The Early Marx and Hegel: the Young-Hegelian Mediation

Emmanuel Renault

There is no doubt that between 1841 and 1845, Marx's relation to Hegel is decisive for him. Marx refers frequently to Hegel and in the Jahrbucher as well as in the Parisian Manuscripts he presents his own critical project as a critique of Hegel. Hence, it is not surprising that scholarship devoted to the early Marx usually considers his relation to Hegel as central. It could be considered as central from a double point of view: firstly because Marx’ thought, between 1841 and 1844, seems to remain strongly indebted to the Hegelian system, secondly, because Marx writings of that time are unfolding a multilayered critique of Hegel. This double relation to Hegel has made possible a double interpretation, the first of which insists on the Hegelian legacy, whereas the second emphasizes the break with Hegel. An illustration of the first type of interpretation is provided by Solange Mercier-Josa according whom the Early Marx is constantly attempting to become a better Hegelian than Hegel himself1. On the contrary, according to Althusser, as early as 1843, Marx's Feuerbachianism is not so much a way of transforming Hegel as a way of escaping from Hegelianism2.

Although opposed, these two types of classical interpretations usually share common methodological assumptions. They consider that the Young Hegelian context of Marx’ writings hasn’t played any decisive role in Marx's relation to Hegel. Its only role is supposed to be negative. According to the first or Hegelian type of interpretation, the early Marx would have been trying to struggle against the wrong Hegel reading proposed by the Young-Hegelians, and especially against its subjectivist and moralistic bias. According to the opposite or Anti-Hegelian interpretation, the Young-Hegelian context would have been significant only as far as Feuerbach would be concerned, a Feuerbach who would have become totally external to the Hegelian movement by the end of the 1830’s. These assumptions seem to me highly questionable since Marx's relation to Hegel between 1841 and 1844 is highly context-dependent, and since this context-dependence has implications for his positive relation to Hegel as well as for his critique of Hegel. In what follows, I will claim that the positive references to Hegel are attuned to Hegel interpretations that have been elaborated inside of the Hegelian school. I will also contend that the critique of Hegel is strongly dependent on the various relations to Hegel that are characteristics of Left-Hegelianism and Young Hegelianism. These two claims rely upon two presuppositions that require preliminary clarification.

The first assumption is that Left-Hegelianism and Young-Hegelianism have a more complex relation to Hegel than usually acknowledged. The Young Hegelian movement is often considered either as a mere transition between Hegel and Marx (according to the classical Marxian approach of Cornu for instance3), or as a falling below Hegel (as a return to the

1 S. Mercier Josa, Pour lire Hegel et Marx, E. S, Paris, 1980.2 L. Althusser, Pour Marx, Maspéro, Paris, 1965. Consequently, Althusser wonders why Marx feels obliged to go back to a Hegel critique in the Parisian Manuscripts, since he is supposed to have become a Feuerbachian anti-Hegelian for more than one year…3 A. Cornu, Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, T. 1 and 2, P.U.F., Paris, 1955, 1958.

1

Kantian or Fichtean idealism, as in Mclellan for instance4), or as an anticipation of post-marxian themes (as in Löwith or Habermas for instance5). The intimate relation of Left-Hegelians and Young-Hegelians to Hegel is usually underestimated, as well as the variety of the forms of this intimate relation. Now, taking the Young Hegelian movement into account in its essential links with Hegel and in its internal variety, sheds a new light on Marx's own relation to Hegel. In what follows, one of my claims is that most of the time when Marx refers to Hegel, he is either using some Young Hegelian interpretation, or taking part in some Young Hegelian debate about the legitimate uses and interpretations of Hegel.

In what follows, I will also assume that between 1841 and 1844, Marx remains a Young-Hegelian6. In 1841, he works in close cooperation with one the main members of the Young Hegelian movement, Bruno Bauer7. In 1842-1843, he becomes the editor of one of the main journals of the Young Hegelian movement, Die Rheinische Zeitung. In 1843/1844, he is the coeditor of the Deutsch-Französiche Jahrbücher, with Arnold Ruge, another central member of the Young Hegelian movement8. In the Marx scholarship, there is a certain tendency to locate the break with the Young Hegelian movement as soon as possible. For instance, the Deutsch-Französiche Jahrbücher has been identified as a theoretical and political break with Young Hegelians9. But the close collaboration with Arnold Ruge, the pregnancy of the debate with Bruno Bauer and the centrality of the relation to Hegel in Marx's work makes this interpretation questionable. Between 1841 and 1844, it is seems hardly disputable that Marx was a member of the Young-Hegelian movement, and that he conceived himself as such a member just as well as he was conceived as a central member of this movement. Engels’s article “Progress of social Reform on the continent”, date November 1843, provide a clear illustration of these facts 10. It is usually not disputed that the Parisian Manuscripts achieve a final break with the Young Hegelian movement, and pave the way to a materialist account of history as well as to a long lasting critique of political economy11. But if this was the case, it would be difficult to understand why, one year later, in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels engage them in such an elaborate criticism of Bruno Bauer and his Berlin friends. It would be even more difficult to understand why their criticism remains so important in what would become The German Ideology12. It makes no doubt that the Parisian Manuscripts kicks off a series of attempts to find the best way to break with the core presupposition of Young-Hegelianism as a whole. Nevertheless, until 1845, Marx intellectual work remains embedded in the social and theoretical world of the Young Hegelian movement: he elaborates his ideas through confrontations of the other members of this movement (Bauer, Ruge, Stirner, Hess), 4 D. McLellan, The Young Hegelian and Karl Marx, Macmillan, London, 1969.5 See K. Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964 and J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.6 For an attempt to read the early Marx, until 1845, as a Young Hegelian, see E. Renault, “Philosophie”, in G. Duménil, M. Löwy, E. Renault, Lire Marx, PUF, Paris, 2010.7 On B. Bauer as a central member of the Young-Hegelian movement, see Herbert De Vriese, De Roes van de Kritik. Bruno Bauer en “die Freien”, ASP, Brussel, 2012. 8 On A. Ruge as central member of the Young-Hegelian movement, see W. Bunzel, M. Hundt, L. Lambrecht, Zentrum und Peripherie: Arnold Ruges Korrespondenz mit Junghegelianern in Berlin, Peter Lang, Bern, 2006.9 S. Kouvelakis, Philosophie and Revolution: From Kant To Marx, Verso, London, 2003.10 See MEW 1, p. 480-196.11 For a criticism of this classical reading, see E. Renault (ed.), Lire les Manuscrits de 1844, PUF, Paris, 2008.12 See Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 2003.

2

and what matters to him is to overcome the theoretical and political shortcoming of the various positions elaborated inside of this movement.

The tendency to locate the theoretical and political break with Young Hegelians as soon as possible usually rests upon an over-restricted definition of the Young Hegelian movement that underestimates its internal diversity. Such underestimation has led to consider that not only Marx, but also Bruno Bauer was external to this movement13. As soon as the Young Hegelian movement is relocated in the complicated becoming of the Hegelian school, a broader definition of this movement is possible, and it becomes possible to avoid such paradoxical implications. In what follows, I will focus on Marx relation to Hegel between 1841 and 1844, that is in Marx’s Young Hegelian period. I will try to delineate the splits of the Hegelian school that gave rise to the Left-Hegelian movement before the emergence of the Young-Hegelian movement. I will try to articulate the various uses and interpretations of Hegel that have been elaborated through these splits of the Hegelian school, and I will try to show that Marx’ uses and interpretations of Hegel, far from being at odds with those of Left and Young Hegelianism, is attuned to them. I will proceed in four steps. The first will deal with Left-Hegelianism, the second with some Left-Hegelian themes in Marx's relation to Hegel, the third will deal with Young-Hegelianism and the fourth with some Young-Hegelian themes in Marx’ relation to Hegel.

Hegelian School and Left-Hegelianism

The terms “Left-Hegelianism” and “Young-Hegelianism” are often considered as synonymous but they should be distinguished from a historical or philological perspective as well as from a systematic perspective: from an historical perspective because they have been used by different members of the Hegelian school and in the context of different splits of the Hegelian school; from a systematic perspective because they are associated with different logics of interpretation and use of Hegel.

Left-Hegelianism was a term coined by Strauss in 1837 and used by those who identified themselves with his cause, in the framework of what can be conceived of as the first split of the Hegelian school14. Young Hegelianism was a term coined by Leo in his criticism of the emerging Left-Hegelian school (Die Hegelinge, 1838). Initially coming from outside of the Hegelian school, it was appropriated by some members of this school after a process of internal radicalization of the Left-Hegelian movement. It is notably used by Bruno Bauer in his Posaune, dated 1841. It was then used as a way of denoting what could be conceived of as a second split of the Hegelian school, a split internal to the Left-Hegelianism. It is not the place to enter in the philological intricacies of the various uses of these two terms15. For my purpose, it will suffice to describe broadly the type of relationship to Hegel that was involved 13 The belonging of B. Bauer to the Young-Hegelian movement has been contested by M. Hundt, “War Bruno Bauer Junghegelianer?” in K.-M. Kodalle/T. Reitz (eds), Bruno Bauer (1809-1882). Ein „Partisan des Weltgeistes“?,Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg, 2010, p. 177-184.14 On D. F. Strauss and his role in the splitz of the Hegelian school, see L. Lambrecht, “David Friedrich Strauß: Seine Fraktionen der Hegel-Schule, seine Charakterisierung Schleiermachers und das ›lange 19. Jahrhundert‹”, in V. H. Drecoll, B. Potthast (eds.), David Friedrich Strauß als Schriftsteller – Werk und Wirkung, forthcoming.

3

in conflict of the Left against the Right, and the new relationship to Hegel that was involved in the emergence of the Young-Hegelian movement after 1841.

The distinction between a Left and a Right is used for the first time by Strauss in 1837, in the third volume of the defense of his Life of Jesus (Zeitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der Gegenwärtigen Theologie). This distinction is intended to reply to the members of the Hegelian school who rejected his own interpretation of Hegel’ philosophy of religion, in order to clear the Hegelian school of all accusations of irreligion. As a reply, Strauss shows that there are two opposite orientations in Hegel’s philosophy of religion, one positivist that is inherited from Schelling (“positive” being referring to the idea of Schelling’s project of a “positive philosophy”), and one critical that is mainly developed in the Phenomenology and its critique of Schelling. As a consequence, there are not one but two possible interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy of the religion, and more generally, it is possible to divide the Hegelian school into a Right and a Left, the Right wing following the positivist orientation and the Left the critical orientation.

This opposition between the positivist and the critical dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy is elaborated by Strauss in reference to two different interpretative issues: the first one relates to the relation between religious representations and philosophical concepts16, the second relates to the identification of rationality with actuality (Wirklichkeit), more precisely, to the interpretation of the famous Hegelian double dictum 'The rational is actual and the actual is rational'17. With regard to the first issue, the Right wing states that the conceptual discourse of the philosophy should not be more than a translation of what is given by the religious representation (that is by the Bible) whereas the Left contends that the formal transformation of religious representations into concepts goes with a transformation in the very content of the representations, that is with criticism. With regard to the second issue, the Right wing considers the identity between the rational and the actual as something that has already been achieved whereas the Left considers it as a processual identity still in the process of becoming.

In its intention, the distinction between a Right and a Left was nothing more than an attempt made by Strauss to vindicate his own interpretation of Hegel and to locate it inside of the space of the various interpretations already elaborated by the Hegelian school. But the Left he described from a mere theoretical point of view became soon a practical reality. In 1838, A. Ruge and Echtermeyer founded the Hallische Jahrbücher, and the opposition between the Left and Right wings of the Hegelian school then became institutionalized through the opposition between the Berliner Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik and the Hallische Jahrbücher. The opposition of these two journals concerned both the interpretation and the use of Hegel. With regard to interpretation, the issue at stake was whether Hegel’s philosophy of the State and Religion was conservative or reformist. With regard to use, the question at issue was whether the Hegelian school should commit itself mainly to the defense of Hegel

15 See E. Renault, « Droite/Gauche, Jeune/Vieux : les scissions de l’École hégélienne entre 1837 et 1843 », forthcoming.16 E. § 573. 17 Gr. Vor. ; E. § 6, Anm.

4

against his enemies and application of the system to the various branches of the knowledge, or whether it should try to contribute introducing the principles of the system into the political and cultural life of the time. Hence, the Straussian opposition between criticism and positivism developed itself into the opposition between conservatism and reformism, and between theoretical defense and practical application of the system.

Let me now sketch an overview of the Left-Hegelian relationship to Hegel. Just as with the Right-Hegelians, their objective was to realize, or to achieve, Hegel’s system18. But the Right and the Left were referring to different Hegelian models of realization. The Right conceived of realization as “Realisierung”, through the model of the transition of the Science of the Logic into the Philosophy of Nature19. On the contrary, the Left conceived of realization as “Verwirklichung”, through the model of the realization of freedom in the world historical process20. According to Left-Hegelian interpretation of the double dictum, contemporary culture and society was not yet rational but still in a process of rationalization. Philosophy itself had a role to play in this process. According to their interpretation of the identity of the concept and the representation, philosophy should not only articulate the rational core of contemporary religious and cultural representations, but also criticize their irrational elements. And the rational requirements of the philosophical discourse should be applied to the whole sphere of the contemporary culture and society and not only to the subject matter of high scientific interest. This latter idea could be related to the project of a realization of philosophy in new sense, a sense in which the accomplishment of the system goes with a Verweltlichung , that is a “becoming wordly” as well as a "becoming mundane" of philosophy. According to Hegel himself, modern philosophy tends to transform itself into a “Weltweisheit” 21, into a wisdom of the mundane, and it should engage in such a becoming mundane, since modernity is a process in which the ideal becomes real, and since philosophy has to explain how the rational can become vivid in the historical world.

It is worth noting that these interpretations and uses of Hegel were considered by the Left-Hegelians as genuinely Hegelian and that they were supported by some of Hegel’s closest disciples, notably by Michelet and Gans. Already in 1832, in his Contributions to the Revision of the Prussian Legislation, Gans contended that the Prussian state remained far from the “constitutional state” or the “absolute state” and that it would necessarily be transformed by the historical process22. One year before, in 1831, in an article checked by Hegel himself, Michelet had highlighted that the philosophy has not only to reflect on the historical world that it comes from, but also to contribute to the rational evolution of history. Therefore, he pointed out, the relation of philosophy to history shouldn’t be depicted only through the image of the owl of Minerva, but also through the image of the cock that announces the dawn23. According to such interpretations, the Hegelian philosophy has a historical dimension as well as a historical function, so that it is not surprising that in Michelet’s reading, philosophy of 18 W. Essbach, Die Junghegelianer. Soziologie einer Intellektuellengruppe, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1988, p. 108-160.19 Gr. § 342.20 W. 6, p. 555.21 W. 12, p. 528.22 E. Gans, Philosophishe Schriften, Detlev Auvermann, Glaushütten im Taunus, 1971, p. 313.23 C. L. Michelet, « Rezension zu Troxler, Logik », Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1831, 1, p. 697.

5

history becomes the center of the system. In 1832, in the first volume of the first edition of Hegel’s works, Michelet contended that “the philosophy of world history has to be considered as the end and as the summit of Hegel’s philosophical activity”24. To say that philosophy of history is the summit of Hegel’s system means that the “absolute spirit”, that comes after “history” in the system and that provides the specific location of philosophy, should not be conceived of as something transcending history, but rather as a systematic reflection on the historical dynamics of rationalization that underpin the present. The consequences of the realization of philosophy as a becoming world and becoming mundane were also drawn when Hegel was still alive. According to a famous letter of Feuerbach to Hegel, dated November 1828, the tasks of the Hegelian school were the following: breaking the limits of the Hegelian school in order to transform the system into a new historical conception of the world and a new historical world.

Some Left-Hegelian themes in Marx relation to Hegel

Up to now, I have described a stage of the development of the Left-Hegelianism that is anterior to the emergence of Young-Hegelianism. Nevertheless, since Young-Hegelianism results from a transformation of the Left-Hegelianism, it is not surprising that the general framework of the Left-Hegelian relation to Hegel remains important for many Young-Hegelians. This is the case for Marx, not only in his Doctoral dissertation, where he endorse the Left-Hegelian project of a realization of the system through criticism25, or in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher where the critique of Hegel is the means of all criticism, but also in the Parisian Manuscripts.

It is striking that here, in a text which is often considered the final break with Young-Hegelianism, Marx uses the Straussian opposition of the positivist and critical orientations of Hegel’s philosophy (although Strauss is mentioned negatively in this manuscript), and that he also follows Strauss when he associates the critical Hegel with the Phenomenology of Spirit26. Indeed, the critical element of the Phenomenology is conceived of through a theory of alienation that comes from Young-Hegelianism (from Bruno Bauer) rather that from the Left-Hegelianism of the 1830s27, and it is also clear that Marx aims at criticizing Left and Young Hegelianism and their “uncritical” way of using the critical elements of the system, as if they

24 K. L. Michelet, Einleitung in Hegel’s philosophische Abhandlungen, 1832, p. XVI-XVII.25 The practice [Praxis] of philosophy, however, is itself theoretical. It is the criticism which measures individual existence against essence, particular actuality against the idea. But this direct realization (Realisierung) of Philosophy is burdened with contradictions in its innermost essence.26 Despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the genuine criticism contained in it, which often anticipates far later development, there is already latent in the Phänomenologie as a germ, a potentiality, a secret, the uncritical positivism and the equally uncritical idealism of Hegel’s later works – that philosophic dissolution and restoration of the existing empirical world (…). As it depicts man’s estrangement, even though man appears only as mind, there lie concealed in it all the elements of criticism, already prepared and elaborated in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint. The “unhappy consciousness”, the “honest consciousness”, the struggle of the “noble and base consciousness”, etc., etc. – these separate sections contain, but still in an estranged form, the critical elements of whole spheres such as religion, the state, civil life, etc.27 On the influence of Bauer’s mediation in the Hegel reading of the third manuscript, see D. Wittmann, “Les sources du concept d’aliénation”, in E. Renault (ed.), Lire les Manuscrits de 1844, op. cit., p. 100-105.

6

were totally independent of positivistic aspects. But it remains that when he writes that the Phenomenology of Spirit entails elements that “often rise far above the Hegelian standpoint”, the intention is clearly to refer to Hegelian elements that could be used for a criticism of Young-Hegelianism. So the idea that the Phenomenology of Spirit outlines a philosophy of history as work. It is worth noting that in this criticism of Young-Hegelianism, Marx draws on two Left-Hegelian themes, the distinction between the critical and the positive elements of the system, and a reading of Hegel’s philosophy of history as the heart of the system.

The Straussian idea that the system itself is polarized by two opposite orientations seem to be decisive for Marx relation to Hegel between 1841 and 1844. In a famous note of the Doctoral dissertation of 1841 (Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature), Marx draws on the Straussian idea that the system is essentially polarized by two opposite orientations, in order criticize the very idea of an accommodation of the system to its time. As it has been used by Ruge in 184128, the notion of accommodation refers to a contradiction between the principle of the system and the theory of the present, this contradiction being either unconscious or conscious. Hegel is supposed to have been either unable or afraid to draw all the consequences of the principles of his own philosophy. But according to Marx, if such apparent contradictions are possible, it is because they are compatible with the very principles of the system, so that they have to be explained by some inadequacies in these principles. Instead of explaining the contradictions between the principles and the consequences by a factor external to the system, in other words, in psychological or moral terms (inability or lack of courage), they have to be explained by a contradiction internal to the system29.

The rest of the note confirms that this internal contradiction in Hegel's system is conceived of through Straussian lenses, since it elaborates the idea that the system contains a critical and a positivist orientation. Instead of repeating Strauss analysis, Marx historicizes it. According to him, the critical and the positive orientations of the system have to be interpreted in historical terms, that is, as expression of the conflict between rational and irrational elements that define the historical situation. And as soon as Hegelian school tries to achieve not only the speculative goals but the historical function of the system, the conflict between the two orientations cannot but come to the fore. Given that the historical function of Hegelian philosophy is to participate in the historical process of the realization of the rational, the critical orientation cannot remain compatible with the positive one, that is with the justification of the irrational. The Hegelian school cannot but to divide into opposite parties. The critical or liberal party, that is the Left-Hegelian, has to reject the positive elements of the system in their endeavors to transform the irrational elements of the contemporary world. On

28 A. Ruge, “Über das Verhältniss von Philosophie, Politik und Religion (Kants und Hegels Accomodation)”, in Sämtliche Werke, Mannheim, 1847, vol. IV, p. 254-297.29 It is conceivable that a philosopher commits this or that apparent non sequitur out of this or that accommodation. He himself may be conscious of it. But he is not conscious that the possibility of this apparent accommodation is rooted in the inadequacy of his principle or in its inadequate formulation. Hence, if a philosopher has accommodated himself, his disciples have to explain from his inner essential consciousness what for him had the form of him had the form of an exoteric consciousness.

7

the contrary, the conservative or positive party, that is the Right-Hegelian, has to put aside the critical elements of the system in order to make it compatible with the historical world30.

In this historicization of the Left-Hegelian opposition between the critical and the positive, Marx is clearly relying upon a historization of the Hegelian philosophy, something that is also characteristic of Left-Hegelanism and that can be traced back to Michelet as we have seen. Following Michelet, he is assuming that the historical function of the system cannot be depicted only by the image of the owl: in Marx's own terms, the “world historical character of the system” expresses itself in its “becoming worldly”, that is, in the very form of the Verweltlichung that the Young Feuerbach was calling for. Describing the contradictions of this becoming worldly, Marx is also assuming a processual interpretation of the actual as a conflict between rational and irrational elements, in total conformity with the Left-Hegelian interpretation of the double dictum that we have read in Strauss and Gans. In total conformity with contention that philosophy is not to be conceived of as an absolute spirit transcending history but as a reflection on the rational dynamics of history, Marx shows that the dynamic of the philosophical debate is nothing else than the reflective development of the historical contradictions between the rational and the irrational. These Left-Hegelian themes are also at play in a famous letter to Ruge, dated September 1843.

The Hegelian tone of this letter is striking. Marx is not only approaching history in a Hegelian way when he writes that “the reason has always existed, but not always in a rational way”. He also articulates it with reference to the Hegelian thesis that the state is the most rational institution of the social world. After having specified modernity as the higher stage of rationalization, he also asserts that the state is the purest expression of the rational principles as well as of the conflict between the rational and the irrational31. Furthermore, he mentions the Left-Hegelian theme of the Verweltlichung of philosophy to give a new formulation of the connection between historical contradictions and philosophical conflicts. He writes that “Now philosophy has become mundane, and the most striking proof of this is that philosophical consciousness itself has been drawn into the torment of the struggle, not only externally but also internally”. Instead of being a way of explaining philosophical conflicts, the internal connection between philosophical and historical conflicts is now intended to justify a direct participation of philosophy in political conflicts.

These references to history and the becoming mundane of philosophy are more than a residue of Hegelianism. They intervene in a polemical context where the target is notably the attempt

30 While philosophy, as will, turns toward the apparent world, the system is reduced to an abstract totality, that is, it becomes one side of the world facing another (...). The consequence, hence, is that the world’s becoming philosophical is at the same time philosophy’s becoming wordly, that its realization is at the same time its loss, that what it combats outside is its own inner defect (…). Finally, this duality of philosophical self-consciousness manifests itself in double directions which are diametrically opposed. The one, which we may generally call the liberal party, adheres to the concept and the principle of philosophy as its main determination; the other to its non-concept, to the element of reality. This second direction is positive philosophy. 31 As far as real life is concerned, it is precisely the political state – in all its modern forms – which (…) contains the demands of reason. And the political state does not stop there. Everywhere it assumes that reason has been realised. But precisely because of that it everywhere becomes involved in the contradiction between its ideal function and its real prerequisites. From this conflict of the political state with itself, therefore, it is possible everywhere to develop the social truth.

8

made by Ruge to ground criticism on a “new” philosophy, completing Hegel by Kant and Fichte on the one hand, and by Feuerbach on the other. The reference to the becoming mundane of philosophy targets not only those Left-Hegelians who believed that it would suffice to apply the system to the historical world to make it more rational32, a position that Marx described in 1841 as an attempt to achieve the realization of the system though “immediate realization” (unmittelbare Realisierung). It also targets Ruge’s attempt to ground criticism on a new principle conceived of as the principle of the future. Against this conception of a philosophy of the future (which as we shall see below is characteristic of Young Hegelianism), Marx recalls the Left-Hegelian principle according to which philosophy belongs to its own time and should conceive itself as a reflection on the historical dynamics of rationalization that are immanent in the present33. It is interesting to note that in this criticism of what Marx calls dogmatism, he relies upon another aspect on the Left-Hegelian conception of critique. We have already recalled that Right- and Left-Hegelianism contrastingly defined philosophy as the translation of representations into concepts and as the criticism of representations. When Marx defines critique as “self-clarification (critical philosophy) to be gained by the present time of its struggles and desires”, or as “reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself, whether it manifests itself in a religious or a political form endorsing”, he is endorsing the Left-Hegelian conception of criticism as transformation of what is implicit in representation but is not articulated in a rational way. He endorses it not against the Right-Hegelian definition of philosophy, but against definitions of philosophy as freedom of thought (or presuppositionlessness34) and of criticism as a break with the present which were characteristic of Young Hegelianism, as we shall see shortly. Indeed, Marx's conception of philosophy as self-clarification doesn’t come straightforwardly from Strauss or other Left-Hegelians. It is clearly articulated in reference to the Feuerbachian critique of religion. But in so far as Feuerbach intends not so much to denounce religion as to articulate the “true interpretation” of religious consciousness (the anthropological versus theological interpretation), he remained a Left-Hegelian on this particular methodological point.

Young-Hegelianism and Hegel

Up to now, I have only shown that Marx’s relation to Hegel was mediated by the Left-Hegelian interpretations and uses of Hegel. It is now time to elaborate the second stage of my contextualization of Marx relation to Hegel and to try to read Marx not only as a Left-Hegelian, but more precisely, as a Young-Hegelian.

32 Hitherto philosophers have had the solution of all riddles lying in their writing-desks, and the stupid, exoteric world had only to open its mouth for the roast pigeons of absolute knowledge to fly into it.33 We do not confront the world in a doctrinaire way with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it! We develop new principles for the world out of the world’s own principles. We do not say to the world: Cease your struggles, they are foolish; we will give you the true slogan of struggle. We merely show the world what it is really fighting for, and consciousness is something that it has to acquire, even if it does not want to.34 See H. De Vriese, “Breaking the Idealistic Spell: Mar’s Farewell to the Hegelian Ideal of Presuppositionless Thinking”, paper presented in Marx and Philosophy Society. Annual Conference 2012.

9

In my opinion, the Young-Hegelian movement, whose chief representatives are Bauer, Ruge and Feuerbach, should be conceived of as a threefold transformation of the Left-Hegelianism. The first transformation concerns the political orientation of the Left-hegelianism, the second transformation concerns the interpretation of the system, the third relates the use of system.

A first transformation consists in a radicalization with regard to religion and politics, in a context of political and religious reaction. It is precisely in this context that some Left-Hegelians accepted the term used by Leo , one of the reactionary critics of Left-Hegelianism, in 183835, and endorsed explicitly the political and religious radicalism denounced by him. This process of inversion of the stigma finds its best illustration in Bauer’s Posaune, dated 184136. This radicalization gave rise to a second transformation: a new interpretation of Hegel. Because the Young Hegelians wanted more than the rationalist interpretation of religion that Strauss was advocating, and more than the defense of a constitutional State demanded by Gans, Hegel’s system started to be seen as belonging to the past, as entailing some kinds of accommodation with the irrational aspects of the world of his time. This new interpretation of Hegel gave rise to a third transformation: new uses of Hegel characterized by the necessity of a transformation of the system. This led to two types of operations, the first of which consists in isolating the critical core of the system from the accommodated parts, that is in purifying and radicalizing the Hegelian philosophy. This is the way Bauer goes, drawing on the Phenomenology of spirit in order to transform Hegel’s philosophy into a philosophy of self-consciousness and a critique of alienation that Marx discusses in third Parisian manuscripts. The second operation is one of completion: it consists in completing Hegel with Kant or Fichte, in order to transform the Hegelian philosophy into a philosophy of free action. This is the way Ruge goes37, the way criticized by Marx in the letter dated September 1843. Whereas the Left-Hegelians worked toward a realization of the system through its “immediate application”, the Young-Hegelian contended that this realization requires transformation, through “a war of liberation against the limitations of the system” in Ruge’s terms38. In this context, some Young-Hegelians elaborated a new conception of the becoming mundane of the philosophical activity. This is the case with Feuerbach, who writes in § 20 of the Principles of the Philosophy of the future that “The new philosophy is the realization (Realisation) of the Hegelian Philosophy, and of the philosophy of the past in general, but a realization that is also its negation (Negation)”. What “realization” (as “Realisation”) means is not only the transformation of the rational principles of the system into historical reality (Verwirklichung)”, or the transformation of philosophy into a “Weltweisheit” able to describe such a historical realization; rather, it is also an attempt to redefine the philosophical principles at the very level of the concrete existence of humans, that of the human existence in its sensitive and particular reality39.

35 H. Leo, Die Hegelingen, E. Anton, Halle, 1838.36 B. Bauer, Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen, Otto Wigand, Leipzig, 1841.37 See the Preface to the year 1841 of the Deutsche Jahrbücher.38 Id.39 See his Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (1843), § 45.

10

Because Young-Hegelianism results from various transformations of Left-Hegelianism, it has much more internal diversity than Left-Hegelianism. This diversity concerns notably the way Hegel should be interpreted and used. Being a Young-Hegelian meant participating in debates about the best way of understanding Hegel’s position in world history, the best way to transform his philosophy, and the best way to transform the rational principles of his philosophy into historical reality. Resulting from its internal diversity, such critical discussions were one of the specific features of the Young-Hegelian movement40. What is Hegel’s historical significance? How should his philosophy be transformed? What is the best way to realize it? These three general issues, constantly raised by Marx between 1841 and 1844, and constantly addressed through critical discussions of the contributions of other Young-Hegelians, define the general framework of his relationship to Hegel.

The first question at issue is whether Hegel’s philosophy already belongs to the past, as Ruge and Feuerbach stated, or anticipates the future, as Bauer claimed. I have already noted that the Doctoral dissertation tried to elaborate an intermediary position. This intermediary position is articulated in a more sophisticated way in the 1843 Kreuznach Manuscript (Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State) and in “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction”. Contradicting Ruge and Feuerbach in the latter text, Marx claims that the “German philosophy of right and the state is the only German history which is on a level with the official modern present”. Nevertheless, in the Kreuznach Manuscript, he often criticizes Hegel for trying to find in the past the solution to present contradictions: this is for instance the gist of his criticism of Hegel’s theory of the estates (“Stände”). These two accounts don’t seem compatible with each other, but they are. Marx point is that Hegel sheds light on the contradiction of modern political emancipation, as well as on its secret continuity with the socio-political alienation of the ancient regime. With such a sophisticated interpretation of Hegel’s belonging to his time, conceived of as the modern time of political emancipation, Marx finds a way to reject on the one hand the claim that Hegel’s philosophy already belongs to the past, and on the other hand the claim that the principle of his philosophy anticipates the future. The worth of the system depends on its organic link with the present and on its ability to reflect the historical process, a link and ability claimed by Hegel himself and highlighted by the old Left-Hegelians, as already noted.

The second question at issue concerns the transformation of Hegel’s philosophy. If Young-Hegelianism as a whole can be considered as an attempt to transform Hegelian philosophy, this transformation could be engaged in diverse ways. One option was to reject the accommodated parts of the system, relying solely upon its critical core. We have seen that this option is constantly rejected by Marx. This is the case in the Doctoral Dissertation of 1841, in the Kreuznach Manuscript and in the Parisian Manuscripts, and in these three texts, the gist of the argument is the same. Marx refuses the idea that Hegel’s system could consist of contradicting elements that could be used separately from each other. On the contrary, they should be considered as having a systematic link with each other and their contradiction should be explained “genetically”41, that is by the contradictions of the very principles the 40 W. Essbach, Die Junghegelianer. Soziologie einer Intellektuellengruppe, op. cit.41 Vulgar criticism falls into an opposite dogmatic error. Thus, for example, it criticises the constitution, drawing attention to the opposition Of the powers etc. It finds contradictions everywhere. But criticism that struggles with

11

system. Therefore, what is required is not the extraction of the critical core of the system but the overcoming of the limits of the principles of the system itself. In other words, Marx rejects the naïve and dogmatic use of the critical parts of the system (as in Bauer), as well as all attempts to complete Hegel from an external point of view (as in Ruge), and instead advocates an overcoming of the system through some kind of internal criticism. There is nothing new in the Parisian Manuscripts in this respect, even if everything changes in other respects: this critical operation being no longer conceived of as a participation in the Young-Hegelian discussion, but as an attempt to overcome its shared presuppositions.

The third main issue at stake relates to the realization of philosophy. The claim that philosophy couldn’t be realized without being transformed is typically Young-Hegelian. It refers to the idea that with Hegel, a style of speculative discourse has been brought to its perfect form and that the time has come to use philosophical reflection as a means of knowledge but also as a tool to make the world better. I have already quoted a classical formulation of this claim coming from Feuerbach: “The new philosophy is the realization (Realisation) of the Hegelian philosophy or of all preceding philosophy, but a realization which is simultaneously the negation (Negation), and indeed the negation without contradiction of this philosophy”. Marx probably has this formulation in mind when he states famously in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher that you cannot realize philosophy without realizing it, just as you cannot realize it without abolishing it – “Aufheben” and “Verwirklichen”, the Hegelian concepts, are the two German words used here. There are good reasons to think that the famous Thesis Eleven is another formulation of the second assertion: you cannot transform reality without transforming the contemplative form that defined the traditional understanding of philosophy. Indeed, this Thesis Eleven also gets rid of the other part of the Marxian double dictum: you cannot achieve revolutionary politics without philosophical criticism. This latter claim, typically Young-Hegelian, was decisive in the letter to Ruge dated September 1843, as well as in “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction”. It is no longer the case from the Parisian Manuscripts onwards.

How should the Hegelian system be realized? Here again, two contradicting options seem to be at play, and in both of them, the practical dimension of philosophy is at stake. According to a first option, Hegelian philosophy, as criticism, has its own practical power. This option, supported by Bauer, seems to be endorsed by Marx in 184142. According to a second option, supported by Cieskowski and Hess, and in a way by Ruge, philosophy has to transform itself into a philosophy of action in order to be able to transform the world. This option is supported by Marx in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher when he describes the necessary union between the criticism of the weapon and the weapon of criticism. It is interesting to note that in the Parisian Manuscripts the realization of the Hegelian philosophy is conceived of

its opposite remains dogmatic criticism, as for example in earlier times, when the dogma of the Blessed Trinity was set aside by appealing to the contradiction between 1 and 3. True criticism, however, shows the internal genesis of the Blessed Trinity in the human mind. it describes the act of its birth. Thus, true philosophical criticism of the present state constitution not only shows the contradictions as existing, but clarifies them, grasps their essence and necessity. It comprehends their own proper significance.42 See footnote 25.

12

through another model that draws on the Feuerbach definition of realization as secularization, the return from abstraction to human blood and flesh. It in this sense that Marx wants to transform what he identifies as the Hegelian definition of history as the work of spirit into a history of industry and alienated labor43. It is also in this sense that the Theses on Feuerbach propose to the Young-Hegelian philosophy of action into a philosophy of praxis – the German word “Praxis” having nothing to do with the Aristotelian praxis, but denoting action in its ordinary form44.

I have tried to read Marx as a Young-Hegelian and to show that his relation to Hegel was that of a Young-Hegelian. Like the other Young-Hegelians, Marx believes that Hegel’s philosophy belongs, partly at least, to the past, and that it has to be deeply transformed. Like some Young-Hegelians, such as Ruge and Feuerbach, he believes that philosophical criticism is possible only through an overcoming of the limitations of the Hegelian system, and through a radicalization of the 'becoming mundane' of philosophy. It is true that on particular points, he seems to defend some kind of more orthodox Hegelianism, for instance in the Doctoral Dissertation when he highlights the systematic dimension of the Hegelian philosophy, or in the Letter to Ruge where the immanence of the philosophical criticism in the present and in representation comes to the fore. But this doesn’t mean that he is a Left-Hegelian of old fashion Hegelian rather than Young-Hegelian in these texts. Young Hegelianism was nothing but a space of debate, and the contentions of Left-Hegelianism were the constitutive background of these debates. The Early Marx was surely more deeply Hegelian and for a longer time than Althusser for instance said. But Marx’s own interpretations and uses of Hegel were surely less genuinely Hegelian and less original than the Hegelian readings of his early writing have often claimed. And surprisingly, at least for the defenders of these Hegelian readings, in his (Young-)Hegelian period, Marx doesn’t seem to pay any attention to dialectics… Maybe the Hegelian permanent deposit in Marx’s though should be better articulated in terms of “criticism” than in terms of “dialectics”45.

Emmanuel Renault

43 On the criticism of Hegel in the Parisian Manuscripts, see J.-M. Buée, “Les critiques de Hegel entre 1843 et 1845”, in E. Renault (ed.), Lire les Manuscrits de 1844, op. cit., p. 35-50.44 Compare with the kantian discussion of the relationship between what is true in theory and what is true in « Praxis ». About the meaning of the terms “Tat”, “Handung” and “Praxis”, see E. Renault, “Le primat fichtéen du pratique et ses avatars”, in S. Haber (ed.), L’action dans la philosophie contemporaine, Ellipses, Paris, 2004.45 For a defense of this hypothesis, see E. Renault, Marx et l’idée de critique, PUF, Paris, 1995 and “Qu'y a-t-il au juste de dialectique dans Le Capital de Marx ? ”, in F. Fischbach (ed.), Relire le Capital, PUF, Paris, 2009.

13