- Smith 2011 Neuroscience vs. Philosophy - Taking Aim at Free Will

7/30/2019 - Smith 2011 Neuroscience vs. Philosophy - Taking Aim at Free Will

1/3

THE EXPERIMENT HELPED TO CHANGE JOHN-DYLAN HAYNESS OUTLOOK ON LIFE. In 2007, Haynes, a neuroscientist at the Bernstein Center for Computational Neurosciencein Berlin, put people into a brain scanner in which a display screen flashed a succession of random letters 1. He told them to press a button with either their right or left index fingerswhenever they felt the urge, and to remember the letter that was showing on the screen whenthey made the decision. The experiment used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)to reveal brain activity in real time as the volunteers chose to use their right or left hands. Theresults were quite a surprise.

Scientists think theycan prove that

free will is an illusion.Philosophers areurging them to

think again.

T A K I N G A I M A T

F R E E W I L L

B Y K E R R I S M I T H

F L A T L I N E R / G E T T Y

1 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 1 | V O L 4 7 7 | N A T U R E | 2 3

FEATURENEWS

2011 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved


2/3

The first thought we had was we have tocheck if this is real, says Haynes. We came upwith more sanity checks than Ive ever seen inany other study before.

The conscious decision to push the buttonwas made about a second before the actual act,but the team discovered that a pattern of brainactivity seemed to predict that decision by as

many as seven seconds. Long before the subjects were even aware of making a choice, itseems, their brains had already decided.

As humans, we like to think that our deci-sions are under our conscious control thatwe have free will. Philosophers have debatedthat concept for centuries, and now Haynesand other experimental neuro scientists areraising a new challenge. They argue thatconsciousness of a decision may be a merebiochemical afterthought, with no influencewhatsoever on a persons actions. Accordingto this logic, they say, free will is an illusion.We feel we choose, but we dont, says Patrick

Haggard, a neuro scientist at University Col-lege London.You may have thought you decided whether

to have tea or coffee this morning, for exam-ple, but the decision may have been made longbefore you were aware of it. For Haynes, thisis unsettling. Ill be very honest, I find it very difficult to deal with this, he says. How canI call a will mine if I dont even know when itoccurred and what it has decided to do?

THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

Philosophers arent convinced that brain scanscan demolish free will so easily. Some havequestioned the neuroscientists results andinterpretations, arguing that the researchershave not quite grasped the concept that they say they are debunking. Many more dontengage with scientists at all. Neuro scientistsand philosophers talk past each other, saysWalter Glannon, a philo sopher at the Univer-sity of Calgary in Canada, who has interests inneuroscience, ethics and free will.

There are some signs that this is beginningto change. This month, a raft of projects willget under way as part of Big Questions in FreeWill, a four-year, US$4.4-million programmefunded by the John Templeton Foundationin West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, whichsupports research bridging theology, philoso-phy and natural science. Some say that, withrefined experiments, neuroscience could helpresearchers to identify the physical processesunderlying conscious intention and to betterunderstand the brain activity that precedesit. And if unconscious brain activity could befound to predict decisions perfectly, the work really could rattle the notion of free will. Itspossible that what are now correlations couldat some point become causal connectionsbetween brain mechanisms and behaviours,says Glannon. If that were the case, then itwould threaten free will, on any definition by any philosopher.

Haynes wasnt the first neuroscientist toexplore unconscious decision-making. In the1980s, Benjamin Libet, a neuropsychologistat the University of California, San Francisco,rigged up study participants to an electro-encephalogram (EEG) and asked them towatch a clock face with a dot sweeping aroundit2. When the participants felt the urge to move

a finger, they had to note the dots position. Libetrecorded brain activity several hundred milli-

seconds before people expressed their consciousintention to move.Libets result was controversial. Critics said

that the clock was distracting, and the reportof a conscious decision was too subjective.Neuroscience experiments usually have con-trollable inputs show someone a picture ata precise moment, and then look for reactionsin the brain. When the input is the participantsconscious intention to move, however, they subjectively decide on its timing. Moreover, crit-ics werent convinced that the activity seen by Libet before a conscious decision was sufficientto cause the decision it could just have beenthe brain gearing up to decide and then move.

Hayness 2008 study 1 modernized the ear-lier experiment: where Libets EEG techniquecould look at only a limited area of brainactivity, Hayness fMRI set-up could sur- vey the whole brain; and where Libets par-ticipants decided simply on when to move,Hayness test forced them to decide betweentwo alternatives. But critics still picked holes,pointing out that Haynes and his team couldpredict a left or right button press with only 60% accuracy at best. Although better thanchance, this isnt enough to claim that youcan see the brain making its mind up beforeconscious awareness, argues Adina Roskies,a neuroscientist and philosopher who workson free will at Dartmouth College in Hano- ver, New Hampshire. Besides, all it suggestsis that there are some physical factors thatinfluence decision-making, which shouldntbe surprising. Philosophers who know aboutthe science, she adds, dont think this sortof study is good evidence for the absence of free will, because the experiments are carica-tures of decision-making. Even the seemingly simple decision of whether to have tea or cof-fee is more complex than deciding whether topush a button with one hand or the other.

Haynes stands by his interpretation, and hasreplicated and refined his results in two studies.

One uses more accurate scanning techniques 3 to confirm the roles of the brain regions impli-cated in his previous work. In the other, which isyet to be published, Haynes and his team askedsubjects to add or subtract two numbers froma series being presented on a screen. Decid-ing whether to add or subtract reflects a morecomplex intention than that of whether to push

a button, and Haynes argues that it is a morerealistic model for everyday decisions. Even in

this more abstract task, the researchers detectedactivity up to four seconds before the subjectswere conscious of deciding, Haynes says.

Some researchers have literally gone deeperinto the brain. One of those is Itzhak Fried, aneuro scientist and surgeon at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the Tel Aviv Medi-cal Center in Israel. He studied individuals withelectrodes implanted in their brains as part of asurgical procedure to treat epilepsy 4. Recordingfrom single neurons in this way gives scientistsa much more precise picture of brain activity than fMRI or EEG. Frieds experiments showedthat there was activity in individual neurons of particular brain areas about a second and a half before the subject made a conscious decision topress a button. With about 700 milliseconds togo, the researchers could predict the timing of that decision with more than 80% accuracy. Atsome point, things that are predetermined areadmitted into consciousness, says Fried. Theconscious will might be added on to a decisionat a later stage, he suggests.

MATERIAL GAINS

Philosophers question the assumptionsunderlying such interpretations. Part of whats driving some of these conclusions isthe thought that free will has to be spiritual orinvolve souls or something, says Al Mele, aphilosopher at Florida State University in Tal-lahassee. If neuroscientists find unconsciousneural activity that drives decision-making,the troublesome concept of mind as separatefrom body disappears, as does free will. Thisdualist conception of free will is an easy targetfor neuroscientists to knock down, says Glan-non. Neatly dividing mind and brain makes iteasier for neuro scientiststo drive a wedge betweenthem, he adds.

The trouble is, mostcurrent philosophersdont think about free

HOW CAN I CALL A WILL MINE IF

I DONT EVEN KNOW WHEN IT OCCURRED

AND WHAT IT HAS DECIDED TO DO?

NATURE.COMTo listen to a podcastabout neuroscienceand free will, visit:go.nature.com/ihlh5z

2 4 | N A T U R E | V O L 4 7 7 | 1 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 1

FEATURENEWS



3/3

will like that, says Mele. Many are material-ists believing that everything has a physicalbasis, and decisions and actions come frombrain activity. So scientists are weighing in ona notion that philo sophers consider irrelevant.

Nowadays, says Mele, the majority of philosophers are comfortable with the ideathat people can make rational decisions in a

deterministic universe. They debate the inter-play between freedom and determinism the

theory that everything is predestined, either by fate or by physical laws but Roskies says thatresults from neuroscience cant yet settle thatdebate. They may speak to the predictability of actions, but not to the issue of determinism.

Neuroscientists also sometimes have mis-conceptions about their own field, says MichaelGazzaniga, a neuroscientist at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In particular, scien-tists tend to see preparatory brain activity asproceeding stepwise, one bit at a time, to a finaldecision. He suggests that researchers shouldinstead think of processes working in parallel,in a complex network with inter actions hap-pening continually. The time at which onebecomes aware of a decision is thus not asimportant as some have thought.

BATTLE OF WILLS

There are conceptual issues and then thereis semantics. What would really help is if scientists and philosophers could come to anagreement on what free will means, says Glan-non. Even within philosophy, definitions of free will dont always match up. Some philoso-phers define it as the ability to make rationaldecisions in the absence of coercion. Somedefinitions place it in cosmic context: at themoment of decision, given everything thatshappened in the past, it is possible to reach adifferent decision. Others stick to the idea thata non-physical soul is directing decisions.

Neuroscience could contribute directly totidying up definitions, or adding an empiricaldimension to them. It might lead to a deeper,better understanding of what freely willingsomething involves, or refine views of whatconscious intention is, says Roskies.

Mele is directing the Templeton Foundationproject that is beginning to bring philosophersand neuroscientists together. I think if we doa new generation of studies with better design,well get better evidence about what goes onin the brain when people make decisions, he

says. Some informal meetings have already begun. Roskies, who is funded through theprogramme, plans to spend time this year inthe lab of Michael Shadlen, a neuro physiologistat the University of Washington in Seattle whoworks on decision-making in the primatebrain. Were going to hammer on each otheruntil we really understand the other persons

point of view, and convince one or other of usthat were wrong, she says.

Haggard has Templeton funding for aproject in which he aims to provide a way toobjectively determine the timing of consciousdecisions and actions, rather than rely onsubjective reports. His team plans to devisean experimental set-up in which people play a competitive game against a computer whiletheir brain activity is decoded.

Another project, run by Christof Koch,a bioengineer at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, will use techniquessimilar to Frieds to examine the responses of individual neurons when people use reason tomake decisions. His team hopes to measurehow much weight people give to different bitsof information when they decide.

Philosophers are willing to admit thatneuro science could one day trouble the con-cept of free will. Imagine a situation (philo-sophers like to do this) in which researcherscould always predict what someone woulddecide from their brain activity, before thesubject became aware of their decision. If thatturned out to be true, that would be a threat tofree will, says Mele. Still, even those who haveperhaps prematurely proclaimed the death of free will agree that such results would have tobe replicated on many different levels of deci-sion-making. Pressing a button or playing agame is far removed from making a cup of tea,running for president or committing a crime.

The practical effects of demolishing freewill are hard to predict. Biological determin-ism doesnt hold up as a defence in law. Legalscholars arent ready to ditch the principle of personal responsibility. The law has to bebased on the idea that people are responsiblefor their actions, except in exceptional circum-stances, says Nicholas Mackintosh, director of a project on neuroscience and the law run by the Royal Society in London.

Owen Jones, a law professor at VanderbiltUniversity in Nashville, Tennessee, who directsa similar project funded by the Mac Arthur

Foundation in Chicago, Illinois, suggests thatthe research could help to identify an individ-uals level of responsibility. What we are inter-ested in is how neuroscience can give us a moregranulated view of how people vary in theirability to control their behaviour, says Jones.That could affect the severity of a sentence, forexample.

The answers could also end up influencingpeoples behaviour. In 2008, Kathleen Vohs, asocial psychologist at the University of Min-nesota in Minneapolis, and her colleagueJonathan Schooler, a psychologist now at theUniversity of California, Santa Barbara, pub-lished a study 5 on how people behave whenthey are prompted to think that determinismis true. They asked their subjects to read oneof two passages: one suggesting that behaviourboils down to environmental or genetic factorsnot under personal control; the other neutralabout what influences behaviour. The par-ticipants then did a few maths problems on a

computer. But just before the test started, they were informed that because of a glitch in thecomputer it occasionally displayed the answerby accident; if this happened, they were to click it away without looking. Those who had readthe deterministic message were more likely tocheat on the test. Perhaps, denying free willsimply provides the ultimate excuse to behaveas one likes, Vohs and Schooler suggested.

Hayness research and its possible implica-tions have certainly had an effect on how hethinks. He remembers being on a plane on hisway to a conference and having an epiphany.Suddenly I had this big vision about the wholedeterministic universe, myself, my place in itand all these different points where we believewere making decisions just reflecting somecausal flow. But he couldnt maintain thisimage of a world without free will for long.As soon as you start interpreting peoplesbehaviours in your day-to-day life, its virtu-ally impossible to keep hold of, he says.

Fried, too, finds it impossible to keep deter-minism at the top of his mind. I dont think about it every day. I certainly dont think aboutit when I operate on the human brain.

Mele is hopeful that other philosophers willbecome better acquainted with the science of conscious intention. And where philosophy isconcerned, he says, scientists would do well tosoften their stance. Its not as though the task of neuroscientists who work on free will has tobe to show there isnt any.

Kerri Smith is editor of theNature Podcast ,and is based in London.

1. Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J. & Haynes, J.-D.Nature Neurosci. 11, 543545 (2008).

2. Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W. & Pearl, D. K.Brain 106, 623642 (1983).

3. Bode, S. et al. PLoS ONE 6, e21612 (2011).4. Fried, I., Mukamel, R. & Kreiman, G. Neuron 69,

548562 (2011).5. Vohs, K. D. & Schooler, J. W. Psychol. Sci. 19, 4954

(2008).

THAT THERE ARE SOME PHYSICAL

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DECISION-

MAKING SHOULDNT BE A SURPRISE.

1 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 1 | V O L 4 7 7 | N A T U R E | 2 5

FEATURENEWS


- Smith 2011 Neuroscience vs. Philosophy - Taking Aim at Free Will

Documents

Transcript of - Smith 2011 Neuroscience vs. Philosophy - Taking Aim at Free Will