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Introduction Readings

Reading 1: Here’s how to get 100% on your essay!

Here’s how to get 100% on your essay!

Marks for essays are awarded according to the quality of the answer you give. In assessing quality a number of considerations are taken into account. These are listed and explained below. The more you satisfy these requirements, the higher your mark will be. You are advised to use this section as a checklist before, during, and after you write an essay.

Know Your Purpose!

The purpose of the essay is to persuade the reader that you have an adequate understanding of the issues, that your conclusions on the topic are valid, and that you can argue your case in a rational, informed and open-minded way.

Answer the Question!

You must answer the question. This may sound elementary and it is. But it is often forgotten. Failing to answer the question is the most common reason for getting a low grade. Answering the question means avoiding wandering off the topic and writing sentences that are irrelevant. It also means addressing the entire question, not just part of it. To answer the question you must first read the question carefully and think about what it means.

Before writing, read!

To write a good essay, read a variety of works. Relying on the chapters and readings supplied is likely to result in an essay that is, at best, barely adequate. The reading list for this course provides you with a list of works worth reading. These works are available through electronic access. There are, of course, many other reputable academic journals and books worth reading, some in the Library and some available on the web. Eschew works on the web that have not been subject to a proper process of quality control.

Start with shorter works from the reading lists, such as encyclopedia entries and book chapters, before looking at journal articles and books. Make sure all your reading is relevant. Skim. Find the relevant bits. Learn how to avoid wasting time ploughing through material not relevant to your essay. As important as the knowledge you gain at university will be the

techniques of researching and writing so develop those skills well. Acquire good habits of planning work, recording thoughts, taking notes, organising material, structuring essays and writing well.

Before reading, think!

Think hard about the question, and work out a provisional position, before undertaking reading. Having thought about the issues raised by the question your reading is likely to be more productive and you will be in a better position to decide what is relevant and what is not, and to make notes accordingly. Be prepared to revise your position in the light of your reading.

Have an Argument!

An academic essay must have an argument. This does not mean that you will present only one point of view. Rather it means that you explore the issue by way of a clear and consistent development of ideas and using adequate evidence. The reader of the essay has no interest in your opinions, only in your argument.

Be Critical!

An essay must be critical. You cannot simply present the views of other authors without saying whether you agree or disagree with them. You must criticise their work and develop your own position and view on the issue. You must quote or refer to writers only if you intend to use or build on their comments.

Prove it!

Back up your argument with evidence. Evidence takes the forms of facts, interpretations of facts, concepts, quantitative data, and quotations. These are the raw material of your essay but they have no significance unless you use them to develop a reasoned argument. To develop such a systematic point of view, adhere to the following principles:

Impose Structure and Ordering!

Your essay should have a clear structure. Many students find this the most difficult aspect of writing a good essay. It thus deserves particular attention. An essay that rambles on, making one point after another in no apparent order and with no clear pattern, is an essay lacking structure. Readers of such essays will usually have no sense of where they are being led, or why, how far they have got, or how far they have to go. Just as lectures that make points in this way are hard to follow, so are essays. As a consequence they are inferior.

An essay with a structure will have parts to it (and probably sub-parts); and the various parts will have been arranged in an appropriate order. Your essay will not develop a structure on its own: structure must be imposed. Work out what the structure of your essay is going to be, and then consciously mould the material into that shape.

Besides division, structuring involves ordering. Think about the order in which you are placing your points. Students often put down points either in the order they happen to have thought of them or in the order in which they appeared in a lecture or book. These are not good reasons for ordering. You should impose a rational and coherent order on the material. Thus you should outline a view before you criticize it; you should usually make the more important points before the minor ones; and you should avoid discussing the same question twice at different points in your essay.

Organise your material so that your main ideas are presented logically and coherently. There must be a reason why each part of the essay is where it is. Essays are clearer if you present your conclusion (your 'argument') at the start of the essay and then argue your case. Essays should include the following:

o Introduction: Your essay should begin with an introduction which sets out the issue of the essay, the answer you give, and also your argument. What is the essay about? What are the appropriate concepts? What general background do you want the reader to take into account? What is your perspective on the topic? Above all, what answer will you be arguing for?

Quote and Paraphrase but never Plagiarise!

When presenting evidence for your argument, you may need or wish to include passages taken from works you have read. This is quotation. You may also need or wish to make a point or argument you have got from your reading, but in your own words. Expressing in your own words points or arguments you have taken from others is paraphrasing.

To be avoided is something between quotation and paraphrasing: taking a passage and altering a few words here and there. If you are quoting, you must quote exactly. The words in quotation marks must be the exact words used in the original, right down to the punctuation. If you are paraphrasing you must put the point in your own way: the words used must be your own. Always decide whether you are quoting or paraphrasing, and act accordingly.

If you use another’s work – whether by way of quotation or paraphrase – you must acknowledge that you have done so. If you quote, place the quoted material in quotation marks and provide a reference. If you paraphrase, do not use quotation marks, but still acknowledge your source with a reference. If you use another person’s words, you must use quotation marks. The absence of quotation marks (even with a reference to its source at the end of the sentence) is liable to be judged as plagiarism. Plagiarism – that is,

presenting as one’s own work the work of another – is prohibited under the Assessment Regulations, and constitutes misconduct under the Discipline Regulations.

Your essay should be primarily your own words: thus excessive amounts of quotation should be avoided. It is extremely rare for long quotations to be appropriate. Long quotations usually demonstrate only a capacity to copy and type (or cut and paste). The space they occupy can generally be better used for displaying more significant abilities.

Be Original!

It is not necessary to discover original material for your essay. But you must construct your own argument out of the material you find, and then use the material as evidence for your argument. The essay is original in that it contains your argument and you have shaped the evidence to back up that argument.

Do not be afraid to include your own ideas. However these should be arguments, or points backed by evidence, and not unfounded notions or bare opinions. Credit will be given for ambition: if you try to do something different and difficult, you will be marked sympathetically – even if your attempt turns out not to be very successful. While a serious attempt at original thought will be marked sympathetically, a few half-baked notions thrown together will not.

Express yourself clearly!

Express your points clearly. The reader of your essay will not be impressed by the use of lots of long words and an elaborate and convoluted style. You should strive to express your ideas as clearly and simply as possible. This is especially true when writing about abstract and complex ideas. With little effort, writing about complex ideas can be made utterly unintelligible. This drives your mark down.

To express your points clearly you should write in grammatical sentences, choose the right word to do the job (the one that means exactly what you mean), use paragraphs to mark the significant divisions in your discussion, and avoid long sentences unless confident you can competently handle them.

While you should write at sufficient length to make your meaning clear, you should also seek to express your points succinctly. You have only a limited number of words at your disposal: repetition and wordiness add nothing to your answer and waste your opportunity to make additional points.

You should present your essay without unnecessary blemishes. Minimize punctuation mistakes and use apostrophes correctly (if you do not know how they are used, take the trouble to find out), and proof-read your work before submitting it through Moodle.

Good luck!

Reading 2: How to get 100% on your reading exercise!

At the very start of your 400 words, state where you would place the thinker on the grid (this may be in the heading or in the opening sentence). Use the terminology and labels from Chapter 1 where nine stances on Political Authority are set out (labelled A-I) and eleven on Political Violence (1-11). Refer to these to be precise in your assessment of the thinker’s stance on political violence and political authority. Then argue for your answer using evidence in the form of the most apt quotations from the readings. Other courses on the history of political thought at Waikato study great political theorists whose work merits study regardless of its historical impact. This courses differs in that it studies the politically-pertinent thought of influential Christian thinkers, many of whom are not political theorists at all. As a result some of the readings are thin and it may be difficult to precisely place a thinker on the grid. Although you must give a precise location, your level of confidence in it may be less than 100%. Claim only what you can truthfully claim. You must quote from the reading/s and may quote from elsewhere if you wish. In both cases, you should reference it fully so that the reader can find it. Present it well, using all of your analytic, writing and referencing skills.

Chapter OneExplanation of Assessment

1.

This is a crucial chapter as it explains the assessment requirements for the course. Read it carefully. You may need to re-read it in order to understand the 14 tasks that you are to complete. There are two readings at the end of this chapter. There is no exercise to submit.

Community and coercion are the themes of this course which looks at thirteen Christian thinkers of the past 2000 years and asks two questions of each:

What is the thinker’s attitude to political violence? What is the thinker’s attitude to political authority?

The assessment exercises involve explaining the thinker’s stance on these two issues and plotting their position on a simple grid. Your explanation of why you have placed them at that point can be either a 400-word reading exercise or a 2300-word essay. By the end of the course you be more aware of Christian attitudes to community and coercion and of the issues that political authority and political violence have raised for that religion.

I. What is the thinker's attitude to political violence?Given the importance of morality to Christianity (and the nature of Christianity as 'moral monotheism'), Christian thinkers will take a moral approach to political violence. They will be concerned with the moral rights and wrongs of political violence and with fidelity to Christian revelation. What moral approaches to political violence exist? How many moral stances on political violence are they? How can we label these attitudes? In his article ‘How Many Ways Are There to Think Morally About War?’ John H. Yoder highlights five main ways.[1] We will start from Yoder’s article but we will expand his five positions to eleven for the purposes of this course.

Yoder’s five ways to think morally about war:A. PacifismB. Just WarC. Holy War

D. RealismE. War of Honor

A. Pacifism

Pacifism is a moral approach to political violence. It rejects violence in some form (maybe in all forms). We will immediately expand Yoder’s first position ('Pacifism') to five. We will divide the pacifist position into:

2.

1. Non-resistance to evil

2. Passive resistance to evil

3. Non-violent active resistance to evil

4. Non-lethal violent resistance to evil

5. Anti-war

1. The strictest form of pacifism is a rejection of any form of resistance whatsoever. Evil is not to be resisted in any way (coercively or non-coercively, violently or non-violently). Any form of resistance is held to be wrong. The strictest form of pacifism requires a complete non-resistance to evil.

2. The next strictest form of pacifism permits only a passive resistance to evil. Evil is to be resisted but not coercively. It holds any form of coercion (whether violent or non-violent) to be wrong. Non-coercive means (such as speaking, writing, protesting peacefully) are permitted but coercive means (such as boycotts, strikes, sanctions) are not.

3. Next is a pacifism that permits or requires a non-violent active resistance to evil. Evil is to be resisted, and coercive means may be used, but violent means may not be used. Violence is held to be wrong but non-violent coercive means (such as protests, boycotts, strikes, sanctions) are permitted.

4. A weaker form of pacifism is one that permits or requires a non-lethal resistance to evil. Evil is to be resisted, coercion may be used, violence may be used, but life may not be taken.

Killing is wrong. Violent means must be non-lethal. Destruction of property is permitted as is the use of non-lethal weapons and techniques against people.

5. The weakest form of pacifism (but still a position that we would commonly label as pacifist) is one that rules out war. This is sometimes called ‘anti-warrism’. Violence may be used, even lethal violence, but there is something about war (the size or scope of the violence, perhaps, or the nature of the people killed) that rules out this particular form of lethal political violence.

We can say the following about the Pacifist approach:a) Morality applies to politics, statecraft and war.b) The Pacifist approach sees as intrinsically evil some or all of the following: resistance, coercion, violence, lethal force or warc) There is no ‘trigger’ that can override this prohibition of some form of resistance.d) It is better to surrender than to engage in a contest that breaches this prohibition

B. Just war

3.

The second of Yoder’s approaches to war is the Just War approach. Yoder presents the Just War as a compromise position between pacifism and realism, sharing something in common with each. It holds some use of force to be right. In common with pacifism, it holds that morality applies to affairs of state as to all areas of life. In common with realism it accepts that force cannot be banished from history. It thus combines a pessimistic view of humanity and history with the optimistic aspiration that moral principles can make an impact on all areas of human behavior, including politics and war. The aim of the Just War position is the use of force as an instrument of order, justice, and good in world affairs. It accepts that force is part of this world but seeks to direct and limit it and to use it a route to relative good.

To this ends, the Just War approach forwards a set of restrictions on the resort to and the use of force, limiting when force may be used, for what ends, and the manner in which it may be used. These rules (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) are listed in the Introduction (p.8). Yoder writes that it must be the case that application of the Just War criteria will find some armed conflicts to be unjust: the principles of a just war have little meaning unless they can be applied to rule out some war as unjust. But how many wars does it rule out? Some, few or all? Any set of rules can be applied strictly, moderately or permissively. The rules of Just War can be applied strictly, moderately or permissively. So we will expand the Just War position to encompass three approaches:

6. Just War (strict)

7. Just War (moderate)

8. Just War (permissive)

A strict Just War approach applies the criteria of a Just War strictly and limits the ruler’s freedom to wage war. The principles of the Just War operate as firm limits on the political use of violence. Many uses of force are ruled out as unjust. A Just War position can be close to pacifism: it can hold most wars to be unjust. Indeed the strict Just War position can merge into pacifism. The principles of a just war can be applied so strictly that they become prohibitively strict: all wars are found to be unjust. This position, which starts from an acceptance of war as long as it meets the Just War criteria but then applies the criteria of a just war so strictly that no war can be just, is called ‘just war pacifism’. This stance does not rule out war in theory but it rules out all wars in practice. In reality no war can meet its application of the criteria. Take for instance the jus ad bellum requirement that war be a ‘last resort’. It seems to demand that all other means to settle a dispute are tried and exhausted before force us used. This is hardly ever the case as the Quaker Jonathan Dymond observes: ‘If nations fought only when they could not be at peace, there would be very little fighting in the world.’[2] Take too the jus in bello principle that requires discrimination between civilians and combatants. This can yield a ‘nuclear pacifism’ that rules out the use of nuclear weapons in all imaginable circumstances because civilians would die. ‘Nuclear pacifism’ can be, as Yoder points out, not pacifism but a variant of the Just War approach.

At the other extreme is a permissive Just War approach which applies the principles of Just War in a manner that gives great freedom to wage war. This permissive Just War position can be close to (and even merge into) Holy War or an amoral realism. The jus ad bellum requirement of ‘proper authority’ limits the resort to force to those in positions of leadership. However, if immense leeway is given to the political leader to determine just cause, ad bellum or strategic proportionality, last resort, etc., then really the leader’s freedom to wage war in the national interest is not restrained at all. Lip-service is paid to the Just War principles and the appearance of abiding by them is maintained but war is waged whenever and however the leadership wishes.

We can say the following about the Just War approach:a) Morality applies to politics, statecraft and war.b) The Just War approach sees war as intrinsically evil. There is a strong moral presumption in favour of peace. This can only be overridden under certain conditions.c) The Just War approach requires a ‘trigger’ for just war. The other party must have committed an injustice (an attack or

a breach of rights or law).d) The Just War approach can distinguish between wars which are morally justified and wars which are not by applying politically relevant criteria.e) The Just War approach should be able to result in firm negative conclusions about wars (or proposed wars). They are wrong and should not be waged.f) It is sometimes better to surrender than to engage in a contest of force. Although there may be a political and moral case for the use of force (i.e., some attack or a breach of rights or law by the other party), either victory is unlikely and so no good can come from the use of force, or more harm will come than good will come from the successful use of force.

C. Holy War (or Crusade)

Yoder uses the terms Holy War or Crusade to denote more than a war declared by the church authorities, such as the crusade proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to claim Jerusalem from Muslim control. Holy War, to Yoder, is a moral approach to war that rejects the presumption in favour of peace that is a key to the Just War approach. It is war in a ‘holy cause’ rather than a ‘just cause’. The Just War approach has a presumption for peace and requires a trigger of injustice to override it. The Just War is a response to a wrong done and the just cause is stopping or undoing the injustice committed by the other party. Whereas the Just War looks to the past (it is a response to an injustice committed), the Holy War looks to the future (the good outcome that will be achieved). The Holy War requires no trigger such as an assault or breach of rights by the other party. The Holy War approach sees a good end as sufficient reason to go to war. The ‘holy cause’ can be non-religious. The good ends could be of any type: maintenance of the rule of law, personal freedoms, free markets, regime change, access to oil, or the imposition of democracy. What is key is that the good end is held to be enough to justify initiating a war. There is no presumption for peace and no trigger of past wrong is needed. Religious ideologies may prompt Holy Wars or Crusades but so too may non-religious ideologies such as Communism, Fascism, romantic nationalism or neo-liberalism. If the supposed just cause of a ‘just war’ is no more than a pretext, then the conflict may be better described as a Holy War or Crusade than a Just War. Given the absence of an Iraqi action to prompt it, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 qualifies as a Holy War rather than a Just War.

The Holy War differs from a Just War on the ad bellum level but also on the in bello. The Just War is the restraint of violence on both the ad bellum and in bello levels. The resort to war is limited by requirements such as just cause; the conduct of hostilities is limited by in bello restraints such as sparing of civilians and civilian property and respect for prisoners of war. In contrast, the Holy War lacks the ad bellum restraints and may also disregard in bello limits. A Holy War approach may have little concern for humanity or moderation and the war may be prosecuted unsparingly.

We can say the following about the Holy War approach:a) The Holy War approach downgrades or rejects the presumption in favour of peace that is found in Just War and Pacifism.b) The good end is held to justify war and no ‘trigger’ is needed.c) The Holy War approach downgrades or rejects other ad bellum restraints such as ‘probable success’ or ‘last resort’. Suicidal heroism and martyrdom may be applauded.d) The Holy War approach downgrades or rejects jus in bello restraints such as civilian immunity. The good end is held to justify all that is useful in war.

D. Amoral realism

Yoder’s fourth approach to morality and the state use of force is one that holds that morality does not apply to this issue. Rulers may resort to war for any reason or to further the national interest in any way. Perhaps moral rightness/wrongness do not apply to the affairs of states, or perhaps they do not apply to war.

We can say the following about the Realist approach: a) The Realist approach rejects the presumption in favour of peace.b) The good end that is held to justify war is not a moral one as it is in the Holy War (or Crusade).

c) The Realist approach denies the applicability of moral values to war: war becomes a matter of pragmatic judgments alone.d) All ad bellum and in bello restraints are rejected.e) The Realist approach may see no universal moral values but rather limit justice to one’s own nation.

E. War of Honour

4.

Yoder's fifth and final approach to the morality of war is one he terms War of Honor (or Rambo war, after the movie of the time). It lies at the other extreme from Pacifism. The Pacifist position has a presumption in favor of peace that can never be overridden (no injustice or good end suffices to resort to war). The Just War position also has a presumption for peace but it may be overridden under certain conditions. A trigger is needed to override it and war may be waged only when a wrong has been done. An injustice has been committed by the other

party and war is a response that aims to undo the injustice. The Holy War approach upholds no presumption for peace and requires no trigger for war. A good end is enough to justify initiating a war (a good end of a moral nature, drawn from some religious or non-religious ideology). The Realist approach upholds no presumption for peace and requires no trigger for war. The good end is enough to justify initiating a war (but it is an end of a non-moral nature, such as self-interest). In the War of Honor, no end is needed to justify the means. No good end, whether moral or non-moral, is required because violent means are held to be good and not in need of justification. It is good to use violence to get things done, to assert yourself, to prove yourself. It is admirable to engage in a contest and win. It is honorable to seek conquest, triumph and domination through war. We go to war because we like war.

We can say the following about the War of Honor approach: a) The War of Honor approach holds that no end is needed to validate violence.b) The means justify themselves.c) Violence validates itself through its frenzy, passion, virility.d) It is good to use violence to gets things done, to assert yourself, to prove yourself.e) Winning is good in itself.

Yoder’s War of Honor raises the issue of the motivation of soldiers. A Just War position, however strict, requires soldiers to fight wars. Any job is done better by professionals who have the natural talent for it and are given the time, training and resources to specialize in it. They will also do their job better if they enjoy it. The idea of delight in combat is thus relevant to all the non-pacifist positions. The Just War uses the love of combat to overturn injustice and the Holy War uses it to achieve a desired end. The Holy War position, if vague about the good end sought and if lacking restraints on the prosecution of war or even celebrating the unsparing violence of the Holy Warrior or Crusader, may merge into the War of Honor approach.

Assigned asReview

Types of PacifismWhich of the following best identifies a stance that accepts the police function of the state but rejects its military function?APassive resistance

BNon-violence

CAnti-warrism

Show Submitted AnswerShow Correct AnswerCheck My Answer

Assigned asReview

Pacifism and Just WarWhat is the difference between Pacifism and Just War?APacifism sees war as a religious issue while Just War sees it as a political one

BPacifism sees war as always wrong but Just Wart sees it as always right

CBoth see war as intrinsically wrong but Just War accepts it under certain conditions


Assigned asReview

Just War and Holy WarWhat is the difference between Just War and Holy War?AA Holy War has divine approval while a Just War does not

BThe cause of a Just War is legal or political but the cause of a Holy War is always religious

CA Just War is always a reaction or response (e.g. to invasion or breach of treaty) but a Holy War takes the initiative and breaches the peace to attain a good cause


Attitudes to political violence

Drawing on the work of Yoder and expanding his Pacifism and Just War positions, we have eleven moral approaches to war:

1. Pacifism (non-resistance)

2. Pacifism (passive resistance)

3. Pacifism (non-violent resistance)

4. Pacifism (non-lethal violent resistance)

5. Pacifism (anti-war – lethal violent resistance but not war)

6. Just War (strict)

7. Just War (moderate)

8. Just War (permissive)

9. Holy War

10. Realism

11. War of Honour

We now have a spectrum depicting a range of moral attitudes towards political violence. These eleven positions will be the vertical axis of our grid. In the case of each of our thirteen

Christian thinkers, we want to say where they sit on this range. Which number, from 1 to 11, best describes the attitude towards political violence of the Christian thinker in question?

II. What is the thinker’s attitude to political authority?

The second issue we look at is our Christian thinkers’ attitudes to political authority. By the political authority is meant the government or state or ruler that claims the right legitimately to coerce obedience and coordinate society. Does the Christian thinker support the political authority in its aims? Does he tolerate it? Does he reject it? Does he oppose it? To what extent can the norms that he values as a Christian be achieved through the political authority? To what extent are the norms that are achievable by the political authority valuable to him as a Christian? Do they engage with it because they see their goals as shared? Do they withdraw because they see none of the goals important to them as a Christian group as shared with the political authority?

The concern is not the attitude to a particular political authority but to political authority per se. A Christian writer may be opposed to a particular ruler but still hold political authority to be worthy of Christian support. Rebellion may be a sign of the rejection of all governance or it may be a sign of a positive attitude to political authority in general but a rejection of the current ruler.

A spectrum of views on the Christian attitude to political authority can be constructed by starting from H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture [3]. Niebuhr looks at the debate within Christianity over the past 2000 years about the relationship between the religion and culture. Culture he defines as follows:

Culture 'is always social'[4] 'Culture...is human achievement'[5] 'the world of culture is a world of values'[6] 'the values... are dominantly those of the good for man'[7] 'culture...is concerned with the temporal and material realization of

values'[8] 'The values a culture seeks to realize...are many in number'[9]

Christ for culture

One extreme in his typology of views on the relation between Christianity and culture is a view which Niebuhr terms ‘Christ for culture’. It sees agreement between Christ and culture. Christ is the fulfillment of cultural aspirations and the restorer of the institutions of a true society. Jesus is seen as confirming past aspirations of people towards cultural values and bringing those aspirations to the point of culmination. Inspired by Jesus, Christianity guides civilization towards its proper goals. The highest forms of civilization and the greatest expressions of culture are to be ardently sought by the Christian. From the Roman Empire to the modern

world, many Christians have seen the world as reflecting more and more adequately values of which Christianity was the standard-bearer. Many of the best values of civilization – progress, prosperity, justice - are seen as in accordance with Christ’s teachings.[10] In the modern era, many Christians have seen the values of modern Western civilization - liberalism, democracy, human rights – as also in accordance with Christian teachings.

Niebuhr’s two extreme positions:1. Christ for culture2. Christ against culture

Christ against culture

At the other extreme is a view on the relation between Christianity and culture which Niebuhr which terms ‘Christ against culture’. It sees opposition between Christ and culture:

'Whatever the customs of the society in which the Christian lives, and whatever the human achievements it conserves, Christ is seen as opposed to them, so that he confronts men with the challenge of an ‘either-or’ decision.'[11]

This view has been there from the beginning too. From the very start of Christianity, many groups and individuals felt compelled by loyalty to Christ to separate themselves from the world and to withdraw from responsibility for it. Christians rejected Jewish culture and attacked Graeco-Roman civilization. From the hermits of the first centuries developed monastic movements whose members abandoned the ‘world’ and lived apart from it. In the Middle Ages, monastic orders and sectarian movements called on believers, though living in what purported to be a Christian society, to nonetheless withdraw from society and the state, from trade and industry, from civilization and culture. In the modern era, such an approach was more often urged on Christians in non-Western societies by missionaries who called on converts to abandon wholly the customs and institutions of their ‘heathen’ societies. But it was can be found in Europe too as some radical Christians continued to emphasize the antagonism of Christian faith to ‘the world’, Western as well as non-Western, to capitalism as well as communism, to industrialism and nationalism.

5.

Niebuhr’s typology looks at Christian attitudes to civilization or culture. Our concern in this course is narrower (although related) and focuses on Christian attitude to political authority. Our concern is Christian support for the goals that can be achieved by the political authority. Do Christianity and the political authority share goals? Are there many shared goals, some shared goals, few shared goals or none at all? Does the Christian thinker seek to work with the political authority to achieve goals that are important to the group? To what extent should Christians seek to work with the political authority to achieve goals that are important to them as Christians? If there are no shared goals, should Christians still accept the political authority? Should they obey it? Should they try to separate from the ambit of political authority? Should Christians completely reject the authority of the ruler?

Rejectionist attitudes towards political authority

At one end of our spectrum is a political-rejectionist position. Christians of this type see no values as shared by Christianity and the political authority. What one values, the other does not. This accords most fully with Niebuhr’s ‘Christ against culture’ stance. Because they see no overlap between the values important to Christianity and the values important to government, Christian rejectionists rejects politics and governance. The rejection of government may express itself in different ways. The rejectionist may be separatist or rebellious. In line with the

Biblical injunction Come out from them and be separate[12], separatist rejectionists seek a way of life very much apart from ‘the world’, the nation, the state, society and its culture. Separatist rejectionists may remain among the others but live separately or they may move to remote areas to avoid the authority of government. Alternatively, rather than separate themselves from government and society at large, rebellious rejectionists may instead seek to overthrow the government and force radical changes upon society. A common theme among rejectionists in the Christian tradition is to see the followers of Jesus as a new people with Jesus Christ as its Lord. They owe allegiance to him and none to the world. The Lordship of Jesus, and the faithfulness of believers to his authority alone, is a motif repeated by many rejectionists.

Negative attitudes towards political authority

Christians with negative attitudes towards the political authority see a few or some values as shared by Christianity and the political authority (e.g. order). They do not separate from it or rebel against it but neither do they engage in it. They endure government. Their loyalty is to the authority of Jesus. They do not seek to avoid the governance of the ruling authorities but they Worship the Lord your God, and serve him only.[13] Negative attitudes towards the political authority may range from very negative to slightly negative. To varying degrees, Christians may endure the rule of government, neither engaging nor rejecting it. The key questions remains how many values they see as shared by the Christian faith and the government.

50/50 attitude towards political authority

In the centre of our range of Christian attitudes towards the political authority is a 50/50 position, a balance of (possibly strongly-held) negative attitudes and (possibly strongly-held) positive attitudes towards the political authority. In line with the Biblical injunction Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities[14], such Christians submit to the rule of government and obey its laws. Possibly these Christians support strongly the order-maintaining function of the state but reject many of the other values of the state.

Positive attitudes towards political authority

Christians with positive attitudes towards the political authority share many of the values of society. Because of this, they may engage in politics and governance to bring about a society that better expresses the values they uphold. They may see politically-engaged Christians as the yeast in the dough[15], working unobtrusively to make society better reflect their Christian aspirations. Positive attitudes towards the political authority may range from slightly positive to very positive. To varying degrees, Christians may engage in politics and government to improve it. However they do not believe that society can ever perfectly reflect Christian values.

Perfectionist attitude towards political authority

At the other extreme of our spectrum from the political-rejectionist position, we will put a political-perfectionist position. This accords most fully with Niebuhr’s ‘Christ for culture’ stance. Christians of this type look to government to express the values they hold dear. Political perfectionist Christians engage fully in politics and governance seeking to perfect society and bring it into conformity with their Christian values. They may be seeking to build the kingdom of heaven[16] on earth through such full engagement in the governance of their society. Such an earthly society will perfectly reflect Christian values.

Attitudes to political authority

We can now make a spectrum depicting a range of Christian attitudes towards political authority. We have nine positions for the horizontal axis on our grid.

The nine attitudes to political authority may relate in a general way to the two broad streams of Christian attitudes to culture identified by H. Richard Niebuhr. ‘Christ against culture’ positions may yield negative attitudes to the political authority. ‘Christ for culture’ positions may yield positive attitudes to the political authority. The nine attitudes to political authority may also relate in a general way to engagement in politics and governance. We may expect to find Christians with positive attitudes to political authority (F, G, H, I) to seek to engage in politics and governance while those with negative attitudes (A, B, C, D) are less willing.

However, the key issue remains shared values. Because some Christian thinkers have complex attitudes (combining a ‘Christ against culture’ stance with an approval of the political authority’s function to keep order and a recommendation to engage with government and hold office), you should locate the thinker of the Attitude to Political Authority spectrum according to how many goals they see as shared by Christianity and the political authority. If they see no shared goals, then they are Rejectionist. Perfectionists look to law and policy to express all the values they hold dear as Christians. In the middle are those Christians who see some values as shared by Christianity and the political authority, to greater (F, G, H) or lesser (B, D, D) degrees. Our 50/50 position (E) designates a Positive and Negative stance in which positivity and negativity towards the values of the political authority are to be found in more-or-less equal measure.

In the case of each of our thirteen Christian thinkers, where do they sit on this range? Which letter, from A to I, best describes the attitude towards political authority of the Christian thinker in question?

The Assessment Exercises

We now have two simple spectra depicting a range of attitudes towards political violence and political authority. The two can be combined into a grid (below). Each Christian theorist can be plotted on this grid (i.e., a dot entered to show where they stand on the two issue of politics and violence). The exercises ask you to plot the thirteen thinkers on this grid to show their stance on political violence and political authority. This is for display purposes only. No causal

relationship is asserted between the attitudes to political violence and attitudes to political authority; there is no independent or dependent variable.

The vertical axis is marked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. These refer to the eleven attitudes to violence described above. Our concern here is not the writer’s attitude to a particular war but to political violence per se (for example, a just war thinker may be opposed to a particular war but still think that war can be justified).

The horizontal axis is marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I. These refer to the nine attitudes to political authority described above. Again, we are concerned with the thinker’s attitude to political authority per se rather than with their attitude to one specific existing political authority. They may be in favour of engagement with political authority but opposed to the current ruler. Rebellion need not be a sign of a negative attitude to political authority in general.

The exercises ask you to plot the thirteen thinkers on this simple grid to show their stance on political violence and political authority; for example, if you believe that a thinker has an attitude to political authority best described as ‘rejectionist’ and an attitude to violence best described as ‘non-resistance to evil’, then place a dot on the grid at A1.

For twelve of the thirteen thinkers, submit a 400-word reading exercise stating that you place this thinker at a certain grid reference and justify why.

For one of the thirteen thinkers, submit a 2300-word essay, critically discussing their attitude to political authority and political violence.

Assigned asReview

The Grid

Where would you enter each thinker?

Your assessment tasksThere are thirteen topics. Twelve of these thirteen are to be the subject of your reading exercises and one of these thirteen is to be the subject of your essay. If you submit a reading exercise and later submit an essay on the same topic, then your essay grade (a mark out of 35) will replace your reading exercise grade (a mark out of 5).

The twelve reading exercises are to be each 400 words long and each worth 5% of your grade for the paper. Reading exercises are graded out of 5 (your possible marks for each are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). These will be graded within one or two days. You are advised to submit work each week (e.g., to submit Exercise 1 in Week 1) in order to get timely feedback and to ensure you understand the assessment criteria. Work submitted after the end of the course cannot be marked.

An essay is to be submitted, 2300 words long and worth 35% of your grade for the course. These will be graded within one or two weeks.

The Final Exercise is 400 words and is worth 5% of your grade for the course. When you have completed twelve exercises and an essay, you will have placed thirteen dots (with names) on the grid representing the location that you have given the thirteen thinkers in your reading exercises. The final exercise is 400 words describing the distribution. What does the grid tell you? What conclusion can be reached as regards Christian attitudes towards political violence

and political authority over the past 2000 years? Are there distinct strands of thought on politics and violence in the Christian traditions?

There is a Grade Sheet that allows you to keep track of your marks.

Topic 1: Exercise 1 (400 words)

What is Tertullian’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


What is Origen’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


What is Eusebius’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 4:

Either: Exercise 4 (400 words)

What is Augustine’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Or: Essay (2300 words)

Critically discuss Augustine’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 5:


What is Aquinas’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Aquinas’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 6:


What is Martin Luther’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Martin Luther’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 7:


What is John Calvin’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss John Calvin’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 8:


What is Hugo Grotius’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Hugo Grotius’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 9:


What is Leo Tolstoy’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Leo Tolstoy’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 10:


What is Kathleen Lonsdale’s attitude to political violence? What is her attitude to political authority? Where would you place her on the grid? Why? Quote from her writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Kathleen Lonsdale’s attitude to political violence and her attitude to political authority. Where would you place her on the grid? Why? Quote from her writings to support your answer.

Topic 11:


What is Reinhold Niebuhr’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss Reinhold Niebuhr’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 12:


What is John H. Yoder’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss John H. Yoder’s attitude to political violence and his attitude to political authority. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Topic 13:


What is the Catholic Church’s attitude to political violence in the nuclear age? What is its attitude to political authority? Where would you place it on the grid? Why? Quote from writings to support your answer.


Critically discuss the Catholic Church’s attitude to political violence and its attitude to political authority in the nuclear age. Quote from writings to support your answer. Where would you place it on the grid? Why?

Final exercise (400 words)

When you have completed twelve exercises and an essay, you will have placed thirteen dots (with names) on the grid representing the location that you have given the thirteen thinkers in your reading exercises. Scan your grid and include it with your final exercise. In 400 words, describe the distribution. What does the grid tell you? What conclusion can be reached as regards Christian attitudes towards political violence and political authority over the past 2000 years? Are there distinct strands of thought on politics and violence in the Christian traditions?

Chapter Four ReadingsRead the following excerpts from Augustine’s City of God and Letters 138, 189 and 229 and then submit an Essay of 2300 words on Augustine. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? What is his attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?

Reading 1: St Augustine, The City of God1

God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sinwas committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. (City of God, Bk 14, Ch 1)

That the whole human race has been condemned in its first origin, this life itself... bears witness by the host of cruel ills with which it is filled. Is not this proved by the profound and dreadful ignorance which produces all the errors that enfold the children of Adam, and from which no man can be delivered without toil, pain and fear? Is it not proved by man's love of so any vain and hurtful things which produces gnawing cares, disquiet, griefs, fears, wild joys, quarrels, law suits, wars, treasons, angers, hatreds, deceit, flattery, fraud, theft, robbery, perfidy, pride, ambition, envy, murders, parricides, cruelty, ferocity, wickedness, luxury, insolence, impudences, shamelessness, fornications, adulteries, incests, and the numberless

uncleannesses and unnatural acts of both sexes which it is shameful so much as to mention...? These are indeed the crimes of wicked men yet they spring from that root of error and misplaced love which is born with every son of Adam. For who is there that has not observed with what profound ignorance, manifesting itself even in infancy, and with what superfluity of foolish desires, beginning to appear in boyhood, man comes into this life, so that, were he left to live as he pleased, and to do whatever he pleased, he would plunge into all, or certainly into many of those crimes and iniquities which I mentioned, and could not mention?

But because God does not wholly desert those whom He condemns, nor shuts up in His anger His tender mercies, the human race is restrained by law and instruction, which keep guard against the ignorance that besets us, and oppose the assaults of vice, but are themselves full of labor and sorrow. For what mean those multifarious threats which are used to restrain the folly of children? What mean pedagogues, masters, the birch, the strap, the cane, the schooling which Scripture says must be given a child, beating him on the sides lest he wax stubborn, and it be hardly possible or not possible at all to subdue him? Why all these punishments, save to overcome ignorance and bridle evil desires— these evils with which we come into the world? For why is it that we remember with difficulty, and without difficulty forget? Learn with difficulty, and without difficulty remain ignorant? Are diligent with difficulty, and without difficulty are indolent? Does not this show what vitiated nature inclines and tends to by its own weight, and what succor it needs if it is to be delivered? Inactivity, sloth, laziness, negligence, are vices which shun labor, since labor, though useful, is itself a punishment.

But, besides the punishments of childhood, without which there would be no learning of what the parents wish—and the parents rarely wish anything useful to be taught—who can describe, who can conceive the number and severity of the punishments which afflict the human race—pains which are not only the accompaniment of the wickedness of godless men, but are a part of the human condition and the common misery—what fear and what grief are caused by bereavement and mourning, by losses and condemnations, by fraud and falsehood, by false suspicions, and all the crimes and wicked deedsof other men? For at their hands we suffer robbery, captivity, chains, imprisonment, exile, torture, mutilation, loss of sight, the violation of chastity to satisfy the lust of the oppressor, and many other dreadful evils. What numberless casualties threaten our bodies from without—extremes of heat and cold, storms, floods, inundations, lightning, thunder, hail, earthquakes, houses falling; or from the stumbling, or shying, or vice of horses; from countless poisons in fruits, water, air, animals; from the painful or even deadly bites of wild animals; from the madness which a mad dog communicates, so that even the animal which of all others is most gentle and friendly to its own master, becomes an object of intenser fear than a lion or dragon, and the man whom it has by chance infected with this pestilential contagion becomes so rabid, that his parents, wife, children, dread him more than any wild beast! What disasters are suffered by those who travel by land or sea! What man can go out of his own house without being exposed on all hands to unforeseen accidents? Returning home sound in limb, he slips on his own doorstep,

breaks his leg, and never recovers. What can seem safer than a man sitting in his chair? Eli the priest fell from his, and broke his neck. How many accidents do farmers, or rather all men, fear that the crops may suffer from the weather, or the soil, or the ravages of destructive animals? Commonly they feel safe when the crops are gathered and housed. Yet, to my certain knowledge, sudden floods have driven the laborers away, and swept the barns clean of the finest harvest. Is innocence a sufficient protection against the various assaults of demons? That no man might think so, even baptized infants, who are certainly unsurpassed in innocence, are sometimes so tormented, that God, who permits it, teaches us hereby to bewail the calamities of this life, and to desire the felicity of the life to come. As to bodily diseases, they are so numerous that they cannot all be contained even in medical books. And in very many, or almost all of them, the cures and remedies are themselves tortures, so that men are delivered from a pain that destroys by a cure that pains.

From this hell upon earth there is no escape, save through the grace of the Saviour Christ, our God and Lord. (City of God, Bk 22, Ch 22)…the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit… (City of God, Bk 14, Ch 1)

First, we must see what it is to live after the flesh, and what to live after the spirit. For anyone who either does not recollect, or does not sufficiently weigh, the language of sacred Scripture, may, on first hearing what we have said, suppose that the Epicurean philosophers live after the flesh, because they place man's highest good in bodily pleasure; and that those others do so who have been of opinion that in some form or other bodily good is man's supreme good; and that the mass of men do so who, without dogmatizing or philosophizing on the subject, are so prone to lust that they cannot delight in any pleasure save such as they receive from bodily sensations: and he may suppose that the Stoics, who place the supreme good of men in the soul, live after the spirit; for what is man's soul, if not spirit? But in the sense of the divine Scripture both are proved to live after the flesh. (City of God, Bk 14, Ch 2)

In enunciating this proposition of ours, then, that because some live according to the flesh and others according to the spirit, there have arisen two diverse and conflicting cities, we might equally well have said, because some live according to man, others according to God. For Paul says very plainly to the Corinthians, For whereas there is among you envying and strife, are you not carnal, and walk according to man? So that to walk according to man and to be carnal are the same; for by flesh, that is, by a part of man, man is meant. (City of God, Bk 14, Ch 4)

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, You are my glory, and the lifter up of mine head. In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. (City of God, Bk 14, Ch 28)

Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? A gang is a group of men under the command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in which the plunder is divided according to an agreed convention.

If this villainy wins so many recruits from the ranks of the demoralized that it acquires territory, establishes a base, captures cities and subdues peoples, it then openly arrogates to itself the title of kingdom, which is conferred on it in the eyes of the world, not by the renouncing of aggression but by the attainment of impunity.

For it was a witty and truthful rejoinder which was given by a captured pirate to Alexander the Great. The king asked the fellow, “What is your idea, in infesting the sea?” And the pirate answered, with uninhibited insolence, “The same as yours, in infesting the earth! But because I do it with a tiny craft, I’m called a pirate; because you have a mighty navy, you’re called an emperor.” (The City of God Book 4, Ch.4)

Now, therefore, let us see how it is that they dare to ascribe the very great extent and duration of the Roman empire to those gods whom they contend that they worship honorably, even by the obsequies of vile games and the ministry of vile men: although I should like first to inquire for a little what reason, what prudence, there is in wishing to glory in the greatness and extent of the empire, when you cannot point out the happiness of men who are always rolling, with dark fear and cruel lust, in warlike slaughters and in blood, which, whether shed in civil or foreign war, is still human blood; so that their joy may be compared to glass in its fragile splendor, of which one is horribly afraid lest it should be suddenly broken in pieces. That this may be more easily discerned, let us not come to nought by being carried away with empty boasting, or blunt the edge of our attention by loud-sounding names of things, when we hear of peoples, kingdoms, provinces. But let us suppose a case of two men; for each individual man, like one letter in a language, is as it were the element of a city or kingdom, however far-spreading in its occupation of the earth. Of these two men let us suppose that one is poor, or rather of middling circumstances; the other very rich. But the rich man is anxious with fears, pining with discontent, burning with covetousness, never secure, always uneasy, panting from the perpetual strife of his enemies, adding to his patrimony indeed by these miseries to an immense degree, and by these additions also heaping up most bitter cares. But that other man

of moderate wealth is contented with a small and compact estate, most dear to his own family, enjoying the sweetest peace with his kindred neighbors and friends, in piety religious, benignant in mind, healthy in body, in life frugal, in manners chaste, in conscience secure. I know not whether anyone can be such a fool, that he dare hesitate which to prefer. As, therefore, in the case of these two men, so in two families, in two nations, in two kingdoms, this test of tranquillity holds good; and if we apply it vigilantly and without prejudice, we shall quite easily see where the mere show of happiness dwells, and where real felicity. Wherefore if the true God is worshipped, and if He is served with genuine rites and true virtue, it is advantageous that good men should long reign both far and wide. Nor is this advantageous so much to themselves, as to those over whom they reign. For, so far as concerns themselves, their piety and probity, which are great gifts of God, suffice to give them true felicity, enabling them to live well the life that now is, and afterwards to receive that which is eternal. In this world, therefore, the dominion of good men is profitable, not so much for themselves as for human affairs. But the dominion of bad men is hurtful chiefly to themselves who rule, for they destroy their own souls by greater license in wickedness; while those who are put under them in service are not hurt except by their own iniquity. For to the just all the evils imposed on them by unjustrulers are not the punishment of crime, but the test of virtue. Therefore the good man, although he is a slave, is free; but the bad man, even if he reigns, is a slave, and that not of one man, but, what is far more grievous, of as many masters as he has vices; of which vices when the divine Scripture treats, it says, For of whom any man is overcome, to the same he is also the bond-slave. (City of God, Bk 4, Ch 3)

The society of mortals spread abroad through the earth everywhere, and in the most diverse places, although bound together by a certain fellowship of our common nature, is yet for the most part divided against itself, and the strongest oppress the others, because all follow after their own interests and lusts, while what is longed for either suffices for none, or not for all, because it is not the very thing. For the vanquished succumb to the victorious, preferring any sort of peace and safety to freedom itself; so that they who chose to die rather than be slaves have been greatly wondered at. For in almost all nations the very voice of nature somehow proclaims, that those who happen to be conquered should choose rather to be subject to their conquerors than to be killed by all kinds of warlike destruction. This does not take place without the providence of God, in whose power it lies that any one either subdues or is subdued in war; that some are endowed with kingdoms, others made subject to kings. (City of God, Bk 18, Ch 2)

Reading 2: St. Augustine, Letter to Marcellinus (Letter 138)2

Paragraph 11: But who, even though he be a stranger to our religion, is so deaf as not to know how many precepts enjoining concord, not invented by the discussions of men, but written with the authority of God, are continually read in the churches of Christ? For this is the

tendency even of those precepts which they are much more willing to debate than to follow: That to him who smites us on one cheek we should offer the other to be smitten; to him who would take away our coat we should give our cloak also; and that with him who compels us to go one mile we should go two. For these things are done only that a wicked man may be overcome by kindness, or rather that the evil which is in the wicked man may be overcome by good, and that the man may be delivered from the evil— not from any evil that is external and foreign to himself, but from that which is within and is his own, under which he suffers loss more severe and fatal than could be inflicted by the cruelty of any enemy from without. He, therefore, who is overcoming evil by good, submits patiently to the loss of temporal advantages, that he may show how those things, through excessive love of which the other is made wicked, deserve to be despised when compared with faith and righteousness; in order that so the injurious person may learn from him whom he wronged what is the true nature of the things for the sake of which he committed the wrong, and may be won back with sorrow for his sin to that concord, than which nothing is more serviceable to the State, being overcome not by the strength of one passionately resenting, but by the good-nature of one patiently bearing wrong. For then it is rightly done when it seems that it will benefit him for whose sake it is done, by producing in him amendment of his ways and concord with others. At all events, it is to be done with this intention, even though the result may be different from what was expected, and the man, with a view to whose correction and conciliation this healing and salutary medicine, so to speak, was employed, refuses to be corrected and reconciled.

Paragraph 13: In fine, that these precepts pertain rather to the inward disposition of the heart than to the actions which are done in the sight of men, requiring us, in the inmost heart, to cherish patience along with benevolence, but in the outward action to do that which seems most likely to benefit those whose good we ought to seek, is manifest from the fact that our Lord Jesus Himself, our perfect example of patience, when He was smitten on the face, answered: If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if not, why do you smite me? John 18:23 If we look only to the words, He did not in this obey His own precept, for He did not present the other side of his face to him who had smitten Him but, on the contrary, prevented him who had done the wrong from adding thereto; and yet He had come prepared not only to be smitten on the face, but even to be slain upon the cross for those at whose hands He suffered crucifixion, and for whom, when hanging on the cross, He prayed, Father, forgive them, they know not what they do! Luke 23:34 In like manner, the Apostle Paul seems to have failed to obey the precept of his Lord and Master, when he, being smitten on the face as He had been, said to the chief priest: God shall smite you, you whited wall, for do you sit to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law?´

Paragraph 13: These precepts concerning patience ought to be always retained in the habitual discipline of the heart, and the benevolence which prevents the recompensing of evil for evil must be always fully cherished in the disposition. At the same time, many things must be done in correcting with a certain benevolent severity, even against their own wishes, men whose welfare rather than their wishes it is our duty to consult... For in the correction of a

son, even with some sternness, there is assuredly no diminution of a father's love; yet, in the correction, that is done which is received with reluctance and pain by one whom it seems necessary to heal by pain. And on this principle, if the commonwealth observe the precepts of the Christian religion, even its wars themselves will not be carried on without the benevolent design that, after the resisting nations have been conquered, provision may be more easily made for enjoying in peace the mutual bond of piety and justice. For the person from whom is taken away the freedom which he abuses in doing wrong is vanquished with benefit to himself; since nothing is more truly a misfortune than that good fortune of offenders, by which pernicious impunity is maintained, and the evil disposition, like an enemy within the man, is strengthened.

Reading 3: St. Augustine, Letter to Boniface (Letter 189)3

4. Do not think that it is impossible for anyone to please God while engaged in active military service. Among such persons was the holy David, to whom God gave so great a testimony; among them also were many righteous men of that time; among them was also that centurion who said to the Lord: I am not worthy that You should come under my roof, but speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed: for I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me: and I say to this man, Go, and he goes; and to another, Come, and he comes; and to my servant, Do this, and he does it; and concerning whom the Lord said: Verily, I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel (Matt 8:8-10)... Among them were also the soldiers who, when they had come to be baptized by John,— the sacred forerunner of the Lord, and the friend of the Bridegroom, of whom the Lord says: Among them that are born of women there has not arisen a greater than John the Baptist, (Matt 11:11) - and had inquired of him what they should do, received the answer, Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages. (Luke 3:14) Certainly he did not prohibit them to serve as soldiers when he commanded them to be content with their pay for the service.

5. They occupy indeed a higher place before God who, abandoning all these secular employments, serve Him with the strictest chastity; but every one, as the apostle says, has his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that (1 Cor 7:7). Some, then, in praying for you, fight against your invisible enemies; you, in fighting for them, contend against the barbarians, their visible enemies. Would that one faith existed in all, for then there would be less weary struggling, and the devil with his angelswould be more easily conquered; but since it is necessary in this life that the citizens of the kingdom of heaven should be subjected to temptations among erring and impious men, that they may be exercised, and tried as gold in the furnace, (Wisdom 3:6) we ought not before the appointed time to desire to live with those alone who are holy and righteous, so that, by patience, we may deserve to receive this blessedness in its proper time.

6. Think, then, of this first of all, when you are arming for the battle, that even your bodily strength is a gift of God; for, considering this, you will not employ the gift of God against God. For, when faith is pledged, it is to be kept even with the enemy against whom the war is waged, how much more with the friend for whom the battle is fought! Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace. For peace is not sought in order to the kindling of war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained. Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace; for our Lord says: Blessed are the peacemakers; for they shall be called the children of God (Matt 5:9) If, however, peace among men be so sweet as procuring temporal safety, how much sweeter is that peace with God which procures for men the eternal felicity of the angels! Let necessity, therefore, and not your will, slay the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared.

7. Let the manner of your life be adorned by chastity, sobriety, and moderation; for it is exceedingly disgraceful that lust should subdue him whom man finds invincible, and that wine should overpower him whom the sword assails in vain. As to worldly riches, if you do not possess them, let them not be sought after on earth by doing evil; and if you possess them, let them by good works be laid up in heaven. The manly and Christian spirit ought neither to be elated by the accession, nor crushed by the loss of this world's treasures. Let us rather think of what the Lord says: Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also; (Matt 6:21) and certainly, when we hear the exhortation to lift up our hearts, it is our duty to give unfeignedly the response which you know that we are accustomed to give.

Reading 4: St. Augustine, Letter to Darius (Letter 229)4

Paragraph 2: Those warriors are indeed great and worthy of singular honour, not only for their consummate bravery, but also (which is a higher praise) for their eminent fidelity, by whose labours and dangers, along with the blessing of divine protection and aid, enemies previously unsubdued are conquered, and peace obtained for the State, and the provinces reduced to subjection. But it is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war. For those who fight, if they are good men, doubtless seek for peace; nevertheless it is through blood. Your mission, however, is to prevent the shedding of blood.

References

[1] Downloaded from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120114.htm.

[2] downloaded from www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102138.htm.

[3] downloaded from www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102189.htm.

[4] downloaded from www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102229.htm

Exercise 4 GridWhat is Augustine’s attitude to political violence? What is his attitude to political authority? Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Quote from his writings to support your answer.

Exercise 4Thinkers • Tertullian [T]

• Origen [O] • Eusebius [E] • Augustine [AU]

In the attached graph, position the initials of the thinkers listed above on the chart according to their stance on Political Violence and Political Authority. Comment on your own post with an argument for your placements.

Chapter Five ReadingsRead the following excerpts from Aquinas’s Summa Theologica and then submit Exercise 5 of 400 words on Aquinas. Where would you place him on the grid? Why? What is Aquinas’s attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?Four questions feature in the readings: on law, on natural law, on war and on murder. Don’t be daunted by his scholastic style. The first sentence of Objection 1 tells you the contrary of the position Aquinas argues for. If you then skip to the paragraph/s beginning I answer that… you can read Aquinas’s reasoning.

Reading: Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (downloaded from http://www.sacred-texts.com)

Summa Theologica (Part 2, First Section) Q.91

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an eternal law?

(2) Whether there is a natural law?

(3) Whether there is a human law?

(4) Whether there is a Divine law?

(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?

(6) Whether there is a law of sin?

(1) Whether there is an eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

Objection 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Objection 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the FP, Q[22], AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rom. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply to Objection 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply to Objection 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

(2) Whether there is in us a natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14 : "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil."

I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (A[1]); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus

implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above (Q[10], A[1]): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

(3) Whether there is a human law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A[2]). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

Objection 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14 : "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the

speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

Reply to Objection 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

Reply to Objection 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

(4) Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above (A[2]), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore man was left

to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above (A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. 118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q[5], A[5]), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only

exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply to Objection 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.

Reply to Objection 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.

(5) Whether there is but one Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8 : "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.

I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle

(Gal. 3:24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Exod. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness (A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mat. 5:20 : "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear and love."

Reply to Objection 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply to Objection 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12 : "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

(6) Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?1

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind."

I answer that, As stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.

Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual

impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21 : "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them."

So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason.


OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is the natural law?

(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?

(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?

(5) Whether it is changeable?

(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?

(1) Whether the natural law is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on (A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.

I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.

Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things

known are in the knower; moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.

(2) Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above (Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.

On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-

evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.

Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.

(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.

Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.

I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated (A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.

Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.

(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."

I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more

frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by."

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.

(5) Whether the natural law can be changed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable."

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said (A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above (A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.

Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.

(6) Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because onRom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out.

Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.

Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.

Summa Theologica (Part 2, Second Section) Q.40

OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?

(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?

(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?

(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

(1) Whether it is always sinful to wage war?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat. 26:52 : "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat. 5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful.

Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering."

I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."

Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace."

Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or "bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].


OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?

(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?

(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?

(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?

(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?

(6) Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person.

Objection 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.

Objection 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death."

I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (A[2]) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Reply to Objection 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears Him.

Reply to Objection 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

Reply to Objection 3: If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a

higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.

(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own body.

Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life.

Objection 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A[3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A[3]), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

Reply to Objection 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Reply to Objection 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."

Exercise 5 Grid – *use Grid for exercise 4*

Chapter Six ReadingsRead the following two extracts and then submit Exercise 6 on Luther (or consult the reading list and write an Essay). Where would you place him on the grid? Why? What is Luther’s attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?

Reading 1: Martin Luther, An Open Letter On The Harsh Book Against The Peasants (1525)1

First of all, then, I must warn those who criticize my book that they ought to hold their tongues and have a care lest they make a mistake and lose their own heads; for they are certainly rebels at heart, and Solomon says, "My son, fear thou the Lord and the king, and mingle not with the rebellious; for their calamity shall rise suddenly, and who knoweth the ruin of them both?" There we see that both rebels and those who mingle with them are condemned, and God will not have it made a jest, but king and government are to be feared. But they who are "mingling with the rebellious" are those who take their part, lament over them, justify them, and show mercy to those on whom God has no mercy, but whom He will have punished and destroyed. For the man who thus takes the part of the rebels makes it perfectly plain that he, too, if he had opportunity, would cause disaster, as he has determined in his heart. The rulers, therefore, ought to seize these people by the cap and make them hold their tongues and note that this is a serious matter.

If they think this answer too hard, and that this is talking violence and only shutting men’s mouths, I reply that this is right. A rebel is not worth answering with arguments, for he does not accept them. The answer for such mouths is a fist that brings sweat from the nose. The peasants would not listen; they would not let anyone tell them anything; their ears must be

unbuttoned with bullets, till their heads jump off their shoulders. Such pupils need such a rod. He who will not hear God’s Word, when it is spoken with kindness, must listen to the headsman, when he comes with his axe. If it is said that in this I am uncharitable and unmerciful, I answer, "This is not a question of mercy; we are talking of God’s Word. It is His will that the king be honored and rebels destroyed; and He is as merciful as we are."

Of mercy I will neither hear nor know anything, but give heed to God’s will in His Word… My good friends, you who are praising mercy so highly because the peasants are beaten, why did you not praise it when the peasants were raging, smiting, robbing, burning, and plundering, until they were terrible to men’s eyes and ears? Why were they not merciful to the princes and lords, whom they wanted to wipe out entirely? No one spoke of mercy then. Everything was "rights"; nothing was said of mercy; it was nothing. "Rights, rights, rights!" they were everything. Now that they are beaten, and the stone that they threw at heaven is falling back on their own heads, no one is to say anything of rights, but speak only of mercy.

And yet they are stupid enough to think that no one notices the rascal behind it! Ah, no! You are in plain sight, you black, ugly devil! You praise mercy, not because you are in earnest about it and love mercy, or you would have praised it to the peasants; but because you are afraid for your own skin, and would use the appearance and reputation of mercy in order to escape God’s rod and punishment. Not so, dear fellow! You must take your turn, and die without mercy… Suppose I were to break into a man’s house, rape his wife and daughters, break open his coffers, take his money, set a sword to his breast, and say, "If you will not put up with this, I shall run you through, for you are a godless wretch"; then if a crowd gathered and were about to kill me, or if the judge ordered my head off, suppose I were to cry out, "Ei, Christ teaches that you are to be merciful and not kill me"; what would people say? …

The words of Scripture that speak of mercy apply to the kingdom of God and to Christians, not to the kingdom of the world, for it is a Christian’s duty not only to be merciful, but to endure every kind of suffering — robbery, arson, murder, devil and hell. It goes without saying that he is to smite, slay and recompense no one. But the kingdom of the world is nothing else than the servant of God’s wrath upon the wicked, and is a real precursor of hell and everlasting death. It should not be merciful, but strict, severe and wrathful in the fulfillment of its work and duty. Its tool is not a wreath of roses or a flower of love, but a naked sword; and a sword is a symbol of wrath, severity and punishment. It is turned only against the wicked, to hold them in check and keep them at peace, and to protect and save the righteous. Therefore God decrees, in the law of Moses and in Exodus 22, where He institutes the sword, "Thou shalt take the murderer even from mine altar, and shalt not have mercy on him," and the Epistle to the Hebrews confesses that he who acts against the law shall die without mercy. This shows that in the exercise of their office, worldly rulers cannot and ought not be merciful, though out of grace, they may give their office a holiday…

The Scriptures, therefore, have fine, clear eyes and see the temporal sword aright. They see that out of great mercy, it must be unmerciful, and from utter kindliness, it must exercise wrath and severity. As Peter and Paul say, it is God’s servant for vengeance, wrath, and punishment upon the wicked, but for the protection, praise, and honor of the righteous. It looks upon the righteous and has mercy on them, and in order that they may not suffer, it guards, bites, stabs, cuts, hews, and slays, as has been commanded it by God, whose servant it knows itself to be, even in this. This punishing of the wicked without grace does not occur for its own sake, because the punishment of the wicked is a thing to seek after, not in order that the evil desires that are in their blood may be atoned for, but in order that the righteous may be protected, and peace and safety maintained. And beyond all doubt, these are precious works of mercy, love, and kindness, since there is nothing on earth that is worse than disturbance, insecurity, oppression, violence, and injustice. Who could or would stay alive, if such things were the rule? Therefore the wrath and severity of the sword is just as necessary to a people as eating and drinking, nay, as life itself…

For that is what you would have seen if this devil’s business of the peasants had gone on and God had not thus warded them off by the sword, in answer to the prayers of pious Christians. Throughout all Germany things would have gone as they are going now with those who are being killed and destroyed; only it would have been much worse. No one would have been safe from another; any man might have killed another, burned down his house and home, and ravished his wife and children. For this business did not start with God; there was no order in it; it had already come to a pass where none of them trusted or believed another; they deposed one captain after another; and things were done, not as honest men would have had them done, but according to the wishes of the vilest knaves. The devil had it in mind to lay all Germany utterly waste, because there was no other way by which he could suppress the Gospel…

Finally, it may be said, "You yourself teach rebellion, for you say that everyone who can shall hew and thrust among the rebels, and that, in this case, everyone is both supreme judge and executioner." I answer: My little book was not written against simple evil-doers, but against rebels. You must make a very, very great distinction between a rebel and a thief, or a murderer, or any other kind of evil-doer. For a murderer, or other evil- doer, lets the head of the government alone, and attacks only the members or their property; nay, he fears the ruler. So long as the head remains, no one ought to attack such a murderer, because the head can punish him, but everyone ought to await the judgment and command of the head, to whom God has committed the sword and the office of punishment. But a rebel attacks the head himself and interferes with his sword and his office, and therefore his crime is not to be compared with that of a murderer…

For rebellion is no jest, and there is no evil deed on earth that compares with it. Other wicked deeds are single acts; rebellion is a Noah’s flood of wickedness. I am called a clergyman and have the office of the Word, but if I were the servant even of a Turk and saw my lord in danger, I

would forget my spiritual office and thrust and hew as long as I had a heartbeat left. If I were slain in so doing, I should go straight to heaven. For rebellion is a crime that deserves neither court nor mercy, whether it be among heathen, Jews, Turks, Christians, or any other people; it is already heard, judged, condemned, and sentenced to death at anybody’s hands. There is nothing to do about it, except to kill quickly, and give the rebel his deserts. No murderer does so much evil, and none deserves so much evil. For a murderer commits a penal offense, and lets the penalty stand; but a rebel tries to make wickedness free and unpunishable, and attacks the punishment itself.

Reading 2: from Martin Luther, Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (1526) (translated by Charles M. Jacobs)2

[Many soldiers] are offended by this occupation. Some of them have doubts, others give themselves up so completely for lost that they inquire no longer about God, and cast soul and conscience to the winds. I myself have heard some of these fellows say that if they were to remember these things they could never go to war; as though war were such a great thing that we are not to think about God and the soul when war is afoot; and yet when we are in danger of death, that is the very time when we ought most to be mindful of God and the soul.

In order, then, that our best advice may be given to these weak and timid and doubting consciences, and that the heedless may receive better instruction, I complied with your request and promised this book. For if a man goes into battle with a good and well-instructed conscience, he fights well, since a good conscience never fails to make great courage and a bold heart; but when the heart is bold and the spirit confident, the fist is all the stronger, horse and man are brisker, everything turns out better, and all the chances better favor the victory which God then gives. On the other hand, if the conscience is timid and uncertain, then the heart cannot be right bold.

Although slaying and robbing do not seem to be a work of love, and therefore a simple man thinks it not a Christian thing to do, yet in truth even this is a work of love. By way of illustration, a good physician, when a disease is so bad and so great that he has to cut off a hand, foot, ear, eye, or let it decay, does so, in order to save the body. Looked at from the point of view of the member that he cuts off, he seems a cruel and merciless man; but looked at from the point of view of the body, which he intends to save, it turns out that he is a fine and true man and does a work that is good and Christian, as far as it goes. In the same way, when I think of the office of soldier, how it punishes the wicked, slays the unjust, and creates so much misery, it seems an unchristian work and entirely contrary to Christian love; but if I think of how it protects the good and keeps and preserves house and home, wife and child, property and honor and peace, then it appears how precious and godly this work is, and I observe that it

cuts off a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may not perish. For if the sword were not on guard to preserve peace, everything in the world must go to ruin because of lack of peace. Therefore, such a war is only a little, brief lack of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small misfortune that prevents a great misfortune.

When men write about war, then, and say that it is a great plague, that is all true; but they should also see how great the plague is that it prevents. If people were good, and glad to keep peace, war would be the greatest plague on earth ; but what are you going to do with the fact that people will not keep peace, but rob, steal, kill, outrage women and children, and take away property and honor? The small lack of peace, called war, or the sword, must set a check upon this universal, world-wide lack of peace, before which no one could stand. Therefore God honors the sword so highly that He calls it His own ordinance, and will not have men say or imagine that they have invented it or instituted it. For the hand that wields this sword and slays with it is then no more man's hand, but God's, and it is not man, but God, who hangs, tortures, beheads, slays and fights. All these are His works and His judgments. In a word, in thinking of the soldier's office, we must not have regard to the slaying, burning, smiting, seizing, etc. That is what the narrow, simple eyes of children do, when they see in the physician only a man who cuts off hands or saws off legs, but do not see that he does it to save the whole body. So, too, we must look at the office of the soldier, or the sword, with grown-up eyes, and see why it slays and acts so cruelly. Then it will prove itself to be an office that, in itself, is godly, as needful and useful to the world as eating and drinking or any other work.

There are some who abuse this office, and slay and smite needlessly, for no other reason than because they want to; but that is the fault of the persons, not of the office, for where is there an office or a work or any other thing so good ^ that self-willed, wicked people do not abuse it? They are like crazy physicians who would cut off a sound hand, without necessity and just because they wanted to; nay, they are a part of that universal lack of peace which must be prevented by right war and sword, and forced into peace. It always happens, and always has happened that those who begin war unnecessarily are beaten, for they cannot finally escape God's judgment, that is, His sword; it finds them and strikes them at last, as happened to the peasants in the revolt. In confirmation of this, we have the greatest preacher and teacher, next to Christ, namely, John the Baptist (Luke iii) who, when soldiers came to him and asked what they should do, did not condemn their occupation and did not bid W them desist from it, but rather confirmed it and said, "Be content with your wages and do no one violence or wrong." Thus he praised the profession of arms and, at the same time, forbade the abuse of it. For the abuse does not affect the office.

That is the sum and substance of it. The sword is in itself right and is a divine and useful ordinance, which God will have not despised, but feared, honored, and obeyed, on pain of vengeance, as Paul says, in Romans xiii. For He established two kinds of government among men. The one is spiritual; it has no sword, but it has the Word, by means of which men are to become good and righteous, so that with this righteousness they may attain everlasting life.

This righteousness He administers through the Word, which He has committed to the preachers. The other is worldly government, through the sword, which aims to keep peace among men, and this He rewards with temporal blessing. For He gives to rulers so much property, honor, and power, to be possessed by them above others, in order that they may serve Him by administering this righteousness. Thus God Himself is the founder, lord, master, protector, and rewarder of both kinds of righteousness. There is no human ordinance or authority in either, but each is altogether a divine thing.

Since, then, it is beyond doubt that the occupation is, in itself a right and godly thing, we will now discuss the persons who are in it and the use they make of their position; for it is most important to know who is to use this office and how he is to use it. And here enters the fact that when we try to set up fixed rules and laws for this matter, there arise so many cases and exceptions that it is very difficult, or even impossible, to decide everything accurately and equitably. This is the case with all laws; they can never be fixed so certainly and so justly that cases do not arise which deserve to be made exceptions. If the exceptions are not made, and the law is strictly followed, it would be the very greatest wrong…

Be instructed, therefore, dear lords! Keep yourselves from war, unless you have to defend and protect yourselves and the office which you bear compels you to fight. Then let war come; hew in; be men, and test your armor. The reason is this. Every lord and prince is bound to protect his people and get peace for them. That is his office; it is for that that he has the sword (Romans xiii). This should be for him a matter of conscience and he should so depend upon it as to know that this work is right in the eyes of God and is commanded by Him. I am not now teaching what Christians are to do; for your rule does not concern us Christians, but we are rendering you a service and telling you what you are to do before God, in your office of ruling. A Christian is a person to himself; he believes for himself and for no one else. But a lord and prince is not a person to himself, but to others; he has to serve them, that is, protect and defend them.

Even though you are sure and certain that you are not beginning it, but are forced into war, nevertheless you must fear God and have Him before your eyes, and not march out, saying, "Yes, I am forced into it and I have good cause for war." If you depend on that and plunge in headlong, that, too, is not the thing to do. It is true that you have good reason to fight and defend yourself, but that does not give you God's guarantee that you will win. Indeed this very confidence may well be a reason why you must lose, even though you had just cause for war, since God cannot suffer confidence and pride except in one who humbles himself before Him and fears Him. It pleases Him when one fears neither man nor devil and is bold and confident, brave and firm against both, if they began the war and are in the wrong; but that this should win the victory, as though it were our deeds or power that did it, there is nothing in that! He will be feared and hear us singing, from, our hearts, a song like this,' "Dear Lord, Thou seest that I have to go to war, though I would be glad not to; I do not build, however, on the justice of my cause, but on Thy grace and mercy; for I know that if I were to rely on my just cause and

be confident because of it, Thou shouldest rightly let me fall as one whose fall was just, because I relied upon my right and not upon Thy sheer grace and kindness'

When the battle begins and the exhortation, of which I spoke above, has been given, they should commend themselves simply to God's grace and adopt a Christian attitude. For the exhortation above is only a form for doing the external work of war with a good conscience; but since no good work saves men, everyone should say this exhortation, too, in his heart or with his lips, "Heavenly Father, here I am, according to Thy divine will, in the external work and service of my lord, which I owe first to Thee and then to my lord for Thy sake. I thank Thy grace and mercy that Thou hast put me into a work of which I am sure that it is not sin, but right and pleasing obedience to Thy will. But because I know and have learned from Thy gracious Word that none of our good works can help us and no one is saved as a soldier but only as a Christian, therefore, I will rely not at all on this obedience and work of mine, but put myself freely at the service of Thy will and believe from the heart that only the innocent blood of Thy dear Son, my Lord Jesus Christ, redeems and saves me, and this He has shed for me in obedience to Thy holy will. On this I stay; on this I live and die; on this I fight and do all. Dear Lord God the Father, preserve and strengthen this faith in me by Thy Spirit. Amen." If then you want to say the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, you may do so, and let that be enough. Thus commit body and soul to His hands, and draw sword, and smite in God's name.

References[1] http://faculty.weber.edu/sfrancis/Luther's%20Letter.htm.

[2] http://www.rockrohr.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Luther-WHETHER-SOLDIERS-TOO-CAN-BE-SAVED.pdf.


Chapter Seven ReadingsRead the following extract and then submit Exercise 7 on Calvin (or you can consult the reading list and write an Essay on him). Where would you place him on the grid? Why? Calvin’s preferred governance is in large part theocratic. What then is his attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?

Reading: John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, volume 4 (trans Beveridge)1

Chapter 20: Of Civil Government

Section 1. Last part of the whole work, relating to the institution of Civil Government.

Having shown above that there is a twofold government in man, and having fully considered the one which, placed in the soul or inward man, relates to eternal life, we are here called to say something of the other, which pertains only to civil institutions and the external regulation of manners. For although this subject seems from its nature to be unconnected with the spiritual doctrine of faith, which I have undertaken to treat, it will appear as we proceed, that I have properly connected them, nay, that I am under the necessity of doing so, especially while, on the one hand, frantic and barbarous men are furiously endeavouring to overturn the

order established by God, and, on the other, the flatterers of princes, extolling their power without measure, hesitate not to oppose it to the government of God. Unless we meet both extremes, the purity of the faith will perish…

Section 8: Three forms of civil government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy. Impossible absolutely to say which is best.

And certainly it were a very idle occupation for private men to discuss what would be the best form of polity in the place where they live, seeing these deliberations cannot have any influence in determining any public matter. Then the thing itself could not be defined absolutely without rashness, since the nature of the discussion depends on circumstances. And if you compare the different states with each other, without regard to circumstances, it is not easy to determine which of these has the advantage in point of utility, so equal are the terms on which they meet. Monarchy is prone to tyranny. In an aristocracy, again, the tendency is not less to the faction of a few, while in popular ascendancy there is the strongest tendency to sedition. When these three forms of government, of which philosophers treat, are considered in themselves, I, for my part, am far from denying that the form which greatly surpasses the others is aristocracy, either pure or modified by popular government, not indeed in itself, but because it very rarely happens that kings so rule themselves as never to dissent from what is just and right, or are possessed of so much acuteness and prudence as always to see correctly. Owing, therefore, to the vices or defects of men, it is safer and more tolerable when several bear rule, that they may thus mutually assist, instruct, and admonish each other, and should anyone be disposed to go too far, the others are censors and masters to curb his excess. This has already been proved by experience, and confirmed also by the authority of the Lord himself, when he established an aristocracy bordering on popular government among the Israelites, keeping them under that as the best form, until he exhibited an image of the Messiah in David. And as I willingly admit that there is no kind of government happier than where liberty is framed with becoming moderation, and duly constituted so as to be durable, so I deem those very happy who are permitted to enjoy that form, and I admit that they do nothing at variance with their duty when they strenuously and constantly labour to preserve and maintain it. Nay, even magistrates ought to do their utmost to prevent the liberty, of which they have been appointed guardians, from being impaired, far less violated. If in this they are sluggish or little careful, they are perfidious traitors to their office and their country. But should those to whom the Lord has assigned one form of government, take it upon them anxiously to long for a change, the wish would not only be foolish and superfluous, but very pernicious. If you fix your eyes not on one state merely, but look around the world, or at least direct your view to regions widely separated from each other, you will perceive that Divine Providence has not, without good cause, arranged that different countries should be governed by different forms of polity. For as only elements of unequal temperature adhere together, so in different regions a similar inequality in the form of government is best. All this, however, is said unnecessarily to those to whom the will of God is a sufficient reason. For if it has pleased him to appoint kings over kingdoms, and senates or burgomasters over free states, whatever

be the form which he has appointed in the places in which we live, our duty is to obey and submit.

Section 9: Of the duty of Magistrates. Their first care the preservation of the Christian religion and true piety. This proved.

The duty of magistrates, its nature, as described by the word of God, and the things in which it consists, I will here indicate in passing. That it extends to both tables of the law, did Scripture not teach, we might learn from profane writers; for no man has discoursed of the duty of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the common weal, without beginning with religion and divine worship. Thus all have confessed that no polity can be successfully established unless piety be its first care, and that those laws are absurd which disregard the rights of God, and consult only for men. Seeing then that among philosophers religion holds the first place, and that the same thing has always been observed with the universal consent of nations, Christian princes and magistrates may be ashamed of their heartlessness if they make it not their care. We have already shown that this office is specially assigned them by God, and indeed it is right that they exert themselves in asserting and defending the honour of him whose vicegerents they are, and by whose favour they rule. Hence in Scripture holy kings are especially praised for restoring the worship of God when corrupted or overthrown, or for taking care that religion flourished under them in purity and safety…

Section 10: Objections of Anabaptists to this view. These answered.

But here a difficult, and, as it seems, a perplexing question arises. If all Christians are forbidden to kill, and the prophet predicts concerning the holy mountain of the Lord, that is, the Church, “They shall not hurt or destroy,” how can magistrates be at once pious and yet shedders of blood? But if we understand that the magistrate, in inflicting punishment, acts not of himself, but executes the very judgments of God, we shall be disencumbered of every doubt. The law of the Lord forbids to kill; but, that murder may not go unpunished, the Lawgiver himself puts the sword into the hands of his ministers, that they may employ it against all murderers. It belongs not to the pious to afflict and hurt; but to avenge the afflictions of the pious, at the command of God, is neither to afflict nor hurt. I wish it could always be present to our mind that nothing is done here by the rashness of man, but all in obedience to the authority of God. When it is the guide, we never stray from the right path, unless, indeed, divine justice is to be placed under restraint, and not allowed to take punishment on crimes. But if we dare not give the law to it, why should we bring a charge against its ministers? “He beareth not the sword in vain,” says Paul, “for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath on him that doeth evil” (Rom. 13:4). …

Section 11: Lawfulness of War

As it is sometimes necessary for kings and states to take up arms in order to execute public vengeance, the reason assigned furnishes us with the means of estimating how far the wars which are thus undertaken are lawful. For if power has been given them to maintain the tranquillity of their subjects, repress the seditious movements of the turbulent, assist those who are violently oppressed, and animadvert on crimes, can they use it more opportunely than in repressing the fury of him who disturbs both the ease of individuals and the common tranquillity of all; who excites seditious tumult, and perpetrates acts of violent oppression and gross wrongs? If it becomes them to be the guardians and maintainers of the laws, they must repress the attempts of all alike by whose criminal conduct the discipline of the laws is impaired. Nay, if they justly punish those robbers whose injuries have been afflicted only on a few, will they allow the whole country to be robbed and devastated with impunity? Since it makes no difference whether it is by a king or by the lowest of the people that a hostile and devastating inroad is made into a district over which they have no authority, all alike are to be regarded and punished as robbers. Natural equity and duty, therefore, demand that princes be armed not only to repress private crimes by judicial inflictions, but to defend the subjects committed to their guardianship whenever they are hostilely assailed. Such even the Holy Spirit, in many passages of Scripture, declares to be lawful.

Section 12: Objection that the lawfulness of war is not taught in Scripture. Answer.

But if it is objected, that in the New Testament there is no passage or example teaching that war is lawful for Christians, I answer, first, that the reason for carrying on war, which anciently existed, still exists in the present day, and that, on the other hand, there is no ground for debarring magistrates from the defence of those under them; and, secondly, that in the Apostolical writings we are not to look for a distinct exposition of those matters, their object being not to form a civil polity, but to establish the spiritual kingdom of Christ; lastly, that there also it is indicated, in passing, that our Saviour, by his advent, made no change in this respect. For (to use the words of Augustine) “if Christian discipline condemned all wars, when the soldiers ask counsel as to the way of salvation, they would have been told to cast away their arms, and withdraw altogether from military service. Whereas it was said (Luke 3:14), Concuss no one, do injury to no one, be contented with your pay. Those whom he orders to be contented with their pay he certainly does not forbid to serve” (August. Ep. 5 ad Marcell.) But all magistrates must here be particularly cautious not to give way, in the slightest degree, to their passions. Or rather, whether punishments are to be inflicted, they must not be borne headlong by anger, nor hurried away by hatred, nor burn with implacable severity; they must, as Augustine says (De Civit. Dei. Lib. 5 cap. 24), “even pity a common nature in him in whom they punish an individual fault;” or whether they have to take up arms against an enemy, that is, an armed robber, they must not readily catch at the opportunity, nay, they must not take it when offered, unless compelled by the strongest necessity. For if we are to do far more than that heathen demanded, who wished war to appear as desired peace, assuredly all other means must be tried before having recourse to arms. In fine, in both cases, they must not allow themselves to be carried away by any private feeling, but be guided solely by regard for

the public. Acting otherwise, they wickedly abuse their power which was given them, not for their own advantage, but for the good and service of others. On this right of war depends the right of garrisons, leagues, and other civil munitions. By garrisons, I mean those which are stationed in states for defence of the frontiers; by leagues, the alliances which are made by neighbouring princes, on the ground that if any disturbance arise within their territories, they will mutually assist each other, and combine their forces to repel the common enemies of the human race; under civil munitions, I include everything pertaining to the military art.

Section 14: Of Laws, their necessity and utility. Distinction between the Moral, Ceremonial, and Judicial Law of Moses.

In states, the thing next in importance to the magistrates is laws, the strongest sinews of government, or, as Cicero calls them after Plato, the soul, without which, the office of the magistrate cannot exist; just as, on the other hand, laws have no vigour without the magistrate. Hence nothing could be said more truly than that the law is a dumb magistrate, the magistrate a living law. As I have undertaken to describe the laws by which Christian polity is to be governed, there is no reason to expect from me a long discussion on the best kind of laws. The subject is of vast extent, and belongs not to this place. I will only briefly observe, in passing, what the laws are which may be piously used with reference to God, and duly administered among men. This I would rather have passed in silence, were I not aware that many dangerous errors are here committed. For there are some who deny that any commonwealth is rightly framed which neglects the law of Moses, and is ruled by the common law of nations. How perilous and seditious these views are, let others see: for me it is enough to demonstrate that they are stupid and false. We must attend to the well-known division which distributes the whole law of God, as promulgated by Moses, into the moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial law, and we must attend to each of these parts, in order to understand how far they do, or do not, pertain to us. Meanwhile, let no one be moved by the thought that the judicial and ceremonial laws relate to morals. For the ancients who adopted this division, though they were not unaware that the two latter classes had to do with morals, did not give them the name of moral, because they might be changed and abrogated without affecting morals. They give this name specially to the first class, without which, true holiness of life and an immutable rule of conduct cannot exist.

Section 16: All Laws should be just. Civil Law of Moses; how far in force, and how far abrogated.

What I have said will become plain if we attend, as we ought, to two things connected with all laws—viz. the enactment of the law, and the equity on which the enactment is founded and rests. Equity, as it is natural, cannot be the same in all, and therefore ought to be proposed by all laws, according to the nature of the thing enacted. As constitutions have some circumstances on which they partly depend, there is nothing to prevent their diversity, provided they all alike aim at equity as their end. Now, as it is evident that the law of God

which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men, the whole of this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it alone ought to be the aim, the rule, and the end of all laws. Wherever laws are formed after this rule, directed to this aim, and restricted to this end, there is no reason why they should be disapproved by us, however much they may differ from the Jewish law, or from each other (August. de Civit. Dei, Lib. 19 c. 17). The law of God forbids to steal. The punishment appointed for theft in the civil polity of the Jews may be seen in Exodus 22. Very ancient laws of other nations punished theft by exacting the double of what was stolen, while subsequent laws made a distinction between theft manifest and not manifest. Other laws went the length of punishing with exile, or with branding, while others made the punishment capital. Among the Jews, the punishment of the false witness was to “do unto him as he had thought to have done with his brother” (Deut. 19:19). In some countries, the punishment is infamy, in others hanging, in others crucifixion. All laws alike avenge murder with blood, but the kinds of death are different. In some countries, adultery was punished more severely, in others more leniently. Yet we see that amidst this diversity they all tend to the same end. For they all with one mouth declare against those crimes which are condemned by the eternal law of God—viz. murder, theft, adultery, and false witness; though they agree not as to the mode of punishment. This is not necessary, nor even expedient. There may be a country which, if murder were not visited with fearful punishments, would instantly become a prey to robbery and slaughter. There may be an age requiring that the severity of punishments should be increased. If the state is in troubled condition, those things from which disturbances usually arise must be corrected by new edicts. In time of war, civilisation would disappear amid the noise of arms, were not men overawed by an unwonted severity of punishment. In sterility, in pestilence, were not stricter discipline employed, all things would grow worse. One nation might be more prone to a particular vice, were it not most severely repressed. How malignant were it, and invidious of the public good, to be offended at this diversity, which is admirably adapted to retain the observance of the divine law. The allegation, that insult is offered to the law of God enacted by Moses, where it is abrogated, and other new laws are preferred to it, is most absurd. Others are not preferred when they are more approved, not absolutely, but from regard to time and place, and the condition of the people, or when those things are abrogated which were never enacted for us. The Lord did not deliver it by the hand of Moses to be promulgated in all countries, and to be everywhere enforced; but having taken the Jewish nation under his special care, patronage, and guardianship, he was pleased to be specially its legislator, and as became a wise legislator, he had special regard to it in enacting laws.

Section 19: Refutation of the Anabaptists, who condemn all judicial proceedings.

Let those who distinctly condemn all judicial distinction know, that they repudiate the holy ordinance of God, and one of those gifts which to the pure are pure, unless, indeed, they would charge Paul with a crime, because he repelled the calumnies of his accusers, exposing their craft and wickedness, and, at the tribunal, claimed for himself the privilege of a Roman citizen,

appealing, when necessary, from the governor to Cæsar’s judgment-seat. There is nothing contrary to this in the prohibition, which binds all Christians to refrain from revenge, a feeling which we drive far away from all Christian tribunals. For whether the action be of a civil nature, he only takes 2the right course who, with innocuous simplicity, commits his cause to the judge as the public protector, without any thought of returning evil for evil (which is the feeling of revenge); or whether the action is of a graver nature, directed against a capital offence, the accuser required is not one who comes into court, carried away by some feeling of revenge or resentment from some private injury, but one whose only object is to prevent the attempts of some bad men to injure the commonweal. But if you take away the vindictive mind, you offend in no respect against that command which forbids Christians to indulge revenge. But they are not only forbidden to thirst for revenge, they are also enjoined to wait for the hand of the Lord, who promises that he will be the avenger of the oppressed and afflicted. But those who call upon the magistrate to give assistance to themselves or others, anticipate the vengeance of the heavenly Judge. By no means, for we are to consider that the vengeance of the magistrate is the vengeance not of man, but of God, which, as Paul says, he exercises by the ministry of man for our good (Rom. 13:8).

Section 20: Objection, that Christ forbids us to resist evil. Answer.

No more are we at variance with the words of Christ, who forbids us to resist evil, and adds, “Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also” (Mt. 5:39, 40). He would have the minds of his followers to be so abhorrent to everything like retaliation, that they would sooner allow the injury to be doubled than desire to repay it. From this patience we do not dissuade them. For verily Christians were to be a class of men born to endure affronts and injuries, and be exposed to the iniquity, imposture, and derision of abandoned men, and not only so, but were to be tolerant of all these evils; that is, so composed in the whole frame of their minds, that, on receiving one offence, they were to prepare themselves for another, promising themselves nothing during the whole of life but the endurance of a perpetual cross. Meanwhile, they must do good to those who injure them, and pray for those who curse them, and (this is their only victory) strive to overcome evil with good (Rom. 12:20, 21). Thus affected, they will not seek eye for eye, and tooth for tooth (as the Pharisees taught their disciples to long for vengeance), but (as we are instructed by Christ), they will allow their body to be mutilated, and their goods to be maliciously taken from them, prepared to remit and spontaneously pardon those injuries the moment they have been inflicted. This equity and moderation, however, will not prevent them, with entire friendship for their enemies, from using the aid of the magistrate for the preservation of their goods, or, from zeal for the public interest, to call for the punishment of the wicked and pestilential man, whom they know nothing will reform but death. All these precepts are truly expounded by Augustine, as tending to prepare the just and pious man patiently to sustain the malice of those whom he desires to become good, that he may thus increase the number of the good, not add himself to the number of the bad by imitating their wickedness. Moreover, it pertains more to the

preparation of the heart which is within, than to the work which is done openly, that patience and good-will may be retained within the secret of the heart, and that may be done openly which we see may do good to those to whom we ought to wish well (August. Ep. 5 ad. Marcell.).

Section 22: Of the respect and obedience due to Magistrates.

The first duty of subjects towards their rulers, is to entertain the most honourable views of their office, recognising it as a delegated jurisdiction from God, and on that account receiving and reverencing them as the ministers and ambassadors of God. For you will find some who show themselves very obedient to magistrates, and would be unwilling that there should be no magistrates to obey, because they know this is expedient for the public good, and yet the opinion which those persons have of magistrates is, that they are a kind of necessary evils. But Peter requires something more of us when he says, “Honour the king” (1 Pet. 2:17); and Solomon, when he says, “My son, fear thou the Lord and the king” (Prov. 24:21). For, under the term honour, the former includes a sincere and candid esteem, and the latter, by joining the king with God, shows that he is invested with a kind of sacred veneration and dignity. We have also the remarkable injunction of Paul, “Be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake” (Rom. 13:5). By this he means, that subjects, in submitting to princes and governors, are not to be influenced merely by fear (just as those submit to an armed enemy who see vengeance ready to be executed if they resist), but because the obedience which they yield is rendered to God himself, inasmuch as their power is from God. I speak not of the men as if the mask of dignity could cloak folly, or cowardice, or cruelty, or wicked or flagitious manners, and thus acquire for vice the praise of virtue; but I say that the station itself is deserving of honour and reverence, and that those who rule should, in respect of their office, be held by us in esteem and veneration.

Section 23: Same subject continued.

From this, a second consequence is, that we must with ready minds prove our obedience to them, whether in complying with edicts, or in paying tribute, or in undertaking public offices and burdens, which relate to the common defence, or in executing any other orders. “Let every soul,” says Paul, “be subject unto the higher powers.” “Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God” (Rom. 13:1, 2). Writing to Titus, he says, “Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work” (Tit. 3:1). Peter also says, “Submit yourselves to every human creature” (or rather, as I understand it, “ordinance of man”), “for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well” (1 Pet. 2:13). Moreover, to testify that they do not feign subjection, but are sincerely and cordially subject, Paul adds, that they are to commend the safety and prosperity of those under whom they live to God. “I exhort, therefore,” says he, “that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men; for kings, and for all that are in authority: that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in

all godliness and honesty” (1 Tim. 2:1, 2). Let no man here deceive himself, since we cannot resist the magistrate without resisting God. For, although an unarmed magistrate may seem to be despised with impunity, yet God is armed, and will signally avenge this contempt. Under this obedience, I comprehend the restraint which private men ought to impose on themselves in public, not interfering with public business, or rashly encroaching on the province of the magistrate, or attempting anything at all of a public nature. If it is proper that anything in a public ordinance should be corrected, let them not act tumultuously, or put their hands to a work where they ought to feel that their hands are tied, but let them leave it to the cognisance of the magistrate, whose hand alone here is free. My meaning is, let them not dare to do it without being ordered. For when the command of the magistrate is given, they too are invested with public authority. For as, according to the common saying, the eyes and ears of the prince are his counsellors, so one may not improperly say that those who, by his command, have the charge of managing affairs, are his hands.

Section 24: How far submission due to tyrants.

24. But as we have hitherto described the magistrate who truly is what he is called—viz. the father of his country, and (as the Poet speaks) the pastor of the people, the guardian of peace, the president of justice, the vindicator of innocence, he is justly to be deemed a madman who disapproves of such authority. And since in almost all ages we see that some princes, careless about all their duties on which they ought to have been intent, live, without solicitude, in luxurious sloth; others, bent on their own interest, venally prostitute all rights, privileges, judgments, and enactments; others pillage poor people of their money, and afterwards squander it in insane largesses; others act as mere robbers, pillaging houses, violating matrons, and slaying the innocent; many cannot be persuaded to recognise such persons for princes, whose command, as far as lawful, they are bound to obey. For while in this unworthy conduct, and among atrocities so alien, not only from the duty of the magistrate, but also of the man, they behold no appearance of the image of God, which ought to be conspicuous in the magistrate, while they see not a vestige of that minister of God, who was appointed to be a praise to the good and a terror to the bad, they cannot recognise the ruler whose dignity and authority Scripture recommends to us. And, undoubtedly, the natural feeling of the human mind has always been not less to assail tyrants with hatred and execration, than to look up to just kings with love and veneration.

Section 25: Same continued.

25. But if we have respect to the word of God, it will lead us farther, and make us subject not only to the authority of those princes who honestly and faithfully perform their duty toward us, but all princes, by whatever means they have so become, although there is nothing they less perform than the duty of princes. For though the Lord declares that a ruler to maintain our safety is the highest gift of his beneficence, and prescribes to rulers themselves their proper sphere, he at the same time declares, that of whatever description they may be, they derive

their power from none but him. Those, indeed, who rule for the public good, are true examples and specimens of his beneficence, while those who domineer unjustly and tyrannically are raised up by him to punish the people for their iniquity. Still all alike possess that sacred majesty with which he has invested lawful power. I will not proceed further without subjoining some distinct passages to this effect. We need not labour to prove that an impious king is a mark of the Lord’s anger, since I presume no one will deny it, and that this is not less true of a king than of a robber who plunders your goods, an adulterer who defiles your bed, and an assassin who aims at your life, since all such calamities are classed by Scripture among the curses of God. But let us insist at greater length in proving what does not so easily fall in with the views of men, that even an individual of the worst character, one most unworthy of all honour, if invested with public authority, receives that illustrious divine power which the Lord has by his word devolved on the ministers of his justice and judgment, and that, accordingly, in so far as public obedience is concerned, he is to be held in the same honour and reverence as the best of kings.

Section 26: Proof from Scripture

And, first, I would have the reader carefully to attend to that Divine Providence which, not without cause, is so often set before us in Scripture, and that special act of distributing kingdoms, and setting up as kings whomsoever he pleases. In Daniel it is said, “He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth kings, and setteth up kings” (Dan. 2:21, 37). Again, “That the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will” (Dan. 4:17, 25). Similar sentiments occur throughout Scripture, but they abound particularly in the prophetical books. What kind of king Nebuchadnezzar, he who stormed Jerusalem, was, is well known. He was an active invader and devastator of other countries. Yet the Lord declares in Ezekiel that he had given him the land of Egypt as his hire for the devastation which he had committed. Daniel also said to him, “Thou, O king, art a king of kings: for the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, and strength, and glory. And wheresoever the children of men dwell, the beasts of the field and the fowls of the heaven hath he given into thine hand, and hath made thee ruler over them all” (Dan. 2:37, 38). Again, he says to his son Belshazzar, “The most high God gave Nebuchadnezzar thy father a kingdom, and majesty, and glory, and honour: and for the majesty that he gave him, all people, nations, and languages, trembled and feared before him” (Dan. 5:18, 19). When we hear that the king was appointed by God, let us, at the same time, call to mind those heavenly edicts as to honouring and fearing the king, and we shall have no doubt that we are to view the most iniquitous tyrant as occupying the place with which the Lord has honoured him. When Samuel declared to the people of Israel what they would suffer from their kings, he said, “This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots. And he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be confectioneries, and to be cooks, and to be

bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers, and to his servants. And he will take your men-servants, and your maid-servants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants” (1 Sam. 8:11-l7). Certainly these things could not be done legally by kings, whom the law trained most admirably to all kinds of restraint; but it was called justice in regard to the people, because they were bound to obey, and could not lawfully resist: as if Samuel had said, To such a degree will kings indulge in tyranny, which it will not be for you to restrain. The only thing remaining for you will be to receive their commands, and be obedient to their words.

Section 29: Considerations to curb impatience under tyranny.

This feeling of reverence, and even of piety, we owe to the utmost to all our rulers, be their characters what they may. This I repeat the oftener, that we may learn not to consider the individuals themselves, but hold it to be enough that by the will of the Lord they sustain a character on which he has impressed and engraven inviolable majesty. But rulers, you will say, owe mutual duties to those under them. This I have already confessed. But if from this you conclude that obedience is to be returned to none but just governors, you reason absurdly. Husbands are bound by mutual duties to their wives, and parents to their children. Should husbands and parents neglect their duty; should the latter be harsh and severe to the children whom they are enjoined not to provoke to anger, and by their severity harass them beyond measure; should the former treat with the greatest contumely the wives whom they are enjoined to love and to spare as the weaker vessels; would children be less bound in duty to their parents, and wives to their husbands? They are made subject to the froward and undutiful. Nay, since the duty of all is not to look behind them, that is, not to inquire into the duties of one another, but to submit each to his own duty, this ought especially to be exemplified in the case of those who are placed under the power of others. Wherefore, if we are cruelly tormented by a savage, if we are rapaciously pillaged by an avaricious or luxurious, if we are neglected by a sluggish, if, in short, we are persecuted for righteousness’ sake by an impious and sacrilegious prince, let us first call up the remembrance of our faults, which doubtless the Lord is chastising by such scourges. In this way humility will curb our impatience. And let us reflect that it belongs not to us to cure these evils, that all that remains for us is to implore the help of the Lord, in whose hands are the hearts of kings, and inclinations of kingdoms. “God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods.” Before his face shall fall and be crushed all kings and judges of the earth, who have not kissed his anointed, who have enacted unjust laws to oppress the poor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble, to make widows a prey, and plunder the fatherless.

Section 30: Considerations considered.

Herein is the goodness, power, and providence of God wondrously displayed. At one time he raises up manifest avengers from among his own servants, and gives them his command to punish accursed tyranny, and deliver his people from calamity when they are unjustly oppressed; at another time he employs, for this purpose, the fury of men who have other thoughts and other aims. Thus he rescued his people Israel from the tyranny of Pharaoh by Moses; from the violence of Chusa, king of Syria, by Othniel; and from other bondage by other kings or judges. Thus he tamed the pride of Tyre by the Egyptians; the insolence of the Egyptians by the Assyrians; the ferocity of the Assyrians by the Chaldeans; the confidence of Babylon by the Medes and Persians,—Cyrus having previously subdued the Medes, while the ingratitude of the kings of Judah and Israel, and their impious contumacy after all his kindness, he subdued and punished,—at one time by the Assyrians, at another by the Babylonians. All these things, however, were not done in the same way. The former class of deliverers being brought forward by the lawful call of God to perform such deeds, when they took up arms against kings, did not at all violate that majesty with which kings are invested by divine appointment, but armed from heaven, they, by a greater power, curbed a less, just as kings may lawfully punish their own satraps. The latter class, though they were directed by the hand of God, as seemed to him good, and did his work without knowing it, had nought but evil in their thoughts.

Section 31: General submission due by private individuals.

But whatever may be thought of the acts of the men themselves, the Lord by their means equally executed his own work, when he broke the bloody sceptres of insolent kings, and overthrew their intolerable dominations. Let princes hear and be afraid; but let us at the same time guard most carefully against spurning or violating the venerable and majestic authority of rulers, an authority which God has sanctioned by the surest edicts, although those invested with it should be most unworthy of it, and, as far as in them lies, pollute it by their iniquity. Although the Lord takes vengeance on unbridled domination, let us not therefore suppose that that vengeance is committed to us, to whom no command has been given but to obey and suffer. I speak only of private men. For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings (as the Ephori, who were opposed to kings among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the people to consuls among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the Athenians; and perhaps there is something similar to this in the power exercised in each kingdom by the three orders, when they hold their primary diets). So far am I from forbidding these officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they connive at kings when they tyrannise and insult over the humbler of the people, I affirm that their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the ordinance of God, they are its appointed guardians.

Section 32: Obedience due only in so far as compatible with the word of God.

But in that obedience which we hold to be due to the commands of rulers, we must always make the exception, nay, must be particularly careful that it is not incompatible with obedience to Him to whose will the wishes of all kings should be subject, to whose decrees their commands must yield, to whose majesty their sceptres must bow. And, indeed, how preposterous were it, in pleasing men, to incur the offence of Him for whose sake you obey men! The Lord, therefore, is King of kings. When he opens his sacred mouth, he alone is to be heard, instead of all and above all. We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. If they command anything against Him let us not pay the least regard to it, nor be moved by all the dignity which they possess as magistrates—a dignity to which no injury is done when it is subordinated to the special and truly supreme power of God. On this ground Daniel denies that he had sinned in any respect against the king when he refused to obey his impious decree (Dan. 6:22), because the king had exceeded his limits, and not only been injurious to men, but, by raising his horn against God, had virtually abrogated his own power.

References [1] Downloaded fromhttp://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.vi.xxi.html.

Exercise 7 - *use Grid from exercise 4*

Chapter Eight Readings Read the following extract and then submit Exercise 8 on Grotius (or you can consult the reading list and write an Essay on him). Where would you place him on the grid? Why? What is Grotius’s attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?

Reading: Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace) trans A.C. Campbell1

BOOK 1

CHAPTER II. Inquiry Into the Lawfulness of War.

I. After examining the sources of right, the first and most general question that occurs, is whether any war is just, or if it is ever lawful to make war. But this question like many others that follow, must in the first place be compared with the rights of nature. Cicero in the third book of his Bounds of Good and Evil,and in other parts of his works, proves with great erudition from the writings of the Stoics, that there are certain first principles of nature, called by the Greeks the first natural impressions, which are succeeded by other principles of obligation superior even to the first impressions themselves. He calls the care, which every animals, from the moment of its birth, feels for itself and the preservation of its condition, its abhorrence of destruction, and of every thing that threatens death, a principle of nature. Hence, he says, it happens, that if left to his own choice, every man would prefer a sound and perfect to a

mutilated and deformed body. So that preserving ourselves in a natural state, and holding to every thing conformable, and averting every thing repugnant to nature is the first duty.

But from the knowledge of these principles, a notion arises of their being agreeable to reason, that part of a man, which is superior to the body. Now that agreement with reason, which is the basis of propriety, should have more weight than the impulse of appetite; because the principles of nature recommend right reason as a rule that ought to be of higher value than bare instinct. As the truth of this is easily assented to by all men of sound judgment without any other demonstration, it follows that in inquiring into the laws of nature the first object of consideration is, what is agreeable to those principles of nature, and then we come to the rules, which, though arising only out of the former, are of higher dignity, and not only to be embraced, when offered, but pursued by all the means in our power.

This last principle, which is called propriety, from its fitness, according to the various things on which it turns, sometimes is limited to a very narrow point, the least departure from which is a deviation into vice; sometimes it allows a wider scope, so that some actions, even laudable in themselves, may be omitted or varied without crime. In this case there is not an immediate distinction between right and wrong; the shades are gradual, and their termination unperceived; not like a direct contrast, where the opposition is immediately seen, and the first step is a transgression of the fixed bounds.

The general object of divine and human laws is to give the authority of obligation to what was only laudable in itself. It has been said above that an investigation of the laws of nature implies an inquiry, whether any particular action may be done without injustice: now by an act of injustice is understood that, which necessarily has in it any thing repugnant to the nature of a reasonable and social being. So far from any thing in the principles of nature being repugnant to war, every part of them indeed rather favours it. For the preservation of our lives and persons, which is the end of war, and the possession or acquirement of things necessary and useful to life is most suitable to those principles of nature, and to use force, if necessary, for those occasions, is no way dissonant to the principles of nature, since all animals are endowed with natural strength, sufficient to assist and defend themselves.

… Now right reason and the nature of society which claims the second, and indeed more important place in this inquiry, prohibit not all force, but only that which is repugnant to society, by depriving another of his right. For the end of society is to form a common and united aid to preserve to every one his own. Which may easily be understood to have obtained, before what is now called property was introduced. For the free use of life and limbs was so much the right of every one, that it could not be infringed or attacked without injustice. So the use of the common productions of nature was the right of the first occupier, and for any one to rob him of that was manifest injustice. This may be more easily understood, since law and custom have established property under its present form. Tully has expressed this in the third book of his Offices in the following words, “if every member could have separate feeling, and

imagine it could derive vigour from engrossing the strength of a neighboring part of the body, the whole frame would languish and perish. In the same manner if every one of us, for his own advantage, might rob another of what he pleased, there would be a total overthrow of human society and intercourse. For though it is allowed by nature for every one to give the preference to himself before another in the enjoyment of life and necessaries, yet she does not permit us to increase our means and riches by the spoils of others.” It is not therefore contrary to the nature of society to provide and consult for ourselves, if another’s right is not injured; the force therefore, which inviolably abstains from touching the rights of others, is not unjust...

II. The observation that all war is not repugnant to the law of nature, may be more amply proved from sacred history. For when Abraham with his servants and confederates had gained a victory, by force of arms, over the four Kings, who had plundered Sodom, God approved of his act by the mouth of his priest Melchisedech, who said to him, “Blessed be the most high God, who hath delivered thine enemies into thine hand.” Gen. xiv. 20. Now Abraham had taken up arms, as appears from the history, without any special command from God. But this man, no less eminent for sanctity than wisdom, felt himself authorized by the law of nature…

III. Proofs of what has been advanced, may be drawn also from the consent of all, especially, of the wisest nations. There is a celebrated passage in Cicero’s speech for Milo, in which, justifying recourse to force in defence of life, he bears ample testimony to the feelings of nature, who has given us this law, which is not written, but innate, which we have not received by instruction, hearing or reading, but the elements of it have been engraven in our hearts and minds with her own hand: a law which is not the effect of habit and acquirement, but forms a part in the original complexion of our frame: so that if our lives are threatened with assassination or open violence from the hands of robbers or enemies, anymeans of defence would be allowed and laudable. He proceeds, reason has taught this to the learned, necessity to the barbarians, custom to nations, and nature herself to wild beasts, to use every possible means of repelling force offered to their bodies, their limbs and their lives. Caius and Lawyer says, natural reason permits us to defend ourselves against dangers. And Florentinus, another legal authority, maintains, that whatever any one does in defence of his person ought to be esteemed right. Josephus observes, that the love of life is a law of nature strongly implanted in all creatures, and therefore we look upon those as enemies, who would openly deprive us of it…

IV. From the law of nature then which may also be called the law of nations, it is evident that all kinds of war are not to be condemned. In the same manner, all history and the laws of manners of every people sufficiently inform us, that war is not condemned by the voluntary law of nations. Indeed Hermogenianus has said, that wars were introduced by the law of nations, a passage which ought to be explained somewhat differently from the general interpretation given to it. The meaning of it is, that certain formalities, attending war, were introduced by the law of nations, which formalities were necessary to secure the peculiar privileges arising out of the law. From hence a distinction, which there will be occasion to use

hereafter, between a war with the usual formalities of the law of nations, which is called just or perfect, and an informal war, which does not for that reason cease to be just, or agreeable to right. For some wars, when made upon just grounds, though not exactly conformable, yet are not repugnant to the law, as will be explained more fully hereafter…

V. A greater difficulty occurs respecting the divine voluntary law. Nor is there any force in the objection that as the law of nature is unchangeable, nothing can be appointed even by God himself contrary to it. For this is true only in those things, which the law of nature positively forbids or commands; not in those which are tacitly permitted by the same law. For acts of that kind, not falling strictly within the general rule, but being exceptions to the law of nature, may be either forbidden or commanded. The first objection usually made against the lawfulness of war is taken from the law given to Noah and his posterity, Gen. ix. 5, 6, where God thus speaks, “Surely the blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of every man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I require the life of man. Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man.” Here some take the phrase of requiring blood, in the most general sense and the other part, that blood shall be shed in its turn, they consider as a bare threat, and not an approbation; neither of which acceptations can be admitted. For the prohibition of shedding blood extends not beyond the law itself, which declares, Thou shalt not kill; but passes no condemnation upon capital punishments or wars undertaken by public authority.

Neither the law of Moses, nor that given to Noah established any thing new, they were only a declaratory repetition of the law of nature, that had been obliterated by depraved custom. So that the shedding of blood in a criminal and wanton manner is the only act prohibited by those commandments. Thus every act of homocide does not amount to murder, but only that, which is committed with a wilful and malicious intention to destroy the life of an innocent person. As to what follows about blood being shed in return for blood, it seems to imply not a mere act of personal revenge, but the deliberate exercise of a perfect right, which may be thus explained; it is not unjust, according to the principles of nature that any one should suffer in proportion to the evil he has done…

VI. The arguments against the lawfulness of war, drawn from the Gospel, are more specious. In examining which it will not be necessary to assume, as many do, that the Gospel contains nothing more than the law of nature, except the rules of faith and the Sacraments: an assumption, which in its general acceptation is by no means true. It may readily be admitted, that nothing inconsistent with natural justice is enjoined in the gospel, yet it can never be allowed, that the laws of Christ do not impose duties upon us, above those required by the law of nature. And those, who think otherwise, strain their arguments to prove that many practices forbidden by the gospel, as concubinage, divorce, polygamy, were made offences by the law of nature. The light of nature might point out the honour of abstaining from such practices, but the sinfulness of them could not have been discovered without a revelation of the will of God.

Who for instance would say, that the Christian precept of laying down our lives for others was an obligation of the law of nature? I John iii. 16…

VII. Omitting therefore the less satisfactory proofs, as a leading point of evidence to shew that the right of war is not taken away by the law of the gospel, that passage in St. Paul’s Epistle to Timothy may be referred to, where the Apostle says, “I exhort therefore that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men; for Kings, and for all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty; for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” I Eph. ii. 1, 2, 3. From this passage, the following conclusions may be drawn; in the first place, that Christian piety in kings is acceptable to God, that their profession of Christianity does not abridge their rights of sovereignty… In this respect they serve the Lord, as kings, when they promote his service by means which they could not use without regal power.

The same part of the Apostle’s writings supplies us with a second argument, where the higher powers, meaning kings, are said to be from God, and are called the ordinance of God; from whence it is plainly inferred that we are to honour and obey the king, from motives of conscience, and that every one who resists him, is resisting God… For the question did not turn upon the characters of the Princes, whether they were godly or not, but whether their holding the kingly office was repugnant to the law of God. This St. Paul denies, maintaining that the kingly office, even under all circumstances, was appointed by God, therefore if ought to be honoured from motives of conscience, which, properly speaking, are under the control of God alone.

A third arguments is derived from the words of John the Baptist, who, at a time when many thousands of the Jews served in the Roman armies, as appears from the testimony of Josephus and others, being seriously asked by the soldiers, what they should do to avoid the wrath of God, did not command them to renounce their military calling, which he ought to have done, had it been inconsistent with the law and will of God, but to abstain from violence, extortion, and false accusation, and to be content with their wages...

There is a fourth argument, which seems to have no little weight, proceeding upon the supposition, that if the right of inflicting capital punishments were abolished, and princes were deprived of the power of the sword to protect their subjects against the violence of murderers and robbers, wickedness would triumphantly prevail, and the world would be deluged with crimes, which, even under the best established governments, are with so much difficulty prevented or restrained. If then it had been the intention of Christ to introduce such an order of things as had never been heard of, he would undoubtedly by the most express and particular words, have condemned all capital punishments, and all wars, which we never read that he did. For the arguments, brought in favor of such an opinion, are for the most part very indefinite and obscure. Now both justice and common sense require such general expressions

to be taken in a limited acceptation, and allow us, in explaining ambiguous words, to depart from their literal meaning, where our strictly adhering to it would lead to manifest inconvenience and detriment…

Upon weighing the whole matter, the slightest ground cannot be discovered for supposing that any pious man, who had heard those words from our Saviour himself, would have understood them in a sense different from that which has been here given. It must however be admitted that, before the Gospel dispensation permission or impunity was granted to certain acts and dispositions, which it would neither be necessary nor proper to examine at present, upon which Christ did not allow his followers to act. Of this kind was the permission to put away a wife for every offence, and to seek redress by law for every injury. Now between the positive precepts of Christ and those permissions there is a difference, but not a contradiction. For he that retains his wife, and he that forgoes his right of redress, does nothing contrary to the law, but rather acts agreeably to the spirit of it. It is very different with a judge, who is not merely permitted, but commanded by the law to punish a murderer with death, incurring guilt in the sight of God, if he should act otherwise. If Christ had forbidden him to put a murderer to death, his prohibition would have amounted to a contradiction, and it would have abolished the law.

IX. In examining the meaning of written evidence, general custom, and the opinions of men celebrated for their wisdom have usually great weight; a practice which it is right to observe in the interpretation of holy scripture…

Salvian says, it was commanded by Christ that we should relinquish the object of dispute, rather than engage in law suits. But this, taken in so general an acceptation, is rather by the way of counsel, in order to attain to a sublimer mode of life, than intended as a positive precept…

BOOK 3

CHAPTER XI. The Right of Killing Enemies, in Just War, to be Tempered with Moderation and Humanity.

I. and II. Cicero, in the first book of his offices, has finely observed, that “some duties are to be observed even towards those, from whom you have received an injury. For even vengeance and punishment have their due bounds.” And at the same time he extols those ancient periods in the Roman government, when the events of war were mild, and marked with no unnecessary cruelty.

The explanations given in the first chapter of this book will point out the cases, where the destruction of an enemy is one of the rights of lawful war, according to the principles of strict

and internal justice, and where it is not so. For the death of an enemy may proceed either from an accidental calamity, or from the fixed purpose of his destruction.

No one can be justly killed by design, except by way of legal punishment, or to defend our lives, and preserve our property, when it cannot be effected without his destruction. For although in sacrificing the life of man to the preservation of perishable possessions, there may be nothing repugnant to strict justice, it is by no means consonant to the law of charity.

But to justify a punishment of that kind, the person put to death must have committed a crime, and such a crime too, as every equitable judge would deem worthy of death. Points, which it is unnecessary to discuss any further, as they have been so fully explained in the chapter on punishments.

III. In speaking of the calamities of war, as a punishment, it is proper to make a distinction between misfortune and injury. For a people may sometimes be engaged in war against their will, where they cannot be justly charged with entertaining hostile intentions…

IV. and V. Between complete injuries and pure misfortunes there may be sometimes a middle kind of actions, partaking of the nature of both, which can neither be said to be done with known and willful intention, nor yet excused under colour of ignorance and want of inclination. Acts of pure misfortune neither merit punishment, nor oblige the party to make reparation for the loss occasioned. Hence many parts of history supply us with distinctions that are made between those who are the authors of a war, and principals in it, and those who are obliged to follow others, as accessories in the same…

VII. Such forbearance in war is not only a tribute to justice, it is a tribute to humanity, it is a tribute to moderation, it is a tribute to greatness of soul. It was in this moderation, says Sallust, the foundation of Roman greatness was laid. Tacitus describes his countrymen as a people no less remarkable for their courage in the field, than for their humanity to the vanquished and suppliant…

VIII. Though there may be circumstances, in which absolute justice will not condemn the sacrifice of lives in war, yet humanity will require that the greatest precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger, except in cases of extreme urgency and utility.

IX. After establishing these general principles, it will not be difficult to decide upon particular cases. Seneca says, that “in the calamities of war children are exempted and spared, on the score of their age, and women from respect to their sex.” In the wars of the Hebrews, even after the offers of peace have been rejected, God commands the women and children to be spared.

Thus when the Ninevites were threatened with utter destruction, on account of their grievous crimes, a mitigation of the sentence was allowed, in compassion to the many thousands, who were of an age incapable of making a distinction between right and wrong.

If God, from whose supreme gift the life of man proceeds, and on whose supreme disposal it depends, prescribes to himself a rule like this, it is surely incumbent upon men, who have no commission, but for the welfare and preservation of the lives of men, to act by the same rule. Thus age and sex are equally spared, except where the latter have departed from this privilege by taking arms, or performing the part of men.

X. The same rule may be laid down too with respect to males, whose modes of life are entirely remote from the use of arms. And in the first class of this description may be placed the ministers of religion, who, among all nations, from times of the most remote antiquity have been exempted from bearing arms.—Thus, as may be seen in sacred history, the Philistines, being enemies of the Jews, forbore doing harm to the company of prophets, that was at Gaba: and David fled with Samuel to another place, which the presence of a prophetic company protected from all molestation and injury.

Plutarch relates of the Cretans, that when all order among them was entirely broken by their civil broils, they abstained from offering violence to any member of the priesthood, or to those employed in the sacred rites belonging to the dead. From hence the Greeks came to denote a general massacre by the proverbial expression of no one being left to carry fire to the altar.

Equally privileged with the holy priesthood are those, who devote their lives to the pursuit of letters, and other studies beneficial to mankind.

XI. Diodorus bestows an encomium upon the Indians, who, in all their wars with each other, forbore destroying or even hurting those employed in husbandry, as being the common benefactors of all. Plutarch relates the same of the ancient Corinthians and Megarensians, and Cyrus sent a message to the king of Assyria to inform him that he was willing to avoid molesting all who were employed in tilling the ground.

XII. To the above catalogue of those exempted from sharing in the calamities of war, may be added merchants, not only those residing for a time in the enemy’s country, but even his natural-born, and regular subjects: artisans too, and all others are included; whose subsistence depends upon cultivating the arts of peace.

XIII. and XIV. More civilized manners having abolished the barbarous practice of putting prisoners to death, for the same reason, the surrender of those, who stipulate late for the preservation of their lives either in battle, or in a siege, is not to be rejected.

The Romans, when investing towns, always accepted offers of capitulation, if made before the battering ram had touched the walls. Caesar gave notice to the Atuatici, that he would save their city, if they surrendered, before the battering ram was brought up. And in modern times it is the usual practice, before shells are thrown, or mines sprung, to summon places to surrender, which are thought unable to hold out—and where places are stronger, such summons is generally sent, before the storming is made.

XV. and XVI. Against these principles of natural law and equity an objection is sometimes derived from the necessity of retaliation, or striking terror, in cases of obstinate resistance. But such an objection is by no means just. For after a place has surrendered, and there is no danger to be apprehended from the prisoners, there is nothing to justify the further effusion of blood.—Such rigour was sometimes practiced, where there were any enormous acts of injustice, or any violation of faith; it was practiced also upon deserters, if taken.

Sometimes, where very important advantages may attend striking a terror, by preventing the same crimes in future from being committed, it may be proper to exercise the right of rigour in its full extent. But an obstinate resistance, which can be considered as nothing but the faithful discharge of a trust, can never come within the description of such delinquencies, as justify extreme rigour.

XVII. Where delinquencies indeed are such as deserve death, but the number of offenders is very great, it is usual, from motives of mercy, to depart in some degree from the right of enforcing the whole power of the law: the authority for so doing is founded on the example of God himself, who commanded such offers of peace to be made to the Canaanites, and their neighbours, the most wicked of any people upon the face of the earth, as might spare their lives upon the condition of their becoming tributaries.

XVIII. From the opinions advanced and maintained above, it will not be difficult to gather the principles of the law of nature respecting hostages.

At the time, when it was a general opinion that every one had the same right over his life, as over his property, and that right, either by express or implied consent was transferred from individuals to the state, it is not surprising that we should read of hostages, though harmless and innocent as individuals, being punished for the offences of the state: and, in this case, the consent of the state to such a regulation implies that of individuals, who have originally resigned their own will to that of the public; in whom, after such resignation, it indubitably vested.

But when the day-spring rose upon the world, men, obtaining clearer views of the extent of their power, found that God, in giving man dominion over the whole earth, reserved to himself the supreme disposal of his life, so that man cannot resign to anyone the right over his own life or that of another.

XIX. By way of conclusion to this subject it may be observed, that all actions no way conducive to obtain a contested right, or to bring the war to a termination, but calculated merely to display the strength of either side are totally repugnant to the duties of a Christian and to the principles of humanity. So that it behoves Christian princes to prohibit all unnecessary effusion of blood, as they must render an account of their sovereign commission to him, by whose authority, and in whose stead, they bear the sword.

CHAPTER XII.: On Moderation in Despoiling An Enemy’s Country.

I. One of the three following cases is requisite to justify any one in destroying what belongs to another: there must be either such a necessity, as at the original institution of property might be supposed to form an exception, as if for instance any one should throw the sword of another into a river, to prevent a madman from using it to his destruction: still according to the true principles maintained in a former part of this work he will be bound to repair the loss: or there must be some debt, arising from the non-performance of an engagement, where the waste committed is considered as a satisfaction for that debt: or there must have been some aggressions, for which such destruction is only an adequate punishment.

Now, driving off some of our cattle, or burning a few of our houses, can never be pleaded as a sufficient and justifiable motive for laying waste the whole of an enemy’s kingdom. Polybius saw this in its proper light, observing, that vengeance in war should not be carried to its extreme, nor extend any further than was necessary to make an aggressor atone justly for his offence. And it is upon these motives, and within these limits alone, that punishment can be inflicted. But except where prompted to it by motives of great utility, it is folly, and worse than folly, wantonly to hurt another.

But upon duly and impartially weighing the matter, such acts are oftener regarded in an odious light, than considered as the dictates of prudent and necessary counsels. For the most urgent and justifiable motives are seldom of long continuance, and are often succeeded by weightier motives of a more humane description.

II. It may be possible, under some circumstances, to detain what belongs to an enemy, so as to prevent his deriving advantage from it, in which case it would be an unnecessary and wanton act to destroy it. And to such circumstances the divine law has an eye, in ordering wild trees to be made use of for the construction of works in a siege, while fruit-trees, and every thing necessary for the support of man, ought, if possible, to be spared.

III. Where there is an expectation also of speedy victory and conquest, prudence will dictate to a general or commander of any kind the necessity of forbearing from all acts of destruction, by authorizing and committing which he would only be injuring those possessions, that are likely to come into the hands of his own state or sovereign. Thus, as we are informed by Plutarch, when Philip had overrun Thessaly, destroying and plundering the whole country, Flaminius

ordered his troops to march in a regular manner, as through a ceded country which had become their own.

IV. In the next place, it is unnecessary to destroy an enemy’s country, when he has other sources, from which he can draw his supplies, as for instance, the sea or any adjoining territory. Archidamus, in Thucydides, attempting to dissuade the Lacedaemonians from a war with the Athenians, asks them, what object they propose to themselves by such a war? he asks them if they suppose that Attica can easily be laid waste owing to the advantage, which their troops have in superiority and numbers? but, says he, they have other dominions to furnish them with supplies, and they can avail themselves also of maritime importations. So that under such circumstances, it is best to leave agriculture unmolested, even on the frontiers of each side: a practice lately followed in the wars of the low countries, where contributions were paid to both parties, in return for such protection.

V. There are some things of such a nature, as to contribute, no way, to the support and prolongation of war: things which reason itself requires to be spared even during the heat and continuance of war. Polybius calls it brutal rage and madness to destroy things, the destruction of which does not in the least tend to impair an enemy’s strength, nor to increase that of the destroyer: Such are Porticos, Temples, statues, and all other elegant works and monuments of art. Cicero commends Marcellus for sparing the public and private edifices of Syracuse, as if he had come with his army to protect them, rather than to take the place by storm.

VI. As this rule of moderation is observed towards other ornamental works of art, for the reasons before stated, there is still greater reason, why it should be obeyed in respect to things devoted to the purposes of religion. For although such things, or edifices, being the property of the state may, according to the law of nations, be with impunity demolished, yet as they contribute nothing to aggravate the calamities, or retard the successes of war, it is a mark of reverence to divine things to spare them, and all that is connected therewith: and more especially should this rule be adhered to among nations, worshipping the same God according to the same fundamental laws, although differing from each other by slight shades of variation in their rights and opinions. Thucydides says that it was a law among the Greeks of his time, in all their invasions of each other’s territories, to forbear touching the edifices of religion: and Livy likewise observes that, upon the destruction of Alba by the Romans, the temples of the Gods were spared.

VII. What has been said of the sacred edifices of religion applies also to monuments raised in honour of the dead, unnecessarily to disturb whose ashes in their repose bespeaks a total disregard to the laws and ties of our common humanity.

VIII. Although it does not fall within the province of this treatise to inquire into the utility of war in all its various branches, but only to regulate its practices by confining them within due and

lawful bounds; yet it will not be improper to observe that rules and practices derive much of their merit from the utility, with which they are attended. So that one great quality, to recommend the moderation above alluded to, will be found in its preventing the enemy from being driven to those resources, which men never fail, at last, of finding in despair. It is a just remark made by some Theologians, that all Christian princes and rulers, who wish to be found such in the sight of God as well as that of men, will deem it a duty to interpose their authority to prevent or to suppress all unnecessary violence in the taking of towns: for acts of rigour can never be carried to an extreme without involving great numbers of the innocent in ruin. And practices of that kind, besides being no way conducive to the termination of war, are totally repugnant to every principle of Christianity and justice.

CHAPTER XIII.: On Moderation in Making Captures in War.

I. The capture of an enemy’s goods, even in just war, is not, in all cases, perfectly justifiable, nor is the captor always exempt from the ties of restitution. For strictly speaking, according to the rules of pure justice, it is not lawful to seize or detain goods except to the exact amount of the debt which the enemy has incurred. Indeed goods may be detained beyond that, as a necessary pledge of security, but still upon the condition of being restored, as soon as the danger has ceased: restored either literally, or by some proper compensation being made.

Here then is a right of capture, which confers no right of property or acquisition. But when any thing may become due to us, either from a penalty or the non-performance of an engagement, in both cases a right to an enemy’s goods, if they can be taken, is acquired. By the latter kind of debt not only the effects of the debtor himself, but those, belonging to his subjects, may according to the principles introduced by the law of nations be taken as a security.

This right of the law of nations is very different from that established in impunity alone, or depending upon the external force of judicial authority. For as by our private consent the person with whom we contract acquires not only an external and legal right over our property, but an internal right, proceeding from conscience, so he acquires the same right by a kind of common consent, which virtually comprehends the consent of individuals, in which sense the law is called the common compact or covenant of the state…

CHAPTER XV. On Moderation in Acquiring Dominion.

I. That equity and moderation towards individuals, which are so highly extolled, are still more deserving of admiration, when exercised towards nations and kingdoms; where injustice would be attended with more signal calamities, and moderation with more beneficial effects.

In just war the right of dominion over a people, and the sovereign power, which that people possess, may be acquired as well as any other right. But the claims to such a right ought by no means to be prosecuted beyond indemnity for aggression, and security against future evils.

But this motive, so necessary to be observed, especially in all treaties of peace, as well as in the use of victory, is often confounded with others. In other points a sovereign prince or state may relinquish a claim from a principle of moderation, but where the future security of their subjects is concerned, it is an act of cruelty rather than of moderation to relax too far in favour of a conquered enemy…

III. The prudent moderation of the ancient Romans approaches nearly to this model of primitive innocence. For although they made conquests, they mitigated the fate of the conquered by incorporating them with themselves.

IV. Another mark of moderation in the use of victory is leaving to conquered kings, or nations the dominions, which they lawfully held before…

IX. If it is not perfectly safe to forbear exercising any dominion over a conquered enemy, the matter may be so regulated as to leave him some portion of his former sovereignty and power. Thus among the Jews the sceptre remained with the Sanhedrim, even after Archelaus was deprived of his kingdom; and Alexander in many cases allowed Darius to remain a sovereign over others, while he required of him submission to himself.

X. Even though a conquered power was deprived of all sovereignty, she might be allowed to retain some of her laws, privileges, and magistracies of inferior importance. Thus, Pliny, in his letters, informs us, that in the proconsular province of Bithynia, the city of Apamaea was allowed to regulate the form of her government at her own pleasure, and, in other places, the Bithynians were permitted to retain their own magistrates, and their own senate.

XI. This indulgence ought to be shewn to every people, especially in their attachment to the religion of their forefathers, of which they should never be deprived but with their own consent and conviction. An indulgence, which Agrippa in his address to Caius, as cited by Philo in the account of his embassy, approves of, as highly grateful to the conquered people, and by no means prejudicial to the conqueror. At the same time a conqueror will take care that erroneous opinions do not prevail to the prejudice and overthrow of true religion, as was done by Constantine upon his crushing the party of Licinius, and afterwards by the Franks and other kings.

CHAPTER XVI. On Moderation with Respect to Things Excluded from the Right of Postliminium by the Law of Nations.

I. How far things taken in just war become the property of the captors has been explained before. From which a deduction must be made of things recoverable by the right postliminium, those being no captures at all.

But things, taken in unjust war, are to be restored, not only by those, who have taken them, but by others also into whose hands they may have by any means fallen. For, as the Roman lawyers say, no one can convey to another a greater right than he himself possesses. The original captor had no just title to any property therein, neither can the person, deriving his title though him, establish any better claim.—A second or third possessor may have acquired a property therein, which the law presumes he has a right to, till the contrary be shewn, and for which an action may be maintained. Yet it is a right of which he cannot honestly avail himself against the real owner, from whom it was unjustly taken.

CHAPTER XVII. Respecting Those Who are Neutral in War.

I. It may appear superfluous to speak of neutral powers, against whom no rights of war can exist. But as war, under the plea of necessity, occasions many aggressions to be committed against them, especially when bordering upon the seat of its operations, it may be necessary briefly to repeat a former assertion, that nothing short of extreme exigency can give one power a right over what belongs to another no way involved in the war. The case too is equally clear that no emergency can justify any one in taking and applying to his own use what the owner stands in equal need of himself. But even where the emergency can be plainly proved, nothing can justify us in taking or applying the property of another to our use, beyond the immediate demands of that emergency. Where the custody of a thing, by securing it, is sufficient for the purpose, the use and consumption of it is absolutely unlawful. If the use of it is necessary, it must not be abused: and if the entire abuse of it be requisite, the full value should be paid.

II. Again, according to what was said in a preceding part of this book, it is the duty of those, who profess neutrality in a war to do nothing towards increasing the strength of a party maintaining an unjust cause, nor to impede the measures of a power engaged in a just and righteous cause. But in doubtful cases, they ought to shew themselves impartial to both sides, and to give no succour to besieged places, but should allow the troops of each to march through the country, and to purchase forage, and other supplies. The Corcyraeans, in Thucydides, say that if the Athenians intend to remain neuter, they ought either to prohibit the Corinthians from enlisting men in the territory of Attica, or to give them the same privilege. The Romans objected to the conduct of Philip king of Macedon, charging him with a double violations of treaties, both by injuring the allies of the Roman people, and assisting the enemy with supplies of men and money.

CHAPTER XIX: On Good Faith Between Enemies.

I. It was before said that the number and extent of actions, lawful in war, may be considered either upon their own intrinsic merits, or as rising out of some antecedent engagement. The former point having before been fully explained, this is the proper place for discussing the latter, which comprehends the good faith of enemies towards each other.

Cicero, in his fifth book on the bounds of good and evil, has well observed that every one must approve and commend a disposition to adhere faithfully to our engagements not only from disinterested motives, but in some cases even in opposition to our own interest. And Augustine says that it is right to maintain the pledge of faith given to an enemy, for under the character of enemies men do not lose their right to the fulfilment of a promise, a right which every one possessed of reason is capable of. It is the power of reason and speech from which the obligation of promises springs. Nor is it to be supposed that, because it is lawful to deceive an enemy on some occasions, the same rule will authorise a violation of faith in engagements. For the obligation to speak the truth arises from causes antecedent in their existence to any state of warfare, and they are causes which a state of warfare may render it necessary to change or abridge. But a promise confers a new right of itself. A distinction which did not escape the notice of Aristotle, who, in speaking of truth, says that he does not consider truth and sincerity in engagements, with relation to justice or injustice, but as belonging to another class of virtues…

XI. Solemn war, signifying such as is proclaimed and begun on both sides by authority of the sovereign or state, among its many other legal rights, includes also that of giving validity to every promise, which may be conductive to its termination, so that if either party, through an ill-grounded fear of further calamities, has even against his will, made promises unfavourable, or acceded to terms disadvantageous to himself, such an engagement will be binding. For the law of nations allows belligerent powers to alarm each other, if possible, into submission upon the most unequal terms, in the same manner, as it gives a sanction to many things not strictly equitable according to natural and municipal law. For if such a practice had not been established, wars, which are so frequent, could never have been brought to a conclusion, an object so much for the interest of mankind.

These are the rights of war which Cicero says ought to be inviolably preserved with an enemy: for an enemy not only retains his natural rights in war, but certain other rights originating in the consent of nations. Yet it does not follow from hence that any one, who has extorted such a promise in unjust war, can, consistently with piety and the duties of a good man, retain what he has so received, nor can be compel another to stand to such engagements, whether upon oath, or not. For the natural and internal injustice of such a promise always remains the same, nor can the injustice be removed or altered, till it has received a new and free concurrence from the party, by whom it was given…

XIX …Almost all questions relating to pledges of faith given by one belligerent power to another, may be solved upon the principles before laid down, in explaining the nature and force of promises in general; of oaths, treaties, and conventions, and also in explaining the rights of the obligations of kings, and the method of interpreting doubtful points…

References[1] http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-1901-ed.


Chapter Nine ReadingsRead the following excerpts from Tolstoy’s Kingdom of God is Within You and his Letter to E.H. Crosby and submit Exercise 9 on Tolstoy (or you can consult the reading list and write an Essay on him). Where would you place him on the grid? Why? What is his attitude to political authority? Does he see many goals shared by Christianity and the political authority? Does he call on Christians to reject it, live apart from it, engage with it or seek to perfect it? What is his attitude to political violence? Is he a pacifist, a Just War proponent or a Holy War proponent? If the former, is he against war, against killing, against violence, against coercion, or against resistance? If a proponent of Just War, are his limits on war strict, moderate or permissive?

Reading 1: Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You (1893)[1]Chapter 2

Criticisms of the Doctrine of Non-Resistance to Evil by Force on the Part of Believers and of Unbelievers.

Fate of the Book "What I Believe"--Evasive Character of Religious Criticisms of Principles of my Book--1st Reply: Use of Force not Opposed to Christianity--2d Reply: Use of Force Necessary to Restrain Evil Doers--3d Reply: Duty of Using Force in Defense of One's Neighbor--4th Reply: The Breach of the Command of Non-resistance to be Regarded Simply as a Weakness--5th Reply: Reply Evaded by Making Believe that the Question has long been Decided--To Devise such Subterfuges and to take Refuge Behind the Authority of the Church, of Antiquity, and of Religion is all that Ecclesiastical Critics can do to get out of the Contradiction between Use of Force and Christianity in Theory and in Practice--General Attitude of the Ecclesiastical World and of the Authorities to Profession of True Christianity--General Character of Russian Freethinking Critics--

Foreign Freethinking Critics--Mistaken Arguments of these Critics the Result of Misunderstanding the True Meaning of Christ's Teaching.

The impression I gained of a desire to conceal, to hush up, what I had tried to express in my book, led me to judge the book itself afresh.

On its appearance it had, as I had anticipated, been forbidden, and ought therefore by law to have been burnt. But, at the same time, it was discussed among officials, and circulated in a great number of manuscript and lithograph copies, and in translations printed abroad. And very quickly after the book, criticisms, both religious and secular in character, made their appearance, and these the government tolerated, and even encouraged. So that the refutation of a book which no one was supposed to know anything about was even chosen as the subject for theological dissertations in the academies.

The criticisms of my book, Russian and foreign alike, fall under two general divisions--the religious criticisms of men who regard themselves as believers, and secular criticisms, that is, those of freethinkers.

I will begin with the first class. In my book I made it an accusation against the teachers of the Church that their teaching is opposed to Christ's commands clearly and definitely expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, and opposed in especial to his command in regard to resistance to evil, and that in this way they deprive Christ's teaching of all value. The Church authorities accept the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount on non-resistance to evil by force as divine revelation; and therefore one would have thought that if they felt called upon to write about my book at all, they would have found it inevitable before everything else to reply to the principal point of my charge against them, and to say plainly, do they or do they not admit the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and the commandment of non-resistance to evil as binding on a Christian. And they were bound to answer this question, not after the usual fashion (i.e., "that although on the one side one cannot absolutely deny, yet on the other side one cannot main fully assent, all the more seeing that," etc., etc.). No; they should have answered the question as plainly as it was put in my book--Did Christ really demand from his disciples that they should carry out what he taught them in the Sermon on the Mount? And can a Christian, then, or can he not, always remaining a Christian, go to law or make any use of the law, or seek his own protection in the law? And can the Christian, or can he not, remaining a Christian, take part in the administration of government, using compulsion against his neighbors? And--the most important question hanging over the heads of all of us in these days of universal military service--can the Christian, or can he not, remaining a Christian, against Christ's direct prohibition, promise obedience in future actions directly opposed to his teaching? And can he, by taking his share of service in the army, prepare himself to murder men, and even actually murder them?

These questions were put plainly and directly, and seemed to require a plain and direct answer; but in all the criticisms of my book there was no such plain and direct answer. No; my book received precisely the same treatment as all the attacks upon the teachers of the Church for their defection from the Law of Christ of which history from the days of Constantine is full. A very great deal was said in connection with my book of my having incorrectly interpreted this and other passages of the Gospel, of my being in error in not recognizing the Trinity, the redemption, and the immortality of the soul.

A very great deal was said, but not a word about the one thing which for every Christian is the most essential question in life--how to reconcile the duty of forgiveness, meekness, patience, and love for all, neighbors and enemies alike, which is so clearly expressed in the words of our teacher, and in the heart of each of us--how to reconcile this duty with the obligation of using force in war upon men of our own or a foreign people.

All that are worth calling answers to this question can be brought under the following five heads. I have tried to bring together in this connection all I could, not only from the criticisms on my book, but from what has been written in past times on this theme.

The first and crudest form of reply consists in the bold assertion that the use of force is not opposed by the teaching of Christ; that it is permitted, and even enjoined, on the Christian by the Old and New Testaments.

Assertions of this kind proceed, for the most part, from men who have attained the highest ranks in the governing or ecclesiastical hierarchy, and who are consequently perfectly assured that no one will dare to contradict their assertion, and that if anyone does contradict it they will hear nothing of the contradiction. These men have, for the most part, through the intoxication of power, so lost the right idea of what that Christianity is in the name of which they hold their position that what is Christian in Christianity presents itself to them as heresy, while everything in the Old and New Testaments which can be distorted into an antichristian and heathen meaning they regard as the foundation of Christianity. In support of their assertion that Christianity is not opposed to the use of force, these men usually, with the greatest audacity, bring together all the most obscure passages from the Old and New Testaments, interpreting them in the most unchristian way--the punishment of Ananias and Sapphira, of Simon the Sorcerer, etc. They quote all those sayings of Christ's which can possibly be interpreted as justification of cruelty: the expulsion from the Temple; "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for this city," etc., etc. According to these people's notions, a Christian government is not in the least bound to be guided by the spirit of peace, forgiveness of injuries, and love for enemies.

To refute such an assertion is useless, because the very people who make this assertion refute themselves, or, rather, renounce Christ, inventing a Christianity and a Christ of their own in the

place of him in whose name the Church itself exists, as well as their office in it. If all men were to learn that the Church professes to believe in a Christ of punishment and warfare, not of forgiveness, no one would believe in the Church and it could not prove to anyone what it is trying to prove.

The second, somewhat less gross, form of argument consists in declaring that, though Christ did indeed preach that we should turn the left cheek, and give the cloak also, and this is the highest moral duty, yet that there are wicked men in the world, and if these wicked men mere not restrained by force, the whole world and all good men would come to ruin through them. This argument I found for the first time in John Chrysostom, and I show how he is mistaken in my book "What I believe."

This argument is ill grounded, because if we allow ourselves to regard any men as intrinsically wicked men, then in the first place we annul, by so doing, the whole idea of the Christian teaching, according to which we are all equals and brothers, as sons of one father in heaven. Secondly, it is ill founded, because even if to use force against wicked men had been permitted by God, since it is impossible to find a perfect and unfailing distinction by which one could positively know the wicked from the good, so it would come to all individual men and societies of men mutually regarding each other as wicked men, as is the case now. Thirdly, even if it were possible to distinguish the wicked from the good unfailingly, even then it would be impossible to kill or injure or shut up in prison these wicked men, because there would be no one in a Christian society to carry out such punishment, since every Christian, as a Christian, has been commanded to use no force against the wicked.

The third kind of answer, still more subtle than the preceding, consists in asserting that though the command of non-resistance to evil by force is binding on the Christian when the evil is directed against himself personally, it ceases to be binding when the evil is directed against his neighbors, and that then the Christian is not only not bound to fulfill the commandment, but is even bound to act in opposition to it in defense of his neighbors, and to use force against transgressors by force. This assertion is an absolute assumption, and one cannot find in all Christ's teaching any confirmation of such an argument. Such an argument is not only a limitation, but a direct contradiction and negation of the commandment. If every man has the right to have recourse to force in face of a danger threatening an other, the question of the use of force is reduced to a question of the definition of danger for another. If my private judgment is to decide the question of what is danger for another, there is no occasion for the use of force which could not be justified on the ground of danger threatening some other man. They killed and burnt witches, they killed aristocrats and girondists, they killed their enemies because those who were in authority regarded them as dangerous for the people.

If this important limitation, which fundamentally undermines the whole value of the commandment, had entered into Christ's meaning, there must have been mention of it

somewhere. This restriction is made nowhere in our Saviour's life or preaching. On the contrary, warning is given precisely against this treacherous and scandalous restriction which nullifies the commandment. The error and impossibility of such a limitation is shown in the Gospel with special clearness in the account of the judgment of Caiaphas, who makes precisely this distinction. He acknowledged that it was wrong to punish the innocent Jesus, but he saw in him a source of danger not for himself, but for the whole people, and therefore he said: It is better for one man to die, that the whole people perish not. And the erroneousness of such a limitation is still more clearly expressed in the words spoken to Peter when he tried to resist by force evil directed against Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 52). Peter was not defending himself, but his beloved and heavenly Master. And Christ at once reproved him for this, saying, that he who takes up the sword shall perish by the sword.

Besides, apologies for violence used against one's neighbor in defense of another neighbor from greater violence are always untrustworthy, because when force is used against one who has not yet carried out his evil intent, I can never know which would be greater--the evil of my act of violence or of the act I want to prevent. We kill the criminal that society may be rid of him, and we never know whether the criminal of to-day would not have been a changed man tomorrow, and whether our punishment of him is not useless cruelty. We shut up the dangerous--as we think--member of society, but the next day this man might cease to be dangerous and his imprisonment might be for nothing. I see that a man I know to be a ruffian is pursuing a young girl. I have a gun in my hand--I kill the ruffian and save the girl. But the death or the wounding of the ruffian has positively taken place, while what would have happened if this had not been I cannot know. And what an immense mass of evil must result, and indeed does result, from allowing men to assume the right of anticipating what may happen. Ninety-nine per cent of the evil of the world is founded on this reasoning--from the Inquisition to dynamite bombs, and the executions or punishments of tens of thousands of political criminals.

A fourth, still more refined, reply to the question, What ought to be the Christian's attitude to Christ's command of non-resistance to evil by force? consists in declaring that they do not deny the command of non-resisting evil, but recognize it; but they only do not ascribe to this command the special exclusive value attached to it by sectarians. To regard this command as the indispensable condition of Christian life, as Garrison, Ballou, Dymond, the Quakers, the Mennonites and the Shakers do now, and as the Moravian brothers, the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Bogomilites, and the Paulicians did in the past, is a one-sided heresy. This command has neither more nor less value than all the other commands, and the man who through weakness transgresses any command whatever, the command of non-resistance included, does not cease to be a Christian if he hold the true faith. This is a very skillful device, and many people who wish to be deceived are easily deceived by it. The device consists in reducing a direct conscious denial of a command to a casual breach of it. But one need only compare the attitude of the teachers of the Church to this and to other commands which they

really do recognize, to be convinced that their attitude to this is completely different from their attitude to other duties.

The command against fornication they do really recognize, and consequently they do not admit that in any case fornication can cease to be wrong. The Church preachers never point out cases in which the command against fornication can be broken, and always teach that we must avoid seductions which lead to temptation to fornication. But not so with the command of non-resistance. All church preachers recognize cases in which that command can be broken, and teach the people accordingly. And they not only do not teach teat we should avoid temptations to break it, chief of which is the military oath, but they themselves administer it. The preachers of the Church never in any other case advocate the breaking of any other commandment. But in connection with the commandment of non-resistance they openly teach that we must not understand it too literally, but that there are conditions and circumstances in which we must do the direct opposite, that is, go to law, fight, punish. So that occasions for fulfilling the commandment of non-resistance to evil by force are taught for the most part as occasions for not fulfilling it. The fulfillment of this command, they say, is very difficult and pertains only to perfection. And how can it not be difficult, when the breach of it is not only not forbidden, but law courts, prisons, cannons, guns, armies, and wars are under the immediate sanction of the Church? It cannot be true, then, that this command is recognized by the preachers of the Church as on a level with other commands.

The preachers of the Church clearly, do not recognize it; only not daring to acknowledge this, they try to conceal their not recognizing it.

So much for the fourth reply.

The fifth kind of answer, which is the subtlest, the most often used, and the most effective, consists in avoiding answering, in making believe that this question is one which has long ago been decided perfectly clearly and satisfactorily, and that it is not worthwhile to talk about it. This method of reply is employed by all the more or less cultivated religious writers, that is to say, those who feel the laws of Christ binding for themselves. Knowing that the contradiction existing between the teaching of Christ which we profess with our lips and the whole order of our lives cannot be removed by words, and that touching upon it can only make it more obvious, they, with more or less ingenuity, evade it, pretending that the question of reconciling Christianity with the use of force has been decided already, or does not exist at all.

The majority of religious critics of my book use this fifth method of replying to it. I could quote dozens of such critics, in all of whom, without exception, we find the same thing repeated: everything is discussed except what constitutes the principal subject of the book. As a characteristic example of such criticisms, I will quote the article of a well-known and ingenious English writer and preacher--Farrar--who, like many learned theologians, is a great master of

the art of circuitously evading a question. The article was published in an American journal, the Forum, in October, 1888.

After conscientiously explaining in brief the contents of my book, Farrar says:

"Tolstoy came to the conclusion that a coarse deceit had been palmed upon the world when these words 'Resist not evil,' were held by civil society to be compatible with war, courts of justice, capital punishment, divorce, oaths, national prejudice, and, indeed, with most of the institutions of civil and social life. He now believes that the kingdom of God would come if all men kept these five commandments of Christ, viz.: 1. Live in peace with all men. 2. Be pure. 3. Take no oaths. 4. Resist not evil. 5. Renounce national distinctions. "Tolstoy," he says, "rejects the inspiration of the Old Testament; hence he rejects the chief doctrines of the Church--that of the Atonement by blood, the Trinity, the descent of the Holy Ghost on the Apostles, and his transmission through the priesthood." And he recognizes only the words and commands of Christ. "But is this interpretation of Christ a true one?" he says. "Are all men bound to act as Tolstoy teaches--i. e., to carry out these five commandments of Christ?"

You expect, then, that in answer to this essential question, which is the only one that could induce a man to write an article about the book, he will say either that this interpretation of Christ's teaching is true and we ought to follow it, or he will say that such an interpretation is untrue, will show why, and will give some other correct interpretation of those words which I interpret incorrectly. But nothing of this kind is done. Farrar only expresses his "belief" that,

"although actuated by the noblest sincerity, Count Tolstoy has been misled by partial and one-sided interpretations of the meaning of the Gospel and the mind and will of Christ." What this error consists in is not made clear; it is only said: "To enter into the proof of this is impossible in this article, for I have already exceeded the space at my command."

And he concludes in a tranquil spirit:

"Meanwhile, the reader who feels troubled lest it should be his duty also to forsake all the conditions of his life and to take up the position and work of a common laborer, may rest for the present on the principle, Securus judicat orbis terrarum. With few and rare exceptions," he continues, "the whole of Christendom, from the days of the Apostles down to our own, has come to the firm conclusion that it was the object of Christ to lay down great eternal principles, but not to disturb the bases and revolutionize the institutions of all human society, which themselves rest on divine sanctions as well as on inevitable conditions. Were it my object to prove how untenable is the doctrine of communism, based by Count Tolstoy upon the divine paradoxes [sic], which can be interpreted only on historical principles in accordance with the whole method of the teaching of Jesus, it would require an ampler canvas than I have here at my disposal."

What a pity he has not an "ampler canvas at his disposal"! And what a strange thing it is that for all these last fifteen centuries no one has had a "canvas ample enough" to prove that Christ, whom we profess to believe in, says something utterly unlike what he does say! Still, they could prove it if they wanted to. But it is not worthwhile to prove what everyone knows; it is enough to say "Securus judicat orbis terrarum."

And of this kind, without exception, are all the criticisms of educated believers, who must, as such, understand the danger of their position. The sole escape from it for them lies in their hope that they may be able, by using the authority of the Church, of antiquity, and of their sacred office, to overawe the reader and draw him away from the idea of reading the Gospel for himself and thinking out the question in his own mind for himself. And in this they are successful; for, indeed, how could the notion occur to any one that all that has been repeated from century to century with such earnestness and solemnity by all those archdeacons, bishops, archbishops, holy synods, and popes, is all of it a base lie and a calumny foisted upon Christ by them for the sake of keeping safe the money they must have to live luxuriously on the necks of other men? And it is a lie and a calumny so transparent that the only way of keeping it up consists in overawing people by their earnestness, their conscientiousness. It is just what has taken place of late years at recruiting sessions; at a table before the zertzal--the symbol of the Tzars authority--in the seat of honor under the life-size portrait of the Tzar, sit dignified old officials, wearing decorations, conversing freely and easily, writing notes, summoning men before them, and giving orders. Here, wearing a cross on his breast, near them, is prosperous-looking old Priest in a silken cassock, with long gray hair flowing on to his cope; before a lectern who wears the golden cross and has a Gospel bound in gold.

They summon Iran Petroff. A young man comes in, wretchedly, shabbily dressed, and in terror, the muscles of his face working, his eyes bright and restless; and in a broken voice, hardly above a whisper, he says: "I--by Christ's law--as a Christian--I cannot." "What is he muttering?" asks the president, frowning impatiently and raising his eyes from his book to listen. "Speak louder," the colonel with shining epaulets shouts to him. "I--I as a Christian--" And at last it appears that the young man refuses to serve in the army because he is a Christian. "Don't talk nonsense. Stand to be measured. Doctor, may I trouble you to measure him. He is all right?" "Yes." "Reverend father, administer the oath to him."

No one is the least disturbed by what the poor scared young man is muttering. They do not even pay attention to it. "They all mutter something, but we've no time to listen to it, we have to enroll so many."

The recruit tries to say something still. "It's opposed to the law of Christ." "Go along, go along; we know without your help what is opposed to the law and what's not; and you soothe his mind, reverend father, soothe him. Next: Vassily Nikitin." And they lead the trembling youth away. And it does not strike anyone --the guards, or Vassily Nikitin, whom they are bringing in, or any of the spectators of this scene--that these inarticulate words of the young man, at once suppressed by the authorities, contain the truth, and that the loud, solemnly uttered sentences of the calm, self-confident official and the priest are a lie and a deception.

Such is the impression produced not only by Farrar's article, but by all those solemn sermons, articles, and books which make their appearance from all sides directly there is anywhere a glimpse of truth exposing a predominant falsehood. At once begins the series of long, clever, ingenious, and solemn speeches and writings, which deal with questions nearly related to the subject, but skillfully avoid touching the subject itself.

That is the essence of the fifth and most effective means of getting out of the contradictions in which Church Christianity has placed itself, by professing its faith in Christ's teaching in words, while it denies it in its life, and teaches people to do the same.

Those who justify themselves by the first method, directly, crudely asserting that Christ sanctioned violence, wars, and murder, repudiate Christ's doctrine directly; those who find their defense in the second, the third, or the fourth method are confused and can easily be convicted of error; but this last class, who do not argue, who do not condescend to argue about it, but take shelter behind their own grandeur, and make a show of all this having been decided by them or at least by someone long ago, and no longer offering a possibility of doubt to anyone--they seem safe from attack, and will be beyond attack till men come to realize that they are under the narcotic influence exerted on them by governments and churches, and are no longer affected by it.

Such was the attitude of the spiritual critics--i.e., those professing faith in Christ--to my book. And their attitude could not have been different. They are bound to take up this attitude by the contradictory position in which they find themselves between belief in the divinity of their Master and disbelief in his clearest utterances, and they want to escape from this contradiction. So that one cannot expect from them free discussion of the very essence of the question--that is, of the change in men's life which must result from applying Christ's teaching to the existing order of the world. Such free discussion I only expected from worldly, freethinking critics who are not bound to Christ's teaching in any way, and can therefore take an independent view of it. I had anticipated that freethinking writers would look at Christ, not merely, like the Churchmen, as the founder of a religion of personal salvation, but, to express it in their language, as a reformer who laid down new principles of life and destroyed the old, and whose reforms are not yet complete, but are still in progress even now.

Such a view of Christ and his teaching follows from my book. But to my astonishment, out of the great number of critics of my book there was not one, either Russian or foreign, who treated the subject from the side from which it was approached in the book--that is, who criticised Christ's doctrines as philosophical, moral, and social principles, to use their scientific expressions. This was not done in a single criticism. The freethinking Russian critics taking my book as though its whole contents could be reduced to non-resistance to evil, and understanding the doctrine of non-resistance to evil itself (no doubt for greater convenience in refuting it) as though it would prohibit every kind of conflict with evil, fell vehemently upon this doctrine, and for some years past have been very successfully proving that Christ's teaching is mistaken in so far as it forbids resistance to evil. Their refutations of this hypothetical doctrine of Christ were all the more successful since they knew beforehand that their arguments could not be contested or corrected, for the censorship, not having passed the book, did not pass articles in its defense.

It is a remarkable thing that among us, where one cannot say a word about the Holy Scriptures without the prohibition of the censorship, for some years past there have been in all the journals constant attacks and criticisms on the command of Christ simply and directly stated in Matt. v. 39. The Russian advanced critics, obviously unaware of all that has been done to elucidate the question of non-resistance, and sometimes even imagining apparently that the rule of non-resistance to evil had been invented by me personally, fell foul of the very idea of it. They opposed it and attacked it, and advancing with great heat arguments which had long ago been analyzed and refuted from every point of view, they demonstrated that a man ought invariably to defend (with violence) all the injured and oppressed, and that thus the doctrine of non-resistance to evil is an immoral doctrine.

To all Russian critics the whole import of Christ's command seemed reducible to the fact that it would hinder them from the active opposition to evil to which they are accustomed. So that the principle of non-resistance to evil by force has been attacked by two opposing camps: the

conservatives, because this principle would hinder their activity in resistance to evil as applied to the revolutionists, in persecution and punishment of them; the revolutionists, too, because this principle would hinder their resistance to evil as applied to the conservatives and the overthrowing of them. The conservatives were indignant at the doctrine of non-resistance to evil by force hindering the energetic destruction of the revolutionary elements, which may ruin the national prosperity; the revolutionists were indignant at the doctrine of non-resistance to evil by force hindering the overthrow of the conservatives, who are ruining the national prosperity. It is worthy of remark in this connection that the revolutionists have attacked the principle of non-resistance to evil by force, in spite of the fact that it is the greatest terror and danger for every despotism. For ever since the beginning of the world, the use of violence of every kind, from the Inquisition to the Schlüsselburg fortress, has rested and still rests on the opposite principle of the necessity of resisting evil by force. Besides this, the Russian critics have pointed out the fact that the application of the command of non-resistance to practical life would turn mankind aside out of the path of civilization along which it is moving. The path of civilization on which mankind in Europe is moving is in their opinion the one along which all mankind ought always to move.

So much for the general character of the Russian critics.

Foreign critics started from the same premises, but their discussions of my book were somewhat different from those of Russian critics, not only in being less bitter, and in showing more culture, but even in the subject-matter.

In discussing my book and the Gospel teaching generally, as it is expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, the foreign critics maintained that such doctrine is not peculiarly Christian (Christian doctrine is either Catholicism or Protestantism according to their views)--the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount is only a string of very pretty impracticable dreams du charmant docteur, as Reran says, fit for the simple and half-savage inhabitants of Galilee who lived eighteen hundred years ago, and for the half-savage Russian peasants--Sutaev and Bondarev--and the Russian mystic Tolstoy, but not at all consistent with a high degree of European culture.

The foreign freethinking critics have tried in a delicate manner, without being offensive to me, to give the impression that my conviction that mankind could be guided by such a naïve doctrine as that of the Sermon on the Mount proceeds from two causes: that such a conviction is partly due to my want of knowledge, my ignorance of history, my ignorance of all the vain attempts to apply the principles of the Sermon on the Mount to life, which have been made in history and have led to nothing; and partly it is due to my failing to appreciate the full value of the lofty civilization to which mankind has attained at present, with its Krupp cannons, smokeless powder, colonization of Africa, Irish Coercion Bill, parliamentary government, journalism, strikes, and the Eiffel Tower.

So wrote de Vogüé and Leroy Beaulieu and Matthew Arnold; so wrote the American author Savage, and Ingersoll, the popular freethinking American preacher, and many others.

"Christ's teaching is no use, because it is inconsistent with our industrial age," says Ingersoll naïvely, expressing in this utterance, with perfect directness and simplicity, the exact notion of Christ's teaching held by persons of refinement and culture of our times. The teaching is no use for our industrial age, precisely as though the existence of this industrial age were a sacred fact which ought not to and could not be changed. It is just as though drunkards when advised how they could be brought to habits of sobriety should answer that the advice is incompatible with their habit of taking alcohol.

The arguments of all the freethinking critics, Russian and foreign alike, different as they may be in tone and manner of presentation, all amount essentially to the same strange misapprehension--namely, that Christ's teaching, one of the consequences of which is non-resistance to evil, is of no use to us because it requires a change of our life.

Christ's teaching is useless because, if it were carried into practice, life could not go on as at present; we must add: if we have begun by living sinfully, as we do live and are accustomed to live. Not only is the question of non-resistance to evil not discussed; the very mention of the fact that the duty of non-resistance enters into Christ's teaching is regarded as satisfactory proof of the impracticability of the whole teaching.

Meanwhile one would have thought it was necessary to point out at least some kind of solution of the following question, since it is at the root of almost everything that interests us.

The question amounts to this: In what way are we to decide men's disputes, when some men consider evil what others consider good, and vice versa? And to reply that that is evil which I think evil, in spite of the fact that my opponent thinks it good, is not a solution of the difficulty. There can only be two solutions: either to find a real unquestionable criterion of what is evil or not to resist evil by force.

The first course has been tried ever since the beginning of historical times, and, as we all know, it has not hitherto led to any successful results.

The second solution--not forcibly to resist what we consider evil until we have found a universal criterion--that is the solution given by Christ. We may consider the answer given by Christ unsatisfactory; we may replace it by another and better, by finding a criterion by which evil could be defined for all men unanimously and simultaneously; we may simply, like savage nations, not recognize the existence of the question. But we cannot treat the question as the learned critics of Christianity do. They pretend either that no such question exists at all or that the question is solved by granting to certain persons or assemblies of persons the right to

define evil and to resist it by force. But we know all the while that granting such a right to certain persons does not decide the question (still less so when we are ourselves the certain persons), since there are always people who do not recognize this right in the authorized persons or assemblies.

But this assumption, that what seems evil to us is really evil, shows a complete misunderstanding of the question, and lies at the root of the argument of freethinking critics about the Christian religion. In this way, then, the discussions of my book on the part of Churchmen and freethinking critics alike showed me that the majority of men simply do not understand either Christ's teaching or the questions which Christ's teaching solves.

Reading 2: Leo Tolstoy, Letter to Ernest Howard Crosby (1896)[2]My Dear Crosby:

I am very glad to hear of your activity and that it is beginning to attract attention. Fifty years ago Garrison’s proclamation of non-resistance only cooled people toward him, and the whole fifty years’ activity of Ballou in this direction was met with stubborn silence. I read with great pleasure in Peace the beautiful ideas of the American authors in regard to non-resistance. I make an exception only in the case of Mr. Bemis’s old, unfounded opinion, which slanders Christ in assuming that Christ’s expulsion of the cattle from the temple means that he struck the men with a whip, and commanded his disciples to do likewise.

The ideas expressed by these writers, especially by H. Newton and G. Herron, are beautiful, but it is to be regretted that they do not answer the question which Christ put before men, but answer the question which the so-called orthodox teachers of the churches, the chief and most dangerous enemies of Christianity, have put in its place.

Mr. Higginson says that the law of non-resistance is not admissible as a general rule. H. Newton says that the practical results of the application of Christ’s teaching will depend on the degree of faith that men will have in this teaching. Mr. C. Martyn assumes that the stage at which we are is not yet suited for the application of the teaching about non-resistance. G. Herron says that, in order to fulfill the law of non-resistance, it is necessary to learn to apply it to life. Mrs. Livermore says the same, thinking that the fulfillment of the law of non-resistance is possible only in the future.

All these opinions treat only the question as to what would happen to people if all were put to the necessity of fulfilling the law of non-resistance. But, in the first place, it is quite impossible to compel all men to accept the law of non-resistance. In the second, if this were possible, it

would be a most glaring negation of the very principle that is being established. To compel all men not to practice violence against others! Who is going to compel men? In the third place, and above all else, the question, as put by Christ, does not consist in whether non-resistance may become a universal law for all humanity, but in what each man must do in order to fulfill his destiny, to save his soul, and do God’s work, which reduces itself to the same.

Christian teaching does not prescribe any laws for all men. It does not say, “Follow such and such rules under fear of punishment, and you will all be happy.” Instead, it explains to each separate man his position in the world and shows him what for him personally results from this position. Christian teaching says to each individual man that his life, if he recognizes his life to be his, and its aim, the worldly good of his personality or of the personalities of other men, can have no rational meaning, because this good, posited as the purpose of life, can never be attained. In the first place, all beings strive after the goods of the worldly life, and these goods are always attained by one set of beings to the detriment of others. Therefore, every separate man cannot receive the desired good, but, in all probability, must even endure many unnecessary sufferings in his struggle for these unattained goods. In the second place, if a man does attain worldly goods, as he attains more of them he is satisfied less and less, and he wishes for more and more new ones. In the third place, as a man lives longer, old age, diseases, and finally death inevitably destroy the possibility of any worldly good coming to him.

Thus, if a man considers his life to be his, and its purpose to be worldly good for himself or for other men, this life can have no rational meaning for him. Life receives a rational meaning only when a man understands that the recognition of his life as his own, and of worldly good as its purpose, is an error. Human life does not belong to him who has received it from someone else, but to Him who produced it in the first place. Its purpose must not consist in the attainment of his own good or of the good of others, but only in the fulfillment of the will of Him who produced it. Only with such a comprehension of life does it receive a rational meaning. Its purpose, which consists in the fulfillment of God’s will, becomes attainable. Above all, only with such a comprehension does man’s activity become clearly defined, and he is no longer subject to despair and suffering, which were inevitable with his former comprehension.

“The world and I in it,” such a man says to himself, “exist by the will of God. I cannot know the whole world and my relation to it, but I can know what God wants of me. He sent men into this world, which is endless in time and space, and therefore inaccessible to my understanding. This is revealed to me in tradition, which is the aggregate reason of the best people in the world, who lived before me, and in my reason, and in my heart, which is the striving of my whole being. In tradition, I am told that I must act toward others as I wish others to act toward me. My reason tells me that the greatest good of men is possible only when all men will act likewise. My heart is at peace and joyful only when I abandon myself to the feeling of love for men, which demands the same. I cannot only know what I must do; I must also know the

cause for which my activity is necessary and defined. I cannot grasp the whole divine work, for which the world exists and lives, but the divine work which is being accomplished in this world and in which I am taking part with my life is accessible to me. This work is the destruction of the discord and struggle among men, and the establishment among men of the greatest union, concord, and love. This work is the realization of what the Jewish prophets promised, saying that the time will come when all men shall be taught the truth, when spears shall be forged into pruning-hooks and swords into ploughshares, and when the lion shall lie with the lamb.”

Thus, the man who comprehends the Christian life not only knows how he must act in life, but also what he must do. He must do what contributes to the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world. To do this, a man must fulfill the inner demands of God’s will and act amicably toward others, as he would like others to do to him. The inner demands of such a man’s soul coincide with that external purpose of life that is placed before him.

We have a clear indication of the proper comprehension of the Christian life that is incontestable from two sides, showing us what the meaning and end of human life consists in, how a man must act, what he must do, and what he must not do. And yet, there appear certain people, who call themselves Christians, who decide that in some cases a man must depart from and act contrary to God’s law and the common cause of life. According to their reasoning, the consequences of the acts committed according to God’s law may be disadvantageous and profitless for men.

Man, according to Christian teaching, is God’s laborer. The laborer does not know his master’s whole business, but the nearest aim to be attained by his work is revealed to him, and he is given definite indications as to what he should do. Particularly definite are the indications as to what he must not do, in order that he may not work against the aim for the attainment of which he was sent to work. In everything else he is given complete liberty. And so, for a man who has grasped the Christian conception of life, the meaning of his life is clear and rational. He cannot have a moment of wavering as to how he should act in life and what he ought to do in order to fulfill the destiny of his life.

According to the law given him in tradition, in his reason, and in his heart, a man must always act toward another as he wishes others to act toward him. He must contribute to the establishment of love and union among men. But according to the decision an opinion of these far-sighted people, a man must do violence, deprive people of liberty, kill people, and contribute, not to union and love, but to the irritation and enragement of people – all while the fulfillment of the law is still premature. It is as though a mason – who is hired to do certain definite work, who knows that he is taking part with others in the building of a house, and who has received a clear and indubitable command from the master himself that he is to lay a wall – should receive the command from other masons like him to stop laying the wall and to undo

the work of the others, even though the other masons do not know the general plan of the structure or what is useful for the common work.

What a wonderful delusion! The being that breathes today and disappears tomorrow, who has one definite, incontestable law given to him as to how he is to pass his short term of life, imagines that he knows what is necessary and useful and appropriate for all men and for the whole world. He goes on developing, and in the name of this usefulness, which is understood differently by each man, he prescribes to himself and to others to depart for a time from the unquestionable law that is given to him and to all men. He does not act toward all men as he wants others to act toward him, does not bring love into the world, practices violence, deprives others of freedom, punishes, kills, and introduces malice into the world when it is found that this is necessary. And he encourages us to do so, knowing that the most terrible cruelties, tortures, and murders of men – from the Inquisitions and punishments and terrors of all the revolutions to the present bestialities of the anarchists and their massacres – have all proceeded from men supposing that they know what people and the world need. They know that, at any given moment, there are always two opposing parties, each of which asserts that it is necessary to use violence against the opposite party: the men of state against the anarchists, and the anarchists against the men of state; the English against the Americans, and the Americans against the English; the English against the Germans, and so forth. All possible combinations and permutations may be found.

A man of the Christian concept of life sees clearly by reflection that there is no ground whatever for his departure from the law of his life, which is clearly indicated to him by God, in order to follow the accidental, frail, and frequently contradictory demands of men. If he has been living the Christian life for some time, and has developed in himself Christian moral sensitivity, he can positively not act as people demand that he shall, not only as the result of reflection, but also of feeling.

Just as it is impossible for many men of our world to subject a child to torture and to kill it, though such a torture may save a hundred other people, so a whole series of acts becomes impossible for a man who has developed Christian sensitivity in his heart. A Christian, for example, who is compelled to take part in court proceedings where a man may be sentenced to capital punishment, to take part in matters of forcible seizure of other people’s property in discussions about the declaration of war, or in preparations for the same, to say nothing of war itself, finds himself in the same position in which a good man would be if he were compelled to torture or kill a child. It is not that he decides by reflection what he ought not to do, but that he cannot do what is demanded of him, because for a man there exists the moral impossibility of committing certain acts, just as there is a physical impossibility. Just as it is impossible for a man to lift up a mountain, and just as it is impossible for a good man to kill a child, so it is impossible for a man who lives a Christian life to take part in violence. Of what significance for such a man can be the reflections that, for some imaginary good, he must do what has become morally impossible for him?

How, then, is a man to act when he sees that obvious harm will result from following the law of love and the law of non-resistance? In the example that is always cited, how is a man to act 4 when a robber in his sight kills or injures a child, and when the child cannot be saved otherwise than by killing the robber?

It is generally assumed that, when they cite such an example, there can be no other answer to the question than that the robber ought to be killed in order to save the child. But this answer is given so emphatically and so quickly only because we are not only in the habit of acting in this manner in the case of defending a child, but also in the case of the expanding the borders of a neighboring state to the detriment of our own, or in the case of the transporting lace across the border, or even in the case of the defending the fruits of our garden against ravage by passers-by.

It is assumed that it is necessary to kill the robber in order to save the child, but we need only stop and think on what ground a man should act thus, be he a Christian or a non-Christian, to convince ourselves that such an act can have no rational foundations. It is considered necessary only because two thousand years ago such a mode of action was considered just and people were in the habit of acting thus. Why should a non-Christian, who does not recognize God and the meaning of life in the fulfillment of His will, kill the robber in defending the child? Someone certainly dies if he kills the robber, but he does not know for certain until the very last moment whether the robber will kill the child or not. There is also this irregularity: who has decided that the life of the child is more valuable and better than the life of the robber?

If a non-Christian does not recognize God, and does not consider the meaning of life to consist in the fulfillment of God’s will, then the consideration as to what is more profitable for him and for all men – the continuation of the robber’s life or that of the child – is only a calculation that guides the choice of his acts. But to decide this, he must know what will become of the child who he saves, and what would become of the robber if he did not kill him. But he cannot know that. And so, if he is a non-Christian, he has no rational foundation for saving the child through the death of the robber.

But if a man is a Christian, and so recognizes God and sees the meaning of life in the fulfillment of His will, he has still less cause to depart from the law given him by God, no matter what terrible robber may attack any innocent and beautiful child. He may implore the robber, may place his body between the robber and his victim, but there is one thing he cannot do: he cannot consciously depart from the law of God, the fulfillment of which gives meaning to his life.

It is very likely that, as the result of his bad upbringing and his animal instincts, and being a pagan or a Christian, a man will kill the robber, not only in the defense of the child, but also in

his own defense or in the defense of his purse. But that will by no means signify that it is right to do so, or that it is right to accustom ourselves and others to think that that ought to be done. This will only mean that, in spite of external education and Christianity, the habits of the stone age are still strong in man, and that he is capable of committing acts that have long ago been disavowed by his consciousness.

A robber in my sight is about to kill a child and I can save it by killing the robber; consequently, it is necessary under certain conditions to resist evil with violence. A man is in danger of his life and can be saved only through my lie; consequently, it is necessary in certain cases to lie. A man is starving, and I cannot save him otherwise than by stealing; consequently, it is necessary in certain cases to steal. I lately read a story by Coppée in which an enlisted man kills his officer, whose life is insured, and thus saves his honor and the life of his family. Consequently, in certain cases it is right to kill.

Such imaginary cases and the conclusions drawn from them prove only that there are men who know that it is not right to steal, to lie, or to kill, but who are so loath to stop doing these things that they use all the efforts of their mind in order to justify their acts. There does not exist a moral rule for which it would be impossible to invent a situation when it would be hard to 5 decide which is more moral: the departure from the rule or its fulfillment. The same is true of the question of non-resistance to evil. Men know that living by violence is bad, but they are so anxious to live by it that they use all the efforts of their mind, not for the elucidation of all the evil which is produced by man’s recognition of the right to do violence to others, but for the defense of this right. But such invented cases in no way prove that the rules about not lying, stealing, and killing are incorrect.

Fais ce que doit, advienne que pourra is an expression of profound wisdom.[3] Each of us knows unquestionably what he ought to do, but none of us knows or can know what will happen. Thus we are brought to the same conclusion, not only because we must do what is right, but also because we know what is right, and do not know at all what will come and result from our acts.

The Christian teaching is a teaching as to what we must do for the fulfillment of the will of Him who sent us into the world. But the reflections as to what consequences we assume to result from certain acts of men not only have nothing in common with Christianity, but are that very delusion which destroys Christianity. No one has yet seen the imaginary robber with the imaginary child, and all the horrors, which fill history and contemporary events, have been produced only because men imagine that they can know the consequences of the possible acts.

How is this? Men used to live a beastly life, violating and killing all those whom it was advantageous for them to violate and kill, and even eating one another, thinking that that was right. Then there came a time when, thousands of years ago, even in the time of Moses, there

appeared the consciousness in men that it was bad to violate and kill one another. But there were some men for whom violence was advantageous. They did not recognize this consciousness, and assured themselves and others that it was not always bad to violate and kill men, but that there were cases when this was necessary, useful, and even good. Acts of violence and murder, though not as frequent and cruel, were continued, but with the difference that those who committed them justified them on the grounds of their usefulness to men. It was this false justification of violence that Christ arraigned. He showed that, since every act of violence could be justified (as actually happens when two enemies do violence to one another and both consider their violence justifiable), and there is no chance of verifying the justice of either cause, it is necessary to disbelieve any justifications of violence, and it is never necessary to make use of such justifications.

It would seem that men who profess Christianity would have to unveil this deception carefully, because one of the chief manifestations of Christianity consists in the unveiling of this deception. But the very opposite has happened. Men to whom violence was advantageous, and who did not want to give up these advantages, took upon themselves the exclusive propaganda of Christianity. These men asserted that, since there are cases in which the non-application of violence produces more evil than its application (the imaginary robber who kills the child), we must not fully accept Christ’s teaching about non-resistance to evil. They advanced the notion that that we may depart from His teaching in the defense of our lives and of those of other men, in the defense of our country, in the protection of society from madmen and malefactors, and in many other cases. But the decision of the question as to when Christ’s teaching ought to be set side was left to those very men who made use of violence. Thus, Christ’s teaching about nonresistance to evil turned out to be set aside completely. What is worse than all that, those very men whom Christ arraigned began to consider themselves the exclusive preachers and expounders of His teaching. But “the light shines in the dark,” and the false preachers of Christianity are again arraigned by His teaching.

We can think of the structure of the world as we please. We may do what is advantageous and agreeable for us to do, and use violence against people under the pretext of doing good to men. But it is absolutely impossible to assert that, in doing so, we are professing Christ’s teaching, because Christ arraigned that very deception. The truth will sooner or later be made manifest, and will arraign the deceivers, even as it does now.

Let only the question of the human life be put correctly, as it was put by Christ, and not as it was corrupted by the churches, and all the deceptions that have been heaped on Christ’s teaching by the churches will fall of their own accord.

The question is not whether it will be good or bad for human society to follow the law of love and the resulting law of non-resistance, but whether you – a being who lives today and is dying by degrees every moment – will now, this very minute, fully do the will of Him who sent you and clearly expressed it in tradition and in your reason and heart, or whether you want to act

contrary to this will. As soon as the question is put in this form, there will be but one answer: I want at once, this very minute, without any delay, without waiting for anyone, and without considering the seeming consequences, to fulfill with all my strength what I alone am indubitably commanded to do by Him who sent me into the world. In no case, and under no condition, will I or can I do what is contrary to it, because in this lies the only possibility of my living a rational life that lifts me above my otherwise wretched condition.

January 12, 1896

References[1] http://www.freeclassicebooks.com/Tolstoy/The%20Kingdom%20of%20God%20Is%20Within%20You.pdf

[2] http://www.nonresistance.org/docs_pdf/Tolstoy/Letter_to_Crosby.pdf


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