Political Stability in Thailand

Tamada, YoshifumiTamada, Yoshifumi

(Kyoto University, Asafas)

Table 1 Becoming less democratic Freedomhouse2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

PhilippinesPR 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3CL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

②⑨Vietnam

PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5

LaosPR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6PR 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

⑨

⑩

⑦CambodiaPR 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6CL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Thailand PR 2 2 2 2 3 7 6 5 5 5CL 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4

⑦

⑤Myanmar

PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

MalaysiaPR 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4CL 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

⑪

④Singapore

PR 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6CL 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

BruneiPR 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6CL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

⑥⑦

IndonesiaPR 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2CL 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3

East TimorPR 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3CL 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4

①③CL 3 3 3 3 3

2PR: political rights, CL: civil Liberties 1‐5: free (democratic), 6‐10: partly free, 11‐14: not free

1: best7: worst

less stable as wellless stable as well

Why has Thai politics become lessWhy has Thai politics become less democratic and less stable?

Wh d h it t blWhy and how was it more stable and democratic in the past?p

What are factors affecting stability and democracy?stability and democracy?

3

Discerning administration and regimeDiscerning administration and regimeadministration

stableFigure 1

regime

Thaksin administrationunstable regime

After 2006 coupSamak administration

hi i d i i i

In the 1990sChuan (I)(II) administration

h d

stable

Aphisit administrationYinglak administration

Banhan administrationChawalit administration

unstableTable 2

administration regime democracy

Before 2001 unstable stable democratic

Table 2

Before 2001 unstable stable democratic

2001‐2006 stable stable democratic

Aft 2006 t bl t bl tl d tiAfter 2006 unstable unstable partly democratic

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causes of instability (unpredictability)causes of instability (unpredictability)

One deriving from parliamentary cabinet systemOne deriving from parliamentary cabinet system (representative democracy)

When PM and MPs are not on good termsWhen PM and MPs are not on good terms.Instability of this type is widely observed all over the world In Thailand it stood out in the 1990sworld. In Thailand, it stood out in the 1990s

Another deriving from friction between li d d TSD(Th i lparliamentary democracy and TSD(Thai‐style 

democracy)Peculiar to Thailand needs explanationBecoming conspicuous and visible during Thaksin era

5

duarchy: two national leadersduarchy: two national leaders4 types of representative democracy4 types of representative democracy

(1) Presidential systemU.S.A., South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia

(2) Semi‐presidential system(2) Semi presidential system      Russia, France

( ) l(3) Parliamentary system     U.K., Japan, Singapore, Malaysia

(4) Semi‐parliamentary system   Thailand

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TSD(Thai‐Style Democracy)h

Figure 2a

Constitutional GovernmentMonarchy

Parliamentary Democracy

PoMP PM

Parliament Cabinet Post‐coup period

Po

ConMP PM

Realm of itthiphon

People

Realm of itthiphon(influence) instead of amnat (power or authority)authority)

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TSD (ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ)TSD (ประชาธปไตยแบบไทยๆ)“Democracy with the king as head of state” (ประชาธิปไตยy g (

อันมีพระมหากษัตริยทรงเปนประมุข)

“shared sovereign power by the king and theshared sovereign power by the king and the people” （ราชประชาสมาศัย）

P li i l i h h ki h ldi h Political system with the king holding hegemony“royal democracy”(Thongchai 2011)

“the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn” and more(Hewison and Kengkit 2010: 191)

it l d i l l b lritual and ceremonial role, symbol

network monarchy (McCargo 2004)

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Formation of TSDFormation of TSDexpanding royal power and authority p g y p y

Hop:   1947 coup

Skip: coups in 1957 and 1958Skip:   coups in 1957 and 1958

Jump: October 14 incident in 1973

toppling the military government intoppling the military government in collaboration with students and army chief

admired as ‘democratic’ kingadmired as  democratic  king9

royal power without institutionalization

( )

royal power without institutionalization

(1) The king can intervene in politics in case of need (Kasian 2010a)case of need (Kasian 2010a)

(2) power has not been institutionalized Royal power has hardly been stipulated in the constitution (Thongthong 2005, quoted by Kasian 2010b)

This power has neither the upper limit nor the bottom = flexible but fragilebotto e b e but ag e

& power cannot be inherited

10

Characteristics of TSDCharacteristics of TSDRoyal power and authority depending upony p y p g p(1) Loyalty of the people(2) barami (virtue and charm) of the king(2) barami (virtue and charm) of the king(3) Character of PM  duarchyWeakness(1) barami: indispensable(1) barami: indispensable(2) power and authority: not inheritable (3) l i hi i h(3) zero‐sum relationship with PM

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summarysummaryIn order for TSD to prevail,

A person on the throne should have baramiA person on the throne should have baramiPM should be obedient

blunmanageableDemocratization may be accompanied by a 

h l d d lstronger PM with solid democratic legitimacyRoyal successor may not have barami

Options: how to cope with(1) Keeping the monarchy above politics truly(1) Keeping the monarchy above politics truly.(2) Searching an able and popular successor.(3) Getting rid of strong PMs one after another.

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Figure 3 Elected MPs in the cabinet d li t 1944 2011and parliament, 1944‐2011

90 0%

100.0%

Parliament

80.0%

90.0%

Cabinet

60.0%

70.0%

40.0%

50.0%

20.0%

30.0%

0.0%

10.0%

Aug

‐44

Aug

‐45

Sep‐45

Jan‐45

Jan‐46

Mar‐46

Jun‐46

Aug

‐46

May‐47

Nov‐47

Feb‐48

Apr‐48

Jun‐49

Nov‐51

Dec‐51

Mar‐52

Feb‐57

Sep‐57

Jan‐58

Feb‐59

Dec‐63

Mar‐69

Dec‐72

Oct‐73

Mar‐75

Apr‐76

Oct‐76

May‐79

Mar‐80

Dec‐81

Apr‐83

Aug

‐86

Aug

‐88

Mar‐ 91

Apr‐92

Jun‐92

Sep‐92

Jul‐9

5Dec‐96

Nov‐97

Feb‐01

Mar‐05

Oct‐06

Feb‐08

Dec‐08

Aug

‐11

13

Before 2001

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Unstable administration and stable regime

Instability:Weak PM

Short‐lived administrationShort‐lived administration

Stability:yLittle necessity of changing the regime predictability: elections bringing little changeschanges

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Unstable administrationUnstable administration

MP d tiMP and parties Weak political parties: small membership, no organization, no manifesto, financial dependency

self‐help MPs  uncontrollable and rebelliousp

Coalition government and PMNon‐confidence motion every year parliament dissolution in a few years  defeat every time

PM with weak leadership: compromise > command

no collision with TSD stable regimeno collision with TSD  stable regime16

Stable regimegConservative parties general elections every f i hfew years with

# no concern about the left forces 

# little concern about election results election makes little difference election makes little difference

# the effects of refreshing the regime legitimacydefeat of the largest party = change of the governmentdefeat of the largest party = change of the government 

shock absorbing mechanisms insulating governments/political parties from the voters

vote brokers , no election pledge (manifesto),vote brokers , no election pledge (manifesto), 

money meaning a lot 17

Political Reform and the 1997 Constitution

Mi t ki th d i i t ti i t bilit f liti lMistaking the administrative instability for political instability,

Electoral reform in order toElectoral reform in order to # stabilize the administration# boost the numerical minority (urban middle class))# weaken MPs (and the numerical majority )

Expected! democratic regime comfortable for Expected! democratic regime comfortable for the middle class and TSDUnexpected product! Thaksin administrationUnexpected product! Thaksin administration

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Figure 4 Larger parties in electionsg g p

1957‐II

1957‐II

1976

1975

1969

1986

1983

1979

1st

2nd

1992‐II

1992‐I

19883rd

4th

2001

1996

1995

1992 II

2007

2005

2001

0 50 100

2011

19

Th k iThaksin eraboth were stableboth were stable

20

Strong leadershipg p• Power: Big victory in elections  electoral reform & money& money– controlling the parliament: MPs and factions within TRT and the oppositionTRT, and the opposition

– harnessing the bureaucracy– surpassing financial contributors (capitalists)surpassing financial contributors (capitalists) 

• Popularity: Fascinating the electorate with l li ipopular policies 

MPs elected owing to TRT and Thaksin(1) TRT ticket is critical 

(2) Very popular   ex. Thaksin on campaign poster

b d obedient MPs 21

Figure 5 PM like a president

presidency president‐like PM PM 1997 constitution

首相president PM#Single constituency  larger party#Proportional representation system

election pledge election pledge

Only party list MPs can be ministers

parliament

parliament

Only party list MPs can be ministers

Party list system functions as direct l i felection of PM

Custom to be followed

people people people

PM able to boast double legitimacy, one from the parliament 

22the other from the people

Collision with TSDCollision with TSDLittle problem within the parliamentary democracy

# Unprecedentedly stable administration Completed 4 years term of MPs for the first time in Thai history

# Regime was stable as well The constitution and rule of game (electoral politics) 

ld b t i dwould be retained. Unable to deny this regime without denying 

democracy.democracy.

However, repulsion of TSD toward the strong PMWhy does TSD dislike Thaksin?

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Network monarchy deemedNetwork monarchy deemed Thaksin as threat against TSD 

Thaksin was very popular and able A t bl A Acceptable ex.Anan

Thaksin was not obedientUnacceptable

+ Thaksin was going to control the militaryUnacceptable

The military and the court should be under the control of  network monarchy

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Exorcizing Thaksin: The 2006 coupExorcizing Thaksin: The 2006 coupusual way was useless 

democratic way: the opposition to defeat TRT in general elections

legal way: judicial power to convict Thaksin

special way: military coupspecial way: military coupBlaming Thaksin harshly to justify every measures to expel him‐‐corrupt, anti‐monarchist, dictatorial,….

“good coup” (Thitinan2011)

Unable to comprehend democratic origins of Thaksin

25rooting out Thaksin = denying democracy  challenging the people

[noted later]

Figure 6 unreversible democratizationg

General elections since 1979

PM should be elected MP since 1992PM should be elected MP since 1992

1997 constitution: electoral reform 

Decentralization since 1995

Thaksin administration in 2001Thaksin administration in 200126

Post coup eraPost‐coup eraBoth are unstableBoth are unstable

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Unable to predictUnable to predict# When the administration will be toppled# When the administration will be toppled

# Whether there will be elections

# When general elections will be held

# Whether election results will be acceptedaccepted

# Whether the present constitution will be prevised

28

Figure 7 gu ea case of unpredictability

mainly because ‘invisible yhand’ continues to intervene in politics as they like

‘special order’, ‘special power’, ‘informal power’

Weekly Nation13 May 2011 29

Figure 8 a case of unpredictabilityElection or coup?

Daily News, Sep 20, 2011

(1) Prophecy of a famous monk: Aphisitwill be PM again(2) How?(2) How?(3) Election or coup?

Daily News, Dec 9, 2008

A road to PM of Aphisit(1) military( ) y(2) PAD(3) Rebel MPs 30

Pitfall 1: using the monarchy as aPitfall 1: using the monarchy as a political weapon (justification)

PAD: forcing the people to choose between the monarchy and Thaksinmonarchy and Thaksin

The people: loving both without contradictionLove and respect for the monarch / Love for ThaksinLove and respect for the monarch / Love for Thaksin

PAD:  the monarchy > the people, as source  of l iti / f th i tlegitimacy / owner of the sovereignty

The people: electoral politics is indispensable d f l ( l k h )definitely (unlike the 1991 coup)

cf strong eapon as necessar no other eapon as strongercf. strong weapon was necessary, no other weapon was stronger than this one 

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Pitfall 2: War on electoral politicsIn order to deprive Thaksin of power,

Condemning people for electing ThaksinCondemning people for electing ThaksinPoor, ignorant, easy to be deceived, 

willing to sell votes

Denying democratic legitimacyDenying democratic legitimacyIntent to postpone elections, reject election results and justify coupresults, and justify coup

Resulting in repulsion and awakening

32

Wrath of the electorateWrath of the electoratePeople never give up electoral politicsp g p p

even if they can forsake Thaksin

electoral politics indispensable due to recent democratizationrecent democratization 

“from subjects to citizens” (Aphichat 2011)

H i j t b t t t t f d f th fi t tiHaving just begun to get taste of democracy for the first time

The electorate got angry if deprived of democracy

33

D i di blDemocracy indispensableDemocratizationDemocratization  political leaders should be elected (cf. appointment)

Decentralization + Thaksin administration leaders of national and local governments should show election pledges and carry out them (‘contract’)

Economic and social changes + development ofEconomic and social changes   development of telecommunication technology increasing interest in policies increasing interest in policies

34

unending power struggle destabilizing politics

The monarchy is sacred and inviolable

i i ibl invincible as weapon

Shouldn’t be defeated, but can’t win against electoral politics

Unending struggle to keep politics unstable Unending struggle to keep politics unstable and to awake the people politically

U d i i th h i th d Undermining the monarchy in the end

The monarchy should not be enemy of 

35

y ythe people and democracy

SOLUTIONSOLUTIONRelationship among 

parliamentary system, constitutional t d TSD h ld bgovernment and TSD should be readjustedreadjusted

(0) Regime should be stabilized prior to administrationadministration.(1) Parliamentary democracy should prevail. MPs 

should be elected and inspected by the people.should be elected and inspected by the people. (2) Constitutionalism should prevail. The constitution 

itself should be widely accepted one.y p(3) TSD should fade out to protect the monarchy.

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TSD(Thai‐Style Democracy)Constitutional GovernmentFigure 9 (Figure 2b)

Constitutional Government

Monarchy

Parliamentary Democracy

MP PM

Parliament Cabinet

MP PM

People

37

Selected referencesAphichat Sathitniramai(อภิชาต สถตินิรามัย). 2011. “จากไพรฟาสูความเปนพลเมือง(From Subjects to Citizenship) ”, Prachathai, 13 May 2011. Hewison, Kevin and Kengkit Kitirianglarp. 2010 “ ‘Thai‐Style Democracy’ ”, Søren Ivarsson and g g p y yLotte Isager (eds), Saying the Unsayable (NIAS, 2010), pp. 179‐202.McCargo, D. 2005. ‘‘Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,’’ Pacific Review, 18(4): 499‐519.Nithi Iosiwong(นิธ ิเอียวศรีวงศ). 2011. “ขบวนการคนเสื้อแดงกับสังคม-การเมืองไทย (1)(2)”, Matichon (Online), Sep g( ) ( ) , ( ), p19 and 26 2011.Kasian Techaphira(เกษียร เตชะพรีะ), 2010a. “ระบอบประชาธิปไตยแบบหลัง 14 ตุลาคม”, Matichon (Online), Oct 15, 2010.‐‐‐‐. 2010b. “ลักษณะของประชาธิปไตยแบบหลัง 14 ตลาฯ : พระราชอํานาจ”, Matichon (Online), Oct 22, 2010.ุ , ( ), ,Phit Phongsawat(พิชญ พงษสวสัดิ์). 2007. การเมืองของไพร (กทม, Openbooks)Sirote Khlamphaibun(ศิโรตม คลามไพบูลย). 2011. ) ประชาธิปไตยกเ็รื่องของ”เรา” (กทม, สํานกัพิมพศยาม).

Tamada, Yoshifumi. 2008. Myths and Realities: The Democratization of Thai Politics (Kyoto UP)UP).‐‐‐‐. 2008.  "ประชาธิปไตย การทําใหเปนประชาธิปไตย และการออกจากประชาธิปไตยของประเทศไทย ", ฟาเดียวกนั 6(4): 98‐139.‐‐‐‐. 2009. “Democracy and Populism in Thailand”, Mizuno and Pasuk (eds), Populism in Asia (Singapore: NUS Press), pp.94‐111. Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2011. “Few voiced opposition to the 'good coup'”, Bangkok Post, 19 Sept 2011.Thongchai Winichakul. 2008. “Toppling Democracy”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 38(1): 11‐37.‐‐‐‐. 2011. “เสวนาชุด 5 ปรัฐประหาร (1) ธงชัย วนิิจจะกูล: สังคมไทยกับภาวะการหลอกตัวเอง”, Prachathai, 27 Sept 2011.

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