EmergencyPetition to U.S. Supreme Court for

Writ of MandamusIN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________________________________

Case No. 11-10814_________________________________________

In re DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON, Petitioner_________________________________________

DR LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON,Plaintiff - Petitioner,

v.THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY AND

HONORABLE JUDGE PEGGY CHIAMPOS,Defendant - Respondent.

_________________________________________

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

_________________________________________

DR LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON9905 S. Kilbourn Ave.Oak Lawn, IL 60453-3539(708) 952-9040

Petitioner, Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. May the Illinois Supreme Court order its clerk to shred any papers filed by an indigent criminal defendant, thus denying defendant access to the court to request petition for writ of mandamus concerning pre-trial lawlessness of the trial court, because she filed several complaints for supervisory orders several years ago, when she was also indigent, and refused to pay the filing fees for these case, and as a result, without explanation or basis, the IL S Ct denied her application for in forma pauperis status and issued this order barring filing, or is this a violation of the First Amendment Right to Remedy Clause (denial of access to the courts) and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (right of access to the courts), as well as a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Smith v. Bennett and Marshall v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81d S.Ct. 895 (1961), and in addition, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 298 (Indigency Rule)?

2. May the Circuit Court of Cook County sanction a criminal misdemeanor defendant for getting sick in the courtroom by striking motions to compel compliance with subpoenas meant to discovery the names of witnesses from the Cook County Sheriff’s staff and the Clerk of the Cook County Circuit Court’s staff, or is this a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process and Equal Protection?

3. May the Circuit Court of Cook County sue sponte deny a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial by striking her motion to dismiss case for violation of speedy trial as a sanction for becoming ill in the courtroom and going out into the air-conditioned hallway, or is this a violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial, the Fourteenth Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act?

4. May the Circuit Court of Cook County sanction a criminal defendant, by arrest for contempt and by striking her motions to enforce constitutional rights for Compulsory Process, Equal Protection, and Speedy Trial, for becoming ill in the courtroom after an air conditioner malfunction caused the environmental temperature to increase to near 90 degrees, left the courtroom to sit in the air-conditioned hall and told

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the courtroom deputies to please inform the judge that she (the defendant) was physically unable to sit in the courtroom in the heat or would pass-out due to medical issues, as she did two weeks previously, due to cardiac and neurological medical issues, requiring that an ambulance be summoned, or is this a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fourth Amendment Probable Cause Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925)?

5. May the Circuit Court of Cook County issue an arrest warrant, increase bail from a $1000 to $25,000 and hold a hearing after the arrest of criminal misdemeanor defendant, for a case that was on hold status, when defendant did not appear inside the courtroom on the another different elected case, or is this a violation of the Fourth Amendment Probable Cause Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) as any orders in this case after it was placed on hold status, except to re-instate it, are facially void, as well as U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), as there was no probable cause for arrest, which was ordered without a good faith belief that there was probable cause?

6. May the Circuit Court of Cook County issue an arrest warrant, set bail at $25,000 and hold a hearing after the arrest of defendant for a misdemeanor case in which the defendant prevailed nine months prior with a dismissal, when defendant did not appear in the courtroom on a new case, or is this a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) as any orders in this case after it was dismissed are facially void due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), as there was no probable cause for arrest, which was ordered without a good faith belief that there was probable cause, in an act of malicious intent by the judge under color of law?

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7. May the Circuit Court of Cook County hold a defendant for trial, on a misdemeanor charge of trespass to real property, for remaining in the public reception area of the county Sheriff’s office, in a public building owned by the state, during public business hours, sitting in a chair, requesting to make a complaint about several courtroom deputies’ refusal to recover defendant’s stolen personal court file and refusal to accept a criminal complaint during a pending civil case – while the judge was off the bench on recess, which had been stolen from a courtroom by a court clerk staff member, upon the illegal order of the presiding Law Division judge, as well as the sheriff supervisors’ and attorney’s refusal to recover this litigant’s stolen personal court file or to take a criminal complaint against the court clerk’s staff, in retaliation for litigant’s federal civil rights’ suits against members of the Sheriff’s staff, or is this a violation of the Fourth Amendment Probable Cause Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), as there was no probable cause for arrest, which was ordered without a good faith belief that there was probable cause, in an act of malicious intent by the sheriff staff, under color of law, and a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920), as any orders in this case are facially void due to lack of probable cause, fraud upon the court by the Sheriff’s staff, and the fact that the Sheriff staff during this incident was aiding and abetting the criminal acts of the court clerk’s staff as well as the criminal acts of the presiding law division judge, in violation of federal case law including United States v. Gualtney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986), Siena Lake Reserve v. Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1991), Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995), Kennedy v. Los Angelos Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989), Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985), Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Co. Sheriff’, 110 F.3d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1997), and Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997)?

8. May a Circuit Court of Cook County Judge violate Illinois Statute regarding SOJ by refusing to transfer the motion to another judge and striking the motion sue sponte or is this a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116

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(1920) as any orders in this case after the SOJ motion was filed are void except to transfer to another judge per 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d), are facially void?

STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES

All interested parties are listed on the caption to this pleading.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions for Review i-iii

Statement of Interested Parties iv

Table of Contents v-vi

Table of Authorities vi-viii

Citations in Case in Official and Unofficial Reports viii of Orders and Opinions

Statement of Jurisdiction viii

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ix - xxii

Introduction , History, and Reason This Case 1Is An Emergency

Statement of the Case 10

Facts 14

Background of Interaction with Presiding LawDivision Judge Maddux and Applications to SueAs Indigent Person 14

Statement of Laws Pertinent to Case 19

Background Law Division Rules 21

Detailed Statement of Facts of First Pending CriminalCase – The “Elected” One – CCCC Case No 09 MC1 223774-01 24

Argument 30

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Abuse of Judicial Discretion and Malicious BiasedConduct of Judge Chiampas 30

Relief Sought 32

Appropriateness of Mandamus 33

Animus Towards Petitioner 34

Prejudgment and Predisposition 35

Pervasive Bias and Prejudice 36

Determination of Impartiality 38

Conclusion 40

Certificate of Service 41

TABLE OF AUTHORITES

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993) 38, 39

Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995) iii

Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation District of Jefferson County, 57 F.3d, 436 (5th Cir. 1995), at 446 35

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33, 41 S.Ct. 230, 233, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) 34

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 9

Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) ii

Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160 (1989), at 166 34

Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) 12

Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill.App.3d 170, 176 (2009) 30

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Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 188 (1976) 36

D.B. v. Ocean Tp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F.Supp 457 (D.N.J. 1997) 39

Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill.2d 228, 281, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1147 (Ill. 2002) 38

First Bank of Oak Park v. Avenue Bank and Trust Co. of Oak Park, 605 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1979) 21

Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir.1992) 38

Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) iii

Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Const. Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 172 Ill. Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992) 21

In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 1995) 38

Jiffy Lube Int'l v. Agarwal 277 Ill.App.3d 722, 214 Ill.Dec.609, 6661 N.E.2d 463 (1996) 30

Kennedy v. Los Angelos Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989) iii

Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, (6th Cir. 1956), at 465. Rehearing denied 235 F.2d 129, cert. denied 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 131, 1 L.Ed.2d 86 35

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) 36, 37

Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994) 36 - 39

Michigan Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Shalala, 859 F.Supp. 1113, 1123 (W.D.Mich.1994) 39

Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985) iii

People v. Loftus, 400 Ill 432 (1948) 5, 9, 14

Siena Lake Reserve v. Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1991) iii

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Smith v. Bennett and Marshall v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81d S.Ct. 895 (1961) i

Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Co. Sheriff’, 110 F.3d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1997) iii

Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986), at 712 34

United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir.1995) 38

United States v. Bertoli , 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir.1994) 38

United States v. Gualtney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986 iii

Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) ii

Valley et al. v. Rapides Parish School Board, 118 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1997), at 1053 35

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 36, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1459, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) 39

Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 17.5.5 Independence and Neutrality, p. 989 (1986) 34

Woods v. Nierstheimer , 328 U.S.211 (1946) 5, 9, 14

Young v. Ragen 337 U.S. 235 (1948) 5, 9, 14

CITATIONS IN CASE IN OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF ORDERS AND OPINIONS

None

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

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Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) or this Honorable

Court may sue sponte determine that jurisdiction should be taken in the

Alternative under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254b(1)(B)(i & ii) under its plenary

powers in the interest of justice.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Page

First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution i

Congress shall make no law . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ii, iii

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution iii

No person shall be . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .

Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution i

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Fourteenth Amendment i, ii, iii

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

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any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) states:Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

28 U.S.C. § 2254b(1)(B)(i & ii) 5, 8, 9(a)The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.(b)(1)An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—

(A)the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B) (i)there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii)circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

705 ILCS 105/10 21     Sec. 10. The principal clerk shall, in all cases, be responsible for the acts of

his or her deputies.

705 ILCS 105/13 21   Sec. 13. The clerks shall attend the sessions of their respective courts,

preserve all the files and papers thereof, make, keep and preserve complete records of all the proceedings and determinations thereof, except in cases otherwise provided by law, and do and perform all other duties pertaining to their offices, as may be required by law or the rules and orders of their courts respectively. [emphasis added]

705 ILCS 105/14 21   Sec. 14. The clerks shall enter of record all judgments and orders of

their

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respective courts, as soon after the rendition or making thereof as practicable.

720 ILCS 5/2 3 27 Sec. 2 3. "Another". "Another" means a person or persons as defined in this Code other than the offender.

720 ILCS 5/2 15 27 Sec. 2 15. "Person". "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.

720 ILCS 5/15 2 27 Sec. 15 2. Owner. As used in this Part C, "owner" means a person, other than the offender, who has possession of or any other interest in the property involved, even though such interest or possession is unlawful, and without whose consent the offender has no authority to exert control over the property.

720 ILCS 5/21 3 27 Sec. 21 3. Criminal trespass to real property. (a) Except as provided in subsection (a 5), whoever: (1) knowingly and without lawful authority enters or remains within or on a building; or

(2) enters upon the land of another [defined in 720 ILCS 5/2 3]], after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner [defined in 720 ILCS 5/15 2] or occupant that such entry is forbidden; or

(3) remains upon the land of another, after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart; or . . . .commits a Class B misdemeanor.

For purposes of item (1) of this subsection, this Section shall not apply to being in a building which is open to the public while the building is open to the public during its normal hours of operation; nor shall this Section apply to a person who enters a public building under the reasonable belief that the building is still open to the public. . . . . "Land" includes, but is not limited to, land used for crop land . . . . "Owner" means the person who has the right to possession of the land, including the owner, operator or tenant.

720 ILCS 5/21 5 27xi

Sec. 21 5. Criminal Trespass to State Supported Land. (a) Whoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State funds, or Federal funds administered or granted through State agencies or any building on such land, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the State or its representative that such entry is forbidden, or remains upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another person's lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land, commits a Class A misdemeanor.

(b) A person has received notice from the State within the meaning of subsection (a) if he has been notified personally, either orally or in writing, or if a printed or written notice forbidding such entry to him or a group of which he is a part, has been conspicuously posted or exhibited at the main entrance to such land or the forbidden part thereof.

. . . .

725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) iii, 10, 30, 32(d) In addition to the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section the State or any defendant may move at any time for substitution of judge for cause, supported by affidavit. Upon the filing of such motion a hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible after its filing by a judge not named in the motion; provided, however, that the judge named in the motion need not testify, but may submit an affidavit if the judge wishes. If the motion is allowed, the case shall be assigned to a judge not named in the motion. If the motion is denied the case shall be assigned back to the judge named in the motion.

735 ILCS 5/5-105 21, 25, 28Sec. 5-105. Leave to sue or defend as an indigent person.

(a) As used in this Section: (1) "Fees, costs, and charges" means payments imposed on a party in connection with the prosecution or defense of a civil action, including, but not limited to: filing fees; appearance fees; fees for service of process and other papers served either within or outside this State, including service by publication pursuant to Section 2-206 of this Code and publication of necessary legal notices; motion fees; jury demand fees; charges for participation in, or attendance at, any mandatory process or procedure including, but not limited to, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, counseling, evaluation, "Children First", "Focus on Children" or similar programs; fees for supplementary proceedings; charges for translation services; guardian ad litem fees; charges for certified copies of court documents; and all other processes and procedures deemed by the court to be necessary to commence, prosecute, defend, or enforce relief in a civil action.

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(2) "Indigent person" means any person who meets one

19 or more of the following criteria: (i) He or she is receiving assistance under one

or more of the following public benefits programs: Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamps, General Assistance, State Transitional Assistance, or State Children and Family Assistance.

(ii) His or her available income is 125% or less

of the current poverty level as established by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of this Code are of a nature and value that the court determines that the applicant is able to pay the fees, costs, and charges.

(iii) He or she is, in the discretion of the

court, unable to proceed in an action without payment of fees, costs, and charges and whose payment of those fees, costs, and charges would result in substantial hardship to the person or his or her family.

(iv) He or she is an indigent person pursuant to Section 5-105.5 of this Code.

(b) On the application of any person, before, or after the commencement of an action, a court, on finding that the applicant is an indigent person, shall grant the applicant leave to sue or defend the action without payment of the fees, costs, and charges of the action.

20, 25 (c) An application for leave to sue or defend an action as an indigent person shall be in writing and supported by the affidavit of the applicant or, if the applicant is a minor or an incompetent adult, by the affidavit of another person having knowledge of the facts. The contents of the affidavit shall be established by Supreme Court Rule. The court shall provide, through the office of the clerk of the court, simplified forms consistent with the requirements of this Section and applicable Supreme Court Rules to any person seeking to sue or defend an action who indicates an inability to pay the fees, costs, and charges of the action. The application and supporting affidavit may be incorporated into one simplified form. The clerk of the court shall post in a conspicuous place in the courthouse a notice no smaller than 8.5 x 11

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inches, using no smaller than 30-point typeface printed in English and in Spanish, advising the public that they may ask the court for permission to sue or defend a civil action without payment of fees, costs, and charges. The notice shall be substantially as follows: "If you are unable to pay the fees, costs, and charges of an action you may ask the court to allow you to proceed without paying them. Ask the clerk of the court for forms." (d) The court shall rule on applications under this Section in a timely manner based on information contained in the application unless the court, in its discretion, requires the applicant to personally appear to explain or clarify information contained in the application. If the court finds that the applicant is an indigent person, the court shall enter an order permitting the applicant to sue or defend without payment of fees, costs, or charges. If the application is denied, the court shall enter an order to that effect stating the specific reasons for the denial. The clerk of the court shall promptly mail or deliver a copy of the order to the applicant. 20 (e) The clerk of the court shall not refuse to accept and file any complaint, appearance, or other paper presented by the applicant if accompanied by an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis, and those papers shall be considered filed on the date the application is presented. If the application is denied, the order shall state a date certain by which the necessary fees, costs, and charges must be paid. The court, for good cause shown, may allow an applicant whose application is denied to defer payment of fees, costs, and charges, make installment payments, or make payment upon reasonable terms and conditions stated in the order. The court may dismiss the claims or defenses of any party failing to pay the fees, costs, or charges within the time and in the manner ordered by the court. A determination concerning an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis shall not be construed as a ruling on the merits. (f) The court may order an indigent person to pay all or a portion of the fees, costs, or charges waived pursuant to this Section out of moneys recovered by the indigent person pursuant to a judgment or settlement resulting from the civil action. However, nothing is this Section shall be construed to limit the authority of a court to order another party to the action to pay the fees, costs, or charges of the action. (g) A court, in its discretion, may appoint counsel to represent an indigent person, and that counsel shall perform his or her duties without fees, charges, or reward. (h) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to affect the right of a party to sue or defend an action in forma pauperis without the payment of fees, costs, or charges, or the right of a party to court-

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appointed counsel, as authorized by any other provision of law or by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court.

(i) The provisions of this Section are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.

(Source: P.A. 91-621, eff. 8-19-99.)

735 ILCS 5/10 (including 103) 6, 9

HABEAS CORPUS 735 ILCS 5/10-101

Sec. 10-101. Action commenced by plaintiff. In all proceedings commenced under Article X of this Act, the name of the person seeking the relief afforded by this Article shall be set out as plaintiff without the use of the phrase "People ex rel." or "People on the relation of".

735 ILCS 5/10-102 Sec. 10-102. Who may file. Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, except as herein otherwise provided, may apply for habeas corpus in the manner provided in Article X of this Act, to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it prove to be unlawful.

735 ILCS 5/10-103 Sec. 10-103. Application. Application for the relief shall be made to the Supreme Court or to the circuit court of the county in which the person in whose behalf the application is made, is imprisoned or restrained, or to the circuit court of the county from which such person was sentenced or committed. Application shall be made by complaint signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, or by some person in his or her behalf, and verified by affidavit. Application for relief under this Article may not be commenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death without the written consent of that person, unless the person, because of a mental or physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her own claim.

735 ILCS 5/10-104 Sec. 10-104. Substance of complaint. The complaint shall state in substance:

1. That the person in whose behalf the relief is applied for is imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, and the place where - naming all the parties if they are known, or describing them if they are not known. 2. The cause or pretense of the restraint, according to the best knowledge and belief of the applicant, and that such person is not committed or detained by virtue of any process, or judgment, specified in Section 10-123 of this Act. 3. If the commitment or restraint is by virtue of any warrant or process, a copy thereof shall be annexed, or it shall be stated that by reason of

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such prisoner being removed or concealed before application, a demand of such copy could not be made, or that such demand was made, and the legal fees therefor tendered to the officer or person having such prisoner in his or her custody, and that such copy was refused.

735 ILCS 5/10-105 Sec. 10-105. Copy of process. Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or any one on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affected not exceeding $500. This Section shall not apply to the Illinois Department of Corrections.

735 ILCS 5/10-106 Sec. 10-106. Grant of relief - Penalty. Unless it shall appear from the complaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court shall forthwith award relief by habeas corpus. Any judge empowered to grant relief by habeas corpus who shall corruptly refuse to grant the relief when legally applied for in a case where it may lawfully be granted, or who shall for the purpose of oppression unreasonably delay the granting of such relief shall, for every such offense, forfeit to the prisoner or party affected a sum not exceeding $1,000.

735 ILCS 5/10-107 Sec. 10-107. Form of orders. If the relief is allowed by an order of a court it shall be certified by the clerk under the seal of the court; if by a judge, it shall be under the judge's signature, and shall be directed to the person in whose custody or under whose restraint the prisoner is, and may be substantially in the following form:

The People of the State of Illinois, to the Sheriff of .... County (or, "to A B," as the case may be): You are hereby commanded to have the body of C D,

imprisoned and detained by you, together with the time and cause of such imprisonment and detention by whatsoever name C D is called or charged, before .... court of .... County (or before E F, judge of, etc.), at, etc., immediately after being served with a certified copy of this order, to be dealt with according to law; and you are to deliver a certified copy of this order with a return thereon of your performance in carrying out this order.

735 ILCS 5/10-108

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Sec. 10-108. Indorsement. With the intent that no officer or person to whom such order is directed may pretend ignorance thereof, every such order shall be indorsed with these words: "By the habeas corpus law."

735 ILCS 5/10-109 Sec. 10-109. Subpoena-Service. When the party has been committed upon a criminal charge, unless the court deems it unnecessary, a subpoena shall also be issued to summon the witnesses whose names have been endorsed upon the warrant of commitment, to appear before such court at the time and place when and where such order of habeas corpus is returnable, and it shall be the duty of the sheriff, or other officer to whom the subpoena is issued, to serve the same, if it is possible, in time to enable such witnesses to attend.

735 ILCS 5/10-110 Sec. 10-110. Service of order. The habeas corpus order may be served by the sheriff, coroner or any person appointed for that purpose by the court which entered the order; if served by a person not an officer, he or she shall have the same power, and be liable to the same penalty for non-performance of his or her duty, as though he or she were sheriff.

735 ILCS 5/10-111 Sec. 10-111. Manner of service. Service shall be made by leaving a copy of the order with the person to whom it is directed, or with any of his or her under officers who may be at the place where the prisoner is detained; or if he or she can not be found, or has not the person imprisoned or restrained in custody, the service may be made upon any person who has the person in custody with the same effect as though he or she had been made a defendant therein.

735 ILCS 5/10-112 Sec. 10-112. Expense involved. . . . 735 ILCS 5/10-113

Sec. 10-113. Form of return. The officer or person upon whom such order is served shall state in his or her return, plainly and unequivocally: 1. Whether he or she has or has not the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, and if he or she has not, whether he or she has had the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, at any and what time prior or subsequent to the date of the order. 2. If he or she has the party in his or her custody or control, or under his or her restraint, the authority and true cause of such imprisonment or restraint, setting forth the same in detail. 3. If the party is detained by virtue of any order, warrant or other written authority, a copy thereof shall be attached to the return, and

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the original shall be produced and exhibited on the return of the order to the court before whom the same is returnable. 4. If the person upon whom the order is served has had the party in his or her custody or control or under his or her restraint, at any time prior or subsequent to the date of the order but has transferred such custody or restraint to another, the return shall state particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause and by what authority such transfer took place. The return shall be signed by the person making the same, and except where such person is a sworn public officer and makes the return in his or her official capacity, it shall be verified by oath.

735 ILCS 5/10-114 Sec. 10-114. Bringing of body. The officer or person making the return, shall, at the same time, bring the body of the party, if in his or her custody or power or under his or her restraint, according to the command of the order unless prevented by the sickness or infirmity of the party.

735 ILCS 5/10-115 Sec. 10-115. Sickness or infirmity. When, from the sickness or infirmity of the party, he or she cannot without danger, be brought to the place designated for the return of the order, that fact shall be stated in the return, and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the judge, he or she may proceed to the jail or other place where the party is confined, and there make an examination, or the judge may adjourn the same to such other time, or make such other order in the case as law and justice require.

735 ILCS 5/10-116 Sec. 10-116. Neglect to obey order. If the officer or person upon whom such order is served refuses or neglects to obey the same, by producing the party named in the order and making a full and explicit return thereto within the time required by Article X of this Act, and no sufficient excuse is shown for such refusal or neglect, the court before whom the order is returnable, upon proof of the service thereof, shall enforce obedience by attachment as for contempt, and the officer or person so refusing or neglecting shall forfeit to the party a sum not exceeding $500, and be incapable of holding office.

735 ILCS 5/10-117 Sec. 10-117. Order in case of neglect. The court may also, at the same time or afterwards, enter an order to the sheriff or other person to whom such attachment is directed, commanding him or her to bring forthwith before the court the party for whose benefit the habeas corpus order was entered, who shall thereafter remain in the custody of such sheriff, or other person, until the party is discharged, bailed or remanded, as the court directs.

735 ILCS 5/10-118 xviii

Sec. 10-118. Proceedings in case of emergency. Whenever it appears by the complaint, or by affidavit, that any one is illegally held in custody or restraint, and that there is good reason to believe that such person will be taken out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the application for a habeas corpus is made, or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the order can be enforced, the court may enter an order directed to the sheriff or other proper officer, commanding him or her to take the prisoner thus held in custody or restraint, and forthwith bring him or her before the court to be dealt with according to law. The court may also, if it is deemed necessary, order the apprehension of the person charged with causing the illegal restraint. The officer shall execute the order by bringing the person therein named before the court, and the like return and proceedings shall be had as in other orders of habeas corpus.

735 ILCS 5/10-119 Sec. 10-119. Examination. Upon the return of an order of habeas corpus, the court shall, without delay, proceed to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, but the examination may be adjourned from time to time as circumstances require.

735 ILCS 5/10-120 Sec. 10-120. Denial of allegations in return. The party imprisoned or restrained may file a reply to the return and deny any of the material facts set forth in the return, and may allege any other facts that may be material in the case, which denial or allegation shall be on oath; and the court shall proceed promptly to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, hear the evidence produced by any person interested or authorized to appear, both in support of such imprisonment or restraint and against it, and thereupon shall determine the matter according to law.

735 ILCS 5/10-121 Sec. 10-121. Seeking wrong remedy not fatal. Where relief is sought under Article X of this Act and the court determines, on motion directed to the pleadings, or on motion for summary judgment or upon trial, that the plaintiff has pleaded or established facts which entitle the plaintiff to relief but that the plaintiff has sought the wrong remedy, the court shall permit the pleadings to be amended, on just and reasonable terms, and the court shall grant the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled on the amended pleadings or upon the evidence. In considering whether a proposed amendment is just and reasonable, the court shall consider the right of the defendant to assert additional defenses, to demand a trial by jury, to plead a counterclaim or third party complaint, and to order the plaintiff to take additional steps which were not required under the pleadings as previously filed.

735 ILCS 5/10-122

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Sec. 10-122. Amendments. The return, as well as any denial or allegation, may be amended at any time by leave of the court.

735 ILCS 5/10-123 Sec. 10-123. When prisoner not entitled to discharge. No person shall be discharged under the provisions of this Act, if he or she is in custody: 1. By virtue of process of any court of the United States, in a case where such court has exclusive jurisdiction; or, 2. By virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court, or of any proceeding for the enforcement of such judgment, unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired; or, 3. For any treason, felony or other crime committed in any other state or territory of the United States, for which such person ought, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to be delivered to the executive power of such state or territory.

735 ILCS 5/10-124 Sec. 10-124. Causes for discharge when in custody on process of court. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the following causes: 1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person. 2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged.

3. Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law.

4. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case or under circumstances where the law does not allow process to issue or orders to be entered for imprisonment or arrest. 5. Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued in a case or under circumstances unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or where the person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is not the person empowered by law to detain him or her.

6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense or bribery. 7. Where there is no general law, nor any judgment or order of a court to authorize the process if in a civil action, nor any conviction if in a criminal proceeding. No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.

CCCC Rule 0.3.1 Clerk of Court 21

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The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall perform the duties usually performed by the Clerk as provided in "An Act to revise the law in relation to clerks of courts," Chapter 25, Illinois Revised Statutes.

CCCC Rule 15.2 715.2 Habeas Corpus

Except in matters of emergency, the following procedures are followed in proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus:

(a) Petitioner with funds. If the petitioner has sufficient funds, the petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Criminal Division, and the filing fee shall be paid.

(b) Petitioner without funds - with attorney.

(i) If the petitioner is without funds, and has an attorney of his choosing, motion for leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus without payment of costs shall be presented to the presiding judge.

(ii) If the petitioner is represented by an attorney of his own choosing the docket fee may be waived by the presiding judge upon a motion supported by the affidavit of the petitioner stating that the petitioner is without funds and that his attorney is rendering services gratuitously.

iii) If the presiding judge grants the motion, he shall enter an order granting leave to file without payment of costs.

(iv) If the presiding judge denies the motion, he shall endorse the fact of denial on the petition for leave to file.

(c) Petitioner without funds and without attorney.

(i) If the petition states the petitioner is without funds and the petitioner is not represented by an attorney, he shall submit a verified petition to the clerk. The clerk shall docket the petition and place it on the call of the presiding judge.

(ii) If the presiding judge finds that petitioner is without an attorney and without funds, the presiding judge shall appoint an attorney to represent the petitioner.

(d) Petition on behalf of another. A person signing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of another shall appear before the presiding

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judge in open court and may be examined as to his interest in or relation to the person on whose behalf the petition is presented.

[Adopted May 17, 1976, effective July 1, 1976.]

Law Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County Presiding 22Judge Standing Orders on Indigency Applications (Provided by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County)

1. Application to Sue or Defend as an Indigent Person (735 ILCS 5/5-104)

For anyone requiring the waiver of fees in regards to filing in the Law Division, an application to sue or defend as an indigent person must be brought before the Law Division’s Presiding Judge.

When: 11:30 – 11:45 am Monday through Friday

Where: Room 2005, Law Division’s Presiding Judge’s Courtroom

Required: For those filing a lawsuit, a copy of the lawsuit & a competed CCGN-689 Application to Sue or Defend as a Indigent Person.

For those answering a lawsuit, an Appearance form, CCL-0530 & completed CCGN-689 Application to Sue or Defend as a Indigent Person.

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INTRODUCTION, HISTORY, AND REASON THIS IS AN EMERGENCY

Circuit Court of Cook County Judge Peggy Chiampas is endangering the

life and health of Petitioner, Linda Shelton (“Shelton”), by refusing to

accommodate her disabilities in several misdemeanor criminal cases before

her, where Shelton is defendant and actually innocent. She has also de facto

denied compulsory process and speedy trial rights by striking, with prejudice,

Shelton’s motions to dismiss for speedy trial violation and motions to compel

compliance with subpoenas in retaliation for Shelton passing out in the well

of her court, due to medical issues and disabilities. Judge Chiampas has also

ordered that no more continuances will be allowed. This ensures that the

trial will not be fair.

PLEASE NOTE that Shelton, although this may seem incredible -

prays this Honorable Court will not jump to knee-jerk conclusions like other

courts have done as she can prove the following and does in attached

appendices - has been denied access to all courts, including Illinois

Supreme Court (“IL S Ct”) and Federal district and 7 th Circuit Courts,

due to errors of the judges in their rulings in civil cases, leaving

Shelton NO OPTION, but to request a Petition for Writ of Mandamus

from this Honorable Court, as any other action would be an exercise

in futility as described below and proven with documents in

appendices.

1

Shelton suffers from a partial hemiparesis, vertigo, intolerance to heat

(passes out very easily if temperature greater than about 82 degrees), and

chronic intractable pain (headache and in hands and feet) from congenital

and acquired spinal stenosis, status post-surgery on cervical spine 12 years

ago to reconstruct it, that is progressing and she needs another surgery to

prevent progressive paralysis and dysfunction (loss of use of her arms) and

congenital cardiovascular disease (passes out if standing still and goes into

brief cardiac arrest). In summary, she has intractable pain and headache

and is intolerant to heat over about 80 degrees, due to spinal cord injury and

cardiovascular defects affecting, since childhood, her ability to sweat and

control her body temperature1.

Every time she has been jailed (all illegally) she has been denied

medication until she was screaming in pain, forced to sleep sitting up in a

corner, when she can only sleep sitting up and needs a hospital bed, and to

shut her up and inhibit her access to the courts they have frequently put her

in the psychiatry ward for complaining she needs her medications or is pro

se and needs access to her legal documents. The Cook County Jail

prohibits inmates, even pro se ones, on the psychiatry units from

having ANY paper or pen. Therefore, they are denied access to courts

as a policy. As Shelton is pro se, when jailed, she has no ability to access

the courts or defend herself or have remedy to false incarceration. Her

1 This illness causes Shelton to rapidly go into heat exhaustion with nausea and collapse and then a life-threatening heat stroke if exposed to hot temperatures and not allowed to cool herself off with emersion in cool water, cold drinks, or placement in an air-conditioned environment. (See medical records in Appendix C)

2

physical condition is worsening and she cannot eat the jail food as she needs

a special diet so she fasts in jail. Therefore, jailing her without

accommodations is dangerous to her life and health as well as to her legal

rights.

The courtroom where Judge Chiampas is sitting is not properly air

conditioned and the heat in Chicago at this time is oppressive, the hottest

spring on record ever, and cannot be tolerated by Shelton. Shelton passed

out in the well of the court on March 6, 2012 due to her serious medical

problems and Judge Peggy Chiampas’ refusal to hear her as a pro se litigant2,

as well as the judge’s refusal to allow Shelton to go get needed medication,

fluids, and food, as well as to lie down for a short time, as she cannot

tolerate sitting up in the courtroom for hours at this time. Judge Chiampas

has twice ignored the pleas of Shelton to accommodate her disabilities under

the American With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) on March 6 and 21, 2012,

resulting in exacerbation of her medical conditions and therefore, her life

and health is endangered by this judge’s immediate actions, amounting to

official misconduct.3

The IL S Ct has illegally barred indigent, disabled, Shelton from filing

any documents because she has not paid the fees on three cases of petitions

for supervisory orders (which Shelton contends were illegally denied), after

the IL S Ct, despite her indigency status as determined by the U.S

2 See attached transcripts of March 6, 2012 and March 21, 2012 attached respectively as Appendix D and E.

3 See Shelton’s statements in court on March 26, 2012 (Appendix F)3

Government granting her disabled status and SSI, denied her petitions for in

forma pauperis status.4

The US District Court for Northern Illinois Chief Judge, Holderman, ex

parte, without any due process, without involvement of the Executive

Committee, sue sponte, falsely quoting a letter from Shelton’s doctor that

she suffers from post-traumatic-stress disorder (after a battery by officers)

with brief episodes of flashbacks (nonviolent and resulting from beatings by

police) where she “misinterprets ongoing events”, has barred Shelton from

filing any complaints, except habeas, with the U.S. Northern Illinois District

Court and denied a motion to vacate this order as void, basing the order on

Shelton’s “mental illness” – when has it become a danger to a federal court

for a person to have non-violent PTSD flashbacks?5.

Federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Easterbrook, in 2010, has

denied Shelton’s complaints about Judge Holderman falsely stating that

complaints cannot involve orders of judges.6 Judge Holderman’s orders

against Shelton are void and Judge Easterbrook is aiding and abetting Judge

Holderman’s official misconduct. Judge Easterbrook has denied Shelton due

process in this matter and refused to allow Shelton to address the 7th Circuit

Judicial Counsel.

4 See order of Illinois Supreme Court and letters from Illinois Supreme Court Clerk (Appendix B).

5 See attached orders of Judge Holderman (Appendix G) and letter he misquoted from Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy (Appendix C ).

6 See attached order and complaint (Appendix H)4

Three 7th Circuit Judges in a case brought to them by Shelton have

illegally sanctioned Shelton with barring her from filing in forma pauperis

with the 7th Circuit7, thus causing her appeal of Judge Holderman’s order to

be dismissed for lack of payment of fees, without any due process

whatsoever8. It is judicial misconduct to sanction a litigant with barring their

access to the courts and denying their First Amendment right to remedy and

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process without any due process

evidentiary hearing.

If this is the stance of the 7th Circuit, then there is a conflict among the

districts as other districts require that only after a due process evidentiary

hearing may a person be barred from filing in the federal courts and only

with a safety valve of a judge being appointed to screen their potential filings

and allow only filings that are not frivolous. Shelton believes that in a due

process hearing she can prove that her complaints have not been frivolous

(Judge Korcoras ruled two were frivolous because he stated without any basis

other than his opinion, that Shelton’s medical issues are too fantastic to be

believed. Well, Shelton if granted an evidentiary hearing, can bring in her

doctors as witnesses that Judge Korcoras’ statements are delusional and

false – Shelton’s medical conditions may be unusual but they are real.)

Judge Coar has consistently dismissed Shelton’s complaints for habeas

corpus on at least three occasions falsely stating that Shelton did not

7 See attached order (Appendix I)

8 See attached order (Appendix J)5

exhaust state remedies (U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois, Case

Nos. 08-cv-04627, 08-cv-06216, 10-cv-01763, when the U.S. Supreme Court

in a line of cases including Niersheimer, Regan, and Loftus9 previously ruled

that Illinois does not have a procedure for appeals of denials of habeas

petitions brought at the local court level and therefore, that denials of

habeas petitions brought at the local court level must go directly to the U.S.

Supreme Court.

Any attempt to file a petition for habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of

Cook County (“CCCC”) court will be denied as Illinois statutes specifically bar

petitions for habeas corpus unless the Defendant is in physical custody and

Shelton is on bail, so she does not meet the element of custody necessary to

file a petition for writ of habeas in Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/10-102.

Shelton had to take drastic action in order to have time to write this

pleading while free with access to courts, in the hope of protecting her

life and health, as well as civil rights. Although she may briefly be in

custody, after she surrenders, on June 5th or 6th 2012, necessary due to

warrants issued for failure to appear in court on May 29, 2012, which Shelton

felt was a necessary act of civil disobedience, because of Judge Chiampas’

blatant orders striking Shelton’s Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation

for Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas – which ensure a lack of a

fair trial. Shelton is gathering the money to bond out quickly, but fears she

9 Woods v. Nierstheimer , 328 U.S.211 (1946) (also see People v. Loftus, 400 Ill 432 (1948) [Illinois Supreme Court response to orders of U.S. Supreme Court for clarification]) and related U.S. Supreme Court cases: Young v. Ragen 337 U.S. 235 (1948),

6

will be tried and summarily convicted without due process. If she bonds out,

then her habeas petitions in the state that she has written and has asked an

attorney to file as soon as she surrenders, will be moot, as in Illinois, by law,

habeas cannot be granted unless a person is physically in custody. If not in

custody, then the habeas petitions, to be filed shortly, as soon as she

surrenders – which will occur as soon as this pleading is mailed, then the

state habeas petitions will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, making this

petition appropriate, and a federal habeas appropriate, under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(B)(i) due to an absence of available State corrective process. If

the state habeas petitions are heard and denied then Shelton still has a right

for a federal habeas.

On May 31, 2012 and June 1, 2012 Shelton, in order to find the habeas

procedures for misdemeanors in Cook County, called the office of the Chief

Judge in the Cook County Courts, Judge Evans, and the Presiding Judge in the

1st Municipal Division, Judge Wright, the Division which is hearing her

misdemeanor cases and where Judge Chiampas is assigned at present.

Shelton also called the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk first the 1st Municipal

Division. As of today they all claimed that there was no procedure to file

or hear a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a misdemeanor case.

The rules of the CCCC do have a procedure for the Criminal Division,

which hears felony cases, and CCCC Rule 15.2 states that petitions for writ

of habeas corpus, in felony cases, are heard by the Criminal Division

presiding judge, Judge Biebel, after filing with the clerk on an expedited or 7

instanter basis, on the same day filed, if filed in the morning, according to

discussions with the Clerk of the Criminal Division.

However the CCCC has NO RULES for hearing habeas petitions in

misdemeanor cases. An attorney representing Shelton on one (1) of the six

(6) misdemeanor cases called Judge Wrights chambers and his clerk said

there is no procedure and that the petitions for writ of habeas would be

denied, but told J. Nicolas Albukerk that he will inquire with the judge as to

what is the procedure. Albukerk also inquired if they could arrange to allow

Shelton to surrender on the present six warrants, issued because Shelton felt

she had no option but not to appear and seek protection from the Canadian

Consulate as she is a dual Canadian American citizen and the Cook County

judge is denying her constitutional rights and guaranteeing a trial without an

opportunity to defend herself. The consulate chief, Brian Herman (card he

gave Shelton is Exhibit K), assured Shelton that he will write letters

requesting an investigation as to if Shelton’s claims about Judge Chiampas

denying her ADA and Constitutional rights to due process.

Shelton knowingly failed to show up on May 29, 2012 for trial of

elected misdemeanor case so she would have time to write her habeas

petitions to have them ready to be filed by a friend, when she is in

custody and denied access to the courts and so she could write and

have ready for another to file her federal habeas petitions and this

Petition for mandamus if, which is likely, the Cook County Courts continue

to deny that there is a procedure to file and have heard quickly a petition for 8

writ of habeas corpus, which would allow hearing of a federal habeas under

28 USC § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)[there is an absence of available State corrective

process] and (ii)[circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the applicant].

Although, under the fugitive rule, until Shelton surrenders, the courts

may dismiss this Petition, by the time this court receives this Petition,

Shelton anticipates having surrendered and either bonded out or in custody

with threats to her life due to medical neglect and unconstitutional denial of

access to the courts.

In addition, Shelton knows that it would be futile to attempt to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus with the CCCC, thus qualifying Shelton for

filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254(b)

(1)(B)(i)&(ii), as Judge McHale in 2010 threw Shelton in jail on a summary

sentence of 16 months10 (consecutive 4 mo., 6 mo., and 6 mo.) for three

“cases” (actually counts of contempt in one hearing continued over several

days) regarding Shelton’s filing of two petitions for writ of habeas corpus as a

NON-attorney NEXT-friend of Annabel Melongo11, who remains in jail with the

habeas petitions still pending.10 See attached orders of Judge McHale and the transcripts regarding those orders (Group Appendix L)

11 Judge McHale ruled that filing a next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus as a non-attorney was illegal and that stating it was an illegal order three times was contempt of court. Melongo is still being held now for two years without hearing of the habeas petitions, without probable cause or trial in Cook County Jail. (Exhibit M)

Shelton was held in contempt for arguing three times that this refusal to hear the habeas petition and declaring the filing illegal because the filer was a non-attorney, was an illegal act of treason by this judge in violation of the Suspension Clause, Illinois Habeas Statutes (735 ILCS 5/10-103), and the U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

9

The U.S. Supreme Court Clerk has three times refused to file Shelton’s

Petition for Writ of Certiorari (originally timely filed in 2010 – Exhibit N),

regarding above unconstitutional conviction for contempt of court, falsely

declaring that Shelton has failed to exhaust state remedies and disregarding

Niersheimer, Regan and Loftus (Id).

Therefore, Shelton has absolutely no legal option except for

filing with the U.S. Supreme Court to protect her health and life

against this absolute lawlessness of the criminal court of the CCCC,

presided over by Judge Peggy Chiampas, who is refusing to

accommodate Shelton’s disabilities, has de facto denied her right to

compulsory process, and has de facto denied her right to a speedy trial, by

striking her motions with prejudice, has violated the ADA, in retaliation for

Shelton passing out in her courtroom (“everyone else has to tolerate the

heat”), as well as who has ignored and violated Illinois Substitution of Judge

(“SOJ”) statutes, 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d), essentially snubbing her nose at the

Constitution, Illinois law, and this Honorable Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Shelton, was unlawfully arrested on the following dates and maliciously

charged with the following fabricated misdemeanor crimes, which are

presently pending before Judge Peggy Chiampas (Appendix O gives full

details), in retaliation for Shelton’s civil rights advocacy, her civil rights suits This is the act that resulted in a 16 month summary sentence, obviously grossly in violation of the Suspension clause, U.S. Supreme Court holdings, and Illinois habeas statutes, 735 ILCS Article X.

10

against the County of Cook, her complaints and suits – some of which may

end up being re-instated (for actions they took with total lack of jurisdiction)

against several corrupt Cook County Court judges, and civil rights suits

against a number of Cook County Sheriff staff (still pending and nearing trial

stage and more to be filed – once federal district court’s illegal bar to filing,

sue sponte declared by chief judge without any due process or participation

of executive committee is vacated), as well as her Internet blogs that detail

corruption in the Cook County Sheriff offices and in the Cook County courts

including felony crimes by judges and state officials:

Shelton’s blogs include: http://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com ,

http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com,

http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com

Summary of pending false misdemeanor arrests/charges and malicious

misdemeanor prosecutions are included in Appendix A and are for disorderly

conduct (only in courthouses before officers), trespass (only in courthouses

before officers), resisting arrest (disabled Shelton is always accused of

resisting by large strong officers), and battery (always bumping officer with

walker).

Shelton has now been arrested, after a lifetime history of being a

pacifist and no arrests, since 2002, 17 times by Illinois State Police or Cook

County Sheriff on fraudulent and false charges similar to above, and eight (8)

petty offense charges of criminal contempt of court (including two cases

where the judges failed to write formal charges), but also including felony 11

Medicaid Fraud12, where she was found not guilty by jury trial. Representing

herself pro se, she prevailed on the first felony and nine (9) misdemeanor

cases, as well as three (3) criminal contempt charges on appeal. Shelton

believes all these arrests were retaliatory for her outspoken advocacy about

corruption in the courts in Cook County, Illinois.

Shelton has represented herself on all cases except two of three felony

cases and portions of several of the misdemeanor cases - the Medicaid Fraud

case, where she was found not guilty, and a felony battery case, where she

was charged and wrongfully convicted of “bumping” an officer with her

wheelchair (when he actually attacked her, falsified his records and

committed perjury – resulting in a conviction and two year sentence [the

sentence was a violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Cunningham v.

California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), and State law]). Shelton has proof of his

perjury that is being ignored by the local court and Illinois Appellate Court.

12 However charge of Medicaid Fraud was legally insufficient and the prosecutor, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan had no legal authority or jurisdiction under Illinois law to bring the charges, thus the court actually had no jurisdiction to hold Shelton for trial or to try her, which she knew resulted from identity theft – and that Shelton was innocent – in the state’s application as an Illinois Medicaid Fraud Control Unit funded by federal law by the U.S.-DHHS, the State of Illinois admitted that the Illinois Attorney General had NO legal authority to prosecute Medicaid fraud and that they referred all such cases to the U.S. Attorney. Despite this, Lisa Madigan indicted and tried Shelton for Medicaid fraud, but Shelton proved her signature was forged and the state knew that it was a case of identity theft and Shelton was innocent, yet the FBI has not arrested the sham prosecutors. [see Appendix P for copy of pertinent pages from Illinois Medicaid Fraud Control Unit’s application for recertification and funding to U.S. – DHHS admitting that the Illinois Attorney General did not have authority or jurisdiction to prosecute Medicaid Fraud (thus admission of official misconduct and harassment of Shelton as well as admission of felony funding fraud upon U.S. Government by State of Illinois), and therefore, the Circuit Court of Cook County did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Shelton or several other persons whom they have convicted, whom Shelton has knowledge that they are innocent and were railroaded including Dr. Maisha Hamilton [Bennett], Naomi Jennings, and the late Vernon Glass.] Therefore, Shelton’s statements to the trial court on the Medicaid Fraud case that they did not have jurisdiction, which caused the trial court to send Shelton to jail four (4) times for contempt of court, are true and represented vigorous defense and not contempt of court.

12

The IL S Ct has barred Shelton from filing any papers with them until she

pays fees for three previous cases of Petitions for Supervisory Orders –

addressing above injustices, where they denied her in forma pauperis

petitions despite the fact she received SSI and was considered indigent and

disabled by the U.S. Government. Details of this fraudulent conviction for

battery and contempt and the evidence of her innocence are posted on the

Internet in numerous places including in her blogs:

Shelton’s appeal of battery case in Illinois Appellate Court:

http://www.scribd.com/DrLindaShelton/d/16301520-Appeal-of-Wrongful-Conviction-Battery-IL-Appellate-Court-073386-Shelton-Illinois-2009

Illinois Appellate Court Outrageous Illegal Affirmation of Conviction,

using only ad hominem attacks against her with hearsay material that was

NOT on the record and ignoring the case law in Appellant’s brief:

http://www.scribd.com/DrLindaShelton/d/47936762-Shelton-Proof-IL-Courts-Corrupt-Corrupt-IL-Appellate-Court-Decision-Affirmed-Conviction-for-Battery-5-14-2010

There is plenty of reason for corrupt Graylord-like judges in the CCCC,

corrupt Nifong-like Assistant Cook County State’s Attorneys, and corrupt

officials and police in Illinois to retaliate against Shelton. She is a thorn in

their side, winning cases pro se, assisting others pro bono as a paralegal,

and exposing their corruption on the Internet as described above. Besides

the above, Shelton has won the first felony case and eight (8) of these

misdemeanor cases pro se in trial and pretrial. The only fraudulent

convictions she has, after nearly 33 fraudulent, malicious, retaliatory, and

13

bogus arrests is this one felony battery case (alleged bumping a Sheriff’s

Sergeant with wheelchair) and six (6) cases of criminal contempt (one

dismissed and declared void nunc pro tunc) and two (2) jailings for criminal

contempt without formal charges (reversed by Illinois Appellate Court after

three (3) weeks in jail each time13). Shelton is attempting to challenge all

convictions, but has been denied access to courts, so is appealing with

complaints for mandamus to U.S. Supreme Court. This being the first, with

hopes that this Honorable Court will order the IL S Ct to give her access to

them and order Judge Coar to reverse his rulings to dismiss her petitions for

writ of habeas corpus in view of Niersheimer, Regan, and Loftus (supra).

Facts

Shelton was arrested in the main CCCC downtown court building in the

reception area of the Cook County Sheriff’s office, room 705, on April 1, 2009

and charged with criminal trespass to real property, disorderly conduct, and

resisting/obstructing a peace officer. Bond was set by rule of court at $1000

13 Two (2) of the contempt charges should be declared void as Shelton was held in contempt and jailed during the Medicaid Fraud case four (4) times (two (2) without formal charges and Illinois Appellate Court ordered her released), because a void order to hold Shelton for trial and her statements to the court that they had no jurisdiction cannot be the basis for a criminal contempt conviction.

Three (3) contempt convictions will be declared void because a judge may not declare that a non-attorney who is filing a next-friend habeas petition has committed a crime, when the State law allows such a filing, the U.S. Supreme Court holdings allow such a filing and the Suspension clause allows such a filing, then find contempt when the Shelton objects to such an illegal ruling and states that the judge is committing an act of treason, and then the judge issues combined consecutive sentences for these three “cases” (actually counts during one continued hearing) of 16 months without a trial, on a day other than the day the alleged contempt occurred. This is gross treason by this judge.

14

D-Bond (10% cash required) and Shelton paid the $100 and was released the

next day. (Exhibit Q)

The facts of the incident are as follows:

BACKGROUND OF INTERACTION WITH PRESIDING LAW DIVISION JUDGE MADDUX & APPLICATIONS TO SUE AS AN INDIGENT PERSON

In June 2009, the Social Security Administration granted Shelton SSI

retroactive to September 2008. In November 2008, Illinois Medicaid granted

Shelton Food Stamps retroactive to September 2008. Therefore, the Federal

Government has administratively ruled that Shelton is indigent at the time

she filed her Application to Sue as an Indigent Person, which is consistent

with the information Shelton provided on her Application and Affidavit to Sue

as Indigent.

Shelton on October 2, 2008 arrived in the courtroom of the Judge at

10:30 a.m. and waited until the call was ending to hand the courtroom clerk

a Petition to Sue as an Indigent Person and a tort Complaint.

At approximately noon the court proceedings had ended, the Judge

had retired to his chambers, and the courtroom clerk took the Shelton’s

documents and documents from other similarly situated persons to the

Judge’s chambers.

Approximately an hour later, the Judge’s staff came out and gave all

the papers and orders to an employee of the Clerk’s office, John (Doe), who

told Shelton and other similarly situated persons, as he was running through

the Judge’s courtroom to the door, to follow him to the Clerk’s office on the

15

8th floor of the Daley Center, Room 801 and wait in a line. In room 801, while

in the line for filing complaints each in succession after a period of waiting

the Clerk’s staff called Shelton and similarly situated individuals up to the

counter.

Shelton was informed that the Judge denied the Petition. Shelton asked

why? The Clerk’s staff stated “You can’t sue in good faith.” The Clerk’s staff

demanded payment of the filing fee of $381 in order to file the complaint.

Shelton stated she could not pay the fee. The Clerk’s staff refused to file the

complaint without the fee, so Shelton demanded her papers back. The

Clerk’s staff withheld the order from Shelton and gave back the complaint

and blank copies of the proposed order.

Shelton immediately went back to the Judge’s courtroom and

requested to have her application reconsidered to the courtroom Sheriff’s

deputy, who was the only person in the courtroom at that time. She sat

quietly with her walker on a bench in the gallery. The Sheriff’s deputy went

to the Judge’s chamber and came back and told Shelton her situation was

being reviewed.

A secretary or law clerk that refused to reveal her name or position

came out and told Shelton she would not be heard. Shelton told her this was

irregular as counsels often ask judges to recall cases when they discover an

error or insufficiency in an order after it was signed and handed back to them

in the courtroom. Shelton told her that she did not receive a copy of the

order and this woman went in the back and eventually came back with a 16

copy of the order that said the Petition was denied because “cannot maintain

action in good faith.” Shelton stated to this lady that this order was legally

insufficient and void and she wanted to make an instanter request to

reconsider, so that the Judge could write a legally sufficient reason as

required by Statute to deny the application. The lady stated she would not

give legal advice, when none was asked for.

The lady stated that the Judge was gone. Shelton stated she would

wait until he returned. The lady stated that Shelton would have to come back

another day at 9:30 for motion call after filing a motion to reconsider.

Shelton stated that she needed a case number to file a motion and that the

Clerk had failed to write one on the order. The lady stated she would give no

legal advice. Shelton stated that she wanted to know the administrative

procedure for appealing the decision. The lady stated she would give no

legal advice.

Shelton stated she needed the lady’s name so that she could appeal

the denial of the application. The lady refused to give her name and left.

When requested by Shelton, the courtroom deputy refused to give the lady’s

name or the nature of her position in the court. The judge’s clerk refused to

give his name.

Shelton stated she would go in the back to the chambers and ask the

law clerk or the Judge’s secretary to identify the lady, as she had the same

standing as a pro se counsel as an attorney to request information from the

secretary and law clerk in the chambers. The courtroom deputy stated he 17

would not allow Shelton to go to the chambers and talk with the Judge’s

secretary or clerk. The Deputy stated he would arrest Shelton if she

attempted to go to the Judge’s secretary’s office.

Shelton then got out her cell phone and called the CCCC Chief Judge

Evan’s office. Rosemary Baldacci answered the phone and Shelton politely

requested the name of the secretary and law clerks for the Judge. Ms.

Baldacci stated she didn’t give out that information, not even first names.

She demanded the name of the caller and Shelton stated Linda. She

demanded Shelton’s last name and Shelton stated, “when you give me your

last name, I’ll give you mine.” Rosemary refused to do so. Shelton asked

Rosemary how to make a complaint to the Chief Judge and Rosemary said to

write a letter and gave the address. Shelton later discovered the secretary’s

name was Baldacci.

During this time, two Sheriff’s Sergeants and several Deputies arrived

in the otherwise empty, but open courtroom. As Shelton was talking on the

phone, the deputies ordered her to leave the courtroom and the oriental Sgt.

known to others as “Q”, Gerard Quimkay, badge number 1074, threatened

Shelton with an unlawful arrest for “trespass to state supported land.”

Clearly this would have been a false arrest. Shelton demanded their names

and the name of the lady. They refused to give their names and said “read it

off my badge”, but were too far for Shelton to read the names, except for

two deputies, Woods badge 11223 and Richard Erman, unknown badge

number. Shelton stated she wasn’t leaving until she had the name of the 18

lady so she could write a proper complaint identifying all the actors in the

situation. The deputies then ordered Shelton to stand and submit to arrest.

They grabbed her papers and her walker away from her and Shelton stood

up. The deputies ordered Shelton to walk to the door and Shelton replied:

“that’s impossible because you took my walker.”

The deputies surrounded Shelton and returned the walker and Shelton

walked out of the courtroom door surrounded by the deputies and led by Sgt.

Q. They did not arrest Shelton, but a deputy pulled the walker too fast

causing Shelton to lose her grip. Then Deputy Woods pushed Shelton,

Shelton lost her balance and had to grab Woods’ shoulder to keep from

falling. Shelton loudly complained: “stop assaulting me.” The deputies then

gave back the walker and backed off a bit.

Shelton then proceeded to the Clerk’s satellite office next to the Judge’s

courtroom and went up to the counter and asked the name of the lady and

the Judge’s law clerks, two of whom came into the room while Shelton was

talking. The two clerk’s assistants and the two law clerks refused to identify

the lady or themselves. Shelton then left the building.

Shelton has a clear right to have either her Indigency Application

approved or to receive a written order stating the specific reasons for the

denial and whether the Judge will allow payments as well as a date for the

payment of fees to become due. The Judge had a clear duty to approve the

Indigency Application or to issue a written order stating the specific reasons

for denial. The Clerk had a clear duty to file the Complaint. The Clerk and the 19

Judge violated Shelton’s right to due process, equal protection of the laws an

to petition the government for a redress of grievances as guaranteed by the

U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.

STATEMENT OF LAWS PERTINENT TO CASE

735 ILCS 5/5-105 mandates that a person who is indigent as defined in

the statute “shall” be granted leave to file as an indigent person with waiver

of fees, upon presentation to a judge of an application to sue as an indigent

person and an affidavit of assets, 735 ILCS 5/5-105(2) [Definition of "Indigent

person" includes those on SSI]; ILCS 5/5-105(b) [Mandate that if indigent

fees are to be waived]. This is an administrative and not judicial decision,

which generally occurs prior to the filing of the complaint, but may be

requested after the complaint is filed. There is NO administrative discretion if

a person qualifies under the definition of ‘indigent”. The judge, acting as an

administrator, “shall” grant the application as dictated by statute. Any judge

can grant such petition.

The Clerk is required by statute to file a complaint without payment of

fee if it is accompanied by an application to sue as an indigent person, 735

ILCS 5/5-105(d).

Please note that the statutes state that the clerk “shall promptly mail

or deliver a copy of the order to the applicant [presumably with a copy of the

officially stamped application].”

One must assume the standard English definition of “promptly”, that

being 20

“immediately”, per the Oxford English Dictionary. Immediately does NOT, in

common practice, include an assistant clerk, John, running through the

Judge’s courtroom at the Daley Center, Room 2005, yelling to applicants

“follow me” and then going down to the CCCC Law Division Clerk’s office in

room 801. Nor does it include the applicant waiting in line for the clerk to file

the complaint, for the plaintiff, if the application was granted; or being told

that the clerk will not accept the filing without the fee being paid when the

application is denied, as is done daily by the Clerk’s assistants. John

performs this task daily, per orders of the Judge, without telling the applicant

the decision of the Judge and without delivering these documents to the

applicants immediately as required by law. This act is not legal, especially

because it is not generally permitted for the assistant clerks to perform

duties of the litigants such as presenting the complaint to the Clerk’s office

for filing. It also prevents applicants from immediately copying the order or

from requesting the Judge reconsider and for oral arguments when the

application is denied.

The Clerk oversees the office of the Clerk of the CCCC. She and her

staff are

responsible for filing and maintaining a record of all civil cases and

administrative orders filed and heard in the CCCC. (CCCC Rule 0.3.1, 705

ILCS 105/10,13 & 14)

Basic rules of statutory construction provide that when statutes

conflict, specific provisions control over the general. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan 21

Const. Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 172 Ill. Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992); First

Bank of Oak Park v. Avenue Bank and Trust Co. of Oak Park, 605 F.2d 372

(7th Cir. 1979) Therefore, 735 ILCS 5/5-105, which is more specific and

states that: “The clerk of the court shall promptly mail or deliver a copy of

the order to the applicant” controls over any “orders of their court”, as

stated in 705 ILCS 105/13.

Please take judicial notice that it is common practice and procedure for

all assistant clerks sitting next to judges in all courts of the CCCC, after

officially stamping a court order, to immediately deliver a copy of the court

order to each attorney or pro se counsel. Shelton has NEVER heard of an

assistant clerk (other than the Judge’s clerks) telling an attorney or pro se

counsel to follow him down to the main clerk’s office and wait in line to pay

for a copy of an order. The Judge does not have any special authority to

change this practice or 735 ILCS 5/5-105. Any order he gives to the assistant

clerks to do otherwise is null and void.

BACKGROUND LAW DIVISION RULES

The Law Division Presiding Judge, Maddux, has by fiat decided that all

applications to sue as an indigent person with waiver of fees, in the Law

Division of the CCCC, will be heard by him ONLY at 11:30 – 11:45 a.m. each

morning the court is open14. If the applicant appears in his courtroom after

noon he absolutely refuses to hear the applicant’s application that day. He

does not hear the applications in open court, but requires that the

14 Law Division Presiding Judge Standing Order on Indigency Applications (See “Statutory Provisions Involved p xxi)22

application be given to his courtroom clerk and the decision on the

application is done without the presence or further input of the applicant. It

is rumored that the Judge does not make the decision on these applications,

but has assigned this task to his law clerk, Donald (Doe?). At his discretion,

the Judge may come into the courtroom and question the applicant, which on

information, observation, and belief in practice, is never done.

This procedure is NOT published or posted anywhere, except for on the

Clerk’s web site, under a section titled “Application to Sue or Defend as an

Indigent Person” and applicants must discover it by accident or by asking the

CCCC Clerk or the Judge’s courtroom clerk or law clerks, unless they go onto

a computer and research the issue under the Clerk’s web site. No rule or

order by Judge Maddux is available to applicants outside of this posting on

the Clerk’s web site. On information and belief, unlike attorneys, pro se

litigants, by fiat of the Cook County Sheriff staff, without notice, are barred

from going behind the courtroom when the courtroom is open during normal

business hours but empty, to give documents to Judge Maddux’s secretary at

his chambers. If the pro se litigants attempts to do so, they may be

arbitrarily and capriciously arrested for trespass.

Therefore, the Judge violated Shelton’s constitutional First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to redress of grievances and due process by

fiat, without legal basis, in an act of administrative misconduct on October 2,

2008 and subsequently as follows. This coerced Shelton and coerces other

applicants to borrow money they are unable to pay back in order to file their 23

tort complaint, or denies them their right to redress of grievances. This

extorts money from indigent applicants such as Shelton. This amounts to the

Judge and the Clerk using the CCCC as a criminal enterprise to extort money

from applicants in order to sue as indigent persons, a felony violation of

federal law.

Shelton has borrowed money she cannot in the near future pay back,

after being coerced by the Judge in this fashion in order to sue in CCCC case

numbers 2008 L 13289 and 2008 L 13288 and paid the filing fees on

December 1, 2008 of $381 each, despite the fact she qualifies for fee

waivers as an indigent person, because the Judge’s previous unlawful denial

of Shelton’s application to sue as an indigent person, on October 2, 2008,

described herein, has chilled her ability to do so and harassed her into

borrowing money that she cannot afford to borrow. Then Shelton presented

her application to sue as an indigent person to waive service fees to the

other CCCC judges assigned to these cases, Judges Budzinski and Ward, at

the first status hearing, in order to avoid the unconstitutional and illegal

denial of indigent application by the Judge. However, they both transferred

these applications to the Judge instanter for an administration ruling stating

this is his policy and REFUSED to decide the petitions in their respective

cases, part of their judicial responsibilities. This amounts to dereliction of

duty.

DETAILED STATEMENT OF FACTS OF FIRST PENDING CRIMINAL CASE – THE “ELECTED” ONE– CCCC Case No 09 MC1 223 774-01

24

On April 1, 2009 Shelton went to the courtroom of CCCC Judge

Budzinski in case number 2008 L 013288. She had been so chilled by Judge

Maddux’s previous illegal denial of her indigency petition on October 2,

2008, that she borrowed money she could not pay back and filed this

complaint with the CCCC Clerk on December 1, 2008, paying the $381 filing

fee. This was the first status hearing date for this case.

Shelton presented to Judge Budzinski a petition to sue as an indigent

person so she could have waived the service fees from the Sheriff’s office ($

60 per defendant). Judge Budzinski said that all indigency petitions must go

to Judge Maddux by rule, but was unable to produce or quote the rule.

Shelton verily believes no such rule exists. Shelton respectfully disagreed

and told her she had plenary and statutory power to rule on the petition. In

an act of dereliction of duty, Judge Budzinski transferred the petition

instanter to Judge Maddux.

Shelton wrote Cook County Clerk Dorothy Brown and asked for a copy

of the court rule that requires that judges may not hear indigency petition

and that only Judge Maddux, presiding judge of the law division may hear

them. She received the “Law Division Presiding Judge Standing Order on

Indigency Applications15”, in typewritten form. This apparent standing order

from Judge Maddux says nothing about applications to waive fees for service

of process by Cook County Sheriff. Therefore, Judge Brudzinski should have

15 See “LawDivision Standing Orders on Indigency Applications” on page xxi25

ruled on that application instead of transferring it to Judge Maddux, per 735

ILCS 5/5-105 (b).

Shelton, at about 10:00 a.m., went to Judge Maddux’s courtroom, room

2005, and tried to give the courtroom clerk the petition and blank order, her

copy of the complaint while also telling them to please immediately return it

when Judge Maddux was finished as this was her personal file copy, and the

order from Judge Budzinski again telling them this was her personal copy.

They refused to accept the petition until 11:30 a.m., so Shelton patiently

waited in the courtroom gallery until 11:30 a.m. and then gave the

courtroom clerk the documents.

After judge Maddux wrote his order, CCCC assistant clerk John took

Shelton’s already filed complaint (Shelton’s/Plaintiff’s personal file copy that

she had leant to Judge Maddux when he reviewed her petition for indigency –

and she had told Judge Maddux’s clerk that the complaint had already been

filed and should be returned to her after the Judge looked at it), her personal

file copy of Judge Budzinski’s order, the indigency petition and the order to

the CCCC Clerk’s Law Division office, room 801, after Judge Maddux ruled on

it, refusing to give Shelton a copy promptly, as required by statute,735 ILCS

5/5-105, or even tell her what the Judge’s ruling stated.

Shelton asked the courtroom deputies to stop this theft and they

refused. They refused to recover the papers and refused to accept a criminal

complaint about the theft. Shelton went to Cook County Sheriff Dart’s office

in room 704, politely sat down in the waiting area in a chair next to a very 26

polite secretary Lynn, and asked to speak to Sheriff Dart or his Chief

Counsel, Mr. Peter Kramer to inform him of this theft and the refusal of his

deputies to do their job. Sheriff Dart was not available and Mr. Kramer also

refused to assist stating that no law was violated. Shelton called the Chicago

Police who came to the Daley Center, room 704, at first agreed this was a

theft, just like someone stealing an attorney’s court file from a courtroom,

but after talking with Assistant Chief Sheriff (“A/C”) Nolan, who had arrived,

privately out in the hall, they also refused to attempt to recover the

documents or take a criminal complaint, stating this was a “civil matter.”

Shelton then called CCCC Clerk Brown’s legal counsel on her cell phone, Ms.

Akem, and she refused to recover these documents or assist Shelton in

obtaining a copy of the petition and order so Shelton could serve the

defendants in the case.

While this was going on A/C Nolan came in the room with several

sergeants, lieutenants, and deputies, and in a disorderly fashion blocking the

Sheriff’s office and hall, they also refused to recover the documents or

accept a criminal complaint for the theft by CCCC Asst. Clerk John. They told

Shelton she had to leave and she said no, they must recover her document

or accept a criminal complaint or they would be obstructing justice and

preventing her from serving the defendants. Then they unlawfully arrested

Shelton when she said they had only two legal choices – to recover her

documents, in which case she “would waive the criminal complaint” against

the clerk for theft, or accept a criminal complaint. 27

Alleged charges are trespass to real property for allegedly refusing to

leave the public waiting area of Sheriff Dart’s office during normal business

hours when told to do so by A/C Nolan and disorderly conduct for allegedly

refusing to leave the office lobby, when ordered to do so by A/C Nolan. Of

note: officers have no legal authority to order a citizen out of a public

building during normal business hours when the person is peaceful and not

impeding anyone else’s business, especially if they are conducting public

business. This would be denial of due process and equal protection under the

Constitutional Amendments.

There is a controversy in this case concerning whether or not the

charge of “criminal trespass to real property” applies in public buildings, in

public areas of the building during normal business hours. The police in

Illinois abuse this charge by ordering people they don’t like out of public

building, falsely claiming there are causing a “disturbance” or being

“disorderly” even if they are sitting quietly, 720 ILCS 5/21 3 (Criminal

trespass to real property).

The question is: was there legislative intent for this charge to apply to

public buildings when there is another charge in Illinois called “criminal

trespass to state supported land”, which clearly applies to public property

and requires the additional element of interrupting someone’s use of a public

building or services in a public building. 720 ILCS 5/21 5, (Criminal Trespass

to State Supported Land).

28

Therefore, Shelton was unlawfully arrested for having the audacity to

exercise her constitutional and statutory rights and ask CCCC Clerk Brown’s

staff, the Sheriff staff, and the Chicago Police to obey the law and perform

their statutory duties. These acts against Shelton are acts of official

misconduct, theft of honest services, obstruction of justice (Shelton could not

serve her complaint upon defendants, when the complaint and the order on

the petition was withheld from her), an illegal penalty on the exercise of her

constitutional right to redress of grievances and due process, conspiracy to

violate civil rights under color of law, violation of civil rights under color of

law, dereliction of duty, outrageous government conduct, unlawful arrest,

malicious prosecution, and denial of equal protection under the law.

While in wrongful custody, Shelton, a handicapped individual, was

medically neglected by Sheriff staff, collapsed, and required treatment at

Loyola medical center after being transferred there in custody by ambulance.

She had first been taken to WestLake Hospital. A letter was written to them

complaining about the lack of care there and the battery Shelton received

there. An additional charge was added of resisting arrest for “kicking” when

being removed from the hospital to a squad car. Shelton has poor memory of

this time as she went into flashbacks at Westlake, thinking that Sgt. Anthony

Salemi was attacking her and she was suffocating. (Sgt. Salemi had

previously attacked Shelton, falsified his records, and charged her with

battery, then committed perjury at trial and she was convicted in 2007. –

This conviction is being appealed). 29

In violation of 735 ILCS 5/5-105, CCCC Clerk Brown’s staff FAILED to

deliver to or to mail Shelton/Plaintiff these documents promptly on April 1,

2009. As a result of this theft and failure of CCCC Clerk Brown’s staff to

deliver the documents to Shelton, she was delayed in serving the complaint

upon the defendants. On April 27, 2009, Shelton went to the office of CCCC

Clerk Brown, room 1001, and insisted that the documents be returned to her.

After much hassle, first going to room 801 at the suggestion of Clerk Brown’s

staff attorney to ask the clerk to return her documents after requesting the

file and the assistant clerk in 801 telling her that she would have to PAY for

them, Shelton returning to the office of CCCC Clerk Brown, room 1001, and

complaining again, CCCC Clerk Brown’s attorney Akem went to room 801,

copied all these documents, and gave them to Shelton. CCCC Clerk Brown

still retains the originals. Shelton then confirmed that the petition was

granted.

The written orders and docket (Appendix S), concerning the State

Elected case reflect the following: (1) SOJ statutes were violated on 8/26/11

and 5/29/12, thus rendering all orders of 8/26/11 and subsequently void ab

initio; (2) orders striking motions for substitution of judge, dismissal for

speedy trial violations, and to compel compliance with witnesses render the

proceedings void due to lack of jurisdiction of court as a result of blatant

pervasive constitutional and statutory violations; and (3) as state is

responsible for 398 days of delay, speedy trial statutes require that all six (6)

30

cases be dismissed. Note court impeded filing and hearing many motions

(Appendix S).

Docket and orders say order of court on:

4/1/09 (arrest date) to 6/6/09 )first appearance) OOC 36 days5/14/09 to 6/25/09 OOC 42 days6/27/11 to 8/26/11 OOC

(on 1/2 sheet, contradicts docket which says BA ) 60 days8/26/11 to 10/31/11 (transcript says OOC but docket BA 65 days3/21/12 to -5/29/12 OOC 68 days_________Total 271+ 10/31/11 to 3/6/12 because all of Judge Burch'sorders are void for failure to transfer SOJ for causemotion to another judge 127 days______________Grand total 398 days

As all cases violate speedy trial and must be dismissed if over 320 days, all

pending cases must be dismissed due to violation of speedy trial laws. Also

arrest warrants are invalid as Judge Chiampas issued them after dismissing

motion for SOJ for cause that a courier filed for Shelton on 5/29/12 and it is

date-stamped in the file. All orders except to transfer to another judge are

void per 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) and Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill.App.3d 170, 176

(2009) and Jiffy Lube Int'l v. Agarwal 277 Ill.App.3d 722, 214 Ill.Dec.609,

6661 N.E.2d 463 (1996).

Defendant as of May 29, 2012 is NOT ready for trial as Sheriff Dart and

Court Clerk Dorothy Brown have refused to answer their subpoenas for

names of witnesses and documents. Court struck all pending pleadings on

motion of state in retaliation for Defendant going out into air-conditioned

hallway and not being in courtroom when name was called on March 21, 31

2012, including motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial statute and

motion to compel Clerk Brown to answer subpoena, de facto terminating

Defendant’s rights to speedy trial and compulsory process.

ARGUMENT

Abuse of Judicial Discretion and Malicious Biased Conduct of Judge Chiampas Ensuring Unfair, Unconstitutional Trial Unless Relief Granted

Shelton's due process, compulsory process, and equal protection

rights, as well as her rights for accommodation under the ADA under the

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were, and continue to be, severely

abridged by the void orders issued by Judges Burch and Chiampas since

August 26, 2012. No judge has the legal authority to de facto deny a criminal

defendant compulsory process and speedy trial rights by striking her motions

to compel compulsory process and dismiss case for speedy trial violation as

a sanction for getting sick in the courtroom, then railroad the defendant into

going to trial without the tools needed to defend herself, as well as force the

defendant to defend herself in an environment that is detrimental to her

health and may prevent her from even remaining upright, let alone being

able to talk and defend herself. Nor does she have any authority to strike a

motion for SOJ for cause. This is a grotesque violation of a judge’s and

prosecutor’s oath to uphold the law.

The continued dilatory tactics of the State in failing to respond to

Defendant’s motions in a timely fashion, and then moving for Defendant’s

motions to be stricken as proven by above docket and attached transcripts 32

and orders is a gross violation of the prosecutor’s oath of office and has been

repeatedly condoned and adopted by Judge Burch and now Judge Chiampas.

Continued fraud upon the court by the prosecutor in making false

statements as to what Defendant said to Mr. Bormes on March 21, 2012, as

to what case has been elected (they keep switching prosecutor and telling

the judges a different case (Defendant could not afford all the transcripts to

prove this, but she affirms this in this statement), as to the prosecutor

condoning the Sheriff and Court Clerk refusing to answer subpoenas and

provide the names of the witnesses (omission of critical facts as well as false

statements is an act of fraud upon the court), have worked together to deny

Defendant speedy trial rights compulsory process rights, and right to due

process, as well as to ensure that defendant is railroaded and denied a fair

trial, all in the interest of the judge clearing her call and rushing to judgment

in the face of a long-standing poorly handled and administered court system,

which she is under pressure from higher ranking judges to correct as fast as

possible.

This situation described above and documented in the attached

transcripts and orders cannot be tolerated by a fair and just judicial system

under our Constitution and Bill of Rights.

Relief Sought

Relief sought amounts simply for this Honorable Court to examine this

pleading, recognize that there is evidence attached that proves violation of

Shelton’s right to speedy trial, compulsory process, accommodation under 33

the ADA, and due process including right to have motions heard in a timely

fashion and motion heard for SOJ for cause, as well as to have all pending

cases dismissed due to speedy trial violations, per 735 ILCS 5/114-5(d), or in

the alternative, then perhaps this Honorable Court will consider ordering the

IL Supreme Court to hear this Petition for Mandamus on an emergency and

expedited schedule by remanding this pleading back to them with

instructions to grant me indigency status and waive filing fees, and/or order

a SOJ for trial and the court to vacate previous orders striking Shelton’s

motions to compel compliance with subpoenas and motion for dismissal due

to speedy trial violations, and hear motion to dismiss due to speedy trial law.

Shelton further prays that the above cases be reassigned to a judge

other than Judge Chiampas or any judge named on Defendant’s Internet

blogs as corrupt so that Defendant may be tried on the merits in a manner

that will promote public confidence in the integrity and fairness of the judicial

system and provide to the litigants the blessing of equal justice under the

law.

Appropriateness of Mandamus

It is well-settled that a defendant has the right to seek a writ of

mandamus from the state supreme court when a trial court is so biased and

lawless that a fair trial is impossible and the stage of proceedings is pre-trial,

so that appellate jurisdiction of the state appellate court is premature. In the

case at bar, since the IL S Ct has denied Shelton access to its court

(Appendix B), the State has waived the requirement of exhaustion of state 34

remedies before the defendant applies to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ

of mandamus, in lieu of applying to the IL S Ct for a writ of mandamus.

Judicial notice is given that it is well-settled that mandamus petition is

the proper procedure for an appellate court to review a lower court judge for

disqualification from a case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably

be questioned. In recognition of this point the federal courts have been

liberal in allowing the use of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to review

orders denying motions to disqualify. Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting

Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986), at 712. (References deleted).

Although mandamus may be opposed on the premise that it should not

to be used as a substitute for appeal, Shelton contends that no party should

be required to submit to a presiding judge who has a prejudicial bent of

mind, expecting that there will be another opportunity for justice after final

judgment has been rendered. Rather, mandamus should be viewed as a

means of avoiding a needless and judicially inefficient ordeal.

[D]ue process . . . [requires] that a judge who is otherwise qualified to

preside at trial or other proceeding must be sufficiently neutral and free of

disposition to be able to render a fair decision. No person should be

required to stand trial before a judge with a 'bent of mind.' Collins v.

Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160 (1989), at 166 citing Berger v. United

States, 255 U.S. 22, 33, 41 S.Ct. 230, 233, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); Wolfram,

Modern Legal Ethics § 17.5.5 Independence and Neutrality, p. 989 (1986).

(Bold emphasis added). 35

Animus Toward Shelton

The SOJ motion filed on May 29, 2012, Appendix R, is a complaint of

judicial misconduct. The accusations in it are so serious and proof of treason

according to previous rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court that it is appropriate

for this Honorable Court to act as soon as possible to remedy this injustice.

The basic requirement of constitutional due process is a fair and impartial

tribunal, whether at the hands of a court, an administrative agency or a

government hearing officer.

Prejudgment and Predisposition

The Judge's condescending assessment of Shelton as being dilatory

(Appendix F1-17) is subjective and prejudicial and reveals that she has

already formed an opinion in this matter before the trial has been scheduled.

"[A]djudicative decisions . . . should be free of bias or prejudice. Thus an

adjudicative decision maker should be disqualified if he or she has prejudged

disputed adjudicative issues." Valley et al. v. Rapides Parish School Board,

118 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1997), at 1053. Judge Chiampas conduct on

3/26/12 is inexcusable. She violated her oath of office and the Constitution

by striking motions to compel compliance with subpoenas and to dismiss for

speedy trial violation then scheduling trial without answers to subpoenas for

defense

The basic requirement of constitutional due process is a fair and

impartial tribunal, and the Supreme Court has consistently enforced this

basic procedural right. The problem of a procedural defect arises when 36

decision makers have prejudged the facts to such an extent that their minds

are 'irrevocably closed' before actual adjudication. Valley, at 1052 citing

Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation District of Jefferson County, 57 F.3d,

436 (5th Cir. 1995), at 446.

Bias or prejudice on the part of a judge may exhibit itself prior to the

trial by acts or statements on his part. Or it may appear during the trial by

reason of the actions of the judge in the conduct of the trial. If it is known

to exist before the trial it furnishes the basis for disqualification of

the judge to conduct the trial. Section 144, Title 28, U.S. Code. Knapp v.

Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, (6th Cir. 1956), at 465. Rehearing denied 235 F.2d

129, cert. denied 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 131, 1 L.Ed.2d 86. (Bold emphasis

added). In the present case, Judge Chiampas’ predisposition and bent of

mind, as revealed by her actions and writing, satisfy the requirement for

disqualification.

Pervasive Bias and Prejudice

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Thomas, and

Ginsburg, expressed in Liteky the majority Court opinion that:

A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as 'bias' or 'prejudice' requiring recusal because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. (That explains what some courts have called the 'pervasive bias exception' to the extrajudicial source doctrine. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 188 (1976).) Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994), at 551.

37

In Liteky, Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter challenged

the extrajudicial source rule, arguing that undue emphasis should not be

placed on the source of the contested mindset in determining whether

disqualification is mandated by 28 U.S.C.§ 455(a).

The statute does not refer to the source of the disqualifying partiality.

And placing too much emphasis upon whether the source is extrajudicial or

intrajudicial distracts from the central inquiry. One of the very objects of law

is the impartiality of its judges in fact and appearance. . . . The relevant

consideration under § 455(a) is the appearance of partiality, see Liljeberg,

[Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)], at 860,

108 S.Ct., at 2202-03, not where it originated or how it was disclosed. Liteky,

Id. at 558.

Justice Kennedy further expressed the opinion that the standard for

disqualification under § 455(a) during the course of a judicial proceeding is

too severe under Liteky and should be modulated to allow its intended

protection.

The [Supreme] Court holds that opinions arising during the course of judicial

proceedings require disqualification under § 455(a) only if they 'display a

deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.' (Reference deleted). That standard is not a fair interpretation of

the statute, and is quite insufficient to serve and protect the integrity of the

courts. Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994), at 563. Section 455(a) . . .

guarantee[s] not only that a partisan judge will not sit, but also that no 38

reasonable person would have that suspicion. See Liljeberg, at 860. Liteky,

Id. at 567.

Notwithstanding the dichotomy of opinion over the extrajudicial source

rule, Shelton contends that Judge Chiampas’ ex part actions with the State’s

Attorney on March 21, 2012 sustain a complaint of a genuine extrajudicial

source factor. Yet, even if this argument is discarded, the extraordinary

circumstances of Judge Chiampas’ gross snubbing of the constitutional

principles of compulsory process and speedy trial as well as Defendant’s

rights to accommodation under the ADA would re-qualify it on the basis of

the "pervasive bias exception." And even if that argument were discarded, it

would still be virtually impossible for Judge Chiampas to escape the

appearance of partiality posed by the facts presented in the petition under

reviewed.

Because we seek to protect the public's confidence in the judiciary, our

inquiry focuses not on whether the judge actually harbored subjective bias,

but rather on whether the record, viewed objectively, reasonably

supports the appearance of prejudice or bias. United States v. Antar,

53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir.1995) at 574; United States v. Bertoli , 40 F.3d 1384,

1412 (3d Cir.1994); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155 (3d

Cir. 1993) at 162; Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d

Cir.1992). In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 1995), at 101. (Bold emphasis

added).

Determination of Impartiality39

The IL S Ct stated the factors that would require SOJ for cause include:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’ (Emphasis in original.) Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill.2d 228, 281, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1147 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

It may be argued that the determination of the judge concerned should

be afforded great weight and should not be disturbed unless clearly

erroneous. However, in the matter here under review, it is clear that Judge

Chiampas engaged in actions that, in the aggregate, constitute serious and

erroneous abuse of judicial discretion, based on apparent deep-seated

antagonism toward Shelton.

Additionally, Judge Chiampas' deep seated favoritism toward the State

and against Defendant since March 21, 2012, demonstrates a pervasive bias

that is so extreme as to indicate a clear inability to render fair judgment. The

latter circumstance requires recusal. Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994).

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that “a fair trial in

a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,” in administrative

adjudicatory proceedings as well as in courts. Michigan Dept. of Soc. Servs.

v. Shalala, 859 F.Supp. 1113, 1123 (W.D.Mich.1994) (quoting Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 36, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1459, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975)). Our 40

court of appeals has declared, '[l]itigants ought not have to face a

judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality . . . .'

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d. 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993). D.B. v.

Ocean Tp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F.Supp 457 (D.N.J. 1997), at 540. (Bold emphasis

added).

In the final analysis, a reasonable person would question the

impartiality of any judge who was so callous as to arrest a defendant who

went into the hallway to cool off, knowing that she cannot physically tolerate

a high temperature in the room on a record breaking hot day, only weeks

after the defendant collapsed unconscious before the bench with an

unfortunate and serious list of medical illnesses and physical disability, and

then would strike defendant’s motions requesting the court to grant her

basic constitutional rights, fundamental to the Constitution of these United

States such as speedy trial and compulsory process.

CONCLUSION

To maintain the integrity of the judicial system, the Court must be

concerned whether the parties received fair and impartial treatment of the

charges. At the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial

process, the welfare of the parties must receive priority over other

considerations should a violation including bias or deep-seated antagonism

by the judge occur. In the matter presently under review, justice requires

that the CCCC’s orders August 26, 2011 and subsequently be vacated and a

41

new judge appointed to preside over Defendant’s cases, who will pledge to

follow the ADA and the Bill of Rights.

In conclusion, Dr. Linda Lorincz Shelton, respectfully prays that a writ

of mandamus be issued by this Court directed to respondent, the Honorable

Peggy Chiampas Judge of the CCCC, Municipal 1 Division, Criminal Section,

and directing the CCCC to vacate orders of August 26, 2011 and all following

orders and disqualify Judge Chiampas from presiding in the action now

pending before her, and to grant all other requested relief as the Court may

deem proper, including if deemed appropriate striking all cases and charges

due to legal insufficiency and violation of speedy trial laws and rights.

Respectfully submitted,

Linda Lorincz Shelton,Pro Se

42

CERTIFICATE

I certify that one copy each of this Petition for Writ of Mandamus was hand delivered on or about June 6, 2012 to judge respondent and the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Timothy Evans CEO, and that three copies were hand delivered to the Cook County State’s Attorney at the addresses indicated below. A separate, notarized certificate shows the actual date of service.

The Hon. Peggy Chiampas, Judge CEO of the Circuit Court of Cook County2600 S. California Ave., Courtroom 102Chicago, IL 60608 - Respondent Judge

The Hon. Timothy EvansChief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County50 W. Washington, Room 2600Chicago, IL 60602

Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez50 West Washington, Room 3rd Floor West SideChicago, IL 60602

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTSOrders of Judge Peggy Chiampas in Case & Summary of Case IssuesNo 09 MC1 223774-01, 09 MC1 238219-01, 09 MC1 258392-01, 09 MC1 260540-01, 09 MC1 2886184, 09 MC1 261096-01, 09 MC1 241978-01, 11 MC1 600086Prepared 3/21, 26 & 29, 2012 A

Order of IL S Ct and their Clerk’s letters to Defendant concerning this order barring Petitioner from any filings B

Medical Records for Linda Shelton C

Transcript of March 6, 2012 before Judge Peggy Chiampas in case no 09 MC1 223774-01 D

Transcript of March 21, 2012 before Judge Peggy Chiampas in case no 09 MC1 223774-01 E

Transcript of March 26, 2012 before Judge Peggy Chiampas in case no 09 MC1 223774-01 F

Judge Holderman’s Orders of 3/31/10 & 4/8/10 G

Shelton’s letter to 7th Circuit Judicial Council requesting review of Judge Easterbrook’s dismissal of complaint against Judge Holderman’s void orders restricting Shelton’s filings in Federal District Court and Access to Federal District Court building and library. Judge Easterbrook’s Orders 4/2010 (N/A due to theft of Shelton’s documents and its disruption of her files in 11/2010 – as well as chilling affect of Holderman’s void orders against Shelton without due process) H

7th Circuit Court order barring in forma pauperis I

7th Circuit Appellate Court Dismissal of Appeal of Holderman Orders J

Business card from Canadian Consul Chief Brian Herman K

Judge McHale’s Orders & Transcript L

Annabel Melongo Proof still in jail M

U.S. Supreme Court Clerk letters erroneously rejecting filing of PetitionsFor failure to Exhaust State Remedies N

Summary of Charges and Incidents O

State of IL MFCU Fraudulent Application to US DHHS for Recertification and funding P

Complaints for case no 09 MC1 223774-01 Q

SOJ Motion re Judge Chiampas R

Docket and judges’ orders for 09 MC1 223774-01 &Typewritten copy of handwritten orders & docket S