charleslincoln3.files.wordpress.com · Web view"Every person who, under color of any statute,...

1 of 2 DOCUMENTS

CautionAs of: Feb 05, 2010

CITY OF GREENWOOD v. PEACOCK ET AL.

No. 471

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

384 U.S. 808; 86 S. Ct. 1800; 16 L. Ed. 2d 944; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2811

April 26, 1966, Argued June 20, 1966, Decided *

* Together with No. 649, Peacock et al. v. City of Greenwood, also on certiorari to the same court.

PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

DISPOSITION: 347 F.2d 679, 986, reversed.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff city sought re-view of a decision from the United States Court of Ap-peals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed a decision of the district court sustaining plaintiff's motion to remand several defendants' cases which were consolidated and which sought removal to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443. Plaintiff asserted that the court of ap-peals erred in reversing the district court's remand order.

OVERVIEW: Defendants were charged with various state criminal charges against individuals engaged in civil rights activity in several counties. Defendants filed petitions seeking to remove their cases to federal district court under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443. The district court sus-tained plaintiff city's motion to remand the cases to the city police court for trial, but the court of appeals re-versed, holding that defendants had a good claim for re-

moval under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443(1) because defendants had been deprived equal civil rights in that the arrest and the charge were effected for reasons of racial discrimina-tion. Defendants asserted the right to removal under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443(1) or alternatively 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443(2). The court reversed the ruling of the court of ap-peals, holding that the individual defendants had no right of removal to the federal court under ß 1443 because there was no removal right under ß1443(1), that there were remedies available on appeal if defendants failed to receive a fair trial, and that ß 1443(2) conferred a privi-lege of removal only upon federal officers for any act un-der color of such office.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the appeals court's judgment, which in turn had reversed the district court's order sustaining plaintiff city's motion to remand defen-dants' case to the city police court for trial. The court found that no right to removal to federal court existed where there were remedies available if state court's failed to provide defendants with a fair trial.

CORE TERMS: removal, civil rights, federal officers, federal rights, arrest, federal law, laws providing, civil rights, color of authority, trespass, freedmen, bureau, color, civil rights, prosecuted, present case, imprison-

ment, assisting, criminal prosecutions, rights of citizens, revenue officers, intimidate, invoked, custom, habeas corpus, arrested, suitable, tribunals, punish, federal statutes

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Po-lice Power[HN1] See Miss. Code Ann. ß 2296.5.

Civil Procedure > Removal > Elements > Federal VenueCivil Rights Law > Civil Rights Acts > Civil Rights Act of 1964[HN2] See 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443.

Civil Rights Law > Voting Rights > Racial Discrimina-tionConstitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Pro-tectionConstitutional Law > Privileges & Immunities[HN3] See 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1971(a)(1).

Civil Rights Law > Civil Rights Acts > Civil Rights Act of 1964[HN4] See 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1971(b).

Civil Procedure > Removal > Elements > RemovabilityGovernments > Federal Government > Claims By & AgainstGovernments > Federal Government > Employees & Officials[HN5] All state suits or prosecutions against any officer of the United States or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office may be removed. Many of the cases presently removable under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443 (2) would now also be removable under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1442 (a)(1).

Civil Procedure > Removal > Basis > Cases Involving Federal OfficersGovernments > Federal Government > Employees & Officials[HN6] 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443 (2) confers a privilege of re-moval only upon federal officers or agents and those au-thorized to act with or for them in affirmatively execut-

ing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Scope of FreedomCriminal Law & Procedure > Jurisdiction & Venue > Jurisdiction[HN7] The First Amendment rights of free expression are not rights arising under a law providing for "equal civil rights" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443(1).

Criminal Law & Procedure > Jurisdiction & Venue > Jurisdiction[HN8] Under 28 U.S.C.S. ß 1443(1), the vindication of a defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.

Civil Rights Law > Practice & Procedure > Criminal PenaltiesGovernments > Federal Government > Employees & OfficialsGovernments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights[HN9] Sanctions, civil and criminal, are available in the federal courts against officers of a state who violate a pe-titioner's federal constitutional and statutory rights. Un-der 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983 (1964 ed.) the officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well. The provisions of 18 U.S.C.S. ß 241 (1964 ed.), a criminal law that imposes punishment of up to 10 years in prison, may be invoked against those who con-spire to deprive any citizen of the free exercise or enjoy-ment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Con-stitution or laws of the United States by causing the ar-rest of Black persons by means of false reports that such Black persons had committed criminal acts.

Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope[HN10] 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983, entitled "Civil action for deprivation of rights," states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-age, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other per-son within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-

stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-ing for redress. .

Civil Rights Law > Civil Rights Acts > Civil Rights Act of 1964[HN11] See 18 U.S.C.S. ß 241.

Civil Rights Law > Civil Rights Acts > Civil Rights Act of 1964Civil Rights Law > Practice & Procedure > Criminal Penalties[HN12] See 18 U.S.C.S. ß 242.

SUMMARY:

The two instant cases involve petitions by individu-als engaged in civil rights activities for removal, under 28 USC 1443(1) and (2), to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi of criminal prosecutions commenced in a Mississippi city police court. In No. 471, where the defendants were charged with obstructing public streets, petitioners alleged that the statute under which they were charged was unconsti-tutionally vague on its face, that it was unconstitutionally applied to their conduct, and that its application was a part of a policy of racial discrimination fostered by the state of Mississippi and the city involved. In No. 649, the defendants were charged with various offenses, such as assault, disturbing the peace, etc. They alleged that their arrests and prosecutions were for the sole purpose and ef-fect of harassing them and of punishing them for and de-terring them from the exercise of their constitutionally protected right to protest the conditions of racial segrega-tion in Mississippi. The District Court remanded the cases to the Police Court, but the Court of Appeals re-versed, insofar as the removal petitions were based on 1443(1), and remanded the cases to the District Court for a hearing on the truth of the allegations of the removal petitions. (347 F2d 679; 347 F2d 986.)

On writs of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Court of Ap-peals. In an opinion by Stewart, J., expressing the views of five members of the Court, it was held that the allega-tions in the petitions for remand did not support removal (1) under 1443(1), because the requirements of subdivi-sion (1) were not met by allegations that the defendants' federal equal civil rights had been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendants were false, or that the defendant was unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court, subdivision (1) being applicable only where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the

operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing a defendant to trial in the state court, or (2) under 1443(2), because subdivision (2) is available only to federal officers and to persons assisting such officers in the performance of their official duties.

Douglas, J., joined by Warren, Ch. J., and Brennan and Fortas, JJ., dissented, expressing the view that the al-legations of the removal petitions were sufficient to make out a case for removal and that hearings on the truth of these allegations were required.

LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:

[***LEdHN1]

REMOVAL OF CAUSES ß62

civil rights cases -- construction of 28 USC 1443(2) --

Headnote:[1A][1B]

The provision in 28 USC 1443 (2), which authorizes the removal to the appropriate federal court of a civil ac-tion or criminal prosecution commenced in a state court for "any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights," is available only to fed-eral officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any fed-eral law providing for equal civil rights.

[***LEdHN2]


STATUTES ß129

civil rights cases -- persons entitled to removal --

Headnote:[2]

The definition of the persons entitled to removal, un-der 28 USC 1443 (2), of a civil rights case from a state court to the appropriate federal court are to be read in the light of the more expansive language of the statute's an-cestor.

[***LEdHN3]

REMOVAL CAUSES ß62

construction of 28 USC 1443(2) --

Headnote:[3A][3B]

The provision in 28 USC 1443 (2), which authorizes the removal to the appropriate federal court of civil ac-tions or criminal prosecutions commenced in a state court for refusing to do any act on the ground that it

would be inconsistent with any law providing for equal rights, is available only to state officers.

[***LEdHN4]


"equal civil rights" --

Headnote:[4]

The First Amendment rights of free expression do not qualify as rights under laws providing for "equal civil rights" within the meaning of 28 USC 1443(1), which au-thorizes the removal to the appropriate federal court of civil actions or criminal prosecutions commenced in a state court against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the state courts a right under any law provid-ing for "equal civil rights."

[***LEdHN5]

CIVIL RIGHTS ß1

First Amendment rights --

Headnote:[5]

The First Amendment rights of free expression and the precious rights of personal liberty it protects are com-prehended in the concept of "civil rights."

[***LEdHN6]

CAUSES ß62

civil rights -- state criminal prosecutions --

Headnote:[6]

Allegations--in a petition to remove to the appropri-ate federal court state prosecutions for obstructing public streets, assault, disturbing the peace, and other offenses--that defendants were prosecuted because they were Ne-groes or engaged in helping Negroes assert their rights under federal equal civil rights laws, that they are com-pletely innocent of the charges against them, or that the defendants will be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court, do not sustain removal of these prosecutions under 28 USC 1443(1), which allows removal only when a per-son is "denied or cannot enforce" a specific federal right in the courts of the state.

[***LEdHN7]


civil rights case -- prerequisites --

Headnote:[7A][7B]

To support removal, under 28 USC 1443(1), autho-rizing the removal to the appropriate federal court of pro-

ceedings commenced in a state court against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such state a right under any law providing for equal civil rights, it is not enough to allege or show that the defen-dant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in ad-vance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court; the vindication of defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.

[***LEdHN8]


civil rights cases --

Headnote:[8]

The civil rights removal statute ( 28 USC 1443) does not require and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial.

[***LEdHN9]

CIVIL RIGHTS ß12.5

CIVIL RIGHTS ß13

civil and criminal sanctions --

Headnote:[9]

Persons who are denied the rights guaranteed to them under federal law may vindicate these rights in ap-propriate cases by various remedies in federal courts, such as direct review by the United States Supreme Court, obtaining an injunction or habeas corpus, bringing suit for damages under 42 USC 1983, or invoking crimi-nal sanctions under 18 USC 241, 242.

[***LEdHN10]



Headnote:[10]

The provisions of 28 USC 1443 (1), authorizing the removal to the appropriate federal court of civil rights cases commenced in a state court, do not operate to work a wholesale dislocation of the historic relationship be-tween the state and the federal courts in the administra-tion of the criminal law.

[***LEdHN11]

COURTS ß537.5

Congress' power over procedure --

Headnote:[11]

Congress has power to enlarge the right of removal from a state court to a federal court in civil rights cases.

[***LEdHN12]

COURTS ß153

civil rights cases -- changes in removal statute --

Headnote:[12]

It is for Congress and not for the United States Supreme Court to make changes in the long-settled inter-pretation of the provisions of the century- old statute ( 28 USC 1443) authorizing the removal to the appropriate federal court of civil actions or criminal prosecutions commenced in a state court.

[***LEdHN13]



Headnote:[13]

By making appealable orders remanding to a state court civil rights cases removed to a federal court, Con-gress invited a contemporary judicial consideration of the meaning of the unchanged provisions of the removal statute ( 28 USC 1443).

SYLLABUS

Various state criminal charges were brought against the individual petitioners, members of groups engaging in civil rights activities in Mississippi in 1964, and they filed petitions to remove their cases to the Federal Dis-trict Court alleging under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1) that they were denied or could not enforce in the state courts rights under laws providing for the equal civil rights of citizens, and under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2) that they were being prosecuted for acts done under color of the authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The ß 1443 (1) removal claims were fundamentally based on allegations (1) that the individual petitioners were ar-rested because they were Negroes or were helping Ne-groes assert their rights and that they were innocent of the charges against them, or (2) that they would be un-able to obtain fair state trials. The ß 1443 (2) removal claims were based on the contention that the various fed-eral constitutional and statutory provisions (including 42 U. S. C. ßß 1971 and 1981) invoked in the removal peti-tions conferred "color of authority" on the individual pe-titioners to commit the acts for which they are being

prosecuted. The District Court on motion remanded the cases to the city police court for trial. The Court of Ap-peals reversed, holding that a valid removal claim under ß 1443 (1) had been stated by allegations that a state statute had been applied before trial so as to deprive an accused of his equal civil rights where the arrest and charge thereunder were effected for reasons of racial dis-crimination, and remanded the cases to the District Court for a hearing on the truth of the allegations. The court rejected the ß 1443 (2) contentions, holding that provi-sion available only to those who have acted in an official or quasi-official capacity under federal law. Held:

1. The individual petitioners had no removal right under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2) since, as the legislative his-tory of that provision makes clear, that provision applies only in the case of federal officers and persons assisting such officers in performing their duties under a federal law providing for equal civil rights. Pp. 814-824.

2. Section 1443 (1) permits removal only in the rare situation where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit law that federal rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bring-ing the defendant to trial in the state court. Such not be-ing the case here, the individual petitioners are not enti-tled to removal under ß 1443 (1). Pp. 824-828.

(a) Some of the rights invoked by the removal peti-tions, such as those of free expression under the First Amendment, clearly cannot meet the statutory definition of "equal civil rights." P. 825.

(b) Neither the two federal laws specifically referred to in the removal petitions (42 U. S. C. ßß 1971, 1981), nor any others confer an absolute right on private citizens to commit the acts involved in the charges against the in-dividual petitioners or grant immunity from state prose-cution on such charges. Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 780, distinguished. Pp. 826-827.

(c) Removal under ß 1443 (1) cannot be supported merely by showing that there has been an illegal denial of civil rights by state officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the de-fendant cannot obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. Pp. 827-828.

3. Section 1443 (1) does not work a wholesale dis-location of the historic relationship between the state and federal courts in the administration of the criminal law, as the line of decisions from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, to Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, makes clear. If changes are to be made in the long-settled inter-pretation of ß 1443 (1), it is for Congress, not this Court, to make them. Pp. 832-835.

COUNSEL: Hardy Lott argued the cause for petitioner in No. 471 and for respondent in No. 649. With him on the briefs was Aubrey H. Bell.

Benjamin E. Smith argued the cause for respondents in No. 471 and for petitioners in No. 649. With him on the briefs were William Rossmore, Fay Stender, Jack Pee-bles, Claudia Shropshire and George Crockett.

Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assis-tant Attorney General Doar, David L. Norman and Louis M. Kauder.

JUDGES: Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Bren-nan, Stewart, White, Fortas

OPINION BY: STEWART

OPINION

[*810] [***947] [**1803] MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

These consolidated cases, sequels to Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 780, involve prosecutions on various state criminal charges against 29 people who were al-legedly engaged in the spring and summer of 1964 in civil rights activity in Leflore County, Mississippi. In the first case, 14 individuals were charged with obstruct-ing the public streets of the City of Greenwood in viola-tion of Mississippi law. 1 They filed petitions to remove their cases to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1964 ed.). 2 Alleging [*811] that they were members of a civil rights group engaged in a drive to encourage Ne-gro voter registration in Leflore County, their petitions stated that they were denied or could not enforce in the courts of the State rights under laws providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, and that they were being prosecuted for acts done under color of authority of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U. S. C. ß 1971 et seq. (1964 ed.). 3 [**1804] Addition-ally, their removal petitions alleged that the statute [***948] under which they were charged was unconsti-tutionally vague on its face, that it was unconstitutionally [*812] applied to their conduct, and that its application was a part of a policy of racial discrimination fostered by the State of Mississippi and the City of Greenwood. The District Court sustained the motion of the City of Green-wood to remand the cases to the city police court for trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-versed, holding that "a good claim for removal under ß 1443 (1) is stated by allegations that a state statute has been applied prior to trial so as to deprive an accused of

his equal civil rights in that the arrest and charge under the statute were effected for reasons of racial discrimina-tion." Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 684. Accordingly, the cases were remanded to the District Court for a hearing on the truth of the defendants' allega-tions. At the same time, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' contentions under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2), holding that removal under that subsection is available only to those who have acted in an official or quasi-offi-cial capacity under a federal law and who can therefore be said to have acted under "color of authority" of the law within the meaning of that provision. 4

1 The defendants were charged with violating paragraph one of [HN1] ß 2296.5 of the Missis-sippi Code (1964 Cum. Supp.), Laws 1960, c. 244, ß 1, which provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person or per-sons to wilfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, high-way, alley, road, or other passageway by imped-ing, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon, and any person or per-sons violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($ 500.00) or by con-finement in the county jail not exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."2 [HN2] "Civil rights cases.

"Any of the following civil actions or crimi-nal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and divi-sion embracing the place wherein it is pending:

"(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

"(2) For any act under color of authority de-rived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1964 ed.). See Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 780.3 The removal petitions specifically invoked rights to freedom of speech, petition, and assem-bly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as additional rights under the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Four-teenth Amendment. [HN3] 42 U. S. C. ß 1971 (a)

(1) (1964 ed.), which guarantees the right to vote, free from racial discrimination, provides:

"All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elec-tions, without distinction of race, color, or previ-ous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Terri-tory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding."

[HN4] 42 U. S. C. ß 1971 (b) (1964 ed.) pro-vides:

"No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, co-erce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose . . . ."

See also ß 11 (b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U. S. C. ß 1973i (b) (1964 ed., Supp. I).4 ". . . ß 1443 (2) . . . is limited to federal offi-cers and those assisting them or otherwise acting in an official or quasi-official capacity." Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 686 (C. A. 5th Cir.). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied strongly on the decision of the District Court in City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 237 F.Supp. 213 (D. C. N. D. Miss.). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also adopted this construction of ß 1443 (2). Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 771-772. The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Cir-cuits have refused to grant removal under ß 1443 (2) on allegations comparable to those in the present case. New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (C. A. 2d Cir.); City of Chester v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 823 (C. A. 3d Cir.). See also Arkansas v. Howard, 218 F.Supp. 626 (D. C. E. D. Ark.).

In the second case, 15 people allegedly affiliated with a civil rights group were arrested at different times in July [*813] and August of 1964 and charged with various offenses against the laws of Mississippi or ordi-nances of the City of Greenwood. 5 These defendants filed essentially identical petitions for removal in the District Court, denying that they had engaged in any con-duct prohibited by valid laws and stating that their arrests and prosecutions were for the "sole purpose and effect of harassing Petitioners and of [**1805] punishing them

for and deterring them from the exercise of their consti-tutionally protected right to protest the conditions of racial discrimination and segregation" in Mississippi. As grounds for removal, the defendants specifically invoked [***949] 28 U. S. C. ßß 1443 (1) 6 and 1443 (2). 7 The District Court held that the cases [*814] had been im-properly removed and remanded them to the police court of the City of Greenwood. In a per curiam opinion find-ing the issues "identical with" those determined in the Peacock case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the cases to the District Court for a hearing on the truth of the defendants' allegations under ß 1443 (1). Weathers v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 986.

5 The several defendants were charged vari-ously with assault, interfering with an officer in the performance of his duty, disturbing the peace, creating a disturbance in a public place, inciting to riot, parading without a permit, assault and bat-tery by biting a police officer, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, operating a motor vehi-cle with improper license tags, reckless driving, and profanity and use of vulgar language.6 Under ß 1443 (1), the defendants alleged that they had been denied and could not enforce in the courts of the State rights under laws providing for equal civil rights, in that the courts and law en-forcement officers of the State were prejudiced against them because of their race or their associ-ation with Negroes, and because of the commit-ment of the courts and officers to the State's de-clared policy of racial segregation. The defen-dants also alleged that the trial would take place in a segregated courtroom, that Negro witnesses and attorneys would be addressed by their first names, that Negroes would be excluded from the juries, and that the judges and prosecutors who would participate in the trial had gained office at elections in which Negro voters were excluded. The defendants also urged that the statutes and ordinances under which they were charged were unconstitutionally vague on their face, and that the statutes and ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants' conduct.7 Under ß 1443 (2), the defendants alleged that they had engaged solely in conduct protected by the First Amendment, by the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by 42 U. S. C. ß 1981 (1964 ed.), which provides:

"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-

tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."

We granted certiorari to consider the important questions raised by the parties concerning the scope of the civil rights removal statute. 382 U.S. 971. 8 As in Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 780, we deal here not with questions of congressional power, but with issues of statutory construction.

8 The City of Greenwood, petitioner in No. 471, challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of ß 1443 (1); the individual petitioners in No. 649 challenge the court's interpretation of ß 1443 (2).

I.

[***LEdHR1A] [1A]

The individual petitioners contend that, quite apart from 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1), they are entitled to remove their cases to the District Court under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2), which authorizes the removal of a civil action or criminal prosecution for "any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights . . . ." The core of their contention is that the various federal constitutional and statutory provisions invoked in their removal petitions conferred "color of authority" upon them to perform the acts for which they [*815] are be-ing prosecuted by the State. We reject this argument, be-cause we have concluded that the history of ß 1443 (2) demonstrates convincingly that this subsection of the re-moval statute is available only to federal officers and to persons assisting such officers in the performance of their official duties. 9

9 The provisions of what is now ß 1443 (2) have never been construed by this Court during the century that has passed since the law's original enactment. The courts of appeals that have re-cently given consideration to the subsection have unanimously rejected the claims advanced in this case by the individual petitioners. See, in addi-tion to the present case in the Fifth Circuit, 347 F.2d 679, the following cases: New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (C. A. 2d Cir.); City of Chester v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 823 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756 (C. A. 4th Cir.). See note 4, supra.

The [**1806] progenitor of ß 1443 (2) was ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. Insofar as it is relevant [***950] here, that section granted removal of

all criminal prosecutions "commenced in any State court . . . against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or the act establishing a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees, and all acts amendatory thereof . . . ." (Emphasis added.) [***LEdHR2] [2]The statutory phrase "officer . . . or other person" characterizing the removal defendants in ß 3 of the 1866 Act was carried forward without change through successive revisions of the removal statute until 1948, when the revisers, disavowing any substantive change, eliminated the phrase entirely. 10 The definition of the persons entitled [*816] to removal under the present form of the statute is therefore appropriately to be read in the light of the more expansive language of the statute's ancestor. See Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560, n. 12;Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227-228.

10 See Rev. Stat. ß 641 (1874); Judicial Code of 1911, c. 231, ß 31, 36 Stat. 1096; 28 U. S. C. ß 74 (1926 ed.); 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1952 ed.). Al-though the 1948 revision modified the language of the prior provision in numerous respects, in-cluding the elimination of the phrase "officer . . . or other person," the reviser's note states simply that "Changes were made in phraseology." H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A134. The statutory development of the civil rights re-moval provision is set out in the Appendix to the Court's opinion in Georgia v. Rachel, ante.

In the context of its original enactment as part of ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the statutory language "officer . . . or other person" points squarely to the con-clusion that the phrase "or other person" meant persons acting in association with the civil or military officers mentioned in the immediately preceding words of the statute. That interpretation stems from the obvious con-trast between the "officer . . . or other person" phrase and the next preceding portion of the statute, the prede-cessor of the present ß 1443 (1), which granted removal to "any . . . person" who was denied or could not enforce in the courts of the State his rights under ß 1 of the 1866 Act. The dichotomy between "officer . . . or other per-son" and "any . . . person" in these correlative removal provisions persisted through successive statutory revi-sions until 1948, even though, were we to accept the in-dividual petitioners' contentions, the two phrases would in fact have been almost entirely co-extensive.

It is clear that the "other person" in the "officer . . . or other person" formula of ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended as an obvious reference to certain cat-

egories of persons described in the enforcement provi-sions, ßß 4-7, of the Act. 14 Stat. 28-29. Section 4 of the Act specifically charged both the officers [*817] and the agents of the Freedmen's Bureau, 11 among [***951] others, with the duty [**1807] of enforcing the Civil Rights Act. As such, those officers and agents were required to arrest and institute proceedings against persons charged with violations [*818] of the Act. 12 By the "color of authority" removal provision of ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act, "agents" who derived their authority from the Freedmen's Bureau legislation would be entitled as "other persons," if not as "officers," to removal of state prosecutions against them based upon their enforce-ment activities under both the Freedmen's Bureau legisla-tion and the Civil Rights Act. 13 Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act, now 42 U. S. C. ß 1989 (1964 ed.), specifi-cally authorized United States commissioners to appoint "one or more suitable persons" to execute warrants and other process issued by the commissioners. 14 These "suitable persons [**1808] " were, in [***952] turn, specifically [*819] authorized "to summon and call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county." 15 Section 6 of the Act provided criminal penal-ties for any individual who obstructed "any officer, or other person charged with the execution of any warrant or process issued under the provisions of this act, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him or them," or who rescued [*820] or attempted to rescue prisoners "from the custody of the officer, other person or persons, or those lawfully assisting." 16 Finally, ß 7 of the Act, now 42 U. S. C. ß 1991 (1964 ed.), awarded a fee of five dollars for each individual arrested by the "person or per-sons authorized to execute the process" -- i. e., the "one or more suitable persons" of ß 5. Thus, the enforcement provisions of the 1866 Act were replete with references to "other persons" in contexts obviously relating to posi-tive enforcement activity under the Act. 17

11 By the Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 507, Congress established a Bureau under the War De-partment, to last during the rebellion and for one year thereafter, to assist refugees and freedmen from rebel states and other areas by providing food, shelter, and clothing. The Bureau was un-der the direction of a commissioner appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. Un-der ß 4 of the Act, the commissioner was autho-rized to set apart for loyal refugees and freedmen up to 40 acres of lands that had been abandoned in the rebel states or that had been acquired by the United States by confiscation or sale. The section specifically provided that persons as-signed to such lands "shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land." 13 Stat. 508. The Act was continued for two years by the Act of

July 16, 1866, c. 200, ß 1, 14 Stat. 173. In addi-tion, ß 3 of the latter Act amended the 1865 Act to authorize the commissioner to "appoint such agents, clerks, and assistants as may be required for the proper conduct of the bureau." The section also provided that military officers or enlisted men might be detailed for service and assigned to duty under the Act. 14 Stat. 174. Further, ß 13 of the amendatory Act of 1866 specifically pro-vided that "the commissioner of this bureau shall at all times co-operate with private benevolent as-sociations of citizens in aid of freedmen, and with agents and teachers, duly accredited and ap-pointed by them, and shall hire or provide by lease buildings for purposes of education when-ever such associations shall, without cost to the government, provide suitable teachers and means of instruction; and he shall furnish such protec-tion as may be required for the safe conduct of such schools." 14 Stat. 176. Section 14 of the amendatory Act of 1866 established, in essen-tially the same terms for States where the ordi-nary course of judicial proceedings had been in-terrupted by the rebellion, the rights and obliga-tions that had already been enacted in ß 1 of the Act of April 9, 1866 (the Civil Rights Act), and provided for the extension of military jurisdiction to those States in order to protect the rights se-cured. 14 Stat. 176-177. By the Act of July 6, 1868, 15 Stat. 83, the Freedmen's Bureau legisla-tion was continued for an additional year.12 "SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That . . . the officers and agents of the Freedmen's Bureau . . . shall be, and they are hereby, specially autho-rized and required, at the expense of the United States, to institute proceedings against all and ev-ery person who shall violate the provisions of this act, and cause him or them to be arrested and im-prisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before [the circuit] court of the United States or territorial court as by this act has cognizance of the offence." Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 28.

The same authorization was extended to dis-trict attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the United States, and to commissioners ap-pointed by the circuit and territorial courts of the United States. In order to expedite the enforce-ment of the Act, ß 4 also authorized the circuit courts of the United States and superior territorial courts to increase the number of commissioners charged with the duties of enforcing the Act.13 Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided for removal by any "officer . . . or other person" for acts under color of authority derived

either from the Act itself or from the Freedmen's Bureau legislation. See p. 815, supra. Thus, re-moval was granted to officers and agents of the Freedmen's Bureau for enforcement activity un-der both Acts. The Civil Rights Act, however, made no specific provision for removal of actions against freedmen and refugees who had been awarded abandoned or confiscated lands under ß 4 of the Freedmen's Bureau Act. See note 11, supra.14 Section 5 also provided that, "should any marshal or deputy marshal refuse to receive such warrant or other process when tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the same, he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one thousand dollars, to the use of the per-son upon whom the accused is alleged to have committed the offence." 14 Stat. 28. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed over the veto of President Johnson. Because of the hostility be-tween Congress and the President, it was feared that the United States marshals, who were ap-pointed by the President, would not enforce the law. In ß 5, therefore, Congress provided severe penalties for recalcitrant marshals. At the same time Congress ensured the availability of process servers by providing for the appointment by the commissioners of other "suitable persons" for the task of enforcing the new Act. Cf. In re Up-church, 38 F. 25, 27 (C. C. E. D. N. C.).15 Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:

". . . And the better to enable the said com-missioners to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the Constitution of the United States and the requirements of this act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to appoint, in writing, under their hands, any one or more suit-able persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants and other process as may be issued by them in the lawful performance of their re-spective duties; and the persons so appointed to execute any warrant or process as aforesaid shall have authority to summon and call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county, or such portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as may be necessary to the performance of the duty with which they are charged, and to insure a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution which prohibits slavery, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and said warrants shall run and be executed by said officers anywhere in the

State or Territory within which they are issued." Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 28. Cf. Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600.16 This aspect of ß 6 thus draws a threefold dis-tinction: "officers," "other persons" (probably the "one or more suitable persons" referred to in ß 5), and those "lawfully assisting" them. We have no doubt that the general "officer . . . or other per-son" language in ß 3 of the Act comprehended all three of these categories.17 "It thus appears that the statute contemplated that literally thousands of persons would be drawn into its enforcement and that some of them otherwise would have little or no appearance of official authority." Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 760 (C. A. 4th Cir.). No support for the proposition that "other person" includes private individuals not acting in association with federal officers can be drawn from the fact that the "color of authority" provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was carried forward together with the "denied or cannot enforce" provision as ß 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, whereas other removal provisions applicable to federal of-ficers and persons assisting them were carried forward in ß 643. Prior to 1948 the federal offi-cer removal statute, as here relevant, was limited to revenue officers engaged in the enforcement of the criminal or revenue laws. The provision was expanded in 1948 to encompass all federal offi-cers. See 28 U. S. C. ß 1442 (a)(1) (1964 ed.). At the present time, [HN5] all state suits or prose-cutions against "Any officer of the United States . . . or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office" may be removed. Thus many, if not all, of the cases presently removable under ß 1443 (2) would now also be removable under ß 1442 (a)(1). The present overlap be-tween the provisions simply reflects the separate historical evolution of the removal provision for officers in civil rights legislation. Indeed, there appears to be redundancy even within ß 1442 (a)(1) itself. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 221, n. 18 (1948).

The limitation of 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2) to official enforcement activity under federal equal civil rights laws draws support from analogous provisions in the removal statutes available to federal revenue officers. Long before 1866, fed-eral statutes had guaranteed certain federal rev-enue officers the right to remove to the federal court state court proceedings instituted against them because of their official actions. These

statutes characteristically used the "officer . . . or other person" formula in defining those entitled to the benefit of removal. The Customs Act of 1815, the primordial officer removal statute, de-scribed the "other person" as one "aiding or as-sisting" the revenue officer. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, c. 31, ß 8, 3 Stat. 198. See also the Act of March 3, 1815, c. 94, ß 6, 3 Stat. 233. The removal clause of a subsequent statute, the Force Act of 1833, was less specific with regard to the scope of the "other person" language, but it focused upon the possibility that persons other than fed-eral officers or their deputies might find them-selves faced with the prospect of defending titles claimed under the federal revenue laws against suits or prosecutions in state courts. Act of March 2, 1833, c. 57, ß 3, 4 Stat. 633. Thus, when Congress desired to grant removal of suits and prosecutions against private individuals, it knew how to make specific provision for it. Cf. Act of Jan. 22, 1869, 15 Stat. 267 (Habeas Cor-pus Suspension Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 755, amended to permit removal of suits or prosecu-tions against carriers for losses caused by rebel or Union forces).

[*821] [***953] The [**1809] derivation of the statutory phrase "For any act" in ß 1443 (2) confirms the interpretation that removal under this subsection is lim-ited to federal officers and those acting under them. The phrase "For any act" was substituted in 1948 for the phrase "for any arrest or imprisonment or other tres-passes or wrongs." Like the "officer . . . or other person" provision, the language specifying the acts on which re-moval could be grounded had, with minor changes, per-sisted until 1948 in the civil rights removal statute since its original introduction in the 1866 Act. The language of the original Civil Rights Act -- "arrest or imprison-ment, trespasses, or wrongs" -- is pre-eminently the lan-guage of enforcement. The [*822] words themselves denote the very sorts of activity for which federal offi-cers, seeking to enforce the broad guarantees of the 1866 Act, were likely to be prosecuted in the state courts. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has put it, "'Arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs,' were precisely the probable charges against enforcement offi-cers and those assisting them; and a statute speaking of such acts 'done or committed by virtue of or under color of authority derived from' specified laws reads far more readily on persons engaged in some sort of enforcement than on those whose rights were being enforced . . . ." New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 262.

The language of the "color of authority" removal provision of ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was taken directly from the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act

of 1863, 12 Stat. 755, which authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and precluded civil and criminal liability of any person making a search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment under any order of the President during the rebellion. 18 Section [***954] 5 of the 1863 Act provided for the removal of all suits or prosecutions "against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to be done, at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of any author-ity derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or any Act of Congress." 12 Stat. 756. [**1810] See The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Phillips v. Gaines, 131 U. S. App. clxix. Since the 1863 Act granted no rights to private individuals, its removal provision was concerned solely with the protection of federal officers and persons acting [*823] under them in the performance of their official duties. 19 Thus, at the same time that Congress expanded the availability of re-moval by enacting the "denied or cannot enforce" clause in ß 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it repeated almost verbatim in the "color of authority" clause the language of the 1863 Act 20 -- language that was clearly limited to enforcement activity by federal officers and those acting under them. 21

18 Act of March 3, 1863, c. 81, ßß 1, 4, 12 Stat. 755, 756. See also the amendatory Act of May 11, 1866, 14 Stat. 46.19 The provision in ß 5 of the Act of March 3, 1863, specifically extending removal to criminal as well as civil proceedings, was added on the Senate floor. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 538. The debates focused on the need to protect federal officers against state criminal prosecu-tions. See, e. g., id., at 535 (remarks of Senator Clark); id., at 537-538 (remarks of Senator Cowan).20 Although, in the revenue officer removal provision of the Revenue Act of 1866, Act of July 13, c. 184, ß 67, 14 Stat. 171, Congress ex-pressly characterized the "other person" as one "acting under or by authority of any [revenue] of-ficer," that statute obviously drew on the compa-rable characterization of the "other person" in the Customs Act of 1815, supra, note 17. And the "title" clause included in the 1866 revenue officer removal provision was obviously derived from the Force Act of 1833, supra, note 17. Thus, the same legislative inertia that led the Reconstruc-tion Congress not to qualify "other person" in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also led it to retain such a qualification in the revenue officer removal pro-vision enacted later the same year. Compare ß 16

of the Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 438 ("ti-tle" clause included in the officer removal provi-sion of a civil rights statute). Cf. City of Phila-delphia v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 720; The Asses-sor v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567.21 The language "arrest or imprisonment, tres-passes, or wrongs" is, of course, easily read as de-scribing the full range of enforcement activities in which federal officers might be engaged under the Civil Rights Act. In a case arising under ß 5 of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, this Court disallowed removal of an action of ejectment brought in a Virginia state court by the heir of a Confederate naval officer whose land had been seized under the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589. The confiscated land had been sold at public auction, and the rights to the land subsequently vested in a man named Bigelow, against whom the action of ejectment was brought. In denying removal under ß 5 of the 1863 Act, Mr. Justice Strong for a unanimous Court stated, "The specification [in ß 5] of arrests and imprisonments . . . followed by more general words, justifies the inference that the other tres-passes and wrongs mentioned are trespasses and wrongs ejusdem generis, or of the same nature as those which had been previously specified." Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, 348-349.

[*824] [***LEdHR1B] [1B] [***LEdHR3A] [3A]For these reasons, we hold that [HN6] the second subsection of ß 1443 confers a privilege of removal only upon federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties un-der any federal law providing for equal civil rights. 22 Ac-cordingly, [***955] the individual petitioners in the case before us had no right of removal [**1811] to the federal court under 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2).

[***LEdHR3B] [3B]

22 The second phrase of 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (2), "for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law," has no rel-evance to this case. It is clear that removal under that language is available only to state officers. The phrase was added by the House of Represen-tatives as an amendment to the Senate bill during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In reporting the House bill, Representative Wilson, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and the floor manager of the bill, said, "I will state that this amendment is intended to enable State officers, who shall refuse to enforce State

laws discriminating in reference to [the rights cre-ated by ß 1 of the bill] on account of race or color, to remove their cases to the United States courts when prosecuted for refusing to enforce those laws." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1367.

II.

We come, then, to the issues which this case raises as to the scope of 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1). In Georgia v. Rachel, decided today, we have held that removal of a state court trespass prosecution can be had under ß 1443 (1) upon a petition alleging that the prosecution stems exclusively from the petitioners' peaceful exercise of their right to equal accommodation in establishments covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ß 201, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. ß 2000a (1964 ed.). Since that Act [*825] itself, as construed by this Court in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 310, specifically and uniquely guarantees that the conduct alleged in the re-moval petition in Rachel may "not be the subject of tres-pass prosecutions," the defendants inevitably are "denied or cannot enforce in the courts of [the] State a right under any law providing for . . . equal civil rights," by merely being brought before a state court to defend such a prose-cution. The present case, however, is far different. [***LEdHR4] [4] [***LEdHR5] [5]In the first place, the federal rights invoked by the individual petitioners include some that clearly cannot qualify under the statu-tory definition as rights under laws providing for "equal civil rights." [HN7] The First Amendment rights of free expression, for example, so heavily relied upon in the re-moval petitions, are not rights arising under a law pro-viding for "equal civil rights" within the meaning of ß 1443 (1). The First Amendment is a great charter of American freedom, and the precious rights of personal liberty it protects are undoubtedly comprehended in the concept of "civil rights." Cf. Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 531-532 (separate opinion of Stone, J.). But the ref-erence in ß 1443 (1) is to "equal civil rights." That phrase, as our review in Rachel of its legislative history makes clear, does not include the broad constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment. 23 A precise defini-tion of the limitations of the phrase "any law providing for . . . equal civil rights" in ß 1443 (1) is not a matter we need pursue to a conclusion, however, because we may proceed here on the premise that at least the two federal statutes specifically referred to in the removal petitions, 42 U. S. C. ß 1971 and 42 U. S. C. ß 1981, do qualify un-der the statutory definition. 24

23 See Georgia v. Rachel, ante, at 788-792. See also New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 266-268 (C. A. 2d Cir.).24 See note 3 and note 7, supra.

[*826] The fundamental claim in this case, then, is that a case for removal is made under ß 1443 (1) upon a petition alleging: (1) that the defendants were arrested by state officers and charged with various offenses under state law because they were Negroes or because they were engaged [***956] in helping Negroes assert their rights under federal equal civil rights laws, and that they are completely innocent of the charges against them, or (2) that the defendants will be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court. The basic difference between this case and Rachel is thus immediately apparent. In Rachel the defendants relied on the specific provisions of a preemp-tive federal civil rights law -- ßß 201 (a) and 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. ßß 2000a (a) and 2000a-2 (c) (1964 ed.), as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, supra -- that, under the conditions al-leged, gave them: (1) the federal statutory right to remain on the property of a restaurant proprietor after being or-dered to leave, despite a state law making it a criminal offense not to leave, and (2) the further federal statutory right that no State should even [**1812] attempt to prosecute them for their conduct. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 as construed in Hamm thus specifically and uniquely conferred upon the defendants an absolute right to "violate" the explicit terms of the state criminal tres-pass law with impunity under the conditions alleged in the Rachel removal petition, and any attempt by the State to make them answer in a court for this conceded "viola-tion" would directly deny their federal right "in the courts of [the] State." The present case differs from Rachel in two significant respects. First, no federal law confers an absolute right on private citizens -- on civil rights advocates, on Negroes, or on anybody else -- to obstruct a public street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile without a license, or to bite a [*827] policeman. Second, no federal law con-fers immunity from state prosecution on such charges. 25

25 Section 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. ß 2000a-2 (c) (1964 ed.), the provision involved in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 310, and Georgia v. Rachel, ante, at 793-794, 804-805, explicitly provides that no person shall "punish or attempt to punish any per-son for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege" secured by the public accom-modations section of the Act. None of the federal statutes invoked by the defendants in the present case contains any such provision. See note 3 and note 7, supra.

[***LEdHR6] [6] [***LEdHR7A] [7A] [***LEdHR8] [8]To sustain removal of these prosecu-tions to a federal court upon the allegations of the peti-tions in this case would therefore mark a complete depar-ture from the terms of the removal statute, which allow removal only when a person is "denied or cannot en-force" a specified federal right "in the courts of [the] State," and a complete departure as well from the consis-tent line of this Court's decisions from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, to Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1.26 Those cases all stand for at least one basic proposi-tion: It is not enough to support removal under ß 1443 (1) to allege or show that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance [***957] of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a par-ticular state court. The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that the state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any other manner the defendant will [*828] be "denied or cannot enforce in the courts" of the State any right under a federal law providing for equal civil rights. The civil rights removal statute does not re-quire and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial. [HN8] Under ß 1443 (1), the vindication of the defendant's fed-eral rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situ-ations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court. Georgia v. Rachel, ante; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303.

26 See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; Bush v. Ken-tucky, 107 U.S. 110; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565; Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592; Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213; Dubuclet v. Louisi-ana, 103 U.S. 550; Schmidt v. Cobb, 119 U.S. 286. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, ante, at 797 et seq.

[**1813] [***LEdHR9] [9]What we have said is not for one moment to suggest that the individual petitioners in this case have not alleged a denial of rights guaranteed to them under federal law. If, as they allege, they are be-ing prosecuted on baseless charges solely because of their race, then there has been an outrageous denial of their federal rights, and the federal courts are far from powerless to redress the wrongs done to them. The most

obvious remedy is the traditional one emphasized in the line of cases from Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, to Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 -- vindication of their federal claims on direct review by this Court, if those claims have not been vindicated by the trial or reviewing courts of the State. That is precisely what happened in two of the cases in the Rives-Powers line of decisions, where removal under the predecessor of ß 1443 (1) was held to be unauthorized, but where the state court convic-tions were overturned because of a denial of the defen-dants' federal rights at their trials. 27 That is precisely what has happened in [*829] countless cases this Court has reviewed over the years -- cases like Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, to name one at random de-cided in the present Term. "Cases where Negroes are prosecuted and convicted in state courts can find their way expeditiously to this Court, provided they present constitutional questions." England v. Medical Examin-ers, 375 U.S. 411, 434 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).

27 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110.

But there are many other remedies available in the federal courts to redress the wrongs claimed by the indi-vidual petitioners in the extraordinary circumstances they allege in their removal petitions. If the state prosecution or trial on the charge of obstructing a public street or on any other charge would itself clearly deny their rights protected by the First Amendment, they may under some circumstances obtain an injunction in the federal court. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479. If they go to trial and there is a complete absence of evidence against them, their convictions will be set aside because of a de-nial of due [***958] process of law. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199. If at their trial they are in fact denied any federal constitutional rights, and these denials go uncorrected by other courts of the State, the remedy of federal habeas corpus is freely available to them. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391. If their federal claims at trial have been denied through an unfair or deficient fact-finding process, that, too, can be corrected by a federal court. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293.

Other [HN9] sanctions, civil and criminal, are avail-able in the federal courts against officers of a State who violate the petitioners' federal constitutional and statutory rights. Under 42 U. S. C. ß 1983 (1964 ed.) the officers may be made to respond in damages not only for viola-tions of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and [*830] statutory rights as well. 28 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167. [**1814] And only this Term we have held that the provisions of 18 U. S. C. ß 241 (1964 ed.), a criminal law that imposes punishment of up to 10 years in prison, may be invoked against those who conspire to

deprive any citizen of the "free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States" by "causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had committed criminal acts." 29 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756.

28 [HN10] "Civil action for deprivation of rights.

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U. S. C. ß 1983 (1964 ed.).29 [HN11] "Conspiracy against rights of citi-zens.

"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi-lege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so ex-ercised the same; or

"If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with in-tent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or en-joyment of any right or privilege so secured --

"They shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U. S. C. ß 241 (1964 ed.).

Criminal penalties for violations of federal rights are also imposed by [HN12] 18 U. S. C. ß 242 (1964 ed.), which provides:

"Deprivation of rights under color of law.

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully sub-jects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privi-leges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on ac-count of such inhabitant being an alien, or by rea-son of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787.

[*831] [***LEdHR7B] [7B]But the question before us now is not whether state officials in Mississippi have engaged in conduct for which they may be civilly or criminally liable under federal law. The question, pre-cisely, is whether the individual petitioners are entitled to remove these state prosecutions to a federal court under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1). Unless the words of this removal [***959] statute are to be disre-garded and the previous consistent decisions of this Court completely repudiated, the answer must clearly be that no removal is authorized in this case. In the Rachel case, decided today, we have traced the course of those decisions against the historic background of the statute they were called upon to interpret. And in Rachel we have concluded that removal to the federal court in the narrow circumstances there presented would not be a de-parture from the teaching of this Court's decisions, be-cause the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in those narrow cir-cumstances, "substitutes a right for a crime." Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315. [***LEdHR10] [10]We need not and do not necessar-ily approve or adopt all the language and all the reason-ing of every one of this Court's opinions construing this removal statute, from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, to Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1.But we de-cline to repudiate those decisions, and we decline to do so not out of a blind adherence to the principle of stare decisis, but because after independent consideration we have determined, for the reasons expressed in this opin-ion and in Rachel, that those decisions were correct in their basic conclusion that the provisions of ß 1443 (1) do not operate to work a wholesale dislocation of the his-toric relationship between the state and the federal courts in the administration of the criminal law.

[*832] It is worth contemplating what the result would be if the strained interpretation of ß 1443 (1) urged by the individual [**1815] petitioners were to prevail. In the fiscal year 1963 there were 14 criminal removal cases of all kinds in the entire Nation; in fiscal 1964 there were 43. The present case was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on June 22, 1965, just before the end of the fiscal year. In that year, fiscal 1965, there were 1,079 criminal removal cases in the Fifth Circuit alone. 30 But this phenomenal increase is no more than a drop in the bucket of what could reasonably be expected in the future. For if the individual petition-ers should prevail in their interpretation of ß 1443 (1), then every criminal case in every court of every State -- on any charge from a five-dollar misdemeanor to first-degree murder -- would be removable to a federal court upon a petition alleging (1) that the defendant was being

prosecuted because of his race 31 and that he was com-pletely innocent of the charge brought against him, or (2) that he would be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court. On motion to remand, the federal court would be required in every case to hold a hearing, which would amount to at least a preliminary trial of the motivations of the state officers who arrested and charged the defen-dant, of the quality of the state court or judge before whom the charges were filed, and of the defendant's in-nocence or guilt. And the federal court might, of course, be located hundreds of miles away from the place where the charge was brought. This hearing could be followed either by a full trial in the federal [***960] court, or by a remand order. Every remand order would be [*833] appealable as of right to a United States Court of Ap-peals and, if affirmed there, would then be reviewable by petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. If the re-mand order were eventually affirmed, there might, if the witnesses were still available, finally be a trial in the state court, months or years after the original charge was brought. If the remand order were eventually reversed, there might finally be a trial in the federal court, also months or years after the original charge was brought.

30 Annual Report of the Director of the Admin-istrative Office of the United States Courts 214, 216 (1965). See Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 788, n. 8.31 Such removal petitions could, of course, be filed not only by Negroes, but also by members of the Caucasian or any other race.

[***LEdHR11] [11]We have no doubt that Congress, if it chose, could provide for exactly such a system. We may assume that Congress has constitutional power to provide that all federal issues be tried in the federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the States, or that jurisdiction of such issues be shared. 32 And in the exer-cise of that power, we may assume that Congress is con-stitutionally fully free to establish the conditions under which civil or criminal proceedings involving federal is-sues may be removed from one court to another. 33

32 See Romero v. International Terminal Oper-ating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-380; 389-412 (sepa-rate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).33 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348-350; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 428-430; The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 251-254; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 287-290; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-271; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310-312. A number of bills enlarging the right of removal to a federal court in civil rights cases are

before the present Congress. See, for example: S. 2923, S. 3170, H. R. 12807, H. R. 12818, H. R. 12845, H. R. 13500, H. R. 13941, H. R. 14112, H. R. 14113, H. R. 14770, H. R. 14775, H. R. 14836 (89th Cong., 2d Sess.).

But before establishing the regime the individual petitioners propose, Congress would no doubt fully con-sider many questions. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has mentioned some of [**1816] the practical questions that would be involved: "If the re-moval jurisdiction is [*834] to be expanded and federal courts are to try offenses against state laws, cases not originally cognizable in the federal courts, what law is to govern, who is to prosecute, under what law is a con-victed defendant to be sentenced and to whose institution is he to be committed . . . ?" Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 768-769. To these questions there surely should be added the very practical inquiry as to how many hundreds of new federal judges and other federal court personnel would have to be added in order to cope with the vastly increased caseload that would be pro-duced.

We need not attempt to catalog the issues of policy that Congress might feel called upon to consider before making such an extreme change in the removal statute. But prominent among those issues, obviously, would be at least two fundamental questions: Has the historic prac-tice of holding state criminal trials in state courts -- with power of ultimate review of any federal questions in this Court -- been such a failure that the relationship of the state and federal courts should now be revolutionized? Will increased responsibility of the state courts in the area of federal civil rights be promoted and encouraged by denying those courts any power at all to exercise that responsibility?

[***LEdHR12] [12] [***LEdHR13] [13]We postulate these grave questions of practice and policy only [***961] to point out that if changes are to be made in the long-settled interpretation of the provisions of this century-old removal statute, it is for Congress and not for this Court to make them. Fully aware of the es-tablished meaning the removal statute had been given by a consistent series of decisions in this Court, Congress in 1964 declined to act on proposals to amend the law. 34

[*835] All that Congress did was to make remand orders appealable, and thus invite a contemporary judicial con-sideration of the meaning of the unchanged provisions of 28 U. S. C. ß 1443. We have accepted that invitation and have fully considered the language and history of those provisions. Having done so, we find that ß 1443 does not justify removal of these state criminal prosecutions to a federal court. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

34 Section 903 of H. R. 7702, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., would have amended 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 to enlarge the availability of removal in civil rights cases. H. R. 7702, however, did not emerge from the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-sentatives. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 787, n. 7.

It is so ordered.

DISSENT BY: DOUGLAS

DISSENT

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS concur, dissenting.

These state court defendants who seek the protection of the federal court were civil rights workers in Missis-sippi. Some were affiliated with the Student Non-Vio-lent Coordinating Committee engaged in getting Negroes registered as voters. They were charged in the state courts with obstructing the public streets. Other defen-dants were civil rights workers affiliated with the Coun-cil of Federated Organizations which aims to achieve full and complete integration of Negroes into the political and economic life of Mississippi. Some alleged that, while peacefully picketing, they were arrested and charged with assault and battery or interfering with an officer. Others were charged with illegal operation of motor vehicles, or for contributing to the delinquency of a minor or parading without a permit. Some were charged with disturbing the peace or inciting a riot.

All sought removal, some alleging in their motions that the state prosecution was part and parcel of Missis-sippi's policy [**1817] of racial segregation. Others al-leged that they were wholly innocent, the state prosecu-tions being for the sole purpose of harassing them and of punishing them for exercising their constitutional rights [*836] to protest the conditions of racial discrimination and segregation. In all these cases the District Court re-manded to the state courts. The Court of Appeals re-versed (347 F.2d 679; 347 F.2d 986) holding that the allegations were sufficient to make out a case for re-moval and that hearings on the truth of the allegations were required.

I agree with that result. As I will show, the federal regime was designed from the beginning to afford some protection against local passions and prejudices by the important pretrial federal remedy of removal; and the civil rights legislation with which we deal supports the mandates of the Court of Appeals.

[***962] I.

The Federal District Courts were created by the First Congress (1 Stat. 73) which designated a few heads of jurisdiction for the District Courts (ß 9) and for the Cir-cuit Courts (ß 11) -- some being concurrent with those of the state courts, others being exclusive. These categories of jurisdiction -- later enlarged -- were largely for the benefit of plaintiffs. There was concern that the rivalries, jealousies, and animosities among the States made neces-sary and appropriate the creation of a dual system of courts.

Lack of trust in some of the state courts for execu-tion of federal laws was reflected in the First Congress that established the dual system. Thus Madison said:

". . . a review of the constitution of the courts in many States will satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of the Federal laws. In some of the States, it is true, they might, and would be safe and proper organs of such a jurisdiction; but in others they are so dependent on State Legislatures, that to make the Federal laws dependent on them, would throw us back into all the embarrassments [*837] which characterized our former situation. In Connecticut the Judges are ap-pointed annually by the Legislature, and the Legislature is itself the last resort in civil cases." 1 Ann. Cong. 813.

Though federal question jurisdiction was originally limited to a few classes of cases, the creation of diversity jurisdiction (ß 11, 1 Stat. 78) was a significant manifesta-tion of this same feeling. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87:

"The judicial department was introduced into the American constitution under impressions, and with views, which are too apparent not to be perceived by all. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehen-sions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has es-tablished national tribunals for the decision of controver-sies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states." And see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 347.

The alternative -- the one India took -- was to let the state courts be the arbiters of federal as well as state rights with ultimate review in the Federal Supreme Court. But the federal court system was the choice we made and those courts have functioned throughout our history. In the years since 1789, the jurisdiction of the federal courts where federal rights are in issue has been steadily expanded (see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 727-733 (1953)), particu-

larly with the creation of [**1818] a general "federal question" jurisdiction in 1875. 18 Stat. 470.

[*838] While the federal courts were for the most part custodians of rights asserted by plaintiffs, from the very beginning they were also the haven of a restricted group of defendants as well. I refer to ß 12 of the Judi-ciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, which permitted removal of cases from a state court to a federal court on the [***963] ground of diversity of citizenship. Thus from the very start we have had a removal jurisdiction for the protection of defendants on a partial parity with federal jurisdiction for protection of plaintiffs.

The power of a defendant to remove cases from a state court to a federal court was not greatly enlarged un-til passage of the first Civil Rights Act, 1 ß 3 of which provided:

". . . the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judi-cial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, [*839] has been or shall be commenced in any State court, against any such person, for any cause whatso-ever . . . such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court in the manner prescribed by the 'Act relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,' approved March three, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and all acts amendatory thereof. . . ." (Em-phasis added.)

1 Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. There were a handful of other removal statutes passed in the interim. See, e. g., Act of February 4, 1815, ß 8, 3 Stat. 198 (removal of civil and criminal actions against federal customs officers for official acts); Act of March 2, 1833, ß 3, 4 Stat. 633 (removal of civil and criminal actions against federal offi-cers on account of acts done under the revenue laws), see Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257; Act of March 3, 1863, ß 5, 12 Stat. 756 (removal of civil and criminal actions against federal officers -- civil or military -- for acts done during the ex-istence of the Civil War under color of federal au-thority).

With the coming of the Civil War it became plain that some state courts might be instruments for the de-struction through harassment of guaranteed federal civil

rights. We have seen this demonstrated in the flow of cases coming this way. But the minorities who are the subject of repression are not only those who espouse the cause of racial equality. Jehovah's Witnesses in many parts of the country have likewise felt the brunt of ma-joritarian control through state criminal administration. Before them were the labor union organizers. Before them were the Orientals. It is in this setting that the re-moval jurisdiction must be considered.

The removal laws passed from time to time have re-sponded to two main concerns: First, a federal factfind-ing forum is often indispensable to the effective enforce-ment of those guarantees against local action. 2 [*840] The federal guarantee [***964] [**1819] turns ordi-narily upon contested issues of fact. Those rights, there-fore, will be of only academic value in many areas of the country unless the facts are objectively found. Secondly, swift enforcement of the federal right is imperative if the guarantees are to survive and not be slowly strangled by long, drawnout, costly, cumbersome proceedings which the Congress feared might result in some state courts. The delays of state criminal process, the perilous vicissi-tudes of litigation in the state courts, the onerous burdens on the poor and the indigent who usually espouse unpop-ular causes -- these threaten to engulf the federal guaran-tees. It is in that light that 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1) should be read and construed.

2 Madison, whose views on the establishment of the federal court system prevailed, said in the de-bates:

"Unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the republic . . . appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that, be-sides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper ver-dicts, in state tribunals, obtained under the biased directions of a dependent judge, or the local prej-udices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. . . . An effective judiciary establishment, commen-surate to the legislative authority, was essential. A government without a proper executive and ju-diciary would be the mere trunk of a body, with-out arms or legs to act or move." 5 Elliot's De-bates 159 (1876).

His victory "destroyed the ability of the states to sabotage the Union through their judi-ciary systems." 3 Brant, James Madison 42 (1950). Cf. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-417.

II.

The critical words, so far as the present cases are concerned, are "denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals" of the State or locality where they may be those rights which, in the most recent version of the removal statute, 3 are characterized as those secured [*841] by "any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof." 4

3 28 U. S. C. ß 1443 (1964 ed.) provides:

"Any of the following civil actions or crimi-nal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and divi-sion embracing the place wherein it is pending:

"(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

"(2) For any act under color of authority de-rived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law."4 Whatever the full reach of the statutory lan-guage "any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens," the wrongs of which these de-fendants and those in Georgia v. Rachel, ante, p. 780, complain (with the possible exception of pure First Amendment claims) are well within its coverage. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. ßß 1971, 1973i (b) (1964 ed. & Supp. I) (statutes adopted under Congress' power to assure equal access to the vote to all citizens, regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," U.S. Const., Amendment XV); 42 U. S. C. ß 1981 (1964 ed.) (guaranteeing all persons the right not to be sub-jected to "punishment, pains, penalties . . . [or] exactions" not suffered in like circumstances by "white citizens"); 42 U. S. C. ßß 2000a, 2000a-2 (1964 ed.) (discussed in Georgia v. Rachel, supra). I doubt that any meaningful distinction could be drawn for removal purposes between, for example, rights secured by 42 U. S. C. ß 1981 and those guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause, which largely reiterated ß 1981 in consti-tutional terms. But it is unnecessary, on my view of these cases, to settle this question. I therefore do not reach the highly questionable propositions relied upon by the majority in restricting the scope of the rights which ß 1443 (1) encom-passes.

It is difficult to discern whether the Court ascribes different meanings to the words "is denied" and "cannot enforce" as used in the statute. In my view, it is essential that these two aspects of ß 1443 (1) be distinguished. The words "is denied" refer to a present deprivation of rights while the language "cannot enforce" has reference to an anticipated state court frustration of equal civil rights. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, and subsequent decisions of this Court which the majority discusses, [**1820] were concerned with claims of the "cannot en-force" variety. 5 [*842] The Court [***965] dealt, in those cases, with the issue of unequal administration of justice in the process of jury selection. The concern was that removal might be permitted on merely a speculation that the state court would not, in the future, discharge its obligation to follow the "law of the land." Whatever the correctness of those decisions as to the "cannot enforce" clause, they have no application whatever to a claim of a present denial of equal civil rights.

5 Strictly speaking, the Court in Virginia v. Rives, supra, drew no distinction between the "is denied" and the "cannot enforce" clauses. It is clear, if only in retrospect, that the Court was there concerned solely with a claim of an antici-pated inability to enforce equal civil rights be-cause of the state court's tolerance of the exclu-sion of Negroes from the jury. The Court held that pretrial removal could not reach "a judicial [as opposed to a legislative] infraction of the con-stitutional inhibitions, after trial or final hearing has commenced." 100 U.S., at 319. Fairly read, Rives applies only to claims for removal arising under the "cannot enforce" clause of ß 1443 (1).

A.

A defendant "is denied" his federal right when "dis-orderly conduct" statutes, "breach of the peace" ordi-nances, and the like are used as the instrument to sup-press his promotion of civil rights. We know that such laws are sometimes used as a club against civil rights workers. 6 Senator Dodd who was the floor manager for that part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which restored the right of appeal from an order remanding a removed case (ß 901, 78 Stat. 266, 28 U. S. C. ß 1447 (d) (1964 ed.)) stated: 7

"I think cases to be tried in State courts in communi-ties where there is a pervasive hostility to civil rights, and cases involving efforts to use the court process as a means of intimidation, ought to be removable under this section."

6 See, e. g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229; Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S.

776 (per curiam); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87.7 110 Cong. Rec. 6955 (1964).

The examples are numerous. First is the case of prosecution under a law which is valid on its face but [*843] applied discriminatorily. 8 Second is a prosecu-tion under, say, a trespass law for conduct which is privi-leged under federal law. 9 Third is an unwarranted charge brought against a civil rights worker to intimidate him for asserting those rights, 10 or to suppress or discourage their promotion. The present charges are initiated by prosecutors for the purpose, defendants allege, of deter-ring or punishing [**1821] the exercise of equal civil rights. The Court of Appeals said:

". . . we do not read these cases [Rives [***966] and Powers] as establishing that the denial of equal civil rights must appear on the face of the state constitution or statute rather than in its application where the alleged de-nial of rights, as here, had its inception in the arrest and charge. They dealt only with the systematic exclusion question, a question which in turn goes to the very heart of the state judicial process, and federalism may have in-dicated that the remedy in such situations in the first in-stance should be left to the state courts. We would not expand the teaching of these cases to include state de-nials [*844] of equal civil rights through the unconstitu-tional application of a statute in situations which are not a part of the state judicial system but which, on the con-trary, arise in the administration of a statute in the arrest-ing and charging process." 347 F.2d 679, 684. (Empha-sis added.)

8 Administration of a law which appears fair on its face violates the Equal Protection Clause if done in a way which is racially discriminatory ( Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356) or which prefers the proponents of certain ideas over others ( Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272; Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 553-558; and see id., at 580-581 (BLACK, J., concurring)). Both stan-dards combine in the case of discriminatory en-forcement directed against civil rights demonstra-tors. And see 42 U. S. C. ß 1981 (1964 ed.).9 See, e. g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 310; Georgia v. Rachel, ante.10 Cf. authorities cited, note 8, supra. Various federal statutes make it a crime to interfere with or punish the exercise of federally protected rights. See, e. g., ß 11 (b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U. S. C. ß 1973i (b) (1964 ed., Supp. I); ß 203 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U. S. C. ß 2000a-2 (1964 ed.). See infra, at 847-848 and note 12.

I agree with that conclusion.

There are two ways which ß 1443 (1) may be read, either of which leads to the conclusion that these cases are covered by the "is denied" clause. As Judge Sobeloff said, dissenting in Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 778, the clause in question may be paraphrased in either of the following ways:

"Removal is permissible by:

"(i) any person who is denied [,] or cannot enforce [,] in the courts of such State a right under any law . . . .

"or

"(ii) any person who is denied [,] or cannot enforce in the courts of such State [,] a right under any law . . . ."

If the latter construction is taken, a right "is denied" by state action at any time -- before, as well as during, a trial. I agree with Judge Sobeloff that this reading of the provisions is more in keeping with the spirit of 1866, for the remedies given were broad and sweeping:

"If a Negro's rights were denied by the actions of such state officer, the aggrieved party was permitted to have vindication in the federal court; either by filing an origi-nal claim or, if a prosecution had already been com-menced against him, by removing the case to the federal forum." Id., at 781.

Yet even if the "is denied" clause is read more re-strictively, the present cases constitute denials of federal civil [*845] rights "in the courts" of the offending State within the meaning of ß 1443 (1), for the local judicial machinery is implicated even prior to actual trial by is-suance of a warrant or summons, by commitment of the prisoner, or by accepting and filing the information or in-dictment. Initiation of an unwarranted judicial proceed-ing to suppress or punish the assertion of federal civil rights makes out a case of civil rights "denied" within the meaning of ß 1443 (1). Prosecution for a federally pro-tected act is punishment for that act. The cost of pro-ceeding court by court until the federal right is vindicated is great. Restraint of liberty may be present; the need to post bonds may be present; the hire of a lawyer may be considerable; the gantlet of state court proceedings may entail destruction of a federal right through unsympa-thetic and adverse fact-findings that are in effect unre-viewable. The presence of an unresolved criminal charge may hang over the head of a defendant for years.

In early 1964, for example, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed [***967] convictions in harass-

ment prosecutions arising out of the May 1961 Freedom Rides. See Thomas v. State, 252 Miss. 527, 160 So. 2d 657; Farmer v. State, 161 So. 2d 159; Knight v. State, 248 Miss. 850, 161 So. 2d 521. More than another year was to pass before this Court reached and reversed [**1822] those convictions. 11 Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).

11 And see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (nearly two years from arrest to our reversal of convictions); Fields v. South Car-olina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963) (three and a half years from arrest to our reversal of convictions); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (more than four years from arrest to our reversal of con-victions).

Continuance of an illegal local prosecution, like the initiation of a new one, can have a chilling effect on a federal guarantee of civil rights. We said in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, respecting some of these fed-eral [*846] rights, that "the threat of sanctions may de-ter their exercise almost as potently as the actual applica-tion of sanctions." In a First Amendment context, we said: "By permitting determination of the invalidity of these statutes without regard to the permissibility of some regulation on the facts of particular cases, we have, in effect, avoided making vindication of freedom of ex-pression await the outcome of protracted litigation. Moreover, we have not thought that the improbability of successful prosecution makes the case different. The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaf-fected by the prospects of its success or failure." Dom-browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487. The latter case was a suit to enjoin a state prosecution. The present cases are close kin. For removal, if allowed, is equivalent to a plea in bar granted by a federal court to protect a federal right.

The threshold question -- whether initiation of the state prosecution has "denied" a federal right -- is resolv-able by the federal court on a hearing on the motion to remove. As noted, it is in substance a plea in bar to the prosecution, a plea grounded on federal law. If the mo-tion is granted, the removed case is concluded at that stage, as a case of misuse of a state prosecution has been made out. Cf. O'Campo v. Hardisty, 262 F.2d 621; De Busk v. Harvin, 212 F.2d 143. In other words, the result of removal is not the transfer of the trial from the state to the federal courts in this type of case. If after hearing it does not appear that the state prosecution is being used to deny federal rights, the case is remanded for trial in the state courts. 28 U. S. C. ß 1447 (c) (1964 ed.). But the removal statute meanwhile serves a protective function. Filing of the petition removes the case and automatically [*847] stays further proceedings in the state court. 28

U. S. C. ß 1446 (e) (1964 ed.). Moreover, if the defen-dant is confined, the removal judge must, without await-ing a hearing, issue a writ to transfer the prisoner to fed-eral custody, 28 U. S. C. ß 1446 (f) (1964 ed.), and he may then enlarge him on bail.

The Court holds in Rachel that a hearing must be held as to whether, in the particular case, the trespass prosecution constitutes a denial of equal civil rights. In-explicably, no such hearing is to be held in the present cases. For reasons not clear, a baseless prosecution, de-signed [***968] to punish and deter the exercise of such federally protected rights as voting, is not seen by the majority to constitute a denial of equal civil rights. This seems to me to overlook two very important federal statutes. The first, 42 U. S. C. ß 1981 (1964 ed.) (the present version of ß 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to which the original removal statute referred), provides:

"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, [**1823] licenses, and exactions of ev-ery kind, and to no other."

The other, ß 11 (b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U. S. C. ß 1973i (b) (1964 ed., Supp. I), provides:

"No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or at-tempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or . . . urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote . . . ."

[*848] Those sections make clear beyond debate that, if the defendants' allegations are true, these state prosecutions themselves constitute a denial of "a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citi-zens." 12

12 Compare the language of ß 203 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U. S. C. ß 2000a-2 (1964 ed.), relied upon by the Court in Rachel as creating a right to be free from a wrongful prosecution: "No person shall . . . (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to in-timidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [the public accommodations sections], or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by [the public accommodations sections]."

The majority appears to distinguish this case from Rachel on the ground that in the latter case, the defendants were "authorized" by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enter a restaurant and re-ceive equal accommodation. In my judgment, that is a distinction without substance for pur-poses of ß 1443 (1). A person "is denied" rights which ß 1443 (1) protects when the very prosecu-tion of him is in violation of a federal statute as-suring equal civil rights. That is true whether the act for which he is being prosecuted is specifi-cally authorized by statute or, rather, is merely one of the innumerable acts which members of the community daily perform without either statutory authorization or police interference.

It must be apparent that the action by the Re-visers of 1874 in eliminating the previous provi-sion for post-trial removal is irrelevant to inter-pretation of the "is denied" clause. Even on the majority's own interpretation of the statute, where "any proceedings in the courts of the State will constitute a denial" of rights secured by a federal statute assuring equal civil rights, an appropriate basis will have been shown for a "firm predic-tion" of such denial. Georgia v. Rachel, ante, at 804.

B.

Defendants also allege that they "cannot enforce" in the courts of Greenwood, the locality in which their cases are to be tried, their equal civil rights. This, unlike a claim of present denial of rights, rests on prediction of the future performance of the state courts; as such, it ad-mittedly falls within the Rives-Powers doctrine. [*849] I agree with the majority that, in providing for appeal of remand orders in civil rights removal cases, Congress meant for us to reconsider that line of cases. 13 Unlike the majority, [***969] however, I believe that those cases, to the extent that they limit removal to instances where the inability to enforce equal civil rights springs from a state [**1824] statute or constitutional provision com-pelling the forbidden discrimination, should not be fol-lowed. 14 That construction of ß 1443 (1) resulted, I think, from a misreading of the removal provisions of the Act of 1866.

13 The irrationality of the Rives-Powers require-ment that removal be predicated on a facially un-constitutional statute was known to Congress when it amended the law to make possible appeal from an order remanding the case to the state court. As then-Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, put it: "The real problem at present is not a statute which is on its

face unconstitutional; it is the unconstitutional application of a statute. When a State statute has been unconstitutionally applied, most Federal dis-trict judges presently believe themselves bound by these old decisions . . . . Enactment of [the ap-peal provision] will give the appellate courts an opportunity to reexamine this question." 110 Cong. Rec. 6551 (1964). (Emphasis added.) Sim-ilar invitations to overrule the Rives-Powers line of cases were uttered by Senator Dodd (110 Cong. Rec. 6955-6956) and Congressman Kas-tenmeier (110 Cong. Rec. 2770) and it is fair to assume that Congress did not reinstate the right to appeal from a remand order merely to allow civil rights litigants the brutal luxury of an appeal, the inevitable outcome of which would be an affir-mance.14 The majority's view of the Rives-Powers doc-trine is none too clear. In Rachel, it dispenses with the broad statement of that doctrine that there be a facially unconstitutional state statute or constitutional provision, for it permits removal on a showing that a state statute is unconstitutional only in application to those seeking relief. The Court explains this by reliance on language in Rives which the Court thought warranted the con-clusion that in certain circumstances, removal might be justified even in the absence of a dis-criminatory state statute. In this case, however, the majority appears to adopt the whole sweep of the Rives-Powers doctrine, and makes the ab-sence of facially unconstitutional state action fa-tal to the petition for removal.

[*850] I think that the words "cannot enforce" should be construed in the spirit of 1866. Senator Lane speaking for the first Civil Rights Act said: 15

"The State courts already have jurisdiction of every single question that we propose to give to the courts of the United States. Why then the necessity of passing the law? Simply because we fear the execution of these laws if left to the State courts. That is the necessity for this provision."

15 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 602.

Senator Trumbull, who was the Chairman of the Ju-diciary Committee and who managed the bill on the floor, many times reflected the same view. He stated that the person discriminated against "should have au-thority to go into the Federal courts in all cases where a custom prevails in a State, or where there is a statute-law of the State discriminating against him." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1759.

It was not the existence of a statute, he said, any more than the existence of a custom discriminating against the person that would authorize removal, but whether, in either case, it was probable that the state court would fail adequately to enforce the federal guar-antees. Ibid.

The Black Codes were not the only target of this law. Vagrancy laws were another -- laws fair on their face which were enforced so as to reduce free men to slaves "in punishment of crimes of the slightest magni-tude" (Id., at 1123), laws which declare men "vagrants because they have no homes and because they have no employment" in order "to retain them still in a state of real servitude." Id., at 1151.

In my view, ß 1443 (1) requires the federal court to decide whether [***970] the defendant's allegation (that the state court will not fairly enforce his equal rights) is true. 16 [*851] If the defendant is unable to demonstrate this inability to enforce his rights, the case is remanded to the state court. But if the federal court is persuaded that the state court indeed will not make a good-faith ef-fort to apply the paramount federal law pertaining to "equal civil rights," then the federal court [**1825] must accept the removal and try the case on the merits.

16 In support of its contrary result, the Court cites the number of removal petitions filed in the year 1965. I am unaware of any relevance this figure has in the interpretation of a statute en-acted in 1866. Indeed, if any contemporary inci-dents are to provide guidance, I should think we would be aided by the debates and votes in Con-gress on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Opponents of the provision allowing appeals from a remand order warned of possible dilatory tactics and dis-ruptions of the judicial processes -- state and fed-eral -- which might result; this was virtually the only expressed basis of opposition to this pro-posed amendment. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 59, 67, 111-112 (mi-nority reports); 110 Cong. Rec. 2769-2784 (pas-sim) (House); id., at 13468, 13879 (Senate). Pro-posals to delete the appeal provision were deci-sively rejected, 118-76 in the House (id., at 2784) and in the Senate on two occasions, 51-31 (id., at 13468) and 66-25 (id., at 13879).

Such removal under the "cannot enforce" clause would occur only in the unusual case. The courts of the States generally try conscientiously to apply the law of the land. To be sure, state court judges have on occasion taken a different view of the law than that which this Court ultimately announced. But these honest differ-ences of opinion are not the sort of recalcitrance which

the "cannot enforce" clause contemplates. What Con-gress feared was the exceptional situation. It realized that considerable damage could be done by even a single court which harbored such hostility toward federally pro-tected civil rights as to render it unable to meet its re-sponsibilities. The "cannot enforce" clause is directed to that rare case.

Execution of the legislative mandate calls for partic-ular sensitivity on the part of federal district judges; but the delicacy of the task surely does not warrant a [*852] refusal to attempt it. I am confident that the federal dis-trict judges would exercise care and good judgment in passing on "cannot enforce" claims. A district judge could not lightly assume that the state court would shirk its responsibilities, and should remand the case to the state court unless it appeared by clear and convincing ev-idence that the allegations of an inability to enforce equal civil rights were true. Cf. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecu-tions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Fed-eral Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 854-863, 911-912 (1965). A requirement that defendants seeking re-moval demonstrate a basis for "firm prediction" of inabil-ity to enforce equal civil rights in the state court is the only necessary consequence of the revision of 1874 which silently deleted the provision for post-trial re-moval from the statute. In this way, the legitimate inter-ests of federalism which Rives sought to protect would be respected without emasculating this statute.

III.

The Court takes considerable comfort from the availability to defendants of numerous other federal remedies, such as direct review in this Court, federal habeas corpus, civil actions under 42 U. S. C. ß 1983 (1964 [***971] ed.), and even federal criminal prosecu-tions. But it is relevant to note when these alternative remedies were conferred. The extension of the habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners was enacted in 1867 by the Thirty-ninth Congress, the same body which enacted the removal statute we here consider. 14 Stat. 385. The criminal statutes involved in our recent decisions in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, were first enacted in 1866 and 1870. 14 Stat. 27; 16 Stat. 141, 144. The civil remedy provided by 42 U. S. C. ß 1983 was enacted in 1871. 17 Stat. 13. If any inference is to be [*853] drawn from the existence of these coordinate remedies, it is that Con-gress was concerned, at the time this removal statute was passed, to protect from state court denial the equal civil rights of United States citizens. Rather than take comfort from the broad array of possible remedies, we should take instruction from it.

Moreover, the Court's many rhetorical questions re-specting implementation of removal, if it were allowed, are answered in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271-272, a case decided the same day as Rives:

"The imaginary difficulties and incongruities sup-posed to be in the way of trying in the Circuit Court an indictment for an alleged offence against the peace and dignity of a State, if they were real, would be for the con-sideration of Congress. But they are unreal. While it is true there [**1826] is neither in sect. 643, nor in the act of which it is a re-enactment, any mode of procedure in the trial of a removed case prescribed, except that it is or-dered [that] the cause when removed shall proceed as a cause originally commenced in that court, yet the mode of trial is sufficiently obvious. The circuit courts of the United States have all the appliances which are needed for the trial of any criminal case. They adopt and apply the laws of the State in civil cases, and there is no more difficulty in administering the State's criminal law. They are not foreign courts. The Constitution has made them courts within the States to administer the laws of the States in certain cases; and, so long as they keep within the jurisdiction assigned to them, their general powers are adequate to the trial of any case. The supposed anomaly of prosecuting offenders against the peace and dignity of a State, in tribunals of the general government, grows entirely out of the division of powers between that government and the government [*854] of a State; that is, a division of sovereignty over certain matters. When this is understood (and it is time it should be), it will not appear strange that, even in cases of criminal prosecu-tions for alleged offences against a State, in which arises a defence under United States law, the general govern-ment should take cognizance of the case and try it in its own courts, according to its own forms of proceeding." (Emphasis added.)

IV.

The federal court in a removal case plainly must act with restraint. But to deny relief in the cases now before us is, in view of the allegations made, to aggravate a wrong by compelling these defendants to suffer the risk of an unwarranted trial and by allowing them to be held under improper charges and in prison, if the State de-sires, for an extended period pending trial. The risk that the state courts will not [***972] promptly dismiss the prosecutions was the congressional fear. The Court de-feats that purpose by giving a narrow, cramped meaning to ß 1443 (1). These defendants' federal civil rights may, of course, ultimately be vindicated if they persevere, live long enough, and have the patience and the funds to carry their cases for some years through the state courts to this Court. But it was precisely that burden that Con-

gress undertook to take off the backs of this persecuted minority and all who espouse the cause of their equality.

REFERENCESAnnotation References:

Anticipatory relief in federal courts against state criminal prosecutions growing out of civil rights activities. 8 ALR 3d 301.

Right to removal to federal courts in civil rights cases. 27 L ed 835.

Race discrimination. 94 L ed 1121, 96 L ed 1291, 98 L ed 882, 100 L ed 488, 3 L ed 2d 1556, 6 L ed 2d 1302, 10 L ed 2d 1105, 15 L ed 2d 990. See also 38 ALR2d 1188.

Copyright 2010 SHEPARD'S(R) - 651 Citing references

Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 16 L. Ed. 2d 944, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2811 (1966) Restrictions: Unrestricted FOCUS(TM) Terms: No FOCUS termsPrint Format: FULLCiting Ref. Signal: Hidden

SHEPARD'S SUMMARY

Unrestricted Shepard's SummaryNo subsequent appellate history. Prior history available.

Citing References:

Cautionary Analyses: Distinguished (4) Positive Analyses: Followed (79) Neutral Analyses: Concurring Opinion (4), Dissenting Op. (17), Explained (9) Other Sources: Law Reviews (88), Statutes (5), Treatises (9), Annotations (2), Court Documents (47) LexisNexis Headnotes: HN1 (1), HN2 (21), HN4 (3), HN5 (33), HN6 (308), HN7 (166), HN8 (191), HN9 (73),

HN10 (16), HN12 (1) PRIOR HISTORY ( 1 citing reference )

1. Peacock v. Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5161 (5th Cir. Miss. 1965)

Reversed by (CITATION YOU ENTERED):Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 16 L. Ed. 2d 944, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2811 (1966)

CITING DECISIONS ( 499 citing decisions )

U.S. SUPREME COURT

2. Cited by:Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 127 S. Ct. 2301, 168 L. Ed. 2d 42, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 7514, 75 U.S.L.W. 4412, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 343, 2007-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P75731 (2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

551 U.S. 142 p.151127 S. Ct. 2301 p.2307168 L. Ed. 2d 42 p.49

3. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 51 (1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9, HN10

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:448 U.S. 1 p.32100 S. Ct. 2502 p.2518100 S. Ct. 2502 p.251965 L. Ed. 2d 555 p.577

Cited by:448 U.S. 1 p.5100 S. Ct. 2502 p.250465 L. Ed. 2d 555 p.560

4. Distinguished by, Cited in Concurring Opinion at, Cited by:Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 101 (1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN9

Distinguished by:441 U.S. 600 p.64499 S. Ct. 1905 p.193060 L. Ed. 2d 508 p.539

Cited in Concurring Opinion at:441 U.S. 600 p.66099 S. Ct. 1905 p.193860 L. Ed. 2d 508 p.549


5. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 135 (1977)

433 U.S. 72 p.10697 S. Ct. 2497 p.251653 L. Ed. 2d 594 p.620

6. Cited by:Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 112, 1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1827 (1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

424 U.S. 693 p.69896 S. Ct. 1155 p.115947 L. Ed. 2d 405 p.412

7. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S. Ct. 584, 46 L. Ed. 2d 542, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 41 (1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:423 U.S. 336 p.36196 S. Ct. 584 p.59746 L. Ed. 2d 542 p.560

Cited by:

423 U.S. 336 p.34396 S. Ct. 584 p.58946 L. Ed. 2d 542 p.549

8. Followed by, Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 95 S. Ct. 1591, 44 L. Ed. 2d 121, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 59 (1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

Followed by:421 U.S. 213 p.21895 S. Ct. 1591 p.159495 S. Ct. 1591 p.159595 S. Ct. 1591 p.159695 S. Ct. 1591 p.159744 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.12644 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.12844 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.129

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:421 U.S. 213 p.22995 S. Ct. 1591 p.160095 S. Ct. 1591 p.160195 S. Ct. 1591 p.160244 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.13344 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.13444 L. Ed. 2d 121 p.136

Cited by:421 U.S. 213 p.21695 S. Ct. 1591 p.1599

9. Cited by:Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 94 S. Ct. 2167, 40 L. Ed. 2d 668, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 57 (1974)

417 U.S. 72 p.8294 S. Ct. 2167 p.217340 L. Ed. 2d 668 p.676

10. Cited by:O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 41 (1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN12

414 U.S. 488 p.50194 S. Ct. 669 p.67938 L. Ed. 2d 674 p.686

11. Cited by:Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 1583, 26 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 79, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257, 62 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P10902 (1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

398 U.S. 235 p.24790 S. Ct. 1583 p.159026 L. Ed. 2d 199 p.208

12. Cited by:Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S. Ct. 518, 24 L. Ed. 2d 549, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 3148 (1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

396 U.S. 320 p.33690 S. Ct. 518 p.52724 L. Ed. 2d 549 p.561

13. Cited by:Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 89 S. Ct. 414, 21 L. Ed. 2d 402, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1 (1968)

393 U.S. 233 p.24289 S. Ct. 414 p.41921 L. Ed. 2d 402 p.409

14. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S. Ct. 1335, 20 L. Ed. 2d 182, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1879 (1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN9



15. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2791 (1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

386 U.S. 547 p.56787 S. Ct. 1213 p.122418 L. Ed. 2d 288 p.302

16. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Wallace v. Virginia, 384 U.S. 891, 86 S. Ct. 1916, 16 L. Ed. 2d 996, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1142 (1966)

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:384 U.S. 891 p.89186 S. Ct. 1916 p.1917

Cited by:384 U.S. 891 p.89186 S. Ct. 1916 p.1916

17. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Baines v. Danville, 384 U.S. 890, 86 S. Ct. 1915, 16 L. Ed. 2d 996, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1141 (1966)



18. Cited by:Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 16 L. Ed. 2d 925, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2810 (1966)

384 U.S. 780 p.786384 U.S. 780 p.80686 S. Ct. 1783 p.178686 S. Ct. 1783 p.180016 L. Ed. 2d 925 p.93016 L. Ed. 2d 925 p.943

1ST CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS

19. Cited by:Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 7970 (1st Cir. N.H. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

498 F.2d 1261 p.1263

20. Cited by:Fosdick v. Dunwoody, 420 F.2d 1140, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11036 (1st Cir. Mass. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

420 F.2d 1140 p.1142

21. Cited by:Denman v. County of Barnstable, 404 F.2d 64, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4636 (1st Cir. Mass. 1968)

404 F.2d 64 p.64

22. Cited by:Ronan v. Stone, 396 F.2d 502, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6650 (1st Cir. Mass. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7

396 F.2d 502 p.503

23. Cited by:Zigmond v. Selective Service Local Board, 396 F.2d 290, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6884 (1st Cir. Mass. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

396 F.2d 290 p.292

1ST CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

24. Cited by:Southwest Boston Senior Services, Inc. v. Whatley (In re Whatley), 396 F. Supp. 2d 50, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24848 (D. Mass. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

396 F. Supp. 2d 50 p.55

25. Cited by:Whitted v. City of Manchester, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 382 (D.N.H. Jan. 10, 1995) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5

26. Cited by:

MASSACHUSETTS v. ANTELMAN, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13255 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1980)

27. Cited by:Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. v. White, 495 F. Supp. 220, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9274, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P31204, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 883 (D. Mass. 1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

495 F. Supp. 220 p.221

28. Cited by:Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15494 (D.R.I. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

458 F. Supp. 610 p.615

29. Cited by:Lund v. Affleck, 442 F. Supp. 1109, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12451 (D.R.I. 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

442 F. Supp. 1109 p.1113

30. Cited by:Giguere v. Affleck, 370 F. Supp. 154, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12554 (D.R.I. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9, HN10

370 F. Supp. 154 p.157

2ND CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS

31. Explained by, Cited by:Emigrant Sav. Bank v. Elan Management Corp., 668 F.2d 671, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22662 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1982) LexisNexis Headnotes HN4, HN6, HN8

Explained by:668 F.2d 671 p.674

Cited by:668 F.2d 671 p.673

32. Cited by:State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baasch, 644 F.2d 94, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19312 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1981) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

644 F.2d 94 p.97

33. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:White v. Wellington, 627 F.2d 582, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16016, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P31056, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 262, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1252 (2d Cir. Conn. 1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:627 F.2d 582 p.592

Cited by:627 F.2d 582 p.585

34. Cited by:Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 6652, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 771 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5

453 F.2d 1075 p.1082

35. Followed by:New York v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10514 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7

424 F.2d 697 p.698424 F.2d 697 p.700

36. Cited by:New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 13039 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN4, HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

411 F.2d 750 p.751411 F.2d 750 p.753411 F.2d 750 p.754411 F.2d 750 p.755

37. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4339 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN1

409 F.2d 121 p.128

38. Cited by:Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d 1, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4153 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

370 F.2d 1 p.3370 F.2d 1 p.5

39. Cited by:United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4709 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1966)

367 F.2d 72 p.82

2ND CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

40. Cited by:State v. Parks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93812 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93812

41. Cited by:

New York v. Redman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103306 (N.D.N.Y Dec. 22, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103306

42. Explained by:Vill. of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76881 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


43. Cited by:New York v. Leslie, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49837 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


44. Cited by:New Haven Firefighters Local 825 v. City of New Haven, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21098 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2004)


45. Cited by:Negron v. New York, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8775 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002)


46. Cited by:New York v. Camprubi Soms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8199 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2001) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


47. Cited by:Wallace v. Wiedenbeck, 985 F. Supp. 288, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175 (N.D.N.Y 1998) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

985 F. Supp. 288 p.291

48. Cited by:New York City Sch. Constr. Auth. v. Bedell Assocs., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15597 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

49. Cited by:

Lynch v. Campbell, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19981 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 9, 1996) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

50. Cited by:Pan Atl. Group v. Republic Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 630, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

878 F. Supp. 630 p.644

51. Cited by:Hodges v. Demchuk, 866 F. Supp. 730, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11935 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) LexisNexis

Headnotes HN9866 F. Supp. 730 p.733

52. Followed by, Cited by:Water's Edge Habitat v. Pulipati, 837 F. Supp. 501, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13810 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

Followed by:837 F. Supp. 501 p.505

Cited by:837 F. Supp. 501 p.506

53. Distinguished by:Carr v. Axelrod, 798 F. Supp. 168, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10582 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

798 F. Supp. 168 p.173

54. Cited by:Wolpoff v. Cuomo, 792 F. Supp. 964, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7636 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

792 F. Supp. 964 p.967

55. Cited by:Wachtler v. Cuomo, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17069 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 21, 1991) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6

56. Cited by:

Brody v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19130 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 1989) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


57. Cited by:New York v. Simithis, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5439 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1988) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

58. Cited by:

Christiano v. Shapiro, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1987) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

59. Cited by:

People v. Foster, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1987) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN9

60. Cited by:New York v. Mitchell, 637 F. Supp. 1100, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23634 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

637 F. Supp. 1100 p.1102637 F. Supp. 1100 p.1103

61. Cited by:

Port Chester v. Port Chester Yacht Club, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 663, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21810 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

598 F. Supp. 663 p.665

62. Cited by:Quirk v. New York Office of Court Admin., 549 F. Supp. 1236, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15786 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

549 F. Supp. 1236 p.1239

63. Cited by:Prominence Realty Corp. v. Mal Restaurant, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1180, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12401 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

538 F. Supp. 1180 p.1183

64. Cited by:Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A., 87 F.R.D. 739, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17252, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P31296, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

87 F.R.D. 739 p.740

65. Cited by:Whitestone Sav. & Loan Asso. v. Romano, 484 F. Supp. 1324, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10264 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)

484 F. Supp. 1324 p.1326

66. Cited by:Little Ferry Associates v. Diaz, 484 F. Supp. 890, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10498 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

484 F. Supp. 890 p.892

67. Cited by:Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Board of Education, 477 F. Supp. 691, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9375 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

477 F. Supp. 691 p.693

68. Cited by:Armeno v. Bridgeport Civil Service Com., 446 F. Supp. 553, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19836, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 111 (D. Conn. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

446 F. Supp. 553 p.556

69. Cited by:New York v. Muka, 440 F. Supp. 33, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12960 (N.D.N.Y 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

440 F. Supp. 33 p.36

70. Cited by:Martropico Compania Naviera S. A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara

(Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16795 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

428 F. Supp. 1035 p.1037

71. Cited by:Sanchez v. Sanchez, 424 F. Supp. 451, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

424 F. Supp. 451 p.453

72. Explained by, Cited in Concurring Opinion at, Cited by:Bridgeport Education Asso. v. Zinner, 415 F. Supp. 715, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14731, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 253 (D. Conn. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN7, HN8

Explained by:415 F. Supp. 715 p.723

Cited in Concurring Opinion at:415 F. Supp. 715 p.724415 F. Supp. 715 p.725415 F. Supp. 715 p.726

Cited by:415 F. Supp. 715 p.719415 F. Supp. 715 p.720

73. Cited by:New York v. Jenkins, 422 F. Supp. 412, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12682 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7, HN8, HN9

422 F. Supp. 412 p.415422 F. Supp. 412 p.416

74. Cited by:New York v. Kakawana, 407 F. Supp. 411, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16884 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

407 F. Supp. 411 p.413

75. Cited by:Godoy v. Gullotta, 406 F. Supp. 692, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14686 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

406 F. Supp. 692 p.694

76. Cited by:In re Bogart, 386 F. Supp. 126, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11844 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN10

386 F. Supp. 126 p.130

77. Cited by:Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13085, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1586 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

331 F. Supp. 945 p.949

78. Cited by:New York v. Konigsberg, 305 F. Supp. 1201, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10120 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

305 F. Supp. 1201 p.1202

79. Cited by:Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 305 F. Supp. 863, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10084 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

305 F. Supp. 863 p.866

80. Cited by:Connecticut v. Ingram, 300 F. Supp. 1153, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8487 (D. Conn. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

300 F. Supp. 1153 p.1155300 F. Supp. 1153 p.1156

81. Cited by:Baker v. New York, 299 F. Supp. 1265, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12610 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

299 F. Supp. 1265 p.1267

82. Cited by:Gadsden v. Silberglitt, 299 F. Supp. 1236, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8613 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

299 F. Supp. 1236 p.1238

83. Cited by:Samuels v. Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9421 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

288 F. Supp. 348 p.355

84. Cited by:United States ex rel. Perkins v. Noble, 287 F. Supp. 365, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

85. Cited by:

Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7532 (D. Conn. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

261 F. Supp. 110 p.116

86. Cited by:Stevens v. Frick, 259 F. Supp. 654, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7433 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

259 F. Supp. 654 p.657

3RD CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS

87. Cited by:Conspirators v. Vora, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24513 (3d Cir. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24513

88. Cited by:Conspirators v. Vora, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20935 (3d Cir. Pa. Sept. 21, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20935

89. Cited by:COP of Johnstown Police Dep't v. Vora, 322 Fed. Appx. 90, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7887 (3d Cir. Pa. 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

322 Fed. Appx. 90 p.91

90. Followed by:BMV Killinger v. Vora, 321 Fed. Appx. 106, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7491 (3d Cir. Pa. 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

321 Fed. Appx. 106 p.108

91. Cited by:Italian Origin Cop v. Vora, 309 Fed. Appx. 540, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2544 (3d Cir. Pa. 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

309 Fed. Appx. 540 p.541

92. Cited by:Christ v. Vora, 294 Fed. Appx. 752, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21038 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

294 Fed. Appx. 752 p.753

93. Cited by:Kanuch v. Vora, 264 Fed. Appx. 153, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3034 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

264 Fed. Appx. 153 p.154

94. Cited by:Janciga v. Vora, 257 Fed. Appx. 530, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28353 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

257 Fed. Appx. 530 p.531

95. Cited by:Killinger v. Vora, 252 Fed. Appx. 448, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24391 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

252 Fed. Appx. 448 p.449

96. Cited by:Janciga v. Vora, 243 Fed. Appx. 734, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18310 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

243 Fed. Appx. 734 p.735

97. Cited by:City of Johnstown Police Dep't v. Vora, 243 Fed. Appx. 733, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18308 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

243 Fed. Appx. 733 p.734

98. Cited by:Clearfield Borough Police Dep't v. Vora, 243 Fed. Appx. 726, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18433 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

243 Fed. Appx. 726 p.728

99. Cited by:Killinger v. Vora, 243 Fed. Appx. 725, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18432 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

243 Fed. Appx. 725 p.726

100. Cited by:Janciga v. Vora, 238 Fed. Appx. 760, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13861 (3d Cir. Pa. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

238 Fed. Appx. 760 p.761

101. Followed by:Pennsylvania v. Vora, 205 Fed. Appx. 953, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27493 (3d Cir. Pa. 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

205 Fed. Appx. 953 p.955

102. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Vora, 204 Fed. Appx. 134, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25553 (3d Cir. Pa. 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

204 Fed. Appx. 134 p.136

103. Cited by:Hudson United Bank v. Litenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7446 (3d Cir. N.J. 1998) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

142 F.3d 151 p.156

104. Followed by, Explained by:Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696 (3d Cir. Pa. 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

Followed by:107 F.3d 1044 p.1045

Explained by:107 F.3d 1044 p.1048107 F.3d 1044 p.1049

105. Cited by:Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 83 (3d Cir. Pa. 1995) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

44 F.3d 209 p.214

106. Cited by:In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16156 (3d Cir. 1991) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

940 F.2d 832 p.860

107. Cited by:Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9722, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P8576, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (3d Cir. Pa. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

584 F.2d 1235 p.1250584 F.2d 1235 p.1251

108. Cited by:Pennsylvania ex rel. Gittman v. Gittman, 451 F.2d 155, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7195 (3d Cir. Pa. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

451 F.2d 155 p.156

109. Cited by:Pennsylvania ex rel. Rothenberg v. Beers, 450 F.2d 783, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7292 (3d Cir. Pa. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

450 F.2d 783 p.784

110. Followed by:Hill v. Pennsylvania, 439 F.2d 1016, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11286, 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P8258 (3d Cir. Pa. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

439 F.2d 1016 p.1019439 F.2d 1016 p.1020439 F.2d 1016 p.1021

111. Cited by:Stevens v. Frick, 372 F.2d 378, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7578 (3d Cir. Pa. 1967)

372 F.2d 378 p.382

112. Cited by:In re Frankel, 362 F.2d 1013, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5419 (3d Cir. N.J. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

362 F.2d 1013 p.1013

3RD CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

113. Followed by:Estate of Casimir v. New Jersey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78113 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


114. Cited by:Meyers v. Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76007 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


115. Cited by:Delaware v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 2d 475, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63334 (D. Del. 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

644 F. Supp. 2d 475 p.478

116. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Tindell, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54582 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


117. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Arsad, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104041 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104041

118. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Plummer, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110028 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110028

119. Followed by:Piskanin v. Banach, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101544 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101544

120. Followed by:Commonwealth v. Mu-El, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98847 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


121. Cited by:J & J Mobile Home Park v. Thomas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32158 (D. Del. Apr. 16, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


122. Cited by:

In re Weddington, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19321 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN102008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19321

123. Cited by:Rickards v. E. Shore Chicken Farm LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28843 (D. Del. Apr. 19, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


124. Cited by:Delaware v. Parker, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11970 (D. Del. Feb. 20, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


125. Followed by:Morganelli v. Yeager, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1796 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN9


126. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Lucabaugh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23491 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9


127. Cited by:Logan v. Harris, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7233 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


128. Cited by:Feldman v. Gueson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6728 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2000) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8, HN9


129. Cited by:First Union Nat'l Bank by & Through Breen Capital Servs. Corp. v. Frempong, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8528 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


130. Cited by:Townline Assocs. v. Turner, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16830 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1998) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


131. Followed by, Cited by:Davis v. Glanton, 921 F. Supp. 1421, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4025 (E.D. Pa. 1996) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

Followed by:

921 F. Supp. 1421 p.1423

Cited by:921 F. Supp. 1421 p.1424

132. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Carter, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 490 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1990) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

133. Cited by:

PENNSYLVANIA v. BROWN, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27142 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

134. Cited by:

PENNSYLVANIA ex rel. BELL v. PENNSYLVANIA, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28241 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

135. Cited by:

THOMAS v. GOODE, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13672 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1985) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

136. Cited by:McQuilken v. A & R Dev. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 1023, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11133 (E.D. Pa. 1983) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

576 F. Supp. 1023 p.1027

137. Followed by, Cited by:Wright v. London Grove Township, 567 F. Supp. 768, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16537 (E.D. Pa. 1983) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

Followed by:567 F. Supp. 768 p.771


138. Explained by:McQuilken v. A&R Dev. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 797, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11277 (E.D. Pa. 1981) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6

510 F. Supp. 797 p.800510 F. Supp. 797 p.801

139. Cited by:Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15209, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 702 (D.N.J. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

404 F. Supp. 815 p.824

140. Cited by:Sole v. Grand Jurors of New Jersey, 393 F. Supp. 1322, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12517 (D.N.J. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

393 F. Supp. 1322 p.1331

141. Cited by:Chesimard v. Kuhlthau, 370 F. Supp. 473, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12349 (D.N.J. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

370 F. Supp. 473 p.476370 F. Supp. 473 p.477

142. Cited by:Comprehensive Group Health Services Board of Directors v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of Higher Education, 363 F. Supp. 1069, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368 (E.D. Pa. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9, HN10

363 F. Supp. 1069 p.1096

143. Followed by:Pennsylvania v. Bradshaw, 361 F. Supp. 405, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13030 (W.D. Pa. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8, HN9

361 F. Supp. 405 p.407361 F. Supp. 405 p.408361 F. Supp. 405 p.409

144. Cited by:Revty v. Pennsylvania, 358 F. Supp. 258, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443 (W.D. Pa. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

358 F. Supp. 258 p.259

145. Followed by:Housing Authority of Newark v. Henry, 334 F. Supp. 490, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10723 (D.N.J. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

334 F. Supp. 490 p.495334 F. Supp. 490 p.497334 F. Supp. 490 p.498334 F. Supp. 490 p.499

146. Cited by:Wilmington v. Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1035, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15077 (D. Del. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

320 F. Supp. 1035 p.1036320 F. Supp. 1035 p.1038

147. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Leonard, 315 F. Supp. 215, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10904 (W.D. Pa. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7


148. Followed by:Pennsylvania v. Civill, 313 F. Supp. 1318, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11305 (W.D. Pa. 1970) LexisNexis

Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8313 F. Supp. 1318 p.1320313 F. Supp. 1318 p.1321

149. Followed by:Pennsylvania v. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 1159, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11413 (W.D. Pa. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7

313 F. Supp. 1159 p.1160313 F. Supp. 1159 p.1161

150. Cited by:Pennsylvania v. Powers, 311 F. Supp. 1219, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12280 (E.D. Pa. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

311 F. Supp. 1219 p.1221

151. Cited by:National Land & Inv. Co. v. Specter, 304 F. Supp. 1004, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9434 (E.D. Pa. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

304 F. Supp. 1004 p.1010

152. Cited by:Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp. 281, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8407 (E.D. Pa. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN7

300 F. Supp. 281 p.290

153. Cited by:Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8316 (E.D. Pa. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

281 F. Supp. 720 p.736

154. Cited by:United States ex rel. Jordan v. Montgomery County Court, 277 F. Supp. 24, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446 (E.D. Pa. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

277 F. Supp. 24 p.25

155. Cited by:Commonwealth ex rel. Arnold v. Hendricks, 272 F. Supp. 957, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7123 (E.D. Pa. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

272 F. Supp. 957 p.960

4TH CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS

156. Cited by:South Carolina v. Grace, 234 Fed. Appx. 103, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16784 (4th Cir. S.C. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

234 Fed. Appx. 103 p.104

157. Cited by:Virginia v. Banks, 120 Fed. Appx. 973, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1779 (4th Cir. Va. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

120 Fed. Appx. 973 p.973

158. Cited by:Green v. Vickery, 108 Fed. Appx. 86, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17889 (4th Cir. N.C. 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN8

108 Fed. Appx. 86 p.86

159. Cited by:Crawford v. Maryland, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24711 (4th Cir. Md. Sept. 24, 1993) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

160. Cited by:

Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 9822 (4th Cir. S.C. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

581 F.2d 399 p.403

161. Followed by, Cited by:Noel v. McCain, 538 F.2d 633, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7714 (4th Cir. S.C. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


Cited by:538 F.2d 633 p.636

162. Explained by:Delavigne v. Delavigne, 530 F.2d 598, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 13148 (4th Cir. Md. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

530 F.2d 598 p.600

163. Cited by:Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6437 (4th Cir. N.C. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN9, HN10

505 F.2d 830 p.834

164. Followed by, Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Frinks v. North Carolina, 468 F.2d 639, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7301 (4th Cir. N.C. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

Followed by:468 F.2d 639 p.642468 F.2d 639 p.643


165. Cited by:North Carolina v. Grant, 452 F.2d 780, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11949 (4th Cir. N.C. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

452 F.2d 780 p.782

166. Followed by:South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8169 (4th Cir. S.C. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

447 F.2d 1067 p.1070

167. Cited by:Maryland v. Brown, 426 F.2d 809, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9564 (4th Cir. Md. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5

426 F.2d 809 p.810

168. Followed by:Wansley v. Virginia, 368 F.2d 71, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4520 (4th Cir. Va. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

368 F.2d 71 p.74

169. Cited by:Virginia v. Jones, 367 F.2d 154, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4885 (4th Cir. Va. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

367 F.2d 154 p.155

170. Cited by:North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5164 (4th Cir. N.C. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6

365 F.2d 559 p.560365 F.2d 559 p.562

4TH CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

171. Cited by:Maryland v. White, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4883 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 2010)


172. Cited by:Maryland v. White, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120023 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120023

173. Cited by:Stepheny v. Baker, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109303 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109303

174. Cited by:Dugas v. Hanover County Circuit Court, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67644 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


175. Followed by:Brum v. County of Wood, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58786 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


176. Cited by:Linden v. Wilbanks, 128 F. Supp. 2d 900, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19554 (D.S.C. 2000) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

128 F. Supp. 2d 900 p.903

177. Cited by:Frazier v. North Carolina State Bar, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9731 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


178. Cited by:South Carolina v. Lindsey, 741 F. Supp. 1217, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8491 (D.S.C. 1990) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

741 F. Supp. 1217 p.1218

179. Cited by:Cavanagh v. Brock, 577 F. Supp. 176, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13546 (E.D.N.C. 1983) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN7

577 F. Supp. 176 p.180

180. Cited by:Osborne v. Osborne, 554 F. Supp. 566, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16847 (D. Md. 1982) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

554 F. Supp. 566 p.568

181. Cited by:Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11869 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

492 F. Supp. 1294 p.1300

182. Explained by:Folts v. Richmond, 480 F. Supp. 621, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8752 (E.D. Va. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6

480 F. Supp. 621 p.626

183. Cited by:Winston-Salem v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union, 470 F. Supp. 442, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13052, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338 (M.D.N.C. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7, HN8

470 F. Supp. 442 p.446

184. Cited by:Delavigne v. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp. 363, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15780 (D. Md. 1975)

402 F. Supp. 363 p.367

185. Cited in Concurring Opinion at, Cited by:Bar Asso. of Baltimore City v. Posner, 391 F. Supp. 76, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14505 (D. Md. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

Cited in Concurring Opinion at:391 F. Supp. 76 p.84

Cited by:391 F. Supp. 76 p.79391 F. Supp. 76 p.80391 F. Supp. 76 p.81391 F. Supp. 76 p.82391 F. Supp. 76 p.83

186. Cited by:Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F. Supp. 1298, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13514 (D. Md. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

373 F. Supp. 1298 p.1299

187. Cited by:West Virginia State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13275 (S.D. W. Va. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

351 F. Supp. 1118 p.1122

188. Cited by:Frinks v. North Carolina, 333 F. Supp. 169, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11021 (E.D.N.C. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

333 F. Supp. 169 p.170

189. Cited by:Turco v. Maryland, 324 F. Supp. 61, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14363 (D. Md. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

324 F. Supp. 61 p.68

190. Cited by:Maryland v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 1164, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11987 (D. Md. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN8

311 F. Supp. 1164 p.1165311 F. Supp. 1164 p.1167

191. Cited by:Schoen v. Sulton, 297 F. Supp. 538, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101 (D. Md. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


192. Cited by:Naimaster v. NAACP, 296 F. Supp. 1277, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10498 (D. Md. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


193. Cited by:Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10515 (D. Md. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9


194. Cited by:Norton v. Ensor, 269 F. Supp. 533, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8784 (D. Md. 1967)

269 F. Supp. 533 p.539

195. Cited by:Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7327 (W.D. Va. 1967)

263 F. Supp. 54 p.56

196. Followed by:Richburg v. South Carolina, 257 F. Supp. 468, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800 (D.S.C. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

257 F. Supp. 468 p.470


197. Cited by:Robertson v. Louisiana, 246 Fed. Appx. 267, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20107 (5th Cir. La. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

246 Fed. Appx. 267 p.268

198. Cited by:Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Ratcliff, 229 Fed. Appx. 348, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12922 (5th Cir. Tex. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

229 Fed. Appx. 348 p.349

199. Cited by:Charter Sch. of Pine Grove, Inc. v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 417 F.3d 444, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14101 (5th Cir. La. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

417 F.3d 444 p.446

200. Cited by:United States v. Drew, 134 Fed. Appx. 753, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12036 (5th Cir. Tex. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

134 Fed. Appx. 753 p.754

201. Cited by:Butler v. King, 781 F.2d 486, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21521 (5th Cir. La. 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

781 F.2d 486 p.489

202. Cited by:Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25384, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P35775, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 987 (5th Cir. Tex. 1985) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

778 F.2d 216 p.219778 F.2d 216 p.222

203. Cited by:Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 16049 (5th Cir. Miss. 1983) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

717 F.2d 191 p.194

204. Cited by:Texas v. Reimer, 678 F.2d 1232, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18410 (5th Cir. Tex. 1982)

678 F.2d 1232 p.1233

205. Cited by:Texas v. Reimer (5th Cir. June 14, 1982)

206. Cited by:

Williams v. Mississippi, 608 F.2d 1021, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 9387 (5th Cir. Miss. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

207. Cited by:

Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14550 (5th Cir. Miss. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9

595 F.2d 291 p.298

208. Cited by:Robertson v. Ball, 534 F.2d 63, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8377 (5th Cir. Tex. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

534 F.2d 63 p.66

209. Cited by:Bell v. Taylor, 509 F.2d 808, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15630 (5th Cir. Tex. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

509 F.2d 808 p.809

210. Cited by:Johnson v. Mississippi, 488 F.2d 284, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10583 (5th Cir. Miss. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

488 F.2d 284 p.286

211. Cited by:Harris v. Houston, 476 F.2d 283, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10846 (5th Cir. Tex. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

476 F.2d 283 p.284

212. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Perkins v. Mississippi, 470 F.2d 1371, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6185 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7


Cited by:470 F.2d 1371 p.1371

213. Cited by:Williams v. Nichols, 464 F.2d 563, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8090 (5th Cir. Tex. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

464 F.2d 563 p.564

214. Cited by:Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9771 (5th Cir. Ga. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

459 F.2d 919 p.925

215. Followed by, Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11823 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN4, HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

Followed by:455 F.2d 7 p.8455 F.2d 7 p.11

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:455 F.2d 7 p.12455 F.2d 7 p.13455 F.2d 7 p.22455 F.2d 7 p.23455 F.2d 7 p.26455 F.2d 7 p.27455 F.2d 7 p.30

455 F.2d 7 p.34455 F.2d 7 p.38

216. Followed by:Georgia v. Loveless, 454 F.2d 1209, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11490 (5th Cir. Ga. 1972)

454 F.2d 1209 p.1209

217. Cited by:Florida--Vanderbilt Development Corp. v. Matthews, 454 F.2d 194, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11692 (5th Cir. Fla. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

454 F.2d 194 p.195

218. Cited by:Williams v. Tri--County Community Center, 452 F.2d 221, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

452 F.2d 221 p.222452 F.2d 221 p.223

219. Cited by:Lowe v. Warden & Comm'r of Holman Prison Unit, etc., 450 F.2d 9, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7478 (5th Cir. Ala. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

450 F.2d 9 p.11

220. Cited by:Varney v. Georgia, 446 F.2d 1368, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8507 (5th Cir. Ga. 1971)

446 F.2d 1368 p.1369

221. Cited by:Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Howze, 445 F.2d 586, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9432 (5th Cir. La. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

445 F.2d 586 p.587

222. Followed by:Alabama v. Buckingham, 437 F.2d 116, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 12350 (5th Cir. Ala. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

437 F.2d 116 p.118

223. Cited by:Thompson v. Brown, 434 F.2d 1092, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6534, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 482 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

434 F.2d 1092 p.1095

224. Cited by:Boring v. Mississippi, 431 F.2d 484, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7195 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

431 F.2d 484 p.484

225. Followed by:Georgia v. Birdsong, 428 F.2d 1223, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8789 (5th Cir. Ga. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

428 F.2d 1223 p.1224428 F.2d 1223 p.1225

226. Cited by:Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10490, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P10166, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 356, 62 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P9395 (5th Cir. Fla. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9, HN10

417 F.2d 569 p.579

227. Cited by:Miller v. Wade, 420 F.2d 489, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9639 (5th Cir. Tex. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

420 F.2d 489 p.490

228. Cited by:Louisiana v. Rouselle, 418 F.2d 873, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10165 (5th Cir. La. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

418 F.2d 873 p.874

229. Followed by, Cited by:Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10632 (5th Cir. Ga. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


Cited by:417 F.2d 5 p.9

230. Cited by:Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 11225 (5th Cir. Fla. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

416 F.2d 1012 p.1014

231. Cited by:Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12076, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P10028, 60 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P9270 (5th Cir. Miss. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

414 F.2d 283 p.290

232. Cited by:Wright v. Montgomery, 406 F.2d 867, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9193 (5th Cir. Ala. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

406 F.2d 867 p.869

233. Cited by:Walker v. Georgia, 405 F.2d 1191, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9467 (5th Cir. Ga. 1969)

405 F.2d 1191 p.1192

234. Cited by:McClanahan v. Louisiana, 399 F.2d 695, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6183 (5th Cir. La. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN7

399 F.2d 695 p.695

235. Cited in Concurring Opinion at, Cited by:Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 399 F.2d 529, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5811 (5th Cir. Ala. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

Cited in Concurring Opinion at:399 F.2d 529 p.530

Cited by:399 F.2d 529 p.532

236. Followed by:Davis v. Alabama, 399 F.2d 527, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5893 (5th Cir. Ala. 1968)

399 F.2d 527 p.528399 F.2d 527 p.529

237. Distinguished by:Whatley v. Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6146 (5th Cir. La. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN9

399 F.2d 521 p.521399 F.2d 521 p.522399 F.2d 521 p.526

238. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 8178 (5th Cir. Miss. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:393 F.2d 468 p.475393 F.2d 468 p.476393 F.2d 468 p.477

Cited by:393 F.2d 468 p.469

239. Cited by:Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 7980 (5th Cir. Tex. 1968)

392 F.2d 532 p.535

240. Cited by:Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4742 (5th Cir. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes

HN6, HN7394 F.2d 927 p.928

241. Followed by:Orange v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 829, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4447 (5th Cir. Ala. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

386 F.2d 829 p.830

242. Cited by:United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4859 (5th Cir. Ala. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

385 F.2d 734 p.747

243. Cited by:United States v. Holmes County, 385 F.2d 145, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4773 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967)

385 F.2d 145 p.149

244. Cited by:Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee v. Smith, 382 F.2d 9, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5270 (5th Cir. Ga. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

382 F.2d 9 p.10

245. Cited by:Bass v. Mississippi, 381 F.2d 692, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5438 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

381 F.2d 692 p.693

246. Cited by:Gamble v. Dublin, Georgia, 375 F.2d 1013, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6647 (5th Cir. Ga. 1967)

375 F.2d 1013 p.1013

247. Followed by:Sunflower County Colored Baptist Asso. v. Trustees of Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 369 F.2d 795, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4183 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN8

369 F.2d 795 p.796

248. Cited by:Carmichael v. Greenwood, 369 F.2d 698, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4541 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

369 F.2d 698 p.698

249. Followed by:Hartfield v. Mississippi, 367 F.2d 362, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4740 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966)

367 F.2d 362 p.363

250. Followed by:Boynton v. Alabama, 366 F.2d 511, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4888 (5th Cir. Ala. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

366 F.2d 511 p.512

251. Followed by:Chinn v. Mississippi, 364 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966)

364 F.2d 829 p.829

252. Followed by:Trapp v. Mississippi, 363 F.2d 880, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5299 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 880 p.880

253. Followed by:Miller v. Mississippi, 363 F.2d 878, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5237 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 878 p.879

254. Followed by:Means v. Alabama, 363 F.2d 877, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5570 (5th Cir. Ala. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 877 p.877

255. Followed by:Cox v. Louisiana, 363 F.2d 877, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5215 (5th Cir. La. 1966)

363 F.2d 877 p.878

256. Followed by:Hexter v. Drew, 363 F.2d 874, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5321 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 874 p.874

257. Followed by:Crawford v. Mississippi, 363 F.2d 874, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5297 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 874 p.874

258. Followed by:Jackson v. Louisiana, 363 F.2d 874, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5214 (5th Cir. La. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

363 F.2d 874 p.874363 F.2d 874 p.875

259. Followed by:Collins v. Jackson, 363 F.2d 873, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5296 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes

HN6, HN7363 F.2d 873 p.873

260. Cited by:Dunlap v. Vicksburg, 363 F.2d 873, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5320 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

261. Followed by:

Hartfield v. Mississippi, 363 F.2d 869, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5403 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966)363 F.2d 869 p.870

262. Cited by:Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5356 (5th Cir. Ala. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

363 F.2d 862 p.864

263. Cited by:Archie v. Mississippi, 362 F.2d 1012, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5571 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

362 F.2d 1012 p.1012

264. Cited by:Catchings v. Jackson, 362 F.2d 265, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5730 (5th Cir. Miss. 1966)

362 F.2d 265 p.265


265. Cited by:Louisiana v. Nelson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103481 (M.D. La. Oct. 14, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103481

266. Cited by:Ross v. White, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100344 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100344

267. Cited by:Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline v. Neely, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27138 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


268. Cited by:Tex. Dep't of Protective v. Mitchell-Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91023 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


269. Followed by:Sandifer v. City of Jackson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18897 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 16, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


270. Followed by:David & Taylor Custom Pools, Inc. v. Davis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9387 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


271. Cited by:Williams v. 363rd Judicial Dist. Court, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8735 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2003) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9


272. Cited by:Clark v. Tex., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1038 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2003) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9


273. Cited by:Louisiana v. Geason, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079 (E.D. La. June 14, 2000) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


274. Cited by:Louisiana v. Ambrose, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18141 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


275. Cited by:Quitman Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Enterprise Sch. Dist., 105 F. Supp. 2d 545, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22035 (S.D. Miss. 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

105 F. Supp. 2d 545 p.548

276. Cited by:Jackson v. Riddell, 476 F. Supp. 849, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10073 (N.D. Miss. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

476 F. Supp. 849 p.858

277. Cited by:W. v. Louisiana, 429 F. Supp. 711, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17528 (E.D. La. 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

429 F. Supp. 711 p.713

278. Explained by:Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16946, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P10750, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 230 (S.D. Tex. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

408 F. Supp. 916 p.927

279. Cited by:Louisiana v. London, 335 F. Supp. 585, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10172 (E.D. La. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

335 F. Supp. 585 p.588

280. Cited by:Louisiana v. Perkins, 335 F. Supp. 366, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10171 (E.D. La. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

335 F. Supp. 366 p.369

281. Cited by:Papen v. Bunkie, 323 F. Supp. 535, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14688 (W.D. La. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

323 F. Supp. 535 p.537

282. Cited by:Williams v. Tri-County Community Center, 323 F. Supp. 286, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14935 (S.D. Miss. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

323 F. Supp. 286 p.288323 F. Supp. 286 p.290

283. Cited by:Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9812 (E.D. La. 1970)

321 F. Supp. 181 p.185

284. Cited by:Nuccio v. Heyd, 299 F. Supp. 939, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8598 (E.D. La. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

299 F. Supp. 939 p.941

285. Cited by:Ratcliff v. Texas, 296 F. Supp. 370, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10435 (S.D. Tex. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

296 F. Supp. 370 p.371296 F. Supp. 370 p.372

286. Cited by:Shaffer v. Bridges, 295 F. Supp. 869, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8348 (S.D. Miss. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

295 F. Supp. 869 p.871

287. Cited by:Shaw v. Garrison, 293 F. Supp. 937, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11869 (E.D. La. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

293 F. Supp. 937 p.951

288. Cited by:Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9030 (E.D. La. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

289 F. Supp. 392 p.400

289. Cited by:MacHesky v. Bizzell, 288 F. Supp. 295, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12591, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P9909, 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P9155 (N.D. Miss. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

288 F. Supp. 295 p.299

290. Followed by:Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7610 (E.D. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

273 F. Supp. 673 p.691

291. Cited by:Heymann v. Louisiana, 269 F. Supp. 36, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8760 (E.D. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

269 F. Supp. 36 p.39

292. Followed by:Griffin v. Louisiana, 269 F. Supp. 32, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8759 (E.D. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9

269 F. Supp. 32 p.33

293. Cited by:Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8407 (N.D. Miss. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

266 F. Supp. 564 p.570

294. Cited by:United States v. Harrison County, 265 F. Supp. 76, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8980 (S.D. Miss. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

265 F. Supp. 76 p.86

295. Cited by:Brock v. Schiro, 264 F. Supp. 330, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7272 (E.D. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

264 F. Supp. 330 p.336

296. Cited by:In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8829 (E.D. La. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

262 F. Supp. 482 p.485

297. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at, Cited by:Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9596 (S.D. Miss. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN8

Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:262 F. Supp. 873 p.882


298. Cited by:Cohen v. Mississippi State University of Agriculture & Applied Science, 256 F. Supp. 954, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6576 (N.D. Miss. 1966)

256 F. Supp. 954 p.957


299. Cited by:Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19783, 2001 FED App. 314P (6th Cir.), 2001 FED App. 0314P (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Ohio 2001) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

265 F.3d 399 p.403

300. Cited by:Hackett v. Tennessee, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10684 (6th Cir. Tenn. May 10, 1995) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

301. Cited by:

Michigan v. Martin, 894 F.2d 1336, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 1465 (6th Cir. 1990) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

302. Followed by:

Conrad v. Robinson, 871 F.2d 612, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 4740, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P38897 (6th Cir. Ohio 1989) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

871 F.2d 612 p.614871 F.2d 612 p.615

303. Cited by:Cooke v. Mwonyonyi, 869 F.2d 1489, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1740 (6th Cir. Ky. 1989) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

304. Cited by:

McQueary v. Jefferson County, 819 F.2d 1142, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6958 (6th Cir. Ky. 1987) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

305. Cited by:

MARCHMAN v. GULKO, 672 F.2d 917, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16325 (6th Cir. 1981) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

306. Cited by:

Michigan v. Campbell, 644 F.2d 886, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21024 (6th Cir. Mich. 1981) LexisNexis

Headnotes HN8

307. Cited by:Detroit Police Lieutenants & Sergeants Asso. v. Detroit, 597 F.2d 566, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14960, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P31258, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 881 (6th Cir. Mich. 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN7

597 F.2d 566 p.568

308. Cited by:Ohio v. Denman, 462 F.2d 1292, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8817, 65 Ohio Op. 2d 178 (6th Cir. Ohio 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

462 F.2d 1292 p.1292

309. Cited by:Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7366, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 658 (6th Cir. Ky. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7

432 F.2d 530 p.534

310. Cited by:Tennessee v. Walden, 406 F.2d 419, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

406 F.2d 419 p.421406 F.2d 419 p.422

311. Cited by:Cleveland v. Corley, 398 F.2d 41, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5968, 19 Ohio Misc. 15, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 184 (6th Cir. Ohio 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

398 F.2d 41 p.44398 F.2d 41 p.46

312. Cited by:Grubbs v. Pound, 374 F.2d 448, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7009 (6th Cir. Ky. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

374 F.2d 448 p.450

313. Cited by:Townsend v. Ohio, 366 F.2d 33, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 4961, 10 Ohio Misc. 6, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 91 (6th Cir. Ohio 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2

366 F.2d 33 p.34


314. Cited by:Kentucky v. Teague, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95826 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


315. Cited by:Stapleton v. Butler County Comm'rs, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89480 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


316. Followed by:Kentucky v. Harvey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51730 (W.D. Ky. June 16, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


317. Followed by:Kentucky v. Shaw, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50823 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


318. Followed by:Ky. v. Teague, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45047 (W.D. Ky. May 27, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


319. Cited by:Teague v. Kentucky, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32175 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


320. Followed by:Kentucky v. Clark, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29506 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


321. Cited by:Teague v. Commonwealth, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24063 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 20, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


322. Cited by:Teague v. Commonwealth, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15836 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


323. Cited by:Ohio v. Anderson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18638 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


324. Followed by:Michigan v. Modena, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5846 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2009)


325. Cited by:Chong Su v. Curee, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64365 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


326. Followed by:Commonwealth v. Greene, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64120 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


327. Cited by:Commonwealth v. Yates, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64069 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


328. Cited by:Kentucky v. Tillman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63307 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


329. Cited by:Kentucky v. Smith, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60135 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


330. Cited by:Kentucky v. Martin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56360 (W.D. Ky. July 23, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


331. Followed by:Westfield Club v. Dominique, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73199 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


332. Cited by:Michigan v. Garner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24717 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


333. Followed by:Griev. Adm'r v. Fieger, 409 F. Supp. 2d 858, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25890 ( E.D. Mich. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

409 F. Supp. 2d 858 p.862

334. Cited by:Taylor v. Currie, 386 F. Supp. 2d 929, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20257 ( E.D. Mich. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

386 F. Supp. 2d 929 p.935

335. Cited by:Walker v. City of Collegedale, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27698 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


336. Cited by:West v. Michigan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13219 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

337. Cited by:

Ohio ex rel. Ney v. PJC, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 28, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23992 (S.D. Ohio 1984) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

592 F. Supp. 28 p.30

338. Cited by:Voinovich v. Cleveland Bd. of Education, 539 F. Supp. 1100, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13876 (N.D. Ohio 1982) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

539 F. Supp. 1100 p.1101

339. Cited by:Irby v. Shelby County Government, 508 F. Supp. 1080, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12153, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 688 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

508 F. Supp. 1080 p.1084

340. Cited by:Dodd v. Rue, 478 F. Supp. 975, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10367 (S.D. Ohio 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN9

478 F. Supp. 975 p.976

341. Followed by:Tucker v. Cleveland Board of Education, 465 F. Supp. 687, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14286 (N.D. Ohio 1979) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

465 F. Supp. 687 p.689

342. Cited by:Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10471 (N.D. Ohio 1973)

367 F. Supp. 1343 p.1345

343. Followed by:Tennessee ex rel. Fisher v. C. C. Manifest of Tennessee, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 759, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7, HN8

362 F. Supp. 759 p.763

344. Followed by:Tennessee ex rel. Davis v. Market Street News, 357 F. Supp. 74, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14325 (E.D. Tenn.

1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7357 F. Supp. 74 p.76357 F. Supp. 74 p.77


345. Cited by:In re County Collector (Appeal of O'Brien), 96 F.3d 890, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (7th Cir. Ill. 1996) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9

96 F.3d 890 p.897

346. Cited by:Wisconsin v. Kavouras, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24240 (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 1991) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

347. Cited by:

Hickey v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11301, 8 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 974 (7th Cir. Ill. 1987)

827 F.2d 234 p.239

348. Cited by:Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21889 (7th Cir. Wis. 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

782 F.2d 670 p.672

349. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7265, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 798 (7th Cir. Ill. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

468 F.2d 389 p.416

350. Cited by:United States ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 429 F.2d 1001, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8551 (7th Cir. Ill. 1970)

429 F.2d 1001 p.1003

351. Cited by:Evanston v. Buick, 421 F.2d 595, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11104, 73 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2290 (7th Cir. Ill. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

421 F.2d 595 p.597


352. Cited by:Wisconsin v. Chapman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17160 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


353. Followed by:

Cook County State's Atty. ex rel. Devine v. Tyler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79783 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


354. Followed by:Cook County State's Atty. ex rel. Devine v. Tyler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50389 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9


355. Cited by:State v. Sheickner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92224 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


356. Cited by:Jacobs v. Houlihan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58086 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2006)


357. Cited by:Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Tarkowski, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 549 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


358. Cited by:Glagola v. Glagola, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13820 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2003)


359. Cited by:Weatherall v. Weatherall, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19949 (E.D. Wis. 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

83 F. Supp. 2d 1003 p.1005

360. Cited by:O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 770 F. Supp. 448, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9767 (C.D. Ill. 1991) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

770 F. Supp. 448 p.456

361. Cited by:Zaun v. Illinois, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14611 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1990) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

362. Cited by:

Cappitelli v. Hoskins, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10267 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1988) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

363. Cited by:AMICI v. TOLLIVER, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27778 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

364. Cited by:

Smith v. Indiana, 622 F. Supp. 973, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13365 (N.D. Ind. 1985) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

622 F. Supp. 973 p.976

365. Cited by:Olsen v. Olsen, 580 F. Supp. 1569, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18744 (N.D. Ind. 1984) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN9

580 F. Supp. 1569 p.1572

366. Cited by:WISCONSIN v. HARRIS, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8679 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

367. Cited by:

Tasner v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 803, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8313 (N.D. Ill. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

379 F. Supp. 803 p.809

368. Cited by:Kennedy v. Wisconsin, 373 F. Supp. 519, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9419 (E.D. Wis. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

373 F. Supp. 519 p.520

369. Cited by:United States v. Kondos, 365 F. Supp. 174, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11260, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 730, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9190 (E.D. Wis. 1973)

365 F. Supp. 174 p.174

370. Cited by:State ex rel. Bruce v. Larkin, 346 F. Supp. 1065, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 (E.D. Wis. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

346 F. Supp. 1065 p.1067

371. Cited by:Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13710 (N.D. Ill. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

342 F. Supp. 82 p.87

372. Cited by:Wynn v. Indiana State Dep't of Public Welfare, 316 F. Supp. 324, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10854 (N.D. Ind. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN9, HN10

316 F. Supp. 324 p.331

373. Cited by:Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12629 (E.D. Wis. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

310 F. Supp. 293 p.295

374. Cited by:Burns v. Board of School Comm'rs, 302 F. Supp. 309, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9293, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P10037, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1313, 60 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P9279 (S.D. Ind. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

302 F. Supp. 309 p.311302 F. Supp. 309 p.312

375. Cited by:United States ex rel. Fuller v. Coffey, 299 F. Supp. 315, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (E.D. Wis. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

299 F. Supp. 315 p.316

376. Cited by:Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9412 (N.D. Ill. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

288 F. Supp. 200 p.224

377. Cited in Dissenting Opinion at:Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11316 (W.D. Wis. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

270 F. Supp. 131 p.146


378. Cited by:Ewings v. Ellis, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1481 (8th Cir. Ark. Jan. 23, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1481

379. Cited by:Minnesota v. Jenkins, 145 Fed. Appx. 564, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22101 (8th Cir. Minn. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8

145 Fed. Appx. 564 p.564

380. Cited by:Abram v. Arkansas, 142 Fed. Appx. 960, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19649 (8th Cir. Ark. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8

142 Fed. Appx. 960 p.960

381. Cited by:Reha v. Iowa Supreme Court, 41 Fed. Appx. 15, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13901 (8th Cir. Iowa 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

41 Fed. Appx. 15 p.15

382. Cited by:Bauer v. Transitional Sch. Dist. , 255 F.3d 478, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 14798 (8th Cir. Mo. 2001)

LexisNexis Headnotes HN6255 F.3d 478 p.478

383. Cited by:Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8769 (8th Cir. Ark. 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN6, HN8

112 F.3d 351 p.355

384. Followed by:Doe v. Berry, 967 F.2d 1255, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14991 (8th Cir. Mo. 1992) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

967 F.2d 1255 p.1257

385. Cited by:United States ex rel. Sullivan v. State, 588 F.2d 579, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7505 (8th Cir. Mo. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

588 F.2d 579 p.580

386. Cited by:Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11849 (8th Cir. N.D. 1978) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

573 F.2d 1011 p.1017

387. Followed by:Powell v. Arkansas, 434 F.2d 604, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6120 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

434 F.2d 604 p.605


388. Cited by:Chevy Chase Bank v. Reyes, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116177 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116177

389. Followed by:Carlton County v. Caprice, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84381 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9


390. Cited by:Arkansas v. Eagle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58759 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


391. Followed by:Coley v. Arkansas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36629 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6,

HN82009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36629

392. Cited by:Thomas v. Arkansas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18889 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


393. Cited by:Dunevant v. Healthcare USA of Mo., L.L.C., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66100 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


394. Cited by:Rolfes v. South Dakota, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29888 (D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN2, HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


395. Cited by:Nebraska ex rel. Bonner v. McSwine, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62016 (D. Neb. Aug. 22, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


396. Cited by:Regions Bank v. Crawford, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41041 (E.D. Mo. June 20, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


397. Cited by:McCullough v. Ligon, 430 F. Supp. 2d 846, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29892 (E.D. Ark. 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

430 F. Supp. 2d 846 p.850

398. Cited by:J. R. v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34223 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9


399. Cited by:Chambers v. Missouri, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31272 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


400. Followed by:Minn. v. Yeazizw, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21648 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8, HN9


401. Cited by:Iowa v. Johnson, 976 F. Supp. 812, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14476 (N.D. Iowa 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

976 F. Supp. 812 p.817

402. Cited by:Neal v. Wilson, 920 F. Supp. 976, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4742 (E.D. Ark. 1996) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

920 F. Supp. 976 p.984

403. Explained by:Bartulica v. Paculdo, 411 F. Supp. 392, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15536, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P11153, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497 (W.D. Mo. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

411 F. Supp. 392 p.394411 F. Supp. 392 p.395

404. Followed by:Banks v. Janklow, 399 F. Supp. 319, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11898 (D.S.D. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

399 F. Supp. 319 p.320399 F. Supp. 319 p.321

405. Cited by:Powell v. Arkansas, 310 F. Supp. 142, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12727 (W.D. Ark. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8, HN9

310 F. Supp. 142 p.144310 F. Supp. 142 p.145

406. Cited by:Arkansas v. Shaddox, 261 F. Supp. 566, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7575 (W.D. Ark. 1966) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

261 F. Supp. 566 p.569


407. Cited by:Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16939 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2007)

492 F.3d 1094 p.1104

408. Followed by:Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10882 (9th Cir. Cal. 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

446 F.3d 996 p.999

409. Cited by:

Adam v. Hawaii, 139 Fed. Appx. 4, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8832 (9th Cir. Haw. 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

139 Fed. Appx. 4 p.5

410. Cited by:California v. Dawodu, 122 Fed. Appx. 884, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26670 (9th Cir. Cal. 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

122 Fed. Appx. 884 p.885

411. Followed by:Inland Valley Dev. Agency v. Patel, 116 Fed. Appx. 98, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 23013 (9th Cir. Cal. 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

116 Fed. Appx. 98 p.100

412. Cited by:Johnson v. Hillside Homes Groups, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24751 (9th Cir. Cal. Oct. 1, 1992) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

413. Followed by:

Hewitt v. Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 29119, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1326 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

798 F.2d 1230 p.1233

414. Followed by:Johnson v. California, 473 F.2d 1044, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 12359 (9th Cir. Cal. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8

473 F.2d 1044 p.1044

415. Cited by:Davis v. Superior Court of California, 464 F.2d 1272, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8499 (9th Cir. Cal. 1972)

464 F.2d 1272 p.1273

416. Cited by:California v. Tolefree, 458 F.2d 494, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10010 (9th Cir. Cal. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

458 F.2d 494 p.495

417. Cited by:Tomasino v. California, 451 F.2d 176, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7169 (9th Cir. Cal. 1971)

451 F.2d 176 p.177

418. Cited by:California v. Duckette, 437 F.2d 455, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 12050 (9th Cir. Cal. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

437 F.2d 455 p.456

419. Cited by:California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6315 (9th Cir. Cal. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

434 F.2d 635 p.636

420. Cited by:Ristuccia v. Adams, 406 F.2d 1257, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 8955 (9th Cir. Cal. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

406 F.2d 1257 p.1258


421. Cited by:HSBC Bank USA v. Abreckov, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123617 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2009)

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123617

422. Cited by:Meglodon Fin., LLC v. March, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122366 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122366

423. Followed by:Arizona v. Carroll, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98953 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


424. Followed by:Gedo v. Idaho, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78033 (D. Idaho Aug. 28, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


425. Cited by:D'Hollander v. San Francisco County Superior Court, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35077 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9


426. Cited by:City of Santa Rosa v. Patel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73749 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


427. Cited by:Arizona v. Mansanares, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44018 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


428. Cited by:Arizona v. Smith, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29030 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2005) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6,

HN82005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29030

429. Cited by:Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gefroh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18377 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2004) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


430. Cited by:City & County of S.F. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13523 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8


431. Cited by:Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. City of Fallon, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, 2002-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P73572 (D. Nev. 2001) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

174 F. Supp. 2d 1088 p.1092

432. Cited by:California v. Winn, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3192 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2000) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


433. Cited by:California v. Banks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5939 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1996) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

434. Cited by:

Arteaga v. Superior Court, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12454 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 1994) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

435. Cited by:

Parker by Parker v. Juvenile Court, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6315 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1994) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

436. Cited by:

Nevin v. Ferdon, 413 F. Supp. 1043, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15781 (N.D. Cal. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

413 F. Supp. 1043 p.1049

437. Distinguished by:Nevin v. California, 413 F. Supp. 1039, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16153 (N.D. Cal. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

413 F. Supp. 1039 p.1041

438. Cited by:Major v. Ferdon, 325 F. Supp. 1141, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14434 (N.D. Cal. 1971)

325 F. Supp. 1141 p.1144


439. Cited by:Oklahoma v. Smith, 223 Fed. Appx. 769, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427 (10th Cir. Okla. 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

223 Fed. Appx. 769 p.769

440. Cited by:Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8888 (10th Cir. Kan. 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

443 F.3d 757 p.761

441. Cited by:Colorado v. Williams, 61 Fed. Appx. 645, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7285 (10th Cir. Colo. 2003) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

61 Fed. Appx. 645 p.645

442. Cited by:Colorado v. Smith, 51 Fed. Appx. 852, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24570 (10th Cir. Colo. 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

51 Fed. Appx. 852 p.853

443. Cited by:Moeller v. Rodriguez, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11928 (10th Cir. N.M. May 21, 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11928

444. Cited by:Matthews v. Phelps, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 13035 (10th Cir. June 17, 1991) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

445. Cited by:

Naugle v. Oklahoma, 429 F.2d 1268, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7587 (10th Cir. Okla. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

429 F.2d 1268 p.1269

446. Cited by:Bohlander v. Independent School Dist., 420 F.2d 693, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9583 (10th Cir. Okla. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

420 F.2d 693 p.694


447. Cited by:Colorado v. Lewis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18170 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


448. Cited by:Colorado v. Lewis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109426 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109426

449. Cited by:Colorado v. Jackson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88973 (D. Colo. Oct. 7, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


450. Followed by:Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110270 (D. Colo. July 30, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110270

451. Cited by:Utah v. Cooper, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14852 (D. Utah Feb. 26, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7


452. Followed by:Utah v. Cooper, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8557 (D. Utah Feb. 4, 2008) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9


453. Cited by:Colorado v. Jackson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38401 (D. Colo. May 24, 2007) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


454. Cited by:Paris v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80533 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8


455. Cited by:Oklahoma v. Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40278 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN8


456. Followed by, Cited by:Akhlaghi v. Berry, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22512 (D. Kan. 2003) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

Followed by:294 F. Supp. 2d 1238 p.1244

Cited by:294 F. Supp. 2d 1238 p.1243

457. Cited by:Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Calderon, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1921 (D. Kan. Jan. 11, 1999) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8


458. Cited by:Hetherington v. Griffin Television, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 493, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16648 (W.D. Okla. 1977) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

430 F. Supp. 493 p.496

459. Followed by:Patterson v. Patterson, 381 F. Supp. 1029, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7096 (D. Colo. 1974) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

381 F. Supp. 1029 p.1030

460. Cited by:New Mexico v. Tartaglia, 365 F. Supp. 171, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11456 (D.N.M. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

365 F. Supp. 171 p.172365 F. Supp. 171 p.173

461. Cited by:Oklahoma ex rel. Field v. Hess, 362 F. Supp. 1114, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12323 (W.D. Okla. 1973) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

362 F. Supp. 1114 p.1116

462. Cited by:Ayala v. District 60 School Board, 327 F. Supp. 980, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13684 (D. Colo. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

327 F. Supp. 980 p.982


463. Cited by:Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5205, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 554, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 557 (11th Cir. Ala. 2001) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

245 F.3d 1292 p.1296245 F.3d 1292 p.1297

464. Cited by:Ackerley Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12567 (11th Cir. Fla. 1989) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

881 F.2d 990 p.993


465. Cited by:Evans v. State Dep't of Revenue Child Support Enforcement, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124300 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2009)

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124300

466. Cited by:Harpagon Co., LLC v. FXM, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79524 (N.D. Ga. 2009) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8, HN9

653 F. Supp. 2d 1336 p.1343

467. Cited by:Gober v. Georgia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24796 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2006) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5


468. Followed by, Cited by:Brown v. Florida, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10308 (S.D. Fla. 2002) LexisNexis Headnotes HN5, HN6, HN7, HN8

Followed by:208 F. Supp. 2d 1344 p.1350

Cited by:208 F. Supp. 2d 1344 p.1348

469. Cited by:Edmond v. Welch, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11195 (S.D. Ala. May 28, 1998) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6


470. Cited by:Alabama v. Kemp, 952 F. Supp. 722, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 359 (N.D. Ala. 1997) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

952 F. Supp. 722 p.723

471. Cited by:Hibbing v. Sofarelli, 733 F. Supp. 1470, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3324 (M.D. Fla. 1990) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

733 F. Supp. 1470 p.1475

472. Cited by:Northside Realty Associates, Inc. v. Chapman, 411 F. Supp. 1195, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15791 (N.D. Ga. 1976) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8, HN9

411 F. Supp. 1195 p.1197411 F. Supp. 1195 p.1198

473. Cited by:Board of Education v. AFSCME, 401 F. Supp. 687, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15585, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3094 (D. Ga. 1975) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

401 F. Supp. 687 p.692

474. Cited by:Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12449, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 131 (N.D. Ga. 1972) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

349 F. Supp. 1335 p.1340

475. Followed by:Georgia v. McLendon, 331 F. Supp. 451, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11635 (S.D. Ga. 1971) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

331 F. Supp. 451 p.452

476. Cited by:Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10615 (N.D. Ga. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

329 F. Supp. 1025 p.1028

477. Cited by:Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10717 (N.D. Ga. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

319 F. Supp. 1048 p.1057

478. Cited by:Washington v. Garmire, 317 F. Supp. 1384, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10079 (S.D. Fla. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

317 F. Supp. 1384 p.1387

479. Cited by:Hall v. Crosland, 311 F. Supp. 106, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12390 (M.D. Ala. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8

311 F. Supp. 106 p.107

480. Cited by:Peacock v. Riggsbee, 309 F. Supp. 542, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12920 (N.D. Ga. 1970) LexisNexis Headnotes HN10

309 F. Supp. 542 p.544

481. Cited by:Tidmore v. Birmingham, 307 F. Supp. 721, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8705 (N.D. Ala. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7

307 F. Supp. 721 p.722

482. Cited by:Georgia v. Lindsey, 306 F. Supp. 910, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8836 (N.D. Ga. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

306 F. Supp. 910 p.911

306 F. Supp. 910 p.912

483. Cited by:Baxter v. Florida, 295 F. Supp. 1164, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8367 (N.D. Fla. 1969) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

295 F. Supp. 1164 p.1165

484. Cited by:Johnson v. Alabama, 288 F. Supp. 655, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9439 (M.D. Ala. 1968)

288 F. Supp. 655 p.657

485. Cited by:Hunter v. Allen, 286 F. Supp. 830, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11548 (N.D. Ga. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

286 F. Supp. 830 p.835

486. Cited by:Dawkins v. Green, 285 F. Supp. 772, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9214, 12 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1268 (N.D. Fla. 1968)

285 F. Supp. 772 p.775

487. Cited by:Wright v. Montgomery, 282 F. Supp. 291, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8201 (M.D. Ala. 1968)

282 F. Supp. 291 p.295

488. Cited by:Rubin v. Classroom Teachers Asso., 281 F. Supp. 371, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8297 (S.D. Fla. 1968) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

281 F. Supp. 371 p.372

489. Cited by:Reynolds v. Alabama, 277 F. Supp. 220, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7460 (S.D. Ala. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6, HN7, HN8

277 F. Supp. 220 p.221277 F. Supp. 220 p.222

490. Cited by:Wallis v. Blue, 263 F. Supp. 965, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11012 (N.D. Ga. 1967)

263 F. Supp. 965 p.966

491. Cited by:Kelley v. Wallace, 257 F. Supp. 343, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6798 (M.D. Ala. 1966)

257 F. Supp. 343 p.344

D.C. CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS

492. Cited by:CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 265 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 13001, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) P75389, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P37424, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1648 (1987) LexisNexis Headnotes HN6

830 F.2d 1132 p.1147

493. Cited by:Carolina, C. & O. Railway v. Interstate Commerce Com., 593 F.2d 1305, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17402 (1979)

593 F.2d 1305 p.1310

D.C. CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURT

494. Cited by:United States v. Conway, 296 F. Supp. 1284, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10499 (D.D.C. 1969)

296 F. Supp. 1284 p.1284

IRS AGENCY MATERIALS

495. Cited by:Gen. Couns. Mem. 38468, GCM 38468, 1980 GCM LEXIS 305 (I.R.S. 1980)

GCM 384681980 GCM LEXIS 305

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS

496. Cited by:88 Interior Dec. 699, 88 Interior Dec. 699

88 Interior Dec. 699 p.708

OTHER FEDERAL DECISIONS

497. Cited by:46 F.R.D. 141, 46 F.R.D. 141

46 F.R.D. 141 p.147

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

498. Cited by:Middlebrooks v. Wayne County, 446 Mich. 151, 521 N.W.2d 774, 1994 Mich. LEXIS 2034, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1513 (1994) LexisNexis Headnotes HN9

446 Mich. 151 p.175521 N.W.2d 774 p.785

MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT

499. Cited by:

Haddox v. State, 636 So. 2d 1229, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1994) LexisNexis Headnotes HN8636 So. 2d 1229 p.1239

OTHER NEW YORK DECISIONS

500. Cited by:People v. Krebs, 54 Misc. 2d 578, 282 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1967 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1265 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967) LexisNexis Headnotes HN7

54 Misc. 2d 578 p.580282 N.Y.S.2d 996 p.999

ANNOTATED STATUTES ( 5 Citing Statutes )

501. 18 U.S.C. sec. 242

502. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1443

503. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1447

504. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983

505. Md. Const. art. IV, @ 8 LAW REVIEWS AND PERIODICALS ( 88 Citing References )

506. SYMPOSIUM: WHEN DOES RETROACTIVITY CROSS THE LINE?: WINSTAR, EASTERN ENTERPRISES AND BEYOND: Takings and Errors, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1047 (2000)

507. NOTE: Splitting the Baby: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Take on Customary International Law Under

the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1415 (2005)2005 BYU L. Rev. 1415 p.1415

508. ARTICLE: Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?: A THEORETICAL APPROACH *, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 163 (2003)

69 Brook. L. Rev. 163 p.163

509. COMMENT: Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 501 (1994)

42 Buff. L. Rev. 501 p.501

510. 69 Cal. L. Rev. 18969 Cal. L. Rev. 189 p.191

511. NOTE: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF FOSTER CHILDREN: SUING UNDER 1983 TO ENFORCE FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE LAW, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2611 (2005)

512. NOTE: Raising the Defense of Procedural Default Sua Sponte: Who Will Enforce the Great Writ of

Liberty?, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 869 (2000)50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 869 p.869

513. NOTES: LIMITING A DEFENDANT'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: GEORGIA v. MCCOLLUM AND THE PROBLEMATIC EXTENSION OF EQUAL PROTECTION., 42 Cath. U.L. Rev. 389 (1993)

514. Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 40 Cath. U.L. Rev. 651 (1991)

515. 73 Colum. L. Rev. 185

73 Colum. L. Rev. 185 p.238

516. ARTICLE: CHALLENGING THE CHALLENGE: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A PROHIBITION AGAINST THE RACIAL USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES., 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1990)

76 Cornell L. Rev. 1 p.69

517. 67 Cornell L. Rev. 48267 Cornell L. Rev. 482 p.514

518. ARTICLE: RATIONALIZING COMPLETE PREEMPTION AFTER BENEFICIAL NATIONAL BANK V. ANDERSON: A NEW RULE, A NEW JUSTIFICATION, 54 Drake L. Rev. 371 (2006)

54 Drake L. Rev. 371 p.371

519. ARTICLE: THE INADEQUACY OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, 55 Emory L.J. 487 (2006)

55 Emory L.J. 487 p.487

520. ARTICLE: CAN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS INTERPRET RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER SECTION 1983?: WHY CHEVRON DEFERENCE SURVIVES SANDOVAL AND GONZAGA, 32 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 843 (2005)

32 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 843 p.843

521. ARTICLE: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AFTER STATE COURT DEFAULT: A DEFINITION OF CAUSE AND PREJUDICE., 53 Fordham L. Rev. 663 (1985)

522. NOTE: THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL UNDER SECTION 1441(c)., 52 Fordham L. Rev. 133 (1983)

523. ARTICLE: Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1988)

524. COMMENT: Day v. Holahan: Crossroads in Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 84 Geo. L.J. 151 (1995)

525. ARTICLE: The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's"Laws", 67

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 51 (1998)

526. ARTICLE: LIBERATING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1995)

527. ARTICLE: Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 439 (2002)

528. ARTICLE: Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine., 44 Hastings L.J. 273 (1993)

529. ARTICLE: SUING UNDER 1983: THE FUTURE AFTER GONZAGA UNIVERSITY V. DOE, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1417 (2003)

39 Hous. L. Rev. 1417 p.1417

530. SYMPOSIUM: Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 71 (1998)

32 Ind. L. Rev. 71 p.71

531. NOTE: Removal and Waiver of the Eleventh Amendment, 74 Ind. L.J. 1019 (1999)74 Ind. L.J. 1019 p.1019

532. ARTICLE: The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 717 (1986)

533. ARTICLE: FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL: WATSON WOULD FLY WITH FAA DESIGNEES, 72 J. Air L. & Com. 485 (2007)

534. ARTICLE: Constitutional History, Federal Arbitration and Seamen's Rights Sinking in a Sea of Sweatshop

Labor, 39 J. Mar. L. & Com. 157 (2008)

535. A FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUM: A FOCUS ON SPECIAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE DISABLED, FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ARTICLE: HATE SPEECH AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR HOUSING LAWS, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 409 (1996)

29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 409 p.409

536. ARTICLE: THE COURTESY COPY TRAP: UNTIMELY REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT, 52 Md. L. Rev. 374 (1993)

537. NOTES: Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand Discretion To Avoid a

Bifurcated Suit, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (1993)92 Mich. L. Rev. 683 p.683

538. SYMPOSIUM; PATTERSON V. MCLEAN: INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE INACTION., 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1988)

87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 p.136

539. NOTE: Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under Protecting the Right To Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 157 (1987)

86 Mich. L. Rev. 157 p.157

540. ARTICLE: BLACK INNOCENCE AND THE WHITE JURY., 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611 (1985)

541. ARTICLE: Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right Without A Remedy., 74 Minn. L. Rev. 437 (1990)74 Minn. L. Rev. 437 p.493

542. 64 Minn. L. Rev. 52364 Minn. L. Rev. 523 p.524

543. 58 Minn. L. Rev. 43958 Minn. L. Rev. 439 p.440

544. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE: ARTICLE: The Freedmen's Bureau Act And The Conundrum Over Whether The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Second Amendment, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 683 (2002)

545. ARTICLE: THE RIGHT TO AVOID TRIAL: JUSTIFYING FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION INTO

ONGOING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS., 66 N.C. L. Rev. 49 (1987)

546. CASE COMMENT: CIVIL RIGHTS - EDUCATION: DO VIOLATIONS OF THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (FERPA) CREATE AN ENFORCE-ABLE RIGHT UNDER THE MEANING OF Gonzaga University v. John Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), 79 N.D. L. Rev. 953 (2003)

79 N.D. L. Rev. 953 p.953

547. ARTICLE: EXPLAINING HABEAS CORPUS., 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1985)60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 p.1020

548. ARTICLE: HOW JUDGES SPEAK: SOME LESSONS ON ADJUDICATION IN BILLY BUDD, SAILOR * WITH AN APPLICATION TO JUSTICE REHNQUIST., 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1982)

57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 p.50

549. 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 109249 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1092 p.1093

550. 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 48969 Nw. U.L. Rev. 489 p.539

551. COMMENT: Remedy for Inner City Segregation in the Public Schools: The Necessary Inclusion of Suburbia., 55 Ohio St. L.J. 415 (1994)

552. Article: The Violent Bear It Away: Emmett Till and the Modernization of Law Enforcement in Mississippi,

46 San Diego L. Rev. 459 (2009)46 San Diego L. Rev. 459 p.459

553. ESSAY: THE NEED FOR TAKINGS LAW REFORM: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES - A RESPONSE TO TAKING STOCK OF THE TAKINGS DEBATE, 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 837 (1998)

554. NOTE: STRICT IN THEORY, NOT FATAL IN FACT: n1 AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION PROGRAMS IN THE WAKE OF ADARAND V. PENA, 11 St. John's J.L. Comm. 101 (1995)

555. ARTICLE: Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme., 41 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1989)41 Stan. L. Rev. 469 p.497

556. COMMENT: LOOSENING THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF REMOVAL JURISDICTION, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 1229 (2007)

80 Temp. L. Rev. 1229 p.1229

557. ARTICLE: THE JURISDICTIONAL LEGACY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 869 (1994)

558. ARTICLE: A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1307 (1995)

73 Tex. L. Rev. 1307 p.1392

559. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 114155 Tex. L. Rev. 1141 p.1191

560. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 58755 Tex. L. Rev. 587 p.606

561. SYMPOSIUM: CLASS ACTIONS IN THE GULF SOUTH AND BEYOND: Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1645 (2006)

80 Tul. L. Rev. 1645 p.1645

562. Article: The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 383 (2008)75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 383 p.383

563. ARTICLE: The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts., 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1989)

56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 p.179

564. ARTICLE: Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394 (1982)49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394 p.397

565. 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63646 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636 p.672

566. 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6343 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63 p.66

567. Comment: Protecting the Right to Vote in State and Local Elections Under the Conspiracy Against Rights Act, 1995 U Chi Legal F 483 (1995)

568. REHABILITATING UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES: AN ANALYSIS OF COTTON V. FORDICE, 157

F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 421 (2003)71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 421 p.421

569. COMMENT: SECTION 1983 AND TITLE IV-D OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: IN PURSUIT OF IMPROVED CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 221 (1991)

570. NOTE: The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private

Enforcement of 1396a(a)(30) of the Medicaid Act Using, 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 697 (2008)

571. ARTICLE: PRECLUSION AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN RULE 23(b)(2) CLASS ACTIONS, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 347 (1988)

572. ARTICLE: When Batson Met Grutter: Exploring the Ramifications of the Supreme Court's Diversity

Pronouncements Within the Computerized Jury Selection Paradigm, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 65 (2007)

573. 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499 p.543

574. PROSPECTUSES: Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 855 (1998)

575. ARTICLE: Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under section 1983: The Supreme Court's

Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283 (1996)

576. ARTICLE: Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329 (1988)

36 UCLA L. Rev. 329 p.340

577. REASSESSING THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL BUSINESS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS: FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND "THE MARTIAN CHRONICLES". *, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1769 (1992)

78 Va. L. Rev. 1769 p.1827

578. ARTICLE: THE IDEOLOGIES OF FEDERAL COURTS LAW., 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 (1988)74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 p.1223

579. 60 Va. L. Rev. 25060 Va. L. Rev. 250 p.263

580. ARTICLE: Tapping the State Court Resource., 44 Vand. L. Rev. 953 (1991)

581. ARTICLE: Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases., 41 Vand. L. Rev. 923 (1988)

582. NOTE: THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST RENDITION OF EQUALITY IN EDUCATION: EXAMINING

THE TRADITIONAL COMPONENTS OF SUCCESS IN MISSOURI v. JENKINS, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1395 (1995)

583. Note: When God and Costco Battle for a City's Soul: Can the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act Fairly Adjudicate Both Sides in Land Use Disputes?, 18 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 291 (2005)

584. NOTE: PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL: WATSON SHUTS THE FEDERAL OFFICER BACKDOOR TO THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE, CONCEALS FAMILIAR MOTIVE, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1455 (2009)

585. ARTICLE: SORCERER OR SORCERER'S APPRENTICE?: FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE CREATION

OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 613 (2003)2003 Wis. L. Rev. 613 p.613

586. 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 2071981 Wis. L. Rev. 207 p.238

587. 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 5231975 Wis. L. Rev. 523 p.530

588. NOTE: MEDICAID AND THE ENFORCEABLE RIGHT TO RECEIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE: THE NEED FOR A DEFINITION OF "MEDICAL ASSISTANCE", 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1487 (2006)

47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1487 p.1487

589. ARTICLE: What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195 (2003)

112 Yale L.J. 2195 p.2195

590. ARTICLE: Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function., 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984)

94 Yale L.J. 71 p.108

591. 86 Yale L.J. 103586 Yale L.J. 1035 p.1040

592. 82 Yale L.J. 136382 Yale L.J. 1363 p.1395

593. SYMPOSIUM: TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW AFTER MEDELL'IN V. TEXAS: A PRIMER ON TREATIES AND 1983 AFTER MEDELL'IN V. TEXAS, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 35 (2009)

ANNOTATIONS ( 2 Citing Annotations )

594. Supreme Court's views as to constitutionality, construction, and application of 42 USCS sec. 1981, providing for equal rights as to such matters as contracts and legal proceedings, 105 L. Ed. 2d 737, secs. 2, 5, 6, 8

595. Supreme Court's construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS sec. 1983) providing private right of

action for violation of federal rights, 43 L. Ed. 2d 833, sec. 11 TREATISE CITATIONS ( 9 Citing Sources )

596. 4-15A Business Crime App. P 15A

597. 2-3 Civil Rights Actions P 3.23

598. 1-4 Federal Litigation Guide: New York and Connecticut @ 4.08

599. 1-10 IL Governmental Tort & Civil Rights Liability @ 10.09

600. Manual of Federal Practice 5th @ 1.155

601. 1-3 MB Practice Guide: Fed Pretrial Civ Proc in CA 3.13

602. 16-107 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil @ 107.15

603. 1-8 Moore's Manual--Federal Practice and Procedure @ 8.42

604. 4-62 Texas Torts and Remedies @ 62.02 BRIEFS ( 36 Citing Briefs )

605. HEALTH CARE SERV. CORP. v. NASH, 2009 U.S. Briefs 38, 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 31 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2010)

606. HEALTH CARE SERV. CORP. v. NASH, 2009 U.S. Briefs 38, 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1543 (U.S.

Dec. 11, 2009)

607. WAYTEC v. ROHM, 2007 U.S. Briefs 1226, 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1235 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2008)

608. LAWSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., 2005 U.S. Briefs 1284, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 365 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2007)

609. WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., 2005 U.S. Briefs 1284, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 294 (U.S. Mar.

30, 2007)

610. WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., 2005 U.S. Briefs 1284, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 241 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2007)

611. WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., 2005 U.S. Briefs 1284, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 243 (U.S. Feb.

26, 2007)

612. LAWSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., 2005 U.S. Briefs 1284, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 155 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2007)

613. CLANTON v. MICHIGAN DOT, 2006 U.S. Briefs 286C, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1463 (U.S. June 21,

2006)

614. KIRCHER v. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST, 2005 U.S. Briefs 409, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 365 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2006)

615. MURPHY BROS. v. MICHETTI PIPE STRINGING, INC., 1997 U.S. Briefs 1909, 1998 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs

LEXIS 934 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1998)

616. BLESSING v. FREESTONE, 1995 U.S. Briefs 1441, 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 655 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1996)

617. BLESSING v. FREESTONE, 1995 U.S. Briefs 1441, 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 439 (U.S. July 26,

1996)

618. PAMELA WITHROW, Petitioner, v. ROBERT ALLEN WILLIAMS, Respondent., 1991 U.S. Briefs 1030, 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 575 (U.S. July 31, 1992)

619. MYRA JO COLLINS, Petitioner, v. THE CITY OF HARKER HEIGHTS, TEXAS, Respondent., 1990 U.S.

Briefs 1279, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 310 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1991)

620. CHISOM v. ROEMER, 1990 U.S. Briefs 757, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 895 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1991)

621. LEWIS v. CONTINENTAL BANK CORP., 1987 U.S. Briefs 1955, 1989 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 931 (U.S.

Aug. 10, 1989)

622. JETT v. DALLAS INDEP. SCH. DIST., 1987 U.S. Briefs 2084, 1989 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1321 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1989)

623. PATTERSON v. McLEAN, 1987 U.S. Briefs 107, 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1193 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1988)

624. MESA v. CALIFORNIA, 1987 U.S. Briefs 1206, 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1564 (U.S. July 21, 1988)

625. SHAARE TEFILA CONGREGATION v. COBB, 1985 U.S. Briefs 2156, 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1196

(U.S. Nov. 20, 1986)

626. MACDONALD v. COUNTY OF YOLO, 1984 U.S. Briefs 2015, 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 281 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1985)

627. PULLIAM v. NICHOLSON, 1982 U.S. Briefs 1432, 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 162 (U.S. June 9, 1983)

628. GRANGER v. FLORIDA, 1979 U.S. Briefs 1260, 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1959 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1980)

629. MAINE v. THIBOUTOT, 1979 U.S. Briefs 838, 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1980)

630. MAINE v. THIBOUTOT, 1979 U.S. Briefs 838, 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2432 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1980)

631. CITIFINANCIAL v. GIMBI, 2005 U.S. 3rd Cir. Briefs 5052, 2006 U.S. 3rd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 878 (3d Cir.

Feb. 3, 2006)

632. KELLY v. MARTIN & BAYLEY, INC., 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs 1756, 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 817 (7th Cir. July 5, 2006)

633. KELLY v. MARTIN & BAYLEY, INC., 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs 1756, 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 816

(7th Cir. June 19, 2006)

634. KELLY v. MARTIN & BAYLEY, 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs 1756, 2006 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 17 (7th Cir. May 18, 2006)

635. THOMAS v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, 2009 U.S. 8th Cir. Briefs 2559, 2009 U.S. 8th Cir. Briefs LEXIS

752 (8th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009)

636. Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs 568394, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 525 (D.N.J. July 6, 2007)

637. Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs 568394, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 523

(D.N.J. June 29, 2007)

638. AMKRAUT v. PACIFIC COAST OFFICE PRODS., 2002 CA App. Ct. Briefs 155804, 2002 CA App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 48 (Cal. App. Dec. 12, 2002)

639. KAUFMAN v. ACS, 2002 CA App. Ct. Briefs 155804, 2002 CA App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 43 (Cal. App. Sept.

24, 2002)

640. ABOOD v. A.J. BORKOWSKI, JR., 2006 OH S. Ct. Briefs 596934, 2007 OH S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 177 (Ohio

Apr. 20, 2007) MOTIONS ( 11 Citing Motions )

641. Woodroffe v. McCollum, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 83830, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 67892 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2008)

642. MOTLEY v. OPTION ONE MORTG. CORP., 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 8659, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct.

Motions LEXIS 78803 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2008)

643. MOTLEY v. OPTION ONE MORTG. CORP., 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 8659, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 78800 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2008)

644. VILLAGE OF CHESTNUT RIDGE v. TOWN OF RAMAPO, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 9278, 2008 U.S.

Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 23624 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008)

645. BUSTER v. CITY OF WALLINGFORD, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 544, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 5493 (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2007)

646. MULDER v. WILSON, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 862A, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 30039 (M.D.

Ala. Nov. 3, 2006)

647. WILLIAMS v. EDWARDS, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 7362, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 70549 (M.D. Ga. July 21, 2006)

648. PARR v. PERLINGER,, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 457, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 17277 (D.

Minn. May 16, 2006)

649. PARR v. PERLINGER, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 457, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 17275 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2006)

650. PARR v. PERLINGER, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 457, 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 19415 (D.

Minn. Feb. 16, 2006)

651. MORGANELLI v. YEAGER, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 5241, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 40495 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2005)

charleslincoln3.files.wordpress.com · Web view"Every person who, under color of any statute,...

Documents

Transcript of charleslincoln3.files.wordpress.com · Web view"Every person who, under color of any statute,...