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“Building Alliances or Rallying the Base:Civil Religious Rhetoric and the Modern Presidency”
Flavio Hickel Jr. Ph.D. – June 2018
Abstract
Civil Religious rhetoric has been utilized throughout American history to legitimize political
interests by drawing upon broadly shared beliefs regarding the nation’s identity, meaning, and
purpose in the world. While scholars have traditionally assumed this rhetoric was employed to
unify the nation others contend that it has the potential to exacerbate conflict as policy debates
morph into battles over the national identity. This research project analyzes presidential
speeches from Franklin Roosevelt through Barack Obama (1939-2012) and finds that the type of
speech delivered, public approval of the president, and the partisan composition of Congress
influence the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. It concludes that modern presidents have
more often relied upon civil religion to rally the partisan base than build alliances with the
opposition.
Introduction
These economic royalists complain that we seek to overthrow the institutions of America. What they really complain of is that we seek to take away their power. Our allegiance to American institutions requires the overthrow of this kind of power. In vain they seek to hide behind the Flag and the Constitution. In their blindness they forget what the Flag and the Constitution stand for. Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the over-privileged alike. (Franklin Roosevelt, Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1936)
But rarely in any time does an issue lay bare the sacred heart of America itself. Rarely are we met with a challenge, not to our growth or abundance, our welfare or our security, but rather to the values and the purposes and the meaning of our beloved nation. The issue of equal rights for American Negroes is such an issue. (Lyndon Johnson, “American Promise” Major Speech, 1965)
And that’s why our focus is the values, the principles, and the ideas that made America great. Let’s be clear on this point. We’re for limited government, because we understand, as the Founding Fathers did, that it is the best way of
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ensuring personal liberty and empowering the individual so that every American of every race and region shares fully in the flowering of American prosperity and freedom. (Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, 1988)
Regardless of partisan evaluations, few would deny that Presidents Roosevelt, Johnson, and
Reagan all presided over and guided major transformations in American government and society.
As these excerpts illustrate, each leveraged their rhetorical skills to convince the public and
Congress that their preferred policies and broader political agenda were not only good for
America, but also consistent with the nation’s historic identity, meaning, and purpose in the
world. Rhetoric such as this may be characterized as Civil Religion - a set of broadly shared
beliefs, myths, and symbols, derived from the United States’ founding and history, which reflect
ideas about the sacred and transcendental nature of the American experience. (Bellah, 1967;
West, 1980)
Scholars have traditionally argued that civil religion would have a unifying effect upon the
populace as this shared American identity supersedes those characterized by partisanship,
ethnicityi, geography, or religion. (Bellah, 1967) There is no shortage of studies which
document presidents’ use of civil religion for these purposes (Adams, 1987; Pierard and Linder,
1988; Roof, 2009). Contentious political issues such as immigration policy (Beasley, 2004), the
cold war arms race (Ungar, 1991), and military interventions (Haberski, 2012) have in part been
legitimized through the use of civil religious rhetoric. Collectively, this “Traditional View” of
civil religion suggests that presidents should be more likely to employ such rhetoric when facing
public and/or congressional opposition - a scenario in which the unifying and legitimizing effects
of civil religion offers the potential to overcome political resistance.
However, civil religious rhetoric is not employed in an ideological vacuum. A frequent
critique of the Traditional view of civil religious scholarship has been its failure to adequately
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address the extent to which elites can manipulate these beliefs in the course of political conflict.
(Cristi, 1997; Demerath and Williams, 1985; Williams and Alexander, 1994; Wuthnow, 1988)
The image of civil religion in America as a canopy of shared values, operating exclusively in terms of consensus and social cohesion turns attention away from the role that civil religion plays in defining (or obscuring) national self-understanding; stabilizing (or upsetting) social and national expectations, its sense of destiny and mission; maintaining (or undermining) social values and beliefs; strengthening (or weakening) social consensus; relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions (Cristi, 1997).
Accordingly, the coupling of civil religious themes with partisan goals sends a message that a
particular course of action is not only consistent with the American identity, but often necessary
to maintain that identityii. While civil religious rhetoric may be music to the ears of ideological
compatriots, it also suggests that the opposition is not only wrong, but un-American. As such,
civil religious rhetoric carries a political cost by diminishing a president’s capacity to find
common ground as policy debates morph into pitched battles over the national identity. This
“Critical View” of civil religion suggests that while the deployment of this rhetoric can serve as a
rallying cry for the political base, it may be ill-advised as a means of reaching out to the
opposition.
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of public approval and partisan
composition of Congress on the prevalence of civil religious language in modern presidential
speeches. While it is beyond the scope of this project to examine the specific motivations of a
president and his speechwriters in each particular case, the results of this analysis allow us to
conclude whether this rhetoric has generally been employed in accordance with the expectations
of the Traditional or Critical view of civil religious scholarship.
Making use of a unique dataset that quantitatively analyzes 180 speeches spanning the
presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt through Barack Obama (1939-2012), I conclude that the
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prevalence of civil religious language varies according to the type of speech delivered, public
approval of the president, and the partisan composition of Congress. Civil religion was more
prevalent while presidents were articulating a vision for their campaign and future presidency
(Inaugural Address and Nomination Acceptance Speeches) than when explaining policy
decisions made in the course of governing (Major Speeches and State of the Union Addresses).
Furthermore, presidents were more likely to rely on this rhetoric as their partisan majority in both
Houses of Congress increased; lending credence to the Critical view of civil religion. The
influence of public approval of the president on civil religious rhetoric was contingent on the
partisan composition as well. When neither party enjoys a partisan legislative advantage,
popular presidents rely more heavily on civil religion to increase the political pressure on
Congress. However, when the president enjoys an overwhelming partisan advantage in
Congress, public approval had a negative effect upon the prevalence of civil religion. Under
these conditions, presidential success is already reasonably assured and they are unwilling to
incur the costs of employing such rhetoric. Collectively, the evidence suggests that the
deployment of civil religious rhetoric is more likely to be motivated by a desire to rally the
partisan base than build alliances with the opposition.
This study not only advances our understanding of civil religion’s role in presidential
communication but also contributes to the study of the rhetorical presidency more broadly.
Shogan (2007) argues that moral rhetoric is a means by which presidents establish their
credibility and nurture existing authority but that its utility depends on the presence of supporting
circumstances. Knowing how presidents adjust their rhetorical strategies in response to the
political environment provides insight into the circumstances that they consider to be favorable
and the motivations behind this behavior. It also paves the way to a more sophisticated
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appreciation for the limits of their influence, the conditions under which they may be successful,
and more accurate predictions for how they will behave in the future. (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010)
I begin with a theoretical overview of civil religion before considering the literature on
presidential rhetoric and the theoretical expectations derived from applying the insights of the
latter with the former. I then describe the research design and present the results before offering
some concluding remarks.
Civil Religion
Robert Bellah initiated a flurry of academic interest in civil religion when he asserted the
existence of a “public religious dimension expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals” that
“played a crucial role in the development of American institutions” (Bellah, 1967). He
conceptualized civil religion as an organic source of unity and integration for a diverse and
secularized society; one that provided cultural legitimacy for its political institutions with a
transcendental understanding of American history. The defining feature of civil religion is the
belief in the sanctity and inviolability of the American identity and its constitutive principles.
Artifacts (e.g. American Flag, Declaration of Independence), events (e.g. Nation’s Founding,
Memorial Day), and heroes (e.g. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln) from the past were
sanctified and mythologized to provide a means by which Americans understood their nation’s
identity, meaning, and purpose in the world. Furthermore, the existence of sacred beliefs and
practices necessarily implies that there are also consequences for their violation. It is the fear of
these consequences that has allowed civil religion to serve as an evaluative standard by which
the legitimacy of the political system and its institutions could be judged. (Bellah, 1992) While
this has often found expression in explicit references to God, a Covenant, or American
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Exceptionalism, they are not necessary to evoke ideas about the inviolability of the American
identity and values.
In the years that followed Bellah’s initial publication, scholars documented the existence of
civil religious beliefs among the public (Christenson & Wimberley, 1978), its effects upon
electoral and policy preferences (Wimberley, 1980; Wimberley & Christenson, 1982; Chapp
2012), and that such beliefs were clearly distinguishable from “church religion” (Coleman, 1970;
Flere & Lavric, 2007; West, 1980; Wimberley et al, 1976). There have also been a number of
insightful qualitative analyses to illustrate the manner in which civil religion has been utilized to
provide legitimacy for immigration policy (Beasley, 2004), the cold war arms race (Ungar, 1991)
and military interventions throughout American history (Haberski, 2012).
Impressive as this body of research may be, it takes for granted that members of society
uniformly interpret civil religious entities in a manner that breeds consensus and cohesion. As a
consequence, this Traditional view of civil religion often fails to adequately address the potential
for division when elites manipulate the meanings of these beliefs in the course of political
conflict. (Cristi, 1997; Demerath & Williams, 1985; Williams & Alexander, 1994) Whillock
(1994) argues that “American civil religion is essentially a study of competing groups who are
seeking to define what America is and the morality that should prevail.” Similarly Wuthnow’s
work (1988) focuses on the alternative civil religious visions of America articulated by liberals
and conservatives and notes that they “have been the subject of disagreement and polarization
more than of consensus and mutual understanding.” This Critical view of civil religion is not
only more consistent with the literature on “multiple traditions” (Smith 1993), and conflict over
the American Creed (Huntington, 1981), but also encourages researchers to analyze the
polarizing potential of civil religious rhetoric.
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As such, civil religion will be defined here as a set of broadly shared beliefs, myths, and
symbols, derived from the United States’ founding and history, which reflect ideas about the
sacred and transcendental nature of the nation’s identity, meaning, and purpose in the world.
While these civil religious entities are themselves non-ideological, their meanings can be
manipulated and deployed by political actors to legitimize or mask their own ideological agenda.
What is novel about my definition of civil religion is that it is related to but analytically
distinct from ideology, which I define as a set of coherently related shared beliefs and issue
positions that are held by a social class or group, which reflect a set of tangible or intangible
group or self interests, and which influence and legitimize political behaviors and relationships
of poweriii. Although these conceptualizations of ideology and civil religion share some
elements, they differ in that the former reflect a set of coherent issue positions and the latter has
no inherent connection to any particular policyiv. In other words, the association between civil
religious entities and policy/conduct is politically contested. Ideology influences and legitimizes
political behaviors and relationships of power by presenting them as “being in the ‘common
good’ or as generally accepted.” (Williams & Demerath, 1991) However, because ideologies
reflect social class or group interests, they are naturally divisive. In contrast, civil religious
entities are widely shared and culturally significant, and therefore serve as one means by which
these particular ideological interests may be presented as being in the common good.
This conceptualization of civil religion guided the coding of presidential speeches and
hypotheses generated for this project. However, before detailing the procedures for the former, I
will review the literature on presidential rhetoric in the modern context as it pertains to civil
religion so as to generate a set of plausible hypotheses.
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The Civil Religious Rhetoric of the Modern Presidency
The overriding narrative in the evolution of the American Presidency is the incremental
accumulation of power and influence by which occupants of the executive office are expected to
assert their authority as the sole representative of the entire nation to advance a truly “national”
agenda (Greenstein, 1978). However, because of our Constitutional system of checks and
balances, the ability to exert leadership and/or avoid challenges to presidential authority is not
guaranteed; it often depends upon having the support of Congress. For example, a hostile
legislative branch can deny the president necessary funding for his initiatives, launch
investigations into his conduct, or pursue an alternative political agenda (among other actions
that could threaten a president’s leadership and authority). Historical accounts demonstrate that
presidents believe their legislative success is powerfully influenced by their standing with the
public (Edwards III, 2009) and analysis of Congressional activity corroborates this expectation
(Bond and Wood, 2003; Rivers and Rose, 1985). Furthermore, Gronke and Wilson (2003) have
found that the electoral prospects of members of Congress are influenced by whether they
support the president in accordance with the desires of their constituents. As such, the president
has an interest in maintaining a high level of support among both Congress and the public.
Civil religion is theorized to be one means by which a president can maintain and generate
this support. As the symbolic representative of the American identity (Bellah, 1967; Adams,
1987; Pierard and Linder, 1988) and most influential actor in our government (Cohen, 1995;
Hill, 1998; Kernell, 2007), the president is arguably well positioned to articulate a civil religious
discourse that can impact public opinion and the political process. Zarefsky (2004) notes that
“because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the
president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals
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are viewed by the public.” On the other hand, presidential scholars have also argued that the
effectiveness of these powers has been exaggerated (Edwards, 2003) and point to the constraints
imposed by changes in the media environment (Cohen, 2004), partisan/ideological
predispositions of the public and legislators (Lee, 2008), and the general lack of attentiveness
toward political matters by much of the public (Converse, 1964; Delli, Carpini, and Keeter,
1996).
Although the capacity for the president to influence public opinion and the political agenda is
debatable, few would deny that presidents have increasingly relied on official speeches in an
attempt to enhance their authority and leadership (Tulis, 1987) and that civil religion is an
important component in these efforts. (Beasley, 2001; Schonhardt-Baily et al., 2012) A wealth
of literature has demonstrated that the strategic decision to deliver a speech is influenced by
changes in public approval, the economy, and foreign events. (Brace and Hickley, 1993;
Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010; Ragsdale, 1984) However, the factors which may influence the decision
to deliver a speech are not always the same as those that influence its content. Shogan’s (2007)
research demonstrates that the presence of war and economic turmoil had no appreciable effect
on the moral content of State of the Union and Inaugural Addresses. Similarly, although the
presence of divided government does not influence the quantity of presidential speeches
delivered (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010; Lewis, 1997; McGauvran and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2017), that
context does have an impact on the policies proposed by presidents (Cohen, 2011) and their
willingness to engage in partisan rhetoric (Rhodes, 2014).
What is largely missing in the literature is a comprehensive analysis of the contextual factors
that influence the relative frequency of civil religious rhetoric employed by modern presidents.
The potential influence of public approval and partisan composition of Congress on speech
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content is of particular interest since the existing scholarship is inconclusive. Although Shogan’s
(2007) regression analysis failed to detect a significant relationship between divided government
and moral rhetoric, her work did not control for public approval of the presidentv or its
interaction with the partisan composition of Congress. Furthermore her case studies
simultaneously suggest that moral rhetoric is a good strategy when Congress threatens to assume
leadership on an issue or when public support is marginal but a bad strategy when the president
is in a position of weak political authority (Shogan, 2007).
The logic of the Traditional view of civil religion suggests that it is precisely at those
moments when the president faces heightened opposition from Congress and the public that the
unifying potential of this rhetoric provides the greatest benefits to leadership. Existing studies
demonstrate that the president’s agenda setting power is diminished under divided government
(Cummins, 2006) as are the prospects of his legislative agenda (Franklin and Fix, 2016). Given
the numerous veto points in which a majority opposition party in either house of Congress may
quash a president’s preferred policies, it is intuitive to assume that the latter will seek to build
bridges with the former to avoid a legislative defeat. While a moderation of policy positions
could accomplish this (Cohen, 2011), a president may alternatively seek to convince or pressure
the opposition by appealing to a shared national identity. The Traditional view of civil religion
theorizes that increasing the salience of an American identity relative to partisan identities
reduces the bias associated with the latter. In other words, this rhetoric calls for the populace to
put aside partisan animosities and ideological preferences and prioritize policies which are
consistent with the American identity and sacred values (as articulated by the president). In the
context of divided government, such actions serve to put pressure on a recalcitrant Congress and
provide them with the ability to “defend their votes as supporting a president [or American
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interests] rather than on substantive policy grounds alone” (Edwards III, 2009). While it is
beyond the scope of this project to evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts, we should expect to
find that presidents increasingly rely on civil religion as their congressional majorities diminish
and public approval is on the decline.
Hypothesis #1: Consistent with the Traditional view of civil religion, the frequency of civil religious rhetoric will be positively associated with partisan congressional opposition to the president and declining public support for the president.
On the other hand, given the well documented difficulties associated with overcoming
partisan bias (Edwards, 2003; Lee, 2008) a healthy dose of skepticism regarding civil religion’s
capacity to deliver on these promises is warranted. The conceptual weakness of the Traditional
view of civil religion is the failure to appreciate the cost associated with this type of rhetoric. In
contrast, the Critical view of civil religion asserts that such rhetoric may alienate a president’s
opponents and exacerbate conflict as policy debates evolve into battles over the national identity.
Those who share a partisan affiliation with the president should respond with greater enthusiasm
for their shared policy goals since they are now framed as being consistent with the national
identity, meaning, and purpose in the world. This expectation is consistent with the work of
Canes-Wrone (2006) who demonstrates that presidents avoid making public appeals on policy
issues that the public disagrees with. Conversely, his partisan opponents may be less inclined to
assent given that their preferred policy options are now implicitly or explicitly framed as “un-
American.” In contrast to the Traditional view of civil religion, this suggests that employing
such rhetoric while the power of a president’s partisan opponents is ascendant or his public
support is in decline will reduce the prospects for success as political compromises become more
elusive. However, these properties render civil religion an ideal leadership tool under united
government or when congressional majorities are marginal. In these circumstances, legislative
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success depends more on maintaining the support of your base and is less contingent upon
bargaining with the opposition. Furthermore, rhetorical attacks against the opposition serve to
rally the base against a common enemy while simultaneously delegitimizing the former’s
concerns and potentially their resolve. This expectation is consistent with Rhodes’s (2014)
discovery of a positive association between unified government and rhetorical attacks on the
opposition.
Hypothesis #2: Consistent with the Critical view of civil religion, the frequency of civil religious rhetoric will have a positive relationship with partisan congressional support for the president and increasing public support for the president.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the purpose of civil religious rhetoric (for the Critical or
Traditional view) is to enhance the influence and authority of the president. It stands to reason
that the relative utility of this rhetoric declines as the president’s prospects for success increase.
When the president enjoys extreme levels of public support and large partisan majorities in
Congress his prospects for success are relatively assured; there is therefore less benefit to be
gained from employing civil religious rhetoric. Because the Critical view of civil religion
conceptualizes a cost associated with articulating such rhetoric, we should expect to find that
presidents eschew these costs when they are already confident in their prospects for success.
This is consistent with Canes-Wrone’s (2006) analysis demonstrating that presidents avoid
making public appeals when they can expect legislative success without it.
Hypothesis #3: Consistent with the Critical view of civil religion, the frequency of civil religious rhetoric will have a negative relationship with very high levels of public approval of the president and very strong partisan majorities in Congress.
Civil Religious Rhetoric and Speech Type
This research is primarily concerned with exploring the effects of public opinion of the
president and the partisan composition of Congress on the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric.
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However, it is also likely that the type of speech delivered will have an impact on the relative use
of this rhetoric. Although no formal comparison of the relative prevalence of civil religious
rhetoric between speech types exist, the literature on presidential communications clearly
demonstrates that important differences in the form and purpose of Inaugural Addresses
(Campbell and Jamieson, 1985), State of the Union Addresses (Schonhardt-Bailey et al, 2012),
Campaign Speeches (Chapp, 2012; Tetlock, 1981), and Major Speeches (Brace and Hinckley,
1993; Coe and Neumann, 2011).
Robert Bellah has asserted that the Inaugural Address is an “important ceremonial event” for
American civil religion, and this claim has been corroborated by content analyses which have
found ample evidence of civil religious language in these speeches (Beasley, 2001; Pierard and
Linder, 1988; Toolin, 1983). Campbell and Jamieson (1985) argue that the Inaugural Address is
of a “distinct rhetorical type” compared to other presidential communication because of their
tendency to:
(1) unify the audiences by reconstituting it as “the people” who witness and ratify the ceremony; (2) rehearse shared values drawn from the past; (3) enunciate the political principles that will guide the new administration; (4) demonstrate that the president appreciates the requirements and limitations of executive power; and (5) achieves these ends through means appropriate to epideictic discoursevi (Campbell and Jamieson, 1985).
Although not mentioned by name, these tendencies share much in common with the
conceptualization of civil religion articulated in this study and reflected in Beasley’s (2001)
documentation of the manner in which such rhetoric has been employed to generate unity and
ideological consensus in these speeches. Furthermore, Sigelman’s (1996) study of these
speeches demonstrates a general increase in the prevalence of unifying symbols and references to
traditional American values throughout U.S. history.
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While considerably more scholarship has been devoted to understanding the role of civil
religion in Inaugural Addresses, the literature suggests that the prevalence of this rhetoric may be
influenced by the degree of policy specificity generally found in different types of speeches.
Although their work does not explicitly compare the two speech types, Schonhardt-Bailey et al,
(2012) argue that “unlike Inaugurals, State of the Union speeches tend to be more policy
prescriptive and so are less likely to embellish upon the broader, more principled rhetoric of civil
religion.” This suggests that civil religion is stylistically better suited to speeches that seek to
discuss policy in broad strokes rather than fine detail. Campbell and Jamieson (1985) note that
when policy proposals are employed in Inaugural Addresses they serve as “illustrations of the
political philosophy of the president” while those in the State of the Union Address reflect “a call
to immediate actionvii.” Furthermore, Coe and Neumann (2011) argue that because Inaugural
Addresses are a “ceremonial genre” they are theoretically less likely than Major Speeches to
discuss policy in a deliberative manner. According to Brace and Hinckley (1993) the latter is
strategically delivered to explain difficult decisions that have the potential to result in declining
public approval. While civil religious rhetoric may be a component of such efforts, it reasonable
to assume that more emphasis will be placed on substance over symbolism in this context. We
might therefore extrapolate from these insights that because State of the Union Addresses and
Major Speeches are less ceremonial and more likely to dwell on policy details, that they will
feature comparatively less civil religious language than Inaugural Addresses out of stylistic
concerns.
These insights can also be applied to presidential campaign speeches which are more likely
to exhibit simplistic, sweeping generalizations than the more nuanced, complex explanations of
policy offered while in office (Tetlock, 1981; Thoemmes and Conway III, 2007). While this
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account does not posit a ceremonial function to campaign speeches in the way we ascribe that
status to an Inaugural Address, Chapp’s (2012) analysis demonstrates that appeals to civil
religion were highly prevalent when candidates spoke of religionviii. Furthermore, it may be
argued that because Nomination Acceptances Speeches aim to strike a delicate balance between
articulating a policy platform and presenting a broad vision for their candidacy and tenure in
office - a vision which is often expressed as being consistent with the national identity, meaning,
and purpose in the world - they more closely approximate the form and function of an Inaugural
Address than other campaign speeches. Several authors have gone so far as to assert that the
Nomination Acceptance Speech functions as a civil religious jeremiad where candidates assert
their consistency with the past and admonish their opponents for their misunderstanding of
America’s sacred mission. (Ritter, 1980; Benoit, 1999) As such, we should expect it to occupy
a middle ground in terms of the prevalence of civil religion between the Inaugural Address and
the State of the Union Address/Major Speeches. These expectations are reflected in the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis #4: Frequency of civil religious rhetoric will vary according to the type of speech delivered. Inaugural Addresses will have a higher prevalence of civil religious rhetoric than Nomination Acceptance Speeches, which in turn will have a higher prevalence of civil religious rhetoric than State of the Union Addresses and Major Speeches.
Research Design
This research project relies on an original dataset comprised of 180 presidential speechesix
delivered between 1939 and 2012x. This includes all “Obligatory” speeches (State of the Union
Address, Inaugural Address, and Nomination Acceptance Speech) deliveredxi during the time
period along with a random sample of “Discretionaryxii” speeches. The latter are confined to
“Major Addresses” which are defined as radio/televised speeches delivered during prime time
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broadcasting hours and which preempt regular programming on local broadcast networks
(Ragsdale, 2014). After a full list of these Major Speeches were obtainedxiii, I randomly sampled
a number of them from each president equal to the number of years they were in office from each
termxiv. This sampling method provided a control for idiosyncratic tendencies in discretionary
speech making among the presidents and variability in the political context which may have had
an effect on the number of speeches given during their tenure. Out of 302 Major Speeches
delivered during this time period, 72 (23%) were incorporated into my sample for subsequent
content analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of the sample with the number of speeches
delivered by each president along with the percentage of each speech type delivered. Because
Nomination Acceptance Speeches and Inaugural Addresses are only delivered once per term,
they are obviously a small percentage of the total sample compared to Major Speeches and State
of the Union Addresses.
(Table 1 about Here)
Two undergraduates from the Rutgers University Political Science Department were hired to
code the speeches in the summer of 2014. After studying “Civil Religion in America” (Bellah,
1967), they were trained by examining several presidential speeches not included in the sample
used in this studyxv. The coders were instructed to identify complete sentences that included civil
religious rhetoric;xvi which was broadly defined as any reference to the American identity,
meaning, or purpose in the world within a transcendental context. Specifically, they focused on
discussions of what it means to be an American and its hallowed values, along with references to
historical figures and important moments in American history which reflect the sacred nature of
the American experience or God’s blessingsxvii. This coding criterion is consistent with Bellah’s
contention that civil religion has “its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events
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and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.” (Bellah, 1967) The following list of
keywordsxviii was provided to the coders to aid in the identification of civil religious passages:
“Sacred, God, Divine, Providence, Covenant, Consecrate, Destiny, Identity, Purpose, Spirit,
Values, Ideals, Truths, Principles, Forefathers, Ancestors, Constitution, Declaration of
Independence, Historical Figures (e.g. Lincoln, Washington, Roosevelt, Reagan), Historical
Events (e.g. Revolution, Constitutional Convention, Great Depression) xix. However, the coders
were not restricted to identifying passages that contained these keywords; nor was the mere
existence of these keywords sufficient for a sentence to be classified as civil religious.
After refereeing their workxx, I calculated the number of words contained in sentences that
included civil religious referencesxxi. I then calculated a continuous, interval level variable that
reports the percentage of those words compared to the total words in each speech (CRWP). This
variable represents the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric and serves as a proxy measure of the
relative utility that each president believes it will have in that particular context. This served as
my dependent variable for all subsequent analyses performed in this study.
The distribution of CRWP (Figure 1) illustrates that it accounted for an average of 15% of
each speech in the sample and ranged from 0% to nearly 70%. Although a very small
percentage (6%) of speeches contained no civil religious language, the vast majority (70%)
features 15% CRWP or lessxxii. This underscores the fact that civil religion is but one component
in a president’s rhetorical repertoire and that there are occasions when it used sparingly or not at
all. This analysis also reveals four potential outliers that ranged from 57%-69% CRWP. This
included the Inaugural Addresses of President Eisenhower (1953) and Obama (2009) along with
President Reagan’s Major Speech to the nation on Independence Day (1986) and President
George W. Bush’s Major Speech to the nation on the first anniversary of 9/11 (2002). After
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thoroughly reviewing the data, I decided to retain these outliers in my sample because no errors
were made in the coding and there was nothing contextually abnormal about their occurrence
that would warrant their exclusionxxiii. Moreover, that a speech could contain this high
prevalence of civil religious rhetoric is corroborated by the work of Schonhardt-Bailey et al
(2012) who found that roughly 50% of President Reagan’s speech text in their study was
classified as civil religious through a similar coding scheme.
Figure 1 also demonstrates that CRWP is a bounded variable (0-1) with a non-normalxxiv,
positively skewed distributionxxv. Several data transformations (log, square root, and arcsine)
were attempted to correct for these issues but all failed to improve the normality of the dataxxvi.
Although the nature of the data must be kept in mind when evaluating the results of this study,
the robustness of OLS against non-normality with a sufficiently large sample size provides us
with a reasonable level of confidence in the forthcoming analysis.
(Figure 1 about Here)
To investigate the influence of a president’s partisan relationship with Congress, I created
two variables to represent the size of a president’s partisan majority in both chambers
(HouseMargin and SenateMargin). I first calculated the percentage of members that share a
partisan affiliation with the president (or presidential Nominee in the case of Nomination
Acceptance Speeches). I then subtracted .50 from that number so that it reflects the size of the
partisan majorityxxvii. I also created an interaction term (House*Senate) to estimate the effects of
a scenario where the partisan majority increases in both Houses of Congress. This specification
provides more precision and explanatory power than would be achieved with a categorical
classification of the governing context as united or divided. To explore the influence of public
approval of the president, I relied upon the most recent Gallup Poll presidential job approval
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questions that preceded a speechxxviii. I created a variable (ApprovalMargin) to represent the size
of a president’s approval margin by subtracting .50 from the Gallup Poll approval percentagexxix.
As such, this variable reflects the amount of public support a president enjoys beyond 50%. I
also created a set of interaction terms to investigate the conditional effects of approval on CRWP
depending on the governing context (Approval*House, Approval*Senate,
Approval*House*Senate). A series of binary variables to represent State of the Union Addresses
(SOTU), Inaugural Addresses (INA), Nomination Acceptance Speeches (NOM) and Major
Speeches (MAJ) were also created to evaluate Hypothesis 4.
Furthermore, this study employed a series of independent variables to control for the effects
of other factors which may have an influence on these hypothesized relationships. The existing
literature on presidential rhetoric demonstrates that the presence of military conflicts and the
performance of the economy have an effect upon the delivery of a Major Speech. (Brace and
Hickley, 1993; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010; Ragsdale, 1984)xxx Although Shogan (2007) did not
detect a similar effect upon the content of presidential communication, it is with an abundance of
caution in mind that I include these variables in my analysis. A binary variable (WAR) was
created to represent the presence of active military conflicts which were likely to garner
widespread public interest and have a noticeable effect on presidential speechmakingxxxi.
Economic performance (GDP) is represented by the percentage change in the seasonally adjusted
gross domestic product from the previous data point (Annual change from 1929-1946 and
Quarterly change from 1947-2013).xxxii
To ensure the accuracy of my analysis, additional controls were introduced to account for
other factors which could potentially influence the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. To
control for unmeasured idiosyncrasies of each particular president and partisan influence over
19
rhetoric, a nominal variable (PRES) and a binary variable representing Republican Party
affiliation (REP) were created. Because it is possible that the employment of civil religious
rhetoric could be influenced by election year politics (Chapp, 2012) a binary variable was
created to represent whether a speech was delivered during a presidential/midterm election year
or not. Finally, the hypothesized relationships could be further complicated when we consider
the historical trend toward greater elite polarization and development of the “Partisan
Presidency” (Skinner, 2009) or “Polarized Presidency” xxxiii (Cameron, 2004). Rhodes (2014)
argues that presidents Carter through Obama have responded to increasing partisan polarization
among members of Congress and political activists by adopting a “bipartisan leadership
posture.” In this context, he contends that “recent presidents have used bipartisan themes both to
obscure their own ideological positions and to create a positive contrast with a highly partisan
Congress” (Rhodes, 2014). Although civil religious themes are often coupled with
partisan/ideological policy goals, they are themselves non-ideological and bipartisan. Therefore,
it is possible that these broader changes in polarization will have an impact on the frequency of
civil religious language in presidential speeches. Although I offer no formal expectations on
these effects, a binary variable was created (POLAR) that included presidents who held office
during this time of heightened polarization: Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Obama.
(Table 2 about Here)
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables included in this analysis. We can see
that the sample is fairly well balanced in terms of the partisan affiliation of the president, the
presence of war, an election year context, and whether a speech was delivered during the age of
bi-partisan posturing (POLAR). On average the president enjoyed elevated public approval
20
ratings (57%) and annual GDP growth rates (3%). In the Senate, the president’s party averaged a
2% majority over the opposition while in the House of Representatives party control was evenly
divided. As Figure 2 illustrates, we can also see that the employment of civil religion has been a
constant feature of presidential rhetoric with no discernible, overall growth or decline over the
time period. However, the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric does fluctuate a great deal from
year to year. The analysis that follows aims to shed light on the factors which influence this
variability.
(Figure 2 about Here)
Results
The following analysis examines the influence of governing context, public approval, and
speech type on the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. The results of the linear regression
model (Table 3a) clearly demonstrate that the type of speech delivered has an independent
influence upon CRWP. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we can see that compared to Inaugural
Addresses (reference group in the model) the other speech types feature significantly less
civil religious language. Table 3b presents the estimated marginal means of CRWP for each
speech type and reports on the significance of those differences. While civil religious
statements account for over 40% of Inaugural Addresses, the average percentage for other
speech types was between 10% and 16%. As hypothesized, Nomination Acceptance
Speeches had significantly higher CRWP than Major Speeches (16% compared to 10%).
Although civil religion was more prevalent in these speeches than in State of the Union
Addresses (12%), the difference was only marginally significant (.078). No significant
differences exist between State of the Union Addresses and Major Speeches. Collectively,
these findings suggest that presidents believe that using civil religious language provides
21
greater benefits and/or is more appropriate while laying out a vision for their campaign and
future presidency (Inaugural Address and Nomination Acceptance Speeches) than when
explaining policy decisions made in the course of governing (Major Speeches and State of
the Union Addresses).
(Tables 3a and 3b about Here)
The regression analysis (Table 3a) also provides support for the Critical view of civil
religion. Because of the inclusion of interaction terms, the results for Approval, House, and
Senate Margins represent the conditional effects of each while the remaining terms equal 0.
When House and Senate Margins equal 0 (e.g. when there are equal percentages of a
president’s partisan supporters and opponents in both chambers) Approval Margin has a
significant, positive relationship to CRWP. Although this particular relationship was not
hypothesized - and seldom occurs - it suggests that a popular president will employ civil
religion to increase political pressure on Congress when their support is marginal. Neither
House nor Senate Margin had a significant effect upon CRWP while the Approval Margin
equals 0 (e.g. when the president enjoys 50% public approval). However, consistent with
Hypothesis 2, the interaction between House and Senate Margin did have a significant
positive effect upon CRWP under these same conditions. In other words, when the president
enjoys 50% public approval, growing partisan majorities in both chambers results in a higher
prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. Substantively, this suggests that a president is relying
on civil religion to help solidify his political base.
The three way interaction between Approval, House, and Senate margin was also
statistically significant but requires more elaborate interpretation. Consistent with
Hypothesis 3, the negative coefficient indicates that as Public Approval, House, and Senate
22
Margins increase, the prevalence of civil religion declines. However, to properly evaluate
this relationship we must take a closer look at the conditional effects of the House and Senate
Margin interaction term on CRWP at various levels of Public Approval (Table 3c). These
estimates were generated by “Process”: a statistical procedure developed by Hayes (2013)
which calculates the conditional effects of each component of the interaction on the
dependent variable at various values of the other terms. Although the size of the Interaction
effect does decline as Public Approval increases, we can see that it is both positive and
significant at all reported levels of Public Approval. Substantively, this suggests that (1) civil
religion is more prevalent under conditions of united government regardless of public
approval (Hypothesis 2) but that (2) as public approval increases, the size of this effect
declines (Hypothesis 3).
(Table 3c about Here)
To better understand these results, Table 3d presents the conditional effects of Public
Approval on CRWP at various levels of both House and Senate Margins. The results
indicate that public approval only exerts a statistically significant influence on CRWP under
two conditions. The first, as reported earlier, occurs when there is no partisan advantage for
either party in both the House and Senate. Under these conditions the prevalence of civil
religion increases with public approval. The second occurs when the president enjoys a 20%
(or greater) partisan majority in both the House and Senate. Under these conditions, public
approval has a significant negative effect upon CRWP (Hypothesis 3). (Supplemental
analysis that visually depicts these conditional effects is available in the Appendix)
It is worth briefly remarking on the lack of significance for the control variables employed in
this model. The party affiliation of the president, election-year politics, economic growth, and
23
the presence of war all failed to register a significant effect on CRWP. Similarly, the age of Bi-
Partisan Posturing has no significant effect upon the frequency of civil religious rhetoricxxxiv.
Collectively, the lack of significance for these variables adds credence to the conclusion that the
prevalence of civil religious rhetoric is primarily influenced by speech type, governing context,
and public approval.
Discussion
The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate that the relative frequency of civil religious
rhetoric incorporated into modern presidential speeches is influenced by the type of speech
delivered. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, civil religious rhetoric was most prominent in
Inaugural Addresses, followed by Nomination Acceptance Speeches, and then Major Speeches
and State of the Union Addresses. The prominence of civil religion in Inaugural Addresses
compared to the other speech types was not surprising considering the extensive existing
literature. However, what is novel are the results indicating the relative prominence of civil
religion in a Nomination Acceptance Speeches compared to a Major Speeches (and marginally
significant differences compared to State of the Union Addresses), and the lack of a significant
difference between State of the Union Addresses and Major Speeches. These findings suggest
that presidents believe civil religion is more useful and/or appropriate when articulating their
general plans for the future than explaining governing decisions already made.
This study also failed to find any evidence in support of the Traditional view of civil religion
that the prevalence of this rhetoric would increase with the growth of partisan congressional
opposition and/or declining public approval (Hypothesis 1). There is therefore little evidence to
suggest that modern presidents have employed civil religion as a means of building alliances
with the opposition. On the other hand, the results of this analysis provide support for the
24
alternative Critical view of civil religion (Hypothesis 2 and 3). When facing a Congress
controlled by the partisan opposition, modern presidents have relied less on civil religion.
Presumably, this occurs because presidents recognize the dangers of antagonizing partisan
adversaries under conditions where their cooperation is vital to effectively govern. Conversely,
the prevalence of civil religion has a positive relationship to the size of a president’s partisan
majority in Congress. This suggests that civil religion is viewed as a means of rallying the
partisan base and weakening the resolve of the opposition.
The results also demonstrate that the influence of public approval of the president on civil
religious rhetoric was contingent on the partisan composition of Congress. When neither party
enjoyed a partisan legislative advantage the prevalence of civil religion increased with public
approval; suggesting that such rhetoric was viewed as a means of applying political pressure on
Congress. However, when the president enjoyed an overwhelming partisan advantage in
Congress, public approval had a negative effect upon the use of civil religion. Under these
conditions, there is no need for a president to incur the costs of civil religious rhetoric when the
achievement of presidential goals is likely to occur without it.
Conclusions
Fifty years ago Robert Bellah’s “Civil Religion in America” (1967) encouraged us to think
about how discussion of our national identity, meaning, and purpose in the world influenced our
politics. While Bellah and others holding the Traditional view theorized about the unifying
potential of civil religious rhetoric, others adopting the Critical view argued for its polarizing
potential. My research seeks to understand whether the rhetorical practices of modern presidents
better conform to one view or the other. The results demonstrate that both the type of speech
delivered and the partisan composition of Congress have an effect upon the prevalence of civil
25
religious rhetoric. Substantively, it is clear that modern presidents have been more likely to rely
on civil religion while preparing to govern (Inaugural Addresses and Nomination Acceptance
Speeches) than in the course of governing (State of the Union Addresses and Major Speeches).
The results also provide strong evidence for the contention that modern presidents are more
likely to employ civil religion when their party controls the legislative branch than when they do
not. This is consistent with the Critical view of civil religion that such rhetoric is used to rally
the partisan base rather than build alliances with the opposition. Furthermore, the finding that
presidents have been less likely to employ civil religion under extreme levels of public support
and partisan majorities reinforces the assertion of the Critical view that there is a political cost to
such rhetoric.
This study infers a general motivation behind the use of civil religion based upon whether the
context in which it is most prevalent is consistent with the expectations of the Traditional or
Critical view of civil religious scholarship. Each provides contrasting expectations for when
civil religious rhetoric would be most prevalent and a theoretical motivation for why a president
would make these discursive decisions. However, it is critical to emphasize that we cannot
assert a direct connection between the context and motivation with the data examined here.
While there is strong theoretical justification for these inferences, the results of this analysis
should be considered to be suggestive of a motivation. Future scholars are encouraged to
conduct comparative case study analyses that could more directly explore the motivations behind
particular speeches.
Similarly, if modern presidents do believe that civil religious rhetoric is more likely to
polarize than unify their audience, it remains unclear whether this belief is valid. The subfield
of political psychology has yet to explore the effects of civil religious framing on public opinion
26
and political polarization. The results of such an analysis would allow us to evaluate whether
presidents have effectively employed civil religious rhetoric and offer invaluable insights to
legislators, interest groups, and social movement actors seeking to influence our politics.
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Appendix
(Figure 3 about Here)
Figure 3 provides a visual depiction of the conditional effects of Public Approval on
CRWP at various levels of Senate Margin while holding the House Margin constant. The
upper graph depicts a scenario in which the president enjoys a 10% partisan majority in the
House with each line representing a Senate Margin of -10% (solid line), 0% (dash-dotted
line) or 10% (dashed line). Although the effect of public approval on CRWP is negative
under conditions of united government (dashed line), the preceding analysis demonstrates
that this is only significant under extreme levels of partisan support for the president
(Hypothesis 3). Consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 1, public approval appears to
have a positive effect on CRWP under conditions of partially divided government (solid line
indicating that the House is controlled by the president’s party and the Senate is controlled by
the opposition), however, this relationship was not statistically significant.
The middle graph depicts a scenario in which the House is evenly split between the
president’s party and the opposition. Although it appears that public approval has a positive
effect upon CRWP in each condition, the preceding analysis demonstrated that the
relationship was only significant when the House and Senate margins both equal 0.
The bottom graph depicts a scenario in which the president’s opponents enjoy a 10%
partisan majority in the House with each line representing either a Senate Margin of -10%
(solid line), 0% (dash-dotted line) or 10% (dashed line). We can see that the effect of
approval on CRWP is negative under conditions of divided government (solid line).
However, this relationship was not statistically significant. Similarly, while it appears that
34
approval has a positive effect upon CRWP under conditions of partially divided government
(Hypothesis 1), this relationship was not statistically significant.
35
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of Speeches Delivered by Type and President
President Major Speech Nomination Inaugural State/Union TotalFranklin Roosevelt 5 6.9% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 6 8.7% 15 8.3%Harry Truman 7 9.7% 1 4.8% 1 5.6% 5 7.2% 14 7.8%Dwight Eisenhower 8 11.1% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 7 10.1% 19 10.6%John Kennedy 3 4.2% 1 4.8% 1 5.6% 3 4.3% 8 4.4%Lyndon Johnson 5 6.9% 1 4.8% 1 5.6% 6 8.7% 13 7.2%Richard Nixon 6 8.3% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 4 5.8% 14 7.8%Gerald Ford 2 2.8% 0 0% 0 0% 3 4.3% 5 2.8%Jimmy Carter 4 5.6% 2 9.5% 1 5.6% 3 4.3% 10 5.6%Ronald Reagan 8 11.1% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 8 11.6% 20 11.1%George H.W. Bush 4 5.6% 2 9.5% 1 5.6% 4 5.8% 11 6.1%Bill Clinton 8 11.1% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 8 11.6% 20 11.1%George W. Bush 8 11.1% 2 9.5% 2 11.1% 8 11.6% 20 11.1%Barack Obama 4 5.6% 2 9.5% 1 5.6% 4 5.8% 11 6.1%Total 72 40% 21 11.7% 18 10% 69 38.3% 180 100%Notes: Figures represent the number of speeches delivered by each president and the percentage of that type of speech delivered by each president.
36
37
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables used in Study
Continuous Variable Mean
SD Min. Max.
Civil Religious Word Percentage .149 .138 0 .689Approval Margin .070 .136 -.240 .390Gross Domestic Product (Annual % Change) .029 .050 -.019 .283House Margin .003 .092 -.170 .270Senate Margin .023 .084 -.150 .260
Binary Variables Freq. % - -Republican 89 49.4 - -POLAR 92 50.8 - -Election 89 49.4 - -War 84 46.7 - -Notes: N Cases = 180 for all variables. Republican, POLAR, Election, and War are binary variables with 1 = the presence of these traits. Freq. and % represent cases where these variables = 1.
38
39
Table 3a: Regression Predicting CRWP
Variable B/(SE)(Constant) .350 (.039)***Rep. .015 (.022)Pres. -.002 (.006)Election .034 (.021)Polar. .056 (.049)War .022 (.020)GDP .000 (.201)Approval Margin .195 (.086)*House Margin -.309 (.196)Senate Margin .298 (.214)Approval*House .235 (1.385)Approval*Senate -.086 (1.500)House*Senate 4.732 (1.435)**Approval*House*Senate
-21.600 (9.550)*SOTU -.305 (.029)***NOM -.257 (.034)***MAJ -.318 (.029)***Adj. R2 .430N 180Inaugural Speeches are omitted to as a reference group. Significance levels are presented as: *<.05, **<.010, ***<.001.
40
Table 3b: Estimated Marginal Means and Differences by Speech Type for CRWP
Speech Type Mean (SE) N NOM (B/SE)
INA (B/SE) SOTU (B/SE)MAJ .106 (.013) 72 MAJ -.061 (.027)* -.318
(.029)***-.013 (.018)
NOM .167 (.024) 21INA .424 (.026) 18 NOM - -.257
(.035)*** .048 (.027)
SOTU .119 (.013) 69Total N 18
0INA - - .305 (.029)***
Notes: Significance levels are presented as: *<.05, **<.010, ***<.001. Covariates were evaluated at their means: Rep = 0.49; Pres = 7.16; Election = 0.19; POLAR = 0.51; App. = 0.07; War = 0.47; GDP = 0.02; House = 0.00; Senate = 0.02; House*Senate = .00; App*House = 0.01; App*Senate = 0.00; App*House*Senate = 0.00
41
42
Table 3c: Conditional Effects of House*Senate Margins on CRWP
Approval Margin B/(SE)-20% 9.052 (3.045)**-10% 6.892 (2.180)**-0% 4.732 (1.435)**10% 2.572 (1.092)*20% 0.411 (1.465)
Significance levels are presented as: *<.05, **<.010, ***<.001.
43
Table 3d: Conditional Effects of Public Approval Margin on CRWP
House Margin Senate Margin B/(SE)-20% -20% -.698 (.417)-10% -10% -.035 (.127)-10% 0% .171 (.137)-10% 10% .378 (.298)0% -10% .203 (.190)0% 0% .195 (.086)*0% 10% .186 (.153)10% -10% .433 (.342)10% 0% .218 (.185)10% 10% -.006 (.099)20% 20% -.639 (.324)*
Significance levels are presented as: *<.05, **<.010, ***<.001.
44
End Notes
45
i More recently, Transue (2007) found that elevating the salience of a shared national identity reduces policy differences among members of different racial groups.ii Although an explicit coupling of this sort does not always occur, the partisan orientation of the President is seldom forgotten. (Edwards III, 2003) It is therefore unlikely that an audience will fail to draw a connection between the President’s rhetoric and his partisan agenda even when the latter is not explicitly mentioned. iii Gerring (1997) makes a strong argument against attempts to construct or employ “all-purpose definitions [of ideology] that can be utilized for all times, places, and purposes.” Rather, we must recognize that there are a variety of arguably valid attributes commonly associated with ideology and scholars should employ a definition that is “context-specific” to their particular research question. In sum, different definitions will be useful for different purposes and the responsible researcher will carefully consider why certain attributes are employed or discarded.iv Gerring (1997) reinforces this perspective by arguing that the primary distinction between ideologies and belief, philosophical, and cultural systems is that they specify a concrete political program and/or issue positions. v Her work does control for the presence of an electoral mandate as measured by a president’s margin of victory in the Electoral College. This term had a statistically significant negative effect on the prevalence of moral rhetoric but fails to capture the president’s standing with the public. viThis term was coined by Aristotle and refers to a “form of rhetoric that praises or blames on ceremonial occasions, addresses an audience that evaluates the rhetor’s skill, recalls the past and speculates about the future while focusing on the present, employs a noble dignified, literary style, and amplifies or rehearses admitted facts” (Campbell and Jamieson, 1985). vii Teten (2003) similarly argues that the Inaugural Address is a “ceremonial speech in which partisan positions and issue propositions are absent, with reverence and general reflection of the past and its unification with the present in their stead.” In contrast, State of the Union Speeches are “essentially the presidential platform from which policy is proposed and evaluated.” viii Chapp (2012) does not provide concrete percentages on these civil religious appeals as they relate to total campaign communications, but does report that religious rhetoric (in general) accounts for less than 1% of all words spoken in campaign speeches and that these civil religious appeals account for 55.8% of that subset. ix The full text of these speeches was obtained from the Public Papers of the President and/or The American Presidency Projectx Given the necessity to control for the influence of public opinion in the subsequent analysis, the data set begins in 1939 when Gallup began to more consistently gather public opinion data. Because speech coding occurred prior to the conclusion of President Obama’s second term, the data set ends in 2012. xi I have excluded speeches which were written but not delivered in person during this time period to avoid any potential confounds associated with a difference between the two delivery formats (Tulis, 1987). xii While the former are mandated by law or custom, the latter are delivered voluntarily in response to situations that arise. xiii Lyn Ragsdale’s “Vital Statistics on the Presidency” (1998; 2014) provides a comprehensive listing of all Major Speeches. Her listing was itself originally obtained from successive volumes of the Public Papers of the President.xiv i.e. I sampled three speeches from John F. Kennedy, four speeches from Ronald Reagan’s first term and four more speeches from his second term. xv Calvin Coolidge’s Inaugural Address (1925) and Herbert Hoover’s State of the Union Address (1932)xvi Given financial constraints, the coders were unfortunately unable to distinguish between civil religious rhetoric that was employed to legitimize ideological positions versus that which was used for other purposes. However, as noted in an earlier footnote, the fact that a speech is delivered by a known partisan (the President) renders a distinction between implicit vs. explicit connections to ideology/policy less important for these purposes. xvii While discussions of how God has guided the U.S. or has intervened on our behalf were included, the end of speech refrain “May God Bless America” was excluded. This was done both to provide a conservative accounting of civil religious rhetoric and because asking for God’s blessing (religion) is different from arguing that God has actually blessed America (Civil Religion). This is consistent with Schonhardt-Bailey et al (2012) who argue that phrases such as “God bless America” or “God bless you” are “vacuous” and less substantive usages of “God”. xviii This list is consistent with Schonhardt-Bailey et al.’s (2012) computer-assisted content analysis that sought terms that represent the “common denominator” and “fundamental basics for civil religious rhetoric”: “mission, sacrifice, destiny, chosen, freedom, divine/providence/spirit/God, American as an international example.” xix To help illustrate the distinction between a historical figure/event that was coded as civil religious and those that were not, consider the following two examples. President Johnson’s 1964 State of the Union Address made the following reference to President Kennedy and it was not coded as civil religious: “Let us carry forward the plans and programs of John Fitzgerald Kennedy – not because of our sorrow or sympathy, but because they are right. In his memory today, I especially ask all members of my own political faith, in this election year, to put your country ahead of your party, and to always debate principles; never debate personalities.” However, in President Johnson’s 1967 State of the Union Address, the following reference to Abraham Lincoln was coded as civil religious: “At the heart of this attack on crime must be the conviction that a free America – as Abraham Lincoln once said – must ‘let reverence for the laws…become the political
religion of the Nation.’”xx The inter-coder reliability of their work was a 90% Agreement and .4 Krippendorf’s Alpha. Although the Krippendorf’s Alpha score did not meet the minimum threshold for that statistic (.67), it should be noted that the presence of civil religion in these speeches is something of a “rare-event” (mean of 15%) and under such conditions disagreements are magnified and overstate the level of error in the coding.xxi This approach (coding of sentences that contain civil religious references) is consistent with Shogan’s (2007) coding methodology for the moral rhetoric of presidents.xxii More specifically, 20% of speeches contained less than %5 CRWP, an additional 26% contained between 5% and 10% CRWP, and an additional 24% contained between 10% and 15% CRWP.xxiii An analysis that excluded these four outliers revealed no substantive differences in the results. xxiv A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality failed to reject the null hypothesis of non-normality with a test statistic of .802. xxv Skewness (1.839; Std. Error .181) and Kurtosis (3.423; Std. Error .360) test statistics fell outside of the normal range.xxvi Alternative models (Poisson and Tobit) were considered, but ultimately rejected because they are not appropriate for the type of data analyzed here.xxvii i.e. 0 represents a condition where there is an equal amount of members of both political parties. 0.05 would represent a condition where the president’s party controls 5% more seats than his opposition. -0.10 would represent a condition where the president’s party controls 10% less seats than his opposition. xxviii Polls were selected as close to the speech date as possible but no more than 6 weeks prior. The vast majority of these statistics were gathered from the Gallup Poll archives at the Roper Center IPoll Database. (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating.cfm) In those cases where Job Approval data was not available (i.e. first month in office) Election results were used as a proxy. In other instances where polls were not available, data was gather from Favorability questions or “Who would you vote for questions”. xxix Alternative variables such as a Presidential Job Approval to Disapproval Ratio and a Percentage Monthly Change in Job Approval Rating were evaluated but found to be less effective for the models presented in this study. xxx Unfortunately, the literature on civil religion is less clear on how these conditions may influence the use of this rhetoric. While there are commendable studies on the content of civil religious rhetoric during military conflicts (Haberski, 2012; Ungar, 1991) and political campaigns (Chapp, 2012), these studies do not evaluate whether these conditions systematically influence the use of civil religion. xxxi This variable excluded conflicts in which there were there was a relatively small number of ground troops involved and/or where the mission was primarily peace-keeping (i.e. Lebanon, 1982; Somalia, 1993; Bosnia, 1994; and Kosovo, 1999). The conflicts included were: World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Invasion of Grenada, Invasion of Panama, Gulf War, Invasion of Haiti, and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Alternative variables such as Active Duty Military Personnel (excluding National Guard and Reserves) for each year and Percentage change in Active Duty Military Personnel from the last year were found to be less effective in the models presented in this study. xxxii Data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce) (www.bea.gov/iTable/index nipa.cfm). These figures reflect the percentage change from the previous data point; seasonally adjusted annual rates from 1929-1946 and quarterly rates from 1947-2013. Alternative economic indicators such as the Unemployment Rate, Consumer Price Index, and Income Shares for the top 10% (proxy for inequality) were considered but found to be less effective in the models presented in this study.xxxiii Cameron (2004) defines this condition as a situation “when politics is polarized and control of government is divided by party.”xxxiv It should be noted that this particular relationship may warrant further analysis since it is measured rather crudely in this study. One could imagine more nuanced data on the varying levels of polarization within each particular Congress (i.e. Poole-Rosenthal Data Set) providing a more refined test on this potential relationship.