to a “Selected” approach where we manoeuvre the aircraft (by hand, or AP) to follow the ground indications. It is possible to combine these two procedures so that our lateral navigation is Managed and our vertical navigation is Selected.

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An important technical point for a Managed Approach is that if the ground signals are removed there is no change in the aircrafts flight path down to the MDA as the aircraft is being guided by the information coded into the arrival as contained in the FMS. However, in this hypothetical case we would initiate an immediate go round as we would have no raw data with which to check our progress. The second group of approaches do not use any ground based data but are solely based on GPS information and are called “RNAV GPS Approaches”. In this case the aircraft is guided by GPS to a point in space where a descent is commenced on a specific path to a minimum altitude from where a visual landing can be achieved or a missed approach carried out. RNAV approaches are normally flown using lateral and vertical managed guidance (FINAL APP mode). However if altitude corrections are necessary due to large differences from the ISA temperature, or where an incorrect vertical coding has been identified in the navigation database, then vertical selected guidance (NAV / FPA), should be used. The Airbus aircraft RNAV system is the FMGS. Flight crews are extensively trained to use this system during their type rating course so no specific training is required to use the FMGS for RNAV approaches. For all Non Precision Approaches a stabilised approach is recommended (but is not mandatory). Configure to reach the FAF in CONF FULL and at VAPP. As the Deceleration point is based on a decelerated approach you need to insert a speed constraint of VAPP at the FAF. We aim to fly the NPA as much as possible like a stabilised ILS with similar procedures. The AP/FD guidance modes for a Managed approach are referred to the FMS FPLN and this is confirmed during the approach by reference to the raw data. This is why the crew must ensure that the FMS data is correct and accurate, with correct sequencing. An exception to this is a Localiser approach, where the ground generated LOC beam is captured Managed approaches (la teral and vertical or only lateral) are only available if they are in the FMGS database and the GPS is Primary or the NAV ACCY check is positive and the procedure has been validated by the Company concerned. A positive NAV ACCY check can be confirmed even if LOW accuracy is indicated on the PROG page. Otherwise an approach in selected mode is requied. If for any reason GPS PRIMARY is LOST then a GPS defined approach cannot be performed and a VOR or NDB approach can only be continued by changing to a Selected Approach. The ILS push button must be set to OFF in order to get VDEV information on the PFD (exception for LOC only approaches)

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The Briefing for the Approach must specify the type of approach to be performed and the intended guidance modes (FINAL APPR, NAV/FPA, TRK / FPA, or HDG V/S) and task sharing procedures and the importance of crosschecking, During the briefing confirm the correct navigational aids and course settings are tuned (manually as applicable) for the approach. ALL NPA’s PRIOR TO APPROACH: - Insertion of correct approach in MCDU - Set VAPP as a constraint at the FAF - Check all constraints in FPLN match approach plates - Check Navigation accuracy - Select and identify radio aids required for approach - Conduct the Approach briefing and cross check the minima - Keep A/THR engaged to use managed speed - Monitor the proper sequencing of the FPLN, particularly if HDG is selected. (The NAV and APPR NAV modes are always guiding the A/C along the ACTIVE LEG of the FPLN, and the managed VERTICAL mode ensures VDEV = 0, VDEV being computed along the remaining FPLN to destination.) - Cleared for a Managed approach ?press the APPR P/B (the VDEV indication will now be visible, if not yet already there). - Cleared for a Selected approach ?select an interception TRK on FCU. - Cleared for a Laterally Managed, Vertically Selected approach remain in NAV - The monitoring o f the interception must be achieved using the applicable raw data depending upon the result of the NAV ACCY CHECK or whether GPS is PRIMARY. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH: - Check deceleration occurs at the decel point, or activate approach phase 10 NM prior to FAF - Select FPD - Ensure raw data is correctly displayed - Verify accuracy is HIGH on PROG page or NAV ACCY positive - Complete approach checks when cleared for APP - Crosscheck FPD approach track with approach plates - Ensure raw data is correctly displayed FINAL APPROACH: - Ensure landing configuration achieved prior to FAF - Start CHRONO at FAF - Crosscheck altitudes and distances with those published on approach plate - Set go around altitude - Monitor raw data and FMA, calling mode changes AT MDA:

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- If visual, disconnect autopilot and both Flight Directors and continue visually or perform a go around if there is insufficient visual references. MANAGED APPROACH Monitor the engagement of FINAL APP mode; use start of descent blue symbol on the ND, VDEV and FMA on the PFD. Use A/THR and Managed speed. With GPS PRIMARY, monitor VDEV / XTK / FPLN on ND and confirm by needles on ND and DME versus altitude. Set Go Around Altitude when you have passed below that altitude. If for any reason, FINAL APPR does not engage at start of descent, select a Flight Path Angle to recapture the Final Descent Path and so fly towards DEV 0. Once VDEV = 0, you may try to re-engage APPR. If during the final approach the message NAV ACCY DNGRADED appears, immediately refer to raw data. If the check is OK, you may continue, however if the check is NEGATIVE, select TRK / FPA and fly according to your raw data. If during the final approach, the message GPS PRIMARY LOST appears while flying a GPS approach immediately INTERRUPT the approach by going round. Non precision approaches must be properly coded in the Navigation Data Base so as to be satisfactorily flown with the APPR NAV / FINAL managed modes. The coding of the vertical part of the approach must be verified by the airline. Should there be any doubt on the vertical F.PLN, or an Airline has not validated the procedure the crew may elect to fly the approach with NAV / FPA modes, provided the NAV ACCY CHECK is OK. You are not allowed to modify the Final Approach F.PLN data (clear waypoints or modify altitude constraints), and you must not insert DIR TO an intermediate waypoint of the final approach segment in Managed Mode. NOTE : At the earlier of MDA -50 ft or MAP the autopilot will disconnect if in FINAL APP mode. Airbus does not recommend levelling off at MDA. SELECTED APPROACH The Selected non precision approach procedure is necessary when the NAV ACCURACY check is negative (or the approach is not in the database) and Raw data must be used for cross check throughout the approach. Track to the FAF having intercepted the inbound track and select TRK / FPA. Pre-select FPA –3.0º (ensure you remain in ALT) and approaching the FAF pull the FPA knob to activate the descent. (the pre-selection will remain for 40 seconds when it automatically returns to dashes. If you are concerned about

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the possibility of your setting disappearing just before activation cycle the setting up or down by 0.1º and a new 40 seconds commences). With your TRK corresponding to the Final Approach Course, initiate your FPA descent momentarily before the FAF so as to establish your descent on the profile given by the chart, using A/THR and Managed speed. Monitor Raw data for accuracy both Laterally and Vertically. The Minimum Descent Altitude is not a decision altitude (as is the case with an ILS). Be aware that some companies add an amount (say 50ft) to a published MDA in order to treat it like a Decision Altitude. If you have a horizontal distance scale you will reach the MDA in position to continue on the same profile to touchdown. If you are not visual at MDA you must go around immediately as there will be no possibility of achieving a safe landing if you subsequently get visual at the MDA altitude, but closer to the threshold. However, if there is no distance scale on the profile you may level off at MDA until the MAP which in this case will usually be station passage of the relevant Navigation Aid. LOCALISER APPROACH As for all Non Precision Approaches, the recommended flying reference is the Flight Path Vector and the recommended FG modes for the final approach are LOC / FPA with A/THR and managed speed. When cleared to intercept the LOC press the LOC P/B on the FCU to arm LOC mode and monitor LOC*. On final approach, coming to the FAF prepare the FPA selection and at the FAF activate the descent by activating the FPA mode by pulling the knob. Monitor the final approach using the LOC deviation scale and cross check the descent with the DME data.

INSTRUCTION Watch out for the following potential errors Raw data information not monitored closely throughout approach. Confusion between managed and selected. NAV accuracy not confirmed or checked. TO waypoint validity not checked on ND Navigation aids not manually tuned and course not inserted. VAPP not stabilized at FAF. Incomplete or rushed briefing. TRACK / FPA selected late. Aircraft descent preparation late. Go around altitude set incorrectly. Going below MDA.

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You are not allowed (from a legal point of view) to teach initiating the descent 0.3nm before the FAF during a vertically selected approach. A technique such as this is part of the Initial Operating Experience training given by a TRE and only in accordance with specific National Regulations.

N.15 CIRCUIT & VISUAL APPROACH, (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND A visual approach is performed whenever we are visual in the circuit area but not lined up on final. Depending on ATC instructions, or established practice, we can join the final approach path (Final) from any direction. As large aircraft have largely different centre of gravity positions our visual perceptions of our approach path can vary from one approach to the next. This means that although we are performing a visual approach we are dependant on confirming our flight path from internal as well as external cues. The visual approach is flown using the Flight Path Vector, A/THR ON with managed speed and the Autopilot and Flight Directors off.

The ND should be set to ROSE NAV 10 nm scale to assist the pilot to visualise his position in the circuit from mid-downwind. If a normal “Circuit” is performed the aircraft will turn onto downwind in a continuous 180º turn at approximately 200 – 220 kts. This will place the aircraft at a certain distance abeam the runway. As the aircraft is configured on downwind and base the speed will reduce and as a consequence a square base leg should be flown to compensate for the reduced turn radius due to the lower speed. The downwind leg is normally flown at, or on descent to 1500ft AAL. Approaching the downwind leg, activate the APPR PHASE. The FCU track target is selected to the downwind leg course, and as the FD’s are off the blue track index gives us a target for our track. Change the reference to the Flight Path Vector to facilitate manual flight.

Typical Visual Circuit – Lateral Profile

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Entering the downwind leg with the Approach activated means that Flap 1 can be selected so that the downwind leg is commenced at S speed. With the flight plan sequenced correctly our final leg will be active so we can see our off track error and so judge our distance abeam the runway. (2.5 nm abeam is a good figure to aim for). Abeam landing threshold (and at 1500 ft AAL) commence timing for 45” ± 1” / 1 kt head or tailwind. End of downwind - Ask for RWY TRK (start base turn) and CONF2. Resist the tendency to turn before asking for the track index to be turned onto the inbound track. During base commence a shallow descent (top of the birds fuselage on the horizon, with the fin above the horizon ie 1º ND) and extend the Landing Gear. If there is an ILS on the landing runway press the ILS pushbuttons and watch the Glide Slope indication. On base leg you should be gradually descending towards the GS, which you should capture as you roll out on final. If you can monitor the glide slope indication on base be guided by its information. If below the GS don’t continue descent! Normally when at 90º to the runway take FLAP 3. With correct sequencing of the flight plan we will have our distance off the centre line visible on the ND and at normal circuit speeds and no tail or head wind we need about 0.9 nm to complete a 90º turn onto final. During our turn onto final, or when rolled out, select Full Flap so that by 500 ft, the A/C is stabilised in the landing configuration. When stabilised the bird should be at º3 ND. We must be stabilised in the landing configuration by 500 ft AAL and if not we must carry out a go around. Both pilots should maintain a lookout for other aircraft both entering and when in the circuit. Don’t rely on the TCAS to override basic airmanship. The pilot on the runway side should ensure he keeps the runway in sight in conditions of poor visibility. Where there are close spaced parallel runways it is possible to conduct a “side-step manoeuvre” to land on the other runway. As this is a visual procedure it should not be programmed but flown according to external cues. The PNF should be ready to cancel any warnings associated with the landing on a runway not in the Flight Plan. The actual wind velocity on base is shown on the ND and this information allows the PF to adjust his flight path for a head or tailwind in his turn onto final. If the turn onto final is not completed accurately and the aircraft is displaced from the runway centre line on rolling out of the turn onto final a

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correction needs to be made. It is important that this corrective action is just that and not a new trajectory to the touchdown zone. In other words the correction is intended to put the aircraft back on the extended runway centreline on the correct approach profile, and not to fly from the displaced position to the threshold. Once the Approach has been activated the target speed with landing flap is VAPP as shown by the magenta v symbol. As we roll out on final we normally fly into a headwind, and if this headwind component is considerable we will see the GS Mini function adjust out target speed to a higher value. The operation of GS Mini is completely transparent to the pilot.

INSTRUCTION Insist on a go round if not stabilised by 500ft. Beware of the following common errors. Late disconnection of the Auto Pilot or FD’s Approach not stabilised by 500 ft AGL or a late go round decision. Overbanking, or flying through final, on a side-step. High sink rate, shallow approach angle, or “ducking under” during the approach. Hands not on the Thrust levers below 1000 ft AGL Continued descent on base leg when below the GS Not reacting to the presented information on PFD and ND when VMC

N.16 CIRCLING APPROACH (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND A “Circling Approach” is flown when the landing runway is different from the instrument approach runway, and the ceiling and visibility do not permit a normal circuit to be flown once visual. The A318, A319, A320, A332, A333, A342, A343 are all classed as Category C aircraft and thus the minimum circling visibility is defined under the JAA as 2400 metres visibility. The A321, A345, A346 are all classed as Category D aircraft and the minimum circling visibility is 3600 metres to reflect the higher approach speeds of these aircraft. The aircraft configuration for the Instrument approach is a function of the aircraft performance and the actual conditions. As a general principle, and with all engines operating, the approach is flown in the Landing configuration minus one stage of flap. If the Instrument approach is a NPA then a stabilised approach is flown. If an ILS is used then a decelerated approach can be flown. The FPV will be selected ON at the commencement of the circling, if not before as a function of the Instrument approach, and the circling pattern

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is flown visually (so the FD’s are off).

The Final Instrument approach (all engines operating) is flown in CONF3 with the Landing Gear down and speed managed. Approaching MDA (and visual) push VS zero to level off. (In an A320 you will stabilise 80 – 90 feet below the point at which you pressed VS zero and remember that MDA stands for Minimum Descent Altitude and not Minimum Decision Altitude). If at any stage during the procedure you loose visual contact with the landing runway Go-round using the procedure applicable to the Instrument approach just conducted, unless ATC advises otherwise. The missed approach must be flown with raw data, since it is no longer part of the FPLN. If a sharp turn is expected, keep FLAP3 (or FLAP2) and selected speed to minimise the turn radius, until properly on trajectory. Remember to only turn in a “safe” direction during such a procedure. NOTE: The recommended configuration for the instrument approach with all engines operating is Conf 3, Landing Gear down and managed speed. The reason for landing gear being selected down early is not to trigger the landing gear not down red warning, and to have to disregard it.

INSTRUCTION In order to perform this exercise realistically you must first of all insert a headwind on the final approach to land that is sufficiently strong enough to preclude a downwind landing from the Instrument Approach. In the vicinity of 15 kts from an arc 30º either side of the runway should suffice. Make sure that the arrival procedure on the landing runway is a runway only arrival and not an ILS. A runway arrival will give a CF position at 5nm and 1500ft which is good for seeing the extended runway centreline. Don’t put the cloud base too close to the MDA so that there is no conflict in the trainees mind that they are visual and should expect to remain so.

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In order for the crew to see the runway on downwind a minimum visibility of around 5000 metres should suffice. As the projected picture they are looking at out of the cockpit windows is in 2D (and not 3D as in reality) a lesser visibility makes definition of the runway particularly hard. Remember we are teaching a procedure and not checking their ability to see a runway in poor visibility.

N.17 LANDING (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Conducting an autoland from an ILS approach is the only occasion where we don’t take control of the aircraft with the autopilot disconnected and land it manually. If we disconnect the AP at the MDA or DH on an ILS the aircraft is moving on a stable trajectory and all that is required is to flare and reduce the thrust to land. As a basic rule for all approaches, not later than 1000 ft AGL, the PF should have one hand on the THRUST LEVERS and the other one on the side stick. This should apply irrespective of Auto Pilot and Auto Thrust selection. During the final visual segment of the approach it is very important not to over control with the sidestick. The aircraft will maintain pitch and roll attitudes resisting any atmospheric disturbance until 50 ft when the landing mode becomes active. Landing mode is only a pitch mode and roll control is the same as normal law until the wheels are on the ground. When reaching 50 ft RA, the pitch law blends into flare mode. The system memorises the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude becomes the initial reference for pitch attitude control. As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system reduces (over 8 seconds) the pitch attitude to minus 2º. Consequently as the speed reduces, the pilot will have to pull back on the side stick to maintain a constant path. The Flare technique is thus very conventional. At approximately 20 ft the thrust levers should be moved to the idle detent. The RETARD call out (at 20 ft / 10 ft for an Autoland) is a reminder for the pilot to retard the thrust levers, if he hasn’t already done so. Remember that if Auto Thrust is engaged it will remain engaged until the thrust levers reach the idle detent. Consequently, if you are late in retarding the thrust levers in a MANUAL landing, the A/THR will add thrust during the Flare to keep the A/C on target speed. Therefore the correct technique is to move the thrust levers smartly to the idle position when you no longer need the engine thrust during the flare. In order to assess the Flare and the A/C position versus the ground, look out well ahead of the A/C.

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The typical pitch increment in Flare is approximately 4° which leads to a - 1° flight path angle associated to a 10 kts speed decay in the manoeuvre. Common faults are too high speed drop below VAPP (pitch up to avoid high sink rate), prolonged hold off to do grease the landing, and flare too high and consequently no control of the de-rotation once the main wheels are on the ground. De-rotation should be commenced as soon as the main wheels have touched. The aircraft has a tendency to nose down naturally as the aft stick applied for the flare is relaxed towards neutral. A comfortable nose wheel touchdown will be achieved if the stick is maintained just aft of neutral during de-rotation. There is a tendency to pitch-up due to the effect of the spoilers extending behind the Centre of Gravity. Smoothly control the de-rotation. Tail strike occurs (A320) at 13.5º or 11.5º (landing gear compressed), so pitch attitude should be monitored in the flare. The recommended technique for a crosswind landing is (during the flare) to apply rudder to align the A/C on the runway centre line and counteract the rolling tendency with side stick (with possibly very slight wing down into a strong wind). NOTE: In a strong crosswind, a full decrab might lead to a significant into wind aileron input causing a significant bank angle.The pilot must be aware that there are aircraft geometry limitations in pitch and in bank not only to prevent incurring a tailstrike but to prevent scrapping the engine pod, the flaps or the wing tip. In such conditions, a partial decrab is preferable. At touch down the ground spoilers will deploy automatically which may give a slight pitch up as mentioned above. Automatic ground spoiler deployment will occur with both main landing gear compressed or with one MLG on the ground and reverse thrust selected. Ground spoiler deployment will enable autobrake operation (if selected). The green DECEL light on the AUTO / BRK panel enable the crew to monitor whether the selected rate of deceleration is achieved. Remember that the autobrake can operate without the DECEL light illuminating. The DECEL light means that the desired rate of deceleration is being achieved, which may not be the case when the Braking Action is poor. During the Roll Out use the rudder pedals to keep the aircraft on the runway centreline. Initially the rudder will be aerodynamically effective and below around 100 kts the Nose Wheel Steering function commanded by the pedals will take over. Do not try and control the roll out with the NWS tiller. In case of crosswind various precautions need to be considered. These include avoiding deflecting the stick into wind. It will not assist in aircraft control but has adverse side effects on braking. Side stick input creates a down force on the wheels on the into wind side due to the aileron deflection

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and spoiler activation, and it creates a differential drag effect due to spoiler retraction on the out of wind side. These differential effects favour the weather-cocking tendency of the aircraft. In cases of lateral control problem in high crosswind landings reduce the reverse thrust to idle. At lower speeds, on wet and contaminated runways the directional control of the A/C may be more difficult. If necessary use differential braking. The Ground Spoilers, the Thrust Reversers and the Wheel Brakes are the three means of retardation on the ground. The Ground Spoilers contribute to the aircraft deceleration by aerodynamic drag and they increase considerably the wheel braking efficiency by increasing the load on the wheels. The thrust reversers have a significant braking effect at higher speeds, but below about 70 kts their efficiency drops rapidly. Their efficiency is independent to the runway condition. The Maximum reverse thrust is obtained between N1 values of 70% to 85%. In an emergency situation it is permissible to keep Maximum Reverse thrust down to aircraft stop. The Actual Landing distances demonstrated in flight test and provided in the FCOM and QRH does not include the use of reversers (which constitute a safety margin). The wheel brakes are the main factors in aircraft deceleration on ground. The brake force from wheels are a function of - - the load on the wheels, - the effectiveness of the brakes and anti skid system, - the contact area of the tires with the runway, - the friction coefficient between the tires and the runway. Thus the braking efficiency depends upon the A/C speed, the load on wheels, the wheel speed (free rolling, skidding or locked wheels), the runway condition and also the brake temperature and wear. The antiskid system maintains the skidding factor close to the point providing maximum friction force. With maximum manual braking and with anti skid operative the typical deceleration rate is 10 kts/sec (or .5g). With Carbon brakes, the wear is directly linked to the number of pedal applications. Pressing the pedals and modulating the pressure without releasing the pedals is therefore a recommended technique for minimizing the brake wear. You may use either Manual braking or Autobrake. Autobrake may be used in LO or MED for landing, (MAX is only used for take-off). Auto brake controls a given deceleration rate (LO: 0.15g and MED: 0.3g). The DECEL light indicates that the selected deceleration rate is being achieved. In other words the DECEL light is not an indicator of the Autobrake operation, but that the selected deceleration rate is being achieved.

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Use of Autobrake minimises the number of brake applications and so the brake wear. Consequently it is recommended to use it when available, unless not needed. To disconnect the Autobrake, pressure needs to be applied to one brake pedal only. However the normal method of disarming the Autobrake is by even pressure on both brake pedals. The auto brake may also be disconnected by action on the respective AUTO / BRK pushbutton (not recommended as both pilots should be heads up during the landing roll) or by pushing down the speedbrake control lever. Autobrake should be disconnected before 20 kts is reached. Max reverse (or idle reverse depending on airport regulations or airline policy) should be selected immediately after main gear touchdown. Reduce reverse thrust to idle at 70 kts. Idle reverse may remain selected until the airplane is at taxi speed. The PNF should monitor spoiler deployment (ECAM WHEEL page), operation of reverse thrust (E/WD) and the operation of Autobrake (green DECEL light on AUTO/BRK panel) and notify the PF of any abnormal indications

INSTRUCTION It is an important concept that the aircraft should be aligned with the centreline of the runway during the landing. If the CM2 is flying and you are looking through the main window of CM1 you may think that CM2 is not aligned very well. This is a feature of the projected visual where both pilots see exactly the same picture. If the CM1 is positioned exactly over the centreline, then CM2 will also be positioned exactly over the centreline. If they have problems landing check they are looking at the far end of the runway during the flare.

N.18 GO-ROUND (00:15) BACKGROUND REJECTED LANDING INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND A Go-round implies a discontinuation of an Approach at the MDA but can occur at any stage of the approach, even when visual below the MDA. During a Go-round the aircraft remains airborne during the whole exercise. This is not to be confused with a Rejected Landing where the aircraft wheels can touch the runway during the exercise. The Rejected Landing is discussed at the end of this briefing.

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A Go-round is frequently unexpected. If during the approach you feel the A/C is not properly stabilised, or will not be well positioned at the MDA don’t delay your decision to carry out a go-round. An early go-round is safer than a last minute one. To initiate a Go-round push the thrust levers forward to the TOGA detent and command GOROUNDFLAP. Not only does this action command TOGA thrust from all engines but with at least Flap 1 selected then SRS and GA TRK modes engage. On hearing the command GOROUNDFLAP the PNF retracts the flap lever one step. As a consequence of entering the Go-round phase the Missed approach procedure for the Approach just flown becomes the ACTIVE FPLN (so a correctly sequenced flight plan is required). Irrespective of whatever FD mode you had, on selecting TOGA and with at least Flap 1 selected the FD’s appear automatically in HDG/VS mode. If the situation permits you may reduce thrust to MCT or CLB when established in pitch, but always initiate the go-round by selecting TOGA first so that the system sequences the correct events. Once positive climb is observed by the PNF (confirmed as on take-off) the POSITIVE CLIMB call is made and the PF orders GEAR UP The SRS mode guides the A/C to the Maximum of VLS, VAPP or IAS (at time of Go-round). SRS mode remains active until reaching the GA Acceleration Altitude (as inserted in the FMGS), or engagement of any other pitch mode (ALT* for example). GA TRK mode guides the A/C on the memorized track at the time of TOGA selection. In every case you must either select NAV (by pushing) or HDG (by pulling) to exit the GA TRK mode. In order to fly the MISSED APPR, ask the PNF to engage NAV mode and if the aircraft is on a trajectory that will cross the Missed Approach path it will be captured. If this is not the case, or a different procedure is to be used select HDG mode as suitable. The speed target will become green dot when GA ACCEL ALT is reached. The previously flown approach will be automatically inserted into the FPLN after completion of the missed approach procedure. The approach must be Activated to get out of Go-round mode and back to Approach mode if another approach is planned. In the event of an engine failure in combination with a low altitude capture (ALT*), monitor the speed carefully because there is no low speed protection in ALT * mode. The go-round can be flown with two autopilots engaged, but when another lateral or vertical mode is selected, one autopilot will drop out.

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Once the aircraft has started the final approach, a Go-round or missed approach must be considered: - If there is a loss or a doubt concerning situation awareness. - If there is a malfunction which jeopardises the safe completion of the approach. - If a situation arises which may lead to a potentially unstable approach. - If the approach is unstable in speed, altitude, flight path (vertical or lateral) or configuration, in such a way that most probably it won' t be stable by 1000 ft AAL (IMC, 500 ft VMC). - If adequate visual cues are not obtained at MDA or DH. - If any GPWS/TCAS or Windshear alert occurs. Remember that once a Missed Approach has been initiated it is too late to refer to the charts to ascertain if there are any constraints to be met. Beware of the following Common Errors. Does not maintain the speed target ±10 kts Not knowing, or obeying speed, bank angle, and altitude constraints. Rotation too slow and / or delayed. Flap retraction completed before acceleration altitude. Wrong selection of lateral mode.

REJECTED LANDING A Rejected landing differs from a Go Around in that the aircraft configuration is not changed during the procedure. It is possible that the main wheels touch the ground. An example of this procedure is when below the Alert height for a CAT lll approach a landing is not possible. With Airbus Fly By Wire aircraft the aircraft will be in pitch Direct, or Flare, Law and the loads on the side stick are increased and auto trim may not be available resulting in a different feel to the manoeuvre.

INSTRUCTION Ensure the trainees are aware of the specific Go-round procedure before they have to carry it out. Some procedures have speed limits and bank angle constraints built into them so give them guidance on how to cope with these.

N.18 DIVERTING (00:10) BACKGROUND TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE DIVERTING IN CRUISE DIVERTING AFTER A MISSED APPROACH INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND Diverting is an event not often practiced. Whether it is done from take-off to a Take-off Alternate, in cruise due to a Medical Emergency, or after a Missed Approach the attention of the crew will be focused on this unusual event and they need to be reminded that only one head at a time must be down.

TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE In good weather conditions it is obvious that after a serious problem during or after take-off the aircraft will return to the Departure airfield and land. However if the weather conditions at your Departure are such that the visibility is below landing minima a Take-off Alternate is required. This Take-off Alternate must be closer than – a) Two engine aircraft - one hour flight time at one engine-out cruising speed based on the actual take-off weight or an approved diversion time at one engine-out cruising speed for ETOPS. b) Three or four engine aircraft - two hours flight time at one engine out cruising speed based on the actual take-off weight Any airport selected as Take off Alternate must comply with the following - a) During a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome the visibility will be at or above the applicable landing minima, and the ceiling must be taken into account when the only approaches available are non-precision and/or circling approaches. b) Any limitation related to one engine inoperative operations must be taken into account. The flight plan for the Take-off Alternate is inserted in the Secondary Flight Plan and if it is required the only action needed is to Activate the Secondary Flight Plan, and then using the DIR TO function create a new routing for the flight.

DIVERTING IN CRUISE If during cruise an event occurs that requires a landing at an airport other than the destination then the crew will divert to this new airport. Having advised ATC and received approval (if required) a New Destination is inserted at a convenient waypoint and the flight plan is completed as required. Don’t forget to keep your company advised by whatever means is possible (even by asking ATC to advise them). In such a case, and with no aircraft problems it is probably reasonable to expect a long delay before the flight can be resumed.

DIVERTING AFTER A MISSED APPROACH After performing a Go-round you must decide whether to make another approach or divert to your alternate. Once the aircraft is cleaned up you will

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be at green dot speed and in Go-round phase. The FMGS needs to know you intentions in order to provide meaningful predictions. There are 3 possibilities to indicate to the FMGS your planned course of action, and these three possibilities depend on whether, or how, you have prepared for this phase of flight. Scrolling through the flight plan you will see that the Alternate Flight Plan is in blue and as such it is not possible to navigate with this flight plan as it stands. By carrying out a Lateral Revision at the TO WPT we can now ENABLE ALTN, and this action makes the blue Alternate Flight Plan a green Active Flight plan, and we can perform a DIR TO any convenient point in the new Active Plan. If, instead of an Alternate Flight Plan you have a Secondary Flight Plan then simply Activate the Secondary Flight Plan by pressing the SEC FPLN key and line selecting the Activate key. You must be in HDG, or TRK mode to do this (not NAV). Now perform a DIR TO a suitable point. In both the above cases the target speed will become 250 kts and predictions will be correct. The third case is where you have not prepared for you diversion. In this case Activate Approach in order to change the FMGS from Go-round mode to Approach mode and then on the Progress page insert a Cruising Flight Level. This causes the Climb mode to become active with normal Climb performance (250 kts). Perform a DIR TO a suitable point along your desired track and laterally Line select this point and insert a new Destination and then build up the flight plan as required.

INSTRUCTION In our Training Scenarios it is possible to practice all these events if you structure the FMGS preparation to suit. If you insert a CORTE you will get the information for ALTN that is part of the CORTE. This can be changed during the FMGS preparation as it can in real life. If in cruise you want to change the Alternate in the Flight Plan remember that the Alternate is paired with the Destination so line select the destination to access the Alternate.

T.01 PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS GENERAL TAKE OFF CLIMB CONSIDERATIONS CRUISE CONSIDERATIONS DESCENT CONSIDERATIONS APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS

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GENERAL The A320 has been designed to cruise at a Mach Number of 0.78. The cost of a given sector depends not only on the fuel consumption but also on other factors such as - - Over flight charges, - Price of fuel at origin and at the destination leading to possible fuel tankering, - Price of flight time (crew, maintenance etc), - Wind gradient, flight plan constraints (such as constant Mach) and Aircraft GW itself. For each sector, the airline determines a cost factor: The COST INDEX (CI) accounts for variable items. The greatest variables are FUEL and MAINTENANCE. However despite the fact that the crew costs are fixed, duty time constraints leading to a night stop will modify the costs index of a given sector. Once a COST INDEX is determined for a given sector, this allows the FMS to generate a CLIMB / CRUISE / DESCENT SPEED profile which will minimize the cost by balancing the cost of fuel against the cost of time. For example, if the fuel consumption is the essential economical factor on a given sector the COST INDEX will be LOW (0 is MAX RANGE), and if time is the essential economical factor on a given sector, the COST INDEX will be HIGH (999 is MIN TIME). It is essential to understand that once the CI is defined for a given sector, the MANAGED SPEED PROFILE will be computed by the FMS, as well as the OPTIMUM FLIGHT LEVEL and OPTIMUM STEP. With Cruise Wind variations and temperature changes the Cruise Mach number will vary, as it varies also with GW and cruise altitude. If you wish to fly at a given fixed cruise mach number, select it on the FCU so that all your predictions will be updated.

TAKE OFF Unreliable Speed Indication If during the take off phase you suspect the Speed Indications to be unreliable the following rule of thumb guidelines will assist before you can ascertain correct values from the QRH. Before ACCEL ALT set TOGA thrust and PITCH 15° After the ACCEL ALT set CLB thrust and PITCH 10°. After 15 seconds select FLAP1, and after another 15 seconds FLAP 0. Performance Data T/O Segment Reminder – Twin Engined aircraft

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The engine out acceleration altitude must be at least higher than the minimum altitude required for obstacle clearance, but is limited to the altitude reached at the end of clean up with 10 minutes TOGA thrust. Definition of speeds associated to Take-off VMCG: mini control speed on the ground, using primary controls only (no NWS). Maximum rudder force 68 kg / Max lateral deviation on ground 30 ft. VEF: engine failure speed allowing the crew to recognize the failure and act when reaching V1. There is typically 1 sec between VEF and V1 (which leads to approx 4 kts). VMBE: maximum braking energy speed, at which the brakes can absorb all the energy required. VMBE becomes a limiting factor at high OAT on long runways. An RTO achieved in such circumstances may lead to very hot brakes, tires automatically deflated and potential fire. V1: Committal speed for Take off. V1 call out must be made so that “ONE” is called when V1 is reached. VMU: minimum unstick speed is the speed at which the aircraft can safely lift off the ground and continue take off. VMU is a function of GW, Aircraft configuration and altitude. VR: rotation speed. Allows the aircraft to reach V2 at 35 ft with engine failed. A rotation initiated before VR leads to a potential tail strike. The higher the flap setting, the greater the tail clearance. V2: minimum speed reached at 35 ft with one engine failed. It must be between 1.13 Vs1g and 1.28 Vs1g. The higher is V2, the better is the a/c climb out gradient in the take off segments. VMCA: minimum control speed with one engine out using maximum rudder deflection and 5° bank angle towards engine inoperative.

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Relations between all those speeds: VMCG = VEF = V1 = VMBE VR = 1.05 VMCA VLOF = V MAX TIRE V2 = 1.1 VMCA On Single Aisle family, Vmax tire = 195 kt FACTORS INFLUENCING TAKE OFF PERFORMANCE: There are obviously many factors influencing the take off performance such as aircraft GW, aircraft configuration, outside conditions (OAT, wind, pressure), the runway available and the obstacles. Those factors allow the basic T/O DATA to be determined, which have still to be corrected by other influencing factors which must be taken into account: - Runway WET: this affects the acceleration/stop capability of the aircraft (as well as possibly, its lateral controllability in case of crosswind). Thus once MTOW and associated T/O speeds, or FLX TEMP and associated speeds are determined on a DRY runway, a weight decrement and associated speed decrease must be applied, or a ?TFLEX decrement and associated speed decrease must be applied. - AIR COND ON: the basic T/O data is often provided on the RTOW charts supposing AIR COND OFF. In that case if PACKS are supplied by engine bleed a weight decrement and associated speed decrease must be applied for MTOW, or a ?TFLEX decrement must be applied; NO speed decrease is to be applied, since the ?TFLEX decrement compensates for the thrust drop caused by the AIR COND. - QNH different from standard: in case of low pressure, the engine thrust is lower than in STD conditions. Thus in case QNH is below STD a weight decrement and associated speed decrease must be applied for MTOW, or a ?TFLEX decrement must be applied to compensate this thrust drop. - ANTI ICE: the same factors apply. The decrements are often not provided on the RTOW charts but as defaulted values in a FCOM specific table. FLEXIBLE TEMP for T/O reduced thrust - RTOW chart use. Whenever maximum T/O thrust is not necessary due to aircraft GW or/and runway conditions, it is efficient to reduce the T/O thrust in order to save engine life. All A320 engines are high by-pass Turbo Fan engines FLAT RATED until a given temperature called TREF; this means that beyond TREF the maximum thrust of the engine reduces. By determining an assumed value of outside air temperature which would allow the engines to provide the thrust required to take off the aircraft in the current conditions, this allows the thrust to be reduced. This temperature value is called FLEX TEMP. The higher the FLX, the more the thrust is reduced, The percentage of the effective Thrust reduction is a function of (FLX TEMP – OAT). FLX TEMP - OAT [° C] 8º 14º 20º 25º 29º EFFECTIVE THRUST REDUCTION [%]

5 10 15 20 23

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FLX is limited as follows: - Max authorised FLX THRUST reduction 25%, - FLX T/O N1 / EPR = MAX CLB N1 / EPR, - FLX TEMP by definition >TREF and OAT. VARIOUS OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING TAKE-OFF Brakes Carbon brakes are quite efficient when hot (100 °C) or partly worn. However the Carbon brake temp increases rapidly with brake application. The HOT BRAKES caution comes up at 300 °C indicating that if the L/G is retracted, there is a potential risk of fire caused by this temperature being spread to the hydraulic system. If your brakes are hot before take off, do not take off. Do not retract hot brakes, but cool with the gear down before retraction. Do not use brake fans during take off or if you experience a wheel fire. Tires Under inflation is one of the major causes of tire failure. If the pressure is low they heat up faster and may cause a breakdown of the rubber material. When under inflated there is a braking action when the tire is rolling so they tend to heat up. The Braking coefficient is a measured value that gives you an indication of how well your aircraft brakes will succeed in stopping your aircraft when compared to optimum braking in ideal conditions. Tire wear favours Aquaplaning. With normal tire pressure (around 180 PSI) the aquaplaning speed on standing water is around 120 kt, and on slush around 130 kt. A tire failure causes longer T/O distances. Line Up allowance Line up allowances after a 90° turn or 180° turn are included in the take off data determination so the following values are for information only. However if the line up is not performed correctly the length of runway still available is reduced. ASDA A 319 A 320 A 321 ASDA line up allowance (90° turn) 23.1 m 25.5 m 28.0 m ASDA line up allowance (180° turn) 26.4 m 27.5 m 35.8 m

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CLIMB CONSIDERATIONS Unreliable Speed Indication during Climb If during the climb phase you suspect the Speed Indications to be unreliable the following rule of thumb guidelines will assist before you can ascertain correct values from the QRH. Ensure normal CLB THRUST PITCH 7° until passing FL 100 will result in (approximately) ?250 kts IAS PITCH 5° from FL100 to FL200 will result in (approximately) ??280 kts IAS PITCH 3° above FL?200 will result in (approximately) M 0.76 PERFORMANCE DATA En Route climb gradient (from 1500 ft AAL at departure): - Gross climb gradient with one EO shall be at least 1.1 % with a 0.8% decrement for Net climb gradient Obstacle clearance criteria (two engined aircraft): - Net flight path must be positive and 1000 ft above all obstacles, 4.34 NM either side of track, - Drift down net slope after an Engine failure 2000 ft above all obstacles, 4.34 NM either side of track. Maximum altitude (FCOM 3.05.15) is defined as the lower of: Maximum altitude at maximum cruise thrust in level flight, and Maximum altitude at maximum climb thrust with 300ft/min VS The FMGS definition is different in that a 0.3g buffet margin is considered and this then becomes the Recommended Maximum Altitude (FCOM 4.03.20). Optimum altitude (FCOM 3.05.15) is defined as the altitude at which the aircraft covers the maximum distance per unit of fuel (best specific range). The FMGS definition is based on gross weight, cost index and temperature. A step climb should be considered if there is not a significant additional headwind at higher altitude and the additional fuel consumed in climb (0.1% of GW) is compensated by enough Cruise time at the higher level. The Maximum Climb gradient speed is the speed which allows the aircraft to reach a given altitude within the shortest distance. Max climb gradient speed = G.DOT G.DOT speed is close to the best L/D ratio speed

CRUISE CONSIDERATIONS Unreliable Speed Indication If during cruise you suspect the Speed Indications to be unreliable the following rule of thumb guidelines will assist before you can ascertain correct values from the QRH. Pitch of 2° NU with an N1 of 82 % for an approximate M 0.76 above FL250 NOTE:

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Even on IAE engines where the thrust is controlled using EPR, it is preferable to use N1 as reference in such circumstances. FMS updating - Insert WINDS and TEMP at successive waypoints of the cruise. It is not necessary to insert them at all waypoints but when wind velocity or temperature vary by more than approx 30°/30 kt and 5°. In case the ETA at destination is beyond schedule and ETA is an important cruise management factor on the sector, insert SCHEDULE TIME of ARRIVAL as time constraint at destination. The FMS will adapt the ECON SPD profile so as to best match the ETA time constraint. - The FMS MAX REC ALT is 0.3 g buffet limit altitude. The crew may elect to fly higher if necessary. He will be advised that he is flying beyond the 0.3 g boundary by a message. The MAX [MAX ALT] above which managed modes are no longer available is defined by the 0.2 g limit. - In case ATC requires the aircraft to fly at a fixed cruise mach number, select it on the FCU. All predictions are updated accordingly in cruise till next STEP or T/D, where the FMS assumes that Managed speed will be resumed.

DESCENT CONSIDERATIONS Unreliable Speed Indication If during descent you suspect the Speed Indications to be unreliable the following rule of thumb guidelines will assist before you can ascertain correct values from the QRH. Thrust Idle and adopt a Pitch of 2°ND for approximately 0.76 / 280 kt. The wind in descent has a significant influence on the descent FPA and thus on the descent distance so that ??with a tailwind the FPA decreases and GND DIST increases. When the a/c is above the desired path ??select a higher speed (as allowed by ATC) and extend the speed brake in Open Descent and ??keep high speed until ALT*, and then select a lower speed (or Activate Approach) and retract the speed brake when getting close to intended target speed. The FMS gives assistance to properly carry out the descent provided the lateral FPLN and vertical FPLN are properly filled in, descent winds (if significant) are inserted, and PERF APPR page completed. The FMS computes a descent profile. It provides, on the EFIS PFD and MCDU PROG page the VERTICAL DEVIATION of the A/C compared with the computed descent profile (VDEV, also called the YOYO). The VDEV is an excellent cue to monitor the descent when in NAV mode or when in HDG (TRK) modes as long as XTK is within 5 NM. When in HDG (TRK) modes, it computes the ENERGY CIRCLE displayed on the ND which represents the distance required to descend from present altitude down to landing elevation, and to decelerate from descent speed to VAPP (including SPD LIM) and land. When selecting a SPD on the FCU (for turbulence), the A/C is still guided on the original descent path. The level off symbol on the ND along the F PLN or TRK LINE shows the position where the A/C will reach the FCU altitude in the current AP/FD mode.

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EMERGENCY DESCENT One of the goals of the High Speed Emergency Descent is to reach a lower level (FL < 140) without triggering the PAX O² mask deployment. Thus the emergency descent is achieved with IDLE THRUST, HIGH SPEED (up to VMO-MMO if failure permits), and with the SPD BRAKES extended. On A320, the rate of descent is approximately 6000 ft/mn; which means that it takes approximately 5 mn to descend from FL 390 to FL 100, and approximately 40 NM. HOLDING SPEED AND CONFIGURATION The MAXIMUM ENDURANCE HOLDING is achieved with CLEAN CONF at G. DOT speed (actually the speed is slightly lower than max L/D ratio speed). NOTE: The descent profile is computed as the succession of several descent segments. From TOD to the first constrained waypoint the descent segment is called “Idle segment” and it assumes a given speed profile with thrust equal to IDLE + ?. This ? allows a more flexible guidance of the aircraft on the pre-computed descent path, when out side conditions vary or Anti Ice is selected. The Idle Factor on the A/C STATUS page is used to adjust the ?; a negative value increases the descent path angle.

APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS Unreliable Speed Indication If during descent you suspect the Speed Indications to be unreliable the following rule of thumb guidelines will assist before you can ascertain correct values from the QRH At Green Dot speed, clean aircraft configuration, set N1 to the aircraft weight value in tons. On final approach, landing configuration, set N1 to the aircraft weight value minus 2%. Performance Data There are runway distance limitations based on the Landing Distance Available and the Actual Landing Distance required from the FCOM & QRH. Before Departure the Landing Distance Available at Destination must at least equal Actual Landing Distance factored as shown below. Dry Rwy LDA =ALD/0.6 Wet Rwy LDA wet =1.15 ALD/0.6 Contaminated Rwy LDA contaminated =1.15 ALD/0.6 AND

=1.15 ALD for actual conditions In case of a problem in flight which has an effect on the Landing Performance the Required Landing Distance is the ALD for the existing conditions factored by a figure given in the FCOM and QRH for the particular failure or combination of failures.

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Go-round requirements are predicated on one or two engines operating (for a two engined aircraft) APPROACH CLIMB: minimum gross gradient 2.1 % - One Engine Operating / TOGA / LDG GEAR UP / FLAPS one detent up, as compared to approach configuration. LANDING CLIMB: minimum gross gradient 3.2 % - All Engines Operating / Thrust after 8 sec from flight idle /L/G DN, FLAPS in APPR CONF. The A320 is never landing climb limited. PCN/ACN The Aircraft Classification Number must be lower than the Pavement Classification number. PCN varies with the life of the pavement since it is a function of the traffic, traffic distribution etc. On a FLEXIBLE pavement (asphalt - concrete) occasional movements with ACN = PCN + 10 % are allowed. On a rigid pavement (concrete surface) occasional movements with ACN=PCN + 5% are allowed. Actual Landing distance / Landing distance with autoland Actual landing distance CONF FULL is the basic distance to which a factor is applied when in an Abnormal Configuration. This factor is given in the QRH in order to determine the required landing distance in such a configuration. The distances given with the use of Autobrake are not to be used for this calculation. APPROACH SPEED VAPP In most cases in normal configuration the FMS computes VAPP considering the wind inserted by the pilot in PERF APPR and the landing configuration selected. In case of suspected wind shear or downburst, or in case of strong gusty cross wind, the FMS VAPP may be overwritten by the pilot (up to VLS + 15 max). In such a case, use MANAGED SPEED in approach. In case of ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION determine VAPP from the QRH procedure and use SELECTED SPEED in approach. MISSED APPROACH CLIMB GRADIENT The crew must be aware that the 2.1% approach climb gradient requirement has nothing to do with the actual climb gradients which may be necessary in a missed approach. The crew must consider the obstacles, which are in the missed approach flight path. The SAFE ALTITUDE to use as a reference for acceleration is either the published missed approach altitude, the relevant sector altitude, or the MSA. In case of very low temperatures below ISA the target altitudes must be corrected by a large amount.

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T.02 FLYING REFERENCES (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND On the PFD two flying references may be selected: These are the ATTITUDE symbol, and the FLIGHT PATH VECTOR (also called the BIRD). The Attitude symbol is the primary reference for Dynamic Manoeuvres such as T/O and GO-ROUND. An action on the side stick has an immediate effect on the A/C attitude and thus the pilot can immediately and accurately control this parameter. The Flight Path Vector (FPV) represents the A/C trajectory. It is directly affected by the Aircraft inertia so as there is a delay it is unsuitable for dynamic manoeuvres. However the FPV is well suited when the pilot wishes to fly a stabilised trajectory. Except for the T/O and GO AROUND cases the FPV can be used in all flight phases. It is particularly recommended for Non Precision Approaches and Visual Flight. If the Flight Directors are ON, the internal Flight Guidance parameters are a function of the flying reference you select: If the FPV is off, the guidance will be HDG-V/S, with the Flight Director. If the FPV is on, the guidance will be TRK-FPA, with the Flight Path Director. During Approach the FPV is a very efficient flying reference because it displays the aircraft trajectory, As a consequence the pilot is made aware of Wind Direction changes and of a Downburst phenomena. Combined with the GS MINI function the FPV enhances a pilots situational awareness. Knowing the drift experienced by the aircraft on reaching the MDA assists the pilot to know where to look for the runway. The FPD is commanding a trajectory. Following it will give a trajectory that is stabilised by reference to the ground. The Flight Path Director should be switched off for visual flight. The FPV shows the present lateral track and present flight path angle relative to the aircraft. It is dynamic and indicates where we will be if all else remains the same. If any changes are introduced, the FPV will show the result of these changes.

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INSTRUCTION The easiest way to brief the FPV is by using the 2D Faros trainer in the Briefing rooms or on your laptop. A short demonstration will save a long explanation.

T.03 USE OF ATHR (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The ATHR computer (part of the FG within the FMGS) interfaces directly with the FADEC (Fully Automatic Digital Engine Control). The ATHR works in two modes, SPEED, or THRUST, and sends to the FADEC the thrust targets to acquire and maintain a target speed when in SPEED mode, and to achieve a specific thrust setting (CLB, IDLE …) when in THRUST mode. With the ATHR active the normal position for the thrust levers is the CLB detent. The ATHR remains active with the thrust levers in any position between CLB and just above IDLE. Any thrust lever position between the CLB detent and IDLE will give a message on the FMA to restore the normal position in the CLB detent. ATHR armed means that the ATHR is armed for reengagement when the thrust levers are placed back into the CLB detent (or below). ATHR is displayed blue in the FMA. At T/O the thrust levers are set either full forward to TOGA, or the FLX detent, and the thrust is controlled manually by the FADEC to the thrust lever position. The ATHR is armed as indicated blue on the FMA. When reaching the THR RED ALT, the PF moves the thrust levers back into the CLB detent, which engages the ATHR. For the rest of the flight (CLB, CRZ, DES and APPR) the maximum thrust commanded by the ATHR will be MAX CLB (unless the thrust levers are placed forward of the climb detent). If one thrust lever is set below the CLB detent, a message on the FMA reads LVR ASYM to remind the crew. If all thrust levers are set below the CLB detent with the ATHR on, then a repetitive ECAM caution is triggered, because there is no operational reason to be in that situation. In such a case, either bring all thrust levers back into CLB detent or disconnect the ATHR. If you set all thrust levers beyond the CLB detent while the ATHR is on, you control the thrust manually to the thrust lever position. The FMA displays MAN THR white. LVR CLB flashes on FMA as a reminder. This technique is used

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when the A/C speed drops significantly below the desired target. Once you are satisfied with the A/C speed or acceleration, bring the thrust levers back into CLB detent. ATHR is reengaged. If you use this technique during approach and you go beyond MCT you will activate the Go-round mode. In case of EO, the levers will be in MCT detent, throughout the rest of the flight, because MCT is the maximum thrust, which may be normally commanded in this case. DISCONNECTING The two normal methods for Auto Thrust disconnection are – - pressing the Instinctive Disconnect button on the thrust levers - or by placing all thrust levers back to Idle. It is also possible to press the ATHR P/B on the FCU, (but this gives an ECAM warning as this is not by design the normal disconnection method as the thrust will be frozen until the thrust levers are moved). Pressing the Instinctive Disconnect button gives Manual Thrust so if the thrust levers are in the Climb detent then by disconnecting the ATHR you are asking for Climb thrust. Therefore the correct method is move the thrust levers so that the TLA corresponds to the current thrust as indicated on the N1 or EPR indication before ATHR disconnection, and so get a smooth transition to Manual thrust flight. You may also disconnect the ATHR by placing the thrust levers in IDLE. To reengage the ATHR press the ATHR push button on the FCU and place the thrust levers as applicable. If you are slow to move the thrust levers you will get an ECAM “Autothrust limited” message. ALPHA FLOOR When the aircraft Angle of Attack passes a threshold called ALPHA FLOOR, (meaning that the A/C has decelerated below ALPHA PROT), the ATHR is commanded ON automatically and sends the FADEC a signal for TOGA thrust, (regardless of thrust lever position). As this TOGA signal is an ATHR function the thrust remains at TOGA while the ATHR remains on. With TOGA thrust the aircraft will increase speed and when the conditions for Alpha Floor no longer exist the thrust remains at TOGA but now the FMA indicates TOGA LOCK. To recover normal operations it is necessary to disconnect the Auto Thrust to cancel the TOGA signal and then to resume Manual or Auto Thrust as required. Alpha Floor is available in Normal Law from lift off to 100 ft R/A at landing. It is inhibited if one engine is unserviceable. USAGE ATHR is recommended throughout the flight and It can be used in most failure cases. At take off, set the thrust levers to FLX or TOGA. The ATHR system is

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then armed. At THR RED ALT, place the thrust levers in the CLB detent. ATHR is engaged and operates in a mode, either THR or SPEED, depending on the AP/FD vertical mode. During APPROACH below 1000ft AAL place your hand on the thrust levers in case additional thrust is needed in gusty conditions, and to reduce thrust on landing. FLARE When thrust retardation is required, bring the thrust levers smoothly to IDLE. ATHR is then OFF. The “RETARD” call out at 20 ft RA (10 ft RA for autoland) comes as a reminder if the thrust levers are above idle. Do not delay the thrust reduction as the thrust is maintained at a level to maintain the speed and this will induce floating and late touchdown. There is NO automatic RETARD except in AUTOLAND and this must be confirmed by the PF by placing the thrust levers in IDLE. If this is not done the thrust will remain at idle while ever the Autopilot is engaged. GO AROUND Push all thrust levers to TOGA. The thrust is controlled to TOGA by the FADEC with MAN TOGA on FMA, ATHR is armed. (Additionally SRS / GA TRK modes engage, Go Around phase activates and Missed Approach + previously flown approach become the active FPLN). In case of a Go Around at low weight, or at a higher height, once TOGA is set and the A/C is established in pitch, you may consider placing the thrust levers back to MCT or CLB detent if very high climb performance is achieved. ENGINE FAILURE When the FADEC senses an engine failure the ATHR system requires the PF to place the thrust lever of the “good” engine in the MCT detent so that the thrust can be increased to this level. The FMA will flash LVR MCT, with an associated aural warning, until this is done. INSTRUCTION Get each trainee to disconnect and reconnect the autothrust a number of times (with the Autopilot engaged) so they will instinctively learn the correct method. Show them the ECAM message and the THR LKD message by disconnecting on the glareshield switch.

T.04 USE OF AP and FD (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Fly By Wire aircraft normally operate with deflection of primary flight control surfaces controlled by computers. The signals to the computers can come from direct pilot input on the sidestick, from the autopilot in response to a pilot input on the FCU, or from the autopilot in response to a signal from the Flight

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Management System. The actual deflection of the flight control surface is the same in all these cases. If the autoflight system becomes degraded due to one or more failures the flight control surfaces are still moved as required but predominantly by direct pilot input on the side stick. When the pilot is flying the aircraft by hand the Flight Director gives the targets required for lateral and vertical navigation according to the flight profile in the FMS or as selected on the FCU. If the Autopilot is engaged it follows the Flight Director orders to fly the flight profile laterally and vertically. If the Autopilot is engaged and the Flight Directors are turned off the pilot selects on the FCU the targets he wants the Autopilot to follow. ENGAGMENT The AP can be engaged when the aircraft is within the Flight Envelope (attitude, bank, speed) five seconds after lift off. It automatically disconnects when the normal flight envelope is significantly exceeded. It may be used down to the A/C landing roll out in case of AUTOLAND, within the limitations provided in FCOM, and down to MDA in other approaches. It may also be used in case of engine failure without any restrictions. It is not permitted to use the Auto Pilot in any Abnormal Configuration (includes slats / flaps abnormal). MODES The AP/FD operates in Managed or Selected modes. The pilot chooses Managed modes when he expects the aircraft to fly the FPLN he has inserted in the FMS. He chooses Selected modes for specific interventions. As a general design rule managed mode may be used when GPS is primary and the active FPLN is both correct and correctly sequenced. If GPS accuracy is Low use Selected mode and monitor using Raw Data. Some Companies have restrictions on the use of Managed mode and some Companies use a combination of modes by using Managed lateral guidance and Selected vertical guidance. INTERFACES The 2 main interfaces to the AP and FD are the FCU and the MCDU. The FCU is the Short Term Interface. This means that when you have to achieve a short term action (HDG, or speed for example) you select it on the FCU. The MCDU is the Long Term Interface. This means that in most cases (except DIR TO) you will prepare the long term lateral, vertical and speed revisions on the MCDU. The FCU and MCDU should be used according to the following rules to follow Airbus SOP’s and so ensure safe operation. The FCU: When the AP is ON, the PF selects targets and modes. When the AP is OFF, the PF asks the PNF for selection, and the PNF confirms.

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In case of urgency and the PNF is using R/T with ATC, the PF may make a selection himself but must announce it to the PNF. The MDCU: The same philosophy applies, and a systematic crosscheck must be carried out. Low altitude time consuming entries into MCDU are to be avoided, or restricted to those which are essential, are short and which bring obvious operational advantages. Examples include the tower wind, DIR TO, RADNAV entry, Activate SEC FPLN, ENABLE ALTN. An action on the FCU must be confirmed by a check of the related Target and Mode on the PFD and FMA. Any major entry on the MCDU must be cross-checked. The PF must call the FMA mode changes to the PNF When you hand fly the aircraft with the Flight Directors on keep the attitude symbol centred on the cross bars. If you do not want the Flight Director It is strongly recommended to set both Flight Directors off as this ensures ATHR SPEED mode.

INSTRUCTION Some pilots coming from older aircraft do not initially follow the FD commands accurately. The FD is designed to be followed exactly and not in an approximate fashion. Until your trainees get used to the correct technique you should keep reminding them.

T.05 MODE REVERSIONS AP & FD (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The AP/FD and ATHR operate in given modes. The choice of mode is a strategic decision of the pilot. The modes are therefore manually engaged by the pilot, but they may change automatically according to logics dictated by - the integration of AP/FD/ATHR, - the integration of FMS wi thin AP/FD/ATHR, - the logical sequence of modes and - the mode reversions. The operation of the Auto Pilot, Flight Director and Auto thrust follow the logic the pilots apply to control the aircraft. When the AP/FD pitch mode controls a vertical trajectory (e.g. ALT, V/S, FPA, G/S etc.), then the ATHR controls Speed, Thus, when there is an AP/FD pitch mode change, there is an associated ATHR mode change. If there are no AP/FD pitch modes – i.e. AP and FD OFF, then the ATHR controls SPEED.

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When the AP/FD pitch mode controls a speed (e.g. OP CLB, OP DES etc.), then the ATHR controls Thrust (THR CLB, THR IDLE). MODE SEQUENCE The design logic is such that if a pilot selects a climb mode towards a target altitude, the AP/FD provides the order to climb, capture and then track this altitude.Thus when you engage a mode you will automatically ARM the next sequential mode. The pilot may also Arm himself a mode, because he wishes the AP/FD to intercept a given trajectory. Typically this is LOC, G/S, and FINAL APP. Such Mode Changes occur when they are ARMED and therefore are indicated in BLUE on the PFD. The integration of the FMS in the AP/FD/ATHR When a pilot has defined a FPLN, the FMS considers this FPLN both Laterally and Vertically. Therefore the Flight Guidance component of the FMS will guide the A/C along the LAT FPLN (NAV – APP NAV modes) as well as the VERT FPLN (CLB – DES – FINAL modes). Managed Vertical modes can only be used if Managed Lateral mode is used. The mode reversions automatically ensure the aircraft stays within the flight envelope following pilot actions (which may have been inadvertent). FCU ALTITUDE CHANGE The pilot changes the FCU ALT target making the active vertical mode impossible to achieve. This reversion is caused when there is pilot action on the ALT selector knob while the aircraft is climbing or descending. It applies equally whether the aircraft is being hand flown or if the autopilot is engaged. VERTICAL MODE ENGAGED

FCU ALTITUDE SELECTION CHANGE

VERTICAL MODE SWITCHES TO

CLB, OP CLB, EXP CLB Below current altitude V/S on current V/S DES, OP DES, EXP DES Above current altitude V/S on current V/S ALT* active Any change V/S on current V/S This reversion to V/S (or FPA) mode at the current V/S (or FPA) value, does not modify the pitch of the A/C. LOSS OF NAV MODE The pilot engages a mode on one axis, which DISENGAGES the ASSOCIATED mode on the OTHER AXIS. This reversion is caused by loss of NAV mode, for example selecting a HDG, or when entering a discontinuity. Again, this applies irrespective of whether the autopilot is engaged or the aircraft is being hand flown. CONDITIONS EVENT CONSEQUENCE CLB engaged Loss of the lateral

managed mode: NAV OP CLB engages

DES engaged Loss of the lateral managed mode: NAV

V/S engages

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FD ORDERS NOT FOLLOWED These reversions occur when the aircraft is in manual flight and the pilot fails to follow the FD bars. CONDITIONS EVENT CONSEQUENCE FD engaged AP Off A/THR active (IDLE thrust) DES, OP DES

lAS = VLS -2 kt lAS= VLS - 17 kt

Automatic engagement of SPD mode on ATHR, and consequently of V/S (FPA) mode on FD to regain the target speed, or VLS, whichever is the greater.

FD engaged AP Off A/THR active (CL thrust) CLB, OP CLB

lAS = VMAX +4 kt where VMAX= VFE or VLE or VMO/MMO

Automatic engagement of SPD mode on A/THR, and consequently of V/S (FPA) mode on FD to regain the target speed, or VMAX, whichever is lower.

EXCESSIVE V/S When an excessive V/S has been selected, the aircraft cannot achieve the V/S demanded. The airplane is trying to maintain a V/S and a speed, but the priority is to maintain the V/S. When this is not possible, speed will decrease (climbing) or increase (descending) up to a maximum. After this point, a mode reversion will occur to protect the aircraft from entering a potentially hazardous situation. The table below explains the consequences of selecting excessive V/S and the reversions. CONDITIONS REVERSION OCCURS

WHEN CONSEQUENCE

V/S or FPA too high to be followed in climb

IAS = VLS (or VLS-5 if target is VLS)

The IAS remains at VLS (or VLS-5)

V/S or FPA too high to be followed in descent

IAS = VMAX (or VFE+2) The IAS remains at VMAX

The Mode Reversions, which can be unexpected, are an additional reason to properly monitor the FMA.

INSTRUCTION Plan your demonstration of the Mode Reversions so you don’t waste a lot of time. A descent at VMO uses a lot of altitude so ensure you have sufficient height before starting (15000ft is usually enough).

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T.06 FLIGHT CONTROLS (00:15) BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND The relation between the pilot input on the stick and the aircraft response is called the CONTROL LAW and as such determines the handling characteristics of the A/C. The Fly By Wire system comprises 3 sets of control laws depending upon the integrity and redundancy status of the computers, peripherals and hydraulic systems. These three control laws are called NORMAL, ALTERNATE and DIRECT LAW. This following information provides an overview of the flight control laws on the FBW aircraft and the protections provided to the pilot. SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY P/B NORMAL LAW ALTERNATE LAW DIRECT LAW MECHANICAL BACK-UP ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAW ALPHA FLOOR LOW ENERGY WARNING ALPHA LOCK ALPHA LOCK AUTOMATIC RETRACTION SYSTEM REACTION TO ENGINE FAILURE SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY P/B When a pilot moves the side stick, he sends an order (an electrical signal) to the FBW computer. Thus if the PNF acts on the stick as well, both signals or orders are added. Thus the PF and PNF shall not act on the stick simultaneously. If the PNF needs to take over, he must press the priority P/B and announce "I have control". In case of a pilot who collapses on the stick, or in case of a mechanical side stick failure leading to a jammed stick the "failed" stick order is added to the "non failed" side stick order.n such a case, the pilot will press the priority P/B during at least 30 sec. in order to deactivate the "failed" side stick. In case of a SIDE STICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected side stick order sent to the computer is forced to zero; in other words the affected side stick is deactivated. When a side stick is deactivated by the opposite side stick priority P/B, it can be reactivated by pressing its own priority P/B. NORMAL LAW

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Normal Law is the normal case and allows for all “single” failures. The handling characteristics of Normal Law (within the normal flight envelope and, regardless of IAS, Altitude, Gross Weight and C of G), are such that the aircraft is stable, with the same consistent response. The efforts on the side stick are balanced in pitch and roll. Don’t fight with the stick - if you feel you are over controlling, release it. There are three modes of normal law; ground, flight and flare mode. a. Ground Mode Direct control of elevator, spoilers, ailerons and rudder. This is progressively blended out when airborne so that flight mode becomes effective. b. Flight Mode Side-stick movement in the pitch axis commands a change in ‘g’. Zero displacement is a positive command for 1g flight. 1g flight means no change in flight path. So once the correct flight path has been established, in the short term it will be maintained, despite any changes to thrust or speed. Hence there is no need to trim. Side-stick movement in the roll axis commands a given rate of roll. Zero displacement is a positive command for zero roll rate flight. Once the required bank angle has been established, release the side-stick to neutral and it will be maintained. Make a small input then gently release to neutral and leave the stick alone unless a further adjustment is required. All turns may require some side-stick and power adjustments. c. Flare Mode A change in pitch control below 50 ft, requiring a gentle pull on the sidestick during the flare in order to maintain a progressive flare. d. Protections: Full flight envelope protection is provided in normal law using the following individual protections.

These protections have been designed to assist pilots in emergency situations, where under stress conditions only an instinctive and rapid reaction will save the situation. The protections make this reaction possible. ALTERNATE LAW In some cases of double failure, the integrity and redundancy of the computers and peripherals are not sufficient to maintain Normal law with its protections. The degradation is progressive depending upon the availability of remaining peripherals or computers. Depending on the particular failure that causes the degrading of the flight control laws, the ECAM will indicate whether Alternate Law with or without protections is active. The indications will be ALTN LAW or

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ALTN LAW: PROT LOST. The main differences between these two laws and normal law are detailed below. In alternate law pitch control is similar to normal law with some changes in the protections available. Autotrim is still available. Roll control is the same as direct law with the sidestick demanding aileron deflection, rather than roll rate. Load factor limitation same as normal law Pitch attitude protection not provided High angle of attack protection changed to low speed stability (PFD display

also changes, VSW is shown and stall warning is provided)

High speed protection changed to alternate high speed stability In some failure cases alternate law without protection is available. All protections except load factor limitation are lost. Protection in Alternate Law at the limits of the Flight Envelope: At high speed, natural aircraft static stability is restored with an OVER SPEED WARNING (as the autotrim stops on reaching the red line the aircraft is now flying faster than it is trimmed for so will naturally pitch up). At the other end of the envelope at low speed, the auto pitch trim stops at Va prot (below VLS) and natural longitudinal static stability is restored, with STALL WARNING at 1.03 VS1g. (as the autotrim stops and the aircraft is flying slower than it is trimmed for there is a natural pitch down movement. If this is resisted the aircraft slows further and eventually stalls). Summary of ALTN law: Within the Normal Flight Envelope, the handling characteristics are the same in pitch as with the normal law and outside the Normal Flight Envelope, the pilot must take proper preventive actions to avoid loss of control, or high speed excursions as he would do it on any non protected A/C. Note that, in ALTN law VMO is reduced to 320 kt and that A.FLOOR is inhibited. DIRECT LAW On the A320 in every case where the Landing Gear is extended when in Alternate Law (and in certain other cases) the control law becomes Direct. In Direct Law the elevator deflection is proportional to stick deflection (the maximum deflection is a function of CONF and CG) and aileron and spoiler deflections are proportional to stick deflection but vary with the A/C CONF and pitch trim is no longer automatic but is controlled manually by pilot input on the trim wheel. The ECAM will indicate to the crew when direct law is the active flight control law and USE MAN PITCH TRIM will be displayed on the PFD as a reminder. No protections are available, but overspeed or stall warnings are still operational. INDICATIONS The degradation of control laws is indicated on the ECAM as well as on PFD.

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On the PFD the availability of protections, in normal law, is shown by specific symbols (= in green), and by the specific display of the low speed information on the speed scale. When the protections are lost, amber crosses are displayed instead of the green protection symbols. When automatic pitch trim is no longer available (in Direct Law) this is indicated by the message USE MAN PITCH TRIM in amber on the PFD. (The message USE MAN PITCH TRIM indicates that Direct Law is active even if it is not possible to move the stabiliser).

Just by watching his main instrument the PFD, the pilot is immediately aware of his control law status and operational consequences MECHANICAL BACK-UP When the A320 was certified it was necessary to demonstrate control of the aircraft with a total loss of the FBW system. The most unlikely way for this to happen is for a loss of five flight control computers. In order of probability it is more likely (statistically 1 in 1000 billion) for a different series of failures to occur which leads to a similar situation (loss of Blue hydraulic plus SEC2 plus ELAC2). This second scenario is what we demonstrate to the trainees. Although roll control is still available from the right hand aileron the aim of the exercise is to control the flight path using solely the pitch trim and the rudder. MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY will be displayed in red on the PFD. There is no turn coordination and no protections are operative. The autothrust, if engaged, will give to large pitch changes and control is considerably easier with manual thrust. The aim of the demonstration is not to fly the aircraft accurately, but to keep the aircraft in a safe stabilised attitude, allowing the lost systems to be restored by computer reset. ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAW If any of the following limits are exceeded Pitch 50° up, 30° down, Bank 125°, AOA +30°, -10° and Speed <440, >60, Mach <0,96, >0,1, (due to atmospheric disturbance for example) the Abnormal Attitude Law is invoked where pitch is ALTN with load factor protection (without autotrim) and lateral Direct Law with yaw alternate.

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The FBW architecture and control laws explain why upset recovery manoeuvres need not be trained on Airbus protected A/C. ALPHA FLOOR Alpha floor is an autothrust mode, however it is also a part of the flight envelope protection. At high angles of attack TOGA thrust is commanded by the autothrust system. Alpha floor is available from lift off until 100 ft RA on approach. It provides protection against stall and windshear and has priority over all other protections. Alpha floor is only available in normal law. It is inhibited is some cases. LOW ENERGY WARNING In Normal Law, a warning is included to alert the pilot to a low energy situation. It is not a protection, and occurs before alpha floor operates. This warning is only available below 2000 ft radio altitude and in CONF 2, 3 or FULL. ALPHA LOCK This protection prevents the retraction of flap from CONF I to zero, if speed is too low or AOA is too high. AUTOMATIC RETRACTION SYSTEM When accelerating through 210 kts with CONF I + F selected, the flaps will automatically retract, before VFE of 215 kt. The Flaps will not automatically re-extend if speed drops below 210 kt. REACTION TO ENGINE FAILURE The most efficient flying technique with regard to performance with an engine failure at take off is to fly a constant heading with roll surfaces retracted. This technique dictates the amount of rudder required, and the residual side slip which will result.

Consequently, in case of engine failure at take off smoothly control the pitch (lower) to keep the desired speed (as per SRS), and centre the Beta target with the rudder pedals. What your trainees need to understand is that if a conventional balance indicator were installed in our FBW aircraft it would not be centred if the Beta target is centred. This is evident during an approach when the single engine thrust increases above 80% N1 and the yellow slip

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indicator changes into the blue Beta target but displaced from the slip index. This is because a centred Beta target ensures all flight control surfaces are retracted and thus there will be a residual side slip. If the side slip index (when visible) is centred there will remain residual deflection of some flight control surfaces.

T.07 RECOVERY FROM APPROACH TO STALL (00:20) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND We need to demonstrate Stalling in both the clean configuration as well as the landing configuration so the trainee will recognise the indications of an impending stall and to take immediate and appropriate actions to recover controlled flight. The conventional stall is only possible in Alternate and Direct control laws, because of the protections provided in Normal law. Low speed indications change from alpha prot. to VSW. VSW is load factor dependant and will increase with increase in pitch rate or bank angle. An aural warning is produced on entering the stall area. This aural warning is produced by the AOA sensors, not the FACs. It is possible to experience “false warnings” if pitch control is rough during the recovery from the stall. VSW indications are always correct as these are generated by the FACs. The recovery technique depends on whether there is a possibility of ground contact, and for this reason the procedure is defined according to whether the aircraft altitude is above, or below FL200 (limitation for flap extension altitude). If above FL200 it can be assumed there is no risk of ground contact so altitude preservation is not considered. The recovery is as follows: INDICATION STALL, STALL, STALL” THRUST LEVERS TOGA At the same time: PITCH ATTITUDE REDUCE BANK ANGLE ROLL WINGS LEVEL SPD BRAKES CHECK RETRACTED Below FL200 we have to be aware of the possibility of ground contact so the procedure is to extend Flap1, which immediately increases the effective chord of the wing which will reduce the stalling speed and thus aid recovery. As there is now an increased margin above VSW this margin can be used to

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maintain altitude while increasing the potential energy of the aircraft and so resume normal flight. The remainder of the procedure is identical. If no danger of ground contact exists, reduce pitch attitude no more than necessary to allow airspeed to increase. Remember that in this situation the auto trim is not working, so to reduce the pitch requires a continual pressure on the side stick and not solely a nose down input. Don’t change configuration until above VSW and be prepared for rapid acceleration once TOGA power is achieved. Recover to normal speed and retract flaps as required. In case of engine inoperative, use power and rudder with care. Be prepared for a strong pitch up due to power application and the need for large manual pitch trim changes in DIRECT law. Care must be exercised not to re-enter the stall regime and set off another warning. With prompt action, very little height is lost.

INSTRUCTION Before you commence this exercise get your trainees to calculate (from the Limitations section of the FCOM) the stalling speed for the projected weight and configuration. With this information they will see that the aural stall warning comes with a relatively large margin above the stalling speed. On recovery ensure they decrease the pitch but not below the horizon. The Autotrim will be inoperative so continual forward pressure is required on the sidestick. Our syllabus only includes the approach to the stall so do not attempt to achieve a fully developed stall due to limitations with the simulator that could lead to negative training.

T.08 ECAM (00:30) BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND ECAM DISPLAY PHILOSOPHY. The Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system monitors and displays all information concerning aircraft systems and system failures and thus reports the status of the aircraft. It is a system which displays the aircraft system information, monitors the aircraft systems, and provides the actions required by the crew in most normal / abnormal and emergency situations.

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Display of system failures and take off and landing memo is flight phase sensitive. Take off and landing memo are only displayed at the appropriate phase of flight. FLIGHT PHASE INHIBITION. Some warnings and cautions are suppressed during take off and landing, however failures critical to a particular phase of flight will always be displayed. On the System Display screen some pages are phase-selected i.e. the WHEEL page is automatically displayed after engine start. The cruise page is not selectable, but is continuously displayed from 1500 ft after take-off to landing gear extension unless a warning / caution is displayed, or a system page has been manually selected. PRIORITY OF WARNINGS. The criticality of a failure is graded from 1 to 3 and this is reflected in the warning or caution given. CRITICALITY COLOUR / AURAL REACTION LEVEL 1 DEGRADATION AMBER / NONE AWARENESS /

MONITORING LEVEL 2 ABNORMAL AMBER / SINGLE CHIME AWARENESS,

THEN ACTION LEVEL 3 SAFETY RED / CONTINUOUS

REPETITIVE IMMEDIATE

Level 1 is displayed in amber on the Engine Warning Display (EWD). There is no Master Caution associated with a Level 1 warning. Level 2 is associated with a Master Caution and is displayed in amber on the EWD along with an Amber “Land as soon as Practicable” message. Level 3 is associated with a Master Warning and is displayed in red on the EWD along with a Red “Land as soon as Possible” message. In addition to the three levels of warning or caution, the ECAM also differentiates between three types of failures as follows: INDEPENDENT FAILURES. A failure that does not affect other systems. The system title is underlined on the EWD. PRIMARY FAILURE. A failure that affects other systems and causes secondary failures. The failure title is boxed on the EWD. SECONDARY FAILURE. A failure that is caused by a primary failure and not by an unserviceability of that particular system. Secondary failures are in amber preceded by an asterisk on the bottom right hand side of the EWD. If a failure of a system affects another system, the Flight Warning Computer will display the PRIMARY FAILURE first followed by the SECONDARY (or consequential) failure.

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In the event of multiple failures there is a hierarchy determining the order in which failures are displayed on the EWD i.e. Level 3 takes priority over Level 2. Furthermore there is a hierarchy within each of the three levels to ensure that the most critical failures are displayed first. Whenever a failure or an advisory occurs, the associated System Display page is provided on the lower CRT. This allows the crew to analyse the situation, as shown by the status of the affected components in the diagram. If a procedure is proposed to the crew for action then the instruction disappears after it has been carried out, IF there is feedback from that item. ABNORMAL ECAM CONFIGURATION The ECAM screens are identical, providing the option of redundancy. The options allowing switching of screens in the event of failure are detailed in FCOM 1.31.05. MASTER WARNING / CAUTION These are Attention Getters in case of a failure. Pressing the related pushbutton extinguishes the light (except for STALL / OVERSPD…) and stops the aural. In case of an aural Altitude Alert pressing the Master Warning stops the sound. RCL and EMER CANCEL The EMER CANCEL pushbutton may be used by the crew to cancel any cautions or warnings that are intermittent or spurious (and are effectively nuisance warnings). The RCL pushbutton is used to either recover cancelled cautions suppressed by the EMER CANCEL pushbutton or to review cautions or warnings which have been cleared using the CLR pushbutton. T/O CONFIG PUSHBUTTON Pressing the T/O CONFIG push button simulates T/O power application and allows the pilot to check that Slats and Flaps, Pitch Trim, Rudder Trim, Speed Brakes, Brake Temp, Parking Brake, and Doors are in a Take Off configuration. OPERATIONAL USE 1. NORMAL OPERATION Periodically review the main systems during flight to check if everything is ok and detect a potential problem. The ECAM memo must be included in the instrument scan. During cruise it should be blank. It helps the pilot to notice that a system has been forgotten. STS label displayed at the bottom of EW/D means that the status page is not empty. Consequently, when the check list calls for status review, press STS only if the label is displayed. At engine shutdown if there is a STS, it pulses at the bottom of EW/D. Review the status page to correctly fill in the technical log. IRS time to alignment is displayed if the alignment is not completed.

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2. ECAM ADVISORY The first pilot who notices an Advisory should announce "ADVISORY on XYZ system". 3. TASK SHARING RULES in case of ABNORMAL OPERATIONS The first pilot to recognise a problem announces the Title of the failure and cancels the Master Warning, or Caution. The PF controls the Aircraft and once stabilised, and above 400 ft AGL, the PF orders the ECAM actions. Since there are two essential tasks, (fly and deal with the failure) both pilots must be aware of what is occurring during the completion of the associated drills. The PF is usually the PF throughout the exercise unless the CM1 decides to take control. The PF will then control the Flight path, Speed, Configuration and Engines. He will deal with navigation and communication and will order the PNF to commence the ECAM actions and check that the actions are properly completed. PF PNF <<ECAM ACTIONS>> Reviews SD and reads ECAM.

Carries out the actions detailed. Once all actions complete asks to <<CLEAR XYZ>>

After checking that the actions are complete confirms <<CLEAR XYZ>>

Continues the ECAM actions or reads STS

Once all actions are done and STS is read asks <<CLR STATUS>>

After crosscheck confirms <<CLR STATUS>>

Clears STS page and announces <<ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETE>>

FCOM 3.02.01 details procedures for the use of ECAM in the event of a failure. The key points are: PF - fly, navigate and communicate— in that order (golden rule). PNF - deal with the failure on the PF’s command. Both pilots to identify failure and confirm by reference to SD, E/WD. When a failure occurs it is important to review the SD prior to acting, in order to get a proper assessment of the situation. Some actions or messages have no feedback and the blue line does not disappear. Examples are, ATC NOTIFY, or VHF 1 (2) (3) USE, or MIN RAT SPEED 140 and so on. Some procedures require reference to QRH and this is indicated by the phrase LDG PROC APPLY on the ECAM. In some failure cases, the STATUS page lists a non standard configuration for Approach. The Status page is automatically displayed when CONF 1 is selected, as a reminder of the current status of the aircraft.

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The Status page appears when all required actions are complete. It is not required to read it immediately it appears! As a reflection of the status of the aircraft it should be referred to when planning an Approach, or to ascertain the current status of the aircraft. Remember the following points. In the case of multiple failures complete all required actions (in blue) associated with the first red or amber title. Request clearance to press CLR and then deal with the next failure. Reinforce that this “chapter” must be cleared before continuing with the next “chapter”. The drills affecting the second “chapter” are then carried out until its red / amber title can be cleared, before starting on the third etc. Don’t leave the red or amber title on the E/WD when all actions associated with that failure have been completed. Clear each one as it is dealt with. When all necessary actions are complete there will be no amber or red displayed on the lower part of the E / WD. Read the ECAM carefully, as it is possible to misread drills. Although the overhead panel is uncluttered, misidentification of switches or pushbuttons is possible. When action on the overhead panel pushbuttons or switches is required by ECAM, identification of the correct panel is aided by reference to the writing etched on the side of each system panel. When carrying out system pushbutton selection, verify on the SD that the required action has occurred e.g. switching off an hydraulic pump changes the indications on the SD. Any non-reversible action must be confirmed by both pilots. This means the THR levers, engine master switch, fire switch, IRs, or any guarded pushbutton. This is to prevent the crew from carrying out an inadvertent irreversible actions. OEB Certain procedures may be modified by OEB. The generic documentation we use does not normally contain any OEBs. However get your trainees to think about referring to any OEBs as part of their training. The OEB’s have to be checked before reading and analysing the status page. OEBs (FCOM Vol 3) are issued by Airbus and contain information which may have implications for crew actions in the event of system failures. If time permits consider consulting FCOM Vol 3 after ECAM actions have been completed. It may contain additional notes or information not displayed on ECAM. However do not prolong the flight for the sole purpose of consulting this volume. STATUS PAGE The status page is reviewed by both pilots. A green overflow arrow indicates further pages of status messages. The Status page can be recalled at any time and is very useful as an aid for descent and approach planning. Following certain failures, or after multiple failures, the STATUS page may contain an excess of information. In order to extract the information essential for landing the aircraft safely use the following guide: CONFIG - flap/slat setting, approach speed increment, landing distance factor and control law for landing.

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GEAR - when to lower gear and whether normally or by gravity BRAKES - normal, alternate or alternate without anti-skid REVERSE - availability. SINGLE SCREEN USAGE When dealing with failures with only one ECAM display the same principles are valid but disciplined use of the ECAM control panel is even more important. There is no automatic display of the SD associated with the failure - confirmation of the failure will require the relevant system page pushbutton to be pressed and held. This is also true when reviewing secondary failures. The STATUS page is only displayed when STS pushbutton is pressed and held. In order to view page two or three pages of status messages the STS pushbutton must be released for less than 2 seconds and then pressed and held again. Remember to teach the transfer of the SD to the PNF’s ND (except in EMER ELEC CONF when it is not available). ADVISORY ECAM advisory mode requires the crew to monitor a parameter and does not necessarily require action. FCOM 3.02.80 contains recommended actions in the event of certain advisory conditions. COMMON ERRORS Beware of the following errors No de-selection of manually selected system page when no longer required. Clear action without cross-check. STATUS page reviewed at the wrong time. Single ECAM screen, SD pages and STS page not reviewed. Green overflow arrow ignored.

T.09 FMS NAVIGATION (00:20) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND For the major part of our Flight Instruction we consider that GPS Navigation is Primary, and as such our navigation is accurate. As we are simulating reality we have a problem because the GPIRS position in the simulator is always accurate. We can simulate GPS Navigation inoperative (by NOTAM for example), or we can insert a Map Shift from the IOS. In the first case the IR position will also be 100% accurate so there will be no constraints on the use of Managed Navigation mode. A thorough briefing is therefore required as we cannot (at present) simulate the slow drifting of IR position that happens in real life.

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Therefore for our training we either consider an accurate system of navigation (GPS Primary, or High Accuracy of IR navigation) and allow use of either Managed, Selected, or Laterally Managed and Vertically Selected modes OR, we insert a Map Shift and cause the trainees to revert to a Selected Approach. If we consider the situation where we require non GPS navigation we have to ensure that the FMS Navigation Accuracy check is performed correctly. NAVIGATION ACCURACY CROSSCHECK TECHNIQUE Checking the Navigation Accuracy is achieved by comparing the FMS derived bearing and distance of a point with the raw data bearing and distance from a received beacon located at that point. This can be achieved in two ways. 1. If the point is the TO waypoint the beacon will be autotuned and the FMS derived bearing and distance is displayed on the top right of the ND. This is then compared with the raw data as shown by the relative bearing of the needle and the displayed DME distance on the lower left or right of the ND. 2. If the point is not the TO waypoint the navaid may not be autotuned. In this case insert the ident into a VOR field on the RAD NAV page to tune the VORDME and on the PROG page insert the same ident in the BRG / DISTance TO field to obtain the FMS computation of the bearing and distance to compare with the raw data as displayed on the ND. REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE The accuracy we require from the navigation system varies according to the phase of the flight. In cruise, in Europe, we require +/-5nm, in Approach we require +/-1nm and on final we require +/-0.3nm. If during a phase of flight we get a message stating that NAV ACCY DNGRADED it means that the Estimated Accuracy has increased to a value larger than the Required Accuracy as it appears on the PROG page. If we are using a Managed navigation function we must change to a Selected mode and monitor the raw data navigational information. In addition, if GPS PRIMARY LOST message appears we must use raw data in a Selected mode. STRATEGY IN NON PRECISION APPROACH A NPA is flown using AP / FD managed modes and ND ARC or ROSE NAV, display modes only if GPS is PRIMARY or the FMS NAV ACCY crosscheck is POSITIVE. In case of GPS PRIMARY, two types of approaches are flown: 1. The NPA defined with a VOR, VORDME, ADF (also called an overlay approach) and with the associated needles on the ND. 2. The NPA is a GPS defined approach where the raw data is the FMS position and in case GPS PRIMARY LOST message appears, the approach must be discontinued.

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When there is no GPS available, the reference navaid raw data of the NPA must be displayed, at least on the PF side. In case the NAV ACCY DNGRADED message appears, proceed immediately with a NAV ACCY CROSS CHECK: if Positive, continue as before, but if Negative, revert to selected mode, and select ROSE VOR at least on the PF side. WITH GPS PRIMARY The GPS directly interfaces with the IRSs which output a GPIRS position. When a GPIRS position is available, it supersedes the RADIO position (if available), so that the FMS position tends to the GPIRS position. The GPS provides 2 essential data, in addition to position (Lat/Long/Alt): 1. The ACCURACY of the Lat/Long position. It is a direct function of the satellite constellation in view of the aircraft. If the satellites are low on the horizon, or if their respective position is unfavourable, the resulting accuracy will be poor. It is provided as a "Figure of Merit". This accuracy can be computed with a high probability of confidence. 2. The INTEGRITY, which is a direct function of the number of satellites in view of the aircraft, and allows a defective or erroneous satellite to be rejected. If 5 or more satellites are in view, several combinations of those satellite signals may be used to process “several positions” and to carry out reasonableness tests on the satellite signals themselves. Therefore if the GPS position (or GPIRS position) fulfils the Integrity and Accuracy criteria, this means that this position is the Best Raw Data position available. WITHOUT GPS PRIMARY When a Radio position is available, the FMS position tends towards the Radio position. Hence the FMS continuously computes: - the FMS position out of MIX IRS and Radio positions, - the BIAS between MIX IRS and FMS position, so as to benefit from the latest update when the RADIO position becomes unavailable and - the ESTIMATED POSITION ERROR (EPE) of its own position. The ESTIMATED POSITION ERROR (EPE) is an Estimate meaning that the FMS considers the instantaneously available navigation means used in the calculation of the FMS position, applies specified tolerances to each one of them and calculates the EPE. Those tolerances assume that the navigation means work properly; but they ignore possible excessive drifts of the IRSs, or erroneous locations of navaids within the Nav Data Base, for example. Consequently the HIGH / LOW accuracy information provided on Progress page are Indicators to the crew of the potential accuracy of the FMS position versus a specified accuracy criteria. HIGH/LOW and thus NAV ACCY UPGRADED / DNGRADED messages are merely indicators to the crew of the estimated accuracy of the FMS position versus required criteria. The PROG Page has the following information: - Indicates GPS PRIMARY.

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- Indicates the value of the Estimated Navigation Accuracy in green. It is either the one as computed by the GPS when GPS PRIMARY is available, or the EPE when GPS PRIMARY is LOST. - Indicates the Required Navigation Accuracy in blue. To day it is either the Navigation accuracy criteria as required in cruise, TMA or approach area, or it can be manually inserted. - If the Estimated Nav Accy is less than the Required Nav Accy, HIGH accuracy is displayed (or LOW if vice versa). These indications will allow the RNP concept (required nav performance) linked to FANS to be addressed. RNP is equivalent to required navigation accuracy. - Link to Predictive GPS page. PREDICTIVE GPS GPS PRIMARY criteria (INTEGRITY + ACCURACY) depends upon the Satellite Constellation status at a given time, in a given location and this is predictable. Provided for crews to know if GPS PRIMARY will be available at Destination, or at Alternate. (This information is only if the A/C is fitted with Honeywell IRS). SELECTED Navaid page DESELECT GPS prompt allows the crew to prevent the FMS from using the GPS data for position computation. GPS PRIMARY LOST message is then displayed on MCDU and ND. The GPS can be reselected later on the same page. ND / MCDU messages GPS PRIMARY LOST - when GPS PRIMARY is lost. Clearable on MCDU but not on ND. GPS PRIMARY- When GPS PRIMARY is again available. This message is clearable. NOTE FMS/GPS POSITION DISAGREE message comes up from time to time when [FM - GPS] = 0.5 NM in LAT or LONG. This occurs due to different reference co-ordinates being used in New Data Base, in T/O or LOC update cases. Operational Consequences Use HIGH / LOW as INDICATORS. Periodically cross check nav accuracy. Once in climb, every 45 minutes in cruise and before TOD, reaching TMA and IAF, and whenever a navigation doubt occurs. Use the NAV ACCY DNGRADED message as an indication to crosscheck the navigation accuracy. If GPS is Primary, crosscheck is not necessary. If GPS Primary is lost, an accuracy crosscheck is necessary. It is not the role of NAV ACCY UP / DN GRADED messages or HIGH / LOW indications (which are only indicators), and are used to trigger a crosscheck. The operational consequences of the navigation accuracy crosscheck are: If the crosscheck is Positive or GPS is Primary:

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AP / FD Lateral / Vertical Managed modes may be used, and ND ARC and ROSE NAV modes are used by both PF & PNF with needles, when required and the EGPWS remains ON. If the crosscheck is Negative: AP / FD Lateral / Vertical Managed modes may be used with care except in Approach where selected modes have to be used. ND ARC and ROSE NAV may be used with care and with raw data by the PF and the PNF except in approach where the PF has to refer to raw data systematically. Be prepared to switch to selected modes and to ROSE VOR if you have a doubt. EGPWS must be set OFF. NOTE Whenever a doubt arises, revert to selected modes and raw data only, to avoid any confusion. On the other hand you must be aware that, in cruise for example, if no navaid is available and no GPS primary, the EPE continuously rises without any damageable consequence. The FMS position slowly drifts along with the drift of the IRSs, while its position is affected by the latest determined bias. FMS Position Update This procedure is a very rough way of correcting gross errors in the FMGS computed position and should only be used when a major position error is apparent or when a CHK IRS / FM POSITION message occurs with an obvious position error. It should not apply to GPS equipped aircraft. When a position error occurs navigate with raw data until the position can be updated. The position error may have occurred due to either FMGS incorrectly identifying a VOR (for any reason), or corruption of a VOR signal as might happen in a war zone. A check of NOTAM’s may allow the crew to identify whether a VOR should be deselected. Pilots must also be aware of equipment failure. The recommended technique is to insert an ident of a beacon or a PBD into the “UPDATE AT” field of the PROG page and on overflying the beacon, or PBD, confirm the update with the 3R key. When a position update is achieved, the EPE is automatically set to a higher value , and Navigation Accuracy is Low. This update will allow the FMS to resume its normal navigation function.

T.10 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING (00:20) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND GPWS The Airbus family is equipped with GPWS. Most GPWS alerts and warnings are generated as a result of changes in radio altimeter height or rate of those changes. The system predicts potential hazard from these trends but has no forward-looking capability. GPWS alerts and warnings are described at the end of this section. EGPWS The Enhanced GPWS incorporates the functions of the basic GPWS with the following added features: Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF), Terrain Look Ahead Alerting and Terrain Awareness Display (TAD). The purpose of the Enhanced GPWS functions is to provide a better situational awareness to the crew through the TAD, and to give earlier Cautions and Warnings to the pilot to initiate a safe recovery manoeuvre. The computer incorporates a world wide Terrain Data Base with varying degrees of resolution. It has also an airport data base. The earth is divided into grid sets with the record of the highest terrain altitude in each element of the grid. The resolution of the data base is a function of the geographic location. There are 5 levels of resolution from High Resolution around an airport, and Small Resolution away from an airport. The EGPWS determines present position, track and ground speed, which is used to advise the crew of any potential conflict with terrain. When the terrain violates specific computed boundaries on the projected flight path of the A/C, the associated threats will be announced to the crew. The Enhanced GPWS is commanded ON from on the overhead panel by the TERR pushbutton located next to the other GPWS pushbuttons. The two EGPWS functions provide displays on the ND. As the ND can only display one type of information at one time there are two specific pushbuttons which control the intentional display of terrain information or radar information. The basic GPWS functions remains unchanged. The EGPWS functions are based on a terrain database and the FMGC current position, not on radar return. The EGPWS has priority over the PWS. The three EGPWS functions 1. FORWARD-LOOKING FUNCTION The forward-looking function computes two terrain envelopes from the aircraft position, speed and track and adds a safety margin. These two terrain envelopes are projected on the terrain data base and are coupled with the

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FMGC position. When a conflict is detected between these terrain envelopes and the terrain memorised in the data base, an alert is triggered.

If the CAUTION envelope is penetrated, the areas which violate the caution envelope appear in a solid yellow with associated warnings. The Caution Alert is: 1) - TERRAIN AHEAD, repeated every 7 sec 2) - GPWS RED LIGHT 3) - TERRAIN AHEAD in amber appears on the ND, 4) - TERRAIN data displayed on ND with SOLID YELLOW areas This caution gives typically 60 sec reaction time prior to potential terrain conflict. If the WARNING envelope is penetrated, the areas which violate the warning envelope appears in a solid red with associated warnings. The Warning Alert: 1) - TERRAIN AHEAD, PULL UP repeated continuously 2) - GPWS RED LIGHT 3) - TERRAIN AHEAD in red appears on the ND, 4) - TERRAIN data displayed on ND with SOLID RED areas This warning gives typically 30 sec reaction time. 2. TERRAIN CLEARANCE FLOOR FUNCTION The terrain clearance floor envelope is stored in the data base. It envelopes the earth at 700 ft AGL and commences reducing to ground level 15 nm around the runways stored in the data base. Consequently it is below a level that an aircraft would normally be during an approach. If the aircraft enters this envelope, an alert is triggered. The warning is a function of the FMGC aircraft position and radio altitude and complements the GPWS warnings. The TCF is available in ALL FLIGHT PHASES and is a complement to the basic GPWS mode 4.

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The TCF Alert: 1) - TOO LOW TERRAIN, TOO LOW TERRAIN 2) - GPWS RED LIGHT 3. TERRAIN AWARENESS DISPLAY FUNCTION The TAD function displays an image of the surrounding terrain on ND (except in PLAN mode). The display is generated by comparing the aircraft altitude to the terrain data base coupled with FMGC position. The terrain is not shown if terrain altitude is more than 2000 ft below aircraft altitude or if its elevation is within 400 ft of the runway elevation nearest the aircraft. A colour code is used otherwise from black to red.

A different image texture, an image display which sweeps from centre outward to both ND side and a TERR indication instead of TILT indication help the crew to make the difference between the EGPWS terrain computed data and the ground picture sensed by the radar. TAD function is to be used for Terrain Awareness, but not for navigation. OPERATIONAL RECOMENDATIONS The EGPWS can be used only if GPS PRIMARY or navigation accuracy check is positive. The EGPWS functions are automatically deselected when navigation accuracy is low. In that case TERR STBY then appears on the ECAM memo. If GPS is not primary, and the Navigation accuracy

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check is negative then switch off the EGPWS with the TERR pushbutton on the overhead panel. Airbus recommends that for an approach where terrain is suspected the PNF has TERR ON ND - ON and the PF has TERR ON ND – OFF. If TERR ON ND pushbutton is pressed off and an EGPWS terrain caution or warning is triggered, the terrain data is automatically displayed on the ND, and the TERR ON ND light comes on. The brightness of terrain indication on the ND is controlled via the weather radar control knob. Thus, when a terrain alert occurs, the ND weather / terrain display brightness may need to be adjusted. TAD and TCF function use FMS1 position to perform their calculations. Therefore, an FMS1 position error may induce erroneous information and warnings. TAD function computes the aircrafts relative altitude by using the Captains barometric setting information. Therefore, if the barometric setting is incorrect the TAD function will also provide erroneous information and / or warnings. In case of any warning including “PULL UP”, immediately and with no arguments: - Set TOGA - Pull full aft stick - Check speed brake retracted - Maintain initially wings levelled. In case of any terrain, descent or configuration alerts - Adjust flight path or go-around or - Climb and turn as necessary or - Adjust configuration or go-around - Re-establish on G/S or press G/S mode pushbutton if undue alert Care must be taken when operating on one engine, with flaps extended and at light weight as in this configuration directional control may be difficult. The drill must be carried out positively, with clear announcement of intent, positive control action and the control input retained until clear of danger. GPWS BASIC FUNCTIONS The five functions of the basic GPWS are: MODE 1: Excessive Descent Rate Warns that the aircraft descent rate with respect to altitude above ground level is excessive. Available in all flight phases. The Mode 1 Alert: 1) - SINK RATE (twice) 2) - then PULL UP (continuously) 3) - GPWS RED LIGHT

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MODE 2: Excessive closure to Terrain Warns of rapidly rising terrain with respect to the aircraft. The Mode 2 Alert: 1) - TERRAIN - TERRAIN 2) - then PULL UP (continuously) 3) - GPWS RED LIGHT Mode 2A active during climb out, cruise, initial approach when Flaps are not in landing conf and the aircraft is not on the Glide Slope centre line. Mode 2B is de-sensitised to permit landing manoeuvres close to terrain without undue alerts. It is automatically engaged when the Flaps are in Landing Conf, or within 2 dots of the G/S. With LDG GEAR down and flaps landing conf, the PULL UP call is suppressed. MODE 3: Altitude Loss After T/O Warns of a significant altitude loss after take off or low altitude go around (> 245 ft) with gear or flaps not in landing conf. The Mode 3 Alert: 1) - DON'T SINK 2) - GPWS AMBER LIGHT MODE 4: Unsafe Terrain Clearance Warns of insufficient terrain clearance as a function of the phase of flight, speed and / or aircraft configuration. The Mode 4 Alert: 1) - TOO LOW TERRAIN 2) - TOO LOW GEAR (500 ft R/A) TOO LOW FLAPS (245 ft R/A) 3) - GPWS AMBER LIGHT This mode is divided into three sub-modes: Mode 4A Cruise approach with Gear Up. This provides alerting for cruise for flight into terrain where the terrain is not rising significantly or the aircraft is not descending rapidly: 1) - TOO LOW TERRAIN 2) - TOO LOW GEAR (if R/A < 500, IAS < 190). Mode 4B Cruise approach with Gear Down and Flaps not in landing Conf: 1) - TOO LOW TERRAIN 2) - TOO LOW FLAPS (if R/A < 245, IAS < 160) Mode 4C After takeoff or low altitude Go Around when Gear or Flaps are not in landing conf. It warns the crew that the terrain is rising more steeply than the aircraft is climbing. A Minimum Terrain Clearance (MTC) is defined and increases with R/A up to 500 ft if IAS =190 kts and up to 1000 ft if IAS increases to 250 kts: 1) - TOO LOW TERRAIN. Mode 5: Excessive G/S deviation Warns whenever the aircraft descends below the glide slope. The Mode 5 Alert: 1) - GLIDE SLOPE, GLIDE SLOPE

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2) - GPWS AMBER LIGHT It starts below 1000 ft RA, and the loudness and rate of the message increases. Below 150 ft RA it is desensitised to reduce nuisance alerts. Pressing the glideslope pushbutton stops the alert and turns off the amber G/S. In case of a further violation the alert returns. The landing configuration is by DEFAULT FLAPS FULL. If landing is to be performed in FLAPS 3 the LDG FLAP 3 pushbutton should be selected ON on the OVHD panel. The Flap mode is then inhibited when CONFIG 3 is selected. In this case ECAM LDG MEMO displays FLAPS ……… 3 rather than FLAP ……… FULL. Note that on MCDU PERF APP page, LDG CONF selection computes VLS and associated deceleration prediction but is not connected to GPWS.

INSTRUCTION In order to demonstrate the EGPWS functions you must explain to the trainees that for the purposes of demonstration they have to ignore the GPWS warnings and the EGPWS Caution in order to see the EGPWS Warning. After take off get them to maintain level flight at approximately the height of some terrain feature. As the aircraft flies towards the terrain the first warning is the GPWS Mode 4 saying TOO LOW TERRAIN and normally this is enough for a pilot to commence recovery. However you must explain that for purposes of demonstration they will maintain their current path and the next event will be the EGPWS Caution with the TAD pop up. Still for purposes of demonstration they maintain their current path and then they will get the EGPWS Warning Alert at which time they should carry out the Emergency recovery procedure.

T.011 VAPP DETERMINATION (00 :10) VAPP NORMAL CONFIGURATION VAPP ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION GS MINI PROTECTION

VAPP NORMAL CONFIGURATION VAPP is computed as a factor of VLS (1,23 VS1G) of the landing configuration. In 95% of the cases the FMGC provides the correct VAPP on the PERF APPR page, once FLAP 3 or FLAP FULL landing configuration has been inserted, as well as the tower wind. Be aware that the wind direction provided by the Tower or ATIS is given in the same reference as the runway direction (magnetic or true) whereas the wind provided by VOLMET, METAR or TAF is always true.

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On PERF APPR, the FMS considers the wind direction to be in the same reference as the runway direction; therefore if the airport is magnetic referenced, insert the magnetic wind direction. VAPP is computed at the predicted Landing Weight while the A/C is in CRZ and DES phases. Once in APPR phase, VAPP is computed using the current Gross Weight. It is possible to insert a lower VAPP (minimum of VLS) if there is no wind, provided the landing is performed manually with ATHR OFF and there is no ice or expected downburst. It is possible to increase the VAPP in case of a strong suspected downburst. In that case, VAPP = VLS + max 15 kts can be inserted. VAPP ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION (slats / flaps, flight controls etc). When a slats / flaps abnormal configuration occurs, the PFD displays a correct VLS related to the actual slats / flaps configuration, unless both SFCCs have failed. In some of these abnormal configurations, it is advisable to fly at a minimum speed higher than VLS to improve the handling characteristics of the A/C. The ECAM then gives the value to be added to the VLS value displayed on the PFD. In order to prepare the approach and landing, the pilot needs to know VAPP in advance, but the VLS is not necessarily available at that time on the PFD because the A/C flies at a higher speed or because the abnormal CONF is not yet reached. In this case VAPP will be determined using the QRH. The principle is to refer to VREF (VLS CONF full), which can be read on PERF APPR or QRH, and to add VREF from the QRH table.

GS MINI PROTECTION In order to benefit from Ground Speed mini protection you have to fly with managed airspeed. The purpose of the GS mini protection is to always keep the A/C energy level above a minimum value, regardless of the wind variations or gusts. This minimum level is the energy the aircraft will have at landing with the expected tower wind. The ground speed of the aircraft at that time which is called GS mini. GS mini = VAPP – Tower head wind component In order to achieve that goal, the aircraft GS should never drop below GS mini in the approach while the winds are changing. So the aircraft IAS will vary while flying the approach to cope with the gusts or wind changes.

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The FMGS continuously computes an IAS target speed, which ensures that the aircraft GS is at least equal to GS mini. The FMGS uses the instantaneous wind component experienced by the aircraft. IAS Target Speed = GS mini + Current headwind component This target speed is limited by VFE-5 in case of very strong gusts and, by VAPP in case of tailwind. If instantaneous wind is lower than the tower wind; below 400ft, the effect of the current wind variations is smoothly decreased so as to avoid too high speeds in the flare (1/3 of current wind variations taken into account). To demonstrate the GS mini function insert a strong headwind so that as the trainees turn onto final they can see the managed VAPP increase due to the headwind.

F.00 INTRODUCTION TO THE FAILURE PHASE When a Training Syllabus is being created an important part of the creation process is knowledge of how a Simulator is reverse engineered to simulate an aircraft. In the development phase of the Simulator construction knowledge is required of what events will be simulated, in what combination and whether subsequent actions from Ground staff can be simulated by a reset. The real aircraft, in flight, is subject to aerodynamic forces as a result of control inputs. When we fly the simulator the motion system is designed to give the same effect in pitch and roll but due to logistics we cannot simulate yaw, other than in a minor sense. This is why we cannot realistically give instruction in recovery from unusual attitudes with the expectation of simulating the “seat of the pants” feeling that an aircraft will give. In addition, as the simulator is only certified (and designed) for certain combinations of simultaneous failures we, as Instruc tors, should not try to design our own combination of failures because the results may not represent reality and so lead to negative training. In short, you must keep to the designed syllabus and not invent you own scenarios.

F.01 ENGINE ABNORMAL STARTS (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND From an Instructional point of view we need to train our crews how to start the engines in both Normal and Non-Normal situations. Wherever possible the correct actions by the Trainees should result in a correct engine start. Our syllabus contains the following Engine start Problems: 1. Hot start 2. Tailpipe Fire 3. Start valve stuck 4. Starting without APU Bleed 5. Cross Bleed start 6. Manual Engine Start 7. Engine Relight in Flight

INSTRUCTION 1. Hot start. This start fault is initiated from the IOS and should be inserted before the start is commenced. What we are demonstrating is how the FADEC senses the problem and stops the fuel flow while cranking the engine and then attempting another start. For this sequence of events to occur correctly you need to remove the inserted fault as soon as the fuel flow is cut off. The PF should have his hand in the vicinity of the Engine Master switch but does not need to intervene while ever the FADEC is in control. 2. Tailpipe fire. The most likely sources of information concerning an engine tailpipe fire are the ground crew or cabin staff when starting engines. The procedure for dealing with a tailpipe fire is contained in QRH chapter 2. It is important to establish which engine is on fire and react accordingly. Establishing good communications between the cockpit and ground crew or cabin staff to establish which engine is on fire, and consider opening the cockpit window to confirm. The engine must be cranked which enables the engine to be ventilated to remove fuel vapours after the unsuccessful start attempt. If the burning has not stopped, consider the use of external fire extinguishers (Note that they can cause severe corrosive damage and should only be considered after the procedure has been completed.) As the fire is “within” the engine there is no point in trying to extinguish it with the Engine Fire Extinguishers which only act on the exterior surface of the engine. The following events need to briefed by the pilots before carrying out the QRH or Volume 3 actions. This briefing can be conveniently done by the PNF reading aloud the procedure in its entirety before commencement. 3. Start Valve Stuck. This start fault is initiated from the IOS and should be inserted before the start is commenced. This event needs a complete understanding of the interaction between the Crew, the Ground Engineer and the Cabin Crew. The fault should be reinserted once the start is in progress and only removed on command of the PF. 4. Starting without APU Bleed. The only action to be carried out by the Instructor is to ensure the APU Bleed is inoperative. The procedure says to switch off both Packs before connecting the ground air but does not specifically say when to pressurise with ground air.

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Connect the ground air when the Packs are off and the Crew asks you to do so. 5. Cross Bleed start. No action is required from the IOS to carry out this exercise. Ensure correct radio calls are made for this procedure, including obtaining permission from ATC as well as the ground staff. 6. Manual Engine Start. Inserting on the IOS an event that will lead to a Manual Engine start will require an engine shutdown to be performed. The point that needs briefing to the Trainees is that they must recognise the problem because there is no ECAM action that tells them to carry out a Manual Engine start after a shutdown. 7. Engine Relight in Flight. This event only requires the Instructor to remove the Engine Failure from the IOS. During the relight the PNF must keep his hand close to the Engine Master switch as the FADEC cannot interrupt the start process. If you have time an EGT over limit will demonstrate the need for vigilance during this procedure. COMMON ERRORS No, or incorrect, timing during manual start. Starter limitations not known. Cross bleed start not coordinated with ATC or the ground. After start scans not carried after an abnormal start.

F.02 ENGINE FAILURES REJECTED TAKE-OFF (00:15 + video) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Failure identification (crew communication). Decision and call out (STOP, GO and V1). Deceleration actions and control. Task sharing. ECAM actions (if appropriate). Notify ATC. Review of non inhibited warnings. Complementary actions and check-lists. The action of rejecting a take-off can be hazardous, and the time available to make the correct decision is limited. To assist with this, the ECAM inhibits warnings which are not of paramount importance between 80 kts and 1500 ft (or 2 minutes after lift off, whichever occurs first). Therefore, any warning received in this period is rather important and needs to be carefully considered. To assist decision making, the take-off is divided into low and high speed regimes and a speed of 100 knots is chosen as the dividing line. There is no significance to 100 knots, merely that it divides the take-off into low and high speed. Consequently, below 100 knots, it is possible to reject for any reason.

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Above 100 knots, and approaching VI, be “go-minded” unless major failures or ECAM warnings occur. Once above V1, the take-off must be continued as it may be impossible to stop the aircraft on the runway remaining. Bring the airplane to a complete stop on the runway centreline with the Parking Brake on and advise the Cabin Crew by PA “Cabin Crew To Your Stations”. Commence ECAM actions. If the event happens to be an Engine Fire and the ECAM calls for shutting the second engine down do so. As the ECAM is inoperative on Battery Power we now ignore the ECAM procedure as it will be lost and follow the On Ground Emergency Evacuation checklist at the rear of the QRH. This checklist can be stopped if the Evacuation is not required. Use ATC, fire service and cabin staff to gain as much information as possible to assist in making a decision on whether to evacuate or not. Remember that the simplest way to confirm an engine fire, on the ground, is to open the cockpit window and look out (Don’t do this in the simulator!). If no evacuation is necessary, clear the runway if safe to do so, but be aware that your brakes will be hot. Irrespective of who is PF once the CM1 initiates the RTO the CM1 is PF. The CM2 should confirm the Autobrake response, Reverse, silence any audio warning and advise the tower by use of the phrase “Stopping on runway”.

INSTRUCTION RTO exercises are invariably carried out at the end of the sessions. For variety you can change where you do these exercises. Ensure you leave the simulator in the correct state so before leaving retract the flaps and remove any failures. COMMON ERRORS Disarming of auto brake due to instinctive manual braking. ATC and / or Cabin crew not informed. Reversers remain engaged after aircraft stop. Omitting to select parking brake on. Inability to use mechanical seat controls.

ENGINE FAILURE OR FIRE AFTER V1 (00:20) ENGINE FAILURE ENGINE FIRE APPROACH ECAM PROCEDURES FMGS PROCEDURES ONE ENGINE OUT APPROACH AND LANDING ONE ENGINE OUT GO-AROUND COMMON ERRORS

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ENGINE FAILURE When they commence their Transition Course your Trainees should have a good understanding of the correct actions to follow when they experience an engine failure after V1 with a conventional aircraft. It is your job to ensure they understand the new principles involved with an Airbus FBW aircraft. When an aircraft experiences an engine failure the offset thrust from the remaining engine(s) causes the aircraft nose to yaw towards the inoperative engine. This yaw moment causes increased lift from the wing with the operative engine. As human beings are used to stand, or sit referenced to a vertical plane we tend to notice the rolling caused by uneven lift before we are aware of the yaw. This is why ME IFR Flight Instructors have to spend considerable time teaching their trainees the importance of using rudder to centre the slip index in a conventional aircraft before inputting a roll command. With an Airbus FBW aircraft the situation is engineered rather differently. When an Airbus FBW aircraft senses an engine failure the Yaw Damper will react to the detected sideslip and the spoilers on the wing with the operative engine(s) will raise so that the aircraft will maintain a bank angle of less than 10º with no pilot input on the controls. Of course, as the thrust is now reduced it is required for the pilot to lower the nose of the aircraft to account for the reduced level of thrust. The Beta (ß) target (outlined in blue) replaces the side slip indicator on the PFD when there is engine power asymmetry and CONF 1, 2 or 3 is set. When the ß target is centred total drag is minimised even though there is a small amount of side slip. Centring the ß target means pushing the rudder pedal so that the ß target is centred under the central index. By pushing the rudder like this we are now counteracting the yaw caused by the offset thrust and this means that the spoilers will retract when no longer required to stop the wing from rising. So centralising the ß target means we have caused the sum of forces to be balanced in the most efficient way possible. No drag devices on the wing and the rudder positioned to balance the offset thrust. The result of this is that there will be some residual side slip. If it were possible to see the slip index at the same time as the ß target they would not be superimposed as they are showing different things. The PF should maintain runway centreline with rudder, visually or with assistance of the PFD yaw bar (if available). At VR, rotate smoothly to 12.5º nose up and push the rudder to centralise the ß target. Adjust pitch attitude and monitor speed trend arrow (minimum speed V2) until SRS has stabilised. The change over from yellow side slip index to blue ß target may not occur instantaneously. We should not engage the auto pilot with the aircraft in an untrimmed state so once the rudder has been pushed to centre the ß target the rudder trim can be used to reduce the load on the pilots feet. The rudder trim index moves at 1º

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per second so can take almost 20 seconds to move into the required position in high thrust situations. As far as performance is concerned Airbus extends the 2nd Segment to 1500ft AAL and so can ignore the 3rd and 4th Segments as the level of performance exceeds (in all cases) these limits. The takeoff performance is calculated by maintaining Flexible Take Off Thrust until setting MCT at 1500 ft AAL but selecting TOGA is allowed for 10 minutes (5 minutes FAA) maximum. After detecting an engine failure, the PNF is to call “ENGINE FAILURE”, without identifying which engine has failed, and cancels the MASTER WARNING. Once we clean the aircraft up we are no longer so critically concerned with efficient flight so we see the ß target is replaced with the conventional slip index. Once your trainees have reached competency with the procedure using the Autopilot you can fail the Autopilot before take off so they can practise the exercise without the benefit of the automation. The PNF should closely monitor the aircraft’s flight path, cancel warnings and identify the failure when appropriate. Note when a positive climb has been established by the RA and the VS and announce accordingly. Retract gear on command. ECAM actions may be started above 400 ft RA. It is not necessary to rush into doing the ECAM drills and 400 ft is the MINIMUM altitude at which commencement of ECAM drills should be considered. The priority is to ensure that the aircraft is climbing, stabilised and is flying in a safe direction. ECAM actions can be interrupted as necessary to allow both pilots to monitor level-off, configuration changes etc. It is important to determine whether the engine has suffered a flameout or has structural damage. Absence of rotation of N1 or N2 or sounds of damage indicate the current condition. Remember that during training we don’t want our trainees confused as to what to do. Your briefing should make the exercise obvious. The action of putting the start switch to ignition confirms the relight attempt being made by the FADEC. If a flameout has occurred, then a relight may be considered at a later stage when aircraft has been cleaned up and a safe flight path established. The Status page is a reflection of what is available for landing. Consequently it is read after the “After Take off” checklist.

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There must be no movement of thrust lever, master switch or a fire pushbutton without positive confirmation from both pilots as follows. Thrust Lever Example

PF PNF Reads ECAM line

“THRUST LEVER 1 IDLE” Selects Thrust Lever 1 and says “THRUST LEVER 1 CONFIRM”

“THRUST LEVER 1 CONFIRMED” Moves Thrust Lever 1 to Idle Position Engine Master Switch

PF PNF Reads ECAM line

“ENGINE MASTER 1 OFF Selects Engine Master 1 and says

“ENGINE MASTER 1 CONFIRM” “ENGINE MASTER 1 CONFIRMED” Switches off Engine Master 1 The procedure just above is to be followed for all guarded switches and any non reversible actions. You should not hesitate to freeze the simulator if an unsafe situation develops during training. Put the aircraft back in the lined up position and quietly restore all controls while explaining what went wrong. Don’t forget that the Trainee probably made his errors because he didn’t fully understand what was happening. You therefore need to explain what went wrong and when it went wrong and how to do it correctly. From a piloting point of view it is far easier to have an engine failure close to VR than it is to have a failure when in initial climb at say 150 ft. Vary the point where you insert the failure to add some more realism.

ENGINE FIRE Inserting an Engine Fire can be done so that it will extinguish after the discharge of the first bottle, the second bottle, or not at all. Generally for airborne training select the situation where the fire is extinguished after the second bottle as it tends to a realistic situation. Don’t insert an unextinguishable fire in flight but use this scenario for a RTO or on short final to lead to an evacuation exercise. When we insert a Fire Warning the thrust of the engine is not affected. Consequently, once safely airborne encourage Autopilot engagement to assist in flying accurately.

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In all single engine situations we have to place the thrust levers in the MCT detent once we have accelerated to green dot speed. In some situations the slats may still be retracting so Airbus recommends putting the thrust lever in the Climb detent and then back to the FLX / MCT detent. This is so as not to trigger the GO ROUND mode inadvertently by selecting TOGA with the Slats / Flaps not retracted.

APPROACH The Airbus Single Aisle family are designed to land with full flap when operating with only one engine operative. At some hot, or high airfields, at high gross weights the selection of landing flap has to carried out after final approach path interception. The use of Autothrust when on final is a matter of individual preference. If engaged and the thrust fluctuates around the 80% value the ß target is replaced with the slip index and vice versa. They will not be superimposed as they represent different values but they should remain centred by rudder pressure. Rudder trim should be reset to zero on very short final, to make manual braking easier, to centre the nosewheel steering and to recover full rudder travel.

ECAM PROCEDURES ECAM procedures should not be started below 400 ft AAL. ECAM actions may be temporarily stopped at any stage on command of the PF for the PNF to carry out an action as for example flap retraction. Once the specific action has been carried out the PF should instruct the PNF to “Continue ECAM”. ECAM actions must not interfere with flight path monitoring. Complete ECAM until STATUS page appears then carry out the after take-off Check List (if applicable) before reading STATUS.

FMGS PROCEDURES The two FMGS procedures of interest when operating with one engine are the use of the EO SID and the EO CLR prompt. An explanation of both these functions is contained in FCOM 4.04. The use of EOSID routing is dependent on there being an EOSID defined in the database for that particular runway. If an engine failure occurs before the point at which the EOSID differs from the planned SID (Common Point) then the EOSID will appear as a TMPY F-PLAN. Selecting the INSERT prompt makes this SID the Active Flight Plan and NAV mode allows it to be tracked. If the engine failure occurs beyond the point at which the two SIDs differ there will be no TMPY F-PLAN created although the EOSID will be shown in yellow

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on the ND. To follow the EOSID in this case the crew can perform a DIR TO one of the EOSID waypoints and then modify the F-PLAN or, more simply follow the EOSID, which is displayed as a yellow line on the ND, using HDG mode and with ATC approval. When an engine failure is detected the bank angle commanded by the FD is limited to 15º when speed is below or at manoeuvring speed of the current configuration (F, S, O). The EO CLR prompt on the active PERF page would remove this bank angle limit if depressed. The EO CLR prompt should only be pressed in the event of a successful relight of a failed engine, or in the event of wrong detection or FADEC fault. Once the Approach has been activated it serves no purpose and can be cleared.

ONE ENGINE OUT APPROACH AND LANDING If an engine failure / fire has occurred on take off, the overweight landing checklist may be required. Autoland (CAT 3 SINGLE) is available on one engine (as shown on ECAM). In manual flight an engine out landing is essentially conventional. Good trimming is beneficial, so keep the slip indication centred. Your trainees may prefer to use manual thrust when hand flying, as it is easier to anticipate rudder and trim inputs when the thrust varies. Rudder trim should be reset to zero on very short final, to make manual braking easier, to centre the nosewheel steering and to recover full rudder travel.

ONE ENGINE OUT GO-AROUND From a Training viewpoint there is no benefit to be gained in giving an engine failure while the autopilot is flying the aircraft. We know the autopilot flies very well! If the syllabus indicates a missed approach with an engine failure the intention of the exercise is to make the weather conditions such that the PF disconnects the autopilot for a manual landing, and then is instructed to carry out a Missed Approach, and then has an engine fail while hand flying. The go-around is essentially the same as on 2 engines, the pitch target is now 12.5º. Apply rudder to compensate for the increase in thrust and keep the ß target centred. The FMA will indicate GA TRK, so think about aircraft navigation with respect to terrain. There will not be an Engine Out routing appear on the ND. Flap retraction and acceleration will take place in level flight at EO acceleration altitude. As this is a go-around, target speed is the memorised approach speed or the speed at engagement of go-around, and this becomes Green Dot at acceleration altitude. Consider starting the APU and the use of APU BLEED if performance limited. COMMON ERRORS

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Over rotation on take off leading to speed below V2. ß Target not fully centred. Not trimming the rudder. ECAM non-reversible actions carried out without proper crew confirmation. SID, EOSID or ATC instructions not accurately followed. Poor maintenance and monitoring of required track. Lack of task sharing discipline during manual flight (FCU actions). Not rotating to correct pitch attitude on go-around. Not aware of MSA

ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND If an engine should fail in cruise there are three logical strategies available. These cover the situation where terrain clearance is not a concern (standard strategy), the situation where terrain clearance is a concern (obstacle strategy), and the case during ETOPS operations where time from a suitable airfield is of prime importance (fixed speed strategy). If the obstacle strategy or the fixed speed strategy apply on a particular route this is communicated to the crew during flight dispatch, and particularly covering specific portions of the route. STANDARD STRATEGY During your briefing show the trainees where to find the drift down ceiling for the current weight. (FCOM 4.04.30 + FMS PROG page). With the Simulator in level flight go through the actions with them before inserting the engine failure. Point out that they are cruising at the same speed as the drift down speed so any delay before descent will result in a bleed off in airspeed before descent initiation. Consequently the initial descent will be steep to capture the original cruise speed. The descent should stabilise around –1200 ft / min around FL300 if conducted according to the syllabus. It is quite acceptable to position at FL390 to demonstrate the speed loss before descent. There is no point continuing after they are established in a stabilised descent. OBSTACLE STRATEGY In certain parts of the world the drift down ceiling can be lower than the terrain. At any point of a critical area on the route, it must always be possible to escape while ensuring, during descent, the relevant obstacle clearance margin of 2 ,000 feet on the net flight path. Having demonstrated the standard strategy freeze the simulator and reposition at the same level at which you demonstrated the standard strategy. As before brief the trainees before releasing the simulator and ensure they are aware of the changes between the standard strategy and the drift down strategy. When you release the simulator and activate the engine failure you

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will have plenty of time to explain the actions as you slow up to green dot. Once established in descent you will have a descent rate appreciably less than with the standard strategy. Having established in descent the normal action would be to start the APU. In the scenarios under which we operate further terrain problems are not envisaged but you should point out the theoretical situation where at the drift down ceiling there is higher terrain in front of the aircraft. However if there are no more any terrain considerations they revert to normal LRC speed. FIXED SPEED STRATEGY The constraint in ETOPS operation is time to the nearest diversion. Thus, the speed target is now M0.78 / 320 knots or M0.80 / 340 knots (established before dispatch). Further, the altitude selected should be 15 000 ft or other established before dispatch. Once levelling off, cruise at 340 knots (or other established figure) or the thrust limited speed. ETOPS operations are taught as a separate course so the above is for reference only. FMGS and QRH The FMGS PROG page will show the EO MAX REC altitude. In the QRH there are tables containing details of engine out ceiling, time to descend, distance taken and fuel used. There is also a graph to calculate gross ceiling. Tables are available for long range cruise performance, an in-flight check of fuel consumed and time to destination. The decision on which technique is appropriate should be taken during the aircraft deceleration, or initial descent, following the failure. Once established in the descent, the relevant table can be entered, and the information assimilated. OVERVIEW The ECAM actions and placing the thrust lever to MCT should not be hurried, as it is important to complete the drill correctly, not in the shortest possible time. At high flight levels close to limiting weights, if an engine fails speed will decay very quickly requiring prompt crew response. One engine out operations will typically use 15% more fuel than with both engines, which may become a factor if a long diversion is contemplated. COMMON ERRORS A/THR not disconnected. Incorrect strategy. OPEN DES not selected. Distraction from primary tasks. Rushed actions.

INSTRUCTION You may prefer to demonstrate the Obstacle Strategy first as the time taken in slowing up to green dot will allow you to talk through the procedure, whereas

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the Normal Strategy is rather rushed owing to the decay in airspeed. Once established in descent it is normal to start the APU.

ALL ENGINE FLAME OUT (00:20) BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS PROCEDURE COMMON ERRORS INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND There are two scenarios for an All Engine Flameout. The first scenario follows on from a Drift Down procedure and we assume the APU has been started using an engine driven generator. In this case electrical power is not lost and both pilots retain their instrumentation. The second scenario is similar to flying into a cloud of volcanic ash with a virtually simultaneous failure of the engines and this leads to the Emergency Electric configuration. As the second scenario is rather more difficult it is the one we will consider here.

CONSIDERATIONS Monitoring of flight path and parameters. Choice of optimum speed. ECAM actions (APU use, relight parameters...). Situational awareness. Relight monitoring and system recovery. Aircraft status : systems, F/CTL law.. Minimum RAT speed. Communications (ATC, transponder, cabin). Related consequences (Pressurisation, forced landing, ditching...).

PROCEDURE Following a dual engine failure the flight deck indications change drastically as generators drop off line, the RAT is deployed and ECAM prioritises checklists. Control of the aircraft must be taken immediately by CM1, and a safe flight path established. It is important at this stage to correctly identify the failure as it can be easily confused with all engine generators fault. ECAM will prioritise checklists so to avoid confusion so the trainees must read the ECAM carefully to correctly identify the failure. It is vital to establish good crew communication and to apply efficient task-sharing. Establish communications with ATC, stating nature of emergency and intentions. Consider use of transponder emergency code. VHF2 (VHF3) and

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ATC2 are not supplied so VHF 1 is the only means of communicating the emergency to air traffic control. This can be easily seen by looking at the ATC and VHF 2 windows, which will be blank. The ECAM actions can be commenced, with attention to optimum relight speed. If there is no relight within 30 sec ECAM will order the engine master switches to be placed off for 30 sec and then on again. This is to permit ventilation of the combustion chamber. Start the APU once you are below the APU Battery Start Limit altitude. Once the APU is available and you are below the APU Bleed Limit altitude the optimum speed is green dot. Maximum gliding range is achieved at green dot speed although this will not be displayed on the PFD if the APU generator is not available.

COMMON ERRORS Incorrect MAYDAY call Incorrect speed choice and lack of monitoring. Confusion with ELEC EMER CONFIG. Lack of situational awareness. APU started too late. Engine relight not monitored (stopwatch/parameters). Lack of communication.

INSTRUCTION Whichever scenario you have leading to this failure it will most likely be initiated by a repositioning to FL350 which puts the aircraft directly above the threshold of the runway in use. Insert a DIR TO someplace more or less in front of the aircraft so there is a track line on the ND so they turn away from their previous track. Monitor the aircraft position so they are conveniently placed for the next exercise. Once the APU has been started and the Bleed Air is available remove the flameout so that the engine relight will be successful.

ENGINE RELIGHT IN FLIGHT (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION ALTERNATIVE EXERCISE COMMON ERRORS

BACKGROUND Factors influencing decision to attempt relight. Engine relight in flight procedure (wind-milling and starter assisted). Relight envelope and limitations (loss of protections). Task sharing and actions requiring crew confirmation.

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Systems to restore or engine shut down procedure.

INSTRUCTION Ensure you have removed the engine failure before the trainees attempt a relight. Before attempting a relight in flight, gather all relevant information to decide whether a relight should be attempted. Consider engine damage, icing or volcanic ash encounter and their effects on a successful relight. Check for satisfactory indications of N1, N2 and oil quantity. Further, is there a more appropriate time to relight, when workload will be lower? Refer to QRH chapter 2 for ENG RELIGHT (in flight) procedure. Auto start is recommended as the FADEC will determine whether an assisted start or a wind-milling start is appropriate. The crew must be ready to take appropriate action in case of an abnormal start as no start protections are provided in flight. The stopwatch should be used to monitor light up after fuel flow increase. Ensure cross checking of vital controls before movement. ALTERNATIVE EXERCISE If you have an excess of time and the syllabus requires a single engine approach it is possible to insert a flameout, and when the engine has been shut down remove the flameout and insert a hot start during the relight. This will reinforce the requirement to monitor the relight and manually terminate the start with the Engine Master switch.

COMMON ERRORS Relight attempt made without checking engine parameters. Actions requiring crew confirmation not cross-checked during relight (e.g. Eng Master ON or OFF). No timing for light-up or engine draining. Procedure initiated at inappropriate time in relation to workload and without checklist. No light up as failure not removed from IOS.

F.03 DUAL FMGS FAILURE (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION COMMON ERRORS

BACKGROUND Each FMGC has two parts; Flight Management and Flight Guidance. The FMGC also computes performance parameters and guides the aircraft along

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a pre-planned route. The relevant functions of the parts of the FMGG are as follow: A. FLIGHT MANAGEMENT Navigation and radio management Flight Planning and management Performance optimisation and predictions B. FLIGHT GUIDANCE CONTROLS FD AP A/THR C. FLIGHT ENVELOPE VAPP computation GW and CG monitoring and display When there is a complete failure of both FMGG’s the following will be the main items lost and are detailed on the ECAM: AP I + 2 FD 1 + 2 A/THR VAPP and GS mini (not shown on ECAM) Auto Landing elevation

INSTRUCTION The syllabus for this session is flown with only one FMS so fail the required one at the start of the session. The MEL extract should be consulted and explained before the session commences. Entering the simulator select the relevant radio aids on the RMP and change the frequency and bearing from the retained values so the trainees will have to practice tuning the aids. Prior to inserting the failure of the remaining FMS remind the trainees that they will loose the AP, FD and the A/THR. If in RVSM airspace a PAN call is required as the aircraft is no longer RVSM compliant as there is no autopilot. The FPV is available so select it. The red FD on each PFD indicates FD failure so they should be switched off which will then give the blue track index. Get them to track to a suitable Navaid by giving them the frequency. Once they have accomplished all required actions they should attempt an FMGC reset. The FM1, when failed, trips its CB so it cannot be reset but the failed FM2 can be reset because the CB does not trip. Remove the failure during the time that the reset procedure calls for the CB to be tripped so that it will be transparent to the crew what you have done. The PNF will have to get out of seat the find the circuit breaker that needs to be tripped as the panel is not normally in its

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flight position. If you want to put the panel in its correct position the simulator has to be settled but the IOS seat will now be some distance rearward. COMMON ERRORS Incorrect FMGS reset procedures Not using FPV and not deselecting FDs.

F.04 TOTAL FCU FAILURE (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION COMMON ERRORS

BACKGROUND Insert this dual failure by failing one FCU and reading the ECAM message, then fail the other thus leading to the dual failure. Some Simulators refer to loss of one system as “Loss of Redundancy”, so insert this first, and then use the Total Failure option. The default PFD and ND contain all the information needed to land the aircraft. The Mach indication is lost because the symbol generator puts the ILS information in the same place.

INSTRUCTION The trainees will be aware of the problem before reading the ECAM because of the loss of FCU information plus the Auto pilot disconnect cavalry charge plus the Auto thrust disconnect tone each 5 seconds. The PF does not need to wait until the ECAM message to set the thrust manually. It will be difficult for you (as Instructor) to read the ND in order to give radar vectors so you may be able to use previous track information on a MAP page of the IOS to assist. You can insert a thunderstorm cell so they can see the radar presentation. For all their careers the trainees have had a bug to remember what their heading is. They set it and then just turn until it is centred, but now they have lost this lifelong device. It is a good idea to advise the PNF to write down all ATC instructions to help monitoring.

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The conversion of millibars into feet is usually not easily carried out under pressure. The PNF can assist by calculating this on paper. A PAN call is required in RVSM airspace due to loss of autopilot. The reset procedure should be referred to in the briefing so that it can be carried out correctly in the simulator. If the reset is to be effective and transparent you must remove the fault in the period when the CB is tripped. Currently our syllabus does not contain an effective reset so they will accomplish the approach and landing with no FCU information.

F.05 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE (00:25) CONSIDERATIONS INSTRUCTION EXTRA INFORMATION PROCEDURE VAPP AND LANDING DISTANCE

CONSIDERATIONS Control of flight path and navigation. Importance of good crew communication and co-ordination as autopilot is inoperative. Coordination with ATC. Correct task prioritisation. Use of selected speed. Accurate following of FD and smooth control inputs. Flight control system architecture (QRH 5.03). QRH landing distance. CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for VAPP calculation with MCDU.

INSTRUCTION You have three ways of ending up with no Hydraulic Pressure. These are Low Air Pressure May be possible to restore at a lower level Overheat The overheat should disappear after the pump has been

switched off for some time allowing reuse of pump. Loss of Fluid Unable to restore in flight. One of the principles of training is that the trainees should not have to decide whether a particular procedure is correct but be presented with a clear choice leading to a certain conclusion. Therefore if you want them to practise landing in Direct (SA) or Alternate Law (LR) make them loose all the Hydraulic fluid in

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two systems as opposed to any other option. This will give them an unambiguous choice. Some simulators have a “Slider” and others require a value to be inserted. In both cases select a value of Zero. We do not consider a single hydraulic failure during the Transition course as it has minimal impact on the landing capability of the aircraft. A dual hydraulic failure is different however. The first time you give a dual failure let the trainees deal with the first failure in its entirety before giving them the second failure to contend with. Any situation where we only have one elevator means that the result of a side stick pitch input is reduced to minimise the twisting effect the single elevator has on the fuselage. Consequently it will be much easier to control the pitch if the Autothrust is disconnected. When we have a single elevator we should also go into Direct Law by lowering the gear at 200 knots so that the elevator input is not dampened and thus control is more direct. If the horizontal stabiliser is lost we can still control the pitch through the elevators which can move through their entire range as long as the gear is up. As the aircraft reduces speed while configuring for landing the new stable attitude is reflected by the neutral position of the side stick. The centre of the elevators range of movement is the neutral elevator position prior to lowering the gear. When the gear is lowered the connection between side stick and elevator is then direct so only a vary small movement of the elevator is possible. This is why the aircraft trim should be as close as possible to neutral before the gear is lowered. In this particular case we select the landing flap and reduce to VAPP before lowering the gear. Once the gear is down we are in Direct Law as indicated by the message MANUAL PITCH TRIM USE but as there is no hydraulic pressure we cannot use the Trim Wheel. Additionally, as there is no trim function there will be a continual load on the side stick in the pitch plane. Task sharing is important, as procedures are lengthy, the approach briefing is necessarily comprehensive and good crew co-ordination is vital. As there are usually many tasks to fulfil, establish clear priorities. If sufficient fuel remains take the time to plan and brief properly. In all situations of dual failure in the syllabus the Green system is one of the failed systems so the gear will be lowered by gravity (paper checklist) and NWS will be lost. The trainees should ask for a tractor to move them off the runway after landing. As the gear cannot be retracted a landing clearance should be obtained before lowering the gear.

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If the Blue and Yellow systems should fail the gear is still lowered by gravity to preserve the Green system integrity.

EXTRA INFORMATION Roll rate will always be reduced by loss of spoilers. There needs to be efficient communication between the pilots as regards braking from the accumulator. The PNF must keep up a continual call out of the applied pressure, even if it is not changing. He should specify Left and Right pressure similar to the following example … 800 left, 900 right etc. If the G + Y is lost the pitch is higher due to slats only and this can lead to a potential duck under situation during the approach because of the PFs view of the runway with a possible risk of a tail strike upon touch down. The PNF should be briefed to watch the pitch during approach and touch down. Hard pitch inputs on the side stick during approach may trigger spurious stall warnings. A stall warning during approach is just a warning, not a stall. It is due to the alpha probes fluctuating and does not necessarily require the application of TOGA power to prevent a stall. This situation is not uncommon with only one elevator and the application of TOGA will not make the aircraft easy to fly.

PROCEDURE A dual hydraulic malfunction is considered as an Emergency situation (LAND ASAP in red) and shall be declared as such to the ATC units. The aircraft configuration should be established early prior to approach (on down wind or on a suitable place on long final) by asking for and performing SLATS or FLAPS JAMMED Checklist until the landing configuration has been achieved. The PNF should brief the PF on the go-around procedure from the same checklist. The procedure should be performed entirely with selected speed. For landing gear gravity extension, the L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION QRH check list should be used. It is recommended to have the gear down and be stabilised prior to starting the final descent. The approach briefing should concentrate on safety issues and should be given early, after the FMGS has been prepared. The PF normally prepares the FMGS. However in a case such as this the PF can ask the PNF to prepare the FMGS and to brief him of what has been inserted.

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If you have two F/O’s this is how it should be done. A briefing should cover the Approach to be carried out with mention of the specific missed approach procedure plus the specifics regarding to the state of the malfunctions. For the PF's awareness, the Slats Flaps Jammed Checklist and the Landing Gear Gravity Extension Checklist contain additional information which should be read before the procedures are carried out (if time permits). VAPP AND LANDING DISTANCE Any factoring of speeds or runway length are always applied to the base line of an aircraft with full flap in Normal law landing on the runway in the actual conditions as they exist. A speed is added to the flap full VREF to get the applicable VAPP and a factor is applied to the distance to account for the loss or reduction in retardation devices. The relevant QRH page has information regarding multiple failures. Refer to the QRH with your trainees for complete information concerning VAPP and landing distance increment calculation.

F.06 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION (00:20) CONSIDERATIONS INSTRUCTION OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING

CONSIDERATIONS EFIS, ECAM, AUTO FLIGHT and FMGS availability following failure. ECAM procedure and status page APPR PROC considerations with RAT. Navigation aid tuning by RMP. QRH use for approach and landing data. Specific procedure for go around (EMER GEN recovery). Task sharing and communications. Communications (ATC, cabin). Raw data approach. Direct law approach and landing. Fuel gravity feeding considerations. Cockpit lighting. When all engine driven generators have been lost, the workload is immediately greatly increased. It is important that task-sharing procedures are understood and adhered to. Remember the golden rules and fly the aircraft. The Autopilot is not available and CM1 must take control as only the following is available:

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CMI PFD (FPV but no FD) CM1 ND (after RAT extension) Upper ECAM CMI MCDU and FMGC 1 FCU

INSTRUCTION Before the trainees get settled select the NAV button on the CM1 RMP and change the frequencies of the previously used radio aids so they will have to tune them for the approach. Depending on the simulator you will have a selection of GEN 1 fail plus GEN 2 fail OR GEN 1+2 fail OR a selection for Emergency Electrical configuration. Before inserting the failure point out that at the moment of failure only the CM1 PFD and Upper ECAM will remain and that as the RAT extends and starts to produce power the ND will come back into view. The Emergency Electrical Configuration is due to the loss of all AC BUSSES (AC BUS 1+2). This malfunction can be caused by: - either the loss of all AC GEN, - or the loss of one engine and the failure of the opposite and APU generators, - or the loss of both engines. With such a combination of malfunctions, the RAT extends and then, the CSM-G comes on line which takes about 5 sec during which the electrical network is powered by batteries only. The red FD on the CM1 indicates that the FD information is unavailable so it should be switched off which will give the heading or track index in blue on the horizon. The FPV is available if selected. Although the ECAM advises a landing as soon as possible, it would be unwise to attempt an approach at a poorly equipped airfield in marginal weather, but prolonged flight in this configuration is not recommended. This is a serious emergency and ATC should be notified using appropriate phraseology (MAYDAY) so that greater separation between you and other traffic can be arranged. It is important to identify the failure that has occurred - it is possible for pilots to confuse emergency electrical configuration with an all engine failure. The ECAM procedure is a lengthy and complicated procedure. To view the system pages you must press and hold the system button. On release of the button the Upper screen reappears. To view an overflow page release the STS button and repress.

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Brief that on an A320 the loss of both engine d riven generators is probably due to a Bus problem. If the APU is started (depleting the battery to do so) it most likely wont be able to be connected to the Bus. The electrical architecture of the other SA aircraft (A318, A319, A21) is different, so if the APU is available start it and use the APU GEN. The line on the ECAM which says GEN 1+2….OFF then ON means that GEN 1 is selected off and 3 seconds later selected on and then GEN 2 is selected off and 3 seconds later is selected on. The both generators should not be both switched off at the same time. All probe heating is lost, except CM1 Pitot and AOA, so if a discrepancy occurs between airspeed indications on CMI PFD and on STBY, disregard STBY indication. The preparation time including the understanding of the status necessarily takes some time and should not be rushed. Do not freeze the simulator during this period so the CM1 has to face the dual challenge of understanding the situation and of the preparation for landing. An exception is with two FO’s where freezing the simulator allows them both time to study the problem with out having to fly from the CM1 position. They are two types of RAT. The “old” RAT and the “new” (or Sundstrand) RAT. The new RAT remains operational at all normal approach speeds. You can see which RAT is fitted to your simulator by reading the ECAM. If the minimum RAT speed is 140 knots then you have an “old” RAT. EVENT OLD RAT NEW RAT AC BUS 1 + 2 LOSS 5 seconds Batt only then RAT extends + CSM-G on line LDG gear DOWN BATT ONLY CSM-G IAS < 125 knots BATT ONLY BATT ONLY RAT stalls IAS < 50 KNOTS BATT ONLY AC ESS lost BATT ONLY AC ESS lost If the flying time has to be extended refer to FLT ON BAT ONLY proc in QRH. At gear extension, (depending on the RAT) the RAT stalls and electrical power supply is battery only, limited to approximately 25 minutes. Do not lower the gear earlier than necessary in order to conserve battery life. Brief that on battery power the ND will be lost and the ILS will only be visible on the CM1 PFD (which is where it should normally be looked at!)

OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES Characteristic speeds are lost in final approach if on BATT power. Navaids must be tuned on RMP1 with the “old” RAT as FMGS is lost on BATT. All types of approaches are flown manually with raw data (no AP, FD or A/THR).

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The flight control law is initially ALTN and then DIRECT once landing gear is down. The BSCUs are lost. Therefore there is no NWS, no ANTI SKID but alternate braking available up to 1000 psi. The reversers are lost. RA 1 + 2 are lost with their associated auto callouts so the FO should make the call outs. FCOM 3.02.24 outlines the available systems left after this failure.

GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING Gravity Fuel Feeding procedure may be unclear in the Trainees minds. When the fuel is delivered to the airport from the refinery it is put into (usually) underground storage, and before it can be put on board an aircraft must sit undisturbed for five hours. This time is for the de-aeration of the fuel. The aeration is caused by the movement during transportation and is similar to the small air bubbles that appear in a glass when a beer or a fizzy soft drink is poured. In the aircraft the fuel is forced by pumps into the engine and any remaining aeration is forced along by more fuel. If the fuel pumps are lost and the fuel arrives at the engine by gravity a parcel of aerated fuel may arrive at the engine causing a problem. Consequently, if the aircraft has been high enough for long enough the fuel will be de-aerated and flight can continue with no fuel pumps. However if the flight has not been flown at a high level for long enough, or not at all, there is a restriction on the level for the rest of the flight.

F.07 NO FLAPS OR NO SLATS (00:20) BACKGROUND CONFIGURING COMMON ERRORS

BACKGROUND Task sharing and crew coordination. Selected speed. Approach speed and landing distance calculations. Speed control for no flaps or no slats approach. Approach briefing and abnormal configuration procedure use. Pitch angle (tail-strike) at landing if no flaps. Go around procedure and briefing. CONF FULL selected on MCDU PERF page for VAPP entry then change as necessary. Should this problem arise when in the intermediate approach phase, a delay in starting the approach should be considered.

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There are four ways the slats or flaps do not move when commanded. 1. No hydraulic pressure to move. 2. No electrical signal to give the order to move. 3. Asymmetric movement on each side of the wing so locked by the Wing Tip Brake (as seen in the No Flaps plus No Slats exercise). 4. Flap handle inoperative (so no signal given to move the surfaces). If a computer reset will not restore the Slat Flap Control Computers the relevant surface will not move and (in the slat case) you will be in Alternate Law. When you are pre-briefing your trainees (the day before) advise them that this SFCC failure is not what you will be giving them in the session but that you will be creating the flight control surface problem (slats or flaps) by a dual hydraulic failure. The flap handle inoperative situation is not covered in our current syllabus. Consequently your briefing will normally be part of that given for a Dual Hydraulic failure.

CONFIGURING It is an important concept that once the Approach has been activated speed control passes to the flap lever handle (assuming the normal use of managed speed). However you now will find that that selecting a flap position will result in an incorrect speed for the actual flight control surfaces (but still safe). Therefore you should select the speed as soon as you are aware of a slat or flap problem and remain in selected speed until touch down. The technique for slowing up and configuring is given in the QRH. The PNF should read this procedure out aloud as a Briefing before it is performed. Remember that the aircraft is safe to fly down to VLS so do not allow your trainees to rush into configuring without reference to the correct procedure for doing so! The configuring procedure is referred to as the VFE next procedure. A demonstration on the FAROS Free Play FMGS Trainer will make it very easy for the Trainees to understand. The relevant Go Around case needs to be briefed before the Approach is commenced so that each pilot knows what configuration and speed to aim for in the case of going around. The landing configuration will depend on the cause of the problem. The QRH table Configuration Speed Distance Corrections for Failures gives the position of the Flap Lever handle, Increment to add to Flap Full VREF to obtain VAPP, and the factor to multiply the Flap Full Landing Distance (without Autobrake and according to the conditions) to give the physical length required from 50ft to a full stop (using maximum foot braking).

COMMON ERRORS Rushing procedure. Starting approach before completing all procedures. Selected speed not used immediately at failure recognition.

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Wrong VAPP selection on MCDU. Rough handling. Use of managed speed on final approach Go around procedure not briefed as applying to the situation.

F.08 NO FLAPS PLUS NO SLATS (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION COMMON ERRORS

BACKGROUND This exercise needs to be understood well by the Trainees as otherwise it will take too long to perform. In your pre-briefing (the day before) advise your trainees that you are going to lock the flaps and slats in the fully retracted position by activating the Wing Tip brake. In this case the aircraft remains in Normal Law for the exercise. After take-off and with the Slats and Flaps fully retracted insert a Slats locked by WTB and also a Flaps locked by WTB. There will be no indication to the crew of the problem until they move the flap lever to the Conf 1 or Conf 2 positions. They need extra distance to prepare for the approach so give them an extended downwind so they are prepared approaching the FAF to put the gear down.

INSTRUCTION As ATC you instruct the trainees to slow up (say 180 knots) so at Green Dot they will select Flap 1 which immediately gives an ECAM warning and the Slat indicator turns amber. As there is a Flight Control problem the speed should be immediately selected. In real life the crew would deal with this problem before continuing the approach only to find some time later that on selecting Flap 2 they receive another ECAM warning with the Flap indicator also amber. However this correct procedure will take some five minutes to perform and all actions will have to be duplicated with the dual failure. Therefore, in this particular case, and only for purposes of training, as soon as they have selected the speed and before actioning the ECAM for the Slats Jammed ask them to select Conf 2 in order to get the Dual failure. It is important that your briefing gets across the message that this is being done just to save some time in the session as the actions required by the Slats Jammed procedure have to be repeated for the Flaps Jammed procedure. (If you have Trainees with a poor comprehension of English it may be better to let them perform both ECAM procedures in their entirety in

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order to not confuse them. But allow an extra ten minutes to complete the exercise). Do not say something like … “let us see if the flaps are jammed as well” … because this implies that you can ignore an ECAM procedure and carry out your own investigation. Follow the ECAM procedure and your speed will (depending on actual weight) be around 190 knots on final. It is very important to point out that with the gear retracted and idle thrust on a 3º descent path in this configuration the aircraft will accelerate. Therefore the gear MUST be lowered before the FAF otherwise the descent will be unstable. The AP may be used to 500 ft AGL. It is interesting to calculate the theoretical stalling speed in this configuration and find it is about 30 to 40 knots below your VAPP. Therefore if some speed reduction is made before touchdown the ground run will be much shorter. Therefore we can reduce to the Flap Full VREF+50 speed (which is in fact VLS speed in the 320 family aircraft). Do this by ensuring the correct means of disconnecting the A/THR and then retard the THR LVRS about 2 cms and the speed will gradually bleed back to the desired value. Approaching the desired value restore the THR LVRS to their original manual thrust position. The nose attitude is not much higher than normal but a prolonged flare incurs a real danger of a tail strike so instead of flaring for landing the better technique is to flare in reverse by easing the nose forward for landing. After landing the brakes will get hot.

COMMON ERRORS Not selecting speed as soon as first problem arises. Leaving the gear until on descent and consequently getting fast. Not co-ordinating with ATC. Not thinking about hot brake possibility before landing.

F.09 DUAL RADIO ALTIMETER FAILURE (00:10) CONSIDERATIONS BACKGROUND PROCEDURE

BACKGROUND GPWS will be inoperative, therefore apply extra caution with regard to terrain clearance. On a normal ILS Approach we press the APPR pushbutton to arm the LOC and the G/S. This action also programs the AP for an autoland. The flare part of the autoland is accomplished with a combination of Radio Altimeter

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information plus Glide Slope information. Therefore you cannot have the AP engaged when the G/S is armed and the RA’s have failed. Inserting a dual failure from the IOS when the Approach is armed will cause the AP to disconnect. It is possible in this case to re-engage the AP and only engage the LOC mode. The vertical profile of the approach can follow the G/S raw data by selecting either V/S or FPA mode. When the gear is lowered the control law becomes Direct. We cannot have the AP in Direct Law so once again the AP will disconnect. It is probably a good idea to disconnect the AP before lowering the gear so the pilots are ready for the transition to Direct Law directly from Normal Law.

PROCEDURE With two RA’s the CM1 reads RA1 information and the CM2 reads RA2 information. If only one RA is working it supplies the information to both PFD’s. As the loss of RA1 causes the loss of the GPWS it is usually a no-go MEL item so you can fail RA2 before take-off and take the opportunity to explain the use of the MEL. Once in the air and before arming the Approach fail RA1. The ECAM message will tell you that you will enter Direct Law on lowering the gear (and you will not be able to Arm the Approach). If you remove the RA1 fault, Arm the Approach and then reinsert the RA1 fault you will loose the AP and the LOC and GS arming for the reasons given above. Although only the LOC can be armed after the failure active the MDA value inserted in the FMGS is that for a CAT1 ILS as in fact the trainees will end up with a hand flown ILS (in Direct Law) and the relevant minima is CAT1. Be aware that the Flight Director can demand excessive roll rates close to the ground (below 400 ft AGL) as there is no automatic damping of roll demand as when there is GS capture. As with most cases of DIRECT law it is possible to set CONF 3 before lowering the gear so that the aircraft is in trim when DIRECT law comes into effect.

F.10 UNRELIABLE SPEED / ALTITUDE (00:10) BACKGROUND PROCEDURE COMMON ERRORS INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND Unreliable speed or altitude indications can be caused by combinations of causes. Primarily these include, but are not limited to, pitot or static probe sensor problems. The pitot sensors can be blocked due to several causes, such as heavy rain which may cause temporary fluctuating speed indication and severe pitot icing or pitot heat failure leading to a decreasing speed indication. The consequences are similar to the case when the pitot probe is blocked by a foreign object. Thus the measured pressure decreases. IAS remains constant in level flight, increases in climb and decreases in descent. Thus causing abnormal behaviour of AP and FD. Pitch up in climb and pitch down in descent. The Mach number varies like the IAS. When static probes are affected, the altitude, the V/S and FPA, the IAS and Mach number are wrong and the FPV as well. If some sensors are independently affected, this will cause an ECAM warning since it can be detected. If all sensors a re simultaneously affected, no ECAM warning will be provided since all measured data will vary similarly. This situation may only be detected by the crew who will observe IAS fluctuations, jerky and delayed ALT indications, abnormal correlation of basic flight parameters (IAS, pitch, thrust, V/S etc.), abnormal correlation between ALT and V/S indications, abnormal behaviour of AP, FD, ATHR, undue stall or overspeed warnings respectively and reductions of aerodynamic noise when IAS decreases.

PROCEDURE The recovery procedure is predicated on whether the aircraft is in close ground proximity (below THR RED ALT) or not. The full procedure is given in the QRH so refer to it during your briefing. The following table may assist the crew in determining the nature of the problem and the information still usable: UNRELIABLE DISREGARD USE

ALT GPS ALT * and GPS GS IAS / TAS GS on ND WIND R / A

ALTITUDE

V/S FPA CAB ALT IAS / TAS GPS GS WIND BIRD

SPEED

WIND from other aircraft * GPS altitude is different from barometric but gives reasonable information.

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The unreliable speed and / or altitude indication may cause the following associated (distracting) phenomena: - SPD LIM flag on PFD, - ALPHA FLOOR activation, - stall - windshear warnings (due to Mach effect), - flap auto retraction, - ALPHA LOCK system activation, - overspeed warning on ECAM, - altitude discrepancy warning on ECAM and - rudder TLU fault on ECAM.

COMMON ERRORS Initial actions incorrect. The PNF has trouble finding the correct part of the QRH. Poor scanning from the PF.

INSTRUCTION In the simulator you achieve this failure situation for the CM1 by simultaneously blocking the CM1 Pitot tube, failing ADR3 and failing the Airspeed Channel of ADR2. This will force the CM1 to fly using the Pitch and Thrust targets from the QRH. For CM2 fail CM2 Pitot tube, ADR3 and Airspeed Channel of ADR1. Another way of inserting a similar fault is (after the gear is retracted) failing three Pitot tubes. The result of all these failures is to fly using pitch and thrust.

F.11 COCKPIT SMOKE (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Any occasion where there is smoke in an aircraft is a potentially very serious situation. There are potentially many means for smoke to be present but the simulators have generally only the facility to reproduce smoke from the Avionics System or from the Air Conditioning System. The ECAM may recognise the problem, in which case the procedure should be followed. If there is no ECAM warning then a paper checklist must be referred to.

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The FCOM Vol3 contains the relevant information for all scenarios and should be referred to during your briefing. Highlight the fact that any faulty equipment be switched off and this should stop the smoke creation. If there is dense smoke a descent is carried out to facilitate the removal of the smoke and this descent is performed during the five minutes before setting the Emergency Electrical Configuration in the case of Avionics smoke.

INSTRUCTION During the Simulator set up you must arm the Smoke Generator by “warming it up” for about five minutes before it will be operational. Depending on the type of simulator this is done either from the IOS or by dedicated switches or buttons. Once the Smoke Generator is Armed the activation is controlled by inserting a failure from the IOS. The Smoke Generator will produce large amounts of smoke for about five minutes. Once the Smoke production is finished the simulator smoke removal fans will remove the smoke from the simulator. Our syllabus contains a Smoke exercise which commences by repositioning to FL350. Before release make a DIR TO a fix some distance in front of the aircraft so that there is a sensible flight plan track in front of the crew. Locate the Instructors Oxygen mask before inserting the failure giving the smoke to avoid breathing the simulated smoke.

COMMON ERRORS Confusion between ECAM and QRH procedures.

G.01 WINDSHEAR (00:20) BACKGROUND PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR INDICATIONS PROCEDURE PRINCIPLES INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Windshear and microburst have been the cause of numerous aircraft accidents during the take off and landing phases. This type of meteorological phenomena is mostly due to a cool shaft of air, (like a cylinder), between 500 and 3000 metres wide that is moving downward. When the air encounters the ground, it flows outward.

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The velocity of the downward flowing air mass ranges from 20 to 40 knots. When it reaches the ground the outflow winds which result vary from 20 to 80 knots. Aircraft safety is affected for two reasons - 1. The aircraft flies in the air mass. When the air mass moves downward so does the aircraft. The aircraft flight path is thus severely affected. 2. The aircraft lift is related to the relative velocity of the air travelling over the wing. When the wind varies suddenly from front to back, the lift significantly reduces which causes the aircraft to descend, or to reach very high AOA.

Therefore a windshear or a microburst is an extremely hazardous phenomenon for an aircraft during take off and landing. The strategies we promote to prevent potential catastrophic consequences are - 1. Increase crew awareness of potential microburst or windshear so as to delay take off or landing by use of the PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR SYSTEM. 2. Inform the crew of unexpected air mass variations. From the Flight Instruments we get FPV rapid movement, and Approach Target Speed variations (from GS mini protection). 3. Warn the crew of significant loss of energy by the Low Energy warning (SPEED, SPEED, SPEED). 4. Provide efficient tools to escape from the situation. For this we use the FBW high angle of attack protection, ALPHA FLOOR an Auto thrust function, and the SRS AP / FD pitch law. The best strategy is to AVOID such weather phenomena, so delay T/O or APPR. In order to do so, the pilot needs to be advised that such phenomena exist in proximity to the aircraft.

PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR The Predictive Windshear System (PWS) is the Primary means of advance information regarding windshear. It works by measuring the velocity of the water droplets carried by the horizontally moving air mass and thus is able to assess wind variations. The Radar scans across the windshear, and it will detect raindrops moving toward it at one range, and raindrops moving away from it at a greater range.

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The measurement principle is the detection of the Doppler frequency shift of the reflected microwave pulses caused by the shear. The Radar can thus determine the width of the shaft and the severity of the shear by the droplet velocity variations. When the severity exceeds a given threshold, windshear alerts are triggered. The PWS must be switched on with its dedicated switch and operates independently of the weather radar. When switched on the system operates automatically when the A/C is below 2300 ft AGL. The diagram below shows the areas in which an advice will be obtained. The warnings are inhibited on take off from 100 knots to 50ft RA and on landing below 50ft.

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The aural Warning given on Take off is “WINDSHEAR AHEAD” announced twice and on Landing is “GO AROUND WINDSHEAR AHEAD”. On the PFD is written in red WINDSHEAR AHEAD. On the ND is the windshear icon. The aural Caution given on both Take off and Landing is “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY”. On the PFD is written in amber WINDSHEAR AHEAD. On the ND is the windshear icon. If the windshear is in the area between 25º and 40º of the aircraft nose, or in the area between 3 and 5 NM from the aircraft the windshear icon only appears on the ND.

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If the ND range is >10 NM, a message W/S SET RNGE 10 NM appears on the ND. Procedure linked to PWS Predictive windshear alert = highly probable windshear At take o ff. Delay Take Off or Reject during T/O Run If during Take Off roll or initial climb – TOGA, Monitor closely SPEED/SPEED TREND - Ensure that Flight Path clears any shear suspected area, If within the shear do NOT modify A/C configuratio. At landing In case of a Warning or Advisory delay landing (or divert). Envisage using CONF3, Use Managed speed and consider increasing your VAPP. Use autopilot with ILS to help for an earlier detection of vertical path deviation. In case of GO AROUND WINDSHEAR AHEAD message apply TOGA and keep your current configuration until out of the shear. Follow SRS orders until full back stick, if necessary INDICATIONS In addition to the PWS and to inform the crew of unexpected airmass variations there are several cues provided on the EFIS, which assist the pilot in determining significant airmass variations symptomatic of potential presence of microburst. These are available essentially in approach. The cues are: IAS speed trend arrow IAS target during approach (GS mini) FPV Wind information on ND The target speed during approach (VAPP) is a function of GS mini, which causes an increase in VAPP when the head wind increases. The IAS speed trend arrow advises the pilot immediately of head or tail wind gusts. The FPV position relative to the centre of the PFD advises the pilots of the wind direction. If the PF flies a constant track and notices that the relative position of the FPV versus the centre of the PFD varies rapidly, he will realise that the aircraft has experienced a change in the wind direction. A sudden downward movement of the FPV is the first sign that the aircraft is under the influence of a downdraft. PROCEDURE Monitor the energy cues, speed trend, speed trend target movement and the FPV in suspected wind shear conditions. Two features are provided to the crew to assist their monitoring -

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1. the LOW ENERGY warning provided below 2000 ft R/A in CONF = 2 2. the REACTIVE WINDSHEAR warning provided at take off and landing up to 1300 ft R/A in CONF =1. In all cases of significant energy loss immediately apply TOGA and do not change the configuration until out of the windshear. The PF can easily fixate on his PFD so the PNF should respond to the “WindshearGo” call by confirming the trajectory by reference to the RA. Once the windshear has been passed the IAS can increase very rapidly so the PNF can call out the actual wind strength as well. As they have TOGA power the ATHR cannot reduce the speed approaching the red line. Brief that they are not expected (or allowed) to overspeed. PRINCIPLES The LOW ENERGY WARNING advises the pilot of a lack of energy (speed or thrust) which limits the manoeuvrability capability of the A/C. The energy level of the aircraft is translated into a value of Angle of Attack as a function of the A/C speed, acceleration, and flight path angle. This Angle of Attack value is compared to a threshold and when it overshoots this threshold a "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" repetitive message is triggered. In shear conditions this is the first warning prior to Alpha Floor. The REACTIVE WINDSHEAR WARNING is provided by the Flight Envelope computer, which computes actual and predicted energy level of the aircraft as an Equivalent Angle of Attack. This Equivalent Angle of Attack is a function of detected head / tailwind change conditions, mean wind component, detected down draft wind, fi ltered by RA value. This Equivalent Angle of Attack is compared to a threshold as a function of the A/C configuration. When the threshold is reached a "WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR" aural warning is triggered, with an associated WINDSHEAR red message on PFD. ALPHA FLOOR condition is processed by the FCPC and triggered by FMGC which engages ATHR and commands TOGA on all engines. ALPHA FLOOR provides an additional level of energy when the A/C AOA gets very high. ALPHA FLOOR is fully automatic and available from lift off to 100 ft RA at Landing. It is inhibited in case of engine failure. The SRS AP/FD pitch mode is used in Take off and Go round so as to ensure the best aircraft climb performance, both with all engines operating and also with an engine failed. However it also ensures a minimum climb out flight path angle, in order to cope with downdraft or windshear situations. This is why the procedure asks the PF to follow the FD pitch bar up to full back stick so as to obey the SRS orders and thus minimise height loss. The High Angle of Attack protection allows the PF to pull full back stick if needed, either to follow the SRS FD BARS or to rapidly counteract a down

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movement of the FPV / a height loss / a deviation below the final path or G/S, or a GPWS warning. Pulling full aft stick provides - maximum lift and minimum drag by automatic retraction of the speed brakes, should those be extended.

INSTRUCTION In the simulator you have three controls with which to train for windshear. These are Predictive windshear, Reactive windshear and Microburst 1. The PWS is used to abandon a take off on line up, reject a take off below 100 kts, deviate from the normal path on take off after rotation, or very strongly encourage a go round on final. Before giving the “Clear to Line Up” call insert a PWS. As the windshear position comes within 40º and 25º of the aircraft axis the Visual advisory symbol will appear (no aural warning). In the fully lined up position the Caution or the Warning (both with audio) will appear if the windshear is closer than 3 or 1.5 nm in front. Inserting a PWS after 100 kts will give the same messages after passing 50 ft. Inserting a PWS when the aircraft is airborne will give good reason to go round when on final (on single engine for example). This would be a normal Go-round as the windshear is still in front of the aircraft. When you insert a PWS you are in fact inserting a Microburst and the position of the centre of the Microburst can be adjusted in relation to the take off, or landing threshold. Because the PWS predicts the presence of windshear we would not normally continue our normal path once aware of the predicted danger. 2. To practice the recovery from unexpected windshear therefore we need the Reactive Windshear function. Selecting Windshear on the IOS gives us the Reactive windshear selection. Generally (according to the simulator) there are three events for the take off case and two for the landing case. There is also a level of severity selection which allows for Low, Medium, or Severe. Do not use the Severe selection as the likelihood of survival is low and this will lead to negative training. The scenario “Before VR” is designed for a large split between V1 and VR and requires the application of TOGA as well as rotation before the end of the runway. The two arrival cases vary in that one occurs quite late on final.

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You can use some ATC terminology such as “Previous aircraft reported turbulence”, or “TX north of the field”. Inserting a TX near the airport can heighten the reality when you become comfortable with such features. It is generally true (but each simulator can be different) that you will not get windshear or microburst from inserting a TX although you may get turbulence. There will be some turbulence associated with all scenarios which is quite realistic, however when the exercise is completed and you remove the event the general turbulence level drops to zero which is not realistic. Reinsert a turbulence value of 5 to 8 % 3. The microburst function allows precise placement of an event such as PWS referenced to the threshold in use.

G.02 TCAS (00:10) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The Traffic Collision Advisory Service monitors the airspace surrounding the aircraft by interrogating the transponder of other aircraft. The reply of the transponders allow the following to be calculated: - the bearing / range to the intruder - the closure rate and - the relative altitude difference and the V/S of the intruder (if mode C-S available). From that data, the TCAS II predicts the TIME TO and the SEPARATION AT the intruder's closest point of approach (CPA). If the TCAS II predicts that the separation is below a safe boundaries a TRAFFIC ADVISORY (TA) is triggered and informs the crew that an INTRUDER is in the vicinity. If the TCAS II predicts there is a collision threat a RESOLUTION ADVISORY (RA) is triggered to maintain a safe separation between the aircraft. The Resolution Advisory is coordinated between your aircraft and the intruder, both using an ATC mode S. The RA's are thus complementary. In case of a RESOLUTION ADVISORY, the crew must follow it promptly and smoothly. The crew should never manoeuvre in the opposite direction of the RA since manoeuvres are coordinated. Always attempt to visually clear the airspace before manoeuvring the aircraft in response to a TCAS Advisory. The purpose of the TA is to advise the crew to attempt to get visual contact with the intruder. No evasive action should be solely based on the TA.

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The TCAS may work only if the intruder's A/C is equipped with a transponder; if the intruder has a Non Altitude Reporting transponder (NAR), then only TAs may be issued based on closure rate. In that case, NAR traffic is not displayed above 14500 ft.

INSTRUCTION As a general rule you should arm the Airport Traffic with one of the levels of traffic. Select a Low or Medium level of traffic but ensure the ND does not get too cluttered and so distract the pilots. There are a number of scenarios in our syllabus and you should start with TA’s and progress to RA’s. Depending on the simulator you may get a countdown to the time of collision. Giving ATC instructions that conflict with an RA will heighten the trainees awareness level. If the simulator has the facility to insert TA’s for an overtaking aircraft it is useful to use this function when the crew have ARC selected on the ND so they need to select NAV in order to see behind. After your initial briefing on the TCAS system you can use the function at any stage of the training.

G.03 USE OF RADAR (00:10) BACKGROUND USE OF RADAR INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The latest radars have 2 functions. These are WEATHER DETECTION & AVOIDANCE and MAPPING. The Weather Radar detects Precipitation Droplets in the form of Rain droplets, Hail, and hail that has commenced to melt (wet hail), Snow, and snow that has commenced to melt (wet snow), and Turbulence associated with any rain or wet hail or snow. The strength of the echo is a function of the drop size, composition and amount. Water particles reflect 5 times as much as ice particles of the same size.

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The primary use of radar is to know where the weather is and after interpreting the radar return to avoid (as far as possible) the area of the weather. The pilot has several tools to operate the radar. - the TILT of the antenna, - the GAIN of the receiver (automatic or manual) and - the MODE of operation (WX, WX + Turbulence, MAP). Some radars provide a Ground Clutter Suppression function which is operative in WX mode and suppresses 85% of stationary targets or ground targets (called GCS). Effective tilt management is the single, most effective key to get a more informative weather radar display. At normal jet aircraft cruising levels the white fluffy cumulus cloud in front is composed of ice crystals and it is not until the temperature is around 0ºC that the cloud becomes water vapour. As water vapour is far more readily seen by the radar than ice crystals we need to tilt the radar down to see the return from the water vapour and not from the ice crystals. If the water vapour contains large droplets the vertical movement in the cloud is strong to allow the build up in droplet size and as there is strong vertical currents there will also be turbulence. The antenna is stabilised. The angle between the weather radar antenna and the local horizon is the TILT. The pilot selectable TILT ANGLE on the radar control panel, (displayed on ND), is the angle between the radar antenna and horizon regardless of the aircraft pitch and bank (if within the stabilisation limits which are typically ?±15° pitch, ±?35° bank). The stabilisation of the antenna is achieved using IRS data. The WET TURBULENCE is characterized by a wide velocity variance between the rain drops. The return velocity variance of the droplets is measured by the Doppler principle. The velocity variance of the droplets creates a return signal frequency shift due to the relative motion between the A/C and the droplets. When the shift is beyond a given threshold, turbulence is detected. Turbulence can be detected up to 50 nm, and only if wet. The analysis of weather, or the adjustment of map returns requires the correct use of the Gain control. When the Gain control is used manually it should be put back to AUTO when no longer required. The gain control allows the detection of the strongest part of a cell displayed in red on ND. Slowly reducing the gain, the red areas (level 3 return) slowly turn into yellow areas (level 2 returns), while yellow areas turn into green ones (level 1 return). The red area which is the last to turn into yellow is the strongest part of the build up. This strongest area has to be avoided by the greatest distance. USE OF RADAR Some values for phases of flight.

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PHASE OF FLIGHT

DETECTION AND MONITORING PROCEDURES

REMARKS

TAXI Clear on parking area, set ND to lowest RNG, TILT DOWN then UP; check appearance/disappearance of GND RETURNS

RADAR CHECK AWAY FROM PEOPLE

TAKE OFF Weather suspected SLOWLY SCAN up to + 10° then TILT + 4°

Scanning along departure path

CLIMB To avoid OVER SCANNING, TILT DOWNWARD as the A/C climbs and maintain GND RETURNS ON TOP OF ND

TILT angle is a function of ALT/ND RANGE

CRUISE Use WX TILT slightly NEGATIVE: maintain GND RETURNS ON TOP OF ND. Use TURB to ISOLATE Turbulence – GAIN to AUTO

No ground returns beyond line of sight Poor ground return over calm sea / even ground

DESCENT During DES, TILT UPWARD about + 1° / 10.000 ft in higher altitudes, then + 1°/5000 ft below 15.000 ft

APPROACH TILT + 4° To avoid ground returns

INSTRUCTION The Weather Radar is functional in all our Simulators and the trainees should use it as they would in normal operations. To heighten their situational awareness when they forget to use it temporarily raise the level of turbulence to a high level. It aids the realism to put TX weather (off track) into any training situation. When you insert a thunderstorm, and before you activate it, you can rotate it, or move its centre. It is also possible to either fix the storm in its position, or to allow it to move as a result of the ambient wind.

G.04 WET RUNWAYS (00:05) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND The session guide for each part of the syllabus details the ambient weather conditions. As far as this part of the training is concerned we only consider whether the runway is Dry or Wet. We do not address any issues in connection with runway contamination as it is not specific to a particular type of aircraft.

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INSTRUCTION The runway condition is to be found (depending on the simulator) on an Environment page. Inserting Rain does not make a Wet runway. Performance information for various contaminations are given in FCOM Volume 2.04.10

G.05 FLIGHT IN SEVERE TURBULENCE (00:05) CONSIDERATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS Flight in Severe Turbulence is not Type Specific so is not addressed in our Transition course. There are however some considerations that need to be discussed with your trainees. The best advice is to avoid areas of severe turbulence either by use of the weather radar (for thunderstorms etc), at the pre-flight planning stage (clear air turbulence forecast in met briefing) or by a change of flight level if turbulence is reported by preceding aircraft. Cruise levels at close to maximum level should not be used when turbulence is anticipated, as there will be a much smaller margin between VMAX and VLS leading to the increased risk of over speed warnings or activation of low speed protections. The appropriate speeds are to be found in the FCOM and QRH. Ensure the Cabin Crew are advised in time to finish and secure the cabin. Both pilots (at all times) should have the lap and crotch part of their seat belts fastened. If the shoulder harnesses are unfastened and retracted there is no need to fasten them in turbulence. However, if the shoulder harness is locked before being removed from the central buckle in order to make it easier to refasten then it should be fastened as the metal buckle will hurt if it hits you due to the turbulence. Keep in mind that the simulator is designed with certain limits and these affect its ability to faithfully represent movement in the rolling and yawing planes.

G.06 GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (00:15) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

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BACKGROUND The GPS is a satellite based radio navigation aid. GPS PRIMARY is an Airbus term defining an operational concept. It means that adequate GPS accuracy and integrity are provided and that GPS is available as the basis for the FM position. The GPS fitted to the Airbus family of aircraft monitors the integrity of the position information provided, and gives indications of when this position information cannot be relied upon. FMGS position calculation. The position calculated by the twin GPS receivers is added to the IRS calculated position producing a GPIRS position. This is then fed to the FMGC’s and a FM position is produced. At take off, even with GPS, the FM position is updated to runway threshold (+ T/O SHIFT if applicable). The FMGC’s will use the GPIRS position as the FM position so long as GPS PRIMARY is indicated on the MCDU PROG page. Reasonableness tests on the GPIRS and IRS positions are carried out and any unreasonable position is disregarded for the purpose of FM position calculation. The table below summarizes how FM position is derived with and without GPS PRIMARY FM POSITION WITHOUT GPS WITH GPS On ground before take-off Mix IRS position GPIRS At take-off Runway threshold (+ T/O shift) GPIRS Flight MIX IRS & Radio Position

-(tending towards Radio Position)

GPIRS

Flight without GPS or Radio Position update

MIX IRS position + Last memorised FM position, gradually tending towards IRS position

Not applicable

FCOM section 1.22.20 FCOM 4.02.20 provides a full description of FMGS position computation. During flight preparation, GPS PRIMARY will be indicated on the MCDU PROG page and the ND. This message should be cleared using the CLR pushbutton. This is a positive confirmation to the crew that GPS is accurate. The GPS workings are transparent to the crew and will only require attention in the case of a fault or a downgrading of the position information. If the GPS status changes, a message will be displayed on the MCDU and ND. The amber GPS PRIMARY LOST cannot be cleared from the ND and is to remind the pilots that GPS is not available. Navigation accuracy up-or downgrade will be shown in the same way as already used for non GPS navigation.

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The following is a list of MCDU pages associated with the use of GPS and a brief description of their use: MCDU PAGE FUNCTION SELECTED NAVAIDS Allows de-selection or selection of GPS GPS MONITOR Display of GPS positions and other GPS derived

information IRS 1 (2) (3) GPIRS Position for each IRS PROG When GPS PRIMARY is shown, indicates that

GPIRS is used for FM PROG position calculation. Navigation accuracy is shown.

PREDICTIVE GPS* Displays information about the predicted availability of GPS at destination ETA or at a particular waypoint

ARRIVAL Allows selection of GPS approach Full descriptions of the above pages can be found in FCOM 4.03.20 The full GPS standard will permit predictions to be made regarding the feasibility of a GPS approach at destination. The calculation involved relies on the number of, and the position of, the satellites at ETA. The “time window” is pilot modifiable. The current status of GPS permits approaches to Cat 1 limits at best. Individual certification authorities are discussing GPS accuracy, reliability and such. Thus, the minima and acceptance of GPS in each country must be checked before using GPS as a prime means of navigation in the approach phase. There are two types of GPS approach: A. GPS OVERLAY APPROACH The aircraft performs an approach along the trajectory of a published non precision approach using GPS position information in GPS PRIMARY navigation mode. Before beginning the approach a check of GPS PRIMARY and HIGH accuracy must be made which replaces the navigation accuracy check. Before the FAF check GPS PRIMARY and HIGH accuracy with a RNP of 0.3 NM or less. Raw data must be displayed and monitored at all times. FCOM 4.05.70 details the procedures to be used. If raw data indicates that the aircraft is not on the required flight path the pilot must revert to raw data to correct the flight path. B. GPS STAND ALONE APPROACH The aircraft is guided along the trajectory of an approach the waypoints of which are not referenced to any ground base navigation aid. If GPS PRIMARY is lost during a GPS Stand Alone Approach, a GPS PRIMARY LOST message in amber will be displayed accompanied by a triple click. If this occurs or there is a navigation accuracy downgrade a Missed

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Approach is normally carried out, unless raw data allows for a satisfactory continuation.

INSTRUCTION Our syllabus is mostly based on GPS being Primary. There can be a situation where there is a NOTAM stating that during a certain period satellite navigation is unavailable. In this case GPS Navigation shall be deselected from the Radio Navigation FMGS page. If GPS Navigation has been de-selected and the crew is flying a Managed Approach after checking the Navigation Accuracy you can force them into a Selected Approach by inserting a Slow Map Shift.

G.07 RVSM AIRSPACE (00:05) BACKGROUND INSTRUCTION

BACKGROUND Increased congestion in available flight levels in various parts of the world have led to the introduction of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima between FL290 and FL410. Instead of 2000ft vertical separation above FL290 in RVSM airspace this is reduced to 1000ft. To achieve the required level of altitude accuracy the use of the auto pilot is mandatory. The levels available are continued from lower levels so that “East” is ODD and “West” is EVEN.

INSTRUCTION Any event that causes the loss of the autopilot or air data requires a PAN call to the effect that the aircraft is no longer RVSM capable. Although not part of our syllabus it is useful to know that an Emergency Descent in RVSM airspace requires Heading selection as the first action.

S.01 SIMULATOR INFORMATION LIMITATIONS REALITY RULES PLANNING DEBRIEFING PREPARATION UNSERVICEABILITIES TRAINEE PERFORMANCE

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LIMITATIONS Full Flight Simulators have evolved so that today it can be hard for a Trainee to say at a given moment whether he is in an aircraft, or a simulator. Modern Full Flight Simulators do have areas where they do not faithfully represent the aircraft. These areas involve movement around the Rolling axis where the roll is limited to about 20º either side of the vertical, and the Yawing axis where movement is limited by the physical restraints of the motion system. The amount of pitch up or down is also dampened from actual values. This is therefore the reason some manoeuvres should be practised without motion (recovery from unusual attitude for example) because the motion system cannot faithfully reproduce the “seat of the pants” feeling from the real aircraft.

REALITY RULES Insist from the first day of referring to reality in all possible areas. This means the trainees should listen to the ATIS on the correct frequency and not refer to the session guide for the meteorological conditions. Radio calls should be made on the correct frequencies. The Ground Engineer should Buzz the cockpit to confirm the request for ground power disconnection. ATC can ask for “Sqawk Ident” and TCAS traffic can be programmed at any suitable stage. We are trying very hard to achieve reality in the FFS. What has been proven many times is that if the trainee thinks he is in an aircraft and not a simulator he will achieve much more from the session.

PLANNING Poor planning by an Instructor can result in wasted time if the radar vectors are unsuitable for the next exercise. Think ahead of the current exercise and plan where you want the aircraft to be when you have completed the present event or demonstration. Do not freeze the simulator position or use the slew, or speed up, function unless you are in IMC. Both of these functions (if the trainees realise they are being used) destroy the reality that we are trying hard to create.

DEBRIEFING Always make written notes during the session with which to debrief. In your Debriefing try and make any criticism constructive. Without giving correct information straight out criticism achieves little. If you don’t know the answer to a question, admit the fact, and find out the correct answer.

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PREPARATION Always take the time to go through the next days session and tell your trainees what preparation you want them to do, and where to find the information. If the first time they hear you talk about a Dual Engine failure, a Dual Hydraulic failure, or the Emergency Electrical configuration is the morning of the session they will be unable to take in all you need to say in the time available. For every session the trainees should be as fully prepared as possible, and this means you have to ensure that they know where to look for all the information that is required to be refreshed before you commence your briefing. In order to do this you need a list of references that you can give your trainees so that if they are not the investigative type they will still have a basic understanding of how the systems work before we try and show them.

UNSERVICEABILITIES You will no doubt come across a situation where you lose time in the simulator due to a Simulator malfunction. Remember you cannot prolong the session by more than about 5 minutes without having a roll on effect to every other session. In cases such as this you need to follow the procedure for the particular Training Centre for an additional session.

TRAINEE PERFORMANCE You may come across a situation where the trainees just haven’t got it right by the end of the session. You need to be very careful how you go about remedying this situation. You have to communicate your concerns to a superior, and arrangements can be made for the trainees to have more sessions. Don’t ever forget to ask yourself whether you would put your family on the trainees aircraft. If you have trouble answering that question then perhaps they are not in the right place! Your job is to help turn out safe, competent Airbus pilots and not to put your trainees up for a Skill test in the hope that they pass.