Dr Jonathan GilmoreDepartment of PoliticsUniversity of ManchesterOxford Road Manchester, M13 9PL

Jonathan.Gilmore@manchester.ac.uk Looking Downward: Ethics, Foreign Policy and the Domestic Politics of Protection

Abstract:This article examines the increasing prevalence of foreign policy commitments to the protection of distant strangers and the interaction this has with domestic political contexts. Although we do not live in a post-state cosmopolitan order, civilian protection practices appear premised in part on cosmopolitan-minded ethical obligations to help non-citizens in dire need. However, this seemingly expanded moral concern sits uneasily with the inconsistency in the translations of such ethical commitments into policy and into practice. Using the lens of recent British foreign policy, the article argues that in order to better understand the inconsistency in cosmopolitan-minded protective action in Western foreign policy, a downward gaze must be directed towards domestic contexts, intra-societal foundations and the increasingly nebulous state-society connections upon which cosmopolitan-minded foreign policy comes to rest. ‘Disaggregated’ forms of citizenship and exceptionally high levels of technological interconnectedness, present a difficult intra-societal context within which to craft a unified ethical foreign policy narrative that resonates well with the diverse identity constituencies of which contemporary Western states are comprised.

Keywords: Global ethics; cosmopolitanism; ethical foreign policy; foreign policy narratives; civilian protection; British foreign policy; refugee protection; humanitarian intervention; domestic politics

IntroductionPractices aimed at protecting non-citizens from political violence and large-scale human

rights abuse suggests a widening of moral community beyond state borders and an ethical

responsibility to help ‘strangers’ in dire need. Although current international society is far

from a post-state cosmopolitan world, a latent cosmopolitan-mindedness has found a place

foreign policy of prominent Western states. Practices of humanitarian intervention, refugee

reception and development suggest that the wellbeing of non-citizens is morally significant

and that foreign policy is no longer confined to the pursuit of narrow national interests. At

the same time, this notion of a growing cosmopolitan-mindedness, sits uneasily with

inconsistent translations of such ethical commitments into practice, revealing an impasse

between an apparently expanded cosmopolitan consciousness and a world where moral

boundaries are entrenched by the state system.

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Analysis of civilian protection has often tended to dwell on the elite-level dialogues

and international norms of protection, with relatively limited exploration of how these norms

might be legitimated internally. This article argues for an expansion of the ethical

imagination to incorporate a downward focus to the domestic level, as an arena of

normative contestation where ideas of national interest and the scope of overseas ethical

responsibilities are negotiated. Civilian protection, whether through armed interventions or

the protection of refugees, involve highly visible and often controversial commitments,

which raise distinctive domestic legitimacy challenges and require support or at least

acquiescence to the dedication of state resources to purposes beyond immediate national

interests. As much as the diffusion of civilian protection norms on an international level, the

domestic ethical landscape is an important point of reference for the contemporary politics

of protection. The article argues that a closer exploration of the ways in which domestic

ethical identities are constructed or mediated is needed, and attention must be directed

towards increasingly complex state-society connections upon which cosmopolitan-minded

foreign policy commitments often rest. Improvements in communications technology and

the emergence of new forms of connection between individuals and global politics that have

driven processes of increasing cosmopolitanisation, also mean that states are faced with a

less predictable and more contested domestic ethical outlooks. This presents both

constraints and openings for foreign policy narratives that make space for cosmopolitan-

minded civilian protection commitments.

The first section of the article examines recent British foreign policy as a means of

drawing out some of the challenges of establishing a cosmopolitan-minded ethical trajectory

within foreign policy. Dilemmas of national role and identity and the tension between

cosmopolitan impulses and a resurgent populist nationalism have become important

features of the recent UK foreign policy debate. The British experience asks important

questions about the internal dynamics of Western states and the influence this has on the

politics of protection. The second section explores the complex domestic ethical landscape

within which contemporary Western foreign policy is articulated. It is one characterised by

increasingly ‘disaggregated’ forms of citizenship, high levels of technological

interconnectedness and sudden ‘microbursts’ of moral concern for the suffering of distant

strangers driven by social media. These present a challenging context in which to craft a

unified foreign policy narrative that resonates well with the diverse identity constituencies of

contemporary Western states, and might help develop stable societal foundations for the

protection of vulnerable non-citizens.

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Cosmopolitan-mindedness and British Foreign PolicyCivilian protection practices have undergone a significant expansion and become an

established feature of international relations in the post-1945 world. Protective practices

principally include those aimed at protecting non-citizens from political violence and large-

scale human rights abuse. These practices encompass refugee reception, following the

normative architecture set out by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and

supported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and more recent regional

declarations.1 More controversially, the post-Cold War humanitarian intervention debate

expanded modes of protection to include armed intervention, codified in the early 21 st

Century into the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept (see ICISS, 2001; UNGA, 2005)

and civilian protection within UN peacekeeping (UNSC, 2009: 5; DPKO/DFS, 2008: 24).

Although not referred to directly in foreign policy discourse as cosmopolitanism, these

protective practices demonstrate at least latent cosmopolitan ethical concern. They

emphasize the moral significance of those beyond state borders and aim to protect or

enhance the wellbeing of those made vulnerable by political violence and human rights

abuse. The paradox inherent in these protective practices is that they are products of, and

remain situated within a state-centric arrangement of territorially-bounded ethical

communities. Consequently, these practices become a matter of state policy a potential

tension emerges between locally-rooted commitments to the national Self community

(national interest) and cosmopolitan-minded protective obligations to non-citizens.

A way out of this tension may be found in the formulations of good statehood, which

see no inherent contradiction between the infusion of cosmopolitan-minded commitments

into foreign policy, alongside more traditional responsibilities to the national interest (see

Linklater, 1992; Lawler, 2005; Brysk, 2009; Shapcott, 2013; Gilmore, 2015). As a possible

path to a more cosmopolitan world, states can adjust their orientations toward a more

Other-regarding and globally responsible position, acting as what Bull (1983: 14) referred to

as “local agents of a world common good”. In the most optimistic reading, cosmopolitan-

minded foreign policy could be seen as an opportunity to forge a ‘communitarian path to

cosmopolitanism’ – working from more localised forms of ethical community that are often

an individual’s primary ethical reference point, to more inclusive and global ethical outlooks

(see Shapcott, 2001: 31). The way in which the state frames and articulates its foreign

policy practices plays an important role in developing this path, by justifying the relationship

between different spheres of ethical concern to domestic audiences. Shapcott (2013: 146) 1 See for instance, the 2011 ‘Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council’

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notes the vulnerability of cosmopolitan-minded commitments in state policy and the

relatively limited exploration of how such commitments might be entrenched at the domestic

level. Questions of legitimacy amongst domestic publics are particularly pertinent for

cosmopolitan-minded practices that might appear non-traditional, when compared to the

more familiar and ‘common sense’ priorities of national interest. British foreign policy over

the past 20 years provides a useful window into the attempts by a prominent Western state

to respond to the challenges of an increasingly interconnected world and to locate an

explicit Other-regarding dimension within its foreign policy narrative. At the same time, this

period has also demonstrated an apparent struggle to frame this within a coherent narrative

that defines Britain’s role in the contemporary world, and the difficulties of grounding this

domestically in popular consciousness.

Overt ethical commitments to vulnerable non-citizens have become a familiar feature

within British foreign policy since Labour’s controversial inclusion of an ‘ethical dimension’,

following their election in 1997 (Cook, 1997). All foreign policies involve ethical claims and

commitments, most frequently ethical responsibilities to serve the national interest. What

differentiated Labour’s approach was the direct incorporation of ethical responsibilities to

non-citizens and to the broader common good. The basic premise, for both Labour and its

Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition successor, was that in a highly globalised or

‘networked’ world, values and British national interests had now become merged (see Blair,

1999; Hague, 2010). Britain could thus demonstrate solidarity with vulnerable non-citizens

without necessarily compromising its core national interests. In practical terms, the ‘ethical

dimension’ of post-1997 British foreign policy manifested itself in the creation of the

Department for International Development (DFID), the overt promotion of human rights,

commitments not to sell arms to countries where they might be used for internal repression,

and support for the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The implication of

these policies is not one of exact moral equality between British nationals and non-citizens,

as a thicker understanding of cosmopolitanism might require, but rather cosmopolitan-

minded in the consideration of non-citizens as a significant ethical reference point.

Although the 2010-2015 Coalition government pledged to “replace the sweeping

generalisations of ethical foreign policy with a clear practical and principled approach,

persistently applied”, many of the precepts of Labour’s ethical approach were continued

during their tenure (Hague, 2010). Funding for international development was maintained

at 0.7 percent of GDP (HM Government, 2010a: 22), the Foreign Office continued to

publish reports documenting the UK’s human rights promotion work (FCO, 2011a), and

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oversight of weapons sales continued (HM Government, 2011a). The Coalition also

continued to develop the UK’s overseas stabilisation approach, launched by its Labour

predecessor, with defined responsibilities “protect the political actors, the political system

and the population” in fragile states where UK forces might be deployed (see FCO, DFID &

MOD, 2011; Stabilisation Unit, 2014a: 6). The Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF)

was founded in 2015, ostensibly providing an updated replacement to the Conflict Pool

established in 2000, with the promotion of human rights and the protection of civilians as

one of its key thematic strands (Stabilisation Unit, 2014b:1-2). Support for armed

humanitarian intervention, civilian protection operations and the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) was also continued by the Coalition (see Conservative Party, 2010: 109; FCO,

2011b), most visibly in the British contribution to the 2011 humanitarian intervention in

Libya.

Varying degrees of support for cosmopolitan-minded practices were evident across

the ideological divides between UK political parties at the 2017 UK general election. 2 Overt

commitments to the promotion of human rights (Labour Party, 2017: 117-118, 123; SNP,

2017: 46; Liberal Democrats, 2017: 85-86)3, protection of civilians and conflict resolution

(Labour Party, 2017: 117; Liberal Democrats, 2017: 82-83), anti-slavery initiatives

(Conservative Party, 2017: 40; Labour Party, 2017: 123), maintaining development aid at

0.7 per cent of GDP (Conservative Party, 2017: 39; Labour Party, 2017: 122; Liberal

Democrats, 2017: 84; SNP, 2017: 46), arms export control (Labour Party, 2017: 119;

Liberal Democrats, 2017: 82; SNP, 2017: 43) and the protection of refugees (Conservative

Party, 2017: 40; Labour Party, 2017: 29; SNP, 2017: 47; Liberal Democrats, 2017: 69). 4

Whilst overt endorsements of armed civilian protection operations were uncommon, the

Liberal Democrats were a notable exception, with support for armed humanitarian

intervention and the Responsibility to Protect featuring in their 2015 and 2017 manifestos

(Liberal Democrats, 2015: 144; 2017: 82).

The recurrent suggestion within post-1997 UK foreign policy discourse is that

overseas ethical commitments are compatible with, and mutually reinforcing of the British

national interest (Gilmore, 2014: 546-550). Indeed, the 2015 Strategic Defence and 2 The UK Independence Party (UKIP) are a notable exception here.3 The 2017 Conservative manifesto is a notable divergence from the other main parties on the promotion of human rights in UK foreign policy. The few direct references to human rights are framed defensively, in commitments to protect British service personnel from ECHR jurisdiction and rejecting the integration of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights into UK law (Conservative Party, 2017: 41). 4 Although the 2017 Conservative manifesto does note the Britain’s continued commitment to the protection of refugees, this is heavily caveated by a commitment to reduce the number of asylum claims and an emphasis on supporting refugees in conflict zones rather than those entering the UK.

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Security Review develops direct connections between the promotion of human rights,

fragile state stabilisation, and the security and prosperity of the UK (HM Government, 2015:

62-65). This reconciliation of national interests with overseas ethical responsibilities in

British foreign policy has had a less than enviable record in practice. One of the most

obvious tension has been between the domestic economic benefits of UK arms exports,

and the obvious potential these have to harm non-citizens (Dunne and Wheeler, 1998: 860-

862; Gilmore, 2014: 552-555). This tension was brought into particularly sharp relief with

regard to arms sales to Saudi Arabia, following its intervention in Yemen in March 2015. A

clear priority was accorded to short-term economic interests over arms control

commitments aimed at civilian protection, with arms transfers worth £3.3 billion to Saudi

Arabia in the twelve month period following the Saudi intervention (H of C Business,

Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees, 2016: 28). Revealing an

apparent ambivalence about civilian protection, these arms transfers have coincided with

reports of large scale civilian casualties and violations of international humanitarian law by

Saudi forces in Yemen (Human Rights Watch, 2017: 510).

Ambivalence towards the wellbeing of non-citizens is also evident when considering

Britain’s contribution to more direct practices of civilian protection, and has been reflected in

a preference for protecting vulnerable civilians from a distance. Recent UK governments

have with some consistency demonstrated an enthusiasm for overseas humanitarian

interventions, in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya and, though stalled by Parliament, in Syria.

However, a much less enthusiastic attitude has been demonstrated toward the reception

and protection of refugees closer to home. UK policymakers have demonstrated clear

reluctance to provide asylum for those fleeing from the Syrian Civil War, preferring instead

to help fund refugee reception in countries neighbouring Syria. Between April 2011 and

May 2017, the UK registered 10,669 asylum claims from Syrians. This is in contrast to the

500,819 Syrian asylum claims registered by Germany and 111,688 registered by Sweden

during the same period. Beyond the Syria case, the disparity between the UK and other

Western European states is also reflected in the overall numbers of those granted refugee

status. From 2011-2016, the UK granted refugee or similar protective status to 57,635

asylum applicants, compared to 88,165 by France, 174,670 by Sweden, and 662,310 by

Germany.5 Thus, despite the recurrent presence of commitments to the protection of

vulnerable non-citizens in UK foreign policy discourse, the practical manifestation of these

5 Data obtained from Eurostat. Available from: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (accessed 25th July 2017)

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commitments demonstrates the limitations of the ostensibly cosmopolitan-minded ideational

current.

Identity Crisis, Ethical Malaise and ‘Strategic Drift’

By including but not fully embracing the cosmopolitan-minded ideational current,

recent UK foreign policy presents an unstable platform for consistent practices aimed at the

protection of vulnerable non-citizens. The awkward juxtaposition of overseas ethical

commitments in UK foreign policy, against narrower national interests and more

geographically limited spheres of moral concern, are reflective of a broader malaise in

British foreign policy, which has become particularly apparent in what might be defined as

the post-War on Terror period, from 2008 onwards. This period has been characterised by

the onset of the Global Economic Crisis in 2008 and the drawing down of British forces in

Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009-2014. It has also seen large-scale, austerity-driven

cutbacks have been made to the UK’s armed forces as a result of the 2010 Strategic

Defence and Security Review, alongside reductions in the UK’s overseas diplomatic assets

(Ministry of Defence, 2010). Economic stagnation and limitations in hard and soft power

tools, stand to further reduce the UK’s capabilities to pursue either national interests or

cosmopolitan-minded ethical commitments in its foreign policy.

The relative decline in UK economic power in the post-War on Terror period fashions

a more direct connection with the domestic level, as an arena within which foreign policy

identities and the boundaries of ethical concern are contested. In the context of fiscal

austerity programmes that have led to significant cutbacks in UK public services since

2010, competition for scarce state resources creates fertile ground for a re-assertion of

communitarian concerns over cosmopolitan-minded commitments in state policy. As the

material wellbeing of the self-community of British citizens is threatened, the legitimacy of

practices aimed at the protection of vulnerable non-citizens, whether by development aid,

expeditionary military interventions or refugee reception, is open to greater contestation.

Reflecting on the basis for the ‘ethical’ turn in Western foreign policy at the dawn of the 21 st

Century, Chandler (2006: 53-88) argues that ethical foreign policies function as a domestic

political to deflect attention away from the absence of broader political contestation in the

post-Cold War period. Although Chandler’s account may not have foreseen the longevity of

the cosmopolitan-minded ideational current, the focus on the domestic societal context in

which such foreign policies are ultimately anchored is significant. Whilst elite-level

policymakers are in a position to articulate agendas for foreign policy, domestic outlooks on

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the scope of ethical obligation represent a significant influence on the parameters of

protective practices.

Although providing only snapshots of public opinion, recent polls have presented a

variegated outlooks on cosmopolitan-minded commitments within the UK. In a general

sense, significant divides in opinion appear on the prioritisation of an ‘ethical’ agenda, when

compared to more immediate national interest/security themes. When members of the

public, surveyed by Chatham House/YouGov (2014: 9), were questioned about the broader

role of ethics in UK foreign policy, there was a near even split between the respondents

favouring a foreign policy “based at least in part on ethical considerations, even if this

means sometimes not acting in Britain’s immediate national interest” (41 percent), and

those endorsing the view that “British foreign policy should pursue Britain’s national interest

at all times, even if this means doing things that some people regard as unethical” (42

percent).6 Although more respondents favoured national interest orientated foreign policy

over an ‘ethical orientation’ in all of the Chatham house surveys from 2010-2014, the gap

between the two standpoints has narrowed considerably – from 16 percentage points in

2010, to 10 points in 2012, to 1 point in 2014. There were also marked divides in

generational attitudes ,with those from the 18-24 group demonstrating a marked preference

for an ethically-minded foreign policy (52 per cent), whereas those from the 40-59 and 60+

age groups demonstrated an equally marked preference for a national-interest focussed

approach (44 per cent and 54 percent). In terms of social class, those of the higher

earning, skilled/professional ABC1 groups expressed a preference for an ethical foreign

policy (49 per cent), whereas those from the semi-skilled/unskilled, lower earning groups

favoured a national-interest orientated approach (48 per cent). Whilst these surveys

provide a relatively narrow window into the shared ideas about foreign policy, these splits in

opinion begin to suggest schisms within the internal ethical landscape of the UK, on the

appropriate location of ethical commitments in world politics.

Looking more directly at cosmopolitan-minded protective practices, other surveys

reveal varied degrees of enthusiasm, often demonstrating differentiated responses to the

principle of Other-regarding action in foreign policy, compared to the potential costs and

consequences of such action. A 2016 BBC World Service/Globescan survey7

demonstrated considerable support amongst UK respondents for refugee protection as a

matter of ethical principle, with 71 percent approving of accepting refugees fleeing conflict

6 Fieldwork conducted 6-12 August 2014. Sample size 2059.7 UK fieldwork conducted 22/02/2016 – 13/03/2016. UK sample size 1,005

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in other countries (BBC World Service/Globescan, 2016: 7). Amnesty International’s (2016:

7-11) Refugees Welcome Survey, suggests an even more cosmopolitan inclination

amongst UK respondents, with 84 percent supporting the concept of refugee reception, and

76 percent indicating a willingness to personally accept people fleeing persecution in either

their household or their neighbourhood. At the same time, this apparent enthusiasm for the

concept of refugee reception must be view against more negative perceptions of refugees

evident in other surveys. In the spring 2016 Pew Global Attitudes Survey8, 52 percent of

UK respondents felt that refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism, whilst 46 percent

considered refugees “a burden because they take our jobs and social benefits” (Wike et al,

2016: 31-32). Although refugee protection as an abstract ethical imperative appears well

supported, perceptions of the costs and consequences of offering such support draw out

wider, more communitarian-minded concerns which position the Other as a potential

economic and security threat.

Recent examinations of public opinion regarding British military power, have

suggested that the experience of the Iraq and Afghanistan has inhibited public enthusiasm

for overseas deployments (see Clements, 2013; Gribble et al, 2015; Berndtsson et al,

2015). The difficulties in marshalling support for military action were evident in the

government’s prominent Parliamentary defeat on more forthright intervention to protect

civilians in Syria in August 2013, with Iraq providing a distinctive backdrop to the debate. 9

Although, a range of factors contributed to this outcome, it is likely that MP’s were attuned

to widespread unease amongst their constituents about future overseas military

entanglements, where direct national interests were not clearly at stake. Gaskarth (2016:

727-730) argues that the fragility of public support and a deeper uncertainties about

Britain’s role in the world, ultimately provided the structural conditions that led to the ‘fiasco’

of the Syria vote. Looking more directly a public perceptions of armed humanitarian

intervention, Davies and Johns (2016: 129) similarly note the influence of Iraq and

Afghanistan in contaminating popular perceptions of both the moral justifications and

effectiveness of military operations to protect human rights. Their research reveals

evidence of support for the principle of armed humanitarian intervention, but with a

scepticism about the likely effectiveness of military action. This is similar to the tension

evident with refugee reception, between support for cosmopolitan-minded protective

8 UK fieldwork dates 04/04/2016 – 01/05/2016. UK sample size 1,4609 See Hansard HC Deb 29 Aug 2013, vol. 566, cols 1425–1436.

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practices as a matter of principle, but concern about the costs and consequences of these

same practices.

Surveys of public opinion provide only a partial account of the complex internal

ethical landscape of the UK and do not definitively suggest either the success or failure of

the government’s foreign policy narrative. They are also unable to fully map the complex

relationship between broader ethical outlooks, specific contexts and different forms of

cosmopolitan-minded practice. However, they do indicate significant levels of support for

cosmopolitan-minded practices, at least in principle. At the same time, this is juxtaposed

against more communitarian-minded outlooks, when direct connections are made to the

localised impact or the implications of protective practices. Broader views on the balance

between national interest and ethical commitments also suggest the presence of different

internal ethical constituencies, with divergent ideas about the scope of ethical commitments

in foreign policy. In this highly contested internal ethical landscape, the task of developing

a resonant foreign policy narrative that might draw together communitarian and

cosmopolitan-minded perspectives on Britain’s international priorities, appears challenging.

This complexities of the connecting domestic outlooks with foreign policy has not

gone unnoticed by British policymakers. Parliamentary reports have reflected upon the

constraints imposed by limited public engagement and emphasised the need for improved

‘strategic communication’ to bolster public support for foreign and security policy (H of C

Defence Committee, 2014a: 45; 2014b: 5; 2015: 5-6; Joint Committee on the National

Security Strategy, 2015: 16). Anxieties about public support for foreign policy and a sense

of a growing disconnect between state and society, have found themselves channelled into

a sense of identity crisis regarding Britain’s role in the world. The House of Commons

Defence Committee (2014b: 16) have suggested that the disconnect between the state and

the public cannot be bridged without the government “looking to explain what it believes the

UK’s position in the world could or should be, and the manner in which that is to be

delivered”. Similarly, the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s

Influence (2014: 19) have argued that:

…there needs to be a long-term strategic narrative about the international role of the UK, promulgated from the centre of Government. Innovative and imaginative Departments would interpret this narrative, with the freedom to use their initiative but with a clear understanding of how their responses fitted into the broader theme.

These developments begin to ask important questions about the societal foundations

necessary for different forms of foreign policy, particularly those related to protection of the

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world’s most vulnerable people. The British government’s response to the question of

foreign policy identity has been to articulate a narrative that might resonate with a British

public ambivalent about the practice of, but necessarily wholly opposed to the principle of

overseas ethical commitments. The narrative has emphasised ‘British values’, the

promotion of which are deemed to be in the UK national interest (Hague, 2010; FCO, 2015;

Conservative Party, 2017: 38-39). This does not necessarily represent a step away from

overseas ethical commitments as the ‘British values’ to be promoted – human rights,

democracy, gender equality and the rule of law – are very similar to the agenda promoted

within Labour’s foreign policy between 1997 and 2010.10 The narrative seeks to relocate the

universalism of liberal internationalism within the societal ethos of a specific bounded

community. There is a notable connection between British history and the development of

liberal thought. However, branding values now firmly embedded within the broader liberal

internationalist tradition as ‘British’, represents a more instrumental, and relatively crude,

attempt to frame a largely unchanged foreign policy agenda within narrower conceptions of

national identity.

The British foreign policy identity crisis of the post-War on Terror period, indicates

the difficulty in navigating the ethical intersection between a state-centric international order

and a nascent cosmopolitan consciousness. Normative progress, with at least a latent

cosmopolitan ethical concern, is evident in the relative resilience of key policies which

emphasize the wellbeing of non-citizens, alongside snapshots of public opinion that

suggests that these policies enjoy qualified popular support. However, the uneven

application of these policies has exposed the limitations of any cosmopolitan-minded

ideational current within UK foreign policy and its lack of coherence with narrower national

interests and more locally-rooted ethical frames of reference. The structural conditions

associated with ethical malaise draw attention to the domestic level and the absence of an

internal ideational consensus upon which a more explicitly cosmopolitan-minded foreign

policy might be crafted and more consistent practices of protection be established. In order

to provide a more solid foundation for consistent practices of civilian protection, greater

excavation of internal shared understandings and ethical outlooks thus important.

Excavating the Foundations of Ethical Foreign Policy

10 Whilst the term ‘British values’ has been used frequently since 2010, the precise content of these values is often less clear. Cameron’s (2015a) speech on extremism in 2015 provides some clarity on this – freedom of religion, freedom of speech, sexual equality, the rule of law and democracy are highlighted here.

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Some aspects of the malaise in recent British foreign policy, are undoubtedly linked

to the peculiarities of UK political culture. However broader questions can be extrapolated

about the ways in which Western foreign policies are anchored to an internal societal

consensus. Looking downward to the domestic level is an important pre-requisite for global

efforts to protect civilians from large-scale human rights abuse. Protecting vulnerable non-

citizens incurs political and economic costs that must be borne by the state and must be

seen as legitimate by the inhabitants of that state. If states are to consistently commit scare

resources to the wellbeing of vulnerable non-citizens, or even risk the lives of co-nationals

in armed humanitarian interventions, these activities must be guided by a foreign policy

narrative that articulates these responsibilities and stands to be accepted by the public.

Weldes (1996: 287) refers to a dual process of foreign policy ‘interpellation’ - the articulation

of ideas and interests by foreign policy elites, alongside the necessary internalisation of

them by the wider population, to the point where they are accepted as ‘common sense’.

Similarly, Holland’s (2011: 53) argues that “political possibility is not achieved in the

utterance alone, but rather relies upon the resonance of particular narratives of foreign

policy”. The challenge for cosmopolitan-minded foreign policy is to develop a narrative that

locates compassion, empathy with non-citizens and human moral solidarity, as resonant

and ‘common sense’ policy concerns akin to the communitarian-minded moral

responsibilities to co-nationals associated with national interest. The protection of

vulnerable non-citizens, either through armed humanitarian intervention or the welcoming of

refugees, poses particular challenges for the development of such resonance. They ask

difficult questions about the boundaries of citizenship, identity and responsibility, and run up

against well-developed forms of ‘psychological citizenship’ linked to national identity, and

deliberate state practices and socially constructed national myths that downplay cross-

border connections and the external influences that have shaped national culture (Sindic,

2011: 203-204; Axelsen, 2013: 453). This would explain the move away from ideas of a

universalised ‘doctrine of the international community’ in the narration of British foreign

policy, towards more narrowly framed ‘British values’, even if the content of each is largely

similar.

Nevertheless, questions about the boundaries of citizenship, identity and

responsibility may now have more complex and ambiguous answers. This creates the

space for the development of national identities that emphasize solidarity beyond the

national community, in keeping with ideas of a ‘communitarian path to cosmopolitanism’.

However, it also makes the development of a resonant foreign narrative a more difficult

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task. Beck (2006: 10) refers to a process of ‘banal cosmopolitanisation’, whereby our

everyday lives become “the locus of encounters and interminglings or, alternatively of

anonymous coexistence and the overlapping of possible worlds and global dangers, all of

which requires us to re-think the relation between place and the world”. For Benhabib

(2008: 47), a consequence of increasing interconnectedness are shifts in identity and the

emergence of “disaggregated citizenship" that “challenges the distinctions between citizens

and long-term residents, insiders and outsiders”. This process of ‘disaggregation’ is

characterised by the boundaries of identity and cultural affinity no longer being

automatically congruent with the Self-Other boundaries established by state citizenship.

Propelling this process of disaggregation or banal cosmopolitanisation, are the technologies

that have allowed transnational practices to become routine aspects of day-to-day life –

from watching global news media, to sending and receiving electronic communications, to

buying goods and services from around the world, to participating in the co-creation of

online content through Web 2.0 interfaces.

The emergence of Web 2.0 technologies, in particular those associated with social

media, have particular salience for the boundaries of identity and have significant

implications for influencing internal societal attitudes toward state foreign policy and on the

boundaries of moral concern. Foreign policy formulations, pronouncements and actions are

now subject to scrutiny by a much wider range of actors, with greater immediacy and with

the state less able to control the mediums through which such discussion takes place. Such

wide and diverse networks of communication might arguably promote the types of cross-

border moral solidarity that might provide a more stable foundation for cosmopolitan-

minded foreign policy. At the same time, new modes of communication have also been

used as powerful conduits for the messages of both the US Alt-right and populist nationalist

movements across Europe. The interconnected present and future is not automatically a

cosmopolitan-minded one, and its processes present two important manifestations when

considering the internal construction of foreign policy. In each case they complicate the

process of formulating the kind of resonant cosmopolitan-minded foreign policy narrative,

necessary to sustain more consistent and ambitious practices of civilian protection.

Overlapping Internal Identity Constituencies

Perhaps the foundational ‘myth’ of the modern sovereign state is one of a bordered

political community who share a homogenous national identity. Although opinions and

ideological outlooks may create cleavages within the national community, when placed in

an international context, there is an implicit assumption of a unified community, with a

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shared national interest that can be pursued through foreign policy. Barkawi and Brighton

(2013: 1113) contend that “the properties of this object of strategy (the state), its power,

interests, social and political coherence, are understood as singular, bounded and internally

stable over time”. The idealised vision of internal coherence sits uneasily in the context of

Western states, where technologically-driven processes of globalisation have re-shaped

senses of identity and place in the world, creating varied and overlapping internal identity

constituencies, with differing levels of moral connection to those beyond state borders.

Internal identity constituencies that align closely with a cosmopolitan ethical outlook

– characterised by trans-border empathy and a sense of responsibility to vulnerable human

beings, irrespective of national citizenship – would seem an obvious point at which foreign

policy commitments to civilian protection might resonate. For Calhoun (2002),

cosmopolitan identities of this kind are frequently connected to well-educated, relatively

affluent and well-travelled segments of the population, suggesting that such a worldview is

arguably a middle class disposition. In Britain, this connection was hinted at in the 2016 EU

referendum, were support for continued British membership of the EU was typically

associated with those having higher levels of educational attainment and engaged in

managerial and professional occupations.11 The referendum also revealed distinctive

generational cleavages on the question of connection to larger transnational community,

with voters in the 18-24 age group demonstrating strong support for remaining, whilst the

majority of those over 55 voting to leave the EU (National Centre for Social Research,

2017).12 Given that the economic risks of British withdrawal from the EU also appealed to

national self-interest concerns, individual support for continued British membership does

not automatically suggest the presence of a defined cosmopolitan consciousness.

However, it is indicative of at least latent personal affinity with, or acquiescence to, the

underlying cosmopolitan values of the EU - internationalism, support for trans-border

citizenship and an embrace of new forms of political community.

At the same time, new-nationalist and anti-cosmopolitan sentiments that have found

their expression within European politics, in opposition to immigration, regional identities

and the governance structures fostered by the EU. Despite the long-term presence of

11 Of the respondents to the 2016 ‘British Social Attitudes Survey’ who held a university degree, 78 per cent supported remaining in the EU, compared to 28 per cent support amongst those with no academic qualifications. Conversely, 72 per cent of respondents with no academic qualifications reported having voted to leave (National Centre for Social Research, 2017).12 Of those polled, 72 per cent of the 18-24 age group, and 63 per cent of the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups reported voting to remain in the EU. This can be contrasted with 55 per cent of those aged 55-64 and 63 per cent of those aged 65+ who voted to leave.

14

Euro-scepticism in British political culture, the polarisation between two distinctive internal

identity constituencies, with different relationships to globalisation, became starkly apparent

in the 2016 referendum. The vote to leave the EU was a significant indicator of the

influence of populist nationalism and an underlying rejection cross-border identity and

solidarity. Close connections were evident between voting to leave the EU, opposition to

immigration and personal affinities with narrower conceptions of English, as opposed to

British, national identity (National Centre for Social Research, 2017). The attempts by elite-

level policymakers to embrace and foster anti-cosmopolitan sentiment following the

referendum, provide possible indications of a coming challenge to the presence of Other-

regarding ethical commitments in UK foreign policy.13 Similar forms of populist nationalism

have also been a feature in the electoral landscape across Europe, as economic crisis

prompts a return to more inward-looking and exclusionary forms of identity community in

the face of competition for state resources. The rise of the National Front in France and the

Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) in Germany are indicative of such trends in other

prominent European states. In the US, the election of Donald Trump in the 2016

Presidential election, reflected the mainstreaming of a similar inward-looking, anti-

immigration electoral platform. Predictably, the hardening of the divide between new

nationalist and more globally-connected cosmopolitan identity constituencies within

Western states, presents significant obstacles to the development of an internal consensus

on overseas ethical commitments in state policy.

The theme of global connection also casts light on the multicultural composition of

internal foreign policy constituencies, following patterns of widespread migration in the post-

World War II era. Barkawi and Brighton (2014: 1119) argue that the UK’s attempts to craft

a unifying foreign policy strategy have largely ignored the subjectivities, hybrid identities

and international connections of those who have migrated from formerly colonised

societies. UK census data indicates a notable decline in the percentage of the British

population identifying as white – from 94.1 percent in 1991, to 91.3 percent in 2001, to 86

percent in 2011.14 Minority ethnic populations represent a location for different

understandings of British identity and history, with unique forms of connection with societies

beyond UK borders. However, whilst the experiences of immigrant communities are

13 Incoming Prime Minister Theresa May’s (2016) suggestion that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means” is an indicator of this trajectory14 Office for National Statistics, “Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales: 2011”. Available from: http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/articles/ethnicityandnationalidentityinenglandandwales/2012-12-11 (accessed 12th October 2016)

15

intrinsically linked to global population movement and transnational connection, this does

not automatically make them cosmopolitan in outlook or necessarily predisposed to

identification with a global moral community. What it does indicate is an ever more complex

and globally connected internal landscape, within which differing internal constituencies

may produce conflicting or complementary accounts of national interests and ethical

connection upon which foreign policy platforms might be founded. It is against this complex

ideational backdrop, of class, education, ethnic and inter-generational division that future

UK policymakers will be required to develop foreign policies that represent the interests of

the UK ‘nation’ and define its ethical relationship with the outside world. Whilst widespread

and self-conscious adoption of cosmopolitan ethical identities may not yet be a reality, the

existence of a communitarian ethical consensus within the British national community,

around which a clear sense of national interest might be formulated, is also less clearly

evident.

‘Moral Microbursts’ and the Transience of Moral Concern15

Similar challenges emerge when examining the connections between hyper-

connectivity, the pace of communication and the transience of moral concern. The almost

real-time speed at which news and opinion on current events can be communicated has

had a notable impact in ‘raising awareness’ about the suffering of vulnerable people beyond

and at the margins of state borders. The viral campaign video Kony 2012, watched over

100 million times since March 2012, was highly influential in generating public concern

about the activities of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. Similarly successful

has been the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter campaign, launched in response to the

kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014. The

prevalence of camera-equipped and internet-enabled smartphones has created openings

for forms of citizen journalism and ‘camera witnessing’, which allow activists and victims of

human rights abuse, to supplant professional media outlets in capturing the attention and

influencing moral consciousness of Western publics (Anden Papadopoulos, 2013). The

Burmese Monks’ protests of 2007, the Tahir Square uprising in Egypt in 2011 and the

suffering of Syrian civilians throughout the civil war, have been closely associated with

citizen camera witnessing and rapid dissemination using video hosting websites like

Youtube and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. These are the product

15 A microburst is a metrological term used to describe a sudden and powerful downward air current, a common hazard in aviation. The use here is obviously metaphorical.

16

of what Castells (2008: 86) refers to as “turbulences of information in a diversified media

system, and of the emergence of spontaneous, ad hoc mobilizations using horizontal,

autonomous networks of communication”. These networks allow first-hand accounts of the

harm being done to vulnerable non-citizens to be communicated to distant audiences in real

time, unmediated by traditional media sources.

Such communication networks would seem like potential drivers of trans-border

empathy and moral concern, which might help to construct a solid domestic foundation for

the presence of overseas ethical commitments in Western foreign policy. Indeed, social-

media driven campaigns have had some direct influence in supporting the politics of

protection at the elite level. For Kony 2012, a central campaign objective was to stimulate

popular support for an existing programme of US military involvement in Uganda, an explicit

objective of which was the protection of civilians.16 Although ascertaining the precise

influence of the campaign on elite decision making is difficult, following the wide visibility of

Kony 2012, Obama (2012) made the renewed commitment that “our advisors will continue

their efforts to bring this madman to justice, and to save lives”. Similar influences on the

politics of protection were noticeable in the British government’s decision in September

2015, to extend the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme to accept 20,000 Syrian

refugees over a five year period (see Cameron, 2015b). Although this was an expansion of

an existing programme, the timing of the decision appeared heavily influenced by the

outpouring of public sympathy in response to viral dissemination of a photo of the body of a

drowned Syrian child, Alan Kurdi, who had died five days earlier as his family attempted to

cross the Mediterranean to seek refuge in Europe.

The limitation of social media driven awareness-raising as a foundation for

consistent ethical foreign policy, lies in the potential transience of such moral concern. In

the case of Kony 2012, the video campaign was itself very successful, reaching 100 million

views in just six days. However, the drop off in attention was swift, declining from a peak of

16.5 million views per day in the first week of release, to 5.8 million views per day the week

after, and 360,000 views per day a month later (Visible Measures, 2012). Moreover, the

‘Cover the Night’ flyposting campaign the video attempted to mobilise in April 2012 fell flat,

with very few of those who had shared the video choosing to participate in the action

(Carroll, 2012). Forms of ethical action like Kony 2012 and #BringBackOurGirls are

prominent examples of ‘clicktivism’ – a non-committal and easily replicable form of online 16 Prior to the Kony 2012 campaign the US had already committed to “support multilateral efforts to protect civilians and eliminate the threat posed by the Lords Resistance Army” in the ‘Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act’, passed by Congress on 25 August 2010.

17

activism, based on communicating awareness of a particular political issue to others

through social networking sites (Halupka, 2014). Sharing a link or posting a concerned

comment on social media allows individuals to demonstrate a sense of trans-border moral

solidarity, without the requirement to contribute in a more direct manner to the social and

political changes necessary to make the subjects of one’s moral concern less vulnerable.

Miller (2017) argues that social media activism represents a form of ‘phatic communication’

– a limited form of ‘expressive solidarity’, directed more towards establishing connection

with like-minded others and curating one’s own digital self-image, than shaping practical

action in the real world. Rapid online dissemination of images and awareness-raising

campaigns can result in a ‘moral microburst’, a sudden wave of public consciousness on a

specific issue, which may demand a response from policymakers, but that also ebbs away

very quickly. Opportunities to locate societal anchor points for cosmopolitan-minded foreign

policy are thus simultaneously enabled and constrained. Enabled, by sudden surges of

trans-border moral concern to which foreign policymakers might anchor overseas ethical

commitments, but also constrained by the transience of such moral concern and the

apparent shallowness of ambition to effect practical change. Ironically, the same

technological developments that have contributed to processes of cosmopolitanisation by

facilitating easier contact with distant strangers, also create significant challenges for the

development of a cosmopolitan-minded foreign policy orientation. Responding to this

challenge will involve a clearer negotiation of the divergent identities within states, the

varied subjects of moral concern and the technological mediums through which ethical

contestation takes place, and to understand how the acceptable parameters of overseas

ethical action are constituted within a society and by whom.

ConclusionPractices aimed at the protection of vulnerable non-citizens are intrinsically

connected to a cosmopolitan ethical outlook, in the regard for all human beings irrespective

of territorial location as important ethical reference points. However, the expansion of

civilian protection concepts and practices, whether associated with international

development, refugee protection or armed humanitarian intervention, takes place within a

state-centred international arrangement, with states as the key agents of protection.

Consequently, cosmopolitan-minded practices of protection inevitably intersect with the

more communitarian-minded responsibilities to the national interest, in the formulation and

articulation of foreign policy. As these protective practices involve financial costs and

18

potentially greater competition for scarce resources within the Self community, they face

significant legitimacy burden compared with traditional national interest priorities. To

provide a solid intra-societal foundation for the consistent protective practices, such

cosmopolitan minded responsibilities require a foreign policy narrative that both articulates

their relevance as key foreign policy objectives and one that resonates with domestic

audiences.

However, the internal character of Western societies presents considerable

difficulties for states wishing to make a more consistent contribution to international efforts

to protect vulnerable non-citizens. Fluid and diverse internal identity constituencies, within

increasingly networked and ‘e-enabled’ populations, create a wide potential range of ethical

preferences and interests, making the construction of a resonant cosmopolitan-minded

narrative more difficult. Moreover, the ‘moral microbursts’ that emerge from the viral

dissemination of images or stories of overseas human suffering are likely to result in

increasing demand for immediate civilian protection responses to complex problems of

which the public’s understanding is fairly shallow. As much as states co-create an

international normative civilian protection architecture – whether related to development

assistance, the R2P or norms on refugee reception – those within a society now play a

potentially more significant role in influencing the parameters of state actions in relation to

the implementation of such norms. The result is a confusing and complex ethical terrain,

one reflecting an intersection between a bordered world of ostensibly sovereign states with

individual foreign policies, and more globalised, and potentially cosmopolitan, polities.

Looking downward to the domestic level might necessitate more expansive

ethnographic approaches to better understand the complex ethical landscape in which

foreign policies are constructed. Recent turns towards explorations of everyday narratives

of political life may also become pertinent for both foreign policy analysis and the advocacy

of cosmopolitan ethics (see Stanley and Jackson, 2016: 223-235). Developing a stronger

internal foundation for cosmopolitan-minded foreign policies might involve accepting that

ideas of the national interest and overseas ethical responsibilities are open to contestation

and re-invention by divergent internal identity constituencies. Improving popular legitimacy

for cosmopolitan-minded foreign policies is likely to necessitate more open forms of

contestation, ethical debate and, potentially the co-creation of foreign policy, acknowledging

that sudden surges of trans-border moral concern and accompanying citizen-led action may

become a feature of the new ethical landscape. The challenge of creating the processes

and institutional mechanisms to support this widened form of ethical engagement, is one

19

that might require a potentially radical re-imagining of the parameters of both diplomacy and

foreign policy development.

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