...TH E BR ITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE SOU DAN FOR THE R E SCU E OF GOR DON. GE NE R AL R. E. COLSTON, OF...

THE BR ITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUDANFOR THE R ESCU E OF GORDON.

GENE RAL R . E . COLSTON , OF WASH ING TON,D . C .

FORM E R LY O F TH E G ENE RAL STAFF OF TH E E G Y PT IAN AR M Y .

I propose to present in this paper an outline narra tiveof the war in . the Soudan for the rescue of “ ChineseGordon.

”The limits of such an article forbid more than

a brief a llusion to the events which led to this war,

'

and

which are still fresh in t he public mind . They may be

summarized a s followsThe brilliant and prodiga l career of the ex -KhediveIsmail-Pa sha ending in

'

his financia l ruin .

The insta lla tion of European commissioners of thepublic debt

,followed by swarms of high-pa id B ritish

officials taking entire control“of Egyptian finances

,rev

ennes,ra ilroads

,and telegraphs .

The resistance of Isma‘

il to their usurpation of hispowers

,and his compulsory abdica tion enforced by the

B ritish and French Consuls-Genera l,June 26

,1879.

The merely nomina l rule of his son Tewfi k,and the

sacrifice of every Egyptian interest to the payment off oreign bondholders ; the dissa tisfaction of the people,and the opposition of the Egyptian a rmy to beingmade thech ief victims of this policy

,culminating in the military

revolt of Arabi-Pa sha the bombardment of Alexandria,

125

The B ritish Campa ign in the'

Soudcm .

the ba ttle of Tel -el -Kebir,and the British occupa tion of

Egypt in 1882.

These events made England the sole and absolutearbiter of Egypt

’s fate

,for France had withdrawn from

the “Dua l Control before the bombardment of Alexandria

,ra ther than participate in that ruthless deed l

In October 1888,after one year of B ritish domination,

this wa s the situation of affa irs,

The young Khedivewa s deprived of a ll real authorityB ritish commissioners having more than ever before ab

solute control of the resources of the country and its en

tire administra tion .

The Egyptian regular army was entirely disbanded,

except a few of‘

Arabi’s disaffected regiments,sent to the

Soudan a s a punishment for their rebellion .

A new native army composed of fresh levies,supposed

by a convenient fiction to be the Khedive’s army,but

commanded by B ritish ofi ic ers,wa s crea ted under Sir

Evelyn Wood. A na tive constabulary force called gendwrmerie (whose officers were chiefly Ita lian) , ra ised toserve a s police and not a s soldiers

,wa s organized under

Valentine B aker-Pa sha,the B ritish ex - colonel of hussars .

The hitherto undisputed power of the Egyptian government

,which had enabled it to enforce order and

obedience upon the turbulent and barbarous popula tionsof the Soudan

,wa s fata lly impa ired

,for the garrisons

had already been reduced for rea sons of economy,in order

tha t the bondholders’coupons might be pa id ; and now a

genera l impression that the Khedive had sold his countryto Christians and foreigners began to preva il among thepeople

,and to give double encouragement to theMahdi’s

rebellion which had commenced two years before .

The B ritish Own-we igh in the Soudcm . 127

Having taken entire possession of the country,avowed

ly not a s a conqueror but expressly a s a friend and protector

,solely to defend her a lly the

'

Khedive aga inst hisrebellious subjects

,England became in equity Egypt

’s

guardian,and a s she had rendered her

"

defenceless,she

wa s bound by every considera tion of justice to shield herfrom a ll harm .

How had she come to occupy such,a position after her

repea ted~declarations that the Suez Cana l wa s the only

B ritish interest involved in Egypt,and tha t so long a s it

wa s safe,England would decline a ll interference in Egyp

tian affa irs 2She had been driven step by step

,a lmost unwittingly

,

to a ssume this role by the pressure of B ritish bondholders numerous and powerful enough to c ontrol both Parliament and ministers . England’s attitude a t this timewa s tersely described by Hon . Henry Labouchere

,the

eminent M. P. and a lso editor of Truth, in these words“Why are we in Egypt ? THAT SHYL OCK MAY H AV E H IS

POUND or FLE SH I

Two courses were open to England.

One wa s to frankly assume a protectorate and to govern Egypt directly

,either continuing the Khedive in his

role of a mere fi gure head or else removing and pensioning him ofi like an Indian Ra jah .

The other wa s to limit the sphere of B ritish a ction tosecuring the Khedive’s power until he could reo rganizehis own army and consolida te his government. This ob

jec t once atta ined, he should have been left free to governEgypt in his own way ,providing only for his compliancewith the obliga tions he had contra cted.

But just at this time commenced that a stounding series

128 The B ritish Campa ign i n the Sendan .

~

of va cilla tions,both politica l and military

,that were

destined to produce such disastrous results .

To procla im a protectorate over Egypt wa s to fa lsifythe declara tions so often repea ted to the world

,and to

incur the hostility of Turkey and France a s well a s thejea lousy of other powers .

Ou - the other'

hand,

'

to withdraw her army from Egy ptand leave the Khedive to govern independently

,seemed

to the B ritish ministry a sa crifice of prestige and of thea dvantages apparently secured by the - occupation .

In the words of a

“

distinguished publicist ! The

m inistry cherished the delusion tha t some middle coursew as open to them

,by which

,while reta ining the ad

vantages of a virtua l protectorate,they could avoid the

liabilities insepa rable fromits overt a ssumption .

'

We have deranged every thing and have establishednothing in its pla ce .

’7 While England held the Khe

d ive in the most absolute tutelage,shorn of every power

,

s he wished the world to bel ieve tha t he enjoyed entirefreedom of a ction and wa s a lone responsible for thea cts of his government. In pursuance of this policy ofh a lf mea sures

,a partia l eva cuation wa s announced by

Mr. Gladstone a t the Guildhall banquet in London onthe 9th of Nov

,1888

,and this declara tion wa s con

sidered a s'

the prelude to a complete withdrawal ofthe B ritish army from Egypt . Consequently the reformsand innova tions forced upon the Egyptian people in spiteof their bitter antipathy were now regarded by thema s temporary evils which would cea se with the B ritishoccupation. To quote aga in from the same writer :

Edwa rd Dicey , Professor of Poli tica l Science and Economy a t Ox ford,in the

Nineteen th Cen tury for Ma rch , 1884.

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soa da n . 129

Egypt .wa s given to understand that after havingbomba rded Al exandria

,invaded the country

,exiled

Ar abi, deprived the Khedive of his authority,disor

ganized the native administration,destroyed the mech

anism by which hitherto order had been ma inta inedafter a fa shion

,and established in its stead a number of

institutions on paper,which could be converted into rea li

ties only if ensured by a prolonged occupation, we wereabout to throw up the ta sk we had undertaken and leavethe country to its fa te —.i. e.

,to a sta te of confusion closely

bordering upon anarchy.

”

But this programme of eva cuation wa s suddenly abandoned . Mr. Gladstone’s Guildha ll speech wa s made onthe 9th of November

,and on the 20th

,news rea ched

London of the entire annihila tion in the Soudan ofHicks -Pa sha’s army of eleven thousand men

,and of the

defeat and death of Consul Moncrieff a t Tokar. The

orders a lready issued for the embarka tion of one half of

the B ritish army and the withdrawa l of the rema inderfrom Ca iro to Alexandria were countermanded

,and the

Soudan suddenly loomed up into formidable prominence,

for while England had concentra ted a ll her efforts tosuppress Arabi’s rebellion

,another much more formida

ble had broken out in the distant regions of the UpperNile. The ea sy triumph over the meek f ellaheen in theholiday campa ign of Tel - el -Kebir had been thought theend of the troubles

,but now it seemed only th e

beginning thereof.A description of the Soudan with its relation to Egyptproper is necessary to a complete understanding of wha tfollows .

In the words of Herodotus,Egypt is the g ift (or crea

130 The B ritish Campa ign in the Sea dan .

’

tion) of the Nile, for being a rainless country,she de

pends upon her only river for her very existence . The

experience of fifty c enturl es ha s proved that Egyptc an never be safe unless she controls the banks of theNile a t lea st a s far south as Khartoum.

From the sea to the mouth of the Atbara above B erber,

a distance of one thousand seven hundred miles,not a

single affluent falls into the Nile,and the breadth of its

va lley above the Delta varies from a mere rocky ca ti on toa very rare ma x imum of three to four miles

,the average

being under two . Three million of people,being nearly

one ha lf of the population of Egypt and Nubia,are

crowded into that narrow ribbon one thousand fi ve hundred

'

miles long by two in breadth,without any possible

outlet,for all the vast spa ces ea st and west (some eight

hundred thousand square miles) are TH E DE SE R T.

Vegeta tion stops just where the wa ters of the Nile c an

not be lifted by irriga tion, and the dividing line betweenthat and the desert is a s sharply marked a s a gravel wa lka cross a gra ss lawn . B etween the Nile and the R ed Sea

is the Ara bian Desert,and on the west

,extending until it

joins the Sahara , is the M in/a n Desert.

Egyptproper extends only to the first ca tara ct a t Assoua n

,about seven hundred miles from the sea (la t . 24

°

B etween the first cataract a t Assouan and the secondcatara ct a t Wady Ha lfa

,t he country 1s ca lled Lower

Nubia,and from Wady Ha lfa (lat . to New Don

gola (la t . is Upper Nubia .

All the regions south of Dongola are embraced underthe name of SOUDAN— an immense and indefinite region

,

stretching a cross the ent ire continent of Africa,on both

'

sides of the equator,and subdivided by geographers into

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan . 131

Ea stern,Centra l

,and Western Soudan . The name is

derived from the Arabic a swa d,bla ck

,of which the

plura l is si taa so that B eled - es-Soa da/n means simplythe coun try of the bla cks, or, a s we would ca ll it

,

The Egyptian Soudan comprises but a sma ll portionof tha t immense territory. It s most important provincesa re Dongola

,Kordofan

,Darfour

,and B ahr- el -Grha zelle

,

west of the White Nile . Its ea stern boundary is theR ed Sea down to Ma ssowah ; thence the Abyssinianfrontier

,between which and the White Nile is the large

and fertile province of Senna ar. When Gordon wa s

Governor-Genera l of the Soudan (1874—187 a cha in ofEgyptian garrisons, of which Gondokoro wa s the princi

pa l , rea ched a s far a s the great lakes,all connected by

telegraph with Ca iro . This region,cla imed by the

Khedive a s part of his . dominions,wa s ca lled the

Equa toria l Provinces ; but in reality it is occupied bywarlike negro tribes —~Dinkas

,Shillooks

,Dowers

,and

others too numerous to mention,and genera lly partici

pants in the slave- trade either a s hunters or hunted ; sothat the Khedive’s authority wa s limited to a sma ll circlea round each military post. Even in time of pea ce and

under Ismail’s and Gordon’s strong government thosetribes would frequently attack sma ll Egyptian detachments

,a s when they ma ssa cred young Linant and his

party in 1875. It fla ttered Ismail’s pride to'

im agine tha this empire extended to the lakes

,but in fa ct

,beyond

Sennaar on the ea st,and B ahr- el -Cha zelle

_

on the west,

the Khedive’s authority was purely nomina l .M ehemet -Ali

,the grea t -grandfather of the present

Khedive,w a s a m an of eminent abilities

,but merciless

132 The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan.

and unscrupulous . H e had no sooner consolidated histenure of the vice - rega l throne than he resolved toincrea se his territory. This wa s impossible within thenarrow va lley of the lower Nile ; but above the a riddeserts of Nubia are broad and fertile regions inside ofthe southern ra in-belt

,and well wa tered by the Atbara

,

the Sobat,and other affluents of the Nile . The so- ca lled

island of M eroé wa s formerly the centre of a civilizationolder than the Phara ohs . Stand ing upon the siteof theancient city

,I c ounted n o less than forty- two pyramid s—i

sma ller,it is true

,than those of Gizeh

,but of a size to

be considered gigantic in any other land . Later st l ll

Meroewa s the seat of fi ve populous Christian bishoprics .

Senna ar,lying between theWhite and the B lue Niles

, pos

sesses a soil of unriva lled fertility and produces Wheatcorn

,cotton

,sugar

,and gum in prod igious abundance

,

beside the senna to which it gives its name . Kordofan,

on the west of the'

White Nile,is a sterile and a lmost

waterless region, yet it yields va st quantities of ostrich

fea thers and the grea t bulk of the best gum- arabic of theworld . But better still

,the ma ster of those provinces

controls the rich trade of Centra l Africa— ebony,gold

dust,ivory

,indigo

,india -rubber

,and above a ll

,slaves .

A pretext wa s easily found,and in 1822 M ehemet -Ali

had a chieved the conquest of Sennaar and Kordofan .

Until tha t time the country had been ruled by numberless Sultans

,a s they call ed themselves

,and its condition

A fa ct men tioned by ea rly his torians and confi rmed by the resea rches of Monsignor Daniele Combon i, B ishop of Nigritia , a most a ccompl i shed Arabi c schola rand a rcheologis t . H e wa s a na tive of V erona ,

a man of splendid presence , genia lna ture , and the most l ibera l - minded priest I ever met . H e a ccompanied me on myreturn journey from R I Obe '

i'd through Kha rtoum

,Berber , a nd Suakim to Ca iro

,

and he d ied in Kordofan in i881,in the prime of middle life , a victim to the mur

derons cl ima te .


from time immemoria l had been one of continua l rapine,

anarchy,and savagery. Commerce could hardly be sa id

to exist,for caravans had to pay heavy tributes to every

robber chief,and even this did not a lways secure their

lives and property from a tta cks by roving bands. ofB edouins. S triking mementoes of tha t period of brigandage are the ruins of ancient ca stles seen on manyba sa ltic islands rising one or two hundred feet abovethe river-bed . Some

,like the feuda l fortresses on the

Rhine (which they so much resemble) , were once“

the

strongholds of bandit chiefs, whence they could spy outthe approa ch of their prey ; while others served a s

refuges in which the agricultura l population stored theircrops to save them from the ra ids of the desert nomads .

M ehemet -Ali’s conquest wa s a ccompanied by fearfulcruelties on both sides . I have stood a t Shendy uponthe very spot where M ehemet

’s son

,Ismail

,was roa sted

"

to dea th with a ll his chief officers and a portion ofhis troops . Isma

'

i’l had made extortionate demands for

gold,slaves

,and forage upon the loca l Sultan

,él JVimr

(the Tiger) , and had struck him a cross the fa ce with hispipe - stem because the forage fell s hort. The crafty chiefretired humbly from his presence

,promising that an

abundance would be supplied before morning. Allthe a fternoon and evening immense quantities werepiled all around the quarter of the town where Ismailand his troops were holding high revel . But an hourbefore daylight the stacks were simultaneously fireda t every point, and the doomed Turco -Egyptians foundthemselves surrounded by a circle of flames from whichnone escaped

,for c l Nimr with his Nubians stood out

side and shot down or speared every one who a ttempted

134 The B ritish Campa ign in the Sea dam.

’

”to break the fiery barrier. To avenge his son’s dea th,

.M ehemet -Ali sent another army under his son - in-law

the famous Def terdam (so- called from his offi ce of regist ra r or trea surer) , whose name still lives in Egyptiantraditions on a ccount of his fiendish cruelties . Thisa rmy of Asia tic Turks showed little mercy to Africanbarbarians . More than people were slaughteredbetween Abou Hamed and Khartoum

,and a still larger

number,chiefly boys and young women

,were sent down

a s slaves to Lower Egypt . The bloody memories of thec onquest were never forgotten

,but so thorough had it

been that sixty years elapsed without a genera l attempta t rebellion.

Even the worst evils are often followed by good'

re

sults . B y degrees, order, defective a s it might be,arose

from absolute chaos . M ehemet -Ali visited the Soudanand his military eye perceived at one glance the stra tegic

“importance of the point of land at the junction of theWhite and the B lue Niles . There he founded Khartoum

(lat . 15°

and made it the capita l of the Soudan provinc es

,with a government pa lace , extensive barra cks for

troops,an arsenal

,a ship -yard

,and a growing popula tion

which,in 1876

,had increa sed to more than A

d espotic and often cruel government,establishing strong

garrisons a t important points,commanded peace and en

forced obedience. Commerce,agriculture

,and industry

took the place of pill age and murder,and were efficiently

protected though heavily taxed . Famines which were“

the frequent consequence of continua l wars and rapine,

d isappeared after a government strong and regula r,even

“

if arbitrary and tyrannical,had given the husbandman an

a ssurance of reaping the crop which he had planted .

The B ri tish Campa ign in the Soudan . 135

Every thing in this world is relative. Wha t would bea n intolerable government for France or England may be

very a cceptable to a semi- civilized population,especia lly

if it is better than any thing they have experienced before .

I explored the greater part of the Soudan— the desert sbetween the Nile and the R ed Sea from Kenneh toSuakim

,a s well a s Kordofan on the west of the

'

Nile .

Altogether I spent two years travelling miles onc amel-back “

among the most numerous and powerfulB edouin tribes now in insurrection

,and visiting a ll ' the

principa l cities— B erber,Dongola

,Debbe

,El Obeid

,

Khartoum,Suakim

,etc .

,et c . In a ll my explora tions I

had the best opportunities,and I made it a point to ex

amine the condition of the country and the people .

There were certa inly no rea sons to bia s my judgment,.and I give now the result of my experience and observations .

Everywhere I found the primary elem ent of civilizationand without which none c an exist

,—submission to law .

It may be thought a crude and defective l aw,but it pos

.sesses the advantage of the universal a ssent of the people,

being based upon the Koran,which on the whole

,is a

humane and equitable code . Life and property weres afer than in our own wild border lands . Of that ruffi anism which makes a hero of a bandit like Jesse James and

glorifi es the monster who ha s killed a score of men inprivate brawls

,there was not a tra ce. Murders were

rare and genera lly punished with death . I rememberseeing a t El Obe

'

l’

d the body of a murderer hanging fromthe gallows on the market-pla ce. H e had been convic ted after a regular tria l before the Cadi

,

'but it wa snot until the ca se had been carefully revised by the

136 The B ritish Campa ign in the Sande/n.

highest tribuna l and the sentence approved by the Kher

dive himself that he wa s executed ; for no provincia lgovernor

.

wa s authorized to carry out a capita l sentence,

except G en . G ordon,upon whom the powers of life and

death had been conferred by specia l fi rman for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade . Even the wildB edouins

,fierce nomads without fixed habita tions

,and

yielding only a limited a llegiance,had been compelled to

abandon the plundering habits of their forefa thers,and

their sheikhs were held answerable with their heads forthe safety of life

,t ravel

,and property throughout their

deserts ._

In many thousand miles of travel among thenow rebellious tribes

,the B ishareens

,H a ssaneeyehs,

Kababeesh,and others

,I .have met hundreds of caravans

loaded,some with the most va luable products of Central

Africa,others with European goods going to the interior.

The commerce thus carried on by land,exclusive of the

river trade,amounted to twenty-fi ve or thirty millions of

dollars a year. Y et no caravan,large or sma ll

,needed

the protection of an armed escort,and a ll travelled in

perfect safety under the charge of unarmed camel-driversand the half-dozen

'

merchants owning the goods . The

certa inty of swift and stern punishment by the Khedive’sgovernment

,known to possess irresistible power to inflict.

it,wa s suflic ient to guarantee security to a ll .In Kordofan

,one of the remote provinces

,European

a s well a s na tive merchants carried on an a ctive trade bymeans of the elec tric telegraph

,which rea ched to Darfour

and the lakes,and they regula ted their transa ctions by

the da ily quotations of ivory, gum and ostrich fea thers at

Ca iro and Alexandria . This fa ct came under.

my persona l observa tion at El Obe’

id,a s well a s the following.

The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n . 137

A branch of the grea t Austro -Ita lian Roman -Ca tholicm l ssmn at Khartoum wa s established a t E l consisting of twelve or fifteen priests and sisters . In thatcity of thirty thousand people

,of whom two thirds were

Mussulmans and the rest hea then negroes,priests and

nuns in their distinctive costumes were da ily seen plyingtheir vocation absolutely unmolested in any way , thoughI cannot say that they made any converts, except thelittle boys and girls whom they purcha sed in infancy and

taught in their school,and who c ontinued good Christians

so long a s they were clothed and fed— and no longer.There were a lso some other branch m i ssmns far awayfrom the protection of the garr1son a t El Obe‘

id,and they

rema ined unmolested until the_Mahdi captured that city,

when twelve members were held for ransom and relea sedupon payment of seventy thousand dollars by the Aust rian consul a t Khartoum. I c an a ssert with . truth tha t“

wherever an Egyptian garrison could enforce its authority,

life and property were rea sonably well protected,far better

than could have been expected in such distant regions,

and among a semi-barbarous people .

Y et I do not pretend to say tha t even under Ismail theSoudan wa s an Arcadia . By no means For some years

. after the conquest, the military governors, a ll Turks,

were cruel and rapa cious,and confirmed the hatred for

Turkish officia ls so deeply implanted in the‘ Soudaneseheart

,and embra cing a ll Egyptians whom they regard a s

Turks . But for the la st thirty years,a milder regime had

gradua lly preva iled . It cannot be denied,however

,tha t

the rapacity of the governors and their subordina tescould never be entirely checked a t such a distance fromthe sea t of government a t Ca iro . The pea sant or laborer

138 The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n.

had to pay in extortions nearly a s much aga in a s the justamount of taxes which found its way to the governmentchest. But yet he had enough left to live ea sily in hisfruga l way , and wa s secure in the enjoyment of this sur

plus wherea s,before the conquest he never knew when

war or the roving B edouins would rob him of his sus

tenanc e and his life . No doubt there Were numerousca ses of wrong and Oppression . Traders frequently hadto pay heavy backsheesh to avoid worse extortion but

,

after a ll,the government gave them the protection with

out which they could not have carried on their trade at

all . Many poor wretches received the kourba sh to f orcefrom them the payment of their taxes but it wa s a pointof honor with them

,and they would have been branded

a s cowards by their fellows if they had pa id up beforetaking a s many strokes a s they could bear. A civilizedpeople is ruled by mora l sua sion

,not

,however

,without

severe pena lties to enforce its laws ; but barbarians c an

not“

be controlled without a good dea l of brute force.

Full allowance being made for taxa tion and extortion,

the population did not have to bear nearly so heavy a

burden a s tha t la id upon the Irish people in rents a lone ;nor had they to contend with evictions and starva tion.

The mildness of the clima te making clothing and shelteralmost a superfluity , the fertility of the cultiva ted land,and the increa se of their flocks combine to

’

procure to theEgyptian and Soudanese people a far ea sier life than fa llsto the lot of the pea santry of Ireland and a ll northernEurope . If law

,order

,and a regular government

,even

though defect ive,a re preferable to ana rchy, brigandage

and incessant war,the Soudan wa s in va stly bet ter condi

tion under Ismail-Pa sha than it had ever been before the

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soud an ..1

'

39>

conquest. And be it remembered tha t the only a lternative .

is between this imperfect but strong government,and

'

a

return to the former chaos and savagery for the Soudan~

ese,if left to themselves

,must inevitably fa ll under the

rule of numerous riva l chiefs of slave - traders,of whom

Abou Saoud,Zobehr-Pa sha

,and Osman -Digma are repre

senta tive types .

Such,then

,wa s the condition of the Soudan under

Gordon’s administra tion bef01e the deposition of Isma'

l’

l

and it cannot be denied that tha t country enjoyedmany benefi ts of an incipient civilization

,destined to in

crea se and develop if its govel nment rema ined undisturbed .

B ut no government c an be supported without taxa tion,

and an ignorant people are unable to realize that the protec tion they receiveis far more than an equiva lent returnfor the taxes which they pay . It is not astonishingtherefore tha t the Soudanese lost sight of the advantagesthey enjoyed in the security for life and industry

,and

considered a ll taxation as robbery. In the memory oftheir fa thers

,time had been when no governors and sol

diers were sent to make them pay tribute to a Turkishviceroy at Ca iro . The traditions of the cruel conquestwith fi re and sword sixty years before still lingeredamong the people

,and it told them of the days when

they were subject only to their own native sultans . Withthe natura l tendency of a primitive people to extol “ thegood old times

,

” they forgot that those petty despotswere the absolute and unsparing ma sters of the l ives andproperty of their subjects, and kept the countryme stateof perpetua l strife and deva sta tion. These memories

,kept

a live by the extortions of some rapa cious officia ls,nursed

140 The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan .

the ra ce-hatred of the Soudanese for the Egyptians,but

With the grea t mass of the people it wa s a passive sentiment which would rema in dormant unless aroused by exciting causes .

A much more a ctive and dangerous element of discontent wa s found in the large and powerful cla ss engagedin the slave -trade

,tha t curse of Africa probably a s old a s

the negro ra ce with '

which it seems to be an innate instinc t for a s Sir Samuel B aker remarks

,the first impulse

of a ! freed negro,as soon

'

a s he ha s a chance,is to a cquire a

slave of his own . Tha t this trade existed in the days ofthe Phara ohs is pla ced beyond doubt by the images ofcha in -gangs of negro slaves carved upon their monuments .

The strength and magnitude of the slave-hunting and

slave - trading organizations cannot be apprecia tedwithouta description of their system of opera tions .

An enterprising adventurer starts with a capita l ofwhich

,if he ha s it not

,he c an a lways borrow in

Khartoum a t 100 per cent.“ interest . H e enlists 150

men from the thousands of slave -hunting soldiers and

desperadoes who swarm in Khartoum and Dongola,eager

for such employment . H e supplies them with fi re- armsand abundant ammuni tion he buys a few hundredpounds of gla ss beads and a few hundred yards of coarsecotton fabrics for presents and barter. H e charters sixor eight Nile -boats and leaves Khartoum about the 1st ofDecember. Sa iling some fi ve hundred miles or more uptheWhite Nile

,he lands

“

at some eligible point. and penetra tes into the interior. First he begins to trade for ele

phants’ tusks

,but this is only a

.preliminary to more

serious business . H e invariably finds some negro chie fat enmity with another and anxious to secure an a lly so

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142 The B ritish"

Campa ign in the Souda n.

Meanwhile the slaver sa ils ba ck down the Nile and is

met a t safe points by the regular slave -merchants ca lled

j ella bs, mostly Arabs, wa iting to purcha se the slaves forready ca sh . These unfortunates are now marched off byvarious routes

,avoiding the Egyptian garrisons, some

down the Nile,others a cross the deserts to the R ed Sea

,

multitudes perishing by the way . The survivors find a

ready market in Egypt, Arabia,

‘

Turkey , Persia , and a ll

the Mussulman provinc es “of Asia,

.while the successfuladventurer returns with his ivory and gold to Khartoum

,

already a rich man . There he repays his loan withinterest

,purcha ses fresh supplies for the men he left

behind,enlists more followers

,and starts back the fol

lowing December to operate year after year upon an

ever- increa sing Scale.

Thepra ctica l working of this system is fully illustra tedby the career of the n otorious Zobehr-Pa sha who rosefrom a common slave -hunting hireling to a conqueror

,

and narrowly missed becoming a king.

H e' wa s of tha t turbulent Dongola ra ce who take

to slave-hunting a s na tura lly a s a duck to water,and he

began his career a s a mere enlisted mercenary ; but before . long he started on his own a ccount

,and possessing

a natura l aptitude for organizing and commanding men,

his zeribas were soon numbered by scores,forming a

cha in of fortified posts extending more than a thousandmiles beyond Khartoum . Around his head-quarters a t

Shaka a town grew up as la rge a s El Obe‘

id,and there

he kept up a roya l sta te,with a body-guard

,and cha ined

live lions in his audience -hall. Dr. Schweinfurth sta testhat in 1871 no less than jellabs visited that pla ceto buy the numerous slaves Zobehr had captured and


collected there . Having deva stated a ll the surroundingregions

,his base of supplies wa s then the powerful king

dom of Darfour ; but Zobehr having 1ncurred the enmityof its monarch

,the la tter forbade the exportation of the

gra in without which the'

slavers could not subs ist. Fromhis numerous zeriba s Zobehr a ssembled an army oftwelve or fifteen thousand men

,and in a grea t ba ttle at

M enowatshee,in 1874

,he defeated and killed Sultan

Ibrahim and his two sons, thus extinguishing a dynastywhich had ruled over Darfour for four hundred years .

If let a lone,he would have seized the va cant throne ,

but the Khedive Ismail wa s too far- sighted to permita chief who once before had defied his power and

a tta cked his troops,to become an independent king. So

he sent a regular army,too strong to be resisted

,to com

plete the subjugation of Darfour so nearly a ccomplishedby Zobehr. The la tter

,making a virtue of necessity,

turned over his conquest .to the Khedive, expecting inreturn to be made Governor-Genera l of Western Soudan .

H is hopes were encouraged,and he wa s invited to Ca iro .

But before going there he a ssembled his lieutenants at

Shaka,and made them take a solemn oa th u pon the

Koran to obey whatever orders he might send them fromCa iro . Arrived there

,he wa s made a pa sha and a ssigned

a pension of £100 a month . He had brought with himin gold

,which he va inly expended in urging

his cla ims . H e wa s trea ted with great honor,but kept

in a sort of gilded captivity. Disappointed and irritated,

he sent secret orders to his son Suleiman to summon a ll

his followers to rebel aga inst Gordon, and in a short timeSuleiman .ra ised ten or twelve thousand men

,far better

fighters than Gordon’s troops,and secretly supplied by

144 The B ritish Campa ign in the Sea cttm .

Zobehr with money,arms

,and ammunition . This re

bellion wa s not suppressed until twelve ba ttles had beenfought by Romulo Gessi, Gordon

’s va liant lieutenant

,

killed some years la ter fighting another rebell ion ofslave -hunters . Suleiman himself wa s captured and

Gessi had him tried and shot for trea son,with Gordon’s

approva l,and among his papers were found Zobehr’s

letters inciting the rebellion . The la tter wa s imprisonedfor some months

, _then released, though still forbidden to

leave Ca iro,but not deprived of his honors and pension.

When Gordon,in 1884

,found his position a t Khartoum

untenable,he urged the B ritish “

authorities to sendZobehr to succeed him

,a s being the only man able to

organize a government and prevent utter anarchy,but

his record wa s too bla ck,and the authorities wisely

refused to trust himZobehr wa s only one of many powerful slave-huntingwarrior- chiefs . Another wa s Abou - Saoud who a lsora ised a rebellion

,and after causing much trouble

,

made terms and wa s received ba ck into favor. Yusufwho did the same

,wa s made a pa sha and wa s exter

minated with six thousand men by the Mahdi,in

Senna ar. Another wa s Osman-Digma who ha s donesuch splendid fighting near the R ed Sea

,and is still

continuing the war aga inst the British . In fa ct,slave

hunting is war on a barbarous and often extensivescale

,and its leaders have to possess no inconsiderable

military capacity.

The slave - trade wa s the only one tha t flourished beforeM ehemet -Ali’s conquest

,and it continued to flourish un

hindered until Genera l Gordon’s appointment a s Governor-Genera l of the Soudan (1874—187 From the de


scription given above of the moda s operandi of theslave-hunters

,it is evident that the number sla in in

the ra ids or left to starve after the destruction of a ll

their subsistence must nearly equa l those reduced toslavery ; and of the la tter, a t lea st one third perished bythe way , a lthough none but the young and able-bodiedwere considered worth carrying away. In spite of thisfrightful morta lity

,not less than three hundred thousand

slaves were annually brought down the Nile and a cross thedeserts from Centra l Africa . B aker

,Schweinfurth

,and

other“African explorers bear witness to the deva sta tionproduced by this hellish brigandage which reduc ed toabsolute deserts provinces a s large a s France and G er

many,and that had formerly supported a n umerous popu

lation . One of Ismail-Pa sha’s strongest cla ims to the sym

pathy of the civilized world is the vigorous and earnestattempt he made to suppress this a trocious crime . H e

gave Gordon orders to annihilate it by the sternes‘t ex ercise of military force

,and invested him with unlimited

powers for that purpose. The effort wa s only partly suc

c essful,for it is 1mpossible to change in a few years

the customs and traditions of centuries,a lthough Gor

don’s sub -governors were afra id to disregard “

his instruotions

,and many slave caravans were intercepted and con

fi sc a ted for having ventured too near the Egyptiangarrisons . This fa ct came to my persona l knowledgeat El Obeid

,where I wa s deta ined severa l months by

the efi ec ts of the deadly.

climate which shattered myhea lth for ever and killed a number of my comrades and

escort. Tha t city was the residence of the governorof the province of Kordofan

,and in pea ce times wa s gar

risoned by some three thousand Soudanese troops . More


than once I saw gangs of slaves just relea sed from the

traders,being marched down to the barracks by an

Egyptian sergeant to be enrolled a s recruits . They weregreat

,tall fellows

,ema cia ted by

( fatigue and s tarvation,

and a ll just a s perfectly naked a s they 'were born . Theywa lked in single fi le

,ea ch one fa stened to the next by

a piece of wood about fi ve feet long,rea ching from the

ba ck of the neck of the first man to the throa t of the

next b ehind him. Thus they had marched hundredsof miles

,never .relea sed for an instant except when

one would drop dead and be left for the vultures and

hyena s . Perhaps ha lf of them had perished by the way ,

and it was impossible to send ba ck the rest'

to their country. So the government made soldiers of them and gavethem the women slaves for wives . This had at lea st theeffect of discouraging the slave - trade by the confiscationof the merchandise . These fellows a s soon a s enrolledwere clothed in a good white cotton uniform

,fed on fair

ra tions,of bread and meat

,better than they ever had

before in their lives. They were taught Arabic and the

Mohammedan religion of which they soon became zea lous proselytes . They learned military drill and disciplinevery promptly and perfectly . These Soudanese regiments formed of men who had been warriors in theirown country

,not only looked very soldier- like

,but they

were greatly superior a s fighters to the troops recruitedfrom the meek and pea ce - loving fellaheen of LowerEgypt.But the current wa s too strong to be entirely stopped

,

and it sought secret channels out of rea ch of governorsand garrisons. I wa s . a t Khartoum in 1876

,during

Gordon’s governorship— but a t that pa rticular time he

The B ritish Campa ign in the Sande/n. 147

wa s on a tour of inspection to Gondokoro and the lakes .

I made many inquiries and obta ined much informationfrom the Austrian Consul

,who wa s in full sympa thy with

Gordon,and he told me

'

tha t it wa s true that slave caravans were no longer brought to Khartoum

,and tha t

the traders had to seek concealment . But,

”added he

if you wanted to purcha se a hundred boys or a hundredgirls

,they c an be procured and delivered to you a t a safe

place in twenty-four hours for $35 to $50 per head .

”

Nevertheless,it is believed that under Gordon’s rule the

annua l importation from Centra l Africa wa s reducedfrom three hundred thousand to less than one hundredthousand

,and in the a tta inment

“

of this result,grea t num

bers of the traders were financia lly ruined,and hundreds

of the slave-hunting soldiers caught red -handed wereshot— “

pea r encour ager Zes wanes.

” It must be keptin mind

,however

,tha t this warfare wa s carried on

aga inst slave -hunting only. In the nature of things nointerference could be attempted or wa s desired withregard to domestic slavery a s it existed in Egypt and

the Soudan .

As a natura l and inevitable consequence,a ll the power

ful cla ss of slave-hunters,together with a ll those who

derived profit from,

the slave- trade,such a s jellabs,

usurers,furnishers of supplies

,bandits and adventurers

,

were driven to despera tion by restra ints which meantruin to them

,and they were ready for revolution.

But far more formidable than a ll the rest, if oncearoused into hostility

,were the ha lf million of B edouins

roaming the desert s ea st and west of the Nile,of whom

every ma le above fifteen is a warrior. They are of different blood from the people of Egypt and the Soudan ,

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan .

their ancestors having crossed over the R ed Sea fromArabia long before the Christian era

,and they have

mingled but little with other ra ces . They are trueIshma elites

,and exhibit the characteristics of the Arab

ra ce,being slender

,of medium size

,well formed

,with small

hands and feet and arched instep,varying in color from

olive to dark bronze,and with stra ight aquiline features .

They are proud,indomitable

,and prefer independence to

life itself. Having but few wants,their deserts supply

them with nearly all,

tha t they need . They are nomadswhose wea lth consists of flocks and camels

,living where

agriculture 1s 1mpossible, and scorning the inhabitants oftowns a s “ dwellers among bricks .

” Even M ehemet -Ali’siron hand could extort from them only the most limitedallegiance . Though born-warriors

,they never submitted

to conscription,and they pa id tribute to the Khedive

because they found it to their interest to do so,being

granted in return the monopoly of the carrying t radea cross their country

,and a llowed to reta in their pa triar

cha l form of government under their great sheikhs,who

c an tra ce their origin even beyond the days of theProphet. ! On these the Khedive bestowed high rank

,

privileges,and revenues on the condition of their insuring

the pea ce and safety of trade and travel through theirterritories

,and this they did so effectua lly that

,a s I

stated before,no caravan needed an armed escort. The

principa l B edouin tribes are the Ababdehs,B ishareens

,

and Hadendowa s,on the ea st of the Nile ; the H as

In my firs t lecture , published by the American.

Geographica l Society in 1880 ,

Life in the Egyptian Deserts , I ga ve a very comple te description of the man

ner and customs of the Bedouin tribes . We a re compe lled to write Arab names a sthey sound , hence the dive rsi ty in spelling them by English , French , I ta lia n and

German writers .

150 The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n .

l st . Isma’

il-Pa sha’s strong persona lity wa s elimina ted byhis forced abdica tion .

2d . Gordon deprived of Isma’

il’s unlimited support,and

disgusted a t the compla ints of the B ritish commissionersa t Ca iro

,because

,under his upright administration

,the

Soudan no longer yielded a surplus,resigned his office

and . his successor,Raouf-Pa sha

,reestablished the old

abuses .

3d . The Egyptian government wa s disorgani zed and

its army destroyed by foreign interference and by Arabi’s

rebellion .

4th . The iniquitous bombardment of Alexandriaa roused the dormant Mussulman fanaticism

,and the

B ritish occupation of Lower Egypt impressed the Soudanese

'

with the idea tha t the Khedive had sold hisc ountry to Christian foreigners .

The na tura l consequence wa s that a ll the bond s whichhad kept the Soudan in subjection were loosened a t

once . Gordon himself had warned Ismail,when invested

by him with unlimited powers,tha t when he left

,it

would never aga in be possible to return to the oldregime

,and this “

expla ins the expression h e used la terI la id the egg which ha tched the Mahdi .It is worthy of notice tha t no rebellion could have

succeeded which did not appea l to the pa ssions or interests of a ll cla sses . The slavers’grievances had awakenedno interest in the B edouins of the desert or the tillers ofthe soil . Therefore Zob ehr

,Abou-Sa oud

,and Yusuf

had been defeated ; Other Mahdis had appeared fromtime to time

,but appea ling only to religious fana ticism

,

they had been ea sily “crushed ; But now onl y a leaderwa s wanted who could unite a ll the elements of discon


tent under a common standard,and

‘

a t the most critica land opportune moment the leader arose.

In the town of New-Dongola,on the west bank of the

Nile,some forty-four years ago, wa s born a Nubian boy

with a ll the chara cteristics of his ra ce ; a ta ll, well-proportioned form

,dark-brown complexion

,stra ight features

long and crisp,but not woolly ha ir. H is name wa s Mo

hammed -Achmet,and his occupation in youth tha t of a

carpenter and boa t-builder. B efore rea ching manhoodhe resolved to become a f akir, and for this purpose helearned to read and write. The fakirs (Arab plura l,foharah) are a cla ss who may be considered a s ha lfpriests

,ha lf laymen. They are the school- tea chers of

Mussulman countries,and the instruction they impart is

limited to reading and writing Arabic and learning byheart a s much of the Koran a s possible . They are a lsothe expounders of . the Koran which is not only the re

ligious but also the civil and politica l law of Islam,so

that they are to some extent the lawy ers of the countrynor are they without medica l pretensions

,though their

pra ctice consists ma inly in charms and the use of writtentexts of the Koran applied tothe person of the pa tient ortaken interna lly . A grea t portion of their income is derived from the sa le of amulets supposed to protect thewearer aga inst bullets and wild bea sts, and the crops andflocks from the evil- eye .

! Their,

influence over the superstitious ma sses is immense. They are a lways ca lled

One of the Egyptia n sta ff- lieutenants a tta ched to my expedition , a gradua te ofthe Ca iro M ili ta ry School

,quite inte lligen t

, a fa ir ma thema tician and surveyor ,rea ding and speaking French fluently

,but a devout Mussulma n , wore an amule t

composed of lea ves of dese rt pla nts , the ha ir of a hyena ,a p iece of serpent - skin ,

the whole wrapped in a piece of pa rchment on which wa s a text of the Koran wri tten by a fakir . This ta lisman

,he a ssured me in a ll seriousness , rendered him in

vulnerable to a ll a tta cks of wild bea sts a s well a s to the influence of the evil- eye .

"


sheikhs (elders) , and are trea ted with great reverence,

which is still increa sed by their affecta tion of superior ,

sanctity.

It wa s not long before Sheikh Achmet,by his display

of extraordinary piety,a cquired the reputation of a holy

dervish,a grade above that of fakir

,and corresponding

somewha t to the mendicant friars of Ca tholic countries .

There wa s an ancient tradition among Mussulmans, thatabout the end of the thirteenth century of the Hegira

(1882—3) a prophet would arise who would restore theglories of Islam and conquer the whole world . It wasprophesied that this M ahdi (derived from ha a

,to lead

M ahdi,led by God) would be named Mohammed, would

be a carpenter by trade,would “ have only four fingers on

his left hand,and certa in moles or marks upon his fa ce .

By accident or design,Mohammed-Achmet while working

a t his trade had chopped off a finger of his left hand,and

he cla imed tha t his fa ce bore the signs indicated by theprophecy . To increase his reputation for holiness

,he re

tired to a cave in the island of Aba above Khartoum and

became a h ermit,pretending in the approved style of

prophets to have V1s10ns and revelations from God. H e

wa s living there in compara tive obscurity,evolving him

self into a Mahdi when I pa ssed not far from his retreatin 1876 .

There c an be no doubt tha t he was a man of unc ommon shrewdness and ambition

,and that he kept himself

fully informed of all the events occurring in LowerEgypt. The wonderful rapidity with which news travelsthrough mysterious channels in Mussulman countries is

"

a

well- est ablished fa ct. In this way the disaffection ofthe army and people

,the forced abdica tion of Ismail


Pa sha,the dictatorship of England and France

,and the

pronunc iamien to of Arabi-Pa sha were known in theSoudan two weeks after they occurred

,in spite of the

officia l suppression of a ll adverse intelligence by telegraph. It is a significant fa ct tha t the first milita ryrising tha t brought Arabi to the front took pla ce inFebruary

,1881

,and ? that a s early a s July . of the same

y ear,Mohammed-Achmet procla imed hl s m1ss1on . Ra oufPa sha

,then governor of the Soudan, received a t Khar

t oum,early in August

,a message from him to this effect

B ismillah,er ra chma n

,er raheem l— In the name of

God,the gra cious

,the merciful ! B lessings be on the

Lord Mohammed and his ra ce ! This is sentby the servant of the L ord

,Mohammed-Achmet

,the son

of Abd-

‘

Allah . God has sa id in H is only book

! the Koran! Oh ye that believe, I will show you a wayby which you may be saved from

Lgreat troubles ; only

believe in God and in H is messenger,and fight the Lord’s

battles with your goods and your bodies . And knowthis and hold it fa st : tha t God ha s called me to be a

Caliph,and that the Prophet .(whom God bless !) ha s

procla imed that I am the expected Mahdi, and ha s pla cedme upon his throne above princes and nobles . And Godhas strengthened me by H is angels and prophets

,and by

the elect and believers among the Djinns ! the genii ord emons

,some of whom the Mussulmans believe to have

been converted to Islam! . And H e ha s a lso sa id,God

ha s given thee signs of thy mission,namely the moles on

thy left cheek. And another sign H e ha s given me,that

out of the fi re appears a standard which will be with me

in the hour of battle,carried by the

.angel Azra el

,whom

God bless I And H e ha s a lso told me tha t whoever does


not believe in me does not believe in Him or Hisprophets . Whoever fights aga inst me will be destroyedin this world and the next

,and his goods and his chil

dren will be a prey to the believersAfter this preamble

,he summoned a ll governors and

peoples to submit to his authority and join his standardfor the destruction of a ll Christians, foreigners, and Turks,and the conquest of the entire country. H e further procla imed the abolition of a ll debts and taxes

,and prom

ised that a ll who fell'

in battle in his cause would enter a tonce upon the enjoyment of the delights of the Mussulman paradise .

At first,Ra ouf—Pa sha tried persua sion and sent the ex

rebel Abou-Sa oud to the'

island of Aba . The Mahdi,a s

he .wa s now ca lled,received him surrounded by severa l

hundred men in coats of_ma il and d rawn swords . When

Abou-Sa oud represented to him the madness of risingaga inst the government which possessed soldiers

,breech

loaders,cannon

.

and steamers,the Mahdi replied

“ Ifthe soldiers shoot a t me and my people

,their bullets will

do us no harm and if they a tta ck us with steamers,both

steamers and cannon will sink together.”

Negotiations fa iling to produce submission,Ra ouf re

luc tantly had recourse to force, but he made the mistakeof underestimating the importance of the incipient rebellion . On the tenth of August

,1881

,he sent three hun

dred regulars and one cannon on two steamers underAbou-Saoud , This force would have been more thansufl‘ic ient if the soldiers had not been inclined to believein the Mahdi’s divine mission . When they landed and

met the Mahdi,they refused to fi re a t the “

h oly man”

—nevertheless the holy man and his people killed one

The B ritish Cmnpa ign in the Soudan . 155

hundred and thirty of the soldiers,and the rest fled in

terror to their steamers . The gunner was ordered to fi rethe cannon a t the Mahdi

,who wa s s itting on horseba ck a

short distance from the shore,but in his excitement and

terror he fired wide of the mark , and the Mahdi coollyturning his horse rode quietly away

,while the disc om

fi ted expedition returned in dismay to Khartoum. Thisfirst success over the government troops ga ined forthe Mahdi much prestige and a large increa se of followers .

In December following,the governor of Fashoda

,a

Kurd named Rashid-B ey , advanced aga inst the Mahdiwith four hundred regulars and two thousand Shillooks .

A short and fierce ba ttle wa s fought at Jebel Gedir,in

which the governor and a ll his troops and nearly a ll the

Shillooks with their king were slaughtered by the B aggara s . All the Remington rifles and ammunition of theregulars and a large quantity of supplies fell into thehands of the Mahdi

,who captured Fa shoda

,an important

military post on the White Nile . This second victorywa s followed by the a ccession of severa l considerabletribes . To the powerful and fierce B aggara s

,who had

a lready joined the Mahdi’s standard, were now added theKababeesh and H a ssaneeyehs in Kordofan and theAbouRof in Senna ar

,while the Ababdehs and B ishareens

,

between the Nile and the R ed Sea,were ready to rise at

the approach of the Mahdi who sent emissaries everywhere with the ominous message :

“ B e ready,I am

coming IIn the meantime Raouf-Pasha wa s superseded

,and

G iegler-Pa sha

,a talented B avarian engineer

,with whom

I had become well a cqua inted in Kordofan,wa s left in

156 The B ritish Cannpa ign in the Soudan .

temporary command until the arriva l of Abd- c l -Kader,

the new governor-general . The situa tion wa s veryc ritica l

,for nearly the entire Soudan

'

wa s rising ; butGriegler who had been vice -governor since Gordon’s timedisplayed grea t energy. H e enlisted “

and organized ac onsiderable force from t he Chiaggia s, Dongolawees, and

other tribes which still - rema ined loya l to the government.To these were joined about fifteen hundred regulars .

This army,well armed and equipped by Giegler

’s care

,

a nd numbering nearly'

six thousand men,started up the

Nile about the middle of March,1882, for Jebel Gedir.

Their commander wa s Yusuf,formerly a great

'

slavehunting chief

,who had killed Munza

,the king of Mon

b uttufi". Later he had rebelled aga inst the Egyptiangovernment

,by whom he was pardoned and received

ba ck into favor. H e had commanded Egyptians underCressi in the rebellion of Zobehr’s son Suleiman

,and had

c ontributed to G essi’s victories,for which service he had

been made a pa sha . In June news rea ched Khartoumt hat Yusuf-Pa sha with his entire force had been annihi

lated by the Mahdi into whose hands fell a ll their arms,

ammunition,and a va st amount of supplies. As usua l in

those desert battles,only a mere handful of the van

quished e scaped to tell the story of the disa ster. The

c onsternation of the European and Egyptian popula tionof Khartoum and B erber wa s extreme

,and with good

rea son, for before mid- summer Darfour was entirely lost,while Kordofan and Senna ar were in grea t danger

,

a lthough Egyptian garrisons still held B ara and ElObe

’

id, the capita l of Kordofan, and the city of Senna ar,t he capita l of the province of tha t name .

See Schweinfurth’s H ea rt of Africa for an a ccount of King Munza .


a nd his power would suddenly collapse . But this ex pect ation wa s tota lly disappointed . The Mahdi’s forces wererepea tedly defeated, but he seemed to gather new strengtha fter each repulse . On the 24th of June he a tta ckedB ara

,near El Obe1d

,and wa s driven off with great

slaughter. On the 28th of August his rela tive and

lieutenant,Amr- el -M aka shef

,a tta cked Duem on the Nile

above Khartoum,with fourteen thousand men . The town

wa s well fortified and garrisoned by fi ve hundred Egypt ians. The a ttack la sted four hours

,until three thousand

rebels had fa llen under the withering fi re of the R emington breech- loaders . The remnant . of this force retreatedto Senna ar and wa s aga in defeated by Sa lah-Aga , and

Amr- el -Maka shef wa s killed ;“

but the ma in body suc

c eeded in crossing the White Nile and joining the Mahdiwho had invaded Kordofan after the destruction of Y ussuf -Pa sha’s army .

On the 8th of September; 1882, the Mahdi re inforcedby the

'

a ccession of the H a ssaneeyeh and Kababeesh

tribes,appeared at the head of sixty thousand warriors

before El Obe'

i’d which had been well fortified and

‘

W a s defended by a garrison of six thousand regulars,

and twelve pieces of artillery. A furious atta ck wa smade a t daybreak of the 9th . The rebels’charge uponthe outer works was so desperate that the soldiers gaveway and retreated upon the inner line . The enemyrushed after them in hand-to-hand fight and wouldhave entered the pla ce pell-mell with them ; but Iskander-B ey , the Egyptian comma nder, exhibited rarecoolness and decision . H e concentrated a heavy fi re ofrifles and artillery upon the struggling ma ss of t he enemya nd of his own soldiers

,killing three hundred of the lat

The B ritish Campa ign in the Sender/n. 159

ter,but saving the town . On the l 1th and the 14th

the Mahdi’s troops aga in stormed the works with despera te va lor

,opposing only swords and spears to the terrible

fi re of breech- loaders and artillery,until fifteen thousand

men (one fourth of his army) lay dead or dying beforethe wa lls of El Obe

'

id. After this enormous loss,the

Mahdi sullenly retired to re 01ganize his sha ttered forces .

It i s a noteworthy . coincidence that at the very same time

(September Arabi Pa sha wa s defea ted withvery feeble resistanc e a t Tel c lKebir.The terrible reverse a t El Obe’

i'd would probably have

ended the career of a leader of ordinary capa city . Not sowith the Mahdi ; it only proved his formidable powerand tena city of purpose. Allowing his followers onlytime enough to go home and s ecure their crop of dourah

,

he returned in December with one hundred thousandmen

,captured B ara

,and then la id siege to El Obe‘

i'd,

which surrendered on the 17th of January,1888

,a fter an

heroic resistance. Every article of food had been consumed

,including even dogs . The soldiers had ea ten

their leather- straps,and the starving popula tion rose in

desperation to demand submission to the Mahdi. All theinhabitants

,not excepting the Christian Syrian and Greek

me1chants,a cknowledged him a s a prophet

,and the garri

son with the ga llant Iskander B ey joined his 1anks, professing conversi on to full belief 1n his divine mission a s

proved by his a stonishing success . The greatest wonder is that they should “have resisted so long a prophetwho appea led so strongly to their religious traditions and

sympa thies . Among the captives were the members ofthe Catholic mission . The Mahdi trea ted them

'

well inspite of the fa ilure of his arguments to convert them

,and


fina lly libera ted them upon the payment of a ransom bythe Austrian Consul a t Khartoum .

This signa l victory produced an immense effectthroughout the Soudan. The Mahdi wa s now in possession of the capita l of Kordofan

,the largest city west

of the Nile. Darfour and Kordofan were completely inhis power

,Senna ar nearly so

,and the tribes which had

wavered in their allegiance now recognized in him the

true Madhi sent of God to break the yoke of Turks andinfi dels . The materia l results of his success were the ao

cession of the conquered garrison (some fi ve or six t housand brave and trained soldiers) , the capture of a largenumber of breech -loaders

,twelve pieces of artillery, and

a large supply of ammunition. El Obe’

1’d became his

capita l and hi s base of operations until Khartoum fellinto his hands . , Already the latter city wa s threa tenedby B edouin ra ids

,and numerous secret emissaries were

inciting the people to rebellion .

Such ‘

wa s the condition of affa irs in the Soudan a t the

begmnmg of 1883. The a ttention of the Khedive and

his government had been so concentrated upon the sup

pression of Arabi’s rebellion tha t they had overlookedthe Mahdi’s . It wa s only after the capture of E l -Obe‘

idtha t they rea lized the extreme gravity of the situa tion .

But they were now entirely helpless . The Khedivenatura lly applied for aid to his self appointed guardiansand p1otec tors, but he wa s answered tha t B ritish interestsbeing 1n no way involved 111the Soudan

,England would

give him no a ssistance . Y et,a t tha t moment

,a little

help would probably have checked the rebellion beforeit became too strong. With the B ritish army of occupation were severa l Anglo-Indian regiments a ccustomed to


a hot clima te the Suakim -B erber route wa s open,for the

B edouins of tha t desert were still loya l and the sea sonwa s favorable . An expedition sent at this juncturewould a t lea st have saved Khartoum and the Ea sternSoudan

,as well a s the lives and the millions wa sted

la ter in disastrous fa ilure .

Not only wa s England’s aid refused to the a lly whosearmy she had destroyed and whose government she had

disorganized under the guise of friendship,but the

Khedive wa s forbidden to use his own still considerableresources . H e rea lized tha t unless he sent an army tosuppress the Mahdi’s rebellion

,the va st empire of the

Soudan would be lost to Egypt. H e directed Genl.Charles P. Stone (formerly U . S . Chief-of -Staff ofwhat had been the Egyptian army

,to prepare plans and

estimates for a campa ign . Although this skilful and ex

perienc ed offi cer had never in person visited UpperEgypt or the Soudan

,he had studied

’

the reports of theexpeditions which he had sent under American officersto explore those regions

,a s well as those of Sir Samuel

B aker and Genera l Gordon . H e knew the geography and

topography of that country,and understood the peculiar

difli culties of warfare in the deserts . H e wa s an excellent organizer and a judicious oflic er

,by no means given

to prodigality in public expenditures . After ma tureconsidera tion

,he estima ted that a force of twenty- seven

thousand regular Egyptian soldiers wa s necessary to re

conquer Kordofan,suppress the rebell ion, and reinforce

the garrisons so a s to insure future tranquillity. When itis remembered that Wolseley took over ten thousandB ritish troops south of the 2d Ca tara ct merely for thepurpose of relieving Gordon and returning

,without any


intention of suppressing the Mahdi,G en! . Stone’s estima te

appears very modera te,especia lly considering the very

different va lue of B ritish compared to Egyptian soldiers.

There were suffi cient funds in the Egyptian trea suryto fit out the expedition

,and the required number of

tra ined soldiers could have been very promptly ra ised byreca lling the la tely disbanded reglments to their colors .

But just a t that time the coupons were due to the foreignbondholders

,and moreover

,Egypt

‘

was to defray the

cost of the B ritish army of occupation and to pay

for the destruction of her own city ofAlexandria by the B ritish fleet. It mattered not thatthe Egyptian debt had been declared by B ritish fi nan

ciers in an officia l report to Parliament to be more thandouble wha t wa s justly due . The bondholders’couponsmust be pa id though a ll Egypt perish . Shylock musthave his pound of flesh I” Therefore

,when the Khedive

a sked of his B ritish ma sters permission to send an ex

pedition and submitted Grenl . Stone’s estima tes

,he was

answered tha t Egypt could not be permitted to increa seher financial burdens

,and tha t the funds in the trea sury

could not be applied to the recovery of the Soudan .

This opportunity being thrown away,nothing rema ined

but to notify Abde l-Kader to make the most of themeans at his command . We have a lready seen withwhat energy he set about fortifying Khartoum and or

gan1z1ng a force from the yet loya l tribes and the Don

golawee and other slave -hunting soldiers now out ofemploym ent. The only reinforcements given him werethree or four of Arabi’s disaffected regiments , sent to theSoudan in December a s a punishment for their '

rebellion,

but too late to save El Obe’

id . With this a ccession,he had

The B ritish Ctr-mpa ign in the Souda n . 163

in hand an ava ilable force of about eight thousand men

for a ctive opera tions . During the spring and summer of1883 he defea ted the Mahdi’s forces in . four severe conflic ts . But his success excited jea lousy and intrigues a t

Ca iro . Sir Evelyn B aring,who from a Ma jor of Artillery

had become the virtua l autocra t of Egypt a s Min isterResident

,wa s unfriendly to him a s he wa s afterwards to

Gordon . Abde l-Kader wa s reca lled . H is successor a sgovernor-genera l wa s Allah - ed -Deen

,while his little

army wa s put under the command of an ex -ma jor of he

B ombay army,until then unknown to fame

,who wa s

made a genera l under the title of Hicks -Pa sha . H e musthave been a man of ability

,for in spite of his ignorance

of the people,the country

,and even the language of the

heterogeneous force he commanded,he inflicted three

serious defea ts upon the Mahdi’s lieutenants on the ea stbank of

(

the Nile,so that Senna ar wa s almost clear of

rebels . The Khedive’s ministers now urged the re

capture of El Obe'

i'd a s necessary to the safety of Khar

toum and the ea stern Soudan . The B ritish commissioners being consulted

,a d/uised aga inst it

,but they did

not f orbid it, a s they had the power to do . Says Prof.Dicey “There is no doubt that England could if she hadchosen have hindered the campa ign of Hicks-Pa sha . B ythe fact of her not exercising her right of veto, she became in reality responsible for it .” And Sir SamuelB aker wrote at the same time : “ Everybody knew tha tEngland wa s the on ly power in Egypt, and that the Khedive could not move his little finger without her specia lpermission ; and tha t a s she had completely fettered theEgyptian authorities

,she a lone was responsible for the

situation .

”

The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n .

But this wa s only another instance of the policy of ha lfmea sures. The intention of the B ritish authorities a t

Ca iro wa s,if the expedition wa s successful

,to cla im

credit for having permitted it ; if otherwise, for havinga dvised aga inst it and in any ca se to shut the mouth ofthose who pretended . tha t the Khedive did not possessabsolute freedom of a ction . Y et while permitting it

,

every thing wa s refused tha t might insure success . We

abs'

olutely refused,

”adds Prof. Dicey

,

“ to a llow eitherEnglish or Indian troops to be sent. We a lso insistedtha t the native Egyptian army which had been organizedunder B ritish oflic ers

,should not be sent to the Soudan

,

because as these officers still reta ined their rank in theB ritish army

,their participa tion in a Soudan campa ign

might be deemed inconsistent with the theory tha t ourintervention in Egypt wa s only of a temporary and provisiona l chara cter. Though we enforced

,both by precept

a nd example,the necessity of pla cing their troops under

B ritish offi cers,we allowed them to enter upon a momen

tous campa ign while refusing the Egyptian governmenta permission to enlist the services for the Soudan of anyofli c er either on a ctive duty or on '

ha lf pay .

” Sir SamuelB aker’s arra ignment of this shuffling policy is still mores evere (see his letter to “The Times

,

” dated Ca iro,

April 5,

Hicks -Pa sha organized an army of eleven thousandmen . O n his stafi were eleven Englishmen who likeh imself had severed a ll f

connec tion with the B ritishs ervice

,a s well a s some ofli c ers of other European na

t ionalities . Although he had six thousand camels,mules

,

a nd horses,so many were needed for supplies

-

b aggage,

a nd ammunition,tha t he wa s unable to carry more than

The B ritish Campa ign in the Sou/dam.

fi c ers,and Allah - ed -Deen

,the governor-genera l

,fell fi ght

ing to the last. Such entire extermina tion is only -whatmust happen on the desert, for if an army c an be cut ofifrom wa ter for three or four days

,there is no need to fi re

another shot. Should any fugitives escape the sword orthe lance

,they fa ll exhausted within a few hundred ya rds,

never to rise aga in. Y ou Seckendorff’s ominous prediction

wa s fulfilled to the letter. Not one man ever returnedfrom tha t doomed army.

The ba ttle of Ka shgill wa s fought Nov . 1st—3d . Thre edays later another Egyptian force wa s destroyed a t Tokaron the shores of the R ed Sea,eight hundred miles fromKa shgill , by the Mahdi’s chief lieutenant

,Osman-Digma

who had stirred up the warlike'

B ishareens inhabiting thedeserts between B erber and Suakim . Col . M oncriefi

,the

B ritish Consul a t Suakim who had volunteered to l eadthis force

,wa s killed with eleven offi cers and one hundred

and fifty men . One cannon and three hundred rifles fellinto Os

’

man-Digma’s hands .

I have stated above that the news of these two disasters rea ching London a few days after Mr. Gladstone’sGuildhall speech announcing a gradual eva cua tion

,put

an immediate stop to all . idea of reducing the B ritishforces in Egypt .The consternation in Ca iro wa s immense

,and with

good rea son,for a ll the troops in the Soudan except the

enfeebled garrisons, had perished with Hicks-Pasha .

Now,Khartoum

,Senna ar

,

'

Ka ssa la,B erber and even

Suakim were in imminent peril . With them the entireSoudan would be lost

,and the rebell ion would endanger

Egypt herself.Once more the Khedive and his ministers turned

The B ritish Campa ign i n the Souda n . 16’i

to their a ll ies and guardians with frantic appea ls forprotection The B ritish Ministry’s reply wa s thata ll the country above the First Ca tara ct must be abandouedShould the reader 1nc line to believe that I am

bia sed in my judgment of events by anti-B ritish prejudices

,I beg leave to state that nothing tha t I could say

approaches the severity with which the course of theB ritish government wa s denounced from the tim e ofIsma

'

fl’s deposition and even before

,to the present time

,

by some of the most talented and promment men of England

,among whom are Prof. Dicey

,Sir Samuel B aker

,

Henry Labouchere,Sir Henry Layard

,and a number of

others . I am not afi ec ted with either angle-

phobia or

angle-ma nia . Next a fter being an American (a goodlong way after

,it is true) , I would prefer being an Eng

lishman . My judgment on this subject is formed uponB ritish statements

,and my narrative of the campa ign is

taken ma inly from B ritish a ccounts impartia lly presentedand criticised .

I quote from a letter to the The Times,dated

Ca iro,April 5

,1884

,from Sir Samuel B aker, the African

explorer and Gordon’s predecessor a s Governor-Generalof the Soudan,a man whose position and experience giveuncomm on va lue to his utterances upon the Soudanquestion

We have so comple te ly abstra cted eve ry vest ige o f power and a uthority fromthe unfortuna te Khedive ,

tha t he cannot even nomina te his own officers in any

branch of the milita ry or civil services . Having divested the lega l ruler of thecountry of a ll importance , we a dd insul t to injury by utterly disrega rding his persona l existence in Egypt . The so- ca lled ‘

a uthority ’ of the Khedivewa s rudely , i f not bruta lly , nega tived by dire ct orders from Downing Stree t toabandon the Soudan aga inst the wishes of the ruler , supported by his Ministry , whores igned en ma sse a t the presumptuous intrusion of the Bri tish d ic tum .

The B ritish Campa ign in the Sondan .

This a c t of unwa rra nted interference , by which an enormous a rea of the Ottom an Empire wa s wres ted from its legitima te ruler and thrown into the diresta na rchy , at once awakened Egypt to the hypocrisy of British de cla ra tions . The

ma sk wa s for the mome nt ca st a s ide . (Smite gue c a ttle, the Souda n wa s

to be abandoned,and proclama tions to tha t e ffe ct were issued without delay . The

fa ct of su ch a proclama tion bore an immedia te and fa ta l result every tribe tha twould have rema ined fa i thful to the government if prepa red toa ssert its power

,

wa s in self- preserva tion forced to abandon a government tha t ha d forsaken themost sa cred duty of upholding the ' rights of those subje cts who h ad decla red the irloya lty . ”

When Tewfi k-Pa sha wa s notified of the commands ofthe B ritish Ministry, wha t

'

manhood still survived in hima fter so many humiliations wa s aroused . For the firsttime he refused to obey

,and declared his resolution to

abdicate and to throw the responsibility upon Englandra ther than submit to the sacrifice .

But this could never be permitted,for it would destroy

the beautiful fictionsof England’s disinterested occupa tionof Egypt .

and non- interference with purely Egyptianc oncerns

,and of the . Khedive’s supposed independence of

a ction'

A middle course wa s adopted . Tewfi k wa s

quieted by being permitted to ca ll upon his suzera in - lord,

the Sultan,for Turkish troops

,provided tha t Turkey

bore the expense and would bind herself to withdraw a s

soon a s the Soudan wa s pa cified. But this qua lified conc ession .was almost immedia tely withdrawn ; and whenTurkey prepared an expedition

,England a ssumed the

preposterous positi on of recognizing the Sultan’s para

mount rights over the Soudan,and yet ordering her iron

c lad s to prevent,by force if necessary

,the landing of

Turkish troops in the Soudan . (See Sir H . Laya rd . )To quote from Prof. Dicey (JVineteenth Cen t

/a rg, March

,

1884)Put into pla in English , the programme came to this England re fused to

‘

sendtroops to the Soudan herself she forba de Egypt to send troops she consented to


troops be ing sent from Turkey only under conditions which rendered the ir dispa tchimpossible . In ' other words , Engla nd insisted tha t Egypt should aba ndon the

Souda n to its fa te . Now if this abandonment ha d been confined to Da rfour,

Kordofan,and the Equa toria l Provinces , which Isma il Pa sha had a dded to his

dominions , no objection would ha ve been ra ised . But wha t Egypt wa s bidden todo wa s to give up Kha rtoum ,

the centre and head - quarters of her tra de with Centra l Africa

,to relinquish the possessions which had belonged to her since the t ime

of M ehemet - Ali,to sa crifice a ll her ga rrisons a nd se ttlements in the Soudan , and

to permit the establishment of a powerful and hostile sta te in the vicinity of herown de fence less frontier , and in comma nd of the river on which she depends forher existence . She wa s bidden

,too

,to do this while our English a rmy wa s oc cu

pying her soil with the a vowed obje ct of strengthening the hands of her government , while her own milita ry resources were not yet exhausted , and while the

a rmed a ssistance of Turkey wa s a t her service upon terms which for her own pa rtshe wa s disposed to a ccept . U nder these circumstances i t is ha rdly to be wondereda t i f th e Khedive and his ministers should ha ve refused this programme .

A question suggests itself here . Why should Englandobject to Turkey’s sending troops to a dependency of herOwn empire

,unless it wa s feared tha t this re - a ssertion of

her sovereignty over Egyp t might produce awkward

complica tions in ca se that England, a t some future d ay ,should want to annex

“

Egypt absolutely,a ccording to her

usua l and time-honored pra cticeMeanwhile the order to eva cuate the Soudan had beenprematurely announced

,and its effect wa s to add new im

petus to the rebellion . All the popula tions and the

B edouin tribes who’

had hitherto held a hesitating a lle

gianc e , wa itingto side with the stronger party,now felt

that their only safety lay in joining the Mahdi. If theeva cuation had been secretly decided upon and quietlymanaged

,the garri sons might have been safely with

drawn,but its imprudent announcement doomed them to

destruction .

Scattered over tha t immense territory between B erberand Gondokoro

,a s large a s France and Germany together

,

were Egyptian troops and non - combatants,


European and Egyptian merchants with their familieswho could expect no mercy

,for the Mahdi . had decreed

extermination aga inst all Egyptians and foreigners . Wha twa s to be their fa te 2With that superb contempt for wha t they call inferiorra ces

,chara cteristic of the B ritish ruling cla sses

,the

Ministry replied “ L et the garrisons be spearedA perusa l of the English papers of tha t date will provethat I am merely stating the naked fa cts . B e it remembered to the credit of the B ritish press and people

,tha t a

universa l cry of indigna tion arose from them aga inst theinhuman decree of their rulers . Gordon

,that noble

type of modern Christian chivalry,protested in these

words :You have men in Kha rtoum . You have ga rrisons in Da rfur, in Bahr

Ga zelle,and Gondokoro . .Are they to be sa crificed ? The ir only offence 15 the ir

loya lty to the ir sovereign . For the ir fideli ty you a re going to aba ndon them to

their fa te . You cannot eva cua te ,because your a rmy cannot be moved . You must

e ither surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or de fend Kha rtoum a t a ll ha za rds The

la tter is the only course which ought to be enterta ined . But i f,in a

moment of pa nic,orders are issued for the aba ndonment of the whole of the

Ea stern Souda n,a blow will be struck aga inst the se curity of Egypt , which ma y

have fa ta l consequences .

”

Public sentiment had quickly become too strong to bedisregarded ; y et the government still “ refused to sendtroops . Aga in a middle course wa s adopted . SinceGordon wa s so bitterly opposed to abandoning the garrisons

,let him undertake their rescue . His name and in

fluenc e might relieve the difficulty. On the 18th ofJanuary

,1884

,he wa s requested by the ministers to a s

sume the ta sk,and he left London tha t same afternoon .

Gordon 's words , your a rmy,your ga rrisons

,

'

when speaking to the BritishMinistry of the Egyptian t roopsrprove with wha t scorn h e fi ung

'

a sid e the hypocritica l discla imer of responsibili ty and solida rity with rega rd to the events in theSoudan .

The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n.

H is mission wa s procla imed to be one of pea ce,and he

wa s expressly ordered to absta in from all aggressivemea sures .

Stopping but one d ay in Ca iro to conf er with the

authorities there,he crossed the Korosko desert a c c om

panied only by his fa ithful comrade, Col . O . H . Stewart,

a few loyal B ishareen sheikhs who guaranteed his safetransit

,and a son of Zobehr-Pa sha who

,no doubt

,wa s

sent by his trea cherous fa ther a s a spy . Gordon had dec lared that if he could not have an army he would goa lone

,and the only materia l a id given him wa s

in gold. The prestige of his name wa s expected to supplya ll deficiencies . H e rea ched Khartoum in exa ctly one

month (Feb . 18th) . On his arriva l he wa s received withf ulsome protestations of loya lty by the principa l sheikhsand a ll the demonstra tions so dearly loved by the peopleof those regions . But he found the situa tion very differentfrom what he had left it four years before. H is disinterestedness , justice, and libera lity had

“won him grea t persona l influence and respect ; for a governor-genera l whorefused to fill his pockets wa s a mira cle in the Soudan

,

and probably his sanity was somewhat doubted in consequence . But most of the good he had a ccomplishedhad been undone by his successors

,and what wa s chiefly

remembered now wa s his energetic suppression of theCentral African slave -hunting. This wa s a grievance notto be forgiven by the slave -trade interest which comprised nearly the entire popula tion of Khartoum . Theiropposition wa s too powerful to be overcome , and it wouldrender his mission impossible . This consideration com

pelled him to issue a proclama tion reducing taxes, abolishing all monopolies

,and removing restrictions upon slave


buying and selling,if not upon slave -hunting. The regis~

ters and records of indebtedness to the government,the

kourba shes and other instruments of punishment,were

burned in front of the governor’s pala ce .

'

At the sametime he sent the Mahdi a robe of sta te

,and invested him

with the rank of Emir or Sultan of Kordofan,both of

which honors the Mahdi rejected with a d efi ant message,

saying that his mission wa s from God and he wanted nodignities from infi dels . This a c t of Gordon wa s an error

,

for it wa s construed as a c onfess1on of weakness,and it

seemed absurd to offer the Mahdi the gift of a provincewhose possession wa s a lready his own by the conquest ofhis victorious arms .

The condition of affa irs is so well described by SirSamuel B aker that I quote his own words :

A few weeks’ reflection brought the na tura l rea ction . The discontented sawtheir opportunity—Gordon ha d no a rmy to support his mora l power. Mora lity isheld in slight respect in the Soudan unless ba cked up by milita ry ma teria l . Witha ll the best intentions , Gordon found his overtures re jected . H is proclama tionswere ignored , and the announcement of abandonment wa s corrobora ted by the dispa tch of the si ck and incapables towa rds Ca iro , toge ther with many of the c ivii employés . I t be came impossible for the wa vering tribes to continue loya l . H a d

Gordon been supported by a milita ry force sent up from Ca iro,he might have post

poned the movement of eva cua tion,but when once a ssured of the rea lity of tha t

fa ta l a c t , even the loya l tribes threw in the ir lot with the genera l cause of iii—

A

S?rection .

In the m eantime the Egyptia n ga rrisons upon the R ed Sea coa sts were threa tened by the ga thering forces of the rebels , hea ded by one Osman Digma , a sla vetra der of evil repute in the Souda n

,who had become an emissa ry of the Mahdi .

The Egyptia n forces were severely de fea ted , Lthe Bri tish Consul Moncrieff waskilled , a nd the ga rrisons of Toka r and Sinka t were invested by the victoriousArabs . Suakin wa s threa tened

,and ! i t became absolutely ne cessa ry to equip a

powerful force from Ca iro for the relie f of the beleaguered ga rrisons .

I t wa s then tha t the ridiculous absurdity of British interference wa s exemplified .

At the ba ttle of Tel - el -Kebir we had destroyed the Egyptia n a rmy,and we ha d set

up in its stea d a model a rmy of men,under the command of Genera l Baker

Pa sha , who wa s summoned from Constantinople by the Khedive of Egypt , withthe sanction of the British Government , to reorganize and to command the E gyp


besieged,and it wa s known in Ca iro tha t unless relief wa s

sent a t once both those pla ces must fa ll. B aker-Pa shawa s the only man ava ilable , but there were no troops .

Zobehr-Pa sha Wa s employed to ra ise a forc e . The streetsof Ca iro and

“

a ll the towns in Egypt were searched forbla cks

,and men were dragged off in cha ins to fill Zobehr’s

ranks ; but at the la st moment he wa s deprived of hiscommand

,and the bewildered blacks were forced into

the ra ilway tra in for Suez by cava lry with drawn sabres .

These men,together with one thousand fi ve hundred

of the reluctant constabulary police drafted in spiteof pledges to the contrary

,and about one thousand

Turkish B ashi-ba zouks (Egyptian service) , composedthe unpromising materia ls out of which Va lentineB aker wa s ordered to form an army for the reliefof Sinka t and Tokar. Not only were they knownto be averse to fighting

,but most of them were

suspected of sympathy with the Mahdi’s cause . However

,Genera l Baker with this force, joined by fi ve hun

dred more men dragged fromdifferent parts of Egyptattempted to carry out his indefinite plans of campa ign .

H e left Ca iro 011 December 17th for Suakim which heproposed to make the ba se of his opera tions . H e wa s

given supreme military and civil comm and,with the

'

power of life and death .

Probably no genera l ever proceeded on an expeditionwith an army less trustworthy and plans less definite thanthose of B aker-Pa sha . For this he is not to be blamed .

In consenting to a ssume the chief command he a ctedsolely from a sense of duty

,and for six weeks he labored

incessantly to drill,discipline

,and fa shion into the sem

blance of an army the heterogeneous elements composing

The B r itish c npa ign in the Souda n.

his command . H is origina l purpose had been to movefirst to the relief of Sinkat .

The first march wa s to ha ve been made to the foot of the hills seventeen milesaway 011 the se cond the forces would enter the hills by a pass three miles long ,ending in a na rrow gorge a t the pla ce were two hundred Egypt ian troops ha d beenkilled . The la tter poin t wa s to be tempora rily fortified and ga rrisoned by twohundred men a nd two guns . The troops would a fter this get on open ground , anda rrive a t Sinka t by a long ma rch of twenty- two m iles . They would rest one d ayand on the next take o ff a ll the women and children from the town and re turn byfour ma rches to Suakim

,eva cua ting on the ir way the fort a t the head of the pa ss ,

be cause there is no wa ter there and consequ ently the post could not be held perma nen tly . But Toka r wa s thrice a tta cked by the rebels be fore this plan could beca rried out

,and Gen era l Baker wa s directed to relieve tha t pla ce a t a ll haza rds .

This de termina tion aba ndoned Sinka t to its fa te . For a fortnight the ga rrisonha d been ea ting roots and tree lea ves . It wa s an enfeebled band indeed whichsortied to d ie amid the rebe l hordes . Tewfi k - B ey had ha rangued his m en , sayingtha t by fight ing they m ight save themse lves , but tha t by rema ining they must diefrom hunger in a few days fl ight wa s impossible . The men thus anima ted withTewfi k - Bey’s spirit

,destroyed the milita ry stores , exploded the maga zine ,

filledthe ir pouch es to the utmost with ca rtridges , and issued forth , six hundred strong

,

aga inst the rebels .

Osman Digma’

s hordes rushed to the a tta ck . T ewfi k- B ey and his men foughtnobly , For a long time they repulsed every a ttempt to break thei r ra nks . Fina llysuperior numbers preva iled

,a nd with a tremendous rush the rebels burst through

one of the sides of the Egyptia n squa re . A genera l ma ssa cre ensued,a nd not a

soul escaped . According to the la test reports only four sick men, who were nu

able to take pa rt in the sortie ,the Ca di of Sinka t , and thirty women were spa red

by the rebels .

”

This disa ster occurred on the 11th of February, 1884.

On the 2d,B aker had sa iled from Suakim and landed

a t Trinkitat,about fifty miles south . Thence to Tokar

the distance is only twelve to fifteen miles . This townalready noted for the defeat and death of Consul Moncrieff in Nov . 1883

,wa s a sma ll fortified post on a

diminutive fresh -wa ter creek which fa lls into the sea a t

Trinkita t. B aker began his advance from his intrenchments a t tha t place on Sunday

,Feb . 3d

,with nearly

men,four Krupps and two Ga tling guns . H e had

sent from Suakim to Cairo an urgent request e rifles to


replace the old muskets with which numbers of histroops were armed . In reply he received orders to tryto force his way to Tokar without delay, and with theEnglish offi cers connected with the expedition he beganthe march

,expecting defea t. The spies had fa lsely re

ported that the roads were clear with the exception ofsmall bands of rebels . On Monday forenoon a portionof the advance wa s a tta cked on the march

,and the fi ght

wa s begun by a few Arab horsemen charging uponB aker-Pa sha’s cava lry which fled . B aker then formed a

square'

which the enemy surrounded . The B ashi-bazouks then fled in confusion

,and the gunners deserted

their guns . B aker-Pa sha wa s severa l times surroundedby the enemy

,but

,with his stafi

,managed to cut his way

through . All the camels,baggage

,and artillery were lost

in the ba ttle . Most of the Egyptian officers and men

bolted . Col . Sartorius tried hard to ra lly them,but with

out success . The Europeans behaved splendidly. Col .

Sartorius narrowly escaped with his life . The enemypursued a lmost into Trinkita t. The Europeans

,police

,

and Turkish infantry were cut to pieces . Twenty-fi ve

hundred men were killed,including fourteen European

ofli c ers . No mention is made of the wounded, for nonesurvived except those who were able to retrea t with therouted army. B aker

,with the remnant of his force

,suc

c eeded in rea ching Trinkitat,where they re - embarked on

the B ritish gunboats and returned to Suakim . Thisevent took place just at the very time tha t Gordon wa s

speeding on hisway to Khartoum a cross the Korosko des

ert . The news met him a t B erber,from which pla ce he

telegraphed that in spite of Baker’s defea t he wa s stillconfident of success ,


Meanwhile Osman -Digma,reinforced' by the conquer

ors of Sinkat,continued the siege of Tokar

,which he

cap tured on the 21st . H e then blockaded Suakim com

pletely on the land side and hara ssed its garrison bynightly a tta cks . His double success had ga ined him the

a ccession of the B edouin tribes occupying the countrybetween Suakim and B erber

,who until then had been

undecided which side to take . The capture ofrifles and ten guns (including those taken in Tokar) , withabundance of ammunition

,helped him ma terially inhis

subsequent battles aga inst G en . Graham .

In the meantime Gordon had rea ched Khartoum and,

a s we have seen,had found the situation far different

from wha t he had expected . His efforts were now conc entrated upon strengthening the defences of Khartoumavowing his purpose of reta ining its permanent possession . B y this means he hoped to secure the safe retrea t “

of the garrisons in the far south .

.

H e wa s willing toabandon the country west of the White Nile and southof Khartoum

,but he wa s firmly convinced of the abso

lute necessity of reta ining possession of the Ea sternSoudan . H is views

,a s expressed before he left London

,

were so judicious and so forcibly expressed that I quotethem here

On ‘Chinese ’ Gordon’s a rrival in England he wa s interviewed by a correspondent of the Pa ll M a l l Ga zette on the s itua t ion in the Soudan . The follow ingis a tra nscript of Colonel Gordon’s rema rksSo you would abandon the Soudan But the Ea stern Souda n is indispensable

to Egypt . It will cos t you fa r more to re ta in your hold upon Egypt proper i f youabandon your hold of the Ea stern Souda n to the M ahdi or to the Turk , than wha ti t would to reta in your hold upon the Eastern Souda n by the a id of such ma teria la s exists in the provinces . Da rfur and Kordofan must be aba ndoned . Tha t I a dmit but the provinces lying to the ea st o f the White N ile should be re ta ined , andnorth of Senna a r . The da nger to be fea red is not tha t the M ahd i will ma rchnorthwa rd through Wa di H a lfa on the contra ry ,

i t is very improbable tha t he will

The B ritish Canpa ign i n the Soudan .

ever go so far north . The danger is a ltoge ther of a diff erent na ture . I t a risesfrom the influence which the specta cle of a conquering Mohammedan power ,established close to your frontiers , will exercise upon the popula tion which yougovern . In a ll the cities of Egypt it will be felt tha t wha t the Mahdi has done ,

they m aydo and , as he ha s driven out the in truder and the infidel,they m ay do

the same . Nor is i t on ly Engla nd tha t ha s to fa c e this danger. The success o fthe M ahdi ha s a lrea dy excited da ngerous fermenta tion in Arabia and Syria . Pla

ca rds ha ve been posted in Dama scus,

ca lling upon the popula tion to rise and driveout the Turks . I f the whole of the Ea stern Soudan is surrendered to the Mahdithe Arab tribes on both sides of the R ed Sea will take fi re .

”

As to the provinces to be abandoned,Gordon’s plan

Wa s to turn them over'

to the descendants of their ancientsultans . But this idea wa s altogether impra cticable. Inthree generations those families had sunk into obscurity

,

and the new rulers would be slave -hunting chiefs likeZobehr-Pa sha

,Osman -Digma

,and Abou-Saoud . Or else

,

the Mahdi,who announced his mission to be the exter

mina tion of a ll Turks and foreigners and the conquest,

ofthe country down to the sea

,would establish an empire

so strong and aggressive a s to be a permanent and formidable mena ce to Egypt.Up to this time nothing had been done to nullify therepea ted declara tion that no B ritish troops would besent to the Soudan . But Gordon had been in Khartoum

just one dang when B ritish soldiers,under the com

mand of Genera l Sir Gera ld Graham,sa iled from Suez

for Suakim on the 19th of February,1884

,and a tta cked

the Mahdi’s lieutenant,Osman -Digma

,a t the very moment

when Gordon, in pursuance of his instructions, procla imedhis mission to be one of conciliation

,and offered the

Mahdi pea ce and recognitionWhy this contradictory course of action ? If

_

Englandhad no interests in the Soudan

,why wa s Graham sent

there ? Not to relieve Sinkat or Tokar ; it was too late


for that . Not to defend Suakim,for one ba ttalion and

two gunboats were amply sufficient,and Admira l Hewett

wa s at that time commander of that post,with 500

marines and severa l war- ships . Then what for To

avenge the death of Moncrieff and Hicks -Pa sha in November and B aker’s recent defeat ? But these werepurely Egyptian disasters in which England had d is

cla imed all responsibility or concern . M onc riefi had lefthis legitimate consular duties to volunteer with an E gyptian expedition

,and B aker was no longer a B ritish

,

“

butan Egyptian officer

,a s were Hicks and his comrades

,and

certa inly England’s honor was in no way affected by theirdisa sters . Why then a ttempt to avenge them by wagingwa r on the R ed Sea while procla iming pea ce on the

White Nile This a ction of the B ritish government c anbe attributed only to the incredible va cillation whichseemed to pervade a ll their Egyptian policy

,or else to a

spirit of Jingoism which a ssumed that'

England’shonor demanded tha t she should avenge Egyptian disa sters merely because Englishmen had been in command

,

while yet refusing to admit that this na tiona l honor wa s

most deeply involved in shielding from harm an a llywhom she had tied hand and foot under the guise ofprotection . The double-dea ling course now adopted wa s

certa in to defea t the avowed object of Gordon’s pea cefulmission

,and to expose his life to the most imminent peril .

“Accordingly,immedia tely after Graham’

s inva sion,we

find Gordon a ttacked at Khartoum and a sking most urgently tha t B ritish

,Indian

,or Turkish tr00ps be sent to

his support .I will here present an outline of Graham’

s campa ign,which

,from the nature of the ca se, is necessarily drawn


from B ritish officia l reports . and the a ccounts of Englishwar-press correspondents.

f

On the 28th of February,1884

,Genera l Graham

landed a t Trinkitat with effective men,and on the

29th he a tta cked Osman -Digm a’s position a t Teb

,about

eight miles from the sea . The B ritish were formed inone square with cava lry covering the front and guns a t

the angles . They advanced wi th a degree of caution fargrea ter than would have been d isplayed before a civilizedfoe

,and the despera te fighting of the Arabs showed tha t

this caution wa s well timed . The weak intrenchments,a rmed with the captured guns

,were not carried until

after four hours of stubborn conflict. Osman-Digma’s

forces were estimated a t about 10,000.men

,of whom not

more than one fifth were armed with Remington rifles .

The rest were supplied with scimetars and spears . But

neither the rifles nor the guns under the Arabs’manipu

la tion caused any grea t loss among the B ritish . The

woundswere chiefly received at close quart ers during thefana tica l charges or rushes upon the troops .

The rebels were in nomili ta ry order,but were sca ttered here and there

, so a s

to take a dva ntage of the abundant cover which the ground a ff orded . They clungto the ir pos it ion with despera te tena c i ty . There were rebels directly in front ,while many hundreds hung a round the two sides of the squa re .

As the B ritish moved forwa rd,firing as they ‘

a dvanc ed ,the rebels , a rmed with

spea rs and huge cross - hilted swords , rose within two hundred ya rds of the a dva ncinglines and rushed aga inst the British a t breakneck speed , heedless and fea rless ofdea th . They fell right and le ft

,though some of the bra ve fellows rea ched within

fi ve pa ces of the squa re . None of them bolted they only fe ll ba ck sullenly whenthey were forced . The British pursued them a s far a s the wells of T eb

,where the

I t is a ma tter of regre t for the sake of historica l a ccura cy tha t there are no

other sources of informa tion . I t would be curious and in teresting to have the Araba ccounts and their estima tes of the British numbers a nd losses . U nfortuna telyne ither the Mahdi nor Osman - Digma wrote any reports or had any wa r- correspondents with them .

The B 7 itish Campa ign in the Soudan

portion of the town are built of white cora l rock upon a

cora l island,separa ted by a channel 200 yards in width

from the ’ma inland on which are the suburbs,ba zars

,

et c . A narrow causeway serves a s communica tion between the town and the ma inland . The only supply of

wa ter is brought on donkeys and camels from very indifferent wells some two miles distant ; but since the

B ritish established'

a garrison they have been suppliedwith condensed wa ter from their steamers . A line of

earthworks ha s a lsobeenerected to cover the wells . The

island- town,if defended by a

_

gun -boa t on ea ch side ofthe causeway

,is perfectly impregnable to any a tta ck tha t

the B edouins could make aga inst it,but the suburbs had

been continua lly hara ssed by Osman -Digma since August,

1888. H e had now concentrated his forces a t Tama’

i

wells,only eleven miles from Suakim .

On the 12th of March G en . Graham advanced to a tta ckhim . The difficulty of securing a sufli c ient provision ofwater for even tha t short distance rendered his movements very slow . H e bivoua cked tha t evening withintwo miles of the enemy who kept up a des

’

ultory fi re

during the night. The B ritish left their bivouacs at

8 o’clock,marching in two squares of one brigade ea ch

,

about 900-yards apart. This is a summary of the B ritisha ccounts of the ba ttle .

They moved in e chelon,the Second briga de lea ding . Th is brigade wa s com

posed-

oi the Forty- se cond , Sixty - fi fth,Roya l M a rines, a nd Nava l Brigade , with

Ga rdners a nd Ga tlings . The First brigade comprised the Eighty- ninth , GordonHighlanders

,S ixtieth. R ifles , with Roya l Artillery nine a nd seven - pounder ba tte

ries , and Roya l Ma rines . As the Se cond briga de moved off to the le ft or southerlydirection , led by Gene ra l Da vis , i t wa s j oined by Genera l Graham a nd his s ta ff .

We could pla inly see the enemy ra nged a ll a long the hills on our fron t and right .The ir bla ck skins s tood out boldly aga inst the gla re of day . Somewere withintwelve hundred ya rds .

Me anwhile the c a ira lry , which ha d ta ken up a position on our le ft rea r , sen t


forwa rd two squadrons , toge ther wi th the Abyssin ians , to skirmish . These werequickly engaged , a nd a hot fi re was soon raging . The enemy coming on

, the skirm ishers fell ba ck , and the Second brigade a dvanced seven hundred ya rd s , firing a sthey went . The troops had opened out nea rly into line

,the ir rea r to a grea t extent

be ing covered by the F irst briga de,which wa s ha lf a mile away on our right . As

we ga ined the edge of the nulla the fi re became very hot from our side , the enemymostly contenting themselves by a ttempting to rush a t us with the ir spea rs and

swords . Our m en could not ea sily be got , despite trumpe t ca lls and officers"shouts , to reserve the i r fi re and a im ca re fully . In a few minutes our line wa s oh

scured by dense smoke from our own rifles , and under cover of this the enemycrept up the sides o f the nulla , and a succession of rushes bv our brave and resolute foes wa sma de a t the troops . The Sixty - fi fth , who were on our right , ma rineson their left , and Forty—second on extreme left , were nea rest to the brink of thenulla , which , on the ir front , made a bend inwa rd towa rd them . The enemy appea r“to ha ve ga thered there one thousa nd strong . Cre eping up unde r cover of thesmoke and sloping ground ,

they da shed a t the ma rines and Sixty- fi fth . A hundredswa rthy Arabs came bounding over the rocks up the"pla in

, spea r and sword inhand . H a lf were instantly shot down , but thirty or forty were a ble to throw themselves upon our bayonets , giving and receiving fea rful wounds .

Quick a s lightning the rush increa sed , and in less time than it takes to tell theSixty - fi fth gave way ,

fa lling ba ck upon the ma rines . The bulk of the regimen tcrowded in upon the ma rines , throwing them in disorder , and ba ck everybody wa sborne in a confused ma ss , men and regiments being inextricably mixed up .

“

G en

era l Graham and his sta ff tried the ir bes t to hold and ra lly the m en ,a nd Genera l

Da vis and a ll the officers labored to ge t the troops toi

stand the ir ground in an or

derly way . A la rge force of rebels cha rged down upon the Second briga de likemen inflamed with despera te feroci ty , shouting and yell ing and utterly heedle ss of

'

dea th , and succeeded in capturing a l l the Ga tlings and Ga rdners be longing to thebrigade ,

which was driven ba ck e ight hundred ya rds .

“ By this time the fi re from the First brigade on our right a s well a s front ,and the cava lry on our le ft , held the Arabs , and the offi cers succeeded in che ckingthe re trea t ; the B la ck Wa tch ,

who were fa irly in hand , and a portion of thema rines la rgely a ssist ing in stopping wha t might ha ve been a much more seriousdisa ster . The brigade wa s reformed , and the men who had got out of their regiments were sent into the ir own lines aga in . I must revert to the way in whichsevera l hundreds of ma rines and Highlanders fought ba ck to ba ck , firing and re

tiring in excellent order . They were over two hundred ya rds to the brigade frontwhen it wa s ha lted and re formed , a nd to the ir grea t coolness and steadiness isla rge ly due the fina l success of the day .

The troops be ing ra llied , G en . Graham immedia tely ordered a bayone t - cha rge ,the ga llant troops went for the enemy , and a fea rful ha nd - toha nd fight ensued forthe possess ion of the guns , which the British fina lly succe eded in re capturing .

Foll owing up the ir advantage ,they continued to press the rebels . who would not

run,but continued to re tire slowly , striking blow for blow , until they were driven

beyond the ir camp , when G en . Graham ordered a ha lt , quickly followed by a for

The B r itish Cam a irn in the Souda n.P

w a rd movement . As the British a dvanced , men sprang up some times within twohundred ya rds of them ,

a rmed with spea rs and bra ndishing a huge shie ld . Thesewould cha rge down upon the Brit ish ranks without hesi ta tion , a t breakneck spe ed ,until the la tter’s bulle ts la id them low . The British s tormed up the works wherethe rebels were in force . The ga llant bla cks , with no thought of fl ight or surrend er

,held out their spea rs and shields a ga inst bulle ts and bayone ts until the trenches

a ll a round were hke one‘

gra ve .

“The next obje ctive point wa s the second intervening ridge

,e ight hundred

ya rds off . The red gran i te boulders and rocks were rugged and sha rp and hot,

a nd the ma rch wa s a most trying one . With a cheer the men took the first ridge ,

firing,a s they wen t a long , occa s iona l shots a t the enemy’s ma in , body , whom we

could see ga thered on our right on the second ridge . The .Arab’s fi re in reply toours wa s feeble and wild , - and they soon

,bega n trotting off towa rds the mounta ins

a s we a dvanced . G en . Graham,with a portion of his sta ff , dire cted the a dva nce

,

a nd,with a ringing cheer

,we ca rried th e se cond ridge

,the defence of which wa s

insignificant . Ga ining the top , we saw in the va lley Tama i,one hundred and

e ighty fee t below , the tents and huts composing the camp of Osman Digma . Therewere very few Arabs about

,and of the se the troops soon ma de short work . The

Arabs re tired be fore the English slowly and sullenly . They were de fea ted , butnot put to rout . They wa lked away a s i f sa untering through a ba za a r

,with a rms

folded or swinging a t the ir s ides . They were often shot down,but this did not

ha sten the ir companions’ speed . It wa s imposs ible to take prisoners . The

wounded Arabs would lie motionless , without uttering a single cry or moan,and

w a tch their chance to s tab the a dva ncing Brit ish with knife or spea r . The victorswa lked among the wounded a s among so ma ny v ipers . A wounded Arab killed aB rit ish ma rine during the night . Another a ttempted to stab Colonel Herbert“

Stewa rt while his a ide - de - camp wa s giving the wounded man wa ter .The rebelsentered the second squa re upon the ir hands and knees , benea th the

muzzles of the Ga tling guns . They then commenced s la shing with the ir wea pons ,doing terrible execution . The Bri tish were no ma tch for the rebels a t closequa rters .

After four hours’fighting the B edouins sullenly retiredfrom the field and the ba ttle of Tama

’

i’

wa s won .

The B ritish loss wa s one hundred killed and one hund red and fifty wounded . The Arab loss wa s estima teda t over two thousand .

After the battle,Osman’s camp wa s burnt

,and the

B ritish returned to Suakim the next day . They werevictorious

,but it had been a very na rrow escape ; for, if

t he First B rigade had been broken like the Second,none

The B ritish C ampa ign in the Souda n . 185»

but the mounted men could ever have cut their way backto Suakim .

This retrea t,after a victory

,illustra tes the peculiar dif

fi culties of warfare in the Soudan. It wa s impossible topursue the Arabs among the foot hills

,where the B ritish

could not reta in their forma tion in squares,and where

the enemy could lie in ambush in every ravine . In fa ct,

if the Arabs had avoided ba ttle on the pla in from the

first,and had drawn the B ritish into the hills

,the result

might have been very'

diflferent . But the insuperable diffi culty wa s the want of water. Not one drop could befound in the bills or on tha t arid pla in scorched by tropica l hea t

,so tha t the retrea t wa s inevitable . It will be

seen further on how the B edouins manage to supplythemselves with wa ter where Europeans would perishfor want of it .The expectation enterta ined tha t the Arabs would bediscouraged by their heavy losses at Teb and Tamai

'

wa s

quickly dispelled . Osman-Digma reoccupied his formerposition a s soon a s the B ritish retired

,and hara ssed them

in their lines around Suakim by nightly alerts . Genera lGraham

,hoping to crush him by a final defeat

,made a

second advance . H is purpose wa s to attack Osman’sposition a t thewells of Tamanieb

,a short distance beyond

Tama'

i. Severa l days were consumed in establishing a

wa ter depot ha lf-way , and the difli culty of the undertaking may be imagined when it is known tha t everydrop had to be brought in goa t- skins on . camel -ba ck fromthe condensing steamers in the harbor or the bra ckishwells outside of the town . On the 24th of March thetroops moved out from their camp , and

' before they had

advanced eight mil es, one fourth of the soldier gave out


entirely,and were left behind

,and another fourth dropped

to the rea r exhausted,following a s best they could after

b eing relieved of their guns“

and cartridge -belts whichpacked on camels . On that pla in the thermometer

rises to 120° or 130° in the sun in March every “

day ,

( 150° or 160° in July and August) , and this terrible

hea t which Europeans cannot Withstand,is just enough

to make the B edouins feel comfortable . This and the

.absolute lack of water are some of the points completelyoverlooked by those whofind it so ea sy to plan and critic ise campa igns from the Horse-Guards ” in London orthe Head-

quarters a t Ca iro . It is certa in that if OsmanDigma had known to wha t helpless condition the fea rful heat had reduced the British column on tha tmarch

,he would have a ttacked it then and there

,and a

m a ssacre like tha t of Hicks-Pa sha would have occurred .

B ut unconscious of this circumstance,and wa rned by his

e xperiences at Teb Tama i,he had resolved to avoid

another encounter with ' the B ritish on the pla in,and to

d raw them in to the hills . Accordingly,his forces slowly

retired,skirmishing from a distance

,inflicting no loss and

s uffering but little . On the 26th,starting very early

f rom their water-depot,the B ritish rea ched the wells of

T amanieb, where the men and horses slaked their thirst.'

This slight skirmish wa s magnifi ed into a ba ttle,and the

E nglish papers announced in big capita ls the capture andd estruction of the “

town of Tamanieb,

” when,in fa ct

,

this wa s the name of the wells ; for no town wa s everbuilt on the desert . Wha t wa s burnt wa s Osman’s campo f brush huts

,such a s he would leave behind him at

every change of position . The most va luable objectc aptured a t Tamanieb

,a s sta ted by the English papers

,

The B r itish Campa ign in the Souda n . 187

wa s Osman -Digma’s frying-

pan, which had the honor ofbeing sent to England a s a trophy . On the following day ,G enera l Graham returned to Suakim with a ll his forces

,

a nd on the 1st of April he re - embarked,leaving only a

ba ttalion of marines and some war-vessels to hold thepla ce

,and declaring the campa ign to be a t an . end .

Y es,it wa s a t an end ; but not because its object had

been a c complished,or because

'

Osman-Digma wa s con

quered , but because it wa s evidently impossible to cont inne it . Genera l Graham was too skilful a soldier notto know tha t his troops could not follow the enemy undera torrid sun and through waterless deserts and mounta ins

,and that if they rema ined a t Suakim during the

summer,the clima te would destroy them: But the de

pa rture of the B ritish wa s inevitably construed a s a tri

umph for the Mahdi’s cause . All the wavering tribes

j oined his standard, and from tha t time forward Suakim

wa s closely blockaded,if not besieged

,from the land- side .

Meanwhile the news of Graham’s inva sionh ad rea ched

Khartoum and neutra lized all the efi ec t of Gordon’s

pea ceful protesta tions . B efore the midd le '

of March hewa s a tt a cked a t Khartoum

,and then began that won

d rous defence,whose deta ils will probably never be fully

known,since its hero ha s perished . Neve1 wa s there a

brighter illustration of the power of a strong will and an

upright and noble mind . One man a lone,forsaken by

his government, without help, an utter stranger in idea s,language

,customs

,and religion, wa s enabled by the mere

f orce of his chara cter to mould into a fighting a rmy a

heterogeneous crowd of Egyptians, Soudanese , and negro

s avages,and to hold them in hand for ten months , under

hardships and priva tions,in spite of their na tura l and


religious sympa thies a ll favorable to the Mahdi’s cause .

The same wonderful fa scination over barbarians tha t hadenabled him to conquer the Ta e -Ping rebellion in Chinawas exhibited here in Khartoum .

It wa s not long,however

,before he became sa tisfied of

the impossibility of rescuing the garrisons,or even holding

Khartoum more than a few months without a id,and he

made repea ted and “urgent requests to his government tosend him B ritish

,or Indian

,or Turkish troops

,or

,a s a

la st resort to send Zobehr-Pa sha,he being the only man

,

in Gordon s judgment,possessing sufficient influence and

force of character to organize a government and preventutter ana rchy after his own retirement . Perhaps Zobehrdid possess the ability

,but he wa s a double -dyed tra itor

,

and a t tha t very'

time wa s in secret communica tion withthe M ahdif“ If he had been sent » to Khartoum he

would undoubtedly have betrayed Gordon '

to his dea th inrevenge for his son Sulima

’

n’s execution. For once the

Ministry a cted wisely 'ih declining to send him.

“

But

why did they still refuse to send troops when it becameevident tha t without military support Gordon’s missionmust fa il and he must become the victim of his own

heroism ? The following extra cts show in . what lightGordon viewed the action of his government

LONDON,M ay 5, 1884 .

—Pa rliam e11t a ry documents give a dispa tch to SirEvelyn Ba ring from Genera l Gordon , da ted Kha rtoum , April 16 th , in which hesays As far a s I understand the si tua tion you say there is no intention of sendingrelie f here or to Berber . You re fuse me Z obehr- Pa sha . I conside r myself free toa c t a ccording to circumstances . I sha ll hold on here a s long a s I c an . I f I c an

suppress the rebe llion I sha ll do so ,otherwise

“I sha ll re tire to the equa tor and

leave you the indelible disgra ce of abandoning the ga rrisons of Senna a r , Ka ssa la ,

This fa ct ha ving been discovered a fter the fa ll of Kha rtoum ,he was impris

oned a t Gibra lta r and a fterwa rds banished to the Island of Cyprus and deprived ofhis honors and emoluments .


On the 12th of M ay the R ight Hon . Sir Micha e l,Hicks - Bea ch , Conserva tive

m ember for Ea st Glouces te rshire,moved in the House of Commons his motion of

M a y ad ,tha t the House regre ts tha t the course of the government ha s not tended

to promote the succe ss of G en . Gordon’s mission , a nd tha t steps to se cure his persona l sa fe ty have been delayed . The honorable gentlema n , i n making the motion ,s a id he did not mean to question the wisdom of the government’s policy in dema nding the eva cua tion of the Soudan by Egypt . Wha t he ca lled in question wa sthe present conduct of the governmen t towa rd tha t country . H e ca lled in reviewthe c ircumstances which led to the depa rture of G en . Gordon to the Soudan .

‘

The obj ect of his going , ’ Sir Micha e l sa id , wa s to bring about the pea cefule va cua tion of the country . A more he roic offer tha n tha t made

, by G en". Gordon

wa s never made by living man . Y e t when he arrived a t Kha rtoum the governm ent , instea d of seconding his proposa ls , nega tived them . With St ra nge inc ons istency the government insis ted upon a pa cific policy in one pa rt of the Souda na nd went to wa r in a nother pa rt , thereby destroying a ny chance which G en . Gordonm ight ha ve ha d for ca rrying out his mission . The gove rnmen t wa s worthy ofblame for not ha ving sent a ssis ta nce from Suakim . They ha ve pra ctica lly desertedthe bra ve soldier , the Christia n he ro , in his hour of peril . This~is the genera lfee l ing of the entire country . Engla nd now dema nds tha t G en . Gordon a nd thosewho trusted him sha ll be rescued .

’

Mr . Glads tone , on rising“ to speak in de fence of the government’s course , wa s

g ree ted with hea rty a nd long- continued a pplause . H e congra tula ted Sir M i cha e lHicks - Bea ch on _

his forc ible speech,but s trenuously denied tha t the government ha d

d eserted G en . Gordon . Continuing , the Prime - Minis ter denied tha t the government ha d fa iled to do one single a c t tha t wa s for the sa fe ty and success of G en .

Gordon . The .cha rges which the honorable gen t leman has j us t pre ferred aga ins tthe gove rnment a re absurd . They c an only be a ccounted for by his la ck of knowle dge of the true fa cts .

’ Mr . Gladstone the reupon,

re ferred to officia l d 1spa tc hes toprove G en . Gordon’s se curity , and to justi fy the a ction which th e government ha dt aken . H e contended tha t the cha rges fa iled to note the fa ct tha t G en » Gordonhad orders to resort to milita ry force i f pea ce ful mea sures should not prove successful . The dema nd of the honora ble gentlema n , ’ he insisted , amounted to awa r of conquest a ga ins t a people struggling to be free . The war which the M ahdiis waging is a wa r for freed om . Is i t tha t which the honorable gentlema n wishesEngland to put down

It is fortuna te for Mr. Gladstone tha t his fame doesnot rest upon the course of his Cabinet in the Soudan

q uestion . To err is human,and great a s he undoubtedly

is a s a sta tesman,it cannot be denied tha t

_

he erred

grievously in this ma tter, probably led into mistakes bythe representations of military men on whose judgment of


professiona l subjects he naturally thought he could safelyrely. H e must have been himself deceived a s to “

the

t rue fa cts when he spoke of “G en . Gordon’s securitya nd his sta tement that “Gordon had orders to resort tomilitary force if pea ceful measures should not prove suc

c essful seems absolutely absurd in view of the fa ct thathe had been sent without a single soldier, that a ll the

force ava ilable for a ctive Operations had been destroyedwith Hicks -Pa sha

,and tha t Gordon had no force wha t

ever except the garrison of Khartoum,a lready insuffi cient

for its defence,a s well

‘

a s unreliable and wavering in itsloyalty . Furthermore

,if,a s Mr. Gladstone sa id

,

“the

Mahdi was waging a war for freedom,

” which Englandshould not put down

,what wa s his lieutenant

,Osman

Digma,fighting for that he should be crushed ? If the

Mahdi’s forces ought not to be opposed on the \Vhite

Nile,why should Graham have been sent to slaughter

them on the R ed Sea ?B y this time public sentiment had become too power

ful and excited to be sa tisfied by such subterfuges,and it

c ompelled the Ministry to organize an expedition forGordon’s relief. Its purpose wa s empha tica lly declaredto be

,

“R escue and retire.

”

This tardy determination having been rea ched,the first

step wa s evidently the selection of the best line of opera tions

,and this selection must be the result of a thorough

study of the country,a ll the more necessary because war

in the Soudan ha s to be carried on under circumstancesso essentially d ifferent from those preva iling in otherlands

,and which are these

I . Outside .of the very narrow valley of the Nile the

country furnishes a bsolutely nothing for the support of

The B ritish Cannpa ign in the Soudan .

an army,which must therefore ca rry a ll its supplies

,in

clud ing even forage for its anima ls.

II . There are no roads and no vehicles in the Soudanonly camel- tra ils

,and every thing must be transported.

on camel -ba ck .

III. And most important of a ll,the Soudan is a ra in

less,wa terless land . Away from the Nile there are no

rivulets,creeks

,or ‘

springs— nothing but rare and osc anty

wells a t long interva ls,or rocky reservoirs in deep ravines

,

like those of G akdul and Abou -Klea,where the ra in-wa tercollects during the brief ra iny season . Droughts of twoand three years’ duration are not uncommon

,and had

just occ urred when I travelled over the deserts on bothsides of the Nile in 1878

,

’74

,and

’75 . In such sea sons

grea t numbers of ca ttle,and even camels

,perish . No

animals are used for transporta tion except camels , for theya lone c an travel fi ve days without water

,even in sum

mer,and on the ca ravan routes wells a re often that far

apart. ~ Consequently wa ter suffi cient to supply men (andcava lry and a rtillery horses in the ca se of an army ) ha sto be carried in goa t - skins which wa ste a large proportion by evaporation . From my experience ofmiles of desert travel I judge tha t every men

,with

the usua l proportion of horses in an army,would require

500camels for . wa ter a lone,and a t least 800 more for

ammunition,supplies

,forage

,etc . This is wha t renders

a ll long desert routes impossible for a European army .

If Gen . Herbert Stewart succeeded,not without much

suffering from hunger and thirst,in crossing the level

B ahiuda pla ins (a s will be seen la ter) , it wa s because thedistance wa s only 150 miles

,the desert le

’

ss arid,and the

wells much closer than the average ; besides which he had

The B ritish Campa ign i n the Souda n . 193

camels for men in the lightest possible marching order

,for his ra tions gave out on the road .

This vital necessity of a certa in and abundant supplyof wa ter makes it self- evident that no B ritish army

,even

if no larger than or men,c an operate in the

Soudan except a long the Nile,which is the on ly unfa iling

supply.

H ad this fa ct been recognized in time,four months

would not have been wa sted in va cillating abou t theroute

,and these four

“months ga ined would have savedGordon .

I make the charge without reserve or hesita tion,tha t

the fa ilure of Wolseley’s relief expedition wa s due to noother cause than the inconceivable and inexcusable ignorance of the B ritish civil and military authorities in Egyptconcerning the country which they had virtually occupiedfor more than six years ; surely time enough to havelearned all about it . More than this

,no greater mistake

could be “made than to suppose tha t the “ Soudan wa s

a terra in cogn ita . So far from it,every route from Ca iro

to theWhite Nile ha s been an avenue of trade and travelfor a thousand years

,and is a swell known a swa s the old

nationa l stage road between B a ltimore and Wheeling before the days of ra ilroads .

Furthermore,a t the War Department in the citadel of

Ca iro,occupied a s head-quarters by the B ritish staff, there

is any number of the most accura te and complete maps

and reports of that region, made by French, EnglishItalian

,and American engineers

,officers

,and explorers

some a s recent a s 1878, and conta ining the most m inuteinforma tion . Most of these documents are to be founda lso in the principal libraries of Europe and America . So

194 The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n .

that ignorance of the geography,topography ,

and wa tersupply of the Soudan routes wa s absolutely inexcusable ,especially in a military staff whose first duty wa s to learnthese very things.

There are three routes from Ca iro to Khartoum. (Seethe map.)I . By the Nile to Korosko

,crossing the desert and

striking the Nile aga in a t Abou -Hamed .

II . By the Nile a l l the way on or a long the river.III . B y Suez and the R ed Sea to Suakim . Thence

a cross the desert to B erber,and thence to Khartoum by

the river.L et us examine them in order.I. The first follows the Nile to Korosko

,690 miles .

above Ca iro and 100 miles below the second ca ta ra ct.Here it leaves the river and strikes a cross the grea t bendof the Nile. It is 500 miles shorter than the a ll -riverroute

,but

,a lthough one of the most frequented by cara

vans,it must be ruled out of military opera tions

,for it

crosses one of the worst deserts in the Soudan,consisting

of hard gravel pla ins diversified with zones of deep sandand rocky ridges

,without a bush or blade of gra ss . The

camels,which fi nd some gra zing on other deserts

,have

to carry gra in on their ba cks for their own consumptionon this one . It is 250miles a cross

,with only one well

half way— so scanty that it c an supply only some 400

camels per d ay , and so bra ckish tha t its name is M oora

hitter. None but camels and B edouins c an drink itswa ter. Caravans of 100 or 200 camels cross this desertby forced marches

,a s I did

,in seven days

,carrying

drinking water to la st from Nile to Nile,but no European

a rmy could cross it at a ll . Meeting the river aga in at


Abou -Hamed,the route follows the river or near it

miles to B erber. At this point the Nile aga in becomes.

navigable 225 miles to Khartoum. Tota l distance fromCa iro 1

,298 miles .

The Korosko desert 1s one of those tha t the Arabs ca llA tmoors

,in contradistinction from the B erreegeh, or wil~

derness in which there is vegeta tion a s well a s game,and

where the B edouins roam with their flocks,though culti~

va tion is impossible for want of ra in . The Atmoors are

entirely destitute of v egeta tion,and consequently of

anima l life,excepting only the ostrich and hyena

,which

cross them swiftly by night,and the ever-present vultures

hovering over the caravans by day . Nothing relieves theglare of the yellow sand . The marches are terrible

,and

y et it is worse to ha lt during the day than -to keep inmotion

,for the fearful heat makes rest or sleep impossi

ble even under the tents,with the burning sand under

you and the vertica l sun overhead . TheKorosko a tmoor

being one of the grea t avenues of trade, the tra il is perfec tly well marked by the skelet ons of camels

,averaging

over 200 to the mile,by my owna ctua l count . Thousands ~

of these anima ls perish of exhaustion on this route everyyear. The a tmoors are genera lly from six to ten days’

march a cross,and are like oceans which ca ravans traverse

upon'

their desert- ships, but where it is death to tarry.

II. The route following the Nile cont inuously fulfils .

the paramount condition of insuring an unfa iling supplyof wa ter

,but it presents the disadvantage of being the

longes t and slowest of all . From an engineer’s point ofview it is divided into three sections .

The first,from Ca iro. to the second ca taract (795 miles) ,

is travelled every winter by hundreds of tourists in daha ~


beahs and Cook’s steamers,and is a s well known a s the

Hudson fromNew York to Albany. It is navigable a t all

sea sons,but a lways best a t high Nile . Trans - shipment is

made at the first catara ct,by the a id of a fi ve -mile ra il

way around it , but fromAugust to January, sma ll steamersc an behauled over it .The second section

,from the second ca ta ra ct to B erber

,

and above to M etemneh,where Genl . Herbert Stewart

struck the Nile aga in after crossing the B ahiuda desert,

has been thoroughly explored by the eminent civil- engineer Sir John Fowler

,who devoted many winters to

surveying and locating the projected Soudan ra ilroad forIsmail-Pa sha ! Nothing c an be more complete than hisreport

,printed in London

,together with his map, a ccu

ra tely marked off in sections of fifty kilometers,and from

which the a ccompanying map is partia lly compiled .

!

This section,from the second ca tara ct to B erber

,is ob

structed by numerous other ca tara cts,rapids

,and shallows,

making it s n aviga tion very difficult for a ll but the na tivecraft ca lled nuggar s . The difficulty of navigating thisgrea t double bend, or S, of the Nile is what forces theSoudan trade away from the river a t B erber to seek an

outlet a t Suakim on the R ed Sea . It wa s sadly demonstrated by the tragic fa te of Col . O . H . Stewart

,in Sept

,

1884. Although the Nile wa s a t its highest,and his

steamer had pa ssed saf ely over the fifth catara ct (which,when I saw it a t low water

,seemed impra cticable for any

boat) , he wa s wrecked a t the fourth cataract,half way

between Abou -Hamed and Korti,and wa s ma ssa cred by

the B edouins with his entire party . Nevertheless the

Th is map wa s engra ved for the Cen tury M agazine , to illust ra te my a rticle 0 11

the‘

Soud an ,in the No . for Ma rch

, 1885, and its use ha s been courteously grantedto the Am . G eogr. Soc . , by the edi tors of the Cen tury .

The B r itish C ampa ign in the Souda n . 197

entire distance is fa irly navigable for the na tive boats

(larger than Wolsel'

ey’s wha le -boats) , provided a lwaytha t advantage 1s taken

,a s it should be

,of the proper

s tage of . the Nile. It is a lso quite pra cticable for thecavalry and a rtillery horses

,with part of the baggage on

camels,to follow a long the banks of the river

,keeping

a brea st with the boats .

The third section is of ea sy navigation from B erber toKhartoum

,and a lmost equa lly so thence nearly to the

grea t equatorial lakes . The chief objection to this’

a ll

river route is the length of time it consumes .

The la st route to be considered is the Suakim -B erber,

a nd a s the mistaken predilection in its favor ha s been thec hief cause of the B ritish fa ilure

,I will describe it in

some deta il .I must be permitted to sta te here

“tha t in an“ Open

Letter,

”written in June

,1884

,and published in the Sep

t ember No . of the Cen tury M tga z ine, in an illustra teda rticle

,written a s early a s September, 1884, though pub

lished in the Cen tur y for March,1885

,and in a letter to

the JV. Y .

“Worlel of March 1,1885

,I proved conclusively

that the Suakim -B erber route is utterly impossible for a

Eur opean army,while hostile B edouins hold the deserts .

I predicted further that the projected ra ilroad wouldnever be built

,and tha t the B ritish would never advance

twenty miles from Suakim,all of which predictions were

verified by subsequent events .

I am not a stonished tha t the Suakim route wa s the

favorite with those ignorant of its difficulties . It looks

so very ea sy and rapid on the map : 120 miles by ra ilfrom Ca iro to Suez 900miles by steamer

,in four days , to

Suakim ; 250 miles to B erber, which caravans travel in


ten days thence 225 miles a long the river to Khartouma ltogether miles

,and twenty-fi ve days would cover

the distance .

Y es,if an army could move . over the country a s ea sily

a s a pencil a cross the map, or even a s a party of travellersin time of pea ce

,this would certa inly be the route. How

prone are stay- a t -home critics to imagine that a t ten

thousand miles’distance they c an judge of the routes tobe followed better than those on the spot: It wa s justso in this ca se. The journey is a ll quick and ea sy enough

,

except that two hundred and fifty miles’stretch to B erber,

which is an impa ssable barrier in time of war for an armywhich cannot move in fra ctionsa t severa l days’interva l

,

but must keep together before the enemy. This route isutterly impra cticable for these rea sonsIt crosses a ra inless desert

,not nearly so arid a s tha t of

Korosko,but yet affording nothing for the subsistence of

men or horses . Though caravans c an cross it in ten days,

an a rmy w ith its ma teriel would require twenty-fi ve a t

lea st (the B ritish staff sa id thirty) , if they encoun tered

no opposition . Where a caravan c an find water and

grazing for its few camels,an army would perish for want

of both . A march of fifteen miles from Suakim wouldbring the army to the foot of the grea t Arabian cha inwhich begins a t Suez and runs para llel to the R ed Seadown to the equator. Many of its peaks rise to eightthousand feet

,its pa sses

,or gaps ” being from two to

three thousand . I t is eighty miles a cross,consisting of

severa l para llel ridges separa ted by deep va lleys . B e

yond this cha in,a pla teau extends one hundred and sixty

miles farther to the Nile,very broken and abounding in

narrow,steep rocky or sandy passes

,where a caravan is

The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n . 199“

compelled to move,in single file . For this entire distance

the wa ter supply is barely sufficient for small caravans .

“It,

often happened to me,travelling in the Soudan with

only two hundred men and four hundred camels (a largercaravan than the average) , to find the wells I dependedupon just exhausted by a preceding caravan . I wouldthen have to wa it from one to three days for the water toooze in aga in suffi ciently to enable me to replenish myWa ter- skins

,and I would leave the wells exhausted for

the next comers .

Now,remembering tha t Genera l Graham

,with four

thousand choice troops,came so near being destroyed in

the pla in,within fifteen miles of Suakim

,it is . evident

tha t no - army could venture to advance through the mouns

ta ins inhabited by the most warlike B edouin tribes,

and the deserts beyond,with less than six or seven

thousand men,requiring for the transportation of water,

ammunition,supplies , baggage, and forage for a ll the ani

mals,not

’ less than eight or ten thousand camels . H ow

could such a force find water enough when the best wellson the route cannot supply over six hundred in twentyfour hours 2

Suppose tha t the fierce Bedouins , whose homes are in these mounta ins , havea llowed the Bri tish , strung out in a long , slender column vulnerable a t every poin t ,to cross the numerous d efi les where a few hundred men could s top a whole a rmySuppose the inva ders to have emerged without serious ki sses from the mounta inrange out upon the pla teau extending to the N i le ,

a nd which itself is very ruggedand abounding in d ifficult pa sses a nd belts of deep , loose sand ,—the toughestobsta cles of a ll . The worst is ye t to come . “la ter wa s compa ra tively plenti ful inthe mounta ins , and the hea t wa s modera te . But now the only supply is from the

scanty wells upon the line of ma rch . The Bedouins retrea t , dest roying the wellsbeh ind them (which is a very ea sy thing to do) , a nd swa rms of them hang a roundthe flank and rea r of the invaders to ha ra ss them and cut off their stragglers . The

he a t rises every d ay above one hundred degrees , even in November a nd De cember ,and one hundred and fi fty degrees and more in summer ; in tha t cloudless land


there is no sha de . The pla in quivers under the fierce sunlight,while the mirage

de ludes the eyes with the mockery of fictitious lakes . This is wha t I experiencedd ay a fter d ay on the deserts . Suppose now the inva ders to have consumed the irsupply of wa ter . I f the enemy c an cut them off from the wells for three days ,there is no need of firing a nother shot : Not a soul of them c an survive . It is the

story of the Roman legions perishing in the Ba rthian deserts , and of Hicks- Pa shain Kordofan .

In the ‘Wa terless Land wa ter is the pa ramount question . I f i t be a sked howa la rge body of Bedouins , like the ten thousa nd who nea rly destroyed th e Bri tishsqua res a t T amar

,mana ge to subsist

,the rea son is pla in . In the first pla ce

,they do

not need the enormous tra i-ns required for a Europea n a rmy . They a re the mos tabstemious of men . Ea ch man ca rries a skin of wa ter and a

'

sma ll bag of gra in ,procured by purcha se or ba rter from ca ra vans . The ir camels and goa ts move withthem , supply ing them with milk and mea t , and subs isting upon the scanty herbagea nd the folia ge of the thorny mimosa growing in se cluded wa dies . As to wa ter

,

they know every nook and hollow in the mounta ins,awa y from the tra ils

,where a

few ba rrels of wa ter collect in some sha ded ra v ine,and they c an sca tter , every man

for himself , to fi ll the ir wa ter - skins . On my first expedition,nea r the close of the

three yea rs’ drought , I rea ched some wells on which I wa s depending , and foundthem ent irely dry . I t wa s severa l days to the next wells . But my Bedouin guidesknew some na tura l reservoirs in the hills about six miles away from the tra il . Sothey took the wa ter camels a t night - fa ll

,and came ba ck before morning with the

wa ter- skins filled . An invading a rmy would find it ha rd to obta in guides , and eveni f they d id , they must keep toge ther , and could not leave the line of ma rch to lookfor wa ter . Besides

,the B edouins

,a ccustomed from infa ncy to rega rd wa ter a s

most precious and ra re ,use i t with wonderful economy . Ne ither men nor a nima ls

drink more than once in forty - e ight hours . As to wa shing ,they never indulge in

such wa ste ful nonsense . When Bedouins came to my camp,wa ter wa s a lways

offered them . The ir answer would frequen tly be : No , tha nks I dra nk ye sterd ay .

’ They know too well the importance of keeping up the habit of a bstemiousness . No wonder they c an subs ist where invaders would quickly perish .

”

A ra ilroad wa s proposed a s a solution of the difficultythis only proved the tota l ignorance of those who sug

gested it a s to the conditions and circumstances of theca se . No one denies tha t a ra ilroad c an be built in timeof peace a cross the Arabian cha in without much morediffi culty than a cross the Alleghany range (ex cepting thela ck of water and timber) , but even then it would be

Extra ct from my Open Le tter to the Cen tury ,published in the September

No . ,1884.


a work of a year or two and Gordon had to be relievedin a few months

,or it would be too late

,a s the sad result

proved . It seems to have been imagined tha t the Suakimdesert wa s a level sand -pla in on which there wa s nothingto do but to lay the ra ils . Every engineer knows howdifficult it would be and how long it would take to construct a ra ilroad over such a range of mounta ins

,through

which not even a preliminary survey had ever been madeoutside of the regular camel tra il . Y et two ridiculouslyabortive attempts,

were made,a s will be seen further.

I have already cha rged that the fa ilure of Wolseley’slief expedition wa s due to ignorance of the country inwhich it wa s to operate . Here is proof positive that thisignorance wa s absolutely inexcusable ; This Suakim routeha s been travelled by hundreds of caravans every yearfrom time immemoria l

,and every well upon it is better

known than a corner grog- shop is to a ll the topers on itsblock . It had been repeatedly and a ccura tely mappedcut years ago. In addition

,one of many explorers

,

my friend and comrade,Col » H. Gr. Prout

,now of

New York,a most able engineer, twice promoted for

efficient and va luable services in the Soudan,and for

a time Vice-Governor-Genera l under Gordon in 1877—79,wa s sent to join my expedition in Kordofan in 1875 . Ihad gone there by the Nile route some months before ;he came by the Suakim route

,and he wa s ordered to

make a deta iled map, survey, and report of it,especia lly

a s to the wa ter supply and the fea sibility of construct inga ra ilway . The report (which lies before me now) ,printed in English

,with m ap and profile

,a t the staff

printing- offi c e,in the c itadel of Ca iro

,conta ins the most

ample informa tion (the map and profile accompany this


paper) . It ment ions every group of wells on the route,and their capa city. The largest c an supply Only 600men

and their animals ; others va l y from 500 down to 250,

the average being about 400. I pa ssed over the sameroute the following year

,and c an confirm from persona l

observa tion the perfect a ccura cy of Col . Prout’s report.This document wa s perfectly a ccessible to the B ritishauthorities

,and a couple of hours’study of it would “have

c onvinced any intelligent staff offi cer that the Suakimroute is out of the questionfor an army . This information conveyed to head qua rters should ha ve put a stop toa ll the fata l va cillations and delays that followed. Whythis neglect of a pl oper and necessary study of thethea tre of war ? Wa s it stolid stupidity

,or wa s it conceit

which took it fo1 granted that what wa s not a lreadyknown to the B ritish commanders wa s not worth lea rning ? This blind preference for the Suakim route wasthe paramount and fata l blunder which caused the fina lf a ilure of the relief expedition

,for its consequence Wa s

the los s of four or fi ve months in repea ted changes ofplan

,a s follows

(1) Officia l announcements published at the time showtha t when Gordon’s pressing appeals for ~ help aroused a

popular sentiment demanding his relief (which wa s beforeG raham’

s army had re - emba rk'

ed from Suakim,April l st) ,

this officer wa s expected to open the road from there toB erbei ; but he wa s too skilful and judicious to attemptsuch an impra cticable undertaking

,and the idea wa s

g iven up.

(2) At the beginning of M ay , a t the very t ime tha t Mr.G ladstone wa s declaring in the Commons tha t “the Mahdiwa s waging a wa r for freedom and should not be put

The B ritish C ampa ign in the Souda n .

the military authorities proceeded with a s much deliberation a s if they had had full control of the sea sons .

It is an axiom that in war,time is an element of the first

importance . How especia lly so in a country wheremilitaryopera tions c an be carried on . only for a few months ofthe year The Nile is a s regular a s the sun . It begins torise about the 21st of June

,rises steadily until about Sept.

1st,rema ins a t its full until about Oct . 1st

,and then de~

creases regularly until the next June . It does not varymore than fi ve or six days from yea r to year in centuries

,

and to ignore these facts,known to

'

the world sinceHerodotus wrote

,400 years no

,is .unpardonable . H ad

the Nile route been decided upon in M ay, boats couldhave been built or collected and every prepara tion madefor the expedition to leave Ca iro July 15th

,when the

Nile'

had been for nearly four weeks on the rise . It was

perfectly clear naviga tion to the second cataract whichshould have been reached by Aug. 15th . Then

,with a

steadily rising Nile, the pa ssage of the upper ca tara ctswould have been ea sy. Korti could have been rea ched .

fully four months earlier, and full advantage could havebeen derived from the cool sea son which is delightfulin those regions . The fa ll of Khartoum and the dea th ofGordon are the direful consequenc es of that fa ta l d elay .

Nevertheless,late a s it wa s when the fina l decision wa s

adopted, no a ttempt seems to have been made to c ompensa te for the lost time . Wolseley did not reach Egypt untilSeptf 9th , and the camel- corps organized in England didnot sa il from there until Sept . 26th . The wha le -boatsordered from England did not leave the second catara ct a tWady Ha lfa until the 19th of Nov .

,and a ltogetherthe fa ct

seemed to be ignored that the Nile wa s steadily fa lling,

The B ritish Campa ign i n the Soudan . 205

and that ca tara cts and sha llows which could ea sily bepa ssed a t the right sea son would become a ltogether impa ssable a t low .Nile .

Y et the military authorities had abundant warnings ofthe danger of delay

,a s c an be seen by a perusa l of the

journa ls of tha t da te . Sir Samuel B aker’s letter of April5,1 884

,is so truly prophetic of what followed

,that I

quote a few pa ssages . The ita lics are my own .

In this we see a continua tion of tha t spa smodic policy which hascha ra cterizedevery opera tion in Egypt since the first shot wa s fired a t the forts of Alexa ndria .

There has been no ca refully orga nized plan,no definite a im ,

no founda tion for theedifice of a future but a ha nd - to- mouth series of a ttempts , ea ch of which ha s beena direct contra diction of our most solemn decla ra tions .

For the la st two ye a rs with regre tful a ccura cy I ha ve expressed my opinion uponthe present and . future of Egyptia n a ffa irs . Da rk a s the

'

present m ay be ,the com

ing events will be still da rker,unless th e policy of Grea t Brita in sha ll be radica lly

changed . The country is bankrupt ; brigandage ,which wa s formerly unknown

,

is rampant even in the Delta (Seventy - four ca ses wi thin one month) the Souda nis .in a bla ze of insurrection

,and Genera l Gordon in a mos t da ng erousposition ,

a s

by a le tter I rece ived from him of the 11 th of M a rch ,he doubts lheposszlzility of

def end ing K ha rtoum bey ond a c erta in period .

Will England permit this sa crifice We have been a grievous c urse to Egypt ,a nd we are entirely respons ible for the miseries a nd disa sters which ha ve befa llenthis unha ppy country . I t ma y suit the convenience of Bri tish officia ls to poohpooh

‘

the gravi ty of the si tua ti on which they ha ve themselves provoked,but the

fa cts a re pa tent to a ll : the "crisis ha s a rrived,a nd un less immed ia te prepara ti ons

sha l l he ma de for the relie f of Genera l Gordon a t Kha rtoumwe sha l l he ag a in too

la te,a s we were a t Toha r a nd Sin/ea t. Wha t wi ll be the humilia tion of Engla nd

should he fa ll through the apa thy or incompe tence of the British Government ?I do not

‘

w zsh to prophesy evil,but 1 see it . L e t the British public awaken to

the fa cts of the situa tion England is re spons ible for the misdeeds of her Min istry ,a nd

.

she is the gua ranty for the sa fe ty of Genera l Gordon,who wa s sta rted upon

a n impossible enterprise . As we invaded Abyssin ia to relea se a British consul , wea re bound to delive r our envoy a t Kha rtoum should h is re trea t b'

e intercepted .

Not a day should he los t in prepa ring f or this nec ess ity . The route fromSuakim to Berber c an only be opened and secured by Indian troops . The Ni le

will af ord the mos t sec ure

.

route f rom Ca iro to K ha rtoum if immed ia teprepa ra

tions sha ll he ma de f or a n expedition a t the-

fi rs t rise of the river in f i l ly .

'

I havea lready sugges ted to the highest a uthority this pla n of a dva nce ,

which requires themos t ca reful but energe tic management . St ill I ha ve no hope tha t such energyw ill be exhibited ; the apa thy a nd va c il la tion which ha ve induc ed a series of d is


a s ters will s ta ve of the evil hour un til one more g a rrison sha ll ha ve heen over

powered ; bu t should Kha rtoum fa ll , and Gordon be thus crue lly aba ndoned , le tt he Government bewa re of the scorn of the Bri tish people .

"

Apathy and va cillation . The la tter,especia lly

,wa s

the fa ta l c ause which pa ralyzed diploma tic a s well asmilitary decisions . I have a lready mentioned the Ministry’s contradictory

.

course regarding the intervention ofTurkish troops. Y et in a pecuniary view alone ; howmuch cheaper to have pa id a few millions to the Sultanfor Turkish regiments !

'

Going there a s the soldiers ofthe Padishah

,the chief of Islam

,no religious antagonism

could have existed between them and the Soudanese .

'

They would have appeared a s the representa tives of thelawful head of their religion

,commissioned to put down

a schisma tic,fa lse prophet ; while, on the contrary

,the

B ritish!

represented what is most hateful to a Mussulman,

a n infidel and a giaour. This a lterna tive had been re

jec ted . There .wa s another even more promising,and to

this day it is an unexpla ined mystery why it wa s aband oued . The grea t empire of Abyssinia is contiguous tothe theatre of war in the Soudan . Its people a re Christians of a very rude and barbarous type. They are ofthe same or a kindred ra ce with the B edouins of thedeserts

,and a re equally indomitable warriors . They had

defeated in 1876 on the pla in of Gura an invading Egyptian army of fifteen thousand regular troops

,splendid ly

armed and equipped,which they a tta cked with the same

reckless bravery a s that displayed by the B edouinsaga inst the B ritish squa res . The Egyptians escaped an

nihila tion only by retrea t into a large fort previouslyconstructed by an American officer (Col . S . H i Lockett) ,from which they repelled severa l furious a ssaults . They


were glad enough later to conclude a pea ce,and be a l

lowed to return to their own The Abyssinians’ most a rdent desire is to obta in an outle t on ‘

the

R ed Sea , from which they have been entirely shut out byEgypt . Early in April Admira l Hewett went on ‘

a mis

sion to King John . It wa s sta ted a t various times tha tthe la tter wa s willing to furnish thirty thousand or moremen for two shillings per head per day , provided he wa s

g iven the port of Ma ssowah and a strip of territory a longthe R ed Sea . It wa s the very best arrangement

'

thatc ould have been made

,and it wa s only a question of

money,for those people are extremely avaricious . Eng

land could have secured King John’s co opera tion for onefifth the cost of her expeditions

,and it would probably

have saved Gordon ; for the Abyssinians, a ccustomed tothe c lima te and the country

,would

”have had but a shortd istance to march from their own territory down the B lueNile and ~ the Raha t

,relieving the garrisons of Ka ssa la

a nd Sennaar,and rea ching Khartoum from the southea st

without difficulty. Why the arrangement wa s not conc luded is not known . Probably B ritish pride revolted a t

the idea of Gordon’s being rescued by an a rmy of barbaria ns . The la st informa tion on the subject wa s a dispatchfrom Admira l Hewett

,received on the i 2th of June .

In this the Adm ira l reported tha t his mission to King John , of Abyssinia ,was

c ompletely successful . A trea ty wa s signed se curing free t ransi t from the Souda nthrough Abyssinia to Massowah . Another trea ty , suppressing the sla ve trade , was

negotia ted .Admira l Hewe t t telegraphed a lso tha t he had rea ched the coa st o f the

R ed Sea ,rea dy to emba rk on h is re turn .

”

7“ A very interesting a ccoun t of the Abyss inia n wa r with Egypt in 1874-

76 is

g iven in Moslem Egypt a nd Christian Abyssin ia .

” New York Atkins Front ,

1880 .By Col . \Vm . M c E . Dye ,

formerly U . S . A . (a t tha t time on the genera ls ta ff of the Egypt ian a rmy) , who wa s wounded in the ba ttle of Gura .

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan.

It is evident that he had a ccomplished nothing of any

va lue,in spite of the a ssertion of complete success .

In the ,meantime

,

-Gordon had every rea son to believehimself abandoned by his own government .

The Egyptian correspondence shows tha t the Government re fused to a llowIndian troops to re lieve Genera l Gordon , on the ground tha t India ha s no dire ctinterest in the Soudan . Among the dispa tches included in the correspondence isone from Ea rl Gra nville to Sir . Eve lyn Ba ring , suggesting tha t British troops bedispa tched to Wa di - Ha lfa to support ' Genera l Gordon . To tha t di‘spa t ch

l

Sir E ve

lyn B a ring replied tha t the milita ry a uthorities depreca ted the proposed movementon a ccount of the clima te. On April 9th ,

Genera l Gordon te legraphed tha t threethousand Turkish in fa ntry a nd one thousa nd ca va lry could a ccomplish the relie f ofKha rtoum

,and crush the Mahdi in four months . Sir Evelyn Ba ring te legra phed

to Ea rl Gra nville tha t i t would be imposs ible to organize a Turkish force in timeto be of a ny use ,

and tha t todispa tch troops of the Sulta n would involve polit ica ldi fficulties . On April 23 , Ea rl Gra nville telegraphed to M r. Egerton a s follows

Genera l Gordon should be immedia te ly instructed to keep us in formed in rega rd to any immedia te or prospective danger a t Kha rtoum , a nd tha t , in order tobe prepa red for such danger , he should a dvise us in rega rd to the force necessa ry tosecure his remova l . We do not propose to supply him with a force for the purpose of making milita ry expeditions

,such be ing be y ond the scope of his commis

s ion and contra ry to the pa cific policy which was the purpose of his m issi on .

Every pretext seems to have been used to refuse a id .

Granville’s dispa tch is absurd on the very fa ce of it.Wha t good could Gordon a ccomplish . by informing himof any immediate or prospective danger a t Khartoum

,

when it would take four months after,

the receipt of histelegraphic dispa tch before any relief could rea ch him ?And what an abuse of words to speak of “

the pacificpolicy which wa s the purpose of his mission , when G raham had just been slaughtering thousands of B edouinson the shores of the R ed Sea !Left to his own resources

,Gordon made the best dispo

sitions in his power. The Mahdi having refused his

overtures and having a tta cked him a t Khartoum,Gordon

sa llied out aga inst him on the l 6th of March,but wa s re


pulsed in a hard fight a t H a lfi yeh , just outside of Khartoum,by the trea chery of two black chiefs whom he hadmade pa sha s

,and who were summarily tried and shot a

few days la ter. Having exhausted the gold he had

brought from Ca iro,he issued bills which the merchants

a ccepted upon his persona l guaranty,a s well a s paper and

lea ther money for circulation,and in this way he procured

funds for sold iers and supplies . H e ra ised an army by

prom1s1ng freedom to slaves who enlisted in his ranks .

H e protected tha t army from the atta cks of a superiorforce by planting torpedoes in front of his lines . H e

converted his sma ll river steamers into gun -boats bypla ting them with iron and building turrets on them .

B ut in spite of a ll his efforts he wa s a lready enmeshedin the fa ta l net which he wa s . doomed never to breakthrough .

B y the end of March the whole country south of B erber wa s in a sta te of revolution

,and

" Gordon had almostda ily fights with the enemy

,and - in the latter ha lf of

April his head-quarte1s a t the Khartoum pa la ce werea ssaulted by the rebels’fi i e f1om the opposite shore . B ythe beginning of M ay the Arabs, c1e ssing the B lue Nile,had established themselves a t B uri

,a mile fi om the ea st

ern corner of the entrenchments . At this spot the - be

siegers suffered terribly from the mines which Genera lGordon had la id down . As early a s the middle of AprilGordon had begun to have recourse to this method ofdisposing of his a ssa ilants . On M ay 7th, nine mines

(a ccording to Mr. Power’s d iary) were exploded during

They were not over sixty or seventy fee t long , and ha d been brought in se c

tions to Berber on camel - ba ck during Baker’s governorship . I travelled down onone of them from above Kha rtoum to Berber in Janua ry , 1876 ,

a nd wa s frequentlygrounded , once ,

among others , a t Shabluka where Sir Cha rles W ilson came to grie f .


an a ttack and one hundred and twenty of the Mahdi’smen were blown to pieces .

In the meantime B erber wa s captured and its garrisonmassacred

,a s well a s a number of its inhabitants

,on the

26 th of M ay . So closely.

wa s Gordon invested tha t itwa s not until the 25th of June that he and his com~

panions had the first news of this additiona l disa sterwhich isola ted them still more from the outer world .

Nevertheless they continued .their defence with renewedvigor. On July 9th Gordon drove the rebels out of

Buri (see plan of Khartoum) , killed numbers of them,

capturing quantities of rifles and ammunition,and driv

ing the enemy out of thirteen zeriba s or stockades,which

they had constructed on the river banks . Mr. Power’sdiary closes a t the end of July

,up to which da te Gordon

had lost seven hundred men . H e continued the defenceso energetically tha t after three months the siege wa sra ised . Descending the river in four steamers

,with

troops and cannon,he bombarded and destroyed B erber in

September,and drove the rebe ls from Shendy and a ll the

other positions tha t they held along the river. But itwa s impossible for his steamers to naviga te beyond B erber. H e tried

,however

,to establish communica tion

with Dongola,and for this purpose he sent his trusty

companion,Colonel O . H . Stewart

,Vice -Consul Power

,

with M r. Herbin the French consul,twelve Greeks and

other refugees,in the lightest steamer tha t he had

,hoping

tha t the Nile being a t full height they might get overthe ca tara cts . By wonderful good luck they pa ssedthrough the

'

fi fth,but near the fourth ca tara ct the steamer

struck on a rock,and sank so suddenly tha t

“

ColonelStewa rt and his pa rty barely escaped to the west bank


the Nile,wa tching in va in for the approa ch of the relief

which never came until itwas too la teWhile he wa s thus continuing his heroic struggle

,let

us see wha t wa s being done for his rescue .

We have a lready seen tha t it wa s not until the 18th ofAugust that the Suakim route wa s finally abandoned

,and

the Nile route adopted,but there wa s still time to a chieve

success,if an energetic efi ort had been made to redeem

t he precious time a lready lost. Unfortuna tely more time

y et wa s wa sted in useless delays . General Wolseley,

the hero of the holiday campa ign of Tel - c l -Kebir,in high

favor in court circles,and procla imed (very erroneously)

by his admirers a s England’s only genera l, wa s just thenreceiving an ovation in London, and he wa s ca lled in toadvise the Ministry. Having ga ined his first laurels bythe use of wha le-boats

“

and Canadian voyageurs in the

R ed -River expedition in 1870,he insisted ' tha t

’

the samemeans were

i

absolutely necessary on the Nile . A

dispatch,da ted War Offi ce

,August 8

,wa s

addressed to Lieutant -Genera l Stephenson,by the M ar

qu1s of Hartington,deta iling the plan adopted for the

expedition up the Nile for the relief of Gordon,which

plan wa s evidently drawn up by Lord Wolseley. It proposed the use of sma ll boats for transporta tion beyondthe second ca tara ct

,

“such a s were employed in the R ed

R iver exped ition .

”

To this Lieutenant-General Stephenson replied by telegraph Sma ll boats proposed not suitable . Can procurelarge amount wa ter transportB eing a pra ctica l soldier

,and gifted with the common

s ense and ability to make use of the means that he foundat hand

,he saw the folly of wa sting inva luable time


wa iting for boa ts to be built in England,while plenty

better suited for the purpose could be had on the spot.But his curt condemnation of Lord Wolseley’s pet idea ,no doubt

,cost the lieutenant -genera l the command of the

Nile expedition,and unf ortunately caused the appoint

ment of the origina tor of the plan for on August 26th,

he received from the.

War Office the following telegram

After anxious cons idera tion , her Ma jesty’s Government ha ve come to the conc lusion tha t i t is unjust to you to a sk you to be responsible for directing an operation which

,a fter full knowledge of plan , you consider to be impra cticable . They

have,therefore ,

de cided to send Lord Wolse ley to ta ke tempora rily the chie f command in 'Egypt . Government highly apprecia te the ma nner in whi ch you havec a rried out the important a nd difficult duties of your command , and ea rnestly hopetha t you may feel yourself able to rema in in Egypt whilst Lord Wolseley is there ,

a nd a ssist h im with your a dvice .

Lieutenant G enera l Stephenson promptly repliedWill willingly rema in here a s you wish .

”Thus it fol

lowed tha t three months more were lost while the boa tswere being built and the voyageurs were being enlistedin Canada

,so that it wa s the 19th of November before

the first d ivision of the expeditionary force wa s ready to

start from Wady Ha lf a,in eight hundred wha le-boats .

Judging from the illustra tions in the L ondon G raphic ,

from drawings made on the spot,it must have been a

very brilliant specta cle,the white -pa inted wha le -boats

,

in double fi le,e a ch covered with an awning

,towed by

steamers,the soldiers sitting comfortably smoking their

pipes with a ll the ease of plea sure tourists . It seemedlike a parade or a review

,and must have looked very

picturesque—m a is oe n’éta it pa s la guerre. No doubt

the expedition appeared much more symmetrical, muchmore plea sing to a martinet’s eye than if it had beentransported in the common rough country boats . I am


not able to sta te wha t wa s the expense in money of thisextra - smartness of appearance

,but I know this : its ulti

mate cost wa s Gordon’s life,and the success of the relief

expedition . How could Wolseley fa il to understand tha t“

no superiority of English boats and Canadian voyageurs

(which wa s by no means proved by the performance)could compensate for the

“

delay it involved ? When it isremembered that the advance of the relieving force

rea ched Khartou m only three days after Gordon’s dea th,

c an there be any doubt tha t the cata strophe would havebeen averted by the saving of two or three weeks

,not to

say months, of the time so unnecessarily wa sted 2And yet.Gordon

’s

-

situation must have been perfectlywell known to Genera l Wolseley. In a letter dated Sept.9th Gordon sa id : We have sufficient money and provisions to la st four months . At the end of tha t time wesha ll be much embarra ssed .

Another letter, published in the officia l “EgyptianB lue -B ook

,addressed to Genera l Lord Wolseley

,da ted

November 4th,says '

I have fi ve steamers a nd nine guns a t Metemmeh awa i t ing your orders . I c an

hold out forty days longer with e ase . After tha t i t will be difficult . The.

loss ofColonel Stewa rt is terrible . I told him to give you a ll the in forma tion poss ible .

H e ha d my journa l from Janua ry 3 to Sep tember IO . The M ahdi is e ight milesfrom Kha rtoum . Senna a r is a l l right . My journa l from September I O to d a te ison boa rd one of the steamers which you will find a t M e temneh . I continue to

have occasiona l fights with the Arabs . I t is rumored tha t a ll the Europeanswith the Mahdi

,including Sla tin B ey a nd the nuns , ha ve be come M ussul

ma ns .

‘ Lupton B ey ha s surrendered . I have sent out scores of mess engersin a ll direct ions during the la s t e ight months . Do not send priva te le tters to me

,

the risk is too grea t . Do not write to me in Cipher . I h a ve none and i t is of nouse . The Mahdi knows every thing . Take the road from Ambukol to M e temneh .

You need not fea r the M ahd i . Both the Greek consul and the Austrian consulare sa fe . The Mahdi ha s c aptured a letter from the king of Aby ssin ia to m e .

Your expedition , a s I understand , is for the relie f of the ga rrison of Kha rtoum ,

which I fa iled to a ccomplish . I decline to admit tha t i t is for the rescue of me

persona lly .

The B ritish Campa ign in the Souda n . 2 I5

It wa s evident from this that Gordon considered it impossible to hold out beyond Jan . 1s t a t the la test

,and tha t

Wolseley wa s aware of it . But even after the start wa smade

,Wolseley’s advance wa s unaccountably slow

,for he

took forty days to reach Korti,400 miles

,with only

men,while more were still below Dongola .

If his excuse wa s the difficulties of navigation,they

could have been avoided by starting when the river wa shigh . H e wa s now (Dec . l 6 th) a t the great bend ofthe Nile

,where it changes its course from south -west

to north,160 miles from Abou-Hamed and . about the

same from M etemneh . H e wa s a t la st within strikingdistance of the enemy and might expect an a tta ck a t any

moment. Stra tegy dicta ted concentration,instead of

which he sen t ofi Genera l Herbert Stewart,on the 30th

,

a cross the B ahinda desert to G akdul wells, 97 miles off,

with men and camels .

'

L eaving the troopsthere

,Stewart returned to Korti . and went ba ck on

the 8th of January with more men and a s manycamels . B y this time more troops having rea ched Korti,Wolseley

,without wa iting to see the result of Stewart’s

movement, sent away Genera l Earle up the Nile towardsAbou-Hamed

,at right angle with Stewart’s direction ,

with men,while he rema ined a t Korti with an

equa l number, entirely beyond supporting distance ofthose two deta chments

i

which were now several days"

march from him.

Meanwhile S tewart left a small force to hold G akdul

wells— which,by the way , are not wells a t a ll

, butnatural rock reservoirs of ra in-water

,much preferable

to wells a s long a s their water holds out. Thence he ad~

vanc ed towards -

another reservoir at Abu-Klea , twenty

The B ritish Campa ign in theSouda n .

three miles from the Nile , but he found the enemy barringthe way,

'

about three thousand strong,in two divisions .

'On Saturday, Jan . 17th, Stewart,'

leaving his baggage ina zeriba

,moved his force of fifteen hundred men in

square formation,with artillery a t the angles . The

B ritish pa ssed'

a round the flank of the enemy who thenwheeled and charged furiously upon the front of thesquare. Recoiling from the terrible fi re which met themthere

,they turned and atta cked the rear of the square

,

where a cavalry and a camel regiment (dismounted) weresta t ioned . This side of the square wa s broken

,

“ owing,it is sa id

,to the unruly conduct of the camels

,which got

powder-burned and became unmanageable .

”The B ritish

ma inta ined a hand- to -hand conflict with admirable steadi

ness,while theother parts of the square and the enfi lad

ing fi re of the a rtillery did terrible execution . It wa s

while ra lly ing and reforming the broken square tha t thega llant Colonel B urnaby

,the hero of twenty ba ttles and

of the “Ride to Khiva,wa s killed . H e had cut down

one B edouin and wa s parrying the sword- thrusts ofanother

,when a third rushed pa st him

,turned around

,

and pierced him in the neck with his spear. The enemywere fina lly driven ba ck

,leaving eight hundred sla in

a round the square .

B y fi ve o’clock the Hussars had possession of the wells

,

‘

where the troops rema ined to rest and procure wa ter untilfour ”o’clock of the afternoon of the 18th . With the

purpose of striking the Nile above M etemneh,Genera l

Stewart turned slightly to the right a fter pa ssing the

wells of Sheba c a t .

Nothing wa s seen of the enemy unt i l sunrise on the l gth ,whe n the troops ar

rived a t a point some fi ve miles d ista nt from the N ile . The Souda nese were then


seen to be in grea t force be twe en our troops and the Nile ,'

and ma inly ga the redabout some in tervening ridges. Genera l Stewa rt , however , a s the troops h a d beenma rching a ll night , de term ined tha t the men should not fight upon empty s tom a chs

,

a nd ca lled a ha lt .The troops were promptly dismounted , and the first ca re of the Genera l wa s to

f orm a zeriba . The camels were unloa ded and a fortifica tion wa s thrown up , composed principa lly of the saddles and baggage . The hospita l wa s pla ced in the c entre , protec ted by Ga rdne r and Ga tling guns . Al l the while the men were constructing the zeriba , a hot fi re wa s kept up by the enemy’s sha rpshooters , who wereconcea led behind bushes and high grass on a ll sides .

“ Their fi re wa s , on the whole ,well directed ,

and ha d most disa strous effe ct ,Genera l Stewa rt himsel f be ing severe ly wound ed in the thigh . Altoge ther twe lvewere k illed and forty wounded here . Mr . Cam e ron , the correspondent of theSta nda rd

, and Mr . St . Leger Herbert , representing the M orn ing Pos t,we re a lso

shot dead . Mr . Burleigh , of th e D a i ly Teleg raph ,wa s slightly wounded . The

command now devolved by seniority upon Sir Cha rles W i lson .

When the zeriba wa s nea rly comple ted , the force wa s formed into a squa re and

the a dva nce wa s sounded a t 2 P. M . The front of the squa re wa s composed of theNa va l Brigade and Grena diers ,

the right flank of the Coldstreams , Scots Gua rds ,

a nd pa rt of the Hea vy Corps , and the le ft flank of the Mounted Infa ntry , whilethe Sus sex Regiment and the rema inder of the Hea vy Corps brought up the rea r .After the British force had a dvanced for about two miles

,the enemy a lso

began to move forwa rd in two la rge bodies in echelon . They firs t directed the i ra tta ck on our right front , towa rd wh ich they cha rged , but our men stood perfectlysteady and delivered a terrific fi re into their midst , mowing them down in heaps .

So telling wa s ea ch volley tha t none of the a ttacking force could ge t within s ixtyya rds of our front line , though they ma de three de spera te cha rges . Our loss herewa s six killed and twenty- three wounded . The guns we re worked admirably byCa pta in Norton of the Roya l Artillery , and did immense exe cutionWhile one body of the enemy wa s thus fruitlessly a tta cking the squa re ,

a nothe rbody

,mostly on horseba ck , made for the zeriba . The force ga rrisoning i t wa s

made up of deta chments of eve ry corps ,under the command of Lord Cha rles

Beresford,R .N. The a tta ck on the zeriba wa s susta ined for two hours , when the

enemy were compelled to re trea t be fore the fierce fi re kept up by the ga rrison fromguns a nd rifles a like . One man wa s killed and three wounded wh ile they werehelping to erect a sma ll redoubt some fi fty yards to the right of the zeriba . Thissma ll work

,when finished , wa s he ld by Lord Cochra ne and forty of the Li fe

Gua rds and Scot Greys ,who by thei r ste a dy fi re did - much to repel the constan t

rushes of the enemy .

The loss of the rebels during the whole d ay must ha ve been quite reckoning both killed and wounded . Among the enemy’s forces were many sla ves ,several of whom ga ve themselves up to the B ritish . They say the M ahdi sent themfrom Kha rtoum .

“ A t sunse t the squa re re a ched the Nile , and then encamped for the n ight .E a rly next morning the squa re m a rched ha ck to the ze riba ,

a nd in the even ing the

whole force returned to the rive r, whe re ,

st rong int renchments were thrown up.

The tota l Brit ish loss , including the loss at Abu - Klea,wa s one hundred and four

killed and two hundred and s ixteen wounded .

On Tuesday “ e moved forwa rd through the v i llages surrounding M etemneh,

and on \Vednesday morning a re connoiss ance in force wa s made of the pla ce i tse lf .I t proved to be tole rably we ll fortified . Some shots we re fired from the Ga rdnerand Ga tling guns

,and the enemy answered occa s iona lly with one gun or with rifle

shots fi red through loopholes in the wa lls . V e ry little wa s,however

,seen of the

de fenders,who appea red ve ry unwilling to show themse lves . A plea sa nt surprise

,

howeve r , wa s in store for the men ,a s four of Gordon ’s s teamers a rrived on the a l s t ,

which a t onc e la nded fi ve hundred men and fi ve guns a s reinforcements .

They-had left Khart oum about one month before

,and

reported tha t Gordon had been fighting hard for twoweeks before they left. No doubt he had sent them forward to ha sten up the reliefwhich he wa s looking for.An evidence of his belief in the hopelessness of his situat ion is the fa ct tha t he sent his diaries and other important papers by these steamers

,in order tha t they a t lea st

might be preserved,and in an a ccompanying letter he

s a id tha t he knew he wa s being betrayed,but tha t he

wa s powerless to prevent it.Oh the 22d and 23d

,Sir Charles Wilson

,on Gordon’s

steamers,bombarded Shendy for two hours with six

guns,destroying the town a lmost completely . Severa l

v illages around M etemneh were a lso burned to the

g round, but a s it turned out it wa s a fata l loss of time,

for had Sir Charles Wilson s ta rted on the 21st a s

.

soon a st he steamers rea ched him

,he might have arrived in time .

It wa s not until the 24th tha t'

he left'

for Khartoum ontwo steamers with part of the Sussex regiment

,Colonel

B oscawen being left in command of the entrenchment a tG uba t with about nine hundred men . Lord Wolseley,before hea ring of Stewart’s victory

,had on Monday

,the

26th,despa tched a strong convoy to G akdul

,followed on

The B ritish Campa ign in‘

the AS'

oa dan.

(a Soudanese promoted by Gordon) had been receivingfrom the Mahd i proposa ls for a capitulation tha t he hadrepea tedly pressed Gordon to a ccept the terms offered

,

which the la tter angrily refused to do tha t on the afternoon preceding the capture

,Farragh had aga in urged a

surrender,probably showing an insubordinate spirit

,and

tha t Gordon,yielding to one of those (impulses of ungov

ernable wra th which were a tra it of his chara cter,struck

Fa rragh and drove him fromhis presence . Tha t night

(26th) , Farragh being in charge of the rampa rts , adm ittedthe enemy within the gates . H e soon reaped the justreward of his trea son . A few days

"

a fter the capture hewa s put to the torture to make him reveal the hidingpla ce of supposed trea sures

,after which he wa s hanged on

the public square a t Omdurman .

For a few days some doubts were entertained a s toGordon’s fa te . The most reliable reports a ssert tha t theMahdi had men in the vicinity of Khartoum

,and

that he introduced a number of his emissaries into thecity. Those emissaries mingled freely with the nativetroops under General Gordon

,and by bribes

,threa ts

,and

appeals to their religious feelings induced them tomutinyf Seven thousand of the garrison deserted to therebels

,leaving Genera l Gordon only fa ithful

soldiers .

-A dispatch of Feb . 17th gives the followinga ccount of his death

,afterwards confirmed by others :

A cava ss of Ibrahim B ey Ruc hd i, who a ccompanied Genera l Gordon fromCa i ro

,ha s come in from Kha rtoum . H e sta tes tha t on '

the morning of the 26th

of Ja nua ry he hea rd a dis turbance ,a nd came out wi th his ma ster to see wha t wa s

the ma tter . They me t Gene ra l Gordon,with about 20 ca va sses i a nd some

notables,coming out of the inner ga te . When the pa rty a rrived a t a n open spa ce

be fore the house the rebels m et them a nd fired,killing Genera l Gordon

,his secre

ta ry , a nd some othe rs,a nd the survivors fl ed . A few sold iers turned out a nd fired


a t one of the ga tes , but there wa s sca rcely any fighting,and Kha rtoum wa s pra c ti

ca lly taken without firing a shot .I

This wa s followed by a second dispatchKOR TI , Feb . i 7th , Midnight .

A messenger a tta ched to the Inte ll igence Depa rtment ha s come in six daysfrom Na sri , a pla ce about one day 's j ourney from Kha rtoum . H e corrobora testhe news of the fa ll of Kha rtoum a nd the dea th of Genera l Gordon . The regula rsoldie rs were ma rched out of Kha rtoum into the Njunnit camp , some of thembe ing killed by the Mahdi’s troops

,who fired on them a s they le ft the '

town . Allthe Turkish—i . e . , Egyptia n sold iers were killed by the rebe ls , who , however , didnot kill the w omen and children . The men hold ing Tuti Island a lso fled . The

Austria n consul wa s killed in his own house ,while M . N i cola , the Greek consul ,

a nd a doctor were taken a live .

’

It is believed tha t about of the Greek,Levan

tine,and Egyptian residents were

'

slaughtered, but thehorrors of the ma ssacre tha t occurred tha t night will neverbe fully known .

Such wa s the tragic fa te of one of the most chiva lrousand noble -hearted soldiers that ever shed lustre not onlyupon his own country

,but upon the human ra ce .

Kha rtoum fell on the 26th of Jan,and Sir Charles

Wilson arrived in sight of the captured city on the morning of the 28th . B efore giving up the attempt to reachit,his steamers susta ined for four hours the fire of thou

sands of riflemen,eight Krupps

,and several ma chine

guns . One man wa s killed and fi ve'

were wounded. onboard the vessels . There wa s no .a lterna tive but to re

turn to Gubat. On the 29th one of the steamers wa s

wrecked and had to be abandoned . On the 31st,a ccord

ing to the report of Lieut. Stua rt-Wortley (R . the

other steamer,on which were Sir Charles Wilson and his

party,wa s wrecked about four miles above the enemy’s.

position,just below the Shabluka catara ct . The steamer,

while dropp'

ng down stern foremost nearly clear of theca tara ct

,struck hard

,and the rock m ade a large hole

The B ritish Campa ign i n the Souda n .

in the bow. She sank to the level of the deck. SirCharles bivouacked on an island with his party

,to

which were added some 250 fugitives from Khartoum,

whom he picked up along the Nile. H is intention wa s

to rema in there until relieved. Lieut. Stuart-Wortley,with four E nglishmen and eight na tives, left a t dusk in arow-boa t and floa ted safely by the enemy’s works througha few volleys of musketry . They arrived a t Guba t

‘

a t 3

o’clock on the morning of the l st . Immedia tely on re

c eiving the news,Lord Charles B eresford

,R . N.

,com

manding the Nava l B rigade,with the Sofia

,one of the

steamers left a t Gubat,manned by B ritish seamen of the

Nava l B rigade,started up the river to relieve Sir Charles

Wilson and his companions . The steamer moved upslowly aga inst the stream

,and wa s not able to get up

there before Tuesday (3d) . It wa s fired a t incessantlyby the enemy’s riflemen

,who were estima ted to be

s trong,and a ba ttery of three Krupp guns

,a t a point

about forty miles above M etemneh . The steamer wa s

a lmost pa st the position when a round shot went throughthe boiler

,but the vessel went on Some 200 yards with

the remaining steam,thus getting away 500 yards from

the enemy, whose two guns were in embra sures pointing

down the stream. The steamer then anchored,and the

Gardner and the heavy guns were shifted so a s to fi restra ight to the front . The enemy were then unable t oshow above the parapet, and dared not move their gunto the only embra sure pointing up stream

,but fired

wildly from the others . Only the guns’muzzles werevisible

,and the deta chments in charge were unable to

point their pieces towards the steamer,because they must

have exposed themselves . The enemy had neglected to

The B r itish C ampa ign in the Soudan .

a ssista nce . H is steamers will now exercise a potent e ffe ct upon the fortunes of thecampa ign , since they not only increa se enormously the s triking power of the lit tleforce encamped a t Guba t , but will a lso enable a helping hand to be he ld out toGenera l Ea rle a s soon as he rea ches the navigable portion of the river . In fa ct

,

thanks to them a nd the h eroic exertions of Sir H erbert Stewa rt , Lord Wolseley nowha s hold of Kha rtoum itse lf , and the mili ta ry obje ct of the expedition is pra ctica llya tta ined . The mora l e ffe ct of these victories , a nd of the commanding posi tion theysecure

,cannot but be enormous

,and a ny furthe r resista nce tha t may be offe red by

the Mahdi must be of a compa ra tively broken and ine ffectua l kind . It now rema i ns.

to make a wise use of the magnificent results a tta ined by the courage of our troops ,and to see . tha t policy sha ll in some degre e rise to the leve l a tta ined by our a rms .

Some permanent a rrangement must be in a d e for the ma in tenance of the a dvan

tages'

so dea rly bought , and for the enduring se ttlement of a district consecra ted bythe blood of brave m en

,and rendered foreve r memorable by the extra ordina ry

a chievements of Genera l Gordon .

Two days later this very na tura l exulta tion wa s .

changed into mourning and ind ignation . A few extra ctsfrom the

“London press will show better than any wordsof mine the “

sta te of public sentiment a t the time .

The Times,in its editoria l d iscussion of the la st news

from Egypt,says

No words of ours a re a dequa te to express the mingled feelings of d ismay , consterna tion ,

and indignant disgust which ha ve been unive rsa lly evoked by this news .

The present s itua tion is the lamentable result of a long course of disrega rd of theelementa ry ma xims of sta tesmanship . The coun try is obliged to confess tha t eve rything ha s been done tha t could be done to add to the risks of de fea t . Advice hasbeen spurned , time wa sted , and opportunity lost . The splendid va lor of our soldiers

,which offered the la st chance for re trieving the mistakes of policy , wa s ha ndi

capped by the choice of a line of ma rch which wa s a t the same t ime long a nd d ifficult and without mea ns of communica tion a nd without a ba se of supplies . By theloss of Kha rtoum ,

wh ich wa s his objective po int . Lord Wolse ley 's whole expeditionis in the a ir . Concentra tion of his forces is the first necessity which confronts LordWolseley . But whe re sha ll he concentra te ? The only e ffective ba se is Sua kim ,

a nd to make this a va i la ble ,Osma n Digma mus t be va nquished , a nd the road to

Berbe r’

opened . Genera l Gordon must be sa ved or a venged . The honor of thecountry must be vind i ca ted a t wha tever cost . ”

In another pla ce the Times saysThe fa ll of tha t soli ta ry figure (Gordon) , holding a loft the flag of Engla nd in the

fa ce of hordes of the sons of Islam ,will reverbera te through every ba zaa r of Cairo

a nd Ca lcutta . The result w ill be a long a nd delibera te abandonment of respe ct forthe Bri tish Gove rnment and its officia ls hy

'

the followe rs of Islam . But England


W ill save Genera l Gordon , i f a l ive and i f sla in,will a venge his dea th . Woe to h is

murderers , i f he ha s been killed’l The Sta nda rd says in its leading article :

rge t Genera l Gordon'

s la st a c t of hero ism. Though knowing tha tin his camp , he stood by the town a nd people committed to hishis only means of escape to help the British expedition on its wa y

to his relie f . H e ha s won undy ing fame for his coun try if only by this a c t . The

g rievous blow which England ha s suffered must be me t with ca lm rea son , and notwith panic pa ssion . All pa rty spiri t must be dropped , a nd a resolution taken bythe whole country tha t the pa th of precedence a nd honor poin ts to a recapture ofKha rtoum . I f we shi'rk this duty , the lives of thousands of British soldiers willhave to be risked here a fte r in trying to re trieve the blunde r. ”

The Ill a/"h ingPost says :The mouse - tra p pol icy of the Mahdi appe a rs to have ha d terrible success . I t

seems tha t the Mahdi’s ca lcula tion wa s to lure the British a rmy into a perilous posit ion . The pressing questi on of the moment is , Ca n Lord Wolseley rescue Genera lStewa rt’s column

On the 6th of Feb .

,the Times sa id :

The news of the fa ll ofKha rtoum is the worst tha t ha s rea ched this country formany yea rs , and the gra vity of thesi tua tion so abruptly revea led c an ne i the r be conc ea led nor pa llia ted . Thought serves only to bring home the full meaning of thea nnouncement . It ma tters li ttle whe ther the event took pla ce two days or twomonths be fore the a rriva l of Sir C . Wi lson the goa l of the exped i tion is in the fullpossession of the enemy :

‘

the present opera tions a re a t an e nd . A t la s t the thinic e over which the country ha s been led for so many weeks ha s broken up , a ndwe are fa ce to fa ce with da ngers which i t is use less to a ttempt to hide . Tha t themere announcement of the fa ll of Kha rtoum should ha ve brought such a comple techange over the whole mili ta ry situa tion is a sufficient proof of the complete un

soundness of our mili ta ry policy ,’—a policy depend ing on cha nce for its fulfilment ,ina dequa te a nd contra ry to the great principles of mili ta ry science ,

unable to bea rthe stress of the sma llest fa i lure . The expedition ha s toiled for months up theNile ; i t ha s ma de a long desert journey ; i t ha s suffered a nd fought . But thepresent emergency finds i t still not in possession of Berber , the most importa nts tra tegic point of a ll , and the one which , a s wa s pointed out long ago , shouldhavebeen the firs t objective . I f we were now a t Berbe r

,instea d of a t Guba t ,

the outlook would be a ltoge ther diff erent . ! Berber could be rea ched in six

we eks by fresh troops j How a re we to ge t to Guba t . to Debbeh , or somepoint in rear ? There is surely nothing to be ga ined by min imizing the gravi ty

Not a t a ll unless the roa d to Suakim were open .

j Where from and how ? Still clinging to the delus ion of the Suakim - Be rbe rroute .

The B ritish Campa ign inthe Sendan .

of the si tua tion the wisest course will be to a ccept frankly the possibili tieswith which we a re con fronted

,and to fa ce the dange r a t on ce . A t Abu Klea there

is a force perhaps two hundred and fi fty strong , with many wounded . At Guba tthere a re about nine hundred men ,

with more wounded . Abu Klea and Guba thave been made strong enough to withstand a ny directne i ther the provisions nor the ammunition supply c an be vercamels , i t is true ,

and there is an ample supply of wa ter .by a t least two thousand Ara bs , whom we canno t now a fford to dislodge ,

and whoseproximity consti tutes a source of danger under certa in circumstances Two steamers rema in a t Metemn

'

eh a ppa rently , and have doubtless been se cured : but the ircrews may be trea cherous , since the stranding of Sir C . Wilson’s steamers may nothave been a ccidenta l . One infant ry regiment is approa ching Abu Klea ,

ma rchingslowly a nd in de ta chments a cross the desert . Another was intended to follow . The

wells a re he ld by a force li ttle exceeding a ba tta lion . Genera l Ea rle is somewherenea r B irteh with four regiments . The dispersion of force which ha s thus beena rrived a t is extreme , and two courses only presen t themselves to Lord Wolse ley .

H e m ay retire his whole force on both lines of a dvance , . and concentra te a t Deb

beh,the stra tegica l importance of which point , in view of a possible a dvance of the

Arabs , ha s been previously noticed . No posi t ion higher up the Nile would beequa lly

'

secure . Or he may rein force Guba t , and pressing Gene ra l Ea rle'

s columnforwa rd , make the a ttempt to se ize Berber a t any sa crifice . The river na viga tionbe fore the flotilla is , hon ever , very diflicult , and weeks rrfust elapse be fore Genera lEa rle c an count on rea ching Berber ; while , with only two steamers a va ilable

,to

make the a ttempt from Guba t appea rs ba rely possible . \Ve may expe ct , there fore ,

tha t Lord Wolseley will fa ll ba ck,i f i t is ye t possible to do so, and mea sures mus t

be taken without a moment’s delay to open the Suakim - Berber route a t any sa crifice.

The option no longe r exists the s tep must be taken i f the milita ry si tua tion in'

the

Soudan is to be saved . Berber must be taken wha tever i t may cos t . The re is noa lterna tive policy of retirement the honor of the country must be ma inta ined ,even if forty thousa nd men a re required . We have been brought fa ce to fa ce witha grave emergency , and we must mee t i t l ike men .

”

This language wa s a reflex of the popular feeling,and

indicated a na tura l,a lthough unrea sonable

,desire for

vengeance . The government announced that Genera lWolseley would be ordered to capture B erber and Khartoum a t any cost, and to inflict the direst punishmentupon the rebels . Punishment for what

,if those

,

peoplewere justifiable in fighting for their freedom ? Gordonhad fa llen by a surprise in a night a ttack

,but this wa s a

perfectly legitimate incident of war. The government’s

The B ritish Campa ign in.

the Soudan .

country where the enemy would certa inly attack the twomoving columns separa tely

,and

'

where no supplies couldbe found

,except what the troops carried with them .

~

A more absolute d isrega rd of strategy cannot be conc eived .

When Wolseley sent Genera l Herbert Stewart a crossthe desert to M etemneh

,it must have been with the ex

pec ta tion of opening communica tion with Gordon . The

steamers would then have transported Stewart’s forceto Khartoum

,and it is to be supposed that Wolseley

,

leaving a reserve a t Korti and strongly occupying thedesert route by establishing fortified pests a t the wells ofHambok

,Abu -Ha lfa

,G akdul

,and Abu-Klea

,would him

self have moved on to Khartoum . Having then command of the river

,he could have sent a force by steamers

to occupy B erber within three days after reaching Khartoum . This shows still more manifestly the absurdity ofhis sending Earle to B erber by the river some three hundred miles

,which it would take him over thirty days to

travel . The rea son a lleged by Wolseley wa s to coverhis flank from a possible a ttack from B erber

,but he

Would have been infinitely sa fer from a flank or anyothermovement

,if he had kept Earle with him . Now

,how

ever,a ll his ca lcula tions were a t fault . Khartoum

,which

he had expected to occupy a s his new ba se,had fa llen

Stewart’s column wa s en Z’aw“

,and if Earle had rea ched

B erber,he would have been isolated there

,and in grea ter

danger than before . The first step impera tively de

manded wa s the concentra tion of the force so. ra shlysca ttered . The moment Wolseley wa s certa in of the fa llof Khartoum

,he should have reca lled Earle’s column.

We will see tha t it wa s not until F eb . l ath tha t Sir


R edvers Buller fell ba ck to Abu-Klea,and the 25th when

Earle’s column wa s ordered to concentra te upon Korti .

In the mea ntime advices from Guba t , da ted Februa ry I st , ga ve gloomy s ta tements about the condit ion of Genera l Stewa rt’s li ttle a rmy there . The men ha d

been pla ced on three - qua rter ra tions These , however , ha d been once supplem ented with a dole of beans and some fresh mea t .On the 7th ,

dispa tches from Korti indica ted a very serious sta te of a ff a irs a t

the British pos ition nea r M e temneh . Lord Wolse ley telegraphed to the War

Office tha t a courier who had j ust a rrived from Guba t reported Colone l Boscawen ,the commander a t tha t pla ce

,seriously ill , and tha t the Mahdi ’s forces wereprepa r

ing to a tta ck the Bri tish camp . The Arabs had severa l hea vy guns , which werebe ing gradua lly moved up so a s to bea r on the British camp , and other fi eld - pie ceswere be ing manoeuvred for the same purpose .

The m a in ea rthworks erected for the prote ction of the camp from the rive rfront ha d be en grea tly strengthened

,and i t wa s ca lcula ted tha t they would be com

ple ted tha t night .The rema inder of the roya l a rtillery , with ten guns , including one Ga rdner

,

ha d a rrived . A convoy had been sent ba ck to G akdul wells for more stores , andhad taken forty of the wounded a long .

The force a t Guba t on the 9th consisted of twenty - six hundred men,of whom

twenty - three hundred were e ffective , and severa l guns .

‘But inte lligence wasrece ived tha t the M ahdi’s forces were a dva ncing from Kha rtoum to a tta ck the

camp with ove rwhelming numbers .

By this time Sir Redvers Buller , ha ving a rrived a t Guba t and taken the c om

mand , decided to eva cua te the rivers ide fort and‘ retire to Abu Klea , which he con

sidered a better stra tegica l posi tion . Lord Cha rles Beresford , who ha d beenpa trolling the r iver w ith his two steamers , so a s to prevent , a s fa r a s possible , theenemy from ere cting fortifica tions a nd securing supplies , aba ndoned the steame rs

,

rende ring them useless to the Mahdi by removing the essentia l portions of thema chinery . (All of them were now destroyed except the three captured by

‘

the

Mahdi a t Kha rtoum , and the comma nd of the river wa s now in his hands) . Onthe 14th of Februa ry the whole of the troops ma rched out , ha lted for the night inthe desert

,and rea ched Abu Klea the following d ay . This re trea t wa s probably

due to a skirmish on the 13th inst . , from which it wa s evident tha t the M ahdi wa s

sending powerful re inforcements to M e temneh . A convoy of wounded had leftfor G akdul under~Colonel Ta lbot , and ,

when about eight miles on the roa d , wa sa tta cked by a large force of the enemy—pa rt com ing from M etemneh and pa rtfrom Kha rtoum . A sha rp little sk irmish ensued

,but on the appea ra nce of a d e

ta chment of light camelry coming from Abu Klea ,the enemy disappea red . The

convoy met with no further opposition , and “ rea ched G akdul on Tuesday the 17th .

”

The ga llant Herbert Stewart had . died of his woundthe d ay before, and wa s buried at G akdul wells . A few


days later Sir Redvers Buller retreated to Korti,his

troops suffering greatly from hunger,hea t

,and thirst

,and

severely hara ssed by the enemy. So diflicult wa s his

retrea t,tha t the English press termed it a mira culous

escape .

L et us now look at the opera tions of Earle’s column.

This genera l had left Korti on the 5th of Janua ry onhisex - centric movement toward s Abou -Hamed. H isprogresswa s very slow

,his boa ts finding grea t difficulty in pa ssing

over the sha llows and rapids . H e occupied nearly fifteendays in rea ching H omdab a t the fourth ca ta ra ct

,about

ninety miles above Korti . The toils and obsta cles he hadto contend with show how utterly impossible it wouldhave been for Wolseley to give him any support in caseof need . While a t the fourth ca tara ct

,he

,had a pra c ti

c al demonstration of the folly of wa sting the season ofhigh Nile

,for the hapless Col . Stewart’s steamer wrecked

there la st September,by striking a rock two feet below

the surfa ce,wa s now to

‘

be seen high and dry sixteen feetabove wa ter. It wa s not until . the 24th of January thathe left H omd ab . I quoteWolseley

’s dispatch of tha t date

,

which shows how greatly he underra ted the enemy’stenacity of resistance .

Genera l Ea rle’s column , thoroughly provi s ioned and equipped , compris inga rtillery , ca va lry , a nd camel corps , sta rted - to - d ay f rom H omdab for Berber . The

ma rch is to be made by way of Abou - Hamed . The enemy , which includ es the eu

tire fighting force of the M ona ss ir tribe , under the command_

of Wadgamr, whoordered the murder of Colone l Stewa rt , and the fighting men of other tribe s underMoussa , a re a ssembled in wa r order a t B i rti . This is forty miles above H omd ab ,

the s tarting- point of to- day 's exped it ion .

“ Genera l Wolse ley says tha t both Wa dgamr and Moussa boa st tha t they are

de termined to give ba ttle . I f so ,an engagemen t be tween these chie fs and G en

era l Ea rle by Monday would seem inevitable . Gene ra l Wolseley sta tes , howeve r ,tha t the soldiers who go with Genera l Eade a re a ll in the bes t of hea lth and

spirits . They rega rd Genera l Stewa rt’s ba ttle of last Sa turday a s a glorious vic


The Bla ck Wa tch a dva nced over rocks and broken ground upon the koppies ,and a fter having by the i r fi re , in the coolest ma nner , driven off a rush o f the enemy ,stormed the pos ition under a hea vy fi re . Genera l Ea rle wa s among the foremostin the a tta ck

,and

,to the deep sorrow of every officer and man in the force ,

wa s

killed on the summit of the koppie . The Sta ffords a tta cked the high ridge overthe most difficult ground i t wa s possible for troops to a dva nce upon

,and ca rried

the position . In this a tta ck the ir ga llant commanding officer , Lieutena nt - ColonelEyre

,wa s killed . Meanwhile

,the squadron of the

_

19th Hussa rs , under Colone lB utler

, swept round to the rea r , and\

c aptured the enemy’s camp . Our suc cess isc omple te ,

and the whole posi tion is in our ha nds . I t is diffi cult to estima te the

enemy’s loss ,but their dea d are lying thick among the rocks and inthe open ,

where,when they found themselves surrounded

,they tried to rush through our

troops . Sca rcely any c an have escaped .

Our a dvance by river will be continued to - morrow a t daylight , and I sha ll end eavor to ca rry out yorir instructions to Gene ra l Ea rle , wi th which I am a cqua inted .

”

A dispa tch from Kirbekan says

A visi t to the scene of Tuesday’s ba ttle shows tha t the enemy’s pos ition wa sst rongly fortified and ca re fully protected by screens of stones and rocks . The

South Sta fford Regiment wa s only able to capture the high ridge by climbing onthe ir hands and fee t . The ridge is about four hundred feet high .

”

LONDON,F eb . I I

,I 885.

—The following a re a dditiona l pa rt icula rs of Genera lE a rle ’

s ba ttle on Tuesday : After the Bri tish forces had succeeded in. completelys urrounding the enemy’s posi tion on Tuesday morning , Genera l Ea rle commanded'

the B la ck Wa tch regiment to ca rry the enemy’s works a t the point of the ba yonet .The regiment responded ga llantly to his command . The pipers struck up , andwith inspiring cheers the men moved forwa rd with a stea d iness and va lor which thee nemy were unable to withs tand , and which ca lled forth express ions of a dmira tionf rom the lips of Genera l E a rle . From loopholes in the enemy’s works rifle puff sshot out c ontinuously , but the B la ck Wa tch kept bra vely a dva ncing . They sca ledthe difficult rocks which lay in the ir pa th , and drove the rebels from the ir sheltera t the point of the bayone t . U nhappily Genera l Ea rle fe ll a t this point a s he wa sga llantly lea ding his troops to victory.

!

When ha rdly a nything else is to be obta ined but dry officia l a ccounts , i t is somewha t “ refreshing to find a a scrap of individua l n a rra tive . The following is takenfrom a le tter of a priva te soldier to his mother—published in the Nineteen th Cen tury ,

June,1885. I t illustra tes the di fference be tween ofi c ia l a nd a c tua l h istory .

I rea d with some interest the a ccount of our little , though importan t , ba ttle ofKerbeka . I see a lso tha t , a s usua l , through a l l our three campa igns , the poorpublic - forgotten l gth Hussa rs ha s no mention , excepting tha t it captured theenemy’s camp before the ir posi tion wa s taken , with twenty banners , of whichtwenty I am the possessor of one . The a ccount of Genera l Ea rle ’

s dea th is somewha t exaggera ted . The rea l thing is this . After the whole of

'

the pos ition wa staken

,Ea rle went up the rocks to in spect a sma ll but (mud) in which some rebels


Mea ntime the ca va lry pushed beyond this scen e of.

confl ict and captured the

enemy’s camp , three miles to the rea r of thei r in trenched posi tion . This manoeuvreWa s a ccomplished be fore the B la ck Wa tch ha d succeeded in ca rrying the ma inposition .

While the ma in a tta ck was being delivered,two compan ies of the South Sta t

fordshire regiment were directed to se ize a high rocky bill which the Arab rifl emen

were stoutly de fending . The Bri tish spra ng boldly to the cha rge,but the enemy

clung despera tely to the ir position a nd disputed the ground inch by inch . But them en of Sta ffordshire were not to be denied , a nd they fina lly drove the enemy fromthe bill . This brought the ba ttle of El Kirbekan to a close . From first to la s t i twa s ga lla ntly contested .

The enemy cons isted of Arabs of the M ona ssir a nd Roba ta t tribes . With themwere numbers of dervishes from Berber . It is imposs ible to j udge of the numberof the enemy

,owing to the ir extended pos ition and the rocky na ture of the ground .

The corpses of the Arabs who were sla in lie in heaps upon the ridges from whichthey were driven by the British cha rge . The leader of the foe ,

who wa S ' from

Berber , and severa l em irs were among the killed The number of fugi tives whoesca ped from the fie ld of ba ttle wa s very small .

On Wednesday the cava lry , ha lf cf the Cornwa ll regiment

,a nd the Egyptian .camel corps advanced three miles

and occupied a strong position pending the arriva l of therema inder of the column .

we re suspected to be secre ted . H e wa s wa rned not to do so,but he poked

his head in a t the hole used for a window,put i t out aga in

,and beckoned to some

one below . Aga in he put his hea d in a t th e fa ta l window,and a s he withdrew it

and locked a round aga in,the muzzle of a rifle Wa s pla ced close to the ba ck of the

Gene ra l’s head , a nd the vagabond ins ide blew his bra ins out , '

the cha rge coming outof the front of his helme t the fellow then threw the rifle a t h im . The m a n i t a s

brought out of th e house by M a j or Slade ,of the Intelligence Depa rtmen t, a nd '

wa s

instantly cut into a hund red pieces . There wa s another house found with a horsea nd camel , a nd ins ide were twenty - s ix men a nd the ir store of ammunition , and thewhole lot we re burn t a live in the house

,a nd blown to a toms by the continuous

plod ing ammun i tion the horse a nd camel were a lso burnt to a cinde r ; so tha trea lly , you See , the Genera l m et w ith h is dea th through ina dvertence . H e wa s .

a

bra ve.

m an,and deserves a l l cred it . When our column ma rched out on tha t

eventful Pa ncake D ay ,we Hussa rs scouted away in front of a ll next came the

poor Gene ra l lea ding the infantry , amongs t whom was Colone l Eyre ,. of the

Sta ffordshire Regiment,notable in tha t he rose from the ra nks ; a nd when the

Genera l ga ve the order to cha rge the enemy , Eyre wa s the fi rs t up the hi ll , andturn ing round he shouted

,Come on

,you men of Sta ffordshire ; I ’

ll take thispoint or d ie in the a ttemp t ’ upon wh ich the men

‘ rushed up the hill and took itga lla ntly

,and bayoneted every Ara b in it ; but the bra ve old Colonel wa s shot

down . “7. H . SAU NDE R S, G T roop , Ieth Hussa rs .

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudam.

It would appear that Genera l Wolseley had not yetopened his eyes to the impossibility of continuing the ,

campa ign,for on the 13th of February he telegraphed the

Khedive tha t he believes “there will be nomore fightinga long the Nile until General B rackenbury rea ches B erber

with the la te General Earle’s force .

”

If he had ever rea ched B erber he would have foundhimself out of range of a ll help, surrounded on a ll sides

,

and with no other a lterna tives but to die in battle or byfamine . It is absolutely inconceivable tha t Wolseleycould have thought for a moment of letting him advancefarther when he knew tha t Sir Redvers Buller wa s

preparing to retrea t,and a ll the steamers were lost.

Tha t“ he wa s so slow in coming to a just estima te . of theha za rdous position of his two deta ched columns speaksill for his genera lship . His only excuse is

,

perhapsthe wild d ispatches from London bidding him captureB erber a t any cost , and a t the same time g ivmg himc a rte bla nche a s to future opera tions . In the meantime ,B ra ckenbury

,having advanced but

'

a short d istance above.

Kirbekan under cont inua lly increa sing diffi culties,crossed

h is entire force to the ea st bank of the Nile on the 25th

of February,and had hardly done so when he received

orders to fa ll back a t once upon Korti,where the entire

a rmy wa s fina lly‘

re - concentrated on the 9th of March.

B ut 'Wolseley’s position wa s .still one of the grea testperil

,according to a ll the rules of probability . Judging

from the ability and the wonderful energy the Mahdihad displayed before

,it wa s to be supposed tha t after

the capture of Khartoum he would hurl his entire forceaga inst the B ritish

,and tha t t he B edouin tribes occupy

ing the desert s for fi ve hundred miles in thei r rea r


hammed himself to slay the fa lse Mahdi. The magnifi

cent success which should have pla ced Mohammed Achmet on the highest pinna cle of power wa s

,in fa ct

,the

beginning of his decadence . After being killed some tenor twelve times by the journa ls

,he fi na lly died of sma ll

pox in July,leaving his prophet’s mantle to another

Mahdi,who wa s soon after a ssa ssina ted by his own

"

follovvers .

To these peculia rly Orienta l circumstances Wolseley,

the lucky,

” owed his escape from the trap into whichhe had ventured . On the 23d of March he ordered theeva cua tion of Korti

,a lleging with much truth the fata l

effects of the clima te . Typhoid fever,dysentery

,and sun

strokes were increa sing among the troops,even before the

advent of the dreaded Khamseen . The army fell ba ckto Dongola

'

— thence .to t he second ca tara ct,where Sir

Redvers Buller wa s left with two brigades ; the restwent ba ck to Lower Egypt

,while Lord Wolseley himself

returned to England in M ay , to be loaded with rewardsand honors for having made one of the most egregiousfa ilures on record

,for it wa s not due to any defeats in

ba ttle,but solely to va cilla tion and delay.

The last'

a c t in the drama is,

G en . Graham’s second

campa ign a t Suakim . Why it should ever have beenundertaken nearly two months after Gordon’s death and

when Wolseley’s force wa s a lready in full retrea t,it is diffi

cult to expla in . But . wha t could be expected from a

government that had never known its own purpose for amonth ahead ? It had refused a id . in the Soud an whenit wa s ea sy and opportune

,and afterwards sent an army

when it wa s too la te ; it had procla imed pea ce a t Kha rtoum

,and a t the same time slaughtered B edouins

The B ritish Campa ign in the Son ata/n.

a t Suakim to prove its peaceful intentions ; it had invitedTurkish intervention and then forbidden it even at the

cannon’s'

mouth it had sought Abyssinia’s help and a lliance and refused to pay the pri ce she a sked

,though not

one tenth of wha t wa s afterwards spent in fa ilure ; andnow

,when really the wa r had no longer -

a ra ison d’étn’

e,

a fresh campa ign was inaugura ted for no other purposethan vengeance . To restore England’s prestige and

avenge Gordon’s death,Khartoum must be captured and

“the Mahdi must be sma shed ! ” And to do this

,the

Suakim-B erber route wa s once more selected,without any

considera tion of last year’s experience .

My opinion might be considered by some a s tingedwi th American prejudice

,but the B ritish journa ls abound

with much more severe denuncia tions . Here is the judgment of Sir A . H . Layard

,formerly

.Minister to Constantinople , and. of world-wide celebrity

,from his letter to the

Times,da ted Feb . 14th .

I t is sca rcely ne cessa ry for me to re fer to wha t I consider the unnecessa ry , andconsequently wicked , bomba rdment of Alexa ndria , and the short but bloody c am

pa ign on the N i le the shocking and useless sla ughter of the Arabs nea r Suakim ,

with whom we had no ca use of qua rre l : and the hope less mission of the heroicGordon

,and his desert ion and dea th . These events

,and the most culpable va cil

la tion and delays on the pa rt of the government , have led to the expedition toKhartoum in which we a re now engaged

,which ha s a lready cos t us the lives of

many bra ve men,and will cost us the lives of many more , whom England , in these

critica l times , c an ill Spa re .

Why are we going to Kha rtoum ? No one , it seems , c an answer the question .

And yet the soil of the Souda n is reeking with the blood of our soldiers and withtha t of the wretched Arabs , whom we a re plea sed to ca ll rebels .

’ Why ‘ rebels ’

?

They are not our subjects , and ha ve done us no wrong . Gordon , be trayed by hisown government

,ha s fa llen in a wa r brought on by ourse lves while holding a

fortified pla ce to which we had no right . Hitherto Engla nd ha s not been wont toa venge the dea th of her heroes by the wholesa le ma ssa cre of bra ve men .

I ha ve only gla nced a t a few of the blunders—and worse tha n blunders—commit ted by the government . But i t is use less to re cur to the pa st . Wha t is to bedone in the future ? We must now of necessity , and a t any sa crifice , take Kha r

The B 7’it7:8! t Campa ign in theSoudan .

t oum , not to a venge the dea th of Gordon , but to restore our prestige and credit,which the inca pa city of the Ministry ha s so seriously compromised . To retrea t wouldbe to make Eastern ra ces be lieve tha t we ha d been de fea ted and driven b a ck bythe undis ciplined hordes of the Mahdi—a be lie f tha t might be productive to us o fthe mos t serious consequences . We cannot re ta in Khartoum permanently ; wecannot a llow any European Power to possess i t . Nor c an we aba ndon it to thewild tribes of the Souda n . To do so would be to expose those who have be friended '

us to ma ssa cre,to enda nger Egypt proper, to re - open the slave trade on a va s t

sca le , and to destroy our commerce in those regions . It a ppea rs to me,the refore ,

tha t we ha ve only one course to pursue—to a l low the Sultan , who is the legitima teowner

.

of the Soudan , to occupy i t . We cannot consistently with our reputa ti ona nd dignity a sk his a id to take Kha rtoum but when we have established ourse lvesthere ,

a nd made the so- ca lled rebels fee l our power , surely there would be noloss of e ither i f we h anded over the country to those who ha ve a right to it .

_

Itwould , inde ed , be we ll worth our while to a ssist the Sultan to occupy i t by helpinghim with our t ra nsports and by forwa rding his troops inland . I t would , in thee nd be a cons iderable saving of blood and money we re we to do so .

But,i t will be obje cted

,Turkish rule is bad and c orrupt f At any ra te , i t

would be be tter tha n the a na rchy which would preva i l in the Souda n a fter we hada bandoned it for there a re no n a tive elements out of which a strong and stablegovernment could be formed . we could take mea sures to restra in any abuse ofpowe r on the pa rt of the Turkish a uthorities—by keeping , for

'

insta n c e ,a t their

s ide a capa ble and ene rgetic man in some such capa city a s our Commissioner . Inthe hands of the Mahdi , or of any one likely to succeed him , Kha rtoum woulda ga in become a centre of the slave - trade . With Turkey we could combine for itscomplete suppression .

Sir Henry L ayard’s plan

,a s marked out in this letter,

might be liable to objection ; but it had a t lea st the merit,of a definite object in view.

B etween the l 0th and 15th of March,G en . Graham’

s

force of about of the elite of the B ritish army,com

prising,among other regiments

,the Coldstream and

G renadier Guards,the Roya l A rtillery

,the 5th and 17th

(Irish) Lancers, la nded a t Suakim“

and repea ted the performanc e of the preceding year with much grea ter lossa nd less success . The movements were so similar tha t itbecomes tedious to describe them in deta il. The firsts tep wa s a lways to establish zeriba s and wa ter-depots before moving a few miles from Suakim ; then having a


The damage done to transport ma teria ls yes terday is immense . The gua rdsand a rtillery were sent to reinforce the troops who were a tta cked . The wholeBritish force rema ined in the field during the night .

The camels and mules were hamstrung by the Arabs . Scores of campfollowers were cut up . Arabs sca ttered about in the whole vicini ty interceptingna tive fugitives . The a ppea ra nce and yells of the Arabs were so sudden tha t thewhole a ssemblage of tra nsport a 1iima ls,

"mix ed with na tives

,became pa nic - stricken

and surged on the zeriba,making resista nce hope less . The scene wa s ind esc rib

able . Arabs glide 'd and crept in a ll directions among the a nim a ls . The Ha dendowa s swa rmed from the bush like magic and a tta cked the zeriba fiercely on a ll

s ides . The Soudanese coolies were mistaken for enemies . a nd many were killedby

- friends .

The enemy bega n an a tta ck a t 3 o’clock this morning . They were repulsed ,and the ground was clea red byLONDON

,Ma rch 23d .

—G en . Graham telegraphs from the a dva nced zeribatha t the British posi t ion there is s trong and secure aga inst any numbe r of theenemy . H e regre ts the serious British losses in - yesterda y’s fight

,but exonera tes

G en M cNeil from blame , believing he did the best tha t could be done under thecircumstances . G en . Graham praises the ga lla ntry of a ll the troops . H e says the

cava lrywould ha ve given the a la rm had not the rugged na ture of the ground prevented the ir see ing more tha n a short distance . Though the rebels met with a

tempora ry success , they lea rned a severe lesson . The corpses of ove r Arabsha ve be en counted on the field of yesterday’s ba ttle

,in cluding the bodies of ma ny

noted chiefs .

”

LONDON,Ma rch 24th .

—The Standa rd” : Suakim dispa tch says the Britishkilled in the engagement of Sunday were seven officers a nd sixty - three m en .

Many bodies of boys and women we re found on the ba ttle - fi e ld .

In this fight the tota l loss on the B ritish side,including

friendly Arabs,wa s grea ter than ever before

,being 580

killed and wounded and 1,000 camels .

This engagement wa s followed by the inevitable returnto Suakim . Though the B ritish advanced zeriba wa ssecure

,a s Genera l Graham said, aga inst any number of

the enemy,it wa s a physica l impossibility to hold it, for

the labor of keeping a water- tra in constantly going overthese seven miles

,protected by troops every step of the

way as it must be,would have speedily worn out '

the

whole army . How much security or tranquillity the

B ritish enjoyed in their lines around Suakim is vividly

The B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan 241

described in the following Soudan correspondence of theLondon Telegraph.

How the H adendowa s do it nobody but they themselves c an te ll,but night

a fter night they come into the middle of our camp , stab and ha ck a few soldiersand go out aga in sca thless . Some times they creep in fi ve abrea st pa st our sentinelssome times they come right up to our tents , ha lf a mile within the line o f redoubtsand picke ts

,and bring camels a nd horses with them . But,wha tever the auda ci ty

of the ir entrance,the impunity of their depa rture is the same . Our gua rds turn

out,bugles sound the a la rm

,s igna ls fla sh

,rifles a re let off , a gun - boa t fires over

head into bla ck spa ce ,but next morning there a re only our own mutila ted a nd

dea d in evidence of the a ssa ssins’ presence . The H a dendowas ha ve le ft none behind . them , or had none to lea ve .

‘ I t is horrible in the highest degree,this monot

ony of midnight murder , and depress ing beyond language to find our head - qua rters’sta ff appa rently so untea chable by experience .

Crawling a long on a ll fours , th-ey tra verse.

the spa ce be tween them and the irvictims with a ll the pa tient ca ution of wild beasts sta lk ing prey . They rea ch thedoomed tent . For the sake of the sea bree ze the doorwa y is open

,and the next

instant the murderer is standing by the s leeping soldier’s side . H e feels a ha ndpa ss ing ove r his body and sta rts . A cry is rising to his lips . It is strangled in h isthroa t by a groan of pa in

,and before the ga llan t fe llow c an even wa rn his com

rades the fierce spea r is driven home through his body , the hea vy two - ha ndedsword ha s fa llen a cross him . But the ten t is a la rmed . There is no time to loseSla shing this way and tha t

,the murderers stab a nd ba ck with the fury of fiends

,

and then as the camp sta rts to its feet in clamor they a re off . Not a sound be tra ystheir pa ssing . There is no tra ce of blood to tell of retribution . They a re goneba ck into the villa inous gullies

,ba ck into the sca ttered brush , and next we c an

imagine them sitting to re fresh themse lves outside our line of redoubts— to listenglee fully to the storm they ha ve ra ised—the bugles telling the old ta le of murdercomple ted and the murderers gone ,

the a imless volley of rifles , the din of voices ,the impotent utterances of our indignant guns roa ring for an impossible vengea nce .

They hea r the tempest o f the camp’s a la rm swell up and dwindle away,and then

quie tly get up and pa ss on to where the ir friends are wa i ting to congra tula te and torejoice—to rub their spea r - heads a ga inst the red t ips of the a ssa ssin’s wea pons , tosmea r the ir swords with the blood still wet on the ir bla des . And in our campThe hospita l stretchers there a re ca rrying away the mangled , mut ila ted bodies ofour men ,

their comrades standing to the ir a rms , sa vage with useless rage ,a s they

look a t the lantern - li t group of surgeons a nd wounded . It is a horrible episode ,

yet of nightly occurrence .

Murder Murder I hea rd the word ring out la st n ight from the ordnancecamp a nd then came a cry—the bitter cry of a ma n suddenly overtaken by the

agony of dea th . A shot and then another and another . Then a confusion ofmuffled sounds . Then silence . I wa s only 400 ya rds away . The night had beenso still tha t the wa ter lapping on the quay wa s pla inly a udible where I lay .

Presently came this brief uproa r of a la rm ,subsiding a s suddenly a s i t ha d a risen .


Signa ls were fla shing overhead . A pa rty of Hadendowa s ha d e i ther crept stra ighta cross the camp , or pass ing a long the rea r , had tra versed its complete length , crossing twice on the ir way the electric light thrown by the Dolphin

,had rea ched , with

out be ing observed , the fa rthest ba tch of tents from the ir sta rting- point , the nea restto the town . Behind them ,

only a hundred ya rds off,wa s Qua rantine isla nd , with

its camp nea rer s ti'll la y our shipping , with the gun - boa ts close in shore , commanding one l ine of the ir re trea t , the whole of the Bri tish t roops intercepting theother. Behind them wa s the sea -ou their left the town , ye t , such is the confidenceinspired by nightly success a nd impuni ty . tha t the a ssa ssins did not hesitate tocreep even in to such a despera te posi t ion a s this . And the i r work was despera teand terribly complete . Of the whole of the occupa nts of the tents—24 in a ll

only two escaped the ir spea rs a nd swords,while the murderers re trea ted appa rently

unha rmed . As they went ba ck rifles were wildly emptied a fter them ,and the

Ca rysfort fired volley-s into the da rk . But there wa s no tra ce of blood . Ins ide'

the

tents the sight wa s dreadful—blood everywhere , and men lying about in a ll d ire c

tions wounded and groaning .

On the 28th of March,Genera l Graham having con

structed more zeriba s and established additiona l waterdepots

,moved aga in to the position occupied by Genera l

M cNeil on the 22d .

'

In two weeks he had approa chedonly two miles nearer to Tama

’

f,the old ba ttle-ground of

la st year. The hea t wa s growing fearful,sunstrokes and

fever ca ses multiplying grea tly. Fina lly,on the 2d of

April,he advanced to Tama

'

i,and found it eva cua ted .

After resting and watering his troops,he burned Osman

Digma’s camp

,a s hehad done la st year

,and returned to

Suakim on the 4th . The wily B edouin wa s learning lessons ia war ; he had ordered his followers to avoid a regular ba ttle

,and to draw the B ritish after them into the

hills . At this time Graham wa s instructed to open negotia t ions with Osman-Digma

,which the latter refused to

enterta in .

It must be stated here tha t,in connection with Gra

ham’s expedition

,a second a ttemptwa s made to construc t

a ra ilroad. The London E ngineering conta ined the following information :


Arrangements have_a lrea dy been ma de b y Messrs . Luca s Aird for the c o

opera tion of na tives , and workmen from other pa rts. will a lso c o- opera te with themen now sen t out immed ia tely on the ir a rriva l . Thus , the public m ay re ly on thefa ct tha t there will be no hindrance or delay in pushing the roa d to the front .

The reports point to a fight in the ne ighborhood of Tama '

l' or Tamanieb , a nd

this wi ll be f ol-lowed

'

up by a rapid a dvanc e to Sinha t,where i t m ay possibly be de

s irable to ga rrison for a time. Sinka t is compa ra tive ly cool,and would form a

hea lthy summer s ta tion,the occupa tion of which would probably pa ra lyze '

the

a ction of the tribes , and enable the ra ilwa y pioneer force to a dva nce a long thenorthern route unopposed . I t has genera lly been believed tha t the movement of asma ll force to Berber would ha ve been poss ible a fte r Genera l Graham’

s victoriesla st yea r , and this IS still more like ly to be the ca se now ,

when,af ter def ea t , the

A ra bs will be a t once f ollowed up to their s trong hold . The probability seems to_

be ,

therefore ,tha t a fter one ba ttle the milita ry si tua tion in this portion of the thea tre

of war will clea r itself while there c an be little doubt tha t the fina l suppression ofO sma n Digma will produce a mora l e ffect a t Kha rtoum .

The “Tha nderer wa s certa inly most unfortuna te in itspredictions when a ssuring the public of thef a c t that therewould be no hindrance or delay in pushing the road tothe front . It fa iled to take into a ccount the ra ther seriousobjections the B edouins made to its construction .

‘

It s

surmise tha t a fi ght -a t Tama 1 or Tamanieb would be followed by a rapid advance to Sinkat Wa s equa lly unlucky,and a ll its prophecies were completely fa lsified by events .

But,in my opinion, the most absurd idea of a ll

,con

sidering the loca lities and circumstances,wa s that “of con

struc ting a line of pipe to convey wa ter from Suakim toB erber. The credit (2) of originating it wa s cla imed byone of the New York da ilies .

'

Now,a lthough an Ameri

c an editor is expected to know every thing— and a good

d ea l more,—he may beexcused for being unfamiliar with

the peculiar difficulties of the Soudan deserts;Some

months before,another New York da ily had given its

readers a highly imaginative and fictitious description ofthe shady groves

,smiling oa ses

,enlivened by the warbling

of birds,and the purling streams to be found on the Sua


him -B erber route But tha t the B ritish military authorities

,who ought to heeoe known ,

and had no possible excusefor not knowing

,the na ture of the country and the obsta

c les in the way , should have a t once jumped a t the ideaa nd proce eded to make contra cts for carrying it out

,

is r ea lly inconceivable . I hope Messrs . WorthingtonTarr were given the contra cts

,and made a good thing by

them. They were not responsible for t he imbecility ofthe scheme . It seems to have been . im agined that therewa s nothing to do but to lay the pipe down and cover itwith sand

,for the paper sa id

I t ha s been se ttled tha t the pipe is to bela id in zig- zag lines to a llow for expa nsion and contra ction unde r the sand . The laying of

_

the pipe ,i f a suffic ient

force of men is put to work,ought to proceed a t the rate of about twenty miles a

d ay . ! Twice a s fa st a s a n a rmy could ma rch An American gentleman conversa n t with a ll the

'

deta ils of the oil pipe - line system , now in London , is in consultation with the B ritish Government , .and there seems to be a disposi tion to expeditethe work .

I t will,of course

,be necessa ry to ha ve a gua rd a t every pumping- sta tion on

the route . These sta tions will a lso be stopping- places for the ra ilroa d tra ins .

”

There were to be engines every twenty-fi ve or thirtymiles

,and wa ter wa s to be supplied at the rate of one

hundred and fifty ga llons a minute,or over two hundred

thousand ga llons per d ay , which would have to be ob

t ained chiefly from the condensers at Suakim ! Andwha t would theB edouins be doing a ll the while ?All this shows the absurdity of trying from the

Horse Guards ” in London to direct opera tions in a

c ountry thousands of miles away,and about wh ich the

Comm ander- in - chief and his advisers evidently knewnothing. It a lso illustrates the folly of supposing tha tthe same mea ns will a ccomplish the same results in .

regl ons difl ering so entirely and absolutely in every re


spect a s Pennsylvania and the Soudan . It wa s a ssumedtha t because a pipe - line had been

‘

highly successful inconveying oil hundreds of miles in America , it would beequa lly ava ilable for conveying wa ter in the desert . Butin America supplies of al l kinds

,transporta tion

,water

,

fuel , timber, workshops, ma chinery, willing and intel li

gent labor,are to be had in abundance far exceeding the

demand ; and in addition,perfect pea ce and the full pro

tec tion,not only of the law but of the entire community

,

ensuring the swift punishment of any trespa sser daringto tamper with the line. In the Soudan

,on the con

trary , no supplies,no wa ter

,no timber

,not even a pra o

tic able road . Every stick of timber,every ra ilroad tie

,

every pound of coal,to be brought from abroad . Not

only no na tive labor_to be had , but every Bedouin bend

ing a ll his energies to prevent the construction of theline

,and to cut it in a hundred pla ces every night

“

if itwere ever built !Now

,let it not be supposed tha t I cla im credit for ex

traord inary a cumen or prophetic foresight for a ssertingbefore the ra ilway wa s shipped and Graham sa iled tha tthe former would never be built and tha t the B ritishwould never advance twenty miles from Suakim . Mypredictions were ba sed upon my knowledge of the country

,and I would have confessed myself an idiot if I could

not have formed a correct judgment . But the point Imake here aga inst the B ritish military authorities is

,that

this same knowledge had been perfectly a ccessible tothem for six years a t least

,and tha t there wa s no

'

ex cuse

for their not ma stering it,or for not drawing correct con

elusions from it. In my letter to the New York World,

published March 1,1885

,I used the following language :

The B ri tish Campa ign in the Souda n .

in burning quantities of the wooden sleepers and othermateria l brought from England a t grea t expense . Onlya few miles were la id

,to be quickly torn up by the

enemy . Three months la ter the steamers,which had

never even unload’

bd the ma teria l,took it ba ck to Eng

land,and that wa s the la st heard of the ra ilway and the

pipe- line . Genera l Graham wa s a distinguished engineerofli c er

,tha t being his specia l arm of the service ; he had a

splendid record,

!and he and Herbert Stewart did the

most and the best fighting in the Soudan . H e understoodperfectly tha t a ra ilway to

.

B erber c an never be builtwhile hostile B edouins hold the deserts

,and in a ll the

a ccounts of the war,I have not seen a single word to

show tha t he ever advoca ted the undertaking.

The burning of Osman -Digma’s camp wa s the la st

episode of the campa ign . On the 7th of M ay , LordWolseley came from Ca iro to Suakim by sea to reviewG raham’

s army and compliment it on it s a chievements.

After this the two genera ls and a ll the troops re- embarked,

l eaving a garrison of one thousand two hundred marinesa t Suakim

,who from tha t time forth were closely be

sieged in their lines,protected by gun -boa ts . It wa s

bffi c ia lly reported the following August,tha t of tha t

number only one hundred were fit for duty in c onse

quenc e of the terrible effects of the clima te .

Genera l Graham entered the Brit ish a rmy a s an ens ign in the Roya l Eugineers , in 1850 . H e served through the Crimean wa r w i th tha t body

,re ce iving

promotion for his ga lla ntry and ga ining the highly- prized V i c toria Cross for hea dinga pa rty in an a ssault by ladders a t the Reda n . Twice during the Crimea n war hewa s wounded . In the Chinese wa r Genera l Graham a lso distinguished himse lf ,taking pa i t in the a ssault of Tangku and the Taku forts , and a lso in the ca pture ofPekin . H is promo t ion wa s ga ined step by step , until , in 1881 , his present ra nkwa s rea ched . In the campa ign a ga inst Arabi

,_

in 1882 , Genera l Graham comm anded the Se cond briga de, and won new honors .

1 he B ritish Campa ign in the Soudan . 249

The condition in which the country and the people.

wereleft by the B ritish eva cuation is well described by thewa r correspondent of the L ondon G raphic , in a letterdated M ay 30, 1885, a s follows

The withdrawa l of British troops from the Soudan goes on rapidly , a like on thethe N ile a nd a t Suakim . Dreading the a rriva l of the Mahdists on the departure ofthe British from Dongola , the ma j ority of the popula tion are fleeing north , a nd thea uthorities a re obliged to provide she lte r and food for the re fugees a t Wady H a lfa ,

while trying to ind uce some ne ighboring powerful she ikh to take the government ofthe dis trict . The Mahdi , howeve r , h a s re tired up the White N ile to Jebel E l liii i ,a nd announces tha t he W ill not adva nce 011 the Dongola district till a fter nextRamadan . Indeed , he i s thought to ha ve lit tle cha nce of doing so

,a s his influence

is w eakened by the growing power of his r iva l the anti - Mahdi,S idi Muley Achmed .

One by one the pos itions beyond Suakim ,which have ' been so ca re fully fortified by

the Bri t ish,a re be ing abandoned . Ota o a n d H andoub , 0 11 the. road to Berber ,

have bee n eva cua ted ; a nd though the ra i lway is s t ill prote c ted by the frequ en trunning of a n a rm0 1ed tra in

,the Arabs tea r up the ra ils , and indulge in

'

sma llskirmishes whenever poss ible . It is eviden t a lrea dy tha t the tribes a re flockingba ck to Osma n Digma , even ma ny of the fr iendlies , taking with them the Br i tishweapons they have re c e ived .

“

Suakim i tself is in a sta te of perpe tua l confus ion ,

with troops continua lly emba rking , the ha rbor filled with transpm t s hea ring thenow useless ra ilwa y stock

,and sickness and depression preva iling amongst the

sold iers . The hea t se riously a ffects Indian a s well a s B i itish regiments , and overha ve been inva lided W ith in the la st two months . A iry huts , wi th tha tched

roofs ,a re be ing cons tructed

-

for the men . Lord Wolse ley ha s gone ba ck to Ca iro ,hand ing ove r the command of the N ile force to Genera l Dormer , a nd prepa ra t ion sa re be ing m ade both a t Ca iro and Alexandria for the tempora ry a ccommoda tion ofthe Bri tish troops . The

'Gua rds have a t la st been d isemba rked a t Alexa ndria ,and

this proce eding ra ise s anew fresh comments a s to the change of plans , none o fwhich a re ove r- complimenta ry to Engla nd a nd her va cilla tion . Egyp t looksanxiously for the reply to the Bri tish note ,

inviting Turkey to occupy. Suakim and!

other R ed Sea p0 1ts . If Turkey re fuses , th e note s ta tes tha t England must a re

range for some civili zed Powe r to occupy the posi tions , wh ile ,a s soon '

a s order a nd

a stable government a re se cured , the English troops ‘W lll be withd rawn from Egypt .

Meanwhile the probabilities of wa r with Russia aboutthe Afghanistan quest ion diverted public a ttention , andthe Soudan a lmost pa ssed out of mind . The Soudanese,however, have persistently continued their advance .

Dongola fell into their hands,and in December they

became so threa tening tha t Sir Redvers'

Buller, then


command ing a t the second ca ta ra ct,found it necessary to

drive them back . H e advanced from Wady Ha lfa,and

on the 30th of December,1885

,he met the enemy a t

Ghinnis . The usua l result occurred . There wa s a skirmish

,a fewvolleys fired

,and the B edouins

,after leaving

two hundred or three hundred killed and wounded on thefield

,retreated

,to advance aga in a s soon a s the B ritish

retired to their former positions . Lord Rosebery,Foreign

Secretary,subsequently instructed Sir Henry Drummond

Wolff,the B ritish Commissioner in Egypt, to withdraw

the British troops from Wady Ha lfa . So tha t the wholeof Nubia

,a s well a s the entire Soudan

,is abandoned to

the horrors of ana rchy and brigandage . It wa s foundimpossible

,however

,to withdraw the B ritish from the

first ca ta ra ct without exposing Egypt herself to the dangerof inva sion . A few regiments a re still a t Assouanand their condition may be inferred from these extra ctsfrom letters published in the London journa ls .

!

While men 's m inds a re wholly occupied with the Irish questi on a t home ,our

troubles abroad a re certa inly not decrea sing . In Egypt and Burmah the flower ofthe British a rmy are being sa cri fi ced .

“ Our be st troops a re silently perishing by disea se on the ba nks of the N ile .

O ur bravest of fi cers , wi th the courage of the ir ra ce ,a re sa crificing the ir lives , one

a fte r the other , in the va in a ttempt to remedy one continued series of m istakes,

which commenced with our occupa tion of th e country , and seem unend zng , Ine a ch ins tance of wa nton a nd unca lled for interference with fore ign na t ions we ha vefa iled ignominiously . We went to Egypt a vowedly to put a n end to Arab i s rebell ion

,a nd to restore pea ce to the country . We have succeeded in ma inta ining j ust

a s much order a s the presence of the British troops inspi res we ha ve,indirectly ,

los t Egypt the Souda n we ha ve cove red the d esert with the bones of bra ve Engl ishmen a nd Arabs in our va in a ttempts to force ba ck in to subj ect ion a provincewe ha d

.

neither the wisdom to keep for Egypt nor the energy to re conque r ; wes a crificed Gordon a t Kha rtoum to the inde cision and va cilla tion of a governmentwhich sent him there in a moment of pa nic , a nd kept him there a l inge ring ma rtyr

The print ing of this paper ha ving been de layed by va r ious causes , I have a ddedfor the sake of completeness a few references to la ter events .


of the hero to whom rescue came too la te Egypt despoiledof ha lf her territory and crushed under the burden of additional debt ; va st provinces where order reigned before ,which were then rapidly opening to humanizing influl

enc es,and were connected with the rest of the world by

increasing commerce and by telegraph,now so completely

beyond the pa le of civilization tha t nothing more is

known of wha t is going “

onthere than of the savagesliving around the equa toria l lakes . These are some of

the fruits produced from the evil seed planted on theil l - omened day when England wa s reluctantly inducedto interfere in Egyptian affa irs “ in order tha t Shylockmight have his pound of flesh .

” Speaking of tha t interference at Cooper Institute

,in November

,1882

,after

the a rbitrary and impolitic deposition of Ismail-Pa sha,

and the bombardment of Alexandria I sa id : “England,

ha s sown iniquity,and

I

she will reap disa ster.” H ow

she must regret to day tha t first fa ta l move which ledstep by step

,to the final ca ta strophe Sir Samuel B aker

,

who is so thoroughly familiar with the country a nd the

people,protesting aga inst the abandonment of Kha rtoum

,

even before Gordon was sent there to efi ec t its eva cu

ation,uttered these prophetic words in the JVineteen th

Cen tury for January, 1884'

Kha rtoum is a name tha t is known among the wildest sa vages of equa toriahAfrica who never hea rd of Pa ris or of London to them it is the centre of a ll tha tis grea t , a nd i t is the ca p ita l of every thing . The abandonment of Kha rtoum would

,

in the ir estima tion , be the d isruption of a centra l power , which would imply impotence . The slave hunters have been suppressed by the a uthority from Kha rtoum

,

and the force required for tha t suppress ion ha s emana ted from tha t centre of strengthand g overnmen t . I f

,there fore

,Kha rtoum should be abandoned , the prote ction

tha t was the support o f loya l tribes of the interior would have been withdrawn,the

supporting power would have been overthrown,and the sla ve hunters would aga in

be in the a scend a nt . The result would be immed ia te those tribes which’

have been.

“

The B riti sh Campa ign in the Souda n . 2532

fa ithful to the government would become the firs t victims to those who ha d beenaga ins t the government . A genera l a na rchy would ensue ,

a nd the loya l would besa c rifi c ed to the s la ve ga ngs which ha d been kept in subje ction by the imperia lforces . The s la ve - trade would be renewed with tenfold vigor

,a s no power would

rema in to curb the a trocities of the traders . This deplorable si tua t ion would render impossible a ll future a ttempts a t government , a s the n a t ives would have los t a llconfidence of support they would have seen tha t the loya l h a d been sa crificed bythe aba ndonment of the government upon which they had depended for prote ction

,

wh ile those who ha d openly defied the laws ha d triumphed by rebellion . All thegood results of the la st fi ve and twenty yea rs of explora tion a nd energe tic a ctiona ga ins t the sla ve - tra de would ha ve been entire ly dissipa ted , a nd the end of the longstruggle would ha ve yielded victory to the wrong- doers . The work of s ixty- fouryea rs , since the conquest of the Souda n by M eheme t - Ali- Pa sha

,would ha ve been

utterly des troyed , a nd the Souda n would relapse in to the frightful ba rba rism d escribed by Bruce a hundred yea rs ago . It is ridiculous to suppose tha t any Soud a nra ces are capable of self- government . I f we re fuse this to I reland , how c an we e x

peet a bette r result from ig’

norant ba rba rians,who would extinguish a l l progress by

a chronic inter - triba l stri fe ? As loca l a utonomy would be impossible should Kha rtoum be eva cua ted by the Egyptia n - forces

,the Soudan

,deprived of its capita l ,

would resolve into a politica l cha os , until some superior force should take a dvantageof the genera l disruption , and restore order by milita ry conques t . ”

Da rk a s this picture is,the rea lity is probably even

worse, for the rumor comes that Khartoum ha s beenra zed to the ground

,probably in consequence of the strug~

gles for it s possession by riva l Mahdis and slave -huntingchiefs .

Of the B ritish inva sion of the Soudan,no tra ces will be

left,except the blea ching bones of thousands of B edouins

on the banks of the Nile and the shores of the R ed Sea,

together with revived and redoubled ha tred of tha t formof Christian civiliza tion which could bring no better boonto those distant regions than the slaughter and destruotion of a people tha t had never done England any wrong.

In this connection a reflection a lmost forces itself uponvery thinking man . If England had devoted to the edu

ca tion,the ma teria l and mora l improvement of Ireland

one tenth of the mi llions she ha s spent in the la st thirty


years in unnecessa ry, if not unjust, wars aga inst weak anduncivilized nations

,howmuch stronger she would be now

,

and how much better she would deserve the title,which

she arrogantly cla ims,of b eing the leader of Christian

civilization.

I will add only a few words of comment. I have a l

ready sa id enough of the politica l and military va cilla tiona s well a s the 1nex cusable and

,it might be thought, wil

ful ignorance of the theatre of war,which precluded the

possibility of success . As to stra tegic ability,none was

d isplayed . Lord Wolseley’s separa tion within rea ch ofthe enemy of his sma ll force into three deta chments

,-be

yond supporting d istance,showed a la ck of genera lship

and common- sense,the consequences of which he escaped

,

not by any skill on his part,but through fortuitous c ir

c umstances,which he had no rea son to count upon,

'

and

over Which he had no control . B ad generalship may byc hance escape the due punishment of its blunders

,but it

is none the’

less bad for a ll that.As to the tactics employed

,they were

,perhaps

,the

best under.the circumstances - and before such an enemy

,

but military men cannot but wonder why an uncivilizedand undisciplined foe

,armed a lmost exclusively with

rds and spea rs,should prove so formidable tha t an

y of select B ritish regiments, supplied with the bestbreech - loaders and abundantly strengthened with artilleryand ma chine-guns

,da red not meet them on the pla in with

out constructing stockades and forming squares . Stranger,

still,in three different engagements a square wa s broken

,

one being driven ba ck eight hundred yards, and a ll its

guns captured by naked savages charging on f oot— a

d eed which Napoleon’s cuira ssiers fa iled to a ch ieve at

256 I he B r i tish Campa ign in the Souda n .

lea st the sincerity of the average civilized Christian,but I

very much doubt whether there are many who wouldgladly fly. to certa in dea th to ga in immedia te admission toheaven. They would more probably follow the exampleof those two chapla ins of Genera l Juba l Early’s commandin the Va lley

,whom he once met running to the rear a t a

2.20 ga it. The old soldier, _who could swea r a s hard as he

could fight,addressed them in his usua l forcible style

B lankity blank your blank souls ! Where the

blank are you running to 2They could hardly gasp out

Genera l ! the Yankees are coming ! ”

B lankity blank you .l rejoined the 11a te Gen

era l ;“ for forty years you have been wanting to get

to heaven, _

and blank you,now you turn ba ck when within

just two minut es of it lThere i s a good dea l of human nature in tha t. We a ll

want to go to heaven some time or other— but not yetawhile !The criticisms I have made may appear harsh

,but they

are mildness itself when compared with the denunciationsof many of the most eminent English soldiers and

civilians,expressed in Parliament and through the press

,

only a fewof which I have “ quoted . It is an undeniablefa ct tha t the Soudan war wa s one of the most completemilitary fa ilures of modern times

,and tha t a fter a ll her

expenditure of blood and trea sure,England wa s forced

to retire baffled from the struggle aga inst barba rians .

In the words of the L ondon Times,of Feb . 13th

‘The N ile expedition , with its immense cos t in men and money , represents a

dead loss to the na tion , a loss directly and wholly due not to the difficulties withwhich the gove rnment had to contend

,but to the obstina cy with whi c h they t e

fused to re cognize fa cts pl a in to a ll the world , and .to a ssume responsibili ties whichit was the ir prima ry duty to d ischa rge .

”

The B ritish C ampa ign in the Souda n . 257

But errors of judgment,though lamentable

,leave no

s ta in upon B ritish arms ; for va lor never shonebrighter than when England’s young soldiers

,most of

whom saw war for the first time,braved the terrible

African heat and thirst, withstood unflinchingly the

a ssaults of countless hordes of fierce B edouins on thedeserts of the Soudan

,and plucked victory from the jaws

of destruction .

One of the best tra its of the English chara cter isits love of fa ir play and it s apprecia tion of

'

a pluckyfoe . This wa s never better illustrated than in the

Soudan war. Every officia l report,a s well a s the letters

of a ll the war'

c orrespondents, express the most unstintedpra ise and admira tion for the courage and unsurpa ssed

ga llantry of the Soudanese. Those veteran officers whohad

~had most experience of war were foremost in their

eulogies of the B edouins’bravery. This generous tributemitigates in some degree the horrors of war

,and

,coming

from equally brave Englishmen,we may say of . it in the

words of a gifted poetess

a ccept it thus ,

Arihomage true they tender ,As soldiers unto soldiers’ worth ,As brave to bra ve will render

Unfortunate a s were the results of the Soudan war, it

wa s not without its laurels . England will feel a justpride in the prowess of her troops, who showed themselvesworthy successors of the soldiers of Pla ssey and Assaye ,of

'

Salamanca and Wa terloo,of Inkerman

,and a hundred

other glorious fields . Herbert Stewa rt, Burnaby, Earle ,Eyre

,and many other ga llant soldiers, sealed with their

blood their devotion to their country. England had

The B ritish Campa ign in

natura lly the most cause to regret their loss, butsoldierly heart in every land joined with true sympathy inthe feeling of sorrow for their fa te and perhaps it is noexaggeration to a ssert tha t the glory of having producedsuch a splendid type of modern Christian h eroism a s wa s

exhibited in Gordon,is suffi cient consola tion for the fa il

ure of the campa ign. An ancient poet sa id that : anupright and resolute man struggling undismayed againstadversity is the admira tion of gods and men .

’

Such a

man wa s Gordon,England’s Sir Ga lahad

,her knight

truly sa ns pea r et sans reproche. While she justlymourns his loss,his noble life and death will rema in

“

a

bright example for her soldiers in a ll time to come, andwherever civiliza tion sheds her light

,his - name will be

engraved high in the glorious roll of those heroes of

humanity whose fame will never die 3


1874 ,Oct—Zobeh r de fea ts and kills the Sultan of Da rfour . Isma i l - Pa sha sends

a n a rmy and completes the conques t a nd a nnexa tion of Da rfour .1 875.

—Gordon es tablishes ga rrisons in equa toria l provinces ” up to the lakes .

Z obehr summoned to Ca iro , made a pa sha ,and held in gi lded captivity .

i 87s, Oct . and Nov .

—Commencemen t of Abyssinia n wa r. M unzinger- Pa sha ,

withmen , and C01. Arrend rup, with entire ly destroyed .

J S76 .

—Egyptian a rmy of regula rs , unde r Ra t ib - Pa sha , defea ted a t ba ttle o fG uru Pla ins , Ma rch

,1876 , by King John . Eva cua te the country in M ay .

E stablishment of mixed tribuna ls . Financia l difficulties . Mr. Ca ve ireports to B ritish Governmen t tha t Egypt equitably owes less tha nof the for which she ha d issued her bonds .

1 877.

—Isma '

1'l volunta rily a ppoints Commiss ioners of the Public Debt

,English

,

French,and Ita lia n . They gra dua lly se ize the entire admin istra t ion ! a nd

usurp Isma il’s powe rs . Turco - Russian wa r. I sma i l sends contingent ofmen .

1878.

- Rebellion of Z obehr- Pa sha ’s'

sons a t.

h is instiga tion in the Soudan .

1879. F eb . 18.—Commiss ioners reduce the a rmy . Emeute o f regula r officers

discha rged penn iless a nd re fused the two yea rs’ ba ck pay due them . The ycompe l the Min' istry to pa rt ia l payment .

1879.

—Isnra 1‘l,exaspera ted by see ing himsel f and his country sa crificed for fore ign

bondholde rs , dismisses the Commissioners . They appea l to the i r governments(j une wh ich obta in from the Sultan a fi rman deposing Isma il . T ewfi k

succeeds him .

End of 1879.

—Gordon res igns a nd Ra ouf—Pa sha succeeds h im a s Governor- Gene ra lof Soudan .

1 881,F eb . 2 .

—Achmed- el - Arabi , Col . 4th Infantry , and three other colone ls protest a ga inst promotions of C irca ssians over the i r he ads . Sent to ci tade l in a r

re st . The i r regiments rise in a rms,rescue them ,

and compe l dismissa l o fMiniste r of Wa r.

1881 , j uly .

—Mohammed Achmed procla ims himsel f the expected Mahdi .1881 , Aug . 10 .

- H e de fea ts the force sen t by Ra ouf- Pa sha to suppress him .

1881,Sept . 9.

—The Ministry be ing about to d isperse the mutinous regiments a t

Ca iro,Arabi surrounds the Khedive’s pa la ce with men

,demands dism is

sa l of M inistry,a constitution ,

and a pa rliament . Sheri f- Pa sha a ppointedPrime - Minister.

1881 , Dec . 8.

—Resh id - B ey with men de fea ted a nd killed by the Mahd i inSenna an

1881 , Dec . 26 .

—Assembly of Nota ble s convene ,a nnounce a j ust and equitable

pla n of consti tutiona l government,and gua ra ntee paymen t of public debt a nd

its inte rest .1881

,Dec .

—Plan re j ected by England a nd France . Ministe ria l cris is .

1882,F eb . 3 .

—Sherif- Pa sha resigns (Feb . sth). Arabi Minister of Wa r.

1882 , Feb . 23.—Ra ou f- Pa sha reca lled ; G iegler a cting Gov .

- Gen’l of Soudan .

1882 , M a rch 15.—Yusuf- Pa sha lea ves Kha rtou'm with men to a tta ck the

Mahd i .


1882 , April 1 1 .

—. Tria l of Circa ssian offi c ers for conspira cy to murder Arabi .

Ministry convoke Assembly of Notables without Khedive’s consent .1882 , M ay 6 .

—Sennaa r ha rd pressed by rebels , who a re fina lly defea ted withgrea t 1055 .

1882 , M ay 12 ,

—Abd- e l- Kader- Pa sha , the new Governor- Genera l , rea ches Kha rtoum .

1882 , M ay 20 .—English and French squadrons repa ir to Alexandria to overawe

the people . The i r presence produce s in tenseirrita ti on .

1882 , M ay 25.

—England and France d emand Arabi’s ba nishmen t . Re fused bythe Ministry .

1882 ,June 1 1 .

—’

M assa cre a t Alexandria . 150 Europeans and 700 na tives killedand wounded .

1882 , June 13 .

- News rea ches Kha rtoum of Yusuf- Pa sha ’s tota l destruction a t

Jebe l Gedir.1882 ,

June 24 .

—The Mahdi repulsed a t Ba ra (Kordofan) , with loss of1882 ,

July 11 .

—Bomba rdment of Alexandria by the British fleet .1882 , j uly 23 .

—Arabi procla imed a rebel by the Khedive .

1882 , Aug—Sir Arch . Alison occupies Alexandria with British troops .

1882 , Aug . 15.

—Lord Wolseley a rrives and takes command . About Britishi

in Egypt .1882 , Aug . 24 .

—British se ize Sue z Cana l and make i t thei r ba se , in spite of pledgesto respe ct its neutral ity given to d e Lesseps , which ha d kept Arabi from destroying it .

1882 , Aug . 28.—Amr- c l - M aka shef a tta cks Duem , and is repulsed with loss of

1882 , Sept . 8—14 .

—The Mahdi makes three a ssa ults on El Obeid . Defea ted ;loss

1882,Sept . 9.

—B ritish ca ptured adva nce pos t a t Ka ssa ssin .

1882,Sept . 12—13 .

—Ba ttle of Te l- cl - Kebir. Tota l de fea t of Arabi’s a rmy .

1882 , Sept . 15.4 Ca iro occupied by Bri tish . Arabi surrenders .

1882 ,Sept . 25.

- Khedive re - en ters Ca iro . Sherif Prime -Minister.1882 . De c . I o.

—Some of Arabi’s d isa ffe cted regiments sent to the Soudan .

1882 , Dec . 15.—L t .

- Col . O . H . Stewa rt (11th Hussa rs) rea ches Khartoum and t e

ports s i tua tion to Brit ish Government .1883 , Jan . 5, I 7.

—The Mahdi ca ptures Bara . El Obe1d , reduced to sta rva tionsurrende rs to the Mahdi , and the ga rrison join his ra nks .

1883 , F eb . 20 , 24 ,and 27.

—Abd- el - Kader defea ts the rebels in three engagements .

1883 , M a rch 10 .- Genera l H icks a rrives a t Kha rtoum .

1883 , Ma rch 22 .

—Abd- c l - Kader de fea ts the rebels a t Ka rkodj .

1883 , Ma rch 26 .—H e is reca lled to Ca iro and superseded by Allah- c d - Deen .

1883 , April 29.

—Hicks - Pa sha defea ts rebels a t M a rabia (Senna a r) . Achmed- el

Maka shef killed .

1883 , M ay .—Hicks- Pasha de fea ts the Mahdi nea r Kha rtoum and a t Jebel-Aj ‘n ,

and

d rives him ba ck to Kordofan .

1883 , Aug . 13 .—Osman - Digma a tta cks Suakim ,

and is repulsed with loss .

The B ritish Cam a ign in the Soudan .

1883 , Aug . 20 .-Hicks - Pa sha supe rsedes Sule ima n a s Commander- in- Chie f in

Soudan .

1883 , Sept . 8,

—H e lea ves Kha rtoum with m en to re capture El Obeid .

1883 , Nov . 1—4 .

—Is extermina ted with a ll his force a t Ka shgill .

18 83 , Nov . 6 .

—Consul M onc riefl ,with Egyptian force , destroyed a t Toka r.

1883, Nov . 9,

—Gladstone’s speech a t Guildha ll,announcing pa rtia l eva cua t ion o f

EgyptT1883 . Nov . 20 .

-News of the disasters rea ches London .

11883 , 26—30 .

—Suakim a tta cked by Osma n - Digma . British Ministry order Tewfi kto aba ndon Souda n and Nubia to I st ca tara ct .

1 883 ,Dec . 2 .

—Seven hundred Egypt ian troops destroyed nea r Suakim ; onlyfifty escape .

"

1883 , Dec . 18.—

.Baker- Pasha lea ves Ca iro for Suakim with a motley force ofa 883 , De c . 26 .

—Turkey notified tha t her intervention will be a llowed in Soudan .

11 884 , Jan . 8.

—Sherif’s Minist ry resign ra ther than abandon Soudan . Nuba rPa sha ,

Prime - Minister .1884 , Jan . 18.

—Gordon leaves London . (24) Rea ches Ca iro , a nd leave s next dayfor Khartoum .

1884 ,F eb . 4 .

—Baker de fe a ted a t Toka r, with loss of1884 ,

F eb . 10 .

—Suakim a tta cked . Defended by British gun - boa ts . Admira lHewett , Governor .

1884 ,F eb . 11 .

—Fa l l of Sinka t . Tewfi k- B ey and ga rrison d ie fighting to the la st .1884 , F eb . 18.

—Gordon rea ches Kha rtoum a nd is wa rmly re ce ived .

1884 , F eb . 19.

—Sir Gera ld Graham sa ils from Suez for Suakim with men .

1884, F eb . l oka r captured by Osman Digma .

1884 . F eb . 29.

—Ba ttle of Teb . Graham de fea ts Osman Digma withgrea t s laughter.1884 ,

Ma rch 2 .

- Graham re takes Toka r . (5) Re turns to Suakim wi th a l l h is force .

1884 ,Ma rch 8.

—E a rl ' Granville notifies Sir Ev . Ba ring tha t Egyptian frontiermust be a t 1st ca ta ra ct .

1884 ,Ma rch 13 .

—Ba ttle of Tama1“. 2d Brigade broken and guns lost and recaptured.British loss

,180 : rebels ,

1884 ,Ma rch 16 .

—Gordon a tta cked a t Kha rtoum .

1884 , Ma rch 2 1 .

—Makes sortie,and is repulsed a t H a lfiyeh by trea chery of two

pa sha s .

1884 ,M a rch 24.

—Te rrible ma rch of Bri tish towa rds T amanieb . One ha lf prostra ted by hea t .

1884 ,Ma rch 27.

—Tamanieb we lls occupied and Osman -Digma’

s camp burnt.1884 , Ma rch 29.

—Sir Herbert Stewa rt with ca va lry force pushes on to H andoub

we lls .

1884 ,Ma rch 30 .

—~Returns exhaus ted . All Graham’

s a rmy return to Suakim .

1884 , April 1 .

—Graham re - embarks for Suez with a ll h is force .

1884 ,April 2 .

—Osman - Digma ca ptures many ca ttle and sheep within one

mile of Suakim .

1884 , April 5.

—Genera l Stephenson a nd Sir E . Ba ring orde red to report onKorosko

, Suakim ,a nd N ile routes .

264 The B ritish Um pa ign in the Soud an .

1885, Jan . 2 1 .

—Four of Gordon’s steame rs a rrive a t_

Guba t . (22 and 23) Sir

Cha rles W ilson shells village s . (24) Sta rts up the N ile for Kha rtoumwithtwo steamers .

1885, Jan 24 .

—Ea rle’5 column leaves H omd ab for Abou H amed .

1885, Ja n . 26 .

—Kha rtoum captured and Gordon ki lled . Abou t 4 ,000 slaughte red .

1885, Ja n . 28.

—. Sir C . Wilson finds Kha rtoum in possession of the enemy and

turns ba ck .

1885, Jan . 29.

—One st eamer wre cked : (31) The other a lso . He takes re fuge on

an island .

1885, F eb . 1 —1-Ga llantly rescued by Lord Cha rles Be resford on a nothe r s teame rfrom Guba t .

1885, F eb . 8.

—Wolseley dire cted from London to capture Berbera t a ll ha zards .

1885, Feb . 10 .

—Sir Redvers Buller rea ches Guba t with re in forcements .

men there:1885,

—Ba tt1e of B irti ‘

or Kirbekan . Genera l Ea rle k illed . Bra ckenburyin command .

1885, F eb . 1 1 .

—West Kent Regimen t lea ve Korti for Guba t .1885, F eb . 12 .

—Sir Ge ra ld Graham a ss igned to command of Suakim expedit ion.

Ra i lroad to bel

la id' a t once18-85, F eb . 14 .

—Sir Redvers Buller eva cua tes Guba t a fter disabling rema iningsteamers

1885, F eb . 16 .

—Sir Herbe rt Stewa rt dies a nd is bur ied a t G akdul we lls .

' 1885, Feb . 19.

—Sir R . Bulle r ordered to concentrate a t Korti .1885, F eb . 19.

- Depa rture of the Gua rds from London for Suakim .

1885, F eb . 20—25.

—Buller's d ifficult re trea t to Korti .1885, F c b . 25.

—Bra ckenbury c rosses '

his fc rc e to ea st ba nk and same d ay rec e lves

orde rs to concentra te a t Korti , and crosses ba ck .

1885, Feb . 28.

—Contrac t ma de for pipe - line for Suakim route .

1885 ,Ma rch 2 .

—Wolseley announces purpose to hold Korti - G akdul route .

1885, M a rch 9.

—All h is force concen tra ted a t Korti .1885, Ma rch 10 .

—Grenadier a nd Coldstream Gua rds (Genera l Freema n tle) rea chSuakim .

'

1885 , Ma rch 15.

—Zobeh r- Pa sha and his two sons a rrested for trea son a nd inc a r

cera ted a t Gibra l ta r.1885, Ma rch 120 —Wolseley retires from Korti to Dongola and gra dua lly to secondca ta ra ct during April and M ay .

1885, Ma rch 20 .

—Ba ttle a t H a sheen . Graham de fea ts Osman - D igma and re turnsto Suakim .

1885, M a rch 22 .

—Second ba ttle a t Ha sbeen a nd re turn to Suakim .

1885, Ma rch 28.

—Graham advances to M cNe il’s ze riba . Two m iles’ adva nce intwo weeks .

1885, Apri l 1 .

—Finds Tama 1 wells eva cua ted . Burns Osman - Digma'

s camp a nd .

re turns to Suakim .

1885, April .—Ra ilroa d proj ec t abandoned . Pla nt sent ba ck to'

E ngla nd . An

o ther Mahd i appea rs ln Kordofan .

1 he B ritish Campa ign in the Sonata/n, 265

1885, M ay 7,—Wolseley goes through Ca iro and Suez to Suakim, reviews Graham'

s

a rmy , and returns to Ca iro.1885, M ay 5

—2o.—Graham t e - emba rks with his a rmy and returns to Alex andria .

1885, June 2 1.—The Mahdi dies in Kordofan . Abd-Allah Ka l if succ eeds him.

1885, July .—Wolseley returns to England . L t . - G en. Stephenson left in c ommand

of a ll Bri tish forces in Egypt.1885, Dec . 30 .

—Sir R . Buller a tta cks and defea ts rebe ls a t Chinnis above WadyHa lfa .

1886 .—British forces withdrawn ,

leavmg two regiments a t fi rst ca ta ra ct.

...TH E BR ITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE SOU DAN FOR THE R E SCU E OF GOR DON. GE NE R AL R. E. COLSTON, OF...

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