...PREFACE In this volume I made an attempt to formulate the fundamental assumptions and main...

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NORMAL AND

ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

WORKS BY BORIS SIDIS

The Psychology of Suggestion .

Multiple Personal ity.

Psychopathological Researches .

The Psychology of Laughter.

Phil istine and Genius .

An Experimental Study of Sleep .

The Foundations of Normal andAbnormal Psychology.

Symptomatology, Psychognosis ,and D iagnosis o f Psychopathic Maladies .

The Causation and Treatmentof Psychopathic D iseases .

THE FOUNDATION S OF

NORMAL AND ABNORMAL

PSYCHOLOGY

BORIS”s lms

,A . M . ,

Ph .D . , M . D .

BOSTON : R ICHARD G . BADGERTORONTO THE copp CLARK co. m m

To the M emory of My Mas ter and Friend

WILLIAM JAMES

Who,being the foremost pioneer in the vast domain of

the human mind,has generously encouraged others

in their efforts at clearing fresh trails , leadingto an ever more comprehensive view ofthe rich varieties of mental life.

PREFACE

In this volume I made an attempt to formulate thefundamental assumptions and ma in principles that underlie normal and abnormal psychology. Every science,

as

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oth ers h ave contributed to this spi rit o f investigation inthe domain of phys i ca l sciences . This spirit o f inquiryhas become of late specially intensified by the revolu

tionary discoveries o f radio - active bodies .We a re acqua inted with the great movement Which

has swept al l ove r b iological , sociological , and economical sci ences due to the influence o f the theory of

( i)

PREFACE

In this volume I made an attempt to formulate thefundamental assumptions and ma in principles that underlie normal and abnormal psychology. Every science,mathematical , phys ical or biological , has i ts postulatesas the foundation o f its structure . Psychology as ascience has also its own assumptions which have to beclearly formulated . The object o f the first part of thisvolume is the unravell ing of the princ ipal concepts andhypotheses which form the bas i s of the study of mental phenomena .All through the domain of the sciences there is a vastmovement for the search of fundamental concepts andfor the close investigation o f such concepts. Evensuch an exact science as mathematics has felt this spiritof examination of its fundamental assumptions , axioms,and postulates . Men l ike Lobatchevsky, Bolyai , Rieman and others have given the sta rt and a number ofmathematicians have recently followed in the i r footsteps , with the result o f getting a wider hori zon and ofopening unknown regions . The same we find in thecase of physical sciences , such as physics , mechanics andchemistry . Mach , Poincaré, Ostwald , Pearson andothers have contributed to this spi rit of investigation inthe domain of physica l sciences . This spirit o f inquiryhas become of late specially intensified by the revolu

tionary discoveries o f radio - active bodies .We a re acqua inted with the great movement which

has swept al l over biological , sociological , and eco

nomical sci ences due to the influence o f the theory of

( i)

i i Preface

evolution . The spirit of free inquiry into fundamentalconcepts has se i zed on all sciences . Throughout thewhole domain of human thought there is felt this rejuvenating and invigorating breath of the new revolu

tionary spirit. Philosophy, ethics , aestheti cs, history,law, economics a ll have been awakened out of theirlong sleep o f centuries . Every science has been shakenby this mighty movement to its very foundation . Evensuch a dry study as logic has left the vita l breeze ofthe inquiring spiri t of modern times .I mak e an attempt in this volume to examine in an

elementary way the foundations of normal and abnor

mal psychology. This i s all the more necessary as phys iologists , biologists , biological chemists , and recentlystudents of comparative psychology, a science which l ieson the borderland of psychology and biology, have atendency to make incurs ions into psychology proper,and favor mechanical or purely physiological conceptsto the detriment and even total exclus ion of mental processes .This tendency towa rds elimination o f psychic l i feby mechanical processes o r by “The Unconscious ”

i s a lso observed in the writings of some workers in thedomain of psychopathology . They think it is in the interest of strict science to express wherever possible mental states in terms of physical changes . Finally a stageis reached in which all consciousness is completely dispensed with in favor of physiological processes or TheUnconscious ” . Psychology is thu s made a branch ofphys iology and biology.

Again, philosophers and metaphys i ci ans a re apt tomake intrusions into the domain of psychology, becausethe latter i s regarded by them from time immemori al

Preface i i i

a s legitimate p rey, inasmuch as thei r own doma in l i eson the outski rts of mental l i fe . In the interest o f metaphysi cal systems philosophers attempt to subj ect psychology to thei r own speculative pu rposes .The popular mind has a tendency of regarding psy

chology as something mysti ca l and of identi fying psychology with a ll kinds of fa ith cu res , mind cures , spi riti sm , telepathy, telaesthes ia , and table rapping. It isunfortunate that even medica l men of note , on accountof lack of acqua intance with psychological subj ects andinqu i ries , are apt to look askance at psychology andidenti fy i t with religious bel ie fs , mental cures as wellas wi th the more shady side o f spiritisti c mani festations .Still more complicated is the pl ight in which the psy

chologist finds himsel f in regard to the recent cla imsput forth by some psychologists in having achi eved re

sults of importance to law , industry, and to the reformation o f social i lls . The demand for practica l resu lts inpsychology 18 due to the industria l spi rit of our times , aspiri t which requires immediate results that can becashed or expressed in dolla rs and cents . The earnestpsychologist should repudiate such industrial businesspsychology, for the simple reason that such a psycholo

gy is imaginary ; in other words , su ch a psychology doesnot exist. An experienced salesman , an intelligent bus iness man knows infinitely more about bu s iness and howto obta in the best results out o f certa in combinationsthan a ll the psychologists with thei r laboratory experi

ments , thei r artific i a l statisti cs , and puerile trivia l experimental arrangements , giving results no less trivialand meaningless .The cla ims made by psychologists as to industrial ef

ficiency which psychology can give is ludicrous in the

iv Preface

extreme . We may as well expect the astronomer toclaim that astronomy can give points how to conductsuccessfu lly a political campaign . As a matter of factthe ps ychologist has nothing to say on the subject o fadvertisements , indu stry, and business , but commonplace trivial ities expressed with all the pomposi ty ofscholastic authority. Industrial effi ciency does not belong to the domain of psychology. We may as well expeet the comparative psychologist to o ff er practicalpoints on the effi c iency of cows to give milk or on theeffi ciency o f hens to lay eggs . The success of ad

vertisement i s a matter of experienced business men andnot of academic psychologists who have to offer nothingbut the merest plati tudes .We must once for all enter a protest against those

psychologists who claim that they have some great psychological truths to reveal to business men , manu factur

er and workingmen . I tru st that both the businessmanand the workingman w i ll have enough common senseto take su ch psychological tru ths for what they areactually worth . The ordinary psychologist understands l ittle o f bu siness l i fe , knows almost nothing ofthe l i fe of the laborer, and is woefully ignorant of theeconomical questions of the times . Psychological bus iness cla ims are illu sory. The sooner the practi cal bu siness man learns thi s fact the better for him , and also forthe earnest psychological investigator .Psychology i s just emerging from its metaphys ical

and theological stages as Augu ste Comte wou ld put it.Psychology i s ju st entering the c i rcle of her sistersci ences . At present it is in a state s imilar to the phys i cs of the sixteenth centu ry. The psychologist shoulddeclare frankly and openly that he can no more assist

Preface

the businessman and the manufacturer than the mathematician with his non - Eucl idean geometry or the logiei an with his algebra of logic can help the solution ofthe great problems of capital and labor .We can obta in some help from abnormal psychologyin its application to the medical treatment of nervousand mental maladies . This is qu ite natural as abnormal psychology is essentially based on cl inical and ex

perimental o f mental diseases . The cla im , however,that psychology can give directions for vocations of l i feor for business and industry i s enti rely unfounded .

The same holds tru e o f the p ractical pseudo - psychology that has invaded the school , the court, the pri sonand the immigration bureau . The intell igence testsa re silly, pedantic, absu rd, and grossly misleading .

I have not discu ssed in this volume the practica laspect o f recent quasi - business psychology for the reasonthat such cla ims are nothing but a snare and delusion .

O f course I do not expect that this warning o f mine asto the misleading character of appl i ed psychology wi llbe taken graciously. There i s at present an epidemic ofpractical or appl i ed psychology. People however willwake up from their psychologica l dreams and will reali ze that applied psychology is nothing but a nightmare.I am fully aware of the fact that my present protest wi lldraw on me the i re and severe attacks of many a psychologist, bu t I s incerely hope that some of the moreearnest psychologists will sustain me in my present contention .

So much for the practi cal l imitations of psychology.

In discuss ing the theoreti ca l aspects of psychology andattempting to point out its l imitations I have had totouch on problems ultra - psychological , but th is was un

vi Preface

avoidable . It had to be done in order to clear the pathand see the lay of the land . I have no doubt that therewill be found a great number of shortcomings in thefoundations as well as vagueness in the delineation ofthe main postulates and psychologica l principles . Ishall be fu lly satisfied, i f this volume will stimulateothers to better work in the same direction.

The second part of this work deals with my theoryof “momentconsciousness . ” This theory was advancedby me some sixteen years ago in my “Psychology of Suggestion .

” It was fu rther tou ched upon in my “Multiple Personality,

”but I had not stated the theory as dis

tinctly as I did in this volume . I may add that whenJames read the theory in “The Psychology of Suggestion ” he told me he found it valuable , and urged me todevelop it more in detai l .The theory o f momentconsciousness presents a general vi ew of the nature and development of consciousness , from reflex consciousness to compound refl ex andinstinctive consc iousness reaching the highest formof consciousness , that of sel f- consciousnes s . Cons ciou sness and the adaptation of the psychi c individuality or o f the organi sm to the externa l en

vironment i s looked at not only from a psychological,but also from a biological standpoint . Consciousnessin the cou rse of its development is presented in a serieso f stages and types , each lower stage leading to the nexthigher and more complicated stage and type . This doesnot mean that the higher type is included in the lowerWe must assume spontaneou s mental variations , orpsychic mu tations , so that while the stages and types arearranged in a progressive series of their developmentand compl i cation , they at the same time difler qualita

Preface

tively i n type o f mental l i fe .I may add that most of the ideas developed in this

volume have been formulated by me some fourteenyears ago , and then retouched from time to time . A

few of the chapters with some modifications have beenpublished by me in various psychological and medicaljournals .

BORI S SIDIS .

S idis P sychotherapeutic Ins titu te,

P ortsmou th,

New Hampshire,

January , 1914.

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

XXI .

XXII .

CONTENTS

Theories of PerceptionThe Structure and Function of thePercept

Prima ry and Seconda ry Sensory Elements

Secondary Sensory Elements and Hallucinatory Perception 146

The Attributes of Sensory Elements . 160

Sensation and External Real i ty 164The Subconsc ious and Unconscious

CerebrationThe Subconsc ious and Automatism .

The Subconscious and the Pass ive Consciousness 194

Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas . 198

The Subconscious , Conscious and Un

consc ious 207

The Threshold and Mental Systems . . 2 13

The Principle of Reserve Energy . 2 19

PART II

THE THEORY OF THE MOMENT CON

SCIOUSNESS

I . The Moment Consciou snessI I . Types o f Moments and Moment

ThresholdIII . Modifications of Moments in the Or

gan ized AggregateIV. Menta l OrganizationV. The Gro w th and Function of the Mo

ment

PAGEThe Relation of the Moment to theEnvironment

The Ass imilation o f the Moment inNorma l States

Abnormal MomentsMental Continuity and the Psychi c

The Moment -ThresholdThe Process o f Moment-D isaggregation

Reproduction and the Reflex MomentDesultory ConsciousnessThe Syntheti c Moment and its Reproduction

The Accumulative Character of the

Synthetic MomentThe S imple and Compound SyntheticMoment

XVI I . The Desultory Type in PathologicalStates

Presentations and Representations .

Representations and the Laws of theirCombinations

Representation and RecognitionThe Recognitive Moment and its Reproduction

The Syntheti c Recognitive Moment .The Synthetic Moment of Sel f- Con

sciou sness

Appendix I . ConsciousnessAppendix II . Physiologi cal TracesIndex

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

AND PRINCIPLES

The Fou ndation s o f N ormal and

Abnormal Psy cho logy

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

E assume that the reader regards psychology as a science . I t is however one th ingto label a subj ect as a science and anotherthing to understand clearly in what sense

the term science is used in the case of psychology. A

clear understanding of the nature o f science is here ofspecial importance on account —of the pecu l iar positionpsychology occupies in the hierarchy of human knowledge . It i s therefore des i rable to define the meaningof science be fore we proceed to discuss the subject matter o f psychology.

Science is the description o f phenomena and theformulation o f the ir relations . Science describes factsand formulates thei r relations in laws . The task ofscience is first to formulate facts belongin g to the sametype , and then to general i ze them , that is to expressthe i r general relationship by one comprehensive formula , in spite o f the many individual variations in thephenomena . Thus in geometry, poss ibly the most ancient of all sciences , many isolated and important factswere already known to the sem i - civi l i zed nati ons ofanti quity, but i t requ ired the rational i z ing spiri t o f the

I I

12 Normal and Abnormal Psychology

Greek m ind to classi fy and general i ze the facts in totheorems, the laws of space . Many important properties of the right- angled triangle , for instance , were already kn own to the ancient Chaldeans and Egyptians .They knew that i f in a right- angled triangle the twos ides are respectively three and four, the hypothenusemust be five and so on ; that is, they knew only concrete facts , but what they lacked was just the scientificside . It required a Pythagoras to discover that in allright- angled triangles the sum of the squares of thetwo sides is equal to the square of the third . NO matter what the size of the triangle be , no matter how di fferent in length its s ides are , once the tri angle be of thesame type , namely right- angular, the same general telationship must obta in .

To take an illu stration from physics . Fallingbodies form one type of movement. Now the bodies themselves may be diflerent in kind , in nature ,may be o f various material , may di ffer widely instructure , weight, and shape, and still , since theyall belong to the same type of motion , they are , inspite of their mani fold diversity, expressed in one general formula , in one law , namely, that the spaces traversed are proportional to the square of times .In other less exact sc i ences the facts are exhaustively

described and a general statement is formu lated as tothei r relationship. In phys iology, for instance , we findmainly descriptions of facts class ified into types , therelationships of which are expressed in general formulac, or laws . Thus in the cerebro - spinal nervou s system , each part and its functions are described as fully as

possible , and then all the facts a re brought under onecomprehensive formu la such as the reflex arc . In em

I4. Normal and Abnormal Psychology

s topped by the pertinent question : You say thatpsychology deals with facts of consciousness , but whatis consciousness ? ” — Consciousness is subj ective facts ,s uch as the elements of sensation , feel ings , pa ins ,thoughts , acts of willing and the like . Positive sciencemust have given facts , data to work upon ; these datai t ana lyzes , describes , classifies into types and seeks tofind the formulae o f their relationships . Psychologycan accompl ish no more than any other sc ience . Thedata of psychology are facts of consciousness , these factsare analyzed into their s implest elements , and the lawsof thei r relations are searched for. But psychology doesnot, and legitimately cannot poss ibly go beyond consciousness . Consciousness is the ultimate datum whichpsychology must assume as given and which is froma psychological standpoint unanalyzable . Consciousness must be postulated, i f we wish to enter the templeof psychology.

In this relation psychology is as positive as the restof her s ister sciences . Geometry, a science to whichno one will deny exactness , deals as we know with thelaws of space - relations . Should we ask the geometr i cianthe same question ju st put to the psychologist : You

say that you r science , geometry, deals with facts ofspace and thei r relations , but what is space ? The geometrician wi ll smile at us . He will tell us that by spacehe means such forms as l ines , angles , triangles , quadrilaterals , circles , cubes , cyl inders , pyramids , etc . Shouldw e persist and ask further,

“Yes , that is true , but allthese are so many forms of space , what is the space itsel f with which you deal ? ” The geometrician wi ll nodoubt answer : “My dear si r, geometry deals with factsof space, space its elf i s taken as an ultimate datum . The

Psychology as a Science 15

work o f geometry is not to ask what space is in itsel f,but what the relations are of spati al forms

,space itself

being postu lated.

”

Mechanics deals with the laws o f energy and motion ,phys ics with molecular changes of matter, but neitherphys ics nor mechanics wou ld have gone far, had theystopped to answer the ques tions as to what motion ,energy, matter are in themselves . These are s imply postulated, taken for granted, they are the ultimate data o fthese sciences . In this respect psychology does notdi ff er from other sciences , i t takes its subj ect matter asgiven and does not inquire as to what the nature of thematerial i s in itsel f . The reader must remember thatthe question as to what things are in themselves is notat a ll a question of positive sciences , but of metaphysi cs .I do not mean in any way to detract from the dignityo f metaphys i cs , what I wish is s imply to point out thel imits of positive sc ience . The problem as to what thingsare in themselves does not fall within the province ofscience , but within the doma in o f metaphysical re

search.

The question as to the nature o f consciousness , whatit is in itself, may be a very important one , but i t l i esoutside the ken o f psychology, ju st as the laws o f aesthetics do not concern the chemist, although the lattermay be a great lover of beauty. In the contemplationand enj oyment of a beauti ful picture he wi ll not introduce a chemical formu la , and in his chemical experiments he will not introduce aestheti c considerations . Thesame holds true in the case of psychology. The psychologist may be a metaphysician , but in his psychologi ca l work he must keep clear of metaphys i cs . Conscious

ness therefore is '

a presuppos ition, a pos tulate of psy


chology .

There is one more important assumption which psychology mu st start with in order to be a positive science at all , namely, uniformity . Under s imilar condi

tions like res ults follow . Suppose a geometrician should

prove to you that the sum of the three angles o f a triangle is equ al to two right angles , suppose that somesceptic shou ld come in and say,

“Yes , that is all right inrelation to the triangles in this particu lar space , inanother portion of space, on some other star, or planetthe theorem w il l not hold good .

” The only answer thegeometrician cou ld give is that we must assume thatspace is uni form , so that wherever we form ou r triangles we obta in the same results . The same is truein mechanics . The laws of motion and inertia holdgood of the pebble on the roads ide , of the dust grainsdancing in the sunbeam , and of distant stars in the milkyway. Uni formity of relations among phenomena mustbe postu lated , i f sc i ence is to be at all . I f under thesame conditions di fferent resu lts follow , sc ience wouldhave been an impossibil i ty. Uni formity of nature isone of the most fundamental postulates of science . Psychology assumes uni formity ; i t assumes that there existcons tant unif orm types of men tal activity with defin iterelations that can be formulated into psychological laws .

Thus psychology at the very outset postulates consciousness and uni formity of mental phenomena .

We can now see in what relation psychology whichdeals w ith phenomena of consciou sness diff ers from

philosophy whose subj ect matter is also consciousness .Philosophy has no postulates , psychology, like all othersc i ences , mu st have its postulates which it cannot transcend . Philosophy deals with the ultimate in conscious

Psychology as a Science

ness , i t investigates the very postulates of conscious activity . Psychology on the contra ry accepts the facts ofconsciousness as ultimate data .

CHAPTER I I

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHIC FACTS

SYCHOLOGYwe said deals with facts of consciousness , but this is too broad a statement,for there are other sciences that also deal withfacts o f consc iousness, such as ethics , aesthet

i cs , logic. In what respect does psychology di ff er fromthese sciences ? It di ffers in this that ethics , aestheticsand logic are normative regulative sc iences ; psychologyis a positive natural science . Ethics deals with idealsof moral l i fe , aesthetics with ideals of beauty, and logicwith ideal ways o f correct reasoning. All these sc iencesdeal with ideals , with norms to which the matter o f factconsc iousness ought to conform , i f i t i s to act rightly .

They put a value on the phenomena . Psychology, however, l ike all other natural sciences has no other idealthan fact, i t admits o f no

“ought. ” From a strictlypsychological standpoint, the ugly and the beauti fu l , thegood and the evi l , the true and the false are of equ alvalue . Psychologically they are all facts of consciousness and must be studied as su ch ; j ust as the serpentand the dove are of equal interest and valu e to the naturalist. The ravings o f t-a maniac are of the same psychologica l interest and value as the subtle reasoning of aNewton . Psychology is a posit ive natural science, it doesnot deal with the subj ective evaluation of facts o f consc1ousness , but with thei r objective natural existence.

Having shown in what psychology agrees with otherpo s itive natural sciences , we must now point out in what

18

Physical and Psychic Facts 19

i t di ffers from them . Psychology deals with phenomenaof consciousness as facts of obj ective natu ral existence .Are these facts of the same order with those of thephysica l world, the subject matter of the natural physi cal sciences ? We must answer in the negative. Theobjects of the natura l sciences of the phys i cal world areof a materia l and spatial nature . A physical body hasweight, occupies a certa in portion o f space , so has themolecu le , the atom . Can we say the same of psychological facts ? By no means . They are di ff erentin kind, and this I wish especially to impress on themind of the reader. To real i ze this truth , I think ita good prel iminary psychological exercise for the readerto try to find how many grams , or gra ins his ideaof beauty weighs , how many mill imeters long , wide andhigh his feel ings of love are ; let him indulge in thefancy of conceiving an engineer building a bridge withmathema tical formulae as l inks , and his feel ings of virtue and patriotism as supports . On the other hand lethim think of a logi cian trying to fi ll up the defects o fhis tra in o f reasoning with sol id bricks , and using asconnecting links bars of pig iron . In short, psychology di ff ers from physical sciences in this , that its facts,the facts of cons ciousness are not of a material nature.

“Do not physica l sciences ” i t may be asked “deal with

such phenomena as sound and light ? ” Certa inly theydo , but these sciences regard these phenomena froma standpoint radically di ff erent from that o f psychology.

Sound in physics is not the sensation sound, but theexternal , material vibration of a ir, which may or maynot give rise to a sensation o f hearing . The same holdstrue in the case of l ight. . What phys i cs investigates isnot light as sensation , but vibrations o f ether which


may or may not give rise to a sensation of sight. It is,

however, j us t such facts as s ensations

,facts not spatial

in their nature which cons titute the subject matter ofpsychology .

“May not facts of consciousness be some kind of matter, some form of material substance the constitution ofwhich we do not as yet know Such was the question

put by a medical man , when he heard me expoundingthe di ff erence in kind between physical and psychicalfa cts . “That might be

” I answered, but then thatsubstance , if i t ever be discovered, will not have theproperties of matter ; i t will be a “matter totallydi fferent in kind from that studied by the physicist . Forthe “matter” o f physi cal sc i ences is essentially one ofextens ion ; a matter however that occupies no space isan existence altogether di fferent in kind from that ofextended things , and is certa inly no

“matter ” for thephys ic ist.The pers istent antagonist may ra ise here a further

obj ection .

“Are not the phenomena of consciou sness ”

he may ask “ facts of activity ? And is not activity,kinetic energy ? And i f thi s be the case mu st not thefacts of consciousness be ranged along with physi calphenomena , be redu ced to the mani festations and transformations o f kinetic energy and thus really and ultimately fall within the domain of the mechanical sciemeesChange certa inly is mani fested in the mu tations of

states of consciousness , but this change is not the physi cal change of translocation . Change in the states of consciousness may no doubt, be regarded as act ivity, andi f you please as energy, but this activity is not the en

ergy of mechanics . Activity in mechanical or physical


portion to its degree of reduction to terms of matterand motion . No one will deny that mathemati cs is anexact science , but is i t exact because it i s reduced to mechamical terms ? While mechanics must be logical , logici s not mechanical .Within certa in l imits th is generalization of the te

lation of scientific exactness to mechanical formulaemay be fu lly granted, i f it be restricted to the concretephys ical sciences , but it cannot possibly hold good incase of psychology, as the latter does not fall withinthe ci rcle of the phys ical sc i ences .The weakness of this last obj ection from scientificexactn ess becomes clearly disclosed, i f we get a l ittledeeper into the matter. The reason why there is sucha persistent tendency to reduce science to mechanicalterms is based on the tacit understanding that atomsand motion are the only ultimate real ities . We see ata glance that this consideration i s at bottom purelymetaphysical ; i t is a consideration which sc ience hasnot to take into account. Nothing is so dogmaticallymetaphysical as just the common sense that has an ab

horren ce of metaphysics . That atoms and their motionsare the only ultimate realities i s certa inly metaphysicsand bad metaphysi cs too , as it is unguarded by reflectivecr1t1cal thought. S ince this unreflective metaphysics ofatomism is widely spread in the medical world, and isconsidered sc ientific, one cannot help discussing it, pointing out its defic ienc ies , showing up the obstacles it putsin the way of positive science . Metaphysics is a branchof philosophy which deals with the nature of reality.As philosophy it accepts no unanalyzed concepts ; un

l ike science i t has no postulates taken blindly on fai th .

The proposition now be fore .u s , namely that atoms and

Phy sical and Psychic Facts 23

thei r motion are ultimate real i ti es , is bad metaphys i cs ,because it i s a blind unanalyzed postulate . How do weknow that atoms and the i r motions are ultimate real ities ? Why not ask what i s real i ty ? Once we are onmetaphysica l ground , why not take it in real earnest ?Why stop on atoms and motions ? Atoms themselvesare not ultimate simple units , they have shape , s ize ,weight. Now shape , s i ze , weight, what are they a fterall ? They are so many resultants of masses o f tactual ,visua l and muscular sensations , which are as l i ttle ultimate as are the sensations of color or of pain . It isout of sensa tions , percepts and ideas that the concept“atom ” i s framed . Subtract from the atom its sensational, perceptual and ideational elements , abstract fromi t its shape , s i ze , weight and the ultimate real i ty o f theatoms will become a bare nothing . The atom therefore is ultimately resolved into terms o f consciousness .

The same holds true in case of motion . Motion is amenta l product of what is known as muscular and retinal sensations . What is most u ltimately known is onlyconsc iousness and its facts . The atom and its motionsare a fter all nothing else but constructs of consciousness .From the standpoint of epistemology, or what the Germans call “

Erkenntn isstheorie,” we have only a

double series of mental phenomena , one standing forthe internal and the other for the external world, andnot atoms , but mental l i fe may be regarded as the u ltimate real i ty.

From a strictly scientific standpoint, however, wehave no right to resolve matter into mind or still lessm ind into matter, because the two are presented to consciousness as di ff erent in kind , even though they bothmay belong to a general consciousness . Between the


two series o f facts , the phys ical and the psychical , thereexists a fundamental di ff erence . The door yonder iscovered with white paint, the inkstand before me ismade of glass , i s round , i s heavy, i s black , but my ideaof the door is not covered with white pa int, my ideao f the inkstand is neither made of glass , nor round, norheavy, nor black . In short, the facts of consciousnes s

are not spatial.

A fallacy prevalent among the medical profession andnow also extant among the populace is the plac ing ofpsychic l i fe in the bra in . The neurologist, the pathologist ridi cu le the old Greek beli ef that the place of them ind is in the heart. Modern sci ence has discoverd thatthe heart is nothing but a hollow muscle , a blood pumpat best, the place of mental processes is in the brain .

This medical bel ie f now c i rculating in the popu lar andsemi - scientific literatu re of to - day di ff ers but l ittlefrom the anc i ent Greek bel ie f, i t is ju st as fallac ious and superstitiou s . It is true that psychic l i fe isa concomitant variable function of nervou s processesand brain activity, but neurosis is not the cau se ofpsychosis . The brain does not secrete thought as theliver secrets bile . The mind is not in the brain , norin fact is the mind anywhere in the universe of space ;for psychosis is not at all a physical spatial process .As fallaciou s and supers titious is the recent tendencyof medical investigation to locali ze psychic processes , toplace di ff erent psychic processes in di ff erent seats orlocal iti es o f the brain , thus implying that each psychicprocess respectively is placed inside some cerebral centre or nerve cells . Psychic l i fe is no doubt the concom i tant of nervous brain activity, and certain psychicprocesses may depend on definite local bra in processes ,

Physical and Psychic Facts 25

but the given psychic process i s not s i tuated in a definitebrain centre , nor for that matter is i t s i tuated anywherein space .

CHAPTER I I I

THE DEFINITION OF THE PSYCHIC PROCESS

HE definition thus far given of psychic l i feis rather of a negative character. We defined the psychic phenomenon in oppositionto the physical phenomenon . Phys ical phe

nomena are in space , psychic phenomena are not spatial .Now a negat ive definition may to many prove ratherunsatis factory. It is , there fore , desi rable to definepsychic phenomena in more positive terms .It is now the tendency to define the physical process

in social terms and the psychic process in terms of individual cognition . A physical phenomenon is defined asone common to many minds , while a psychic phenomenonis an obj ect o f an individual consc iousness . I thinkthat such a view of the exte rnal physical obj ect, as thatwhich is common to many minds in contrast to thepsychic or that belonging to an individual mind onlyis incorrect from a purely psychological standpoint.Psychologi cally cons idered the characteristi c tra it of aphys ical obj ect is not that it is common

,but that it is

external. The tree yonder is to me a phys ica l object,not because it is common to many minds , but because I

perceive i t as external , the sensory elements of the perception carry with them external object ivity.The soc ial perception o f an object may be one of thecriteria o f externa l reali ty, but certa inly not the only one ,and su rely not the chie f one . In perceiving an object Ido not consider it as a physical obj ect, because I know

26

The Definition of the Psychic Process 27

that i t is common to my fellow - beings , but because thevery psychic process o f perception gives the immediateknowledge of externali ty . An object is cons idered asphysical , not because of its soc ial aspect , but because o fits perceived external aspect . Had my perception of thehouse yonder been a hallucination , I would have sti llseen it as external and there fore regarded as a physicalobj ect ; and should this halluc ination furthermore beconfirmed by the testimony o f all my other senses ,should I be able to touch it , press against i t and feel resistance, knock myself on i t and feel concussion and pa in ,and have a series of tactu al and muscu lar sensations bywalking into i t and around it, and should I further havethi s halluc ination of all the senses every time I cometo this identical spot, the obj ect would be to me anexternal physical obj ect, and no amount of social contradiction could and would make i t di fferent. Regardedfrom a psychical standpoint an object is considered asphys ical , not because it i s common to other m inds , butbecause it i s proj ected as extens ive and external to mind .

N ot community, but extens ion,externality is the psy

chological cri terion of the physical obj ect .It is tru e that community o f obj ect is one of the cri

teri a o f external rea l ity, but it i s certa inly not true thatthe community of the obj ect gives ri se to the perceptionof extemality . It may, on the contra ry, be claimed, andpossibly with far better reason , that it i s the obj ect

’sexternali ty that gives rise to its community .

The child in its growth learns to discriminate between things and persons . Persons move , act, makeadaptations , while things are moved , acted upon , adapted to ; persons initiate movements , things do not ; persons are prime movers and it is to them that one has to

2 8 Normal and Abnormal Psychology

look up in the satis faction of needs and in the acqu is ition and u se of things . As aga inst persons things arecontrasted as impersonal . Gradu ally the child learnsto include himsel f within the class of persons

,— his

hopes , w ishes and desires come in contact, as well as inconfl ict with those of other persons , and he learns moreand more of inner li fe and activity with which he finallyidentifies all personali ty . Personal ity is more and morestripped of the thing aspect unti l the inner mental li fe,espec ially in its will aspect, remains as its sole characteristic. Persons are willers

,and it is these wills which

are of the u tmost importance for the child to learn asthe fu lfi llment of his W i ll depends on them . He thenlearns to class himself within the category of willers ;he himsel f i s a willer . Impersonal things , fall ing out

side and being contrasted with the class o f willers , areconceived as independent of persons .Moreover, while from the very nature of the case

each willer bears to things a direct relation , his relationto other willers is only to be established through things .Wills come in contact not through the mere fact of wi lling, bu t through thei r relations to things . Coming indirect relation with things , things alone give direct experience, experience in its first intention . In other words ,only things give rise to sensation or rather perception ;hence sensory l i fe with its time and space experience giv1ng 118 6 to externality i s the criterion of the un iverse ofthings , conce ived as independent of will . Only thing i sexternal , will i s not. Wills , however, can come in relation through things , and only through the same things ;the universe of things must be a common one to all thewills

,i f these wills are to come into relation at all . In

other words,the phys ical universe, genetically regarded,


It is the task of the epistemologist and metaphysician to inquire into the nature of that phys ical worldwhether it really exists independent of consciousness.Without, therefore , going into metaphysica l considerations, I think it is best to define the physical phenomenonas the object or process conceived as being independent

of consciousness,whi le the psychic obj ect or process is

one that is conceived as being directly dependent on

conscious ness . It seems to me that this definition hasthe merits o f being pos itive as the one given by therepresentatives o f the idealisti c school ; i t has not thedefects of bringing in i rrelevant metaphysical and epistemological considerations ; and it has furthermore theadvantage of being fully in accord with the data andpostulates of psychology.

CHAPTER IV

P SYCHIC STATES AS OBJECTS

HE atta cks may now be renewed from quitea di fferent direction . We asserted that psychology deals with facts of obj ective , natura lexistence , the subj ect matter of science in gen

eral . How does i t rhyme , it may be asked , with the conelusion just arrived at, namely, that the facts of psychology are di ff erent from those with which other natura lsciences deal ? To this may be answered that facts mayagree in being obj ective , and still diff er widely as tok in d, - a square and a man , a pound and a m i le , are allobj ective , and still the i r difference is certainly a fundamental one .An objection may be ra ised that may to some appearas a very grave one . Is psychology a science at all ?

Does it actually dea l with objective natural existence ?Phys i cs , chemistry and other concrete sciences treat ofob jects , of facts , in the externa l world. Any one cango and veri fy those phenomena and their relations . This ,however, is not the case with facts of consciousness , theyare essentially s ubj ective. Psychology, there fore , properly speaking, i s not a science in the same sense as othersciences are . This obj ection may be eas ily obviated bythe very simple consideration that the facts of any individual consciousness are as much objective to other people , as the cha i r, the table , the molecule , the atom . Myindividual consciousness is considered by others as exte rnal , as objective , as existing outside o f the i r con

3 1


sciousness , and, in fact, were it not so , there would havebeen no individuality.

After this lengthy discu ss ion we at last arrive at theconclus ion , that although the facts which psychologytreats of are not o f a material , phys ical nature , they arenone the less obj ective in character . Obj ective however,as the facts are , they are not independent of consc iousness in the same way as the obj ects of the external worldare regarded, they are essentially facts of consciousness .

“What is the relation ,” it may be asked

,

“of psychology to the physical and biological sc iences ? ” Thephysical and biological sc iences constitute a system ofknowledge of the material world . Psychology investigates the genesis o f this knowledge . Mechanics , forexample , treats of motion and space . Psychology investigates not what motion and space are in themselves ,but what the elementary acts of consc iousness are out

of which the space and time perceptions are developed .

The di fferent obj ects which other sciences treat ofmay be regarded psychologically, and studied from thestandpoint of their rise and development in consc iou sness . For obj ects to be known at a ll must first be perceived or conce ived by consc iousness . Psychology im

plies knowledge o f the phys ical world as the contentof consciou sness . In order to know how perception andconception of obj ects originate , those obj ects must firsto f all be given . A thing that is not yet in existence cannot possibly be analyzed . It IS only when knowledge

of obj ects is already formed that one can begin to thinkabou t knowledge itsel f, how it originated and how itcame to be in the shape possess ed by the knowing mind .

Phys i cal sc iences are in that relation independent ofpsychology

,the former can be carried on to a high

Psychic States as Obj ects 33

degree o f perfection withou t any knowledge of psychology, while psychology without knowledge of the phys ical world wou ld s imply lack subj ect matter.Apart , however, from the fact that psychologyhas as its subj ect matter the obj ects o f physical sciencesas perceived by and developed in consc iou sness , i t alsostudies the forms , the character, the way of working ofconsciousness , i t formu lates the laws of how consciousness works , and analyzes into simplest elements andtheir combinations , the rich materia l that goes to makeup the mental l i fe of individual existence , or what isknown as mind .

The postu lated obj ective real ity acts upon the givenindividual consc iou sness and gives rise to mental stateswhich along Wi th the obj ective representation of thatreal i ty has also its own coloring, its own subj ective s ide .The represented obj ect floats so to say in a stream ofconsciousness . The subj ect matter which the psychologist investigates is not the obj ective real i ty itsel f, butobj ective s tates of consciousness .

We may represent the relation of the psychologist tohis obj ect of study by the following series :

1 2 3

The obj ective The represented The subject ivereality. obj ect . stream .

4 5The obj ective The psychologist.state of consciousness .

We must be on our guard and not confuse objective


thought, the thought of the obj ect, and the obj ect ofthought. The three differ fundamentally, and thestandpoints from which the matter is regarded must beconstantly kept in View . The thought contemplates andholds the obj ect by the function of knowledge it possesses , but the knowledge constituting the thought andthe obj ect of that thought are totally di ff erent in theirnature . The obj ect in the external world may undergochange , but the thought that got hold of the obj ect maystill persist, or on the other hand , the thought maychange and the obj ect sti ll remain the same ; or againthe thoughts and the obj ect may both change . As I amwriting these lines a red book lying on my table stronglyattracts my attention , and for the time being constitutes the obj ect of my thought . I can close my eyes andcontinue to represent to mysel f the red book, its color,i ts s i ze , its content, in short all about the red book, thered book constituting so to say the “ focal- obj ect ” of mythought constantly renew ing itsel f by the fresh materialwhich it draws from the surrounding marginal stream .

Meanwhile the book may be changed, the cover may betorn , the pages may be mu ti lated , the book may be burntor substituted by another body or by a totally di ff erentobj ect, say an inkstand ; or on the other hand, thebook may remain lying on my desk undisturbed , but mythought may change . I may begin to think of something else , say of the coming election or the Spanish war ;or both the book and thoughts may change , the bookmay be taken away and I at the same time may thinkof something else , say o f the watch and its mechanism .

The cognizant thought that possesses the obj ect andthe object of that thought are from a purely scientific

psychological standpoint, independent variables .

Psychic States as Obj ects 3 5

Thought i tsel f with its object may in its turn becomean obj ect o f thought , and here once more the same relations obta in . The contemplations or psychologica l analysis of a thought mu st be discriminated from thethought as the material or object of that ana lysis . Fromthe confu sion of these di ff erent aspects many a fallacyresu lts . Thu s the schematic incessant change in the flowo f obj ective time is confused w ith the state of consciousness having time as its obj ect, and the attributes o f oneare fallaciously ascribed as undergoing continuouschange . Another fallacy often committed by the so

called new psychology ” i s the substitution of theattributes o f the object for those of the functioningthought.

CHAPTER V

THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY

SYCHOLOGY, we sa id , deals with states ofconsc iou sness , bu t these states are not independent , floating in the ai r so to say. They are inconnection w i th some material existence , and

not with physical real ity as a whole , but with somedefinite individu al body. We must keep in mind that

psychology is first of all a natural science , and the onlything it has to take into consideration is experience.

Now as a matter of fact we never find a thought , anidea , a sensation setting up on its own hook and havingcomplete independence of all phys ical reality . Wereeven such a thing poss ible , we could not know of it,because the only way we come to know of other thoughtsis through thei r physical activiti es perceived by our senseorgans . We know of the ex i stence of other individualhate , love , anger, friendship , kindness by the physicalexpressions of those feelings , by the acts that aecompany them . We know of the thoughts , of the emotions ,of our companions , by the mu scular expressions of theface , by the changes in the brill iancy of the eye , by thegeneral bodily state

,su ch as qu ietness or restlessness , by

their gestures , by many other physical expressions , bu t

principally by means of those phys ical mani festationsknown as speech . Were all those concomitant physicalprocesses absent , there wou ld have been no means whatever o f know ing of the very existence of external stateso f consciousness . As an empirical science psychology

36


tivity. We know that our neighbor is conscious , becauseof his active purposive l i fe . When a fly is on his nose ,he ra ises his hand and brushes i t away ; he knows howto walk and preserve equil ibrium ; avoids obstacles ; l ivesin a house for protection from the changes of weatherand from harmful intruders ; seeks shelter from ra in ;dresses himsel f warmly on a frosty winter day ; a thousand other movements all o f them express ive of purpos ive activi ty tell us o f our neighbor

’s consc iousness ,intelligence . The stone on the road changes its placeaccording to the influences o f incident forces ; the grainof dust i s blown hither and thither by the wind ; theydo not show a more or less definite purpos ive activi tyunder changing circumstances . The disturbance of thei requ il ibrium does not stimulate them to indu ce changesin the external envi ronment, changes that would tend torestore that lost equil ibrium . They, therefore , have no

purpose . For a purpose is the tendency to real i zesome external action which is useful or indispensable tothe li fe - existence of the particu lar individual being. Thetendency to the maintenance of a definite activi ty in opposition to the onset of disturbing forces of the environment in order to restore the lost equi l ibrium , may becons idered as the universal formula for purposive li fein general .This formula holds true of all animal l i fe. Theman in running a fter the car has purpose, so hasthe cat in chasing the mouse , so has the deer in fleeing from the hunter. The very amoeba , that lump of

protoplasm , in extending its pseudopodia to draw in thebit o f nutriment, possesses the germ of purposive activi ty

,and some primitive psychic state must therefore be

ascribed to it. Life is essentially purpos ive in its na

The Scope of Psychology 39

ture. Wherever, there fore , we meet with l i fe , theresome form o f psychic state , however prim itive and elementary, must be present. Psychi c states stand in themost intimate relationship to l i fe activity. The two infact cannot be separated . Psychos is is concomitant withbiosis . Psychologists as well as phys iologists all agreethus far, that there is no psychos i s without neuros i s ;some go further and aflirm that there is no neuros i swithout psychosis ; I think , we are closer to the truth ,i f we advance still further and assume , that there is nobios is without psychos is . Psychi c states must be predicated not only o f highly organized animals , possessedof a nervous system , but also of the most elementarymonocellular organisms .The evolutionist especially must accept our last con

elus ion , for he wi ll agree that consciousness did notcome into existence per saltum,

he wi ll acknowledge thatthe germs o f. consc ious l i fe characteristi c o f the highestorganized being must already be present in the lowesttypes of l i fe , out o f which developed the higher, themore complex organisms .We are now in a position to define the scope of psy

chology.

Psychology is the science of psychic states both as to

content and form,regarded from an objective stand

point, and brought in relation to the living corporeal in

dividual.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGY

ACTS of consc iou sness , we pointed out, are thesubj ect matter of psychology. The qu estionarises as to the sou rces of the facts . The botanist, when he w ishes to carry out a series o f ex

periments , goes into the herbarium or into the field togather the material for his study. The entomologistcollects his spec imens on the street, field , and forest. Thesame holds true in the case of all other sc iences . Theexternal world is infinitely rich , it is an inexhaustiblemine from which phys ical sc ience draws its facts . Nowwhat are the sou r

’ces of the psychologist ? The psychologist cannot possibly go out into the forest, catch hisspec imens , dry them , and pin them for his observationand study.

This question as to the sou rces of psychologycomes to u s with greater force , when we realize ,that psychological facts are not of the same order withthose of the rest o f natural physical sc i ences . It is , ofcourse , evident that we mu st draw our material fromconsciou sness , but where shall we turn to find the facts

’J

Where are the particu la r localities from which we canwork out and bring to light mental facts ? Su ch is thedi ffi cult qu estion that arises be fore the mind of thesci entist, who has been trained in the school of concretenatural sci ence . He finds himsel f helpless . The neu rologist to whom a psychological training is truly invaluable

,finds himself i ll at ease when in his investigations

40

The Sources of Psychology 4 1

he strikes a problem which has to be studied mainlyfrom a psychological point of View . A pi ece of tissue ,a lump o f protoplasm , a nerve cell with its dendrons andaxons can be sta ined , mounted , observed , and exper

imented upon , but who can get hold of a fact o f consciou sness , of an elementary psychic state , of a sensation , of a feeling, o f an idea , sta in them , put them un

der the microscope for sc ientific investigation ? Thefacts o f consc iou sness are so pe culi ar, so di ff erent inkind from those which form the subj ect matter of othersc i ences that they who are tra ined exclu s ively in concrete natu ra l sc i ences are at a loss where to look for“real ” psychological facts .Some even go so far as to doubt whether facts o f

consc iou sness are “ real ” fa cts at all . Frequently Ihave heard from people w ith a good medical edu cation , people who were far from being unintelligent, thatthey doubted the reality of psychic facts :

“they are notanything ! nothing substanti al !” Comical as this lastassertion may appear, one can understand its reason ;one can understand the consternation and bewildermentof him who for the first time pu ts his foot on the threshold o f psychology. What they meant to express was thestrange experience o f having been confronted with factso f a natu re totally di ff erent from the ones w ith whichthey u sually dealt. The facts w ith which they are conversant are o f a tangible natu re , bu t the facts o f consc iou sness are not tangible , they cannot be seen , nor tasted ,nor smelled , nor weighed by pounds and ounces , normeasu red by ru lers and compasses . In short , psychological facts cannot be reached by any o f the sense organs ; that is why they are su ch a pu zz le , that is whysome arrive at the conclusion that facts o f conscious


ness can hardly be considered as facts , that they are notanything substantial . Still on further reflection any ofthese sceptics will admit that the phenomena of consciousness exis t

,and as such they must be facts .

In fact, i f one wants to be a thorough sceptic, he maydoubt the real ity of the external material world . All

that might be nothing but a dream , nothing but an illusion , a ha lluc ination . We have no sure criterion of thetruth of the external material reality, but one thing re

mains perfectly clear in all this destructive sceptici smand that is the real ity o f the doubting thought, the existence of the sceptic consciousness . That is why Des

ca rtes , the father of modern philosophy, beginning w ithprofound sceptic i sm as to the reali ty of things finallyfound his criterion of the tru th of real existence in hisvery doubting thought, and he expressed it in his famous “

Cogito ergo s um.

” Thought, there fore , i s evenmore real than the objects of the material world ,we know of the latter only through thought, throughconsc iousness . In short , consc iousness is a stern real i ty,and the phenomena of consciousness are real facts .We may re fer here to the behavior hypothesis recentlyadvanced by Watson . The psychological knowledge o fanimals can only be obtained from the observation ofthei r action , of thei r behavior, or of their adaptations tothei r environment . The same holds true in the case ofhuman ps ychology . Man does not di ff er from otheranimals and should be studied in the same way. This ,i f I understand Watson aright, i s essentially his position . Watson goes to the extent of denying the veryexistence of “centrally initiated processes ,

” he reducesa ll psychology to peripherally induced processes , sensory and motor. He contests the presence or the veryexistence o f images and denies the presence of any af

The Sources of Psychology 43

fective elements . Perhaps it may be best to quote Watson’s own words

“Having thus summarily dismissed the image and thea ff ective elements , I crave perm ission to restate the essential contention of the behaviorist . It is thi s : theworld of the physicist, the biologist, and the psychologist is the same , a world consisting of obj ects— the i rinterests center around di fferent obj ects , to be sure , butthe method of observation o f these obj ects is not essentially di fferent in the three branches of science . G ivenincreased accuracy and scope of technique , and the behaviorist will be able to give a complete account of asubject’s behavior both as regards immediate response

to stimulation , which is e ff ected through the larger muscles ; delayed response, which is e ff ected through thesame muscles ( so - called action a fter deliberation )these two forms comprising what I have called explicit

behavior ; and the more elusive types , such as the movements of the la rynx , which go on in cases where actionupon stimulation is delayed ( so - called thought processes ) . This latter form of behavior, which mani festsi tsel f chiefly in movements of the larynx, but which maygo on in ( to the eye ) imperceptible form , in the fingers ,hands , and body as a whole , I should call implicit behavior. For years to come , possibly always , we shallhave to content ou rselves with experimental observationand control of explici t behavior. I have a very decidedconviction , though , that not many years will pass be foreimplici t behavior will likewise yi eld to experimentaltreatment .

“Possibly the most immediate result o f the acceptanceof the behaviorist’s view will be the elimination of sel fobservation and of the introspective reports resulting


from such a method .

The View taken by Watson is physico - biological .While one can sympathise with his Views in makingpsychology more of a biological study, still one cannot help reali zing the fact that he takes an extreme Viewwhen he w ishes to redu ce all mental processes to behavior . His view of a ffection as being essentially senseprocesses seems to be sound . He should not

,however,

involve his View of a ffection w ith the more narrow sectarian v iew of sex analys is forced gratu i tou sly on clinical facts . A ffection and emotion are no doubt peripherally indu ced and are probably due to the actionof the central nervous system and glandu lar secretions o f internal organs . In this respect one mayfu lly agree w i th the behavior hypothesis . There is noneed of invoking sex to that e ff ect as Watson himselfstates it : “ It is not essential to my contention that theabove vague suggestion shou ld be true . It is essential

to our pos ition to have afiection reducible to sense pro

cesses . It is even more probable that the mechanism isglandu lar ; that very slight increase in the secretion

produ cts gives us the one group ; checking or decreasing the secretion , probably the other .

”

What, however, one cannot accept is the extremeView of the denial of introspection . Introspectionwill ever remain the fundamental method in normal andabnormal psychology. The very problem of sensations ,ideas

,images , thoughts , a ffects, emotions , has no mean

ing w ithou t introspection . We mus t know the psychic

s tates or mental processes from our own experiences .

Pa in , pleasu re , feelings , anger, fear, love , acqu i re theirmeaning only from the introspective attitude of theobserver.


changing the obj ective stimulus ; the other method, andby far the most effi cient and fruitful , is the modificationof the very function on which the psychic content depends .Memory, for instance , may be studied by giving the

subj ect a series of auditory or visua l impress ions at given inte rvals , and then seeing how many of the series thesubj ect can remember a fter a given interval . We canthus determ ine the role played by such factors as time,number of impress ions , number of repetitions , etc. Thefunction of memory rema ins the same, and only thestimuli o f the psychic content are modified . We may,however, study memory from a totally di ff erent standpoint, and that is by the disturbance of its function . Dis

turbance of function may be studied in artificial statesproduced by drugs , or induced by hypnosis ; or by investigating cases in which the function is accidentallydisturbed, such , for instance, as are to be found in di fferent forms of amnes ia and aphasia .The second method is by far the more importantof the two , and is extremely valuable . For it is only bydisturbances in the function of thought that we canlearn something about the factors and nature of mentall i fe . We cannot possibly learn about the nature of aprocess , unless we disturb it artificially, or unless we tryto study cases in which we can find the process in diff erent stages or degrees of perturbation ; here one factor ismissing, there another is exaggerated, and so on . Fromsuch cases i t is easy to analyze the constituent factors andthei r interrelations . In mechanics , for instance , the lawof inertia would have never been discovered , i f not forthe imagining of such a case as the absence of all fri ction

,or its approximate removal. The ancients who

Psychology and Psychopathology 47

looked to the ordinary phenomena of common l i fe , thatis to the normal, cons idered that bodies are boundto stop . The ancient physicists, relying on the ir observation s of the normal , bel ieved that bodies in falling traverse space in proportion to thei r weight ; i t requireda Gal ileo to detect the fallacy and show that bodies , no matter what their s i ze and weight be, falling from a high place or in a vacuum, fall to the groundat the same time . The same holds true in the case o fchemistry ; no obse rver o f water in its

“normal ” statewould have detected the presence of hydrogen and oxygen . Only under highly artificial or abnormal conditions was it possible to discover the consti tuents that goto make up the compound water.I f we turn to the sciences deal ing with more com

plex phenomena , we find i llustrated the same truth . Weknow how highly instructive Darwin found it to followclosely for a period of many years experiments o f breedsin artificia l selection , and to what capita l account heturned his highly valuable observations o f all forms ofcurios ities and monstrosities . We all know how valua

ble the observation and study of al l forms of anomal iesor variations from the normal type or species proved tothe final establishment of the theory of evolution . Thepre -Darwinian zoologist ignored variation regardingit simply as an exception to the normal , as a mere abnorma li ty, as a pathological mani festation which is ofl ittle value to the scientist, who is only occupied withthe discovery of general laws , laws of the normal . As amatter of fact, i t was just these neglected variations,deviations from the normal that tu rned out to be at thevery foundation of biology, reveal ing the nature andmechanism of the evolution of species .


The same truth we find illustrated in the investigations of the functions of the different parts of the organism . Experiments on animals su ch as vivisection , injecting of toxin matter, etc . , experiments that actuallymean the putting of animals in pathological states

,as

well as the investigation of pathological cases in man,have given phys iology its most valuable treasu res .Knowledge of the normal arises out of knowledge ofthe abnormal . In fact we may even say that the normal itsel f originates in the abnormal . It i s in variations , in anomalies , that the normal spec ies takes itsorigin .

Strictly speaking th'

e normal is not at all a sc ientificconcept, i t i s pu rely provis ional in its nature , and holdsonly good from a restricted point of View in transitionalstages of sc ience . The normal is that which is common ;the normal is the u sual ; and it i s not the u su al , but theunusual that gives birth to new li fe in sc ience . The unusu al attracts our attention and reveals to u s the functionand role played by the particu lar a ffected product in thetotal compound .

Taking all this into consideration , I think that theyare wrong who insist that the abnormal can be knownonly from the normal . We can realize now how superficial are those who tell u s “we learn but little from theabnormal , for first of all comes the normal . We reali ze now how detrimental to sc ientific investigation su cha contention is . As a matter of fact the progress ofscience is not from the normal to the abnormal, but thevery reverse , from the abnormal to the normal ; thenormal is but an arbitrary temporary concept, modified ,and determined by the abnormal or unu su al .The supreme importance of pathological research

Psychology and Psychopathology 49

holds especially true in the case of psychology, wherethe phenomena and the conditions on which these depend are so highly complex and so intricate , appearingat the same time so simple and taken as a matter ofcou rse in ordinary l i fe .As we have pointed out in the investigation o f mentall i fe we may either change the psychic or obj ectivecontent, or e ffect changes in the mental function itsel f. In the study o f vision , for instance , we may e ffectchanges in the conditions of external obj ects , leavingthe eye itself undisturbed . We may keep the obj ect atdiff erent distances and study its appearances , put the object in water and have it refracted at di ff erent angles ;we may look at it through different prisms , coloredglasses or contrast its color when appearing in combination with other colors , whether it be success ive or simultaneou sly . Instead, however, of e ff ecting changes in theobj ects taken in by the eye , we may study the mechanismof vis ion by investigating the disturbances of thefunction of sight itself under the influence of drugs in

jected into the eye , or in different ocular diseases . Thelatter method is by far the more valuable for reveal ingthe real mechanism of the visual apparatus .S imilarly in the study of memory we may follow the

method of the German school , such for instance as thatof Ebbinghau s and others , and investigate the laws ofmemory by analyz ing the changes effected in its contents ;or we may study the mechanism of memory by studyingits disturbances in di fferent forms of amnesia and mentaldiseases . S ince psychology primari ly deals with the lawsof psycho - phys iologica l functions , i t will be admittedthat the more important and valuable method is the onethat has for its subj ect matter the changes going on di


rectly in the materi al under investigation . The investigations , however, of changes or disturbances of menta lfunction itsel f are really a study of the abnormal , tesearches into the domain of mental pathology. In psychology , as in many other sciences , especially those ofthe biological order to which psychology naturally belongs , the pathological method is by far the most important.We can real ize now the reason why it would be wellfor psychology to follow clos ely not the methods ofphysical sciences , but those of the biologica l sciences .The material with which phys ics deals lacks thepathological element, i t can be introduced only figuratively , not so is it in the order of phenomena withwhich biology deals . In biology variations , abnormali

ties , pathological elements stand out in the foreground,and no step can be made without taking them into consideration . The psychologist in order to succeed and ohtain more effi c ient and valuable results must keep inmind clearly the fact that the psychic process is a formof li fe in general, its phenomena are naturally relatedto the province of biology, and that of the highest partof it . The methods o f psychological investigation mustfollow the l ine not of the phys ical, but of the biologicalsciences .

CHAPTER VI I I

THE SPIRITUALI STIC AND MATERIALI STIC HYPOTHESES

F we scrutinize more closely the science o f psychology , we find that it is essentially dynamical incharacter. Consciousness is the subj ect matterof psychology ; but consc iousness is dynamic , i t is

first o f all an activity, a process . Now all sciences thatdeal with processes cannot possibly help forming someworking hypothesis that should uni fy the facts dealtwith , and should above all be a guide for further research . Mechanics has its hypothesis of masses , forces ,energy, inertia , conservation of matter and energy ;thermotics i ts molecular energy ; electri city its ether vibrations and currents ; chemistry the aflinity of atomsdynamic phys iology has its reflex processes ; what isthe fundamental hypothesis o f psychology ?We find the following hypotheses( I ) The Spi ri tuali sti c, or sou l hypothesi s ,( I I ) The Material isti c hypothesis ,( II I ) The Facu lty hypothesis ,( IV ) The Transmission hypothesis ,(V ) The Psycho - physiological hypothesis .

( a ) The Metaphysical ,( b ) The Positive .

We give here a brie f review beginning with the spiritualistic hypothesis . At the very outset I must cautionthe reader aga inst the grave error of con founding spiritualism with spi ritism . The latter i s a rel igious doctrineof l i fe a fter death , and of the influences of natural or

5 1


resurrected spi ri ts ; the former is a philosophical theory,hoary with age , that attempts to expla in the phenomenao f consc iousness . Su ch men as Lotze and Ladd are ardentadvocates of spi ritu alism . According to this hypothesisthere ex ists a spi ri tual substance , a sou l , that acts in allthe processes o f consc iousness . The sou l is the immu table principle that unifies all the phenomena of consciou sness ; in other words , all mental processes are but manifestations of the sou l’s activity .

The medical man tra ined in the school of concretephys ical sciences may smile , i f not sneer, at the mentioning of the “sou l ” Su ch a hypothesis is in his opinionnothing but an anachronism . He may consider it asa theory long exploded by sc i ence and now only l ingering among the lower ignorant classes , a theory which anintelligent sc i entist shou ld be ashamed to introdu ce intohis work even for the sake of discussion , and elu c idation of his subj ect,— the “sou l ” i s nothing but superstition . To call a theory supersti tion does not re fu te i t .The significant fact that Prof . Ladd in his volume onphys iologica l psychology defends it valiantly, thatS igwart in his

“Logic ” takes up a rms for it, and

also that such a great thinker as Lotze , himsel f amedical man , takes i t under his protection and finds itperfectly rational , and in fact the only tenable hypothesis , seems to show that there mu st be something inthe “sou l ,

” and i f superstition it be , i t is one that has tobe reckoned with , and not dismissed w i th contempt . Wemu st, there fore , examine the reasons and facts that u rgesome thinkers and sci entists to accept the sou l as aworking hypothesis for the phenomena of consc iou sness .There are two weighty considerations that are stronglyin favor of spi ri tual ism .

54 Normal ' and Abnormal Psychology

we have no right whatever to conclude that they requiretwo di fferent substances . Time is diff erent from space ,but are they two di ff erent substances ? Consciousnessmay di ffer widely from matter and sti ll require no onesimple substance for its existence and act1v1ty .

The only sol id argument that remains for the soulhypothesis is that o f mental synthesis . The very consideration , however, on which the spiritual ist lays somu ch stress serves as his best re futation . That phenomena o f consciousness di ff er radically from material

ones is a fundamental proposition with the psychologistin general , and with the spiritual i st in particulaf , butthis i s far from supporting spi ri tualism . On the contrary , i t overthrows his last stronghold . For i f mentalfacts di ff er in kind from physi cal materia l facts , i t ispoor reasoning to raise diffi culties perta ining to one region , and carry them over into a totally di ff erent one .It would be senseless ‘to raise aesthetic di ffi cu lties inchemistry or mechanics , but it i s no better to reasonthat because a medium is required for physica l obj ects ;movements

,forces to combine thei r effects in one

resultant , therefore , a medium , a substance, a soul , i salso required for a synthesis o f a totally di fferent orderof phenomena , those of consc iousness . The two ordersdi ff er in kind, and what i s found necessary in one , is notfor that reason also proven to be indi spensable to theother. It must first be proven that the conditions ofunification are the same in both be fore the argumentfrom mental synthesis may be accepted as val id . Statesof consciousness may become synthetized, without anymedium , without any tertium quid, without any soul .The spi ri tualist by his “soul ” hypothesis reallyundermines his own position . For i f it be grant

The Spiritualis tic and Materialis tic Hypotheses 5 5

ed that the conditions of unification are the same inmental as in physical activity ; that a medium is requ iredin both in order to get a unity, a resu ltant, then thewhole “soul ” structu re tumbles to the ground .

M ateri al and mental phenomena cannot possiblybelong to two radically di ff erent substances , i f the condition s of thei r activity are exactly of the same nature .It would have been perfectly logi cal had the di ff erencebetween consciou sness and the phys ical world been asserted and emphas ized , and had the medium , the soul ,been totally le ft out.The greatest diflicu lty , however, which the spi ritual istencounters is the interaction o f the two substances . I fmatter and soul are di fferent in natu re how can theyinteract, how can they come into any relation ? Hoursin so far as they are di ff erent from pounds , or miles ,have nothing in common , and as su ch do not interact ; anhour cannot modi fy a pound , nor can pounds changehou rs , and i f thi s holds true o f phenomena of the external world where the di ff erence a fter all is not so verygreat, it mu st with spec i al force recoi l on the spi ri tual istwhere the soul and body are so totally di ff erent in all tespects . The only way out of the di ffi cu lty, i f one is cons istent and is not a fra id to take the consequences , i s tointrodu ce the miraculous and say that the interaction i sdue to the intervention of the dei ty. This View was infact taken by the followers of Descartes . The spi ri tual i st ,however, with a philosophi cal and sci entific tra ining willrather be inconsistent and support his view by all kindsof props than to accept such a conclusion , because heknows that it practi cally means defeat, i t means that thehypothesis i s not working, and that the soul mu st takeshelter under the wing of the dei ty, the refuge of ig


norance.

From a purely scientific standpoint we must rej ect thissoul - hypothes i s . The first requirement of a scientifichypothes is is that its hypothetical cause should be ofsuch a nature as to be verifiable by experiment and ob

servation . Now in the case of the soul , this condition isnot fulfilled . The soul is something that l ies outs idethe range of experience , and could never be broughtwith in the l imits o f empiric i sm , the basis of science . Thespiritual i st, in fact, has not even a positive notion of his“soul ,

” he either frames i t in wholly negative terms ,that i t is not changeable , that it is not material ; or, i fpressed hard , he falls back on the phenomena of consciousness , the very phenomena the soul i s called for toexpla in .

Furthermore , a scientific hypothesis i s justified andfound useful , i f shown that i t makes the facts moreeas ily understood . This cannot be shown in the case ofthe soul . As a hypothesi s the sou l i s useless and seientifically unjustifiable . The acceptance of the

“spirit,”

o f the soul, does not make it a b it easier for us to comprehend the modus operandi of the states of consciousness . The sou l is an immutable , indefinite , indescribable , incomprehensible being, and the insuperable difficu lty of how i t gives rise to conscious activity requiresanother hypothes is . I f mental phenomena present di fficulties , spiritual i sm doubles them . The soul in fact, i sthe “double ,

” the ghost o f consc iousness . The soul isan unverifiable superfluous enti ty, i t is not a vera causa

in nature ; i t explains nothing, and withou t removingdifficulties is only introduced as an additional burden .

Be fore we dismiss the soul hypothes i s , we may pointout that it must be rej ected on quite di ff erent grounds,

The Spiritualis tic and Materialistic Hypotheses 5 7

i t i s at bottom unscientific , i t is metaphys i cal , i t goes intothe ultimate nature of things , an investigation that doesnot fall within the province of science . The soul- hypothesi s assumes the existence o f an abiding unchan geableenti ty behind the veil o f mental phenomena , an enti tywhich in the flow and change of the phenomena remainsthe same and is the really real, the ultimate nature o f thefacts o f consciousness . This belongs to the ontologicalpart of metaphysics , but shou ld not be introduced intoscience . The reader will real i ze now, why thewhole compl icated “soul discuss ion ” is taken up here .It i s to emphasize the fact that psychology has nothingto do with substances , noumena , entities , and quiddities ,that psychology has nothing to do with the inner natu re of consc iousness . Psychology, l ike all other sc iences , describes , class ifies , and investigates by means ofobservation and experimentation facts of consc iou snessand thei r relations , and endeavors to express these relations in genera l formu lae or laws ; a ll attempts to makeof psychology more than this can only result in bad metaphysics .

The material i sti c hypothesis i s even worse metaphysics than is the spi ritualisti c one . It is a hypothesis whichin spite o f its evident absurdity is none the less in favorwith some representatives o f the medical profession .

Matter and force , as Buchner puts i t, give rise to , or produce consciousness , or as Cabanis and Moleschott ex

press i t“the b rain produces thought as the l iver secretes

bile . ” This hypothesis is unscientific and metaphys ical ,because i t attempts to penetrate into the inner nature

of consciousness , and claims to have it resolved into“matter. ” It is bad metaphysi cs , because i t takes itsmatter ” on trust, without any critical reflection . More


over it is more crude and worse metaphys ics than is thesou l hypothesis , because it lacks even the recognition ofthe most elementary, psychological proposition , namelythe knowledge of fundamental difference between mentaland material phenomena .

Tu rning now to the facu lty- hypothesis , we find that1t ls nothing else than spi ritualism under a somewhatdi ff erent form . The facu lty- hypothesis chops the mindinto many different parts , termed facu lties , one i s forreading, another for speaking, another for remembering, another sti ll for w i ll ing, and so on . Sometimesthey are limited to a few , and sometimes they are multiplied to infinity.

The faculty- hypothesis is a cheap edition of spi ri tualism , i t i s spi ri tualism many times over. Instead of onesou l it has many of them . Spiritual ism has but one di f~

ficulty and that i s the sou l which , l ike an omnipotentdeity, presides in some mysteriou s way over mental andorganic activ i ti es . The facu lty- hypothesi s has an infinitenumber o f them , inasmu ch as it multiplies the deity intoan endless number of gods and spirits that take chargeof different psychic and psychomotor departments .One can see the reason of the facu lty hypothesis . It

originated with people who as a ru le are inclined to accept uncritically words for realities . Thu s , will , memory

,words that are only collect ive terms for many di f

ferent states of mind , names furnished by the languageof unreflective common sense , are naively taken as indicating some substantial entities , or l ittle spi ri ts existingsomewhere in the brain .

CHAPTER IX

THE TRANSMISSION HYPOTHESI S

HE transmiss ion hypothes is advanced byJames is a modification of the soul hypothesis .The transmission hypothesis postulates theexistence o f a physical world and of an inde

pendent universe o f consciousness . Consc iousness , however, cannot mani fest itsel f in this sublunar world without the occurrence o f definite physical changes . Thatlevel of physical changes which makes the mani festationso f consc iou sness possible is termed the phys ical threshold . Now the ocean o f consciousness pours forth its psychic waves into the material world with the rise and fallof the physical threshold . The threshold is to be picturedas a sort o f flood gate regulating the volume and imtens ity of the transmitted current. The rising of the threshold diminishes the psychic stream , while the lowering ofthe threshold permits a greater volume of consciousnessto pour over into our physical world .

The transmiss ion hypothesis has ce rta in advantagesover the previous ones discussed by us . While this hypothesis postulates the independence of consc iousness , i ti s also in accord with the sc i entific proposition now generally accepted , namely that mental l i fe is somehow connected with or is a function of brain activity, only specify ing that this function is one of transmission . It cla imsto fall in l ine with the threshold concept of psychophysics as worked out by Fechner, and further harrowed

5 9


by the new psychology movement ; moreover, i t iscomprehensive enough to embrace all the facts andspeculations brought out by recent investigations in thedomain of mental pathology.

The transmission hypothesis , however, has alsodisadvantages which are of such a grave nature as tomake one hesitate to accept it . The transm ission hypothesis from its very nature is unverifiable. For, i f, byhypothes is , consciousness mani fests itself in this sublunarworld ( the only one we know ) only under physicalconditions , how can we ever come to know and veri fy apostulated world of pure consciousness ? Being outsidethe domain of our psychophysical world

,the universe of

disembodied consciousness cann ot, by hypothesis , furnishu s the means for its verification. In this sublunar worldwe can know of the existence of consciousness throughits physi cal express ions , through its being embodied .

How then , can we ever reach a universe of disembodiedconsc iousness ? But a hypothesis which from its very nature i s not verifiable cann ot possibly be accepted.

The transmiss ion hypothes is is a ll the more unacceptable as the terms in which it is expressed are contradictory, and the analogy on which it is based is essentiallyi llegitimate . Consciousness is supposed to be di ff erentin nature from the phys ical world and existing independently, the psychophysical threshold alone regulatingthe volume of the stream of consciousness to be pouredover into the material world . The threshold then whichis physical in character limits consc iousness , but how canthe two be limited by each other when they are totallydi fferent in nature ? In assuming two diff erent universes ,we assert that the two cannot l imit each other, but inexam ining aga in the concept of threshold we make a


s ion hypothesis lacks this essential requirement . Itsagent, disembodied consciousness

,i s not a vera causa

,

nor can it ever be drawn into the circle of experience . Agood hypothesis must be framed with a View of becoming a possible fact

,but this hypothes is from its very na

ture discla ims this poss ibil ity, since its agent is in aregion that l ies outside our world of experience .For this very last reason , namely, for speculating in

things extra -mundane , the hypothesis may also becharged with committing transgress ions in metaphys i cs .Such a hypothesis is the more metaphysical as the phenomena under consideration are dealt with as i f theywere entities .Furthermore , the hypothesis only seemingly holds to

the empirical law that consciousness is a function of thebra in . For i f consciousness is in a separate world a llthe psychic phenomena are in existence from all eternity,ready made, the phenomena of consciousness have reallynothing to do with the brain , inasmuch as they exist fromall eterni ty, in a region outs ide and totally independentof the bra in . Thus the hypothesis by its very character,even i f the matter be regarded from a purely logicalstandpoint undermines the proposition which it undertook to explain , and as such can hardly be considered asval id .

Finally, it may be urged, that the invocation of anextra -mundane world helps matters little , as it does notshow the modus operandi of the interdependence ofmenta l and physical phenomena , inasmuch as the ris ingor fall ing of a phys ical threshold does not in the leastexpla in or show how a stream of consc iousness is made

possible to vary in volume and intensity. Without explaining the proposition that mental processes vary as

The Transmission Hypothesis 63

physica l processes , the transm ission hypothes is only as

sumes an additional world of disembodied consci ousnessand thus gratu itously multipl ies enti ties .

CHAPTER X

THE METAPHYSICAL HYPOTHESES OF PARALLELISM

HE Sp inozisti c doctrine of pa ralleli sm cl a imsthat the mental and physical orders run parallel to each other, taking its stand on purelymetaphysical grounds , namely, on the ex

istence of one substance with an infinite number of attributes , a ll expressing the nature o f this substance. Twoof these attributes , being mind and matter which in aninfinite number of parallel running modes or phenomenaexpress the nature of this one substance . A modificationof the unitary substance regarded under the attributeof mind is a mental mode or phenomenon . The same regarded under the attribute of matter or extension is amaterial mode or physical phenomenon . Mental andphysi cal phenomena are both mani festations of one unitary substance . There is no need for me to point outthat this double aspect of one un itary substance belongsto metaphysical dogmatism , of substantialism, and assuch cannot possibly be adm i tted into the province ofpsychology as a natu ral science .The voluntari stic school does not acknowledge a strictparallelism in the sense of a double aspect of the sameunknowable or of two infinite attributes of the eternalnature of the same substance , but it does teach a psycho

phys iologica l parallelism , grounding it on the doubleaspect, subj ective and obj ective , o f one

“unitary” ex

perience. This di ffers but li ttle from the substantialisticdogmatism . Instead of one unitary substance the volun

64

The M etaphysical Hypotheses of Parallelism 65

tarist substitutes a no less metaphys i cal category of“unitary experience . ”

Another metaphys ical view of the new associationistor sensationalist school grounds parallel ism on epistemological and metaphysical grounds . Psycho- phys iological parallel i sm i s partly a matter of pure defin ition,partly a matter of phi losophical considerations . Thisschool defines a psychic obj ect as one belonging to as ingle subj ect, one individual only, Whi le a physical object i s one belonging to many subj ects . Now, reasonsthis school , i f psychology is to be a science at all , itmust surely be of such a nature as to be communicatedto other subj ects , that is , i t must become common property , and since by definition , only a phys ical obj ect is anobj ect of many and is communicable , hence a psychicobj ect to become communicable must be expressed inphysical terms .This excursion into the region of metaphysics and

epistemology of the otherwise matter of fact and common sense school i s the result o f good intention of be ingthorough - going, hence , this metaphysical definition ofmental and physical phenomena of the “one ” and the( C

many .

”

Another argument adduced by the same school seemsto be somewhat more sound . Physical facts i t is allegedhave a necessary causa l connection , while psychi c factsare only connected by association , which is not one ofnecessi ty . An idea a is sometimes followed by idea band sometimes by idea c and so on . There is no invariable connection in psychic l i fe , such as is to be foundin physi cal facts . The soundness o f th is argument, however

,i s rather questionable . For i t may be contended

that no fastening bonds are ever observed in phys i cal


phenomena , the only thing observed is a relation of se

quence of antecedent and consequent, and in case ofcau sation an invariable sequence of a definite antecedentand definite consequent. Now psychic facts also manifest relations o f sequence , we observe antecedents followed by consequents .The argument that an idea is sometimes followed byone and sometimes by another idea showing the absenceof invariable sequence is , i f looked at closer, of a ratherdubious character . An idea a or idea b i s only ob

jectively the same , by having the same object ,but the thought, mental stream , or moment consc iousnessthat possess that idea may not be the same , but i t i sj ust this mental stream , the moment - consciou snessthat determines the content of the succeeding idea .

The thought of a i s di fferent according to the di fference o f the mental stream or moment consc iou sness . It is one of the psychologist’s fallac ies toconsider that i f the obj ect is the same then the thoughtthat possesses the object mu st also be the same . Nowideas of the same a are totally di ff erent in di fferent mental streams , j ust as two di fferent minds regarding thesame obj ect have absolutely di ff erent psychic states . It isthere fore clear that an idea a may be sometimes followed by b and sometimes by another idea . An ideaa followed by b i s altogether di ff erent from idea a followed by c. It is only the recurrence of the same mentalstream or moment consc iousness that would give thesame sequence . This i s clearly observed in hypno idicstates where the same moment consc iou sness recurs , thesame sensations , ideas , feelings , and actions follow ininvariable succession .

CHAPTER XI

THE UNITARY EXPERIENCE OF VOLUNTARISM

N the cou rse of ou r discu ss ion , we had aga in andagain to refer to the data and postu lates o f psychology. I t wou ld be well to give now a short reviewof them so as to bring them clearly be fore the

mind of the reader. The fact that the postulates arenot kept clearly in view leads one to commit many a fallacy .

Psychology assumes the val idi ty of unanalyzed criteri a o f reali ty taken as valid by common sense . Theverification o f illus ions , hallucinations , and delusions is

,

finally based on the dictum of common sense . The .

work of sci ence may a fter all be nothing but an i

i llus ion , an halluc ination , or a delusion of consciousness . =What keeps up the scientist in his work is his fi rm be l ie fthat mankind believe in it , and that when other peoplea re put under the same conditions they will veri fy hisexperiences .Sc ience assumes the postulates on which all expe rience

o f common sense is based . Sc i ence furn ishes our knowledge of the external world, but sc ience is essenti ally notsel f- consciou s , and it cannot there fore on its owngrounds answer the qu estion as to the validity of i tsknowledge . Is there something independent in that externally perceived obj ect, the house , for instance , or isthe psychic account all there is to it ? This is a problemnot to be answered on psychological grounds . Knowledge , i ts poss ibili ty, i ts nature , and its general aspect

67


must be taken for granted . Psychological knowledge ,general for all subj ects mu st be assumed, as well as general knowledge of the obj ective world . The psychologist,l ike other sc ientists , mu st assume that his experiencesare so conditioned, that though they may be unique ,still i f others were to be put under the same conditionsand confronted with the same external real ities

,they

would pass through similar experiences . In short, psychology assumes the validity of its knowledge , its general val idity for all know ing subjects , also knowledgeof an externally existing obj ect, analyzed from the subljective standpoint into its psychological elements . Psychology , therefore , has really far more assumptions at itsbasis than any other natural science , for in addition tothe assumption of the existence o f an external world itmust assume a knowing or sens itive subject, and a lso theinterrelation of the two .

It is true that the so - called Voluntaristic schoolcla ims that psychology is the only sc ience that has noassumption at its basis . The representative of thatschool cla ims that there i s but one “unitary experience.

” From this “unitary experience natural sci

ence abstracts the knowing subject and as such dealswith abstract mediate experiences requiring auxil ia ryassumptions , not so is psychology which deals with experience as it is immediately presented to the experiencing subj ect. ” According to the voluntarist natural science deals with mediate experience , while psychologydeals with immediate experience requiring no assump

tions .This argument is questionable on the very face of it.For the existence o f that “unitary experience ” i s i tselfan assumption ; it impl ies that the experience and the


sensation itsel f with which psychology deals is notimmediately given ; i t requires a long tra in ing beforethis is separated and si fted from experience ; the psychological aspect of experience is really secondary, andas su ch mediate .I f by “ immediate we mean to indicate the fact that

the psychic process must antedate the knowledge of theexternal obj ective world, the propos ition can be contestedonce more ; for along with the psychic process the ohjcet also is given ; espec ia lly is this true of the ideal i sti cmetaphysical presupposition of the voluntaristic schoolthat identifies the obj ect ive world with the givenprimary experience . The obj ective and subj ective aspeets o f the “unitary experience ” are both suppos edto be given together and, as such , are both immediate . Natural sc ience abstracts the subj ective aspect andpsychology abstra cts the objective aspect the

“mediateexperience . ” We should , however, question the term“mediate experience . ” What may “mediate experience ”

mean ? I f experience has any meaning, i t means something gone or l ived through directly, immediately ; butthen all experience is immediate , otherwise it cannot beexperience . A mediate experience as contrasted with immediate experience can only mean experience inferred,experience not experienced , a concept contradictory in itsvery nature and definition , and must be there fore rejected as a meaningless term . The fact is , that

“mediate ex

perience” is an inappropriate and misleading term

for physical processes which as such are neither experience nor mediate .The very statement of the voluntaristi c psychologistdiscloses the hidden assumption . There is a unitary ex

perience which falls asunder into mediate experience of

(The Unitary Experience of Voluntarism 7 1

natura l science and immediate experience , the subj ectmatter of the psychologist. I f this be so , then the psychologist does not deal with the totality of experience .Since the mediate experience— part of the unitary experience

” falls outs ide its doma in , i t deals only withexperience in so far as i t is regarded as immediate .Evidently psychology requires presuppositions to supplement the abstra cted mediate aspect o f the unitary experience. For the voluntaristic school wi ll surely admitthat unita ry experience is given ne ither in the mediateaspect nor in the immediate aspect alone , and as sciencedeals e ither with the one , or with the other, presuppos itions are ipso facto also indispensable in psychology.

Moreover, psychology even from the standpoint ofthe voluntaristi c school requires more presuppositionsthan the natura l sciences . For experience , even i f i t beimmediate , must still be o f something other than itsel f.The sensation white is

‘

of something white , the touchsensation hard i s o f s omething hard , the pain sensationprick i s o f something sharp , and so on . Now i f thissomething, i f that other of which there i s immediateexperience be the so - called “mediate experience” as th isis the supplementary part of the unitary experience , ofthe tota l real i ty, then

“ immediate experience ” is experience of “mediate experience .

”The science then that

deals with immediate experience must postulate mediateexperience as one o f its fundamental presupposi tions .Thus we come once more to the conclus ion , and this timefrom quite a di ff erent standpoint, that psychology as science in general has i ts presuppos i ti ons , and that i t furthermore presupposes all the presuppos i tions of the naturalsciences .Psychology expla ins the subject and object in con


sciousness , and that only in relation to the ques tion of“how,

”— how we come to know this or that object, but

whether there is an object or subject independent of theexperiencing thought ; what the nature of that object orsubj ect is , whether of mental experience stu ff or of someextra -mental material , is a question that does not belongto the domain of psychology. The answer is di ff erentlygiven by the idealist, material ist, reali st, monist. Inshort, the problem of

“what” belongs not to psychology,but to the province of metaphysics . The Voluntaristi cschool in denying all presuppositions in psychology startswith a purely metaphys ical speculation of the idealisticstamp , namely, in postulating that the external object ofpsychic experience is identical with that same experience .Psychology or any other science must rej ect unhesitatingly such metaphysical speculations .

CHAPTER XII

THE INDUCTIVE BASIS OF THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICALHYPOTHESIS

T now remains for us to examine the psycho - phys iological hypothes is . This last hypothesis fu lly ac

cepts the di fference between the two series o f facts ,the material and the mental , but instead of going

to look for “the other side ,” instead of going into meta

physics , it takes the two different series as its data , andconsiders them as co - ordinate. It does not trouble itsel fas to whether there is a soul behind the scenes , all i t hasto consider i s facts , phenomena that can be observedand experimented upon . The co - ordination it assumesis not an assumption based on abstract philosophi ca lspeculations , on subtle ha ir- spli tting , but is based on ex

perience.

Numerou s facts from pathology and experimentalphys iology go to prove that mental states havethei r phys iologi ca l correlatives . It is enough to mention the fact of the influence of toxi c matters on thebra in and the effected mental distu rbances . In alcoholicintox i cation , for instance , we first meet with an unloos

cu ing of higher psychic inhibitions ; in the initia l stageof intoxication there is an apparent heightening ofmenta l and motor activity, and then as the quantity ofthe poison absorbed by the blood and conveyed to thecerebro - spinal nervous system is increased , a progressiveparalysi s of psychomotor l i fe sets in . At first the highest psychic functions , the moral and intellectual processes


are disturbed and finally paralyzed ; and this paralysisslowly descends to the lower and more stable functions

,

su ch as speech and writing, then a ffecting the coordination of grosser movements , su ch as running, walking,standing, s itting ; and as the action of the poison increases , the organic, respiratory functions become affected, finally ending in death . D i fferent drugs and poisonsthat act on the cerebro—spina l nervou s system producediff erent symptoms , but all of them , while influenc ingthe physiological nervous processes , at the same time havetheir action mani fested by a parallel modification ofpsychic processes . Illu sions , hallucinations , and delus ions , changes in reasoning and will ing, changes in memory, amnesia and paramnes ia , all these can be induced bythe influence of poisons . Thu s we find that the twoseries of phenomena , the psychic and the phys iologicalor phys ical are intimately related .

Pathology and psychiatry with thei r vast stores offacts go to confirm the psycho - phys iological hypothesis .In general paralys is , for instance , we meet conditionssomewhat similar to those o f alcoholic intoxication . At

first inhibitions are removed, the psychomotor processes become deranged and slightly stimulated, sooneror later to be followed by gradual paralysis . The process o f dissolution progresses from the highest , mostcomplex, least stable functions , memory, intell igence ,will and so on , to the lower, less complex and more stable functions , reading, writing, playing, etc . , finallyreaching to the very lowest, to the simplest co - ordinationof movements , mastication , swallowing, etc . A postmortem examination of the brain uni formly reveals aprofound degeneration of the bra in cells . In the various forms of epilepsy and in most cases o f chronic in

Inductive Bas is of PsychologicalHypothes is 75

sanity, ending in dementia , we find on examination as arule , some degeneration of the bra in cells .In cases of the many forms of aphas ia , science tri

umphed in discovering the brain lesion . In motoraphasia the third frontal convolution , or that ofBroca is found to be degenerated , in sensory aphasiathe degeneration is in the first temporo - sphenoidal convolution, or that of Wernicke . In many other nervousdiseases where there is a profound change in the sensorimotor functions , such as posterior spina l scleros is or locomotor ataxia , acute ascending para lysis , acute poleomyelitis anterior, syringomyel ia , etc. , we also find degeneration in some one part of the cerebro - spinal nervous system . Thus in tabes we find a degeneration of the posterior root zones often associated with similar les ions inthe intramedullory continuation of the several cranialnerves . In pol iomyelitis anterior we find an inflamma

tion o f the anterior cornua ( sometimes extending in theantero - latera l columns ) the multipolar cells with theirdendrons and neuraxons are destroyed . In syringomyelia we find the formation of one or more cavitieswithin the substance of the spina l cord, usually withinthe horns of the gray matter the cavities being fi lledwith a flu id which is either l iqu id or gelatinous . Wefind in these diseases definite organic changes concomitant with definite sensori -motor modifications .In the functional diseases belonging to the province of

psycho - pathology, diseases such as are known under thevague term of hysteri a in all its protean mani festations ,the di fferent forms o f anaesthes i a and amnes ia , abul ia ,psychopathic chorea , astasia - abasia and numerous others

,where no organic lesion in the cerebro- spina l ner

vous system can poss ibly be discovered, we have good


reasons for su specting some functional derangement inthe psys iological processes of the nervous system . Myown psycho phys iological investigations in this l ine tendstrongly to confirm the theory that all functional diseases are disassociations of functioning brain cell - systems , and that the gravity of the disease depends on theextension of such functional dissociations . Thus wefind that neuro- pathology and the recent science of psycho - pathology with all the wealth of facts and discoveries at their disposal give evidence of the truth of the

psycho - physiological hypothesis ; in fact, this is thei r onlyworking hypothesis s ine qua non the very existence ofthese sciences .The psycho -

phys iological hypothesis finds special support in the brilliant investigations of experimental physiology . The experiments of Munk , Ferrier, Hitz ig,Brown - Sequard , Goltz , Schi ff, and others clearly showthe correlation of brain functions with psychic activity.

They show , for instance , in animals that the phys iological processes in the occ ipital lobes are correlated withvis ion

,that those of the temporal lobe , especially of the

superior temporo - sphenoidal convolution are correlatedw i th hearing, that sensations of smell are concom itantwith the function of the median descending part of thetemporal lobes , that taste is probably correlated with theprocesses o f the lower temporal regions , that tactualsensibil ity is intimately connected with the physiologicalprocesses of the motor zone ; and the recent researchesof B ianchi and Flechsig tend to correlate the highestpsychic activity of man with the fun ction of definiteareas in the cortex .

Shou ld we care to look for more proofs as to theval idity of correlation of psychic with neural , or phys i cal


poss ibly because of the increased blood supply to thebra in and more especially on account of the motor reactions . Pneumographic, plethysmographic, carotido

graphic, cardiographic, automatographic, ponographic,

and ergographic trac ings show physiological changesconcomitant with the slightest modification of psychicprocesses . As s imple an instrument as the sphygmograph can demonstrate the same truth . A sphygmogramtaken under mental act ivi ty diff ers from the one takenunder mental repose .All these facts , and many more could be adducedto establish on a firm basis the psycho- physiologicalhypothesis that psychic phenomena are accompaniedwith physiological or physical processes . The whole ofrecent psycho - phys iological research work is based onthe hypothesi s that there is no psychos is without neurosis . The two are concomitant. Psychic and physical

phenomena go hand in hand,the two processes run

parallel to each other. Thus we find that psycho -phys i

ological parallelism is a s trictly scientific hypothes is .

‘

f The psychic and physiological series o f changesare concomitant, para llel , but they do not stand to eachother in relation of antecedent and consequent, they arenot causally related . I take here the opportunity ofemphas iz ing the non - causal relation of menta l and physiological processes . It is usually taken for granted bymany medical men , and even by some scientists , neurologists , physiologists , biologists , who do not happen tothink out clearly the more theoretical aspects of theirinvestigations , that bra in processes are the direct causeo f mental phenomena and that psychology there fore isnothing but a chapter in phys iology . Study the brainand you will know all about psychic li fe . This view is

Inductive Bas is of PsychologicalHypothes is 79

certa in ly fallacious . A psychic fact as we have po intedout is radically different, diflerent in k ind from a physi cal , mechanical fact. One cannot, there fore, give riseto the other.The reason why i t is thought that physical processesgive rise to mental , l ies in the fallacious analogy takenfrom the law of convertib i l i ty and equivalence of energyin the activity of physical processes . Heat, it i s reasoned,can be converted into electricity, electri city into magnetism , magnetism into motion , motion into sound or l ight,and the same may be done in reverse order ; the energyof physiological processes there fore is converted intomental , or psychic energy. The whole reasoning iswrong. We must remember that what underl ies allthese di fferent phys i cal phenomena is vari ous forms ofmolecular and molar motion , and when one order ofphys i cal phenomena passes into another, i t is a fter allonly the transformation of one form o f motion intoanother form . ! uite di ff erent is i t in the ca se o f thephenomena of consciousness . The activity o f consciousness is not a form of motion , and the two there fore ,cannot be converted into each other. Mental act ivity

.

i s but figuratively termed energy, j ust as a well reasonedargument may be characterized as clear and lucid, but

'

i t does not mean that one can see a candle shining :

through it. The energy of mental phenomena is as ,much the energy of physi ca l and phys iological sciences .as the idea of a brick is a bri ck i tself and made up ofclay.

Furthermore , were i t poss ible that a phys iologi calprocess should be converted into a mental process , thelaw of conservation o f energy would have to be givenup , and along with it the whole edifice of modern science


would tumble to the ground . For according to the lawof conservation o f energy no physical energy can 'poss ibly be lost. One form of energy may pass into another,but the phys ical energy which is some form of motion ,molar, molecular, atomic , ionic or electronic cannot belost, that is , there must always be so much motion , nomatter under what form it may appear. Now on theone hand, were it possible that a physiological process ,which is nothing but a form of phys ical energy, couldpass into a psychic state , which is no motion at all , wewould really have a loss o f energy . Were it on theother hand possible that a mental or psychic processshou ld pass into a physiological process , we would havehad new energy generated, energy that is not a transformation o f some previous existing energy, or physicalactivity.I f mental and physiological processes were to

stand to each other in relation of antecedent and conse

quent, in relation of cause and e ffect, we would have hadwith each beat of consciousness a new creation of physical energy and a loss of it with each cerebralprocess . Thiswould be su ffi c ient to undermine the basis of science , andpractically we might have had good hopes that in thenear fu ture our steam engines would be run by goodintentions and w indm i lls by aesthetic feelings .Psychic and physiological series are no doubt intimately related , but their relation is not causal , they donot stand to each other in relation of invariable succession characteristic of cau se and effect, but in thato f co - exis tence. The two series of processes areconcomitant

,they run parallel to each other, but

neither is the cause of the other . A change inthe one means also a simultaneous , concomitant mod

Inductive Bas is of PsychologicalHypothes is 8 1

ification in the other. In other words , every psychicchange must have its physiological concomitant, andvice versa

,every physiological process may have i ts

psychi c accompaniment. This hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism is at the bas is of all modern psychophysiological , neurological , and psycho - pathologica l investigation s , inasmuch as it is taken for granted that forevery mani fested sensori -motor or ideo -motor symtom ” there must be present term for term some phys ilogical process . Psychology takes the same view and accepts the same hypothesis ; i t does not trouble itself

’

in the least with the philosophica l problem as to whetherthe two series o f phenomena , the menta l and the physi cal , have behind them separate substances , or whether‘.they are but two diff erent aspects of the samelth ing . This belongs to metaphys i cs . The psycho - physiological theory l ike a ll other sc i entific hypotheses hasnothing to do with metaphys ical substrata , but dealsonly with facts and their relations .

CHAPTER XIII

THE DEDUCTIVE BASIS OF THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICALHYPOTHESIS

HE concept of causal ity cannot be worked inpsychology in the same way as it can be donein the physical science . The circle of physicalprocesses is complete in itsel f. A physical

proces s without ceas ing to be physical can be tracedendlessly in the past or futu re , all the l inks of the endlessprocess must all be physical in thei r nature . For i f wepermit in the endless chain of l inks of the phys i cal process any other but physical l inks to be interpolated, allthe physical sciences must fall to the ground , since at anystage we may get hold of a process of which the antecedent l ink is not of a physical nature . In short , the postulate that forms the basis of phys ical science is that theantecedent and consequent of a phys ical process takenat any stage of the process are physical in thei r nature .This is the princ iple o f continuity. The whole edificeof the phys i cal sc iences is based on this principle .I f we now turn to psychology, we find that it cannot

be based on‘

a postulate of similar character. Psychology cannot possibly work on the assumption that theprocesses it deals with can be traced endlessly in eitherdirection , past, or future . Unl ike the phys i cal , thepsychic process is finite and final,— it has a beginning andan end, it begins with a purpose , conscious , subconscious ,or unconscious , and ends with an adjustment. Thepsychic process begins as a sensation , and its complete

8 2

Deductive Bas is of Psychological Hypothes is 83

cycle runs i ts course as an idea and then ends in a vol ition to act. The stimulus marking the beginning of thepsychic process and the act marking the end of the process are physical l inks of a continuous physical process ,the links of which can be traced endlessly in phys i ca lterms .Taking the psychic process from the ontogeneti c

standpoint, we find again the same thing . I f the psychicl i fe of the individual is taken as a whole and traced backward , in the past, we arrive at some point, when thestream of consc iou sness begins , and on following itforward, we finally arrive at a point where the streamof consciousness ends . I f we View the question phylogenetically, we come once more to the same conclusion .

In the history of biological evolution there was a timewhen psychic l i fe began , and there will come a time whenall psychic l i fe will disappear from our globe . Theprinciple o f continuity, the warp and woof of physicalsc ience , cannot be worked in psychology, instead of it wecan only discover a principle of finiteness and final ity.

In a phys ical process any l ink taken at random musthave a physi cal antecedent and consequent ; not so is itin a psychic process , not each l ink of the series has itspsychic antecedent and consequent, the first l ink has noantecedent and the last one has no consequent. Thephenomena o f sleep , o f hypnosis , of amnes ia , of unconsciousness , o f syncope show that the psychic processmay be cut short anywhere in its course, and may re

sume its flow from any given l ink or stage . The l inksthat go to form the psychic process hang loosely, andany l ink may really be without an antecedent or withouta consequ ent.In many cases the seemingly lost antecedent


can still be found in the subconscious, dissociatedfrom the active stream of consc iousness constituting forthe time being the conscious personal ity or the sel f- consciousness of the subj ect, su ch for instance is the case inthe many forms of functional psychopathic diseases anda lso in hypnosis . In other cases , such for instance , asunconsciou sness of epilepsy, the stream of consc iousnessis interrupted and resumed only a fter a certa in period oftime , not even the subconscious can supply us themissing link . In normal sleep we meet once more w ithan interruption of the current of consciousness , and it isonly under certa in conditions , such as dreaming, that thesubconsc ious can supply the missing states . Each psychicprocess is l ike the l i fe process o f a given individual , i thas a definite beginning and a definite end ; while aphysical process has neither beginning nor end , and canbe followed out endlessly in the direction of the l ine ofantecedents or consequents . In other words while aphys ical process is infinite, a psychic process is finite.

Let P be a phys ical process and p represent a l ink inthat process , then p

‘, p

“, pm

, etc . , may be representedas its consequents

,while pl

, pz, pa, pt, etc . , may be represented as its antecedents . P therefore may be represented by the following infinite series

(p

The series is infinite in both directions , in direction ofp: antecedents , and in the direction of p

i

consequents .Let S represent a psychi c process , s a l ink in that process , 3

1s11

s111

31111 etc. , i ts consequents and 3 1, 8 2, 8 3 , S4 ,

etc. , its antecedents , then the psychi c process can be represented by the following series


tecedent and phys i cal consequent, a psychic process andeach l ink of it does not necessarily have an antecedentor consequent, it may begin and end at any l ink.

It is only by means of the phys i cal or physiologicalseries that the principles o f continui ty and necessarycausal connection , the foundation of all objective science,can be worked in psychology. Without the help of theconcomitant phys iological series the investigator of thepsychic process is , sc ientifically cons idered, completelyhelpless , s ince the psychic process has no obj ectivelynecessary causal interconnection .

The “Voluntaristic ” school in attempting to make ofpsychology a sc i ence independent of all physiology isfundamentally wrong . Without the phys iologi cal seriespsychology has no cement to fasten its material with , i thas no foundation to build on . Psychology can mainta in itsel f in the work of obj ective natural sciences onlyon condition o f its intimate interdependence with phys iology. No psychology without phys iology . The psycho- phys iological hypothes is i s both inductively and deductively the s ine qua non of the science of psychology.

CHAPTER XIV

LIFE AND THE PSYCHIC PROCESS

E have pointed out that the psychic processi s essentially finite and final , can we find anyother process that should be characterizedby the same mark of finiteness and final ity ?

We find an analogous process in l i fe . The l i fe processis one that has the aspect o f finiteness . Ontogenetically,the l i fe - process o f an organism has its beginning in theferti l i zation or stimulation to l i fe - activity o f the ovum ,

and has its end in death . Phylogenetically, the l i fe process runs a determinate cou rse . There was a time whengeological conditions did not perm i t the presence of l i fe ,and there wi ll come a time when l i fe will be extinct .Ontogenetically, the biological process is analogous tothe menta l process . The biological process , unl ike thephysical process , i s not endless ; i t has a definite beginningand end . Taking any stage of the process as the starting point, we find that neither the cha in o f antecedents ,nor that of consequents can be followed endlessly. Beinga finite process we find in it the same relation we discovered in the psychic process , —the first term of the serieshas no antecedent and the last one has no consequent .Fu rthermore , the biological process , l ike the psychological one , may be cut short at any stage ,— the organism orthe protoplasm may die or be killed . It i s only mechanically regarded that the biological process can be workedinto the definite textu re of physical series .The finiteness of the l i fe process is especi ally mani fest

87


ed from the point of finality. In examining the character of l iving beings , in contradistinction to physicalth ings , we find a fundamental difference between thetwo . The structure and function of living beings canbe regarded under the concept of purpose or that offinal causation , the purpose being the good , the ad

vantage , the util ity o f the organism . Inanimate thingscannot be regarded under the concept of final causation ,but under that of eflicient causati on . The stone lyingyonder has no purpose , i t has no special advantage forits material particles from its particu lar position . Theinner relations of its parts and the relations of its surfaceangles and prominences are not of any ultimate good tothe stone , nor do we ask of what use is this particular vibration to the molecules . We do ask, however, thisquestion of util ity in regard to organisms . O f what use isthe grazing or drinking to the cow ? O f what use isthis particular organ and its function to this or thatorganism ? The problem of util i ty i s one that can onlybe ra i sed in the case of organi c li fe , but not in the caseo f inorganic things . We can see the reason why i tshould be so . Li fe may be regarded as an adaptationo f inner and outer relations . Adaptation and fitness areimportant criteria with biological processes . What isthe fitness , or u ti lity of organs and thei r functions to theparticu lar organism , and how have they come to this

given state of fitness ? These problems cannot be ignored by biology as a science . The whole of the Dar

winian theory a ims to give the key to the way the di ff erent forms o f adaptations have come about. Adaptationand util i ty, however, mean a ims . A biological processis not an endless series of antecedents and consequents ,but one that has an end . A l i fe process is a final pro


di ff er from a mechanism ? Must not then a biologicalprocess be , a fter all , reduced to mechanical terms ; andi f this be so , i s not rather the opposite statement the correct one , namely, that a biological process does nor

really di ff er from a phys ical process ? This , however,i s not so . The di fference between the two is a fundamental one . The unity of the mechanism does not liein the machine per se

,but in the needs and mind of the

mechanician , while the orgamc un1ty IS postulated as being in the organism itsel f. The purpose of the machinedoes not lie in the machine itse l f, bu t in needs ou tsideitsel f ; no machine exists , for its own advantage andgood , from its very nature a machine is for somethingelse .An organism , on the contrary, constitutes its ownpurpose . No organism in nature , not as yet modifiedby artificial selection , exists entirely for the good ofanother. The structure and functions of the parts ofan organism are for the good and advantage of that

parti cular individu al . Unlike a machine,the purpos e

falls not outs ide,but ins ide the organism. An organ

ism forms a closed c i rcle , a microcosm , to which themacrocosm is made subservient. Each organism is acentre from which rays radiate to all the points of theuniverse ; in other words , an organism is an end forwhich everything else is nothing but a means . Darwinwas so mu ch impressed w ith this teleological aspect oforganic l i fe that he frankly admitted that, i f only oneexample in a natu ral state cou ld be produced , an example of an organism show ing structure and function useful not to itsel f, but to another organism , his wholetheory of evolution would fall to the ground . A mech

anism is a means, never an end; an organism is an end,

Life and the Psychic Process 9 1

never a means .

A biological process is finite,i t has a definite begin

ning and end ; i t is also final, inasmuch as it is supposedto be of some use to the organism in which the processtakes place . This does not mean , however, that thebiological process cannot be looked at from a purely mechamical standpoint . Every object, every external ob

jective process can be looked at from the point o f Viewof pure mechanism , where the series o f antecedents andconsequents is infinite , where only atoms and their movements have supreme sway ; but while some objects andprocesses admit only of this standpoint, others adm i talso of another point of View , namely the teleologicalin which the leading princ iples are unity , synthes is, and

purpose .Biological processes certa inly adm it of mechanical

treatment, they can be worked into the infinite seriesof mechanical causes and e ff ect, but, then , theseprocesses so regarded , are simply mechanical and ceaseto be biological . Li fe i s regarded under a teleo

logical aspect. Sc ience need not necessarily beentirely mechanical , i t may also deal with purposes , not self - conscious , not even conscious , butsti ll with purposes

,which on account of their not be ing

consc ious are to be treated according to the principle ofe ffi cient causation . Such is the method of Darwin , inopposition to that of Lamarck. The purpos ive l i feprocesses are treated by Darwin on the principle ofeffi cient causation .

They who want to reduce biology to mechani smshould reflect on the meaning o f evolution . From amechanical standpoint, evolution ,— the basi s o f biology,is meaningless. Molecules , atoms and their vibra tions


can have neither lower nor higher stages , they are allon the same plane , following the same laws from alleterni ty .

I f from our long digression on the nature of the biological process , we now return to the subj ect under discussion , namely, the psychological process , we can re

alize clearly the point of View from which psychic l i feshou ld be regarded . The psychic process is primari lya li fe process .Since the l i fe - process is regarded under a teleologicalaspect, i t follows that the psychi c process should betreated in the same way. The psychic process i s thehighest stage in the evolu tion of li fe , and as such shouldbe studied not by the instruments of mechanics andchemistry , but by the methods of biology. In additionto the concept of eflicient causation , psychology evenmore than biology, shou ld also work with the conceptso f unity, synthes i s, and purpose .


mal from enem ies , even when as highly developed asin the torpedo ; and we do not know of any otheressential service they can perform . Whether the samemay also be said of the phosphorescent organs ofmany animals is perhaps open in some cases to doubt,but there can be little question that the light producedby most of the small marine organisms , such as noctilica,jellyfish , ctenophores , copepods , pyrosoma , etc . , cannot be o f use to these animals in protecting them fromattack. In the case of certa in bacteria i t seems quiteevident that the production of l ight can be o f no useas such to them . The production of light may be onlya sort of by - product of changes going on in the organism , and has no relation to outside conditions . In certain cases , as in the glowworm , i t has been supposedthat the display may serve to bring the sexes together ;but since the phosphorescent organs are also present inthe larval stages of the glowworm , and since even theegg itsel f is sa id to be phosphorescent, i t is improbable ,in these stages at least, that the presence of the l ight iso f service to the organism .

While it is di ffi cult to show that the wonderful patterns and magnificent coloration o f many of the largeranimals are not of service to the animal , however sceptical we may be on the subj ect , yet in the case of manymicroscopic forms that are equ ally brilliantly coloredthere can be little doubt that the coloration can be of nospec i al service to them . We also see in other cases thatthe presence of color need not be connected with anyuse that it bears as such to the animal . For instance , thebeauti ful colors on the inside of the shells of manymarine snails and of bivalve mollusks , can be of no useto the animal that makes the shell, because as long as

The Chance Aspect of Life and M ind 95

the animal is al ive this color cannot be seen from theouts ide . The splendid coloring of the leavesin autumn is certa inly of no service to the organism .

As an example o f a change in the organism that is o fno use to it may be cited the case of the turning white ofthe ha ir in old age in man and in several other mammals . The absorption of bone at the angle of the ch inin man is another case of a change of no immediate useto the individual . We also find in many other changesthat accompany old age , processes going on that are ofno use to the organism , and which may in the end bethe cause of its death .

”

We cannot help agreeing with Morgan that the teleology of the biological process is not always evident .A number of processes in the world of li fe areindifferent, useless , and even detrimenta l to the l i feexistence of the organism . All the biological processes that lead to the decl ine o f the organism are certainly not use fu l to the individual ; neither are allthe processes o f a pathological character to whichorganisms are often subj ected in thei r relations withand adaptation to the external environment . Thereis ce rta inly no more fl imsy, more superficial , and morespec i ous reasoning than the one that ascribes a meaning ,u ti l ity, and pu rpose to every organ , function , and physiologica l process found in the organism . The teleologicalspeculations are often a matter o f ingenious casu i stry .

The evolu tionist who works with the teleological concept of utility mu st assume spontaneous variation as animportant factor in the development of l i fe . In otherwords , out of a great number of many vari ations , harmful, indi fferent, and u se ful , the ones that are use ful inthei r adaptation to the external envi ronment survive


or are se lected by the process o f natu ral selection . Thisclearly requires the presence of a great numberof vari ations which show no adaptations and thereforeare not useful . The util ity and adaptation mani festedby the biological processes are due to the presence ofan immense number of variations of biological processeswhich are useless , indi fferent, and even harmful .The struggle for existence with its survival of the fittest and the princ iple of spontaneous variations clearlyindicate the presence of biologica l processes which areessentially purposeless . The theory of evolution , at leastfrom a Darwinian standpoint, the most sc ientific of’evolutionary hypotheses , is based on the empirical assumption that the unadapted variations far exceed innumber the adapted or use ful variations . Useful pur

pos ive biological processes are rare , few , and accidental ,while the indi fferent, the useless and the purposelessbiologi cal processes are by far the most common . Thepurposive processes are the accidenta l and the excep

tional, while the pu rposeless processes are the rule . It isout of the pu rposeless that the purposive processes develop. The fully developed biological process, the fullydeveloped organism is purposefu l , because of its selection o f the purpose fu l out of the great mass of purposeless biologica l processes and unadapted organisms .In the psychological process a similar state prevails .

The general outcome may have purpose , but this i s accomplished at the expense of a great number of processes which are accidental

,meaningless , and pu rpose

less . The sensations , feel ings , emotions , and ideasthat arise in our consciousness are spontaneous oraccidental variations . They are the raw material forthe guiding select ive consciousness . Many of the psy


the process o f selection is not so rigid as in the arts ,sciences , and philosophy, still the process of attention tomainta in rationality is a severe judge in the rej ection ofthe unfit ideas . In a train of ideas few ideas that o ff erthemselves are accepted as fit and u til i zed by the gu iding thought . The stream of consciousness as it rushesalong pi cks up objects that are intended for and helpto reach the destination set out. Every idea , everythought as it presents itself to the guiding process isselected with respect to the purpose of the given streamof thought .The thoughts that present themselves at any onemoment are meaningless and purposeless , they aresimply the acc idental chance material which the given momentary, purposive thought selects as fit in orderto succeed best in the achievement of its purpose . Theideas themselves as they present themselves are meaningless , pu rposeless , chance creations of the bra in , l ikethe phenomena of acc idental vari ation . When the selective process o f attention is rigid, more of the chancecomers are rej ected as not adapted for the pu rpose ,more of the ideas rising to the antechamber of consciou sness from the subconsc iou s regions are found to bepu rposeless . A Kepler rej ects a number of generali zations before he finds the formu lae o f his laws that answer his pu rpose in the co - ordination of his facts .At the same time di fferent minds , l ike diff erent animals , di ff er in the spontaneous or accidental variationsto which they can give rise . The dull mind has but fewsuch variations , while the man of genius , l ike the endowed animal , has a mass of acc idental variations fromwhich to select in the adaptation to the purpose of thethought. The man of genius whether as a rtist o r thinke r

The Chance Aspect of Life and M ind 99

requires a mass o f accidental variations to select fromand a rigidly selective process o f attention . A greatwealth of chance variation of thoughts to select fromis the spec i a l endowment of the man of genius .When the process of attention relaxes in the rigidi ty

o f its selective activity, more chance images and acc idental variations o f thoughts are presented to and ac

cepted by consciou sness ; the selective thought does nothold on to its purpose, the stream of thought becomesconstituted of relatively pu rposeless chance images andaccidental ideas . Su ch states occur in day- reveries or under the influence o f alcohol and various toxins as well asin the hypnoidal , hypnagogic , and hypnopagogic

states . When the process of attention becomes completely relaxed as in sleep , fever, or in the acu te formsof mental maladies , the chance images and accidental variations of ideas come and go without a im and purpose .Pu rposeless thought is as mu ch the ru le o f mental l i feas pu rposeless acc idental variations are the rule of or

gan ic l i fe . Like the fully developed biological process ,the fu lly developed mental state presents purpose in itsselective activi ty . Purpose , however, arises out of chaos ,out o f chance variations . Our dreams , our unintentionalerrors in speech , writing and action are due to the manychance thoughts which either intrude themselves onconsciou sness in spite o f the selective rigid process o fattention , or are due to the momentary relaxation of theselective process . Chance - thoughts , meaningless imagesand ideas , like acc idental variations , form one of themost important factors in the evolution of purposivemental activi ty.

The so - ca lled psycho- analytic sci ence is erroneou s ,not only becau se o f its fallacious “psychi c causation ,

”but


also because it is based on the fallacy of regarding eachand every mental state as purposive in character. Thispseudo - psychology misses the fundamenta l fact thatmany psychic occurrences are l ike many biological occurrences , mere chance variations . These chance vari ations form the matrix out of which the purpos ive psychicprocess arises . N ot purpose, but chance is at the heart

of mental life.


consequent is invariably observed to depend in its variation on the antecedent, su ch an antecedent is declaredto be the cause of the consequent. To give an illustration . I f a stone falls from a certa in height on a heapof many layers o f thin glass , the stone in fall ing breaksthe glass . We declare the stone to be the cause ofthe breaking of the glass , why ? Becau se we observethe fall o f the stone , and on reprodu c ing the same conditions , the same resu lts follow ; fall o f stone , thenbreaking of glass . Fu rthermore , increasing the weighto f the stone , more layers of glass are broken , on decreasing the weight of the stone less layers are broken , variation s in the consequent depend on the variations of theantecedent . We may s imilarly change the distance fromwhich the stone falls , and the e ffect will vary once more .On changing the material of the stone the amountof breakage will vary once more . Furthermore , onchanging the consistency of the glass layer the e ff ectwill aga in vary. In short, where the phenomenaare observed to stand to each other in functional relation of invariable sequ ence , the antecedent is declaredto be the cau se o f the consequent, such , as in our example, the fall o f the stone is regarded as the cau se of thebreaking of the glass . What is observed is s implyan invariable sequence , so much stone momentum ,

so much glass breakage . No strain or enforcementare ever observed between causes and effects . Nostrain is observed in the falling stone to producethe e ffect, nor is it ever detected that the glass re

sists and is forced into the broken state by the powerof the stone .Strain , resistance , enforcement, power ; are all states

drawn from experiences of our psychic l i fe . As Mach

Activity of Mental Life 103

puts i t : There is but one sort o f constancy whi chembraces all forms of constancy, constancy o f connection ( or of relation ) . The majori ty of the pr0positions of natural science express such constancieso f connection : ‘The tadpol e i s metamorphosed intoa frog ; chlorate of sodium makes i ts appearance inthe form o f cubes . Rays o f l ight are retilinear.

Bodies fall with an acceleration of When theseconstancies are expressed in concepts we call them laws .Force ( in the mechanical s i gnificance ) is l ikewise merelya constancy o f connections . When I say that a bodyA exerts a force on a body B , I mean that B , oncom ing into contrapos i ti on with A, i s immediately af

fected by a ce rta in accelerati on with respect to A .

The s ingula r i llusion that the substance A is the ab

s olutely cons tant vehicle of a force which takes ef

feet immediately on B’s being contraposed to A i seas ily shaken . The phra ses ,

‘No matterwithout force , no fo rce without ma tter,

’ which a reall but abortive attempts to remove a sel f incurredcontradi cti on , become superfluous on our recognizingonly constanci es o f connecti on .

”

Sim ilarly Karl Pearson regards the scientific law asa bri e f description in mental short hand of as wide arange as poss ible o f the sequences of our sense - impress ions” or experiences . “I f the stone from my handbreak a window, the cause o f the broken window m ightvery l ikely be spoken of as the moving stone . But although this usage is an approach to the scientific usageof the word cause , i t yet involves in the popular estimation an idea of enforcement which is not in the latter. That the stone moving with a certain speed mustbring about the destru cti on o f the window is , I think ,


the idea involved in thus speaking of the moving stoneas the cause of the breakage . But were our perceptiveorgans sufliciently powerfu l , sc ience conceives that weshould see be fore the impact particles of window andparticles o f stone moving in a certain manner, and a fterthe impact the same particles moving in a very di ff erentmanner. We might carefu lly describe these motions ,but we shou ld be unable to say why one stage wou ld follow another, ju st as we can describe how a stone falls tothe earth , but not say why i t does . Thus scientificallythe idea of necess ity in the stages of the sequence— stonein motion , broken window— or the idea of enforcementwould disappear ; we should have a routine of experience . When we speak however of the stage of a sequence in ordinary l i fe as cau ses , I do not think it is because we are approaching the scientific standpoint, butI fear it arises from our associating , through longu sage the idea of force with the stone Forceas cau se of motion is exactly on the same footing as atree god as cause of growth— both are but names to hideour ignorance of the why in the rou tine of our perceptions . The necessity in a law of nature has not thelogical mus t o f a geometrica l theorem , nor the cate

gorical mus t of a human law - giver ; i t is merely our ex

perience o f a routine whose stages have ne ither logicalnor volitional order. In what we have termed secondary cau ses ( successive stages of the sequence ) sciencefinds no element of enforcement, solely the routine ofexperience . ”

Within certa in limits the psychic process , l ike the

physical process , may be regarded as an activity, as aseries of phenomena , as a sequence of antecedents andconsequents

,or as Pearson puts it, as a routine of experi

CHAPTER XVI I

THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY

ITH all other sciences psychology mustpostu late the existence of an external material world of space , time , and objects .Psychology does not inqui re into the nature

o f these obj ects , as to what they are in themselves . Thisas we pointed out is the business of metaphys ics , not ofscience . Psychology however does ask how we come toknow the outs ide world ; i t inquires as to the process bywhich external real i ty comes to be presented in consciousness .

The fact that psychology postulates an external material world and studies it in so far as it comes to bereflected in consciousness , points to another postulatewhich psychology must assume in addition , namely, theexistence of an inner world consciousness . This postulate is peculiar to psychology, no other o f the descriptive and objective sc iences have to assume it . Althoughit is quite clear that without mind there can possiblybe no study, no sc i ence , still this is but an indirect reflection which none o f the concrete sc iences have to takeinto consideration . O f course , a chemist is requiredfor chemistry, a phys ic i st for physics , a physiologistfor physiology, and so on , but the chemist, the phys i cist,the phys iologist do not introduce themselves into theirsc ience . In all concrete sciences the mind is entirelyprojected into its obj ect , it is the external obj ectitself that has to be taken into consideration . In con

106

The Postulates of Psychology 107

crete science consciousness is drowned in the object, inpsychology, on the contrary, the obj ect is drowned inconsciousness . The chemist, the phys i cist, who will turnhis attention to consciousness and introduce his psychicstates , his moods , dispositions , and intentions as elementsinto his investigations will hardly be an exact scientist .Not so with the psychologist, he must take the innerworld into account , he must deal with consc iousness ,with moods , with feel ings . It is true that he must treatthem as obj ects , but these obj ects , unl ike those of otherpos itive sc iences , are a fter all of the inner subj ectiveworld of consciousness . For the very essence of psychology i s the taking account of phenomena of con

sciousness .

In our last statement that psychology deals with theobj ective exte rna l world as reflected in consciousnessanother postulate is impl i ed . Besides the external andinternal worlds , psychology also postulates the interrelation of the two .

This interrelation is not di rect, i t i s not one o f antecedent, and consequent, but that of coexistence ; for aswe hav e already pointed out, the two series of phenomena, the mental and the phys iological , must be assumed as concomitant, as running parallel to eachother. I f, however, by

“the external world ” we um

derstand the universe o f obj ects exclusive of the function ing psycho - phys iological processes then we may saythat it stands to the phenomena of consciousness in re

lation both of sequence and coex istence .The obj ective external world enters into relation withconsc iou sness only through the intermediacy of phys iological nervous processes . Only on this condition canthe external world enter into relation with conscious


ness , and under specia l conditions become i ts directobj ect. I take a dose of opium, mescal, or cannabisIndica , and have di ff erent hallucinations and illus ions , mental activity is stimulated. The m ind teemswith sensations , images, ideas , feel ings, emotions ,moods ; now the whole organism is pierced by sharppa in, now it tingles with indescribable acute pleasure ; now a charming vis ion appears, a beauti fulscenery unrolls before the mind’s eye , a feeling of perfeet heavenly bliss diffuses itsel f a ll over our consciousbeing ; now a disgusting, ugly figure presents itsel f, ahorrible scene is witnessed that plunges the m ind into anabyss of misery. The current of consciousness is accelerated and it drives its waves with more vigor thanever.Instead of being accelerated, the current may bedepressed and retarded even to such a degree as toplunge the mind into a deep sleep . Such retardation wefind under the influence of brom ides , or of anaestheti cs,such as ether, chloroform , of hypnotics, such as sulfonal,chloral and others . We have here the action of a drug,of an external obj ect on the physiological nervous processes with their psychic concomitants. In this case ,however, the drug itself does not become the direct ob

ject of consc iousness . Through the mere absorption ofopium , cannabis or belladonna , we can know nothing oftheir constitu tion , we can know nothing of their color,of their size , of their weight, specific gravity and soon , we cannot possibly perceive them as objects . Thesfates of consc iou sness which cannabis , for instance ,givesrise to a ffords no knowledge of the external objectivenature of the drug itsel f.A direct knowledge of an external object is acquired

Normal and Abnormal Psychology

Fig. I I

In fig I , Ob . is the obj ect stimulating S . the organ ofspecial sense , giving rise to phys iologi ca l nervousprocesses with thei r concomitant psychic states constituting the subjective object which is objectified in theobject yonder. In Fig. I I , D . i s the drug act ing directlyon the nervous centre the stimulated activi ty of whichgives rise to the perception of an external object Ob .

Thus we find that external phys i cal and phys iologicalprocesses are causally related, or stand to each other inrelation of invariable or necessary sequence while thephys iological and psychic proces ses stand in relation o fcoexistence. What the nature of this interrelation isand how i t i s poss ible are problems for epistemologyand metaphys i cs . Psychology must assume this interrelation as its postulate .I f psychology is to be a sc ience at all , i t must po stu

late the uni formity o f the phenomena with which it

The Postulates of Psychology 11 !

deals . This we have pointed out in our second chapterwhen we discussed the subject matter of psychology.We turn to it again in order to reali ze clearly its fu llmeaning in psychology. Psychology, as we know, inaddition to the external world of phys i cal sci

ences , also postulates consciousnes s . Its postulate of

uni form ity is , there fore , far more complex than in otherpos itive sciences . W i th phys i cal science psychology mustpostulate un i form i ty of the external world, because i tpresuppo ses the phys i cal sciences, and because the ex

ternal world forms the content and obj ect of cons ciousness. This , however, is not suffi cien t. Psychology mustalso postulate the uniformity in the inner world of psycho- phys iologi cal, or mental phenomena. Were thereno uni form ity in the phenomena of consciousn ess, psychology , as a science would have been an imposs ib il i ty .

This, however, is not all . Psychology mus t also

postulate the uniformity of relationship between the

phenomena of the external and inner worlds . Definite

phys ical processes must be concomitant with certain well

defined psychic s tates . Were this otherwise , the twoseries , the mental and the physical , would be out ofjoint, the relations of coexi stence would no longerbe obta ined , and the two series would stand toeach other in no relation at all ; thus noise, forinstance , would sometimes be smelled, sometimestasted , and sometimes seen . Psychology a s a sciencethat deals with general laws , would certa inly havebeen impossible . We would neither have been ableto express to others our states of consciousness inuni form definite movements , nor would it have beenpossible for others to understand us , nor would it havebeen possible to call forth in others certa in desired states


of consciousness ; in short, not only psychology wouldhave been an impossibil ity, but also all human intercourse . The myth of the tower of Babel would havebeen fully real i zed . Psychology mus t pos tulate uni

formity of interrelation of phys ical, phys iological, and

psychic processes .


The same fa llacy, however, is not so very obviouswhen it appears under a somewhat diflerent guise . Theobject o f thought has parts, therefore it is concludedthat the thought of the obj ect must also be made up ofcorresponding parts . Because the cha in in the externalworld is made up of so many links , i t is concluded thatthe idea of the cha in is made up of so many ideas ofl inks , and that the total sum of the ideas o f the l inksforms the idea of the cha in . The idea of the cha in ,however, is not a mere juxtapos ition of so many ideasof l inks . The ideas of the links would have rema inedin the juxtaposed disconnected condition , had they notbeen connected and synthetized in one new idea , the ideaof the cha in . The word is made up of so many letters,but the sum of the letters is not the idea of the word .

The phrase is made up of words , but the mere sum ofthe words does not make sense , does not form the ideaof that sentence .It is of the utmos t importance to fully and clearly

realize this principle of mental synthes is . Many a m i sunderstanding in psychology is cleared up , by keepingthis princ iple clearly before one’s m ind. We may saythat it i s one of the pr1nc1pal keys that gives us an eu

trance into the science of psychology. A sum of sensations

,of ideas , of images , of feelings , etc.

,at once

brought in cons ciousness as a sum is by this very factsynthetized by thought into a un ity . The cha i r yonderis composed of many parts , i t has four legs , a seat, aback , and each part in its turn is again made up of manyparts . Each part , i f represented in consciousness at all ,has i ts corresponding idea , but the idea of these component parts , the idea of the cha ir is a whole , a unity, nolonger be ing a conglomeration of parts. Objectively

M ental Synthesis 1 15

cons idered , that man yonder i s made up of many parts ,of many organs, of many tissues, o f m ill ions of cells .To my consc iousness , however, he is one , my friendJohn .

An idea is not made up of parts , as is the obj ect of theidea . Before me l ies a grain of wheat, I have a perceptof i t, I have an idea of that grain . The gra in may be divided into halves , or quarters , and I can form an ideaof a hal f, of a third , or of a quarter of a grain . Is itpossible to do the same thing with the idea ? Can we subdivide the idea o f the grain in the same way as we didthe gra in itself ? Can we have a hal f, a thi rd , a quarter of an idea o f the grain ? One real i zes theimposs ib i l i ty and absurdity o f subdividing an idea . Wecan have an idea of a third of a pound, but i t i s absurdto talk o f a thi rd of an idea of a pound . A third ofan idea is s imply so much nonsense . But why i s i t absurd to subdivide an idea ? Why is it nonsense tospeak of having . a hal f, a thi rd , a quarter or any fraction or part o f an idea ? Evidently because an idea is

essentially a synthes is , a unity , and has no parts .

This synthesis , or unity i s more or less clear whenthe percept, or idea is of such a nature as to be synthetized into a numerical unity, and be projected intothe externa l world , such for instance , as the cha i r, thetable , the house , or my friend John . It is , however,far less clear when thought includes many ideas , manypercepts and the natu re o f the synthetized uni ty is multiplicity . There are in my room

.

four chairs . I perceive them as being four. Have I not four percepts ,four ideas going to make up my idea of the sum o f thechairs ? Certa inly not. What we have here is not fourideas, but one idea o f there be ing four cha irs . A sum


of ideas i s not the same thing as the idea of the i r sum,

j ust as in algebra the sum of squares is not the sameas the square of the sum . I think a sentence “I tooka stroll in the forest yesterday morning .

” The sentenceforms a multipl ici ty of words , but in spite of all thatmultipl ic i ty, the phrase appears in consc iousness as onewhole , as a synthetized unity. Synthetic unity is the

essence,the backbone of thought.

This synthetic unity of consciousness can be madestill clearer by the following example . Let the readerimagine a row of men , each thinking one single word ofthe sentence : “We are standing here in a row .

” Thereis here a completely i solated series of ideas , but thewords in the series will remain in their full i solation andas such will make no meaning, no one sentence , as longas they will be confined to diff erent disconnectedthoughts , and not unified in the synthesis of one syntheticthought or of what I te rm momentconsciousness .

To have the idea of a conglomeration , of a multiplicity of obj ects , images or ideas , a syntheti zingmoment consciousness is required, a momentconsciou sness that should take cognizance of all theseobj ects , images or ideas and synthetize them intoa unity, the one idea of the many. The many words ,the many ideas must be synthetized in one momentconsciousness before the idea of the sentence can emerge .

This synthesis , in fact, is that one idea . Ideas , images ,thoughts , feelings do not come together, fuse into one ,and make one idea .

A book is a complex object, it is a conglomeration ofpages

,letters

,words , l ines , sentences, paragraphs , chap

ters . We can have an idea of hal f a book , but it iscerta inly absurd to have half an idea of a book.


Like all other problems that refer to the ultimate natu re of things and how they are possible , the problem ofthe inner nature of mental synthes is does not belong toscience , but to epistemology and metaphysics .

CHAPTER XIX

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

HE theory of perception is fundamental bothin normal and abnormal psychology . All

mental activities are intimately related withthe process o f perception . Ou r wills , our

thoughts and ou r feelings relate to our experience o f theouter world o f things . Biologically regarded , the percept is o f the most vital importance , inasmuch as itforms the medium between the individual and the outerenvironment . Psychologically, the percept reflects theexternal world and mirrors the conditions of l i fe towhich the given organism has to adjust itsel f . In fact,the percept may be regarded as the coin possessing thevalue of the external environment . In this respect wecannot help agreeing with Baldwin’s statement“The theory o f perception is perhaps the mostimportant as well as the most di ffi cu lt problem in psychology . The interpretation of the higher processes o fmind rests upon it and it underlies the body of our general philosophy. The great phi losophies o f the worldtake thei r rise from initial di ff erences in the method ofconstruing perception .

”

In abnormal psychology the theory of perception iso f the utmost importance , both from a theoreti ca l andpracti cal standpoint . IlluS1on s , hallucinations , dreamstates , subconscious states , many states o f dissoc i ati ondepend for thei r explanation on the analys is o f the process o f perception . I have developed a theory o f per

1 19


ception which may be characterized as the doctrine ofprimary and secondary sensory elements . This doctrine is based on a close analysis o f the normal processo f perception and is substantiated by observations andexperiments of abnormal mental l i fe .Before however we state our View of perception it

may be well to make a review of what the principalpsychological authori ties teach on the subject.James M ill in discussing perception tells us Thecolors upon a body are di fferent, according to its figure ,i ts shape , and its s ize . But the sensations of color andthe sensations of extension , of figure , of distance havebeen so often united , felt in conjunction that the sensations of the color are never experienced without ra i sing the ideas of the extension , the figure , the distance insuch intimate union with it, that they not only cannotbe separated , but are actually supposed to be seen ( i talics are mine ) . The sight, as it i s called of figure , ordistance , appearing, as it does a s imple sensation , i s inreal ity a complex state of consc iou sness , a sequence inwhich the antecedent, a sensation of color, and the consequent a number of ideas are so closely combined byassociation that they appear not one idea , but one sensation .

”

Sully defines perception as a menta l act that ‘supplements a sense impression by an accompaniment or escorto f revived sensations , the whole aggregate of actu aland revived sensations being sol idified or integrated intothe form o f a percept .’ The revived sensations areequivalent to James M ill’s assoc iated ideas and images .We shall point out later the confusion which generallypreva ils among psychologists and psychiatrists , whenthey talk indiscriminately of revived sensations and ideas


before me and my eyes open I am said to perceive thetable ; i f I close my eyes and think of what I saw ,

tohave an idea of a table . But we have seen that the sensations arou sed centrally do not di ffer as psychologicalprocesses from those arou sed peripherally This statement put in such an expl ici t form brings out clearly whatmay be designated as the psychologist’s fallacy . Thefallacy becomes spec ially apparent in the domain of ahnorma l psychology.

Baldw in w i th his characteristic breadth o f comprehens ion puts the subject of perception on a w ide basisPerception is the apperceptive or synthetic activity ofmind whereby the data of sensation take on the formso f representation in space and time ; or it is the processo f the constru ction of our representation of the externalworld .

” Baldw in does not commit himself to the or

dinary fallacy cu rrent among psychologists .S imilarly James w i th his geniu s for psychological in

s ight tells us :“The consc iou sness of particu lar ma

terial things present to sense is nowadays called perception . And again Perception thus di ff ers from sensation by the consc iousness o f farther facts associatedwith the object o f the sensation .

” He tells us further :“We certainly ought not to say what usu ally i s sa id bypsychologists and treat the perception as a sum of distinct psychic entities , the present sensation namely, plusa lot of images from the past, all integrated together ina way impossible to describe . The perception is onestate of mind .

”

We thus see that most of the psychologists regard the

percept somewhat in Spenceri an terms as being madeup o f presentations and representations , or as Spencerputs it as being ‘partly presentative and partly represen

Theories of Perception 123

3

tative. In other words , the percept is a compound ofsensations and images , a synthesis of peripherally lnduced sensations and of images , or of ideas centrallyexcited . One principle underl ies the current theory ofperception , variously phrased by di ff erent psychologists ,and that is the identification of ideational and sensoryprocesses .The identification o f ideational and sensory processesmay be traced to Spinoza when he tells us in his E thics

,

Prop . XVI I . , note ,“The modifications of the human

body, of which the ideas represent external bodies aspresent to us , we will call the images o f things

” and thenin another place of Part I I . , Prop . XLIX . , note , Inorder to i llustrate the point let u s suppose a boy imagining a horse and perceiving nothing else . Inasmuch asthis imagination involves the existence of the horse , andthe boy does not perceive anything which would exelude the ex istence of the horse he will necessari ly re

gard the horse as present ; he will not be able to doubtits existence , although he be not certa in thereof. Wehave daily experiences o f such a state of things indreams . ” The images , according to Spinoza , are equivalent to sensations and percepts , unless counteracted bythe more intense peripheral sensations which thus become the ‘reductives’of the image , a doctrine a fterwardsfu lly developed by Taine . I may add that Spinoza’sview of dreams is repeated almost verbatim by the greatest psychological authoriti es , all uncritically giving thei rassent to the cu rrent fallacy that the image is but aweakened sensation and that the sensation is an intensified imageThis theory of images and perception is perpetuatedthrough Hobbes , Locke , Hartley, Hume , James M i ll


down to our times .Hobbes in his terse English puts it : Imagination

there fore is nothing but decaying sense and is foundin men and many other living beings , as we ll in sleepingas waking .

”

Locke derives his ‘ideas’ from ‘experience ,’ but his

‘experience’ i s somewhat vague and broad , inasmuch asit flows from two fountain heads ,— sensation and te

flection .

“Let us then suppose the mind to be as we say

white paper void of all characters without any ideas ,how comes it to be furnished ? To this I answer in one word from experience . Our observation employed either about external sensible ob

jects or about the internal operations of our m inds , perceived and reflected on by ourselves is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials o f thinking . These two are the fountains of knowledge fromwhence all the ideas we have or can natural ly have, dospring.

” Perception is used by Locke in a broader sensethan what it is understood at present, as he uses perception for sensory experience as well as for the introspection o f higher mental processes . He tells us , however, that in e ither case

“the mind has a power to revive

perceptions which it has once had, with this additionalperception annexed to them that it has had them be

fore . ” Locke evidently enterta ins the View that sensations can be revived as original sensory experience andthat the revived ideas do not di ff er, except for the addition of pastness , from the origina l ideas derived fromthe great source of sensation .

When we pass to Hartley and Hume the identification of sensation and idea is set forth with great ex

plicitness . In fact, i t is taken as the fundamental prin

CHAPTER XX

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE PERCEPT

S in many other sc iences , espec i ally the onesof the pu rely mental variety, a good dea l inpsychology is traditional such for instanceare the tripa rtite and bipartite division of the

mind or the variou s classifications of the mental activities . Of course , classifications as well as theori es havethei r important funct ion in sc ience , but they should notbe perm itted to become a bed of Procrustes to theguests whom they shelter .It may sometimes be wel l to disregard establ ished

principles , classifications and time- honored traditionsand study the facts from a somewhat di ff erent standpoint. We may then possibly see the facts in a newlight and realize aspects and connections which are hidden from the customary View of the phenomena .Suppose we take a mental cross - section of a moment

of perceptual consc iousness in the very act of formationof a percept . The whole perceptual moment may besa id to be spread out before our mental gaze . We findsensory elements o f a relatively intense character. Certa in sensory elements stand out first and foremost inconsciousness, they are the very first to arrest the mentalgaze and keep it steadily fixed on themselves . In thesame View, however, we can also discern other elements ,not so prominent, though equ ally sensory which , on ac

count of their lack of prominence , appear to be of asubordinate character. The whole tone of the percept

126

The Structure and Function of the Percept 127

i s given by the qual i tative aspect o f the prom inent elements which seem to guide and form the organizationof the percept.The general plan of the structure of the percept maybe compared to that of the cell . A close examination ofthe cell reveals the presence of a central element, of anucleus surrounded by cytoplasm with its meshwork, thecyto- reti cu lum . The nucleus forms the central and important stru cture having the functions o f ass imilationand reprodu ction . The nucleu s and cytoplasm , however, are intimately related ; the modification of onea ffects the other . Both nuclear and cytoplasmic structures form one organized whole , one l iving cel l . Sim

ilarly in the percept we find a group of sensory elementswhich constitute the nucleu s , and a mass of other sensoryelements , poss ibly the main mass , form ing the tissueof the percept. The nu clear elements are more intenseand appear to be predominant in the tota l mental state ,

— both however are intimately connected and go toform the l iving tissue o f the percept .The nuclear elements of the percept have thelead and seem to possess the organizing, the fermenting power to ass imi late the mass of subordinate elements and have them transformed into oneunified organic whole . The slightest modificationin the stru cture and function of the nuclear elements brings about a change in the tota l cytoplasmi cmass of the percept, giving rise to a di ff erent stru ctu re ,to a different percept ; and again , modifications of thecytoplasmic mass , so to say, a ffect the formation of thenuclear elements often resulting in a di fferent percept.It requi res however quite a considerable change in thesubordinate elements to bring about a change in the per


cept ; while the sl ightest modification of the nuclearelements , whether in quality or intens ity, often bringsabout a fundamenta l transformation of the percept .The nuclear elements may be regarded as the sens itive, as the vital point of the perceptual system . Wecannot displace nor can we modi fy the nucleus of thepercept without profoundly modi fying or even completely destroying the l i fe existence of the percept.We may point out here an important aspect of thepercept, an aspect which has been neglected by theolder psychologists , but which is now being more andmore emphasi zed by the younger psychologists who laymore stress on the functiona l and biological s ide ofmental l i fe . Like the l i fe of all organized beings, thel i fe existence of the psychic state is for some reaction ,for some adjustments to the conditions of the externalenvironment. In the struggle for existence the animalorganism mu st on pain of death be adjusted to the ob

jects of its external world . Now the central , nuclear,sensory elements awakened by external excitations givethe cue for the reaction ; they form the sensitive organization for the release of motor energy in definite dircetions ; they s igni fy a definite obj ect to which corresponddefinite motor tendenc ies with final reactions of adjustment. To the mouse the cat is not an obj ect of contem

plation or an obj ect o f observation , on account of itssensory eff ects ,— the cat is an obj ect to run away from .

To the dog a cat i s not an object of beauty, but something to be run a fter. The sensory stimu lations com ingfrom the ‘that,

’which is mouse , is for the cat somethingto be on the alert, to jump a fter and to attack .

The lower we descend in the scale of animal l i fe , themore prominent do the motor reactions become. Where


So apparently insignificant is the sensory side and sopredominant is the motor side with its almost mechanleally fatal reactions , that some physiologists put thewhole mechanism of exc itation and reaction in the loweranimals under the category of tropisms , which may bepositive or negative , according as the animal goes to orfrom the particu lar stimulus . The sensory side is denied , the whole a ffai r is regarded as a del icate chemica lreaction, such as the chemotaxi s of leu cocytes in the phenomena of phagocytos is observed in inflammation s andbacteria l invasions , or what is still s impler as the phenomena of heliotropism observed in the case of plants .This purely mechanical or chemico - phys iological viewmay be crude and far fetched in the case of lower animals, but it brings out strongly the predominance of themotor react ion in response to definite sensory exc itations .The motor attitude of the animal towards the exc itations of the external environment constitutes the predominant part of its obj ective world . The reactionswith the ir sensori -motor e ff ects are part and parcel o fthe total percept. Sensori -motor li fe gives real ity to theworld of obj ects . The spatial , the res istant, the material character of objects depends on our motor reactions which give content and reality to the world ofthings . Activity gives the sense of ‘

physwal’ reality,

the sense of material actuality, or of what i s regardedas ‘the really real .’ In other words , sensori -motor reactions with consequent k inwsthetic sensations may beregarded as constituting the very essence of the real ,external , material world,— the world of external , material obj ects .The percept as we have pointed out forms one or

ganic whole , the constituent elements are firmly inte

The Structure and Function of the Percept 13 1

grated into one l iving organi zation . In other words ,just as the organism is not simply an integrated compound o f cells , tissu es and organs , but all those lowerunits go to form the higher living unit, the li fe of theorganism as a whole , so we may say that the sensoryelements are not the same as the percept, they are anatomically found , on the autopsy o f the percept ,— the sensory elements are the lower units that help to form thehigher unit, the l iving percept. From a sci entific standpoint, as the result o f psychological dissection , the sensory elements going to make up the psychic compound ,the percept, may be regarded as di fferent from the totalsynthes is w i th its characteristic l iving activity and itspecul i ar form of perceptual consc iousness .The constitu ent elements of the percept are not of

the same defin iteness and intensity . The central nuclearelements stand ou t more distinct , more definite , and consciou sness l ights them up with more power and intens ity . They are l ike the mountain peaks— when gladeand va lley and mounta in s ide are sti ll immersed in darkness , the rising sun greets the mounta in tops and playsand caresses them w i th its rays ; when again the shadesof evening begin to fl i t and gather over vale , ravine , andgulch , the rays of the setting sun long l inger on the

peaks taking of them thei r last farewell . The centralnu clear elements are in the focus of consc iousness ,they are the first to be met by the glance o f the mentaleye and are the very last to be le ft by i t . Consciousnessplays with its searchlight on the nuclear sensory elements . The central nuclear elements are intense , distinct , and definite , while the subo rdinate elements areof fa r less intensi ty, are often quite indistinct, are , soto say, on the fringe o f consciousness ; in fact, may even


be enti rely subconscious . And still indefinite , indistinct ,and submerged as those subordinate elements are , theyform the main content of the percept, giving it thefullness of real i ty.

The nuclear elements form the cue of the total teaction, thus standing for the parti cular obj ect, formingthe rea l i ty o f the percept for the organism . No wonder then that the cue, though it may be the smallest portion of the percept, none the less forms for the organism the most vital , the most significant as well as themost constant part o f the percept. The att itude , thetotal reaction of the organism depends on the slightestdi fference in the cue , on the sl ightest change o f thenuclear elements , since the apparently sl ight modifica

tion may often prove of great s ignificance to the li feexistence o f the organism ,

— it may be a matter of l i feand death . The nuclear elements constitute the s ignal ,the sensitive trigger for the release of definite reactionstowards the changes of external objects . Hence thenuclear elements come to signi fy , in fact, to constitutethe essence of the percept .A change of the subordinate elements of the perceptdoes not matter so much as the sl ightest modification inthe qual ity or even in the intensity of the signal . This ,of course , does not mean that the subordinate sensoryelements are not psychologically and biologically of theutmost consequence to the organism , but they are not ofthat immediate importance as the focal , nuclear elements appear to the consc iousness o f the organism . Thenuclear elements , as signal , focus the interest of the animal . We can well real i ze thei r vital importance , i f wecons ider that the nuclear elements are the flag which indicates friend or enemy, war or peace , l i fe or death .

‘


sensory qu ality that they di ffu se it into the other elements ,— the subordinate elements appear under thesensory form of the nu cleus ; they become ass imilatedby the nucleu s , and are satu rated w i th its sensory coloring . This holds tru e not only in regard to satu ration ,but also in regard to sensory brightness . The centralelements possess a sensory brightness far in excess ofother elements ,

‘ and hence they shed thei r sensory l ighton the more obscure , though no less important sensoryelements . What however they i llumine‘ i s not so mu chthe pecu li ar sensory characteristics of those elements ,but the ir own coloring w ith which they have saturatedthe total percept .The force of the central elements l ies spec ially in theemotional or a ffective tone with which they are pervaded . They arouse an atti tude towards the external worldin general and to the speci al obj ect in pa rticu lar ; Tainewould call i t a ‘

tendency . The individual is stimulatedby those nuclear elements ; his whole attention is goingout in direction to the obj ect that has exc ited them .

The whole organism is invaded by the subtle influ ence ofthe nu cleu s giving rise to definite sensori -motor reac

tions , intensi fying the a ffective state which permeatesthe perceptual consciou sness .The a ff ect ive state of the percept i s not alwaysobvious in cases o f fleeting percepts , but it becomesmani fest, when the central elements become temporarilyfixed

,the stress and strain of consciousness tending in

one direction . The very changes occurring in the flick ering intensity of the nuclear elements tend to sharpen thesituation , to enl iven the interest, strain the attention , andbe all agog so to say . The cat getting a glimpse of amouse

,or the dog catching sight of the cat may be taken

The Structure and Function of the Percept 13 5

as good i llustrations o f the affective states present inperceptual consciousness . The nuclear elements are theones that are specially charged with a ffect ive or emotional states .Biologically regarded, we can well see the importance

o f the centra l nuclear elements , the necess ity of thei rstanding out in consciou sness a s more prominent andmore intense than the rest of the sensory elements . ConStituting the s ignal , they come to be the most significantpart o f the percept, for they announce what

‘that’ is ,they present the obj ect, friend or foe , something to welcome or something to flee from . The central nuclear elements thus come to present objective real i ty, they sa fegu ard the individual , they are the sa fety as well as thedanger signal . The more del i cately di fferentiated thosesa fety- danger signa ls a re , the more protected the individual i s in the struggle for existence . The more sens itive the individu al becomes to the least di fference ofthe nuclear elements, the better adjusted will he be tothe conditions o f the external envi ronment, and the better will be his chances in the process o f survival of thefi ttest.

This brings us to the purposiveness o f the percept.One of the important characteri stics of the biologicalprocess is the fina l cause , the purpose formed by natura lselection out of chance variations , and leading to thepreservation of that process , to the preservation o f theindividual . We should there fore expect that in thepsychic process which is the most highly developed b iological process , purposiveness , formed out o f psychicchance variations , wi ll be one of the most importanttraits . In the course o f phylogenetic and ontogeneti cevolution some sensory elements , the ones to whi ch


the organism is more sensitive , will be selected andbecome the indicators of the total percept, they wi llbecome the index, or better to say the pa in - pleasure flag,the sa fety- danger signal . The central elements willthus be the most prominent, the most intense for thatparticular state of pe rceptual consciousness . The nature and character of the elements will vary with theorganization o f the species and the individual . Thedog will become more sensitive to va riations of his 01factory sensations , while man wi ll show marked sensitivity towards del icate diff erences of his visual sensoryelements .The great sensitivi ty of the nuclear elements i s s ig

nificant, in so far as they lead to better adaptation and tomore success fu l reactions . It is not of any consequencefor the cow to gaze at the stars , for the pig to observethe phases o f the moon , but it is a matter of importancefor them to perceive any signs of food , or the approacho f a beast o f prey. The heavenly bodies are non - exis

tent for the brutes , because of lack of all reactions ofadaptation , while food and predatory beasts are easilydetected , becau se o f the vital reactions bound up inthe elements of the percept of which the nuclear elements form the signal . It is on account of the vita lreactions that the perceptual nucleus plays such a prominent part and takes the lead o f all the other elements .As I have pointed out in a former work :

“Thepsychic state is for some reaction and that sensory element which gives the cue for the formation of the psychomotor elements , leading to some given reaction is ,for the time being, the center, the nucleus of the totalstate . ”


be regarded as consisting of two classes of elements ofsensations , the primary and secondary sensory elements .*

The secondary sensory elements are not images , norideas , nor representations , di fferent terms employed forthe same state by various writers , the secondary mele

ments of the percept are essentially s ensations . Nowsensations are qualitatively di ff erent from images, ideasor representations . The image of a l ight does notshine , the idea of a voice does not sound, and the representation of a perfume does not smell . A sensation ,or presentation as it i s sometimes termed, di ff ers froman image or representation qual itatively, fundamentally.

The sensation or presentation is given as immediate ex

perience, whi le the image , the representation is essentially mediate , i t i s a mental substitute for the 1mmedi

ate experience o f the sensation . The idea or imagebears the same relation to the sensation as a photographbears to the original , or rather as a symbol to the thingit

,represents . Ideas , images , representations substitute ,represent sensations , but they are not sensations . A

sensory process is fundamentally di ff erent . A sensationis not an intense idea , nor is an idea a weak sensation .

Ideas di ffer far more qual itatively from sensations thanvisual sensations

,for instance , differ from olfactory sen

sations . There is not a particle of evidence to substantiate the View that ideas or images are copies of sensations in the sense of being weak sensations or ‘centrallyexcited sensations .’There i s nothing of the sensory in the

*It may be wel l here to po int out that the doctrine of primaryand secondary sensory elements advanced by me has nothing in

common with the primary and secondary qual ities of the olderpsychologists ,

Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 139

idea . The weakest sensation cannot compare with themost vivid representation .

The laboratory experiments on that subj ect

(Miinsterberg and K'

iilpe ) are inconclus ive as theyeither deal with incompletely perceived impress ions,or

’with minima l sensations . In ei ther case the per

cept i s incomplete and un certa in . Kiilpe himsel f isforced to adm it that ideas or ‘centrally excited sensations’as he terms them “cannot be regarded as s implerevivals of peripherally excited contents , i f only for thereason , that thei r rema in ing attributes are very rarelyindeed identica l with those o f perception . He thengoes on making a fatal adm i ssion “The most strikingevidence o f disparity is perhaps a fforded by intensity.

It is only in s pecial cases that centrally excited sens ations can rise from thei r accustomed fa intness to the vividness of sense pe rception . We then speako f . them ' as hallucinations and they enter into adisastrous competition with the real material o f pe rception , completely transcending the boundary l inewhich so use fully divides it from the materia l o f imagination .

”Kiilpe admits t hat there i s no intensity to the

image , that there is no variation in‘intensity’of images ,

an“attribute

’ characteri sti c of percepts . Psychologically regarded , this in i tsel f shows the qual i tative di ff erence between image and percept. ‘

In spite of the fact that Bergson is interested in psychology from a purely metaphys ical standpoint, he nevertheless has some excellent remarks on memory and onthe qual itative di fference between image and percept .Although he is wrong in supposing that the image maybe prolonged and proj ected into perceptual consciousness s he: none the ' less emphasi zes strongly the qual i ta


tive di fference of the two . I f I understand him arighthe i s opposed to the view of identification of memoryimages with sensations . A memory image is not a weakened sensation .

“The absurdity ” says Bergson “be

comes patent when the argument is inverted ( althoughthis ought to be legitimate on the hypothesis adopted ) ,that is to say, when the intens1ty of the sensation is decreased instead of the intens i ty of the pure memory being increased . For, i f the two states (memory- imageand sensation ) di ff er merely 1n degree , there should be agiven moment at which the sensation changed into amemory. I f the memory of an acute pain , for instance ,i s but a weak pain, inversely an intense pain which I feelwill end, as it grows less , by being an acute pa in re

membered . Never will this weak state ap

pear to me to be the memory of a strong state . Mem

ory is something quite di fferent .Ideational and perceptual processes cannot be identi

fied. The two are qualitatively diff erent : the sensationhas intens ity, the image lacks i t. We may point outthe main di fferences of sensation and image . (a) Asensation has intensity, an image totally lacks i t. ( b )An image is a reproduct ion or rather a representation,a symbol of a sensation , but no sensation representsanother ; a sensation , unlike an image , i s not mediate ,but immediate experience . ( c) A sensation bears themark of externality, an image lacks it . Fina lly (d ) asensation cannot be called up at will, while an imagei s independent of peripheral stimulations of externa l oh

jects and is usually under the control of the will . No

sensation di ffers so much from another as the image di ffers from its corresponding sensation .

Sensory elements and their synthesw, the percept,


The theories of illusions, hallucinations as well asof. dream states and hypnotic hallucin ations are vitiated by that fundamental psychological fallacy. As

a matter of fact hallucinations are not made upof images , but of sensory elemen ts ; while on the

contrary hypnoti c hallucinations are not made up ofsensory elements , but of images . Hallucin ations are notdue to ‘images’ but to actua l sensations . Psychologically regarded, hallucinations do not di ff er in the irmake - up from ordinary percepts . Ideas and. images arenot possessed of magic virtues , _

and with all the fancywork about them , they cannot display sensory qual ities . The image or. idea is that bloodless , shadowy,fluttering a ff ai r which : can no more atta in the l i fe of asensation than a written letter can atta in the power ofsound . Had it been otherwise the world would havebeen a large asylum for images to play their pranks in .

We may quote Stout as one of the few psychologistswho seem not to accept the current psychological doctrin e . In his ‘

Analytic Psychology’ he tells us ‘thatcomplex perception does not cons ist in a given impress ion reviving a cluster of fa int images of previous impres sions .’ And aga in “ impress iona l revival does notin the least coun tenance the theory that ideas are merelyfaint revivals o f impressions . On the contrary, i t tendsstrongly in the opposite direction . It shows that arevived impression is itself an impression , and not anidea . ” In his ‘Manual of Psychology’he says

‘that at

bottom,the distinction between image and percept is

based on a di fference of quali ty.

’And aga in ,

“percepts and images possess a relative independence . Thiscan be accounted for, i f we suppose that the nervoustracts excited in perceptual process are not wholly coin

Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 143

eident wi th those excited in ideational proces s.The elements of the percept are not ideati onal, not

1mag1nary , they are essentia lly sensory. The perceptualelements are synthetized into one percept. To take ourstock example , the ice . The lump of i ce is experiencedas one obj ect with many qual iti es each of which furnishes respectively its sensory quota towards the formation of the whole of the perceptual expe rience . We see ,we perce ive the hard , heavy, smooth , resistant body ofice , —all the elements have al ike the intens ity of sensation . The hardness , the smoothn ess , the bodily resistance are perce ived by the visual sen se and are visual ,but as such they, of course, di ffer from the sensations ex

perienced by thei r appropriate sense organs , as whenfor instance the same sensations are given by touch orby muscular and kinaestheti c sensations . Those museular and tacto -motor sensations appearing as visual . arenot memoryimages , but they are actual sensations , theyare secondary sensations ; they are secondary sensory

elements which give the fullness of content to the per1

cept, having visual sensory elements as i ts nucleus . Un

l ike memoryimages , secondary perceptual elementshave the immediacy of sensory experience . Remembered sensory qual ities are not immediate experiencesgiven in the obj ect o f perception .

I f we tu rn to pathology, we find that cases closelyconfirm our view . In certa in mental diseases the patient can perce ive the various qual ities , although he cannot represent them to himsel f. In other cases the patient can clearly and vividly represent obj ects in all theirdeta i ls , but he cannot perceive the objects , when directly confronted with them . Cl in ical cases , even i f .we

exclude all facts from introspective study,‘

clearly point


to the qual itative di ff erence of image and sensation ,i rrespective of the assumption of local i zation— theymay be due to the function of di fferent bra in struetures , or to di fferent processes of the same bra in struetures . In the l ight of recent research it is more l ikelythat the neuron structures underlying ideational processes di ff er from those subserving sensory processes .Whichever view however we enterta in in regard to theanatomical structures all the facts go to prove thatimage and sensation are qualitatively different psychicevents .

The percept is not ideational,but sensory . There

are no memoryimages in perceptual consciousness , al

though the latter may be closely assoc iated with ideational processes . Such ideas, however, are on the fringeof the perceptual consciousness and do not constitute theessence of the percept. The percept cons ists of sensoryelements , primary and secondary . The primary elements are initiated directly by incoming peripheral stimulations , while the secondary sensory elements arebrought about indirectly, through the mediacy of theprimary elements , the secondary elements themselvesbe ing really derived from senseorgans others than the

ones directly s timulated by the peripheral excitation .

I f the percept is visual , and V stands for the visualphysiologica l processes , A for the auditory, O for theol factory, M muscular, K kine sthetic , T for tactualphysiologica l processes ; then let Va

, M n,Ox

,K

,

T: stand for the primary sensory elements ; and letVa

,Oz

,M e

,Kn

,Ta stand for the secondary sensory ele

ments , then the tota l percept may be represented by theformula VxOM s Tz. Since all the other elements appear in the visual percept under the visual aspect, we

CHAPTER XXII

SECONDARY SENSORY ELEMENTS AND HALLUCINATORYPERCEPTION

N stimulating a sense - organ we not only get sensory elements characteristic of that parti cular sense ,but also sensory elements belonging to other senseorgans which have not been stimulated . What

really takes place is this : the externa l excitation actingon a part icular s ense - organ produces i ts appropriate sensations, but the peripheral phys iological process di ffusesor rather to say gets i rradiated along other neurons ofother sense structures , awakening their appropriate sensations . Such sensations , not being directly but indirectly peripherally initiated should be regarded as secondary sensations .The phenomena of secondary sensations are wellknown in psychological literature . Some psychologistsfollowing the general fallacy of confusing image andsensation describe vivid images succeeding sensationsunder the category of secondary sensations . Barringsu ch confusion we may say that the pure phenomena ofsecondary sensations are essentially sensory in character.When a sensation due to the stimulation of a periphera l sense - organ , instead of being followed by a tra ino f assoc i ation of ideas is followed by another sensation belonging to the domain of another sense - organ ,the phenomenon is known as that o f syna sthesia or ofsecondary sensations .One image or representation relating to a sensation

146

Secondary Sensory E lements and ‘Perception {247

of one : sense - o rgan :may:be ass ociated and"bring’in fiits

train '

o f associations any other image r elating ‘

to s any

other s ensation of "any other sense - organ .

"

The ‘

series

of ideas ~ or images is a reproduction of s timulatedsense - organs with thei r accompany ing

‘

sensations , theideas running parallel to the original psycho- phys iological processes , somewhat on the Spinozistic principleof ‘Ordo et connexio idearum idem es t ac ordo et con

hexia rerum .

’And again in other cases , when not re

producing a previous series of sensory experience , theseries of associated images may be more i rregu lar andapparently capricious— a process usually described asthe work of fancy, or imagination . A sensation orimage then may be followed by any series o f imageswithout the intermediacy of external exc itations andperipheral phys iological processes . A sensation , however, cannot be followed by a series of sensations without the intermediacy of external stimulations . A sensation can only be initiated by its own appropriate stimu lus and by i ts own special i zed peripheral physiological

processes . The smell o f a rose does not by simple association give rise to a series o f sensations of touring inan automobile , nor does the eating of bee fsteak give rise ,through association , to the hearing of a symphony. Inother words , there is an internal association of images orideas

,but there is not an internal association of sensa

tions . Images once born can be reproduced endlesslyand at wi ll , sensations die a lmost immediately a fter theyare born and must be renewed every time under thesame conditions of external stimulations . Briefly stated ,there is memory for images , but not for sensations . Sensations are independent, images are interconnected.

If we represent sensations by A,B,

'

C,D and sym


bolize images by a,b,c,d,the A, B, C,

D have norelations to one another, but each one bears a definiterelation to each corresponding image , A to a, B to b, Cto c

,D to d

,and so with the rest of the series . Sensa

tion A will arouse image a which in turn may arousethe whole tra in o f images , b , c, d, but A cannot give riseto any of the sensations B

,C,D . The image series

a,b,c,d can be reproduced at will , in fact a fter a series

o f repetition the whole chain of l inks may rattle o ff

aga inst will , but nothing of the kind occurs in the caseof sensations. Sensations do not form links in a chainwhich becomes automatic a fter many reproductions .R epetition of sensations does no t form associated series ;

sensations maintain their independence.

The difference between image and sensation in te

spect to association i s, psychologically regarded, apparently flawless . Unfortunately as it i s usually the casewith flawless general izations and descriptions of phenomena observed under normal conditions , there is anungracious ‘abnormal’ that refuses to fall into l ine .There are cases apparently abnormal from the psychological standpoint, cases which refuse to be gatheredinto the normal psychological fold ; these cases seem torun counter to all normal psychological introspection .

The sensations seem to run riot,— instead of beingl inked with their respective images they really call upass ociated sensations ; these are the so - called sound- photisms or l ight- phon isms , and similar odd combinations .It is true the sensations are rather awkwardly associated . One sensation always calls forth only a particular sensation and no other one , and besides the calledforth sensation does not belong qual itatively to the samedoma in with the one that has ini tiated it. It is also

‘

1150‘Normdl ‘

and “Abnormal‘Psycho logy

maryi’sensory elements absent.

'

When secondary sensory’elements become dissociated“ from the perceptual synthesis with the primary sensoryelements , the

“

elements, thu s dissoc iated, not being re

lated to any peripheral phys iological process of their appropriate sense - organ , are regarded as central phenomena, as secondary sensations which are describedas unusual , abnorma l events of mental l i fe . What,however, i s abnormal i s not the secondary sensationper se

,but the fact of its dissociation . A secondary sen

sory element dissociated from its perceptual system becomes mani fested as a secondary sensation .

Secondary sensations are free secondary sensory elements , dissoc i ated from the perceptual aggregate intothe synthetic uni ty of which they enter as importantcomponents form ing the organic whole of the percept .When appearing i so lated, secondary sensations are thesimplest form of hallu cinations which become more andmore complex as the secondary sensory elements , dissociated from the primary elements , become mani festedin complex systems . Hallucinations are systems of secandary sensations or of secondary sensory elements .

Sensory elements are , as a rule , not free , they usuallyappear as perceptual compounds , and this holds spec i allytrue of secondary sensory elements . When , there fore ,dissociated from their perceptual compounds , they ap

pear as ghosts o f the ‘real’percept, as hallucinations . Toquote from a previous work of mine : “The integration of the groups and especially of the secondary presentative groups is not of that unmodifiable organiccharacter . Around a nucleus formed by a group , orcombinations of groups o f primary elements , groups ofsecondary sensory elements become aggregated, and the

Secondary Sensory E lements and Perception 15 1

total aggregate gives rise to a consol idated and,

unifiedsystem of groups , resu lting in a percept . In perceivingthe chair yonder only the visual sensations consti tutethe true sensory groups that form the nu cleus of thepercept . The other psychic groups that are crystall i zedround the percept, su ch as weight, resistance , volume ,size , shape , distance are really visuo - tacto motor groups ;they are largely tacto -mu scu lar groups tinged by thesensory qu al i ty of the nucleu s ; they are tacto -motorgroups sensorially visual ized , seen indi rectly . Thoughthese secondary sensory groups are firmly integrated,sti ll the i r integration i s not o f such a character as notto become dis integrated and rearranged into new sys

tems o f groups . Su ch a disintegration i s no doubte ff ected with difliculty, but i t i s by no means impossible .Perceptual compounds , unl ike sensory, adm i t of de

composition into elementa ry primary and secondarysensory groups . The component elementary sensorygroups can be experienced separately under different conditions and c i rcumstances . We can close oureyes and walk up to the ob j ect o f perception , say thechair, and thu s experience the free muscular sensationsof distance , or we may pu sh our hand against the chairand experience the sensati on of resistance , or take thechai r in the hand and experience the muscular sensati onsof weight and shape . The primary and secondarygroups going to make up the percept can be isolated byw ithdraw ing the organiz ing nuclear group of primarysensations , thus bringing about a di sintegration of thepa rticular aggregate .

“ I f we inspect more closely thi s process o f isolation,we find that the consti tuent secondary sensory groups


are not really isolated, so as to stand out all by themselves . What actually happens in this seeming processof isolation is simply the formation of a series o f newperceptual aggregates in which the parti cular sensorygroups that are isolated and specially brought out become the nuclei , the foci . For in the perceptua l aggregate it i s always the character of the nucleus that isspec ially brought out, and it is the nuclear aggregatethat tinges with its sensory color all the other aggregates . To revert to our previous example , to the percept chair. In passing the finger over the chair, thetou ch may form the nucleus of the moment, but aroundthis primary nuclear sensory group other secondarysensory groups , such as thermal and muscular sensoryelements become organized to form the synthesis of theperceptua l moment. I f we try to find out the shape ofthe cha ir by a se ri es of touches , we really form a seriesof percepts , the sensory nuclei of which are not visual ,but tacto -muscu lar in their nature . A sensory groupthen cannot in reality appear in a purely isolated form .

In other words , sensory elements appear in groups ,*

and this holds spec i ally true o f secondary sensory elements or of secondary sensations . Secondary sensations ,though present in every percept , rarely appear in isolation . The a ffinity of secondary sensory elements torun into compounds becoming syntheti zed with primaryelements makes it di ffi cult to observe them , except in thepecul ia r phenomena of s ynaesthesi a and in the abnormalstates of hallucination .

fl ames lay s stress on this fact o f grouping o f sensory elements“All brain process es are s uch as give ris e to what we may call

Figured C ons cious nes s . If parts are irradiated at all, they are

Irradiated in con s istent sy stems and occas ion thoughts of defin iteobj ects , not mere hodge-

podge of elements .

”


them as saints who came to his help . He could seethem spl itting the rocks and disappearing there , orsometimes the rocks split open and the saintly l i ttle mencame to the surface . Occasionally apparitions of thedead vis ited him . The vis ions were never qu iet, butalways in motion , they did not stay long and rapidlydisappeared , giving rise to new vis ions . An examination of his speci al sense - organs showed nothing abnor

mal . The sense of tou ch , pressu re and k inze sthetic sens ibility mani fested pecul iar abnormalities . The skin ofthe body was very sensitive and that of the scalp wasextremely tender to tou ch . The patient cou ld not bearany pressu re of the scalp and was mostly bareheaded ,though he was very sensitive to draughts and to changesof temperature . Occasionally he experienced a senseof formication all over the body, espec ially in the scalpand in the region of the neck, the mu scles of which wereextremely sensitive to pressure . Now when the headwas inclined to one s ide or pressed hard or kept in atense state for a couple of minutes at a stretch , he cou ldsee spi rits floating in the ai r, he cou ld see the l ittle menwith their sa intly faces coming out of the ground anddisappearing into it again .

One case of functional psychosis , w ith epilepto form

attacks presenting phenomena of dissoc iated states w ithdistinct tendenc ies toward the formation of mu ltiple personality , su ffered a good deal from auditory hallu cinations . It wi ll take too mu ch space to give an account ofthe deta ils o f the different se izu res and of the variousdissoci ated states mani fested by the patient . For our

present purpose it i s enough to refer to the hallu c inations . The patient complained that she cou ld hearvoices talk ing to her, her mother and brothers commu

Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception I5 5

n icating with her from a distance . An examination ofthe auditory apparatus proved it to be in excellent condition . In this case the phenomena of unconscious

phonation were quite well developed , the patient wasobserved to move her lips and whisper— the whisperbecoming sometimes quite loud so that many wordswhich the patient referred to the voices of the motherand brothers were really uttered by the patient. An

examination of the eye revealed the presence of anastigmatic condition and a limitation of the field ofvis ion . When the patient was made to count or to readaloud or when absorbed in a conversation , the auditoryhallu c inations ceased . The auditory hallu cinations cons iderably diminished , both in frequency and intensity,when the astigmatism was corrected by eye glasses .S imilarly in another case the patient suffered from

auditory hallu c inations . Here the patient was observedtalking to himself. This was so pronounced that nowand then he himself became consc ious of the fact thathe was talking to himsel f . He describes this experienceof automatic talk which seems to be uncontrollable andof which he is often unconsc ious by the te rm of ‘autovoca l i zation .

’ In this case the patient now and thencan catch himself tell ing things to himsel f which hetakes for the voices of other people as he i s then consc iou s of the hearing, but not o f the utterance of thewords and phrases . This , however, i s not always thecase ; in fact in a good many cases Where un consciousphonation is present, as , for instance , in the case of thepatient with the epi lepti form seizures described above ,the patient i s entirely unconsc ious of the fact of ‘

whis

pering .

’ When attention was drawn to the phenomenon , the whisper and the hallucination disappeared .


Another patient of m ine suffers from auditory hallucinations . He hears people abus ing him and callinghim names . The halluc inations occur when he i s awake

,

but they are frequ ent when he is on the point of fa ll ingasleep , or when he wakes up . He thinks , in fact he hea rsthat people whisper about him . The voices are observedto increase in frequency and intens i ty with the presenceof external noises, such as noises made in the hall , orsounds made by cars passing by. The patient was observed having subconscious or unconscious movements of l ips , tongue and even of the j aws . When hehears the voices the subconsc ious movements increase sothat they may be perce ived at a distance . Even thenurse could not help pe rce iving the subconsc ious whispering made by the patient. When the patient looksthrough a printed or written page the subconscious whispering increases . The same is observed when the patientis very much interested in something or absorbed indeep thought . During Such times he compla ins that hehears voices . With his mouth wide open and holdinghis tongue stationary, the unconsc ious whisperingceases and along with it the auditory hallucinations disappear.One o f my cases , a lady of about sixty, suffered forabout fourteen years from auditory and visual hallucinations . She compla ined that she was surrounded byghosts of departed family members who did not leaveher alone . The spi rits talk to her, they give her advicewhich is o ften against her interests . Her departed husband and his brother are the chie f leaders , the

‘guides’

so to say. They talk to her on all important occasionsand try to guide her in l i fe . The patient resents su chinterferences . When the voices became ins istent she

15 8 Normal and Abnormal Psycho logy

speech and auditory halluc inations . The patient wasof Iri sh descent, uneducated , though very intelligent.The explanation of ‘demoniacal possession’ was given and ma inta ined by her family in Ireland . She wasglad to take my View of the phenomena which I triedto make pla in to her , as much as it was possible underthe circumstances .A quotation from her written account may be of in

terest :“When I was nine years old, one day,

I remember, I sat down on a stone and suddenly I heard a voice :

‘I f you live four or five yearsmore, you will wish you had never grown up .

’ Ithought i t was strange , but soon forgot i t and went toplay again . I had no trouble until I was fou rteen , whenthe voice changed and forced me to talk with my ownvoice . The voices would make me speak of things thatin my own self I had no idea of doing and would not dofor anything . About eight years ago I had a terriblefright a fter which I thought I talked with saints andangels and saw unu su al things , I really s aw them .

” Wefind here the presence of automati c speech, unconsciou sphonation with subconsc iou s states resu lting in dissoci ations of secondary from primary sensory e lements withthe consequent formation of variou s forms of hallucinations .

Observations and experiments incontestably provethat halluc inations are syntheti zed compounds of secondary sensory elements , dissociated completely or incompletely from their primary elements . Normal andabnormal perceptive processes do not diff er psychologically as to their make - up, except in the relation o f theirprimary and secondary sensory elements . Hallucinations are not centra l ; they are essentially of peripheral

Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 15 9

origin ; they are induced by peripheral excitati ons giving rise to peripheral phys iological processes , awakeningprimary sensory elements which are subconscious or fallout entirely of the patient’s consciou sness , leaving thegroups of secondary sensory elements to stand out asfu lly developed hallucinations . The hallucinatory secondary sensory elements may be tinged with the qual i tative aspect of the dissoc iated primary sensory elements ;thu s pathologica l processes in the auditory sense organmay give rise to voices ; or morbid processes of thevisual apparatu s may give rise to vis ions . ! uite o ften ,however, the dissociation is so deep and extens ive thatthe synthetized system of secondary sensory elementsdoes not bear the least trace of the qual itative aspectof the prima ry sensory elements ; thu s a morb id condition of the pharynx , for example , may give rise to anauditory and even to a visual halluc ination . Whatevermay be the qu al itative character of the sensory com

pounds one thing stands out clear and distinct, and thatis the fact that the percept, whether normal or ab

normal,does not consist of images , but of sensations ,

primary and secondary.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE ATTRIBUTES OF SENSORY ELEMENTS

ONTRARY to the View ma intained by manypsychologists we have la id special stress onthe fundamental qual itative diff erence betweenimage and sensation . We shall not venture

far from our facts , i f we arrange images and sensations in two qualitatively di ff erent psychic series .Sensations can be ranged in a graduated series o fintens ities

,while images or representations can be

ranged in a graduated series of clearness and distinctness , or of vividnes s , as it is sometimes described bysome psychologists . I use the term vividness in thesense of clearness and distinctness and not in the senseof intensity as it i s often used ; even those psychologists who do not use intensity and Vividness indiscriminately ascribe both of them equally to sensation andimage .Vividness and intensity are understood by me to

be two fundamentally qu alitatively di ff erent aspects ,or attributes . Sensations have intensity, but no viv

idness ; images or representations have vividness , butno intensity. Sensory elements may vary from min

imum to maximum intensity . This variation in intens ity holds true both o f primary and secondary sensoryelements . S imilarly, images or representations may

pass through all degrees of vividness from minimum tomaximum. The image represents the sensation . In

160

[ 62 Normal and Abnormal Psychology

ax“az

“as

“af

'as“

t

The characteristic of the image , or of the representative element i s j ust its extraordinary plastic ity andpossibil ity of substitution . This function of substitu

tion was described by Taine with all the power of hisluc id style . The great modifiability of representationplays an important réle in psychic l i fe— adaptab il

ity to variou s conditions of li fe increases , reactions ceaseto be rigid and uni form , but change easily in responseto a changing environment. Variations o f sense - organswith their physiological process es are rather slow andtardy, often requiring generations for an e ff ectivechange, while the representative element can be modifiedand adapted within the l i fe - existence of the individualand often in a very short time . In brie f, the functionof s ubs titution pos sessed by the representative element

in the proces ses of mental selection is the s ubs titute fornatural s election in the highes t representatives of animallife .

Now under ordinary conditions of li fe the graduatedseries of representative vividn ess runs parallel to thegradated series of sensory intensities . Usually a more

The Attribu tes of Sensory E lements 163

intense sensation is represented w i th greater vividness .The increase or decrease of intens ity of the sensoryseries has a corresponding change in the vividness o fthe elements of the representative series . Intensity andviv idness vary directly. Such direct variation , however,i s not always the ru le . There are cases , when the twopart company . In states o f distraction , in subwakingstates , in states of dissoc iation , and generally in the conditions o f functional psychosis , intensity and vividnessdo not vary directly.

Strong stimulations may give rise to sensationsof great intensity, but the viv idn ess of the repre

sentative elements may fall so low as almost toreach the minimum. When the vividness is so lowas to reach the min imum

,the representative elements

cannot be used as substi tutes and , since reproductionbelongs to representative elements which symbolicallv

reproduce the sensations by the process o f substi tution ,reproduction or memory o f the original experience isabsent and there is a break, a gap in mental continu i ty,dissoc iation resu lts . The depths and exten t of dissociation of men tal sys tems may be regarded as variables

of vividness . D issociation varies invers ely as vividness .

When vividness is at its min imum,dissoc iation i s at its

maximum. The phenomena o f functional psychosishav ing thei r origin in states o f dissoc iation may thu s beregarded psychologically as functions o f vividn ess , themost characteristic a ttribu te of representative elements .Functional psychos is with all its protean man ifes tations .

the great variety of dissociated and s ubconscious s tates

may thus be reduced to variations of one fundamen tal

attribute— vividness .

CHAPTER XXIV

SENSATION AND EXTERNAL REALITY

E must not omit to point out another fundamental di fference between sensory andrepresentative elements . Sensations havethe s ignificance , or possess the attribute of

external reali ty, while images , ideas , or representationsenti rely lack‘ it. Put in Baldwin’s terminology— s ensations have the coeffic ient o f external reali ty, the

sensory coeffi c i ent of real ity . No matter whether the sensation was produced by an external stimu lus , or by a pathological process going on in the senseorgan , or brought about indirectly through the actiono f another sense - organ by means of indirect associationpaths ; no matter whether the sensation i s primary orsecondary, as long as it is a sensation at all , i t possessesthe sensory coe ffic ient o f real ity . A sensation whether‘true or false’possesses rightfully the coe fficient of reality as its necessary and inherent attribute . The percept,true or halluc inatory, cons isting of sensory elements , hasthere fore the sensory coefficient of real i ty.

Psychologically regarded , the‘tru e’percept and the

halluc ination have the same sensory constitution withthe same attributes . The di fference between the trueand false percept may be regarded from a biologicalstandpoint as a matter of adjustment . The perceptsw i th success ful adjustments are true , while those withunsuccess ful motor reactions are false and hallucinatory. Psychologically, the di fference between the

‘true’

164.


series of images with which it easi ly assoc i ates and fu ses .Writers on psychology in try ing to define fu rther thecoefficient of reality re fer it to the w i ll . Some maintainthat the coeffic ient o f reality is the ‘independence of thewill ,

’while others cla im that the coe ffic ient of reality i s‘subj ection to the will .’ Baldwin in his paper ‘ThePerception of External Reality,

’ offers an extremely interesting solution which reconci les both views .He points out that there is a di fference betweenthe ‘memory coeffic ient’ of reality and ‘sensational coe ffic i ent’ o f reality . The two coeffi c ients are oppositeas far as control of w i ll is concerned . The sensationalcoe ffic ient is independence of the w i ll , while the memorycoe fficient i s control by the will . A sensation , in short,is not under the control of the w i ll , while an image issubj ect to the will .Baldwin makes a fu rther distinction between a

simple image or‘memory image’ and a ‘memory

image of externa l real ity.

’ The memory image canbe brought up voluntarily by its proper associ ates , buti t has no sensational coeffici ent as a result, while thememory image of external reality can be followed bysensational coeffi c ients , that is , sensations can be broughtabou t in the train of such an image . To quoteBaldw in : “Certainly a present sens ible reality isnot under the control of my w i ll ; i t is independent,and i f my coeffic ient is to be discovered in the relationof the presentation to my voluntary l i fe , this mu st be itsexpress ion and I go over to the class of writers who findthe psychological basis of external reality in sensationsof resistance . But when we come to inqui re into the‘memory’coeffi cient— ask ing the qu estion what character is in a memory- image

~

which testifies to its being a

Sensation and External R eality 167

memory o f real ity, the tables seemed to be turned .

Without stopping to examine other views , I hold thatthat image is a tru e memory which we are able to getagain as a sensation (Baldw in

’s ital i cs ) by volun

tarily repeating the series o f muscular sensationswhich were assoc iated with it in its first experience . Thememory coeffi c ient therefore is subjection to the will inthe sense indi cated . A true memory in shorti s an image which I can get at will by a tra in of memoryassocia tes , and which , when got, i s further subj ect tomy will ; a memory of external real ity, on the contrary,i s an image which I can get at will by a tra in o f sensational associates and which , when got, is not subject tomy wi ll . ”

Now i f I understand Baldwin aright, a sens ation do es not fall under the control of the will , whi lea simple ‘memory image’and a ‘memory image of extern al reality’are both under the control of the wi ll , thedi ff erence being that the former does not terminate ina sensation , whereas the latter does . This I take tomean that a sensation does not depend on the subject(wi ll ) , but on the external obj ects ; in other words , asensati on cannot be produced from center to periphery(not internally initiated by the will ) but is initiated byan external excitation peripherally stimulating the senseorgan and giving rise to sensation . An image , on theother hand , does not depend for its initi ati on on the externa l object or excitation , but i s essentially an interna levent which can be brought about from with in by theprocess o f associative activity , so highly characteristi co f the image . Thus far my analys i s seems to me to bein full accord with Baldwin’s vi ew . S im i larly, Baldwin

’sin regard to ‘

memory images’and ‘memory im


ages of external real i ty,’the former not ending in sen

sory experience , the latter term inating in experience withsensory coeffic ient, seem to me to be closely related tothe views expressed by me in this work and in my otherworks on the subject .In spite o f the agreement on so many points there are

other points which do not appear to me acceptable . Wemay agree that k inzesthetic and muscu lar sensations orsensations o f resistance are at the core of things , butare they the be- all of external real i ty ? Have not sensations of pain , of hearing, of color, or of smell as muchreal i ty as our sensations coming from muscle , j oint,synovial membrane and articular surfaces ? The acute ,shooting, twinging pains of rheumatism , gout, tabesdorsal is , the burning pa ins of meningitis, the excruci

ating throbs of megrim , the fine stabbing pains of toothache , the agony o f angina , the sharp tormenting pa insof fac ial neuralgia , and many other pa ins coming fromdi fferent organs and tissues , are not they real and external ? In fact, do they not bear on them more themark of grim , piti less , external necessity than any ofthe sensations coming from active muscle and j oint ?What abou t l ight, color, sound , smell , are not they sensations of external reality, even i f sensations of resistance do not enter into their make - up?Muscular and kinaesthetic sensations may be granted

to play an important role in our knowledge of things ,but psychologically regarded, all sensations bear on themunmistakably the mark of external real i ty. It is not theparticular form or kind of sensation, but it i s the sensory quale as such , that gives the coeffi cient of reali ty.

As far as resistance is concerned Baldwin isright

,i f it be appl ied to each and every sensation . For


into our experience , and even i f it should come , i ts coming is not due to our voluntary control ; it is not wethat can make the comet- experience come into our perceptual or sensory world w i th its sensory coefficient ofexterna l reali ty . We may be in the position of Plato’scave - dwellers and have no control over real ity, thereflection of which is displayed before us , and sti ll wemay agree with Plato that for the cave - dwellers thememory images of external real i ty, the recurrence ofwhich is not under control , will sti ll be discriminatedfrom a general memory image , from an image o f fancy.

The sensation or percept may be unique , i ts reproduction may not be poss ible , and still i ts memory image willbe that of external real ity .

On the other hand, we meet in psychopathology witha vast domain o f phenomena , such as recurrent mentalstates , insis tent ideas which force themselves on thepatient’s mind against his will . The recu rrent mentalstates or the insistent ideas are far more stubborn anduncontrollable than any resistant sensory object . Theidea may come l ike attacks which overcome the patientmore than any sensory real ity , or the idea may be persistent gnawing at the very Vitals o f his mental li fe . No

external object is so stubbornly, so pain fully resistantas ju st such an idea ; and still the insistent idea i s notregarded as a sensory real i ty . The insistent idea possesses the coeffi c ient o f external reali ty, independence ofthe will , pa in fully so , and still i t is not regarded by thepatient as external real i ty ; in spite of its being independent o f the wi ll , i t is still regarded as an idea .

It seems to me that we cannot express the sensationaland ideational

'

coeffi cients in terms of will , o f control ornon

-

control , It is not resistance to thew i ll thatmakes ex

Sensation and External Reality 17 1

perience sensory, nor is i t subjection to the wi ll thatmakes experience ideational or representative . Whynot state the fact as it is ? Externa l real ity is the qualeof sensory experience , while interna l real i ty is the qualeof the image or representation. A sensation i s experienced as sensation, no ma tte r whether or no it dependson the wilL. the independence is a secondary matter ; thesame holds true in the ca se o f the image , i t is experi

enced as image , independent of the fact o f its subjectionto the will .There is an other view which finds the fun damentaldi fference between per cept and image in what is andwhat is not common to all selves . Perceptual experien ce is common , while ideational experience is no t common to all fellow- beings . I see the sun and other people can share i t with me, while my image of the sunis experienced by myself . Thus Calkins tells us :“ I perce ive lowering heavens , pouring ra in , bare treesand drenched sparrows , but I imagin e wide horizons ,brilliant sky , blos soming apple - trees and nestl ing orioles . The ma in di fference is th is : in the one case I assume that my experience is shared by other people andthat everybody who looks out sees the same dreary landscape ; but my imagination of the sunny orchard I regard as my pr ivate and unshared experience . ”

The mark of be ing common is not the essential coefficient of external reality g iven by the percept. Thepercept is not expe rienced as external , becauseit i s common to other people . We do not see the treeyonder, becau se other people can see it too ; we wouldsee it there

,even , i f, like Robinson Crusoe , we had no

fellow- being to compare notes with . A halluc inationis as fully a percept and is perce ived in the full garb of


external reality, although it may have no currency withmy fellow - men . The percept possesses the coeffi cientof external reality, no matter whether or no others canshare in it.Moreover, psychologically regarded, the percept is

as mu ch of a private experience as the image is . In fact,every psychic state has the privacy ascribed to theimage , and as such is unshared by other selves . It issimply the old psychological fallacy of confusing thephysical with the psychic obj ect, or with thepsychic state cognizant of the physical object.*

The flower as physical obj ect, as stimulus , i sshared by all who perce ive it, but the perception of the flower varies with each individual . Myperception of the flower cannot be experienced by anyone else ; like the image , the percept is entirely individual , unshared by other selves . I perceive the flower ashaving external real ity, not because my perceptual experience i s the same as that of other people, not becauseit i s shared with others — as a matter of fact, i t is not thesame

,and from its very nature cannot be the same as

the experience of others , as we cannot poss ibly share

our individual psychic experience with our fellow -men .

We perce ive the flower as an external real ity simply andsolely because it i s s ensory . The percept consisting ofsensations , primary and secondary, bears the impress ofexternal reality ; i t possesses what Baldwin so aptly terms

‘sensational coeffic ient’ giving externalreality. External reality is given directly and immediately by the sensation or by the sensory compound, by

*Royce and Mun sterberg defin e the phy s ical obj ect in terms o f‘

social ity ,’but if I un derstand them correctly they do not regard thedefinition as a psychological one.


al ity is given by and cons ists in nothing else but thesory elements.From a phi losophical and epistemologi cal stand

point the social aspect may perhaps be suffi cientto fix the external ity ’of the obj ect, but from apsychological standpo int the trade -mark of ‘shares andcommon stock’has no currency. The percept consisting, as we have : shown , of sensory elements, primaryand secondary, posses ses , on that account, the sensoryattribute o f external reality.

CHAPTER XXV

THE SUBCONSC IOUS AND UNCONSC IOU S CEREBRATION

LATO put on the po rtals of his academy theinscription ,

“No one can enter here without aknowledge o f geometry.

”

Simi larly no one canga in access to the facts o f abnormal psychology

without a thorough understanding of the subconscious .The subconscious may be briefly defined as mental processes o f which the individua l i s not di rectly conscious .

Such knowledge i s all the more requis ite as psychopathicdisturbances with which psychopathology proper deals

are essentially afiections of subconscious life activity .

The general dri ft of my Psychology of Suggestion i s thedescription of the subconscious as a di ffused‘ consciousness below the margin of persona l consciousness . Isometimes use the term “ subconscious sel f. ” I des ignateby “sel f ” not personal consciousness , but mere consciousness . In M ultiple Personality, in which I developthe theory of thresholds in regard to the phenomena ofnormal and abnormal menta l l i fe , I define the subconscious as consciousness below the threshold o f at

tentive personal consciousness . I find that my clinicaland psychological investigations more and more confirm me in the View of the subconscious advanced byme in The Psychology of Sugges tion . I am pleased tofind that Prof. James , in a recent article , accepts thesame view, and advances the same theory of thresholdin regard to the subconscious . “Nobody knows ,

” hewrites ,

“how far we are ‘marginally’consc ious o f theseI7S


memories, concepts and conational states at ordinarytimes , or how far beyond the

‘margin’of our presentthought trans -marginal consciousness of them mayexist.In my Psychology of Sugges tion I pointed out thedi ffi culties of the pu rely physiological interpretation ofthe subconsc ious . S ince this View still l ingers amongsome psychologists , I cannot do better than reproducethe passage

“The facts of hypnotic memory alone strongly indicate the intell igent nature of the subconscious . Can the

theory of unconsc ious cerebration expla in , for instance ,the fact of suggested amnesia during hypnosis ? I hypnotize Mr. V . F. and make him pass through manylively scenes and actions . I give him hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions . The subject i s wakened and hypnotized time and aga in . At last he is put into a hypnotic state , and it is suggested that on awakening heshall not remember anything of what had happenedin the state of hypnosis . The subj ect, on emergingfrom his trance , remembers nothing of what he haspassed through. I then put my hand on his foreheadand tell him in a commanding voice ,

‘You remembernow everything.

’As i f touched by the wand of a

magician , the suppressed memories become endowedwith l i fe and movement, and invade the consciousnesso f the subj ect . Everything is now clearly remembered ,and the subj ect is able to relate the tale of his ad

ventures withou t the omission o f the least incident . Sodeta iled is the account that one cannot help wonderingat the extraordinary memory displayed by the subject.How i s the theory of unconscious cerebration to ac

‘

zount for this strange fact ? Prof. Ziehen, in his Phys


On closer exam ination, we find the term uncon

scious cerebration to be of so loose a nature thatunder its head are often recorded facts that clearlyindicate the working of an intelligence . Thus , Mr.

Charles M . Chi ld brings the following fact as aspecimen of unconsc ious cerebration : “I had earnestlybeen trying ,

” a gentleman writes to Mr. Child,to ! make a trial balance , and at last left off

working, the summary of the Dr. and Cr. s ides ofthe accoun t showing a difference of £2 1os . , the Dr.

s ide being so much sma ller. The error I had not foundon Saturday night when I left the counting- house . On

this same Saturday night I reti red feel ing nervous andangry with mys el f. Some time in the night I dreamedthus : I was seated at my desk in the coun ting- hou seand in . a good l ight ; eve rything was orderly and natural , the ledger lying be fore me . I was looking overthe balan ce of the accounts and comparing them withthe sums in the trial- balance sheet. Soon I came to adebit balance of £2 108 . I looked at it , called mysel fsun dry names , spoke to mysel f in a deprecating mannerof my. own eyes , and at last put the £2 10s . to its properside of the tr ial- balance sheet and went home . I aroseat the usual . Sunday time, dress ed carefully, breakfasted ,went to call on some friends to go to church .

Suddenly the dream flashed on my memory . I wen t forthe keys , opened the offi ce , a lso the sa fe , got the ledger,and: tu rned to the folio my dream had indicated . Therewas the account whose balance was the sum wan tedwhich I had omitted to put in the balance - sheet, wherei t was put now, and my year

’s pos ting proved correct.

”

The adherents of unconsc ious ; cerfi ration tacitly in

clude under this term not only unconscious phys iological

Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 179

processes , or nerve mod ifications , but also psychi calstates . Keeping clea rly in mind the real meaning o f unconsc iou s cerebration as refe rring to physiologi cal processes , or nerve modifications with no psychical accompan iment, the di fficulties o f unconscious cerebration toaccount for the phenomena of hypnoti c memory become truly insurmountable . For i f the phys i ologi calprocesses subsumed under the category of unconsc iouscerebration are completely lacking in all psychi cal elements whatever, how can a general abstract negativephrase ,

“You cannot remembe r,” suppress parti cu lar

psychical states , and how can a simi lar positive phrase ,“You can remember,

” bring the forgotten memoriesback to consc iousness ? It is s imply incomprehensible .Furthermore , while the subject i s in a hypnoti c con

dition , we can suggest to him that on awakening heshall not remember anything, but when put to the au

tomatic recorder he shall be able to write everythingthat has taken place in the state of hypnosis . The

subj ect i s then awakened : he remembers nothing at allof what he has passed through while in the state of hypnotic trance . As soon , however, as he i s put to theautomatic recorder the hand gives a full rational account o f a ll the events . I f now you ask the subject whati t is he has written , he stares at you in confu s ion ; heknows nothing at all of the writing . How shall we account for thi s fact on the theory of unconscious cerebration ? Can unconsciou s phys iological processes writerational discourses ? It is simply m i raculous , incomprehensible .These , however, are not the only diffi cu lties whichthe theory o f unconscious cerebration has to encounter.Take the fol lowing expe riment : I gave Mr. V. F.


the suggestion that on awakening he should put mycoat on three times , take it o ff , and put it on again ;that he should do it when he heard a signal whichshould be a knock ; amnesia was suggested and also thepossibi li ty o f writing the suggestion . The subj ect wasthen roused from his trance . There was not the slightest recollection o f what had been suggested , but whenhe was put to the automatic recorder the hand at onceproceeded to write everything . In the middle of thewriting, when a s ignal will be given Istopped the subj ect and asked him what he was writingabout . “I do not know ,

” he answered .

“How is it,I asked aga in ,

“you write and do not know what youwrite ? ” “ I do not know , I think it was somethingabout a coat. ” “What was it you were writing about acoat ? ” “I do not know , maybe it was about the makeof a coat. Then when the signal came , he rose andput on the coat three times .To take another experiment of the same kindI g1ve the subject the suggestion that he shouldbow to the gas whenever the door should be opened ;again amnesia i s suggested , with the possib il i ty ofwriting . The subj ect i s stopped when he finishedhis account. What was it you wrote ? ” I asked .

The subject looked su rprised . I repeated my question .

“I do not know , I think something about adoor . What was it about a door ? ” “I do notknow . I have made many s imilar experiments , andall of them with the same results . It is evident that thewriting is not an unconsc ious automatic process , for thesubject possesses a general knowledge of what he haswri tten

,or even of what he is going to write .

Now, on the theory of unconscious cerebration this


Z iehen , f or instance , conce ives that each sensation depos its a copy of iwelf , — an image , an idea , in someone of the memory ganglion cells , and memory cons i stsin the reprodu ction of this copy, —the hen lays an eg

from whi ch another hen may come ou t. Maudsleyexpresses the same thing in slightly di ff erent terms ; lns tead o f “depos i ts of images in memory ganglion cells

,

”

he us es modifications of nerve elemen ts . ” It may besupposed,

” says Maudsley,“that the firs t activity did

leave behind it, when it subs ided , some a fter- eff ect , somemod ification of the nerve element, whereby the nerveci rcuit was d i spos ed to fall again readily into the sameaction , such disposition ( unconsciou s ) appearing in consciousnes s as recognition or memory. R ibot and manyother psychologists , w ith slight vari ations in m inorpoints , fo llow the same beaten track . All of them agreethat it is the nerve modifications produced by the phys iologica l processes of sens ations , emotions , etc . , that constitute the basis , nay, the very ess ence , of memory itsel f.It does not require a close examination to find the de

ficiencies of this theory . A mere modification le ft behind as a trace cannot possibly expla in memory, recollecti on , the fact o f re ferring a parti cular b it of experience to an experience felt before . The retention of atrace or o f a nervous modification , and the reproduc

tion of that trace or modification , cannot in the leastaccount for the fact that a series o f sensations , ideas ,images , emotions felt at di fferent times , should becomecombined , brought into a unity, felt l ike being similar,like be ing repetitions , copies of an original experience .It is no t retention or reproduction, but it is the recogni

tion element that constitutes the essence of memory .

The rose o f to- day rem inds me of the rose of yesterday,

Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 183

of the same rose seen the day be fore yesterday. Now

the image of the rose may be reta ined, may even bereproduced , but i f i t i s not recognized as having happened in my past, there can be no recollection . In short,without personal recognition there i s no memory. As

James strongly puts i t,“the gutter is worn deeper

by each success ive shower, but not for that reasonbrought into contact with previous showers . Does thetheory of unconsci ous physiological processes , of material brain traces , o f nerve modifications , does the theorytake into account this element of personal recogni tion ?Can the theory of unconsc ious cerebration off er thefa intest suggestion as to how that element o f recognitionis brought about ? What is that something added to theunconscious physiological trace or nerve modificationthat effects a conscious recognition ?Furthermore , first impressions can be local i zed in thepast, but so can a lso each subsequent revival . How

shall we explain on the theory of unconscious phys iologica l nerve registration that the original , the prim itive sense experience, as well as each subsequent tevival, can be re ferred to as distinct psychical facts . Fori f the stru ctural nerve elements are sl ightly modifiedwith each revival , how shall we account for this psychical distinction o f the origin a l sense experience as wellas of the modified revivals ? The remembered experi

ence leaves its own individual trace , then a trace of itsbeing a copy of a former original impress ion , and alsoa trace o f its being a member in a seri es of s im ilartraces , each trace being a copy of another and a copy ofthe original impres s ion . How all that is done is a

mystery .

”

These objections advanced by me many years ago


hold true of recent theories which fall back on the oldviews of M i ll and Carpenter, namely, unconsc ious cerebration . The modern upholders of unconscious cerebration think that they have discovered new factsand arguments in favor of unconscious mental activi ty, and are thu s justified in denying subconscious mental l i fe . The arguments , as we have pointed out, arenot new, nor are the facts advanced in support of thesearguments true . The same obj ections hold true in thecase of the theory of unconsc ious cerebration offered u s

in the garb of nerve currents and nerve paths , well wornnerve tracks , opening and closing of nerve cu rrents andtra cks , and formation of all shapes and forms of neurograms . Why be misled by figments and by sounds ?

The subconsc iou s stands for a number of facts , reac

tions , and behavior which are accompanied by ps ychicl i fe , by mental activities , by consciousness .

The phys iological unconsc ious registration theories ofnerve currents , nerve - paths , and neurograms are notonly figments , arbitrary fanci fu l weavings of the imag

:

ination , they cannot even hypothetically explain thesimplest act o f memory, and espe cially of recognitivememory .

Since the theories o f unconscious registration fai l usin the most elementary mental processes , how can wepossibly rely on cerebration - fanc ies in the case of suchcomplex phenomena as hypnotic conditions and variousmental states of trance and dissociation ? The phys iological theories , such as unconscious cerebration andits modifications , fa iling, we must use for all thosephenomena the psychological interpretation . The subconscious must be taken as a necess ary theory in psychopathology , as atoms , molecules , electrons and ether

CHAPTER XXVI

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND AUTOMATISM

HE theory of unconscious cerebration dieshard . Recently a few psychologists made anattempt to revive it . The arguments ad

vanced are rather philosophical than psychological . It may be well to test the val idity of these arguments . I f we clear the ground of all superfluousspeculations , we find two main contentions . In the firstplace , it is assumed that many hypnotic and hystericalmani festations are solely the result of phys iological activities . It is cla imed by some , such as Miin sterberg,that physiological processes without any psychic accompan iments , may reach such a high state of complexityas to account fully for all the observed mani festations inthe di ff erent forms of mental dissoci ations . In the second place , i t is cla imed , from a purely philosophicalstandpoint, that even in the case of dissoc i ation whenconsc iousness may be granted to be present, there is nodissoc i ation in consc iousness itself, since consciousness isbut a passive onlooker while the active changes go on inthe content of consciousness ; in other words , in stateso f dissoc iation it is not consciousness that is changed ,but only the content of consciousness .Let us examine these contentions and see whetherthey can stand the test of critical analysis . The viewof regarding mental activity from a purely phys iologicalstandpoint is not new, i t dates as far back as Descartes,who regards all the animals , with the exception of man ,

186

The Subconscious and Automatism 187

as mechanical automata . The philosopher, Ma imon ,in his "

Autobiography” tells an anecdote on himsel f.

In his youth Maimon was an ardent adherent of Cartesian automatism . During one of his strolls with afri end Ma imon struck a goat. The animal bleated .

The friend rebuked Maimon for his cruelty. Ma imonlaughed at the simplici ty of his friend —

“The goat islike a drum which sounds when it is beaten .

Huxley carried this View further, regarding consciou sness as an epiphenomenon . The physiologicalmechanism is the engine , consciousness is but the whistle accompanying it.O f course , i t goes without saying that psychologists

and physiologists at present assume that all statesof consc iou sness are accom by physiologica lprocesses . Every l ing , even the mostcompl icated poetical inspiration , or the most abstrusemathematical , logical , and metaphysical speculations ,have physiological processes as thei r aggmpan iments .

We are , however, hardly j ustified in carrying this postulate to the absurdity of the total deni al of consciousness ,and regarding all adjustments and adaptations as somany chemical and mechanical reactionsas some modern biologists , such as Loeb and others , areapt to put it in the case of many animals , a revers ion tothe Cartesian hypothesis of mechanical automatism . Mo

tor reactions can be regarded solely from the physiologica l standpoint, but consciousness cannot be entirelyru led out . What probabi l i ty is there that a play ofatoms and electrons would produce the Iliad

,Hamlet

,

the Principia of Newton , the Celes tialM echanics of La

place , or Da rwin’s Origin of Species ?

Even i f we descend to such motor reactions as are

18 8 Normal and d bnormal Psychology

expressed in the compositions of a schoolboy, we still unhesitatingly assume a consc ious activity. We cannot refute the philosopher who wou ld regard all such manifestations as so many physiological processes withoutany conscious accompaniment . For though every oneis di rectly conscious of his own mental li fe , no one canexperience directly the mental l i fe of another. We cannot inspect directly the psychic processes that go on inother living beings , or in our fellow men . M ind is inferred from action , from behavior. Reactions , ad

j ustments to environment, accompanied by consciousness, by intelligence in us , are rightly judged to have thesame accompaniment in other beings , in our neighbours .To deny consc iousness to our neighbour, and to regardhim as a phys iological automaton , is to put oneself inthe absurd position of denying the existence of stateswhich are observed in ourselves under similar conditions . In fact, the burden of proof falls on those whomake such a

' denial .Now , in the case of hypnosis or various states of dissoc i ation , we meet with intell igent adjustments oftenexpressed in gestu res , writing, and speech . We can , bymeans of variou s methods , enter into active relationship with those dissociated activities , unknown to the individual himsel f. We can obta in intelligent replies toour questions e ither by writing, or by speaking, or byother arranged means of communication . What righthave we to deny consc iousness in one case while wea ffi rm it in another case under similar circumstances ?When I receive a letter from my friend I regard the letter as having been written by a being who possessesconsciousness , but when a similar letter is written by afriend in a hypnotic or posthypnotic state , we regard

I90 Normal and Abnormal Psychology

how arb itrary and illogical i s the pos ition of those psychologists who coquet with physiology under the delusion that they are more scientifi c. They are led totake arb itrary positions which lead into the pitfallsof sol ips ism , with all its contradictions and absurdities .Bes ides , physiological processes are , a fter all, but hy

pothetical concepts ; physiological currents are conceived a fter the model of electrical currents , and are byno means theoretically proven . While they should beused for the sake of a better elucidation of the facts , i tis not good sc ientific sense to sacrifice to them the verymaterial of the science of psychology. Sensations , ideas ,feel ings , emotions , are a fter a ll the direct data of thepsychologist, while physiologica l processes and currentsare purely hypothetical . When , there fore , these hypothetical entities lead not to a better understandingof the facts of mental l i fe, but to the i r denial , the verypurpose of the hypothetical creations is completely defeated.

Physiological processes are framed to expla in stateso f consc iousness with thei r motor reactions . When,there fore , these hypothetical creations threaten to sweepaway the actual l iving facts , i t is time to halt and exam ine closely the sterile character o f the hypothesis .The central fallacy lies in the tacit assumption that unknown and possibly unknowable , highly problematica lbra in currents , with their

“opening and closing valves ,”

with“wellworn or blocked paths ,

” all of a purely conjectural character, have , by their ingenious complexity, become , l ikes marionettes , so marvellously endowed withsense - l ike activiti es as to dispense completely with themental states which these conceptual entities werecalled in to expla in .

The Subconscious and Automatism 191

Cl in ical cases and experimental facts go further toinvalidate the theory of the purely phys i ca l interpretation of the subconscious , or what may be described asautomatism - psychology . I f anything is o f the utmostimportance in mental l i fe , i t is surely memory. Mem

ory forms a un i ty of our l i fe , brings , so to speak, to afocus our li fe - experiences , which would have otherwisebeen disconnected, confused, and chaotic . I remember j ust now what I did an hour ago , a day ago, whatI l ived through many years ago . I remember the experiences of my childhood, boyhood, and youth . I remember my struggles and disappointments , my loves ,my friendships , my enmities , my feel ings , sentiments ,emotions

,ideas , and sensations . All these inter- con

nected, interlocked l inks o f memories form the sol idchain of my conscious personal ity.

In my memory of the past experi ences there isthe present consciousness that all that I had gonethrough at the time of the experience— any change ,any modification , that had taken place— occurredin my mind, in my consciousness . Unless underdelusion or i llus ion of memory we cannot remember what did not occur in consciousness . We can

not remember what we were not conscious of . Thepast mental state which the present memory re fers to isa state of consc iousness ; otherwise memory is imposs ible and meaningless . Memory, recollection , remin is

cence , can only refer to a previous s tate of consciousness .

Surely no one else can have a better and more directknowledge than I mysel f have o f the ideas , emotions ,and moods that I remember, as experienced by me .The memory factor is all the more important in

psychology, s ince we have to take account of the sub


ject’s inner experiences . In each case of memory the

bu rden of proof falls on those who deny the validity ofthat memory, as referring to a past state of consciousness . Suppose I have a memory in a full state of consciousness that I l ighted a lamp an hou r ago , the burdenof proof would fall on those who deny the existence ofsuch a state . It wou ld be an arbitrary, i f not a preposterous position for an outside observer to cla im that thelighting of the lamp was carried out mechanically

,by

a physiological automatism , and that the subsequentmemory was but an illusion . The onus of proof thatthe origina l act had no consc ious accompaniment is entirely on those who take such a position in Oppositionto the direct introspective account. Where such a proofis not forthcoming, the position taken is arbitrary. Werewe to take such a position , the very science ofpsychology wou ld become an impossibility, s ince allmemory would have to be declared a snare and a delusion. All psychological studies based on introspectionand memory would have to be abandoned, and weshould have to follow Comte, and declare psychologyan impossibil ity . A psychologist ma inta ining such a

point of View is , from the very nature o f his atti tude ,disqual ified to give his opinion ; he must fal l back onphysiology, and rule out all psychology.

I f,however, memory and introspection are not re

jected, then the recollection of a consc ious state shouldnot be arbitrarily dismissed , unless there are good reasons for such a dismissal . Now , the hypnotic subject,or the patient, in the case of functional psychosis , undergoes an experience of which he is apparently uncon

sc iou s . In a subsequent state , in a hypnotic or trancestate , he actually recollects that the experience was a

CHAPTER XXVI I

THE SUBCONSC IOUS AND THE PASSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

RIVEN out of the psychological fortress ,some psychologists of the philosophical type(Miinsterberg) still take refuge in the metaphys ical c itadel . It i s claimed that, psycho

logically, mental l i fe is analyzed into consc iou sness andits content . Now , i t is further assumed that all mentalmodifications occur in mental contents , but not in consciou sness . Consc iousness , itsel f, i s supposed to be apass ive , immu table looker- on , a sort of psychic de ity.

We thus have a mental content which is not consciousand a consciou sness , the blessed Buddha in his bl issfulstate of Nirvana . Consciousness is regarded in the lightof a substance which contains the mental content somewhat a fter the fashion of a material substance underlying physical qualities . This View of an underlying, immutable substance , with a changing qualitative content,was long ago critic i zed by Hume , both in the case ofmind and body. The assumption o f an entity underlying observed phenomena , whether physi cal or mental ,has since become so weakened that it is no longer regarded as a living hypothesis among thinking men ofscien ce .We can see at a glance that the substance - conscious

ness with its changing qu alitative content is but a pieceof metaphysi cal speculation , it is a revival of the oldsoul- hypothesis , long ago buried by modern psychologists . The soul - consciousness hypothesis must be re

194

Subconscious and the Pass ive Consciousness 195

jected, for the s imple reason that it compl icatesmatters , and explains nothing . In fact, the hypothesis o f an impertu rbable soul - consciousness from the

very nature of its hypothetical being, i tsel f requires anexplanation , while it does not in the least explain themental content , which is the material of the psychologist. Su ch a passive , changeless soul - consciousness isa sort o f box in which the content of soul - consciou snessresides and has its being. This soul - consciousness is buta survival from a past metaphys ica l period .

In the case of double and multiple personal i ties it i scla imed that while the personalites are di fferent, theirconsc iousness is not di ff erent, but one and the same . Inthe di fferent personali ties found in the case of multiplepersonality, there is among them but one consciousness ,somewhat l ike the Greek myth of the three old womenwith one eye among them . By a parity of reasoning wemay say that the minds of di fferent individuals , such asJohn’s and Peter’s , are really identical . John and Peter are different personal i ties w i th di ff erent contents ,but with the same consciou sness . In fact, we may generalize further and say that the whole human race andthe beasts o f the field and the birds of the a ir sharein one and the same indivis ible , passive , immutable consciou sness , a sort o f world - soul . This may be a grandmetaphys ical speculation , but i t i s neither psychologicalnor scientific .There is another obj ection to the subconsc ious , an

objection based on an artificial fast and hard l ine drawnbetween the purpose of science on the one hand , andthat of will on the other. Science , i t is cla imed , dealswith artificial concepts , while pe rsonal wi ll i s concernedwith the real values of l i fe , It i s claim¢d that the con


cept of the subconscious i s illegitimate , because it involves a confusion of this metaphys ical double bookkeeping .

The world of description and the world of appreciation were brought out and contrasted by ProfessorRoyce in his early works , and a fterwards elaborated bya few psychologists of the Schopenhau erian tinge . Thedivis ion is not new , and dates back to the M iddle Ages ,w ith its spli t o f science and philosophy on the one hand,and religion on the other. It is the doctrine of the twofold truth (Die Lehre von der zwei fachen Wahrheit ) .

According to mediaeval thought , there are two rea lms ,the realm of knowledge and the realm of faith ; therealm of intellect and the realm of will . What is truein the one may not be true in the other . From Maimonides , Ibn Gabirol, Albertus Magnus , Thomas Aquinasto Duns Scotus and Occam the same doctrine of the twofold truth and the two realms prevailed . The scholasti ccould say anything he wished provided he was cautiousto cla im that what was true secunclum rationem was nottrue secundum fidem.

This double View still survives in some philosophicalquarters . Instead of finding fault with the subcon

scious for ignoring this time - honored double truth , itshould rather be regarded as a special merit. As a matter of fact, the subconscious , unless interpreted in metaphysi cal terms of a cosmic sel f, has nothing to do withthe hei rloom of metaphys ical mediaeval thought . Thesubconsciou s is based on experience and facts to whichphilosophical and metaphysica l distinctions should adaptthemselves .We thus find that the objections to the subconsciousare based on insu fficient grounds . We also find that the

CHAPTER XXVI I I

SUBCONSC IOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS IDEAS

HERE is a school which regards the subconscious as formed of “suppressed mentalcomplexes . ” The views of this school arenot psychologically clear. It seems , however,

that the subconsciou s is viewed in the light of “un

consciou s ideas . ” “Unconsc ious Ideas ” were discu ssed

by me in my Psychology of Sugges tion , and I cannotdo better than to quote from that volume ,

“For themechanism of consciou sness is hidden deep down in thedepths o f the subconsc iou s , and it is thither we have todescend in order to get a clear understanding of thephenomena that appear in the broad dayl ight o f consciou sness .

The German school , w i th Wundt at its head , at firststa rted out on s imilar l ines , but they cou ld not make anyuse o f the subconscious , and their specu lations ran wildin the fanc ies o f Hartmann . The reason of this fa ilureis due to the fact that the concept of the subconsciou sas conceived by the German school was extremely vague ,and had rather the character of a mechanical than thatof a psychical process . An unconsc ious consciou sness— that was thei r concept o f the subconsc i ous . In sucha form as this the subconscious was certainly meaningless — mere nonsense— and had to be given up . TheGerman psychological investigations are now confined tothe content of consciousness in so far as the individualis immediately conscious of it. But as this form of con

198

Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 199

sciousness i s extremely narrow and circumscribed, theresults arrived at, though remarkable for the i r thoroughness , are , a fter a ll , of a rather trivial nature . It iswhat James aptly characterizes as “the elaboration o fthe obvious . ”

This criti cism appl i es well to Freud and his adherents . Das Unbewusste i s conce ived as “Suppressed unconscious idea - complexes . ” O f course , the cla ims ofthat school to original i ty and to the apparent unveil ingo f the causation of psychoneurosis are enti rely unjustified. A

“suppressed complex ” i s but another term fora dissociated system , commonly accepted in psychopathology . The special theories developed by that school inregard to desire , to sexual i ty, and to voluntary suppression of unpleasant or pain ful ideas are entirely gratuitous and false in the l ight of modern psychology and cl inica l experience .This psycho - analytic school has unfortunately fallenback on the Herbarti an psychology with its metaphysi calReals or ideas which by thei r mutu al tension keepsuppressing one another, thu s determ in ing the display o f the contents of consciousness . As Herbart tells us : Concepts become forces when they res istone another . This resistance occurs when two or moreopposed concepts encounter one another. ” This propos ition or principle procla imed by Herbart is at the bas i so f Freud’s mythi cal speculations . “

A concept is in consciousness in so far as i t i s not suppressed,

” Herbart tellsu s ,

“but is in actual representation . When it rises out ofcomplete suppression , i t enters into consciousness .

”Ac

cording to Herbart and his modern followers , suppressed ideas become forces and impulses . Conceptswhich are not opposed or contrasted with one another,


so far as they meet unhindered , form a complex, a

favouri te term used by the psycho - analyti c school andi ts followers .It may possibly be of interest to remark that Herbart

i s closely followed by the psycho - analytic schoolin regard to the doctrine of desire . Desi re withHerbart is fundamental . “The faculty of desiremust include wishes , instincts , and every speci es o f longing .

” “The expression ‘desire’must not be so l imitedas to exclude those wishes which remain , though theymay be va in , or so - called pious wishes , and which , forthe very reason that they do remain , constantly inc i temen to new e ff orts , becau se through them the thought ofa possibil ity is ever anew suggested , in spite of all reasons which appear to prove the impossibil i ty of atta inment . It is very important to give the concept of theunattainab i l i ty of the wished- for object strength enoughso that a peaceful renunciation may take place of thedesi re . A man dreams of a des irable future for himsel f, even when he knows it will never come . TheseHerbartian doctrines , long ago abandoned by psychology, are now being revived by the marvellous ,

“scien

tific ” psycho - analytic technique as a new discovery in thesc i ence of norma l and abnormal psychology. No bettercriticism can be passed on this revival of Herbartianpsychology in the domain of psychopathology than theone made by James : “ I mu st confess that to mymind there is something almost hideous in the gl ib Herbartian j argon about Vors tellungmassen and thei r Hem

mungen ( suppress ions ) and sinken and erheben ands chweben and Verschmelzungen and Complexionen

complexes .It is claimed by some o f Freud’s younger adherents


notions to explain the real facts ; but each o f these hypothetical agents is regarded as real , as a vera causa.

We cannot help agreeing with J . S. M ill on the subj ecto f hypothesis : “ I conceive it to be necessary, when thehypothesis relates to causation , that the supposed causeshould not only be a real phenomenon , something actually existing in nature , but should be already known toexerc i se , or at least to be capable of exercising, an infinence o f some sort over the e ff ect. In any other case it isno sufficient evidence of the truth of the hypothesis thatwe are able to deduce the real phenomenon from it . ”

Again ,“What is true in [Newton

’s! maxim is that thecause , though not known previously, should be capableof being known therea fter ; that its ex i stence should becapable of being detected , and its connection with theeff ect ascribed to it should be susceptible of be ing provedby independent evidence . ”

I f we apply this very simple rule o f logic to the theoryof “unconscious ideas , ” we at once real i ze the illegitimate character o f such a hypothes is . An idea is essentially of a consc ious nature . To speak , therefore , ofunconscious ideas , is to introduce into psychology thesel f- contradictory impossible concept of unconsciousconsc iou s ideas . This is equivalent to the assumption ofan unconsc iou s consciousness . An unconsc ious idea i sneither a vera causa nor a fact ultimately to be verified .

The conception of an unconscious idea is like the conception of a round square .Moreover, it is not true , psychologically, that ideascan be “suppressed ” so that they become dissociated or“unconsc ious . ” It i s not true that we suppress pain fulideas into the unconscious .

” We do not forget our

painful ideas . On the con trary, painful ideas stand out

Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 203

a ll the more prom inent in our cons ciousness . Pain hammers experience into the mind. In fact we may say withmore right that it is the pleasurable ideas that are for

gotten, whi le the painful ideas are remembered. An

experience associated with pa in is never forgotten . Likea splinter in the flesh , it remains in consc iousness . It isdue to other causes that a pa in ful experience becomessubconscious .Teleologically, we can well see the importance of thisfact. I t would have been suicidal to the individual andultimately to the spec i es , i f pa in ful experiences were forgotten . The individual must learn to avoid harm ful objects and hurt ful stimuli . This can only be aecomplished by actual ly remembering pa in ful experiences .That individual would survive who remembered besthis pa in ful experiences . Were it otherwise , the individua l would be very much in the condition of the proverbial si lly bird that hides its head at the s ight of thehunter. The subjective pa infu l experiences must be remembered ; a pa in ful experience fixes the attention .

On this fact of strengthening memory by pa in wasbased the once universally recognized method of tra ining and education . What is fixed by pa in 18 never forgotten . What may bring about forgetfulness is e ithera consti tutionally bad memory, or a state of indifference , or an intense , paralyzing emotion of fear,especially in early childhood . The whole theory of“suppress ion of painful

“complexes

”

is based on

false clinical and psychological assumptions . Neitheris there such a process as suppression of complexes ,

”

nor i s there su ch a mental state as an “unconsciousidea .

”

Bergson , who as usual has his hand everywhere , takes

204'Normal and Abnormal Psychology

up cudgels in defense of the unconscious: In his work“M atter and M emory

” he argues that common sen seassumes the presence of external objects , although itmay not be directly cognizant of them . Being an idealist and pan - psychist Bergson regards the nature of thingsas made up of images . I f, then , he reasons , commonsense believes in the existence of obj ects ‘passed out ofs ight and sense,

’ i f it affirms unhes itatingly the actualexistence of not directly experienced obj ective images ,there should be no diffi culty in assuming the existence ofsubj ective images , or of psychi c states of which there isno consciousness . The argument is essentially metaphysica l and will hardly have any weight with the psychologist or psychopathologist .Bergson

’s psychology is unfortunately so much satu

rated with metaphysics that many a valuable suggestion becomes lost in the haze and tangle ofhis speculations . The psychologist has nothing todo with the constitution of matter as i t isin itself. This belongs to metaphysica l ontology. The

psychologist assumes matter as an external existence ,and separates it from his own subj ect matter, — psychi cstates , mental processes , their elements and relations . A

psychic state made up of ‘images’a fter the fashion of‘material images’with no consciousness to them ceasesto be psychic in the psychological sense . From a psychological standpoint the term

‘psychic’can only meansome form of consc iousness , however vague and mar

ginal. Bergson’s view would have probably been near

er the truth , i f he had assumed the existence o f a subcons cious consciousness .

An“unconsc iou s idea in the sense that the idea has

no consciousness can have no meaning. I f, however, by


un conscious , but that there are mental states , ideas,feel ings , which, though conscious , do not reach selfconsciousness. In other words , there are in us mentalprocesses which have consciousness , but no selfconsciousness . This is precisely what I mean by the sub

conscious,— mental s tates which have consciousness

,but

do not reach the personal consciousness . In short, theonly poss ible psychological assumption is a subconsciousconsciousness .

CHAPTER XXIX

THE SUBCONSCIOUS , CONSC IOUS , AND UNCONSCIOUS

HOSE who accept the division of the subconscious into co- existing consciousness , or theco - conscious and the unconscious really assume the doctrine of the subconscious . They

cla im that it would be better and more precise to indicate whenever poss ible the conscious or unconscious ,that is , the strictly phys iological character of the ob

served mani festations. This, however, i s more eas ilysa id than done . We know next to nothing of the phys iological bra in processes , which are ma inly hypothetical,and we do not know the l im its o f the subconscious consciousness . In many cases it is not easy to determ inewhat the exact character of the subconscious mani festation is, how far it i s conscious , dimly conscious, how fari t has gone toward the development of an independentpersonal i ty , and how far it shades in the direction ofthe purely physiological . In the absence of any exactdeterm ination , the term

‘subconscious’indicates the character of the mental state without any definite committal to any o f the possible hypotheses .The term “unconscious i s a ll the more objectionable,as Hoffding has already pointed out, i t is essentiallyan amb iguous , negative concept. The unconscious

”

may mean absence o f selfconsciousness , or lack of consciousness , that is , purely physiological processes withno conscious concomitant. He who uses the term “

nu

conscious ” must in each case indicate in what sense he207

208 Normal and Abnormal Psycho logy

uses the term . Is the mani festation entirely physiological , or is i t consc ious in the sense of consciousness withno sel f- consciousness ? The two meanings are diametrically opposed to each other . The unconscious inthe sense of the purely physiological assumes the theoryo f unconsc ious cerebration ; the other use of the unconscious in the sense o f mere consciousness with no selfconsciousness recognizes the View of the subconsciousness as advanced in my works .It is cla imed again that in many cas es of psychopathic

maladies there is no need to have recourse to subconsc ious systems . It i s qu ite probable that the association between the stimulus and the emotion called forthis a direct one . The patient who is a fra id of dogs hasthe fear called forth by the sight of a dog . There isno need to assume that there are here any intermediatel inks in the chain of assoc iation . Even physiologicall inks may be totally absent here . It may be that byinvestigation i t can be shown that this assoc iation hasa history based on some former experience . There is noreason to assume that the experience is functioning subconsciously, whether consciously or

“unconsc iously, that

is , physiologically. The dog and the fear have formedan indissoluble assoc i ation , so that, as soon as the dogis perce ived the fear is awakened .

This,however, i s rather a debatable subject , smee It

i s impossible to tell in the case of purely physiologicall inks

,whether such are present or not. Thus , Hoff

ding says ,“Not only may consc ious results come from

unconscious ( subconsc ious ) working up , but there mayalso be unconsciou s intermediate links in the midst ofconsc ious work . Supposing the idea a to be l inked withthe idea b

,and b aga in with c, then a will finally pro


Wundt acknowledge the presence of intermediate linksin what appears to be a case of purely “ immediate ” association .

In cases where the intermediate l inks are un

conscious,”

in the sense of a pu rely phys iological process , there is no criterion to prove the presence of suchintermediate physiological l inks , and one may as well ,from a purely psychological introspective standpoint,deny thei r very existence . On the other hand , i f withWundt, Hb ffding and others we assume the presenceof intermediate psychi c l inks , there is no way of disproving them . It is quite probable that such intermediate l inks are present in every s ingle case . Thevery fact that “unconscious ” systems can be revivedas memories or hallucinatory hypnoidic states would iadicate thei r functioning when one of the i r componentsbecomes awakened to activity.As an objection to the presence of intermediate psychic l ink s Pavlow’s experiments are brought forwardto show that associations can be formed between re

mote stimuli and glandular secretions , for instance .Thus , a dog with a fistula in the parotid gland can bemade to react with secretions to l ight or sound stimul i .This objection may be easily obviated by the consideration that we do not know whether there are or arenot intermediate mental links between the artificia lstimul i and the discharge of the glandular secretion .

This cons ideration is all the more cogent as the remotestimul i can only give results , i f persistently associatedwith food stimul i . I f such association with food stimuliis absent, and new stimu l i a re associated with remotestimuli which give reactions through thei r associationswith food stimul i , the result i s inhibition of secre tion .

The Subconscious,Conscious

,and Unconscious 2 1 1

In other words , each new stimulus must be di rectly associated with the original food stimulus .To quote from Savadsky

’s work carried out in Pav

low’s laboratory : “Was iliev and Mishtovt were thefirst to investigate conditions of inhib itions . At firstthe authors had in mind to develop conditional reflexes ,not on the basis o f the unconditional reflex ( i. e. food )but on the bas is o f another conditional reflex ( such asa sound or l ight stimulu s giving secretion . ) Their ex

periments were as follows : From time to time they associated with the usual conditiona l stimulus anotherstimulus which had no relation whatever to sal ivarysecretion , and this combination was not accompaniedby the presence o f the unconditional stimulus ( food ) .

By means o f a great number of repetitions of such acombination , it was supposed to associate with thequal ity of the extraneou s stimu lus the qual ity of bringing about sal iva ry secretion . It turned out, however,that such an arrangement o f experimentation could by nomeans trans form the extraneous agent into a conditionalstimu lus . In that way i t became clear that the conditional stimulus , contrary to the unconditional , i s notcapable of communicating its property of bringing aboutsaliva ry secretion . The fact is that the associative external stimulus , when accompanied by the unconditionalstimu lus alone , becomes a fter a few repetitions a power

ful inhibiting agent.”

This clearly shows that the conditional reflex in thedog can bring about sal ivary secretions only whenassociated wi th the unconditional reflex . What it meansi s , that the dog on seeing a l ight or hearing the soundexpects food , and hence the psychic stimulation of hissal ivary glands resulting in secretion. Pavlow

’s experi


ments and also the experiments carried out under hisdirections by his pupils clearly prove that there is nodirect association between secretion and an external

s timulus,such as light or sound

,but that the secretion

is brought about by an intermediate psychic link , namelythe expectation of food. Thus we find that the workof Pavlow and his pupils , far from showing the possibility of formation of direct assoc iations , really goes tosubstantiate the view of the presence of intermediatementa l l inks in cases o f apparently immediate asso ciations .As a matter of fact there is no need for us to estab

lish hypothetical , intermediate , unconsciou s or phys iological l inks . The “unconsc ious ” brain - processes areproblematic entities and there is no way of getting atthem . What we need to discover in cases o f mediateassociation , and espec ially in cases of psychopathic diseases , i s whether the intermediate l inks , or the originalexpe rience that brought abou t the trauma , or the stateof dissoci ation is present, consc i ou sly, or subconsc iously,or coconsc iously. This is possible to test by hypnosisor by means of the hypnoidal state . In many su ch caseswe actu ally find that the patient lives through the original experience e ither cons ciously in a hypnoidal state ,or in a hypnoidic state , thus undergoing a mental experience which is immediately forgotten or dissoc i ated ; orwhat is more commonly the case , the patient livesthrough the original experience subconsciously . But ,whether conscious or subconscious , the mental state isnot “unconscious ,

” but is essentially of a consciou s character. In short, we deal here either w ith the personalconsciousness or with the subconsc i ous consc iousness .Thus , all the facts o f mental l i fe , normal or abnormal ,substantiate the presence of a subconscious consciousness.


cho - physiologica l systems . I f we term the stimuluswhich can just bring about a reaction in the system thestimulus threshold, we can say that a given system canonly be thrown into activity by a stimulus ris ing in intensity above the stimu lus threshold . Intensity of stimulus , then , i s an indispensable condition o f the fun ctioning of a psycho - physiological system .

In highly di ff erentiated cells , however, it is not onlythe quantity, or intensity of the stimulus that is to becons idered , but also the qual i ty. The visual sense organ is not a ff ected by auditory stimul i nor can the auditory sense organ be a ff ected by visual stimulations . Similarly , in the functioning of the higher psychophysiological systems the qual ity of the stimulus should notbe overlooked . Systems that remain inactive underone set o f stimul i , however intense , will respond toanother set o f a di fferent qual i ty.

The same holds true o f that synthesis of mental systems which we term moment consciousness , and whichwe shall treat in detai l further on . To set the momentinto activity, the moment threshold must be passed , andnot only the intensity of the stimulations should be takeninto consideration , but also the qual i tative aspect o f thestimul i . Ideas , emotion and feel ings which apparentlyremain dormant at the action of one set o f exc itationswill respond readily to the action of excitations of adi fferent nature . Habits , habitual movements , hab i tualthought, depend enti rely on the qual i tative character ofthe excitations , on the combinations of special objects ,c i rcumstances and times . The qual ity of the stimulusis one o f the important factors in the activity o f a psychophysiological system , or of a moment consciousness .

Besides those two factors of intensity and qual i ty,

The Threshold andM ental Sys tems 2 15

another factor, that of inhib i tion , plays quite a role inthe variations of the threshold . We are acquainted withinhib i tions in phys iology, su ch , for instance , as the inhibitions exercised by the pneumogastric nerve on theheart, or the arresting of the activity of glands or ofthe peristalsis by the stimulation o f aff erent nerves . Weknow also o f central inhib i tions , such as fear, distress ,pa in , acting as so many inhibitions on the peripheralorgans and serving to arrest functioning activity . Sim

ilarly in menta l l i fe , complex as it is , the highly organized psycho - phys iological systems , with thei r concomitant moments consc iousness , sti ll fall under the same general phys iological laws o f inhib i tion . In the course ofassociative activi ty systems become organi zed into complex groups , into compl i cated systems or constellationsof systems which , to mainta in thei r functioning equilibt ium , keep one another in check or under inhibition .

Such a formation of checks and inhib i tions isjust what takes place in the tra ining and the education of the individual and the race . Every psy

cho - physiological system or moment entering into te

lations with other systems and moments is bound in thecourse of i ts associative activity to form inhib i tions toi ts function by the di rect influence of exte rnal or internal excitations . In other words , there is a rise ofthreshold due to inhib i tory associations .In hib i tion and rise o f threshold may also result in a

di fferent way in the process of association . We may

poss ibly lay i t down as a law, which plays no small rSlein the interaction of systems and moments , that in a

series of aggregati on of various systems or moments ,form ing a more complex organi zed whole , due to as

sociation and synthes is of the component systems , hav


ing various thresholds , the ones having the higherthresholds w i ll ra ise the thresholds of the moments having a greater sensitivity . This , however, may be counterbalanced by the lowering of the moment thresholdby assoc i ations w i th moments of great sensitivity, thatis , with low moment thresholds .While on the one hand the inhibitions and the con sequent rise o f threshold go along w ith the complex i ty ofsystemic stru ctu re as well as with the increase of associative activity, both in extension and intension , thereis at the same time an advantage gained for the system , inasmu ch as it really has now more chances to become active , on account o f the greater number of systems w ith which it has become assoc iated . The threshold of the assoc iated system rises , but on the other hand ,the chances for activity increase , while the liberation ordischarge o f energy w ith the consequent ev i l e ffects o fextreme fatigue , exhau stion and ill nu tri tion is checkedand guarded against by the inhibitions and the rise ofthreshold .

What happens now when a psycho -

physiological system becomes dissoc i ated ? The inhibitions become re

moved and the threshold falls . The system is no longerchecked by inhibitions or by other systems , and hence ,w i th a lowering of the threshold , becomes sensitive , reacting to any slight, passing stimu lu s , mani festing orliberating all the energy it possesses until fatigue andcomplete exhau stion set in . From this vantage groundwe can understand the fact of the extraordinary en

ergy which the dissoc iated subconscious systems manifest, so much so that the unusual energy appears almostsupernatural , and has on that account been ascribed bythe superstitious to diabol ical possession .


stincts . D issociated systems present impulsiveness , because o f lack of associated counteracting sys tems . Theonly way to diminish the overpowering impulsivenesswi th which the dissoci ated subconsc ious systems makean onset in their rush into the personal consciousness isto bring abou t an association w ith counterbalanc ing orinhibitory, controlling, consc iou s systems , to work thedissoci ate systems into the ti ssue of the personal , controlling consc iousness which has to be fortified and developed.

“Phys iologically, it may be sa id that a neuron ag

gregate, entering into association w ith other aggregatesand being called into activity from as many different directions as there are aggregates in the associated clu ster,has its neuron energy kept within the limits of the physiological level . A dissoc i ated neuron aggregate , onthe contrary, i s not a ff ected by the activi ty of otheraggregates ; i t is rarely called upon to function andstores up a great amount of neu ron energy. When nowan appropriate stimu lus liberates the accu stomed en

ergy, the activity is ove rwhelming, and is very mu ch l ikethe eruption o f an underground volcano , giving rise totemporary attacks , to

‘se izu res’ by subconscious statesof the whole field of the upper consciousness , -

‘sei zures’which , being really of the nature of post- hypnoticau tomatisms , are generally mistaken for epilepsy, theattacks be ing regarded as epilepti c mani festations , as‘larval epi lepsy,

’ as ‘epileptic equivalents ,’ as ‘psychic

epi lepsy.

’ With the restoration of the equil ibrium ofthe neuron aggregate , with the synthes is of the assoc iated systems , a synthesis which can be brought about bydifferent methods , the subconscious eruptions , the at

tacks , or‘se i zures’vanish, never to return .

”

CHAPTER XXXI

THE PRINCIPLE OF RESERVE ENERGY

E have pointed out the significance of inhibitions in keeping back the systemic neuronenergy from fu lly being discharged undernormal conditions of li fe , and we have also

shown that the removal of inhibitions results in the fulll iberation of the accumu lated neuron energy. This fact,so striking in the domain of recurrent psychomotorstates , almost forces itse l f on the attention of the student o f abnormal psychology. From such a fundamental fact o f abnormal mental phenomena , we maydraw some conclusions in regard to mental li fe in general . For, a fter all , the laws of pathology do not di ffer from those of physiology in general , the pathological really being the phys iologica l under specia l conditi ons . The normal i s e ither the usual , the habitu al ,the customary, or is , at best, an ideal construction of thevariations o f l i fe more or less success fully adjusted tothe conditions of the exte rnal environment.This adju stment, however, keeps on constantly shi ft

ing ground , continua lly changing the relative positionof the normal and the abnormal . From this standpointpathology is of the utmost importance in the studv

of organic l i fe . The pathologica l be ing the normalout o f place , the abnormal being the normal un

der special conditions , pathology that deals withthe abnormal gives us a deep insight into the general laws o f normal physiological act ivity. All the

2 19


experiments in physiology cons ist practica lly in theproduction of so many pathological conditions andstates . When the phys iologist makes inj ections

,sections

and stimulations by various agencies , what else does heeff ect i f not the production of the pathological

,in order

to learn the phys iological a ction of the various tissuesand organs ? In psychopathological studies we follow the interrelations o f mental phenomena underspec ial conditions ; i t i s the phys iological methodof experimentation by production of pathologicalvariations ; the conclu sion arrived at in psychopathologyshou ld apply to mental l i fe in general . What is thisconclusion ? It is the principle of potential subconsciousenergy or, more briefly stated, the principle of reserve

The moment thresholds of our moment consc iousness , or, put in phys iological terms , the thresholds ofour psycho - physiological systems , are usually ra ised,mental activity working in the course of its developmentand growth of assoc i ative processes under ever- increasing inhibitions with ever- higher thresholds . It i s enoughto compare the educated , the c ivi li zed, with the uneducated or with the barbarian and the savage , to reali zethe truth of our statement. On account of the thresholdand inhibitions , not the whole of the psycho -

phys iolog

i cal energy possessed by the system or moment is manifested ; in fact, but a very small portion is displayed inresponse to stimu li coming from the habitual environ

*When this prin ciple was formu lated by me in a series of articlespubl ished in The Boston Medical and S urgical Jou rnal for March

and Apri l, 1907, James sent me his article, “The Energies o f Men ,

”

in wh ich he developed a s im ilar po int o f view , though on w idelydiff erent l ines . Nothing gives me more pleasu re than to find my sel fin accord w ith the great American psychologist and phi losopher.


test in the ever- raging struggle for existence has donefor ages on a large scale . We should, therefore , expeet that the natural reserve energy would far exceedthat of the cultivated one . The brain and m ind of theancient German di ff ered in nothing from his moderndescendant, the German philosopher, and still what adiff erence in the man i festation of mental energy ! Thesavage brain and mind do not di ff er from those of the i rcivi l i zed descendants, and sti ll what an ocean of mentall i fe separates the civil i zed man from his savage pro

genitor l

It is against the evidence of biological sciences tosuppose that the acquis itions of the cultivated bra inshave actua lly been transmitted from generation to gencration . It is not l ikely that acquired characteristicsbrought about by socia l l i fe will change so radica lly thebra in in the course of some forty or fi fty generationsthat separate the civil ized man from his savage progenitor ; and the trend of biological evidence hardly favorsthe transmiss ion of such acquired characteristi cs .

“There s i ts the savage ,” once exclaimed a friend of

m ine , an eminent neuro - pathologist,“with three quar

ters of his bra in unused .

” Yes , there s its the savagewith a brain far surpassing the needs of his environment

,harboring powers of a Socrates , Plato , Aristotle,

of a Shakespeare , Goethe , Darwin , and Newton . Theancient German and Briton hardly di ffered in theirmental powers from their contemporaries , the civil izedEgyptian and Babylonian . What, then did thoseAryan savages do with their richly endowed mentalenergies ? Nothing. The mental energy was lyingfa llow

,- it was reserve energy,— e nergy for future use ,

for the use of future ages o f com ing civil i zation .

The Principle of Reserve Energy 223

But what about the cultivated man ? Does he suffer from neurasthenia , from nervous impotence , because , as some would have i t, on account of the stra inof civil i zed l i fe he has exhausted his store of nervousenergy ? One may well ponder over the s ignificant factthat it i s the neuras thenic

,the

“

psychas thenic”who is

do ing the world’s work . We must remember that civi

lization i s but o f yesterday, and that the reserve energyis hardly touched upon .

In the treatment of the phenomena of psychophysiological dissociat ion , in the protean symptoms of nervous and mental exhaustion , we should not forget thisbiological princ iple o f reserve energy, and should makeattempts to use it . In many cases the inh ib itions becometoo heavy and the thresholds too high . We mus t loosen

the grip of some of the inhibitions and lower the thresholds

,thus utilizing a fresh supply of reserve energy .

The treatment of psychopathic diseases should bebased on this b iological principle of dormant reserveenergy. In many cases the inhibitions become too heavyand the threshold too high . We must loosen the gripof the inhibitions and lower the thresholds, util i z inga fresh supply o f dormant reserve energy.

*

A s imilar tra in of thought was developed by Dr. S .

J . Meltzer, in his excellent paper on“The Factors of

Sa fety in Animal Stru cture and Animal Economy.

” Bya striking series of instructive facts , Dr. Meltzer pointsout that “all organs of the body are bui lt on the planof superabundance of structure and energy. ” I cannotresist the temptation of quoting Dr. Meltzer

’s conclu

*The principle o f reserve energy is of great importance in educa

tion . I hope to work out this subj ect elsewhere. Io

have also shown

the importance of the princrple of reserve energy i n my work TheP sychology of Laughter.


sions at some length , because they so clearly elucidateour principle of reserve energy, which is all the morevaluable , as Dr. Meltzer has formulated it independently on widely di fferent grounds .

“Of the suppliesof energy to the animal, we see that oxygen is luxuriously suppl ied . The supply of carbohydrates and fatsis apparently large enough to keep up a steady luxurioussurplus . The liberal ingestion of prote idmight be another instance of the principle of abundanceruling the structure and energies of the animal body .

There is , however, a theory that in just this s ingle instance the min imum i s meant by nature to be also theoptimum . But it i s a theory for the support of whichthere is not a single fact. On the contrary, some factsseem to indicate that Nature meant di ff erently. Suchfacts are , for instance , the abundance of proteolytic enzymes in the digestive canal and the great capac ity ofthe canal for absorption of prote ids . Then there isthe fact that prote id materia l is stored away for use inemergenc i es ju st as carbohydrates and fats are storedaway . In starvation , nitrogenous products continue tobe eliminated in the urine , which , according to Folin ,are derived from exogenou s sources , that is , from in

gested proteid and not from broken - down organ tissues . An interesting example of storing away of proteid for future u se is seen in the muscles of the salmonbefore they leave the sea for the river to spawn . Ac

cording to Mescher the mu scles are then large and thereproductive organs are small . In the river where theanimals have to starve , the reproductive organs becomelarge

,while the mu scles waste away. Here , in time of

a ffluence , the mu scles store up nu tritive material for thepurpose of mainta ining the l i fe o f the animal during


influence on the destiny of humanity. The constantwars and national mis fortunes o f the Jews releasedthe ir reserve energy making of them a race of prOphets, apostles and martyrs , deeply a ffecting the cou rseof human c ivi li zation . The wars of the Reformation open a new era of free development ofmodern European civil i zation . The English , American, and French revolutions have released new suppliesof energies and have opened a new arena for the freedevelopment of politi cal , social , and industrial forces .In our oWn times we meet with the example of theJapaneS

—

e, who, under the stra in of great national dan

ger, have released a reserve energy unsuspected in racesof the Mongolian stock.

Reserve energy becomes mani fested under the influence of radical changes in the environment, j ust as wehave found that psycho - physiological systems react andstart into function under the influence of special conditions and specia l appropriate quali tative stimuli . Inthe study of functional nervous and mental diseases , inthe study of neurasthenia , or psychasthenia , hysteria ,and insistent or recurrent mental states , one becomesmore and more impressed with the fact that beyond the

psycho - physiological l imits o f energy, ava ilable for thehabitu al adjustments to the ordinary external conditions of li fe , there is a vast store of reserve energywhose depths one canno t gauge .

Aus demKelche dieses Geisterreiches

Scha'

umt ihm seine Unendlichkeit.

PART II

THE THEORY OF

THE MOMENT CONSCIOUSNESS


w i th no psych ic l i fe to them . We must allow the factthat other animals lower than man in the rungs o f development possess some form of psychic l i fe . The horse ,the dog , the cat, the cow , the ant , the bee , and otheranimals have some form , however varied , of psychophysiological activity, some form of mental l i fe, however di fferent in type from that of man . Abnormal paychology disclos es to us dissolving views of human con~

sciousness , such as found in the various forms of insani ty and in the variou s mani festations of psychopathicstates , presenting conditions of all stages of dissociation and disaggregation of consc iousness . Psychic l i feis by no means uni form , there are many types of consciousness .

We have pointed out above that synthetic unity isthe essence of consciousness . Consc1ou sness i s not anassociation o f independently existing ideas , images , feelings , and sensations . Mental events must form a unity,a syn thesi s in the total psychic li fe of some psycho - b iologi cal organ izat1on . D isconnected words of a sentencethought by a series o f thinkers do not give rise to thatunified mental process which goes to form the psychicexperience of the meaning of the sentence . The wordsmust be cognized by the consc iousness of one psychobio logical organism . Ideas , images , feelings , emotions ,volitions do not meet on independent ground , associate , fu se and go to to form a unity , a new idea or feeling. Experiences in di ff erent minds do not combineand associate to form a new synthesis . Even the associationist tacitly impl ies that the variou s associationsof ideas and feelings take place in some one mind.

In order to get some form of cognizance or someform of experience of sensations and ideas there must

The M oment Consciousness 23 1

be some one organic consciousness that experiences orl ives through the psychic events . Thoughts , feel ings ,ideas , images , and sensations are occurrences in someone psychi c individual i ty, a psycho - biologica l or psychophysiological organism , an organism which possessesthe l iving syntheti c uni ty of consciousness . From a

purely psychological standpoint we may term this l ivingorganic unity o f consciousness — a subj ect . I use theterm "moment—consciousness ,

” or s imply “moment ” toindicate this synthetic unity of consciousness which constitutes the characteristi c o f the subject having the synthes i s of mental experiences . This holds true of allpsychic l i fe , from the very lowest representative of mental l i fe to the very highest, such as the sel f- consciousnessof man .

The subject, or the unity of the psychophysiological individual i ty cannot be represented by a series ,whether temporal or spatial , as a seri es ceases to be aunity, or a synthesis . For a series o f independent eventsrema ins a se ri es, while the synthes is or unity of theseri es is a superadded event . A series of psychi c eventsmust exist in and for some psychic unity or individual i tywhich stands for the organic uni ty of consciousness , orfor the synthesi s of consciousness , no matter what thetype o f consciou sness i s , low or high , animal or human .

This syntheti c unity of consciounsess , no longer a series ,i s indicated by the term “moment” or “moment consciousness . There are various types of moment consciousness , according as there are various forms or typesof synthesis .Psychi c contents or states o f consciousness are alwaysfound in connect ion with some individual i ty. That pieceof bread lying yonder may awaken hundreds of mental


states under di fferent conditions and in various organizations . My friend sitting by my s ide sees it, so do I ,and so does the child , so does the bird in the cage, sodoes the dog, and so possibly does the fly fl i tting aroundthe table . The states awakened are no doubt di ff erent,but they are of a psychic character none the less . Myfriend and I may be consc iou s o f the personal elementalong with it. We may think it in the form of ownership ;

“It i s who thinks , who has the thought o f

the bread ;” but this i s only one of the many forms un

der which the perception or thought of the bread mayappear. One thing, however, i s essential to all thestates , di ff erent as they may be in thei r content, and that is the fact that they belong to some oneindividuali ty which under certain spec ial conditions may

also be of the nature of a personal i ty. The individual i tymay be of a high or of a very low type , i t may be thatof a man or it may be that of a fly, but it must be someone cons ciou s bemg that syntheti zes the psychic state . Itis this one syntheti zing consc iou sness that constitu tes theessence of what we term “moment consc iou sness . ”

The moment consciou sness is the subj ect, the psychobiologi cal individuali ty, requ is ite in all psychic activ

ity. The psychic individual i ty cannot be regarded as aseries o f independent physical events . For it may beasked , for whom does that seri es exist and to whom is it

presented ? A synthetiz ing moment consciou sness , bothsubject and content, i s a fundamental assumption ofpsychology, just as space is that o f geometry , and matter and force that of phys ics and chemistry . This necessity of assuming a synthetiz ing moment consc iousnessbecomes clearly mani fested in the highest form of psychic activity, such as sel f- consc iousness . For i f sel f


the center of the moment .The same object which seem ingly gives the same ex

perience assumes di ff erent meanings and is thereforereally quite a di ff erent experience , according to themoment consc iousness in which the perception or knowledge o f that obj ect is syntheti zed. These presently experienced states , syn theti zed w i thin the moment, formthe matter, or what we may term the content o f the moment consciousness . The moment of consciousness w illchange with the changes of the syntheti zed content . Asan official , I am now in my office doing my work, andthe di fferent experiences form one whole , an associationof experiences , systemati zed and syntheti zed into anorgani c unity. As a family man , I am at home enjoying the company o f my wi fe , children , and fri ends , andonce more the experiences are organized into the unityof a moment consc iousness . Now I am cl imb ing mountains and stand on the sl ippery edge of a precipice , nowI enjoy a conversation w i th the child I love , now Itake part in the excitement of the pol i ti cal arena , now Isit on the bench of the jury l istening gravely to the crossexamination of witnesses in a murder case ; all thesea re nuclei for the formation of di ff erent moments . All

of these depend on the di ff erent central experiences thatform the kernel for the moment consciou sness .The central experience , round which al l otherexperiences are grouped and syntheti zed , forms , soto say, the very essence of the given moment consciousness , and as long as this central experience remainsUnchanged in its position the new experiences areassimilated within the same moment consciou sness .The moment consciousness , there fore , does not varywith the change of the content, i f only the ass im ilating

The Moment Consciousness 235

nucleus remains invariable . Should, however, the content vary so that the central experience is transposed andsome other one occupies its place, then the momentconsciousness itself is changed. In fact, we may havethe content of the moment consciousness entirely nu

changed ; but i f the central experience alone is displacedfrom its position , then the moment consciousness itselfbecomes changed in its natu re . Thus , i f as a travellerI cl imb the mounta ins chiefly for the sake of pleasure ,and keep the scientific and aestheti c aspects in the back~ground, the moment consciousness will be entirely different from the one where the scientific or aesthetic aspeets are in the foreground, and all other cons iderationsin the background . The moment cons ciousness

,we may

say, is entirely determined by the leading central ex

perience.

The content of the moment consciousness, however,i s not confined to the presently experienced psychic statesonly ; i t embraces the past, i t includes memory, thatis , i t synthetizes outl ived moments . In my present ca

pacity of phys i cian and working in the offi ce , I may alsoinclude the experiences as traveller, as juror, as teacher,as companion , and as lover, but sti ll the tone of this particu lar moment consciousness i s given by the duties> f my present occupation . The most vivid, in teresting, and leading experiences form in this synthesisthe nucleus round which al l other experiences are crystallized and synthetized into one organic whole . Wehave here a series of moments , all of them being coordinated and conta ined in one synthesis of one momentconsc iousness .The members of this synthetized series are notof equal value nor are they qual itatively the same .


The leading experience that consti tutes the ass imilating element of the given moment has reali ty, interest, and value , while others are only so much material support for the principal central experience . This central experience di ffers also from the other experiencessynthetized in the moment consciousness by the fact thatit alone , that is , the nucleus only, has the most vividpsychic states , sensational and perceptual elements ,while the others may totally lack them . Other subsiduary synthetized moments are rather of an ideationalcharacter ; they are what i s called

“ reproductions ,” ideal

representatives of formerly experienced , outl ived moments .The moment consciousness may contain moments thathappened to emerge by the dynamic process of assoc iation, such as contigu ity, similarity, or contrast. Eachmoment consc iousness may become content for the next.Each success ive moment consciousness may synthetizethe preceding ones , conta in them in an abridged ideational form , and may, moreover, recognize and claimthem as belonging to itsel f, and as being one with them .

There may, in short, be various forms of mental un ification , but one thing stands out clear and that is thenature of the moment consc iousness . The essence ofthe moment consc iousness is men tal synthes is .

I f we take a cross section of the moment consciousness , and try to fixate i t with our mental eye , we find acentral psychic element round which other psychic elements are crystallized . This central psychic element isprominent

,vivid , forms , so to say, the vital point of

all the states and gives the tone to the rest, forming awhole

,one organized experience . The psychic matter

that surrounds the luminous central point do es not stand


i ts nucleus .Integrated as all those elements are they are not, how

ever, of equal value and importance for the l i fe existence of the whole . The central sensory element is ofthe utmost consequence , it is the vital point of the wholeexperience . While the change or destruction of one orsome of the subordinate elements may still leave thetotal moment unchanged , or but slightly modified, achange of the central sensory element or of the nucleuswill profoundly modi fy all the other elements and theirinterrelation ; and a destruction of the nucleus will destroy the total moment. Like thei r neuron counterparts , the moments may be regarded as be ing organ i zedinto groups , systems , communities and constellations ,aggregates of greater and greater complexity.

CHAPTER 11

TYPES OF MOMENTS AND MOMENT- THRESHOLD

E may discriminate the following types ofmoment- consciousnessI . The Desultory Moment .

( a ) The Absolute ,( b ) The Relative , or Reflex Moment.

I I . The Synthetic Moment .

( a ) The S imple Accumulative ,( b ) The Compound Accumulative .

I I I . The Recognitive Moment .

( a ) The Synthetic, or Generic Recognitive ,( b ) The Specific, the Reflective , or the Synthet

ic Moment of Self- consciousness .The ch ie f characteristi c of the desultory moment is

the lack of interconnection of the l inks of the psychicseries . Each pulse o f psychosis stands out as an isolatedfact without “be fore and “a fter. ” A moment of sucha character has no reproduction , no recognition, nomemory, and certa inly no personal ity. The lower stageso f this moment, the absolute desultory momentconsciousness are mere moment- content devoid of all or

ganization and substance . The higher forms of the desultory moment, those of the reflex moment - consciousness , have an elementary organization , but of such afixed character that the se ries o f mani festations , or o ffunctioning remain completely isolated . Reproductionsappear here for the first time in an elementary form ,

inasmuch as the recurrences of the moment leave the239


latter unmodified ; i t i s reproduction only on ac

count o f the modifications produced in a higherobserving moment.This moment has the germs of reproduct1on , but norecognition and hence no memory, no selfconsciousness . The moment of the absolute desultorytype may poss ibly be found in unorganized protoplasm and in the lowest forms of the pro

tozoa. The higher forms of moment of the .

~desultorytype , the reflex moment, may be found in the lowerforms of lowly organized li fe and in the lower struetures of the higher metazoa .The momentconsciou sness of the synthetic type hasits series o f links interconnected . In each l ink the preceding ones are synthetized . The recurrence of thistype of moment, unlike the moment of relative desultoryconsc iousness , i s embodied in the stru ctu re and function of the moment. It is in this type of moment thatreproduction is for the first time clearly and fu lly manifested. The moment is modified with each reproduc

tion ; i t accumulates more content with each recurrenceand, as such , the syntheti c moment may also be characterized as accumulative .

This type of moment has reproduction , and the re

production is not only for the external observer, but is

present and inherent through changes in the organization , structure and function of the moment itself. Mem

ory first appears in this type , but it is rather organic, notrecognitive in natu re .The more elementary form of this type of moment

shows accumu lations only along single lines of development . The l ines rema in disconnected . Sensory nu cleisurrounded by secondary sensory elements do not


experienced, in short, it recognizes .

Recognition is the function of representation and isthe essential characteristic of this type of momentconsciousness . Ideational psychosis germinates and develops with the growth of the recognitive moment. Forthe very function of the idea is the cognition over aga inof what has been cognized in perception , in short, recogn ition i s the essence of the idea .In generic recognition the time element is absent or

but vaguely present. In perceiving the table yonderwe also recognize it as table by class ing the percept table with representations derived from previously perceived tables , but hardly does any time- element enterinto th is form of recognition, the idea' of having generi c recognition does not refer to any percept experienced at some defin i te point of time . The recognitivemoment uses the idea as a means to reproduce its former experience without actua lly l iving them over aga in .

The representation in the lower form of moment is sobound up with the percept that the function of recogn ition is but implicit, and becomes expl icit in the higherforms , when the ideational or representative elementsbecome completely free and appear in mental tra ins , orin series of associated ideas.In i ts specific form , however, the recognitive momentalso includes the time element . The moment- contentor obj ect generically recognized is classed or combinedwith a definite representation generi cally referring toperceptua l expe rience ; spec ifically recognized , the content or object is placed in a definite po int of the objective schema o f the flowing time series . Theparticular rose thought of now is the parti cular roseseen before, say yesterday. The idea of the rose

Types of M oments and Moment- Threshold 243

substi tutes and represents the percept and has thefunction o f the percept as reproduced , thus referring tothe same obj ect . That i s why the qual itatively di ff erentrepresentation is identified with the actual perception .

What is common to the two is their re ference to thesame object, in al l else they rea lly di ff er widely. Therecognitive moment that lacks the time - element is termedgeneric, while the moment that has time element included in the process o f its recognition is termed spe

cific recognitive moment- consciousnes s .

In the lower and s impler stages o f the recognitivemoment the generic form predominates , in the higherand more complex stages the specific form of recogn ition arises and atta ins i ts full development. From abiological standpoint one can understand the importance and immense advantage in the struggle for existence o f those organisms whose momentconsc i ousnesshas varied in the direction o f representation and hasbegun to reproduce a fter the mode of the recognitivetype . To e ff ect a modification and new adaptation tochanges in the environment the moments o f the desultory type have no other mode of modification but by theslowly working factors o f spontaneous variations andnatural selection

,a process of adaptation and use ful

modification prolonged throughou t the course o f generarions . The adaptations of the di ff erent forms of thesynthetic type are greatly facil i tated , and the cou rs e ofthe process is so much foreshortened that it becomes teduced to the l i fe - existence of the given individual or

gan isms . The adaptations are brought about by theslow process of chance success and error, and the wholeseries o f modifications must be fully and directly undergone by the organism .


The recognitive moments have reduced the timeelements of adaptations to changes of conditionsin the external environment almost to a minimum

,

the series of reactions in the growth to most perfeet adaptations is e ff ected in representation , savingitsel f the necessi ty of actually undergoing a series ofintervening modifications . Representative elements , being free , can enter into di ff erent modes of combinations ,and thu s form adju stments and adaptations with an easeo f which the primary and secondary sensory elements ofthe lower moments do not admit . This freedom ofmovement in the formation of new representative comb inations i s an important factor in organic l i fe , as itgives the organism that possesses this variation an ad

vantage in the struggle for existence . Adaptation canbe made for the future from the experiences of the past .In those forms o f the recognitive moment in which

the time - element plays a part in the determination of thewhole there is always present a spec ific time - locali zationo f the given psychic or moment content . Where theform of recognition is spec ific the representation or ideais regarded as actual and localized in some definite pointin the stream of past time , where the recognition is generic the representation or idea is re ferred to no definitepoint in the stream of obj ective time , and when presentin the highest types of moments , is regarded as belonging to what is termed imagination . Recognition determines the place o f the given experience in the seriesof events .In the lower stages of the recognitive moment no time

element is present, in the higher stages some vague re ference to time may be present in the forms of spec ificrecognition , but defini te localization appears only with


of sel f- consciousness all are present in the adult stage ofthe most highly organized psychic li fe . Now in theseries o f moments going to form such a highly complexbeing, those that are of the recognitive type can becomefocal , while those that belong to the lower types cannever enter the focus . The lower types of momentconsc iousness , belonging to the groups and systems ofreflex and instinctive activity, cannot, from thei r verynature , reach that level of consciou sness and that degreeof psychosis as to become qualified to enter into thefocus of the moment of selfconsciousness .From this standpoint, then , the subconscious may be

divided into two regions , the one including all the moments belonging to that of the recognitive type , the other comprising all the moments belonging to the lowertypes . Within the subconscious , then , there is a threshold which the lower types o f moments cannot pass .This threshold may be termed the threshold of recognitive consciousness .

The moments lying above o the threshold of recogn itive consciou sness may change in psychic intensity, maypass through all degrees of sensory intensity and repre

sentative vividness ranging from minimum to maximum;

they may sink and rise gradually or suddenly, but theydo not and cannot fall , without becoming degenerated ,below the recognitive threshold . Those moments that l i ebelow the recognitive threshold cannot rise above it, theyare condemned to remain in the obscure regions of thesubconscious ; thei r fate is never to enter the strong l ightof the upper world of consciousness . At the same timetheir psychic intensity does not suffer any change , theydo not shi ft forwards and backwards in the field of consciousness l ike the moments of the recognitive type ly

Types of M oments and M ament- Threshold 247

ing above the threshold, they remain unalterable , theyare fixed .

In a certa in sense the moments lying below the threshold o f recogn itive consc iousness may be cons idered asdissoc i ated from the upper regions , inasmuch as theyl ie outside the field of the upper consc iou sness . Fromthe standpoint of activity, however, they stand in intimate relation to the upper level of consciousness . Thehighly organized moment u ses the lower ones as instruments to carry out its pu rpose , and through them it alsoenters into relation with the external environment.Stimu l i a re rece ived by the lower moments , and motorresponses are once more given by these moments . Inother words , the lower types o f moments are in serviceo f the higher moments .From a teleological standpoint one can understand

the importance of it for the l i fe - ex istence o f the individual . In order to save time and energy any activity thatcan be carried out by the lower aggregates is directlyresponded to by the less complex and more fixed moments . The lowermost moments are the easiest togain access to by the external stimul i , and in case theadaptation is simple the response immediately followswithou t any re ference to higher aggregates . Should,however, the stimulu s be under conditions where morecomplex adaptations are requisite then the next higheraggregate i s set into activi ty . The ascending degreeo f complex i ty of aggregates set into activi ty grows in accordance w i th the need of complexi ty o f adaptation , until the most complex o f all aggregates i s reached, theone representing the complete organization of sensorimotor adaptations of the organism as a Whole .At the same time it must be pointed out that there


i s a series of moments a lmost independent of this organized hierarchy of moments , never falling under thesway, or but indirectly and casually being affected by theprinc ipal complex momentconsc iousness ; such are themoments that go along with functions , directly subservient to the internal needs of the organism . This complexaggregate of moments from its very nature is withdrawnfrom the general control of the other aggregates , inasmuch as it need not adapt itsel f to the varying conditions and di fferent stimulations of the external environment. The set of stimul i this aggregate responds torema ins almost unchanged , hence thei r activity is of alow order, belonging to the character of the reflex moments .


intensity characteristic , for instance, of the act withwhich one buttons his coat , opens his doo r, walks in thestreet, or simply mainta ins his equ i librium . The consciousness of the dog, rabbit or mou se may be and surelyis of a lower order than that of a man, but its intensityis not necessari ly of the same level with the automaticactivity of man .

The greater di ff erentiation of elements in the highlyconsti tuted being is also their greater simpl ification . Thelower a moment is in the scale of a highly organizedbeing, the more di fferentiated it is , and the more simplified i s its function in the organic whole . ! u ite di ff erentis it in the case of the lower type

,

of moment in the phylogenetic series , there the di ff erentiation has not proceededfar, and although it may be low in type and structu re ,the very lack of differenti ation o f function makes thatlowly moment more complex as to function . A lowmoment of a high type of organization is lower than ahigh moment in a lower type of organization . A moment occupying a low stage in a statically establ ishedhierarchy i s really lower than a corresponding stage ineither the phylogenetic or ontogeneti c series . The highest momentconsciousness o f a fish i s homologous witha very low moment in man , but the latter lacks the intensity to which the former attains .The moment by entering as a unit in an organized

hierarchy becomes degraded and loses much of its

psychic activ i ty by becoming di ff erentiated and confined to one mode of reaction , though reaching its acmeo f perfection in that direction . The number of functions present, though in an impe rfect , undeveloped,sketchy way

,in the representatives of the low type of

moment becomes narrowed down , even l imited to one

Moments in Organized Aggregate 25 1

function , highly developed and intensified in the lowerrepresentatives of moments belonging to a hierarchyorganized on the plan of a higher type .I f a

,b,c,d,e etc . , represent the functioning

modes of a low type o f moment, then the total of function ing modes of the moment may be represented by thesum each function is in itsfirst degree , that is , it is present in a prim itive undeveloped form . The low moment, however, forming a partof a highly developed organic hierarchy, becomes highlydi fferentiated in the process o f evolution o f the wholeand is finally reduced to the exerc i se of one functiononly, fu lly developed and intensified to its highest pitch .

The number of functions then present in a primitiveform in the moment of low type i s in the course of evolution gradu ally sundered into its units

,each unit reach

ing a high stage of perfection in the low moment belonging to a high type of moment hierarchy.

I f a function in its primitive form is representedby a quantity, then the same or analogous functionhighly developed may be represented by the sameor simila r quantity ra i sed to ( n

th

) degree . Now

let a1 stand for the primitive functi on , then a11 will stand

for the fully developed function . The number of themoment’s functions is l imited , but highly developed .

The moment’s functioning act ivities may be representedby the formula : The highest moment ofthe low type has a richer and more variable contentthan the lower moment belonging to the higher type .This truth can be sti ll further real ized by having re

course to the higher guiding momentconsciou sness , thelower moments are shown there to work with an a lmostmechanical - l ike activity. Man , dog, or monkey with


thei r spinal or medu lla ry gangli a only fall lower thana fully developed fish or a fu ll grown lobster.I f we come to consider the moment of correspondingstages in the ontogenetic and phylogenetic series

,we

once more meet with resemblance , but at the same timewith one of fundamental di ff erence . The moment ofhigh type that passes ontogenetically the stages of phylogenetic evolution does it in a general , and, so to say,sketchy form , each stage of ontogenesis in reality fundamentally di ff ering from that of the parallel stage inphylogenesis . Just as the human embryo in the cou rseof its growth and pass ing the stages that re

flect phylogenesis is not necessarily once a worm , thena fish , then a bird, but only approaches these types in amost general form , so also is i t in the case of the momentin the di ff erent stages of its growth ; it approaches thelower types of activi ty in a most general and sketchyform .

Themoment in phylogenesis is independent and is fullydeveloped, while the corresponding stage in ontogenesisi s but a stage in the growth of another and higher moment, and as such is certa inly di ff erent in nature fromthe phylogenetic moment. The embryo in the firststate

,though provided with gi lls , i s still not a fish and

could not live in water . The consciousness of the infantin passing through stages running parallel to the lowermoments - consciousness does not temporari ly become thatpart icular low momentconsc iousness . It is s imply a general outline of the type of momentconsc iousness that thehigher moment is pass ing or a stage in the course of itsontogenetic development.The infant in the growth of its psychic li fedoes not actually turn butterfly, fish , bird, monkey,

CHAPTER IV

MENTAL ORGANIZATION

OMENTS of the same type form aggre

gations in an ascending series of complexi ty, groups , systems , communities , clusters ,constellations . Isolated moments are or

gan ized into groups , groups into systems , systems intocommunities and commun 1t1es into constellations .Groups are the simplest, while constellations are thehighest and most complex of the aggregates . The firmness , the stability of organization stands in di rect relation to complexity, the more complex an aggregation theless stable i t is .The order of complex ity also represents the orderof development, so that the more complex is alsothe latest to appear in the course of evolution . Evolution and stabi lity stand thus in inverse relation . Whatappears early in the course of development is less firmlyorgani zed than what appears later on . The whole tendeney of evolution is from stabili ty to instabil ity. Theorder of growth and instability is in the ascending scale

— from groups , through systems , communities , to clusters

,and constellations . The simpler sensori -motor re

actions are , both ontogenetically and phylogenetically,the first to appear in the course of evolution and they arealso more stable than the more complex sensori -motorreactions . We can possibly best real i ze the relation ofinstab ility to complexity of structure , i f we regard l i fe,including both phys iological and psychic processes , as an

2 547

Mental Organization 25 5

ascending organization o f sensori -motor reactions tothe influ ences of the external environment.The sensori -motor reactions represent a hierarchy oforganized aggregations beginning in the lowest te

flexes and culminating in the highest activi ty.An i llustration of the lower reflexes may be taken,

such as the knee - j erk, the action of the bladder, persistalti c movements of the intestines , respiratory movements ,heart- beats , and other organic activities . Associationamong these variou s reflexes may be taken as higher aggregates . The complex coordination o f orientation and space adjustment, such as the maintenanceof equ ilibrium , walking, running, j umping, flying, swimming , etc . , represent more complex activity. A stillhigher aggregate is to be found in the association ofgroups and systems of sensori -motor reactions within thesphere of a sense - organ with the complex coordinationof motor adjustment of the whole body. The highestaggregates are to be foun d in the association o f a ll themotor reactions organized within the different spheresof sense - organs with the complex motor coordination ofbody- adjustments .Simple s ensori —motor refl exes , complex reflexes , sen

sori -motor coordinations , instinctive adaptations and intelligent adju stments , statically regarded , correspond tothe classification of psycho -motor aggregates into groups ,systems , communities , clusters , and constellations . Inother words , the study of the sensori -motor constitu

tion of the higher organized be ings in thei r adult stages ,reveals the presence and interrelation of moments . Wefind that the history o f the use and growth ofaggregates is in the order of thei r complexity.

In ontogenesis we find that the simple reflexes ap


pear first, then the assoc i ation , the more complexsensori -motor coordination , later on the so- called instinctive adaptations begin to appear, while the intelligent adaptati ons appear late in the course of development.The child at its birth is a purely reflex being ;

the di ff erent reflexes are not even associated, i t is themedul la and the spinal cord that are principally active ;the pupils react to light, the legs and hands react tomore or less intense sensory stimul i , such as ti ckl ing, andsensori -motor reflexes to taste - stimuli are present. All

of those reactions are isolated , incoordinated ; they areso many s imple groups of sensori - motor reflexes, eventhe su cking activity of the infant is largely of the sensori -motor reflex type ; the child at i ts bi rth is a spina lbeing, and its moment consciousness is desulto ry, consi sting of the desultory activities o f i solated funct ioning sensori -motor groups .Later on the reflex activity such as o f the hands ,

legs , eyes become assoc iated through the development of sight and kinaesthetic sensations ; the eyescan follow an obj ect, the hands become adaptedto the seizing movements . Movements and bodycoordination then begin to appear, such as tum

ing the body to right or left, then s itting up , thencreeping, standing, then walking, then ta lking, allinvolving more and more coordination of muscles andkinaesthetic sensations , a ided by the association of sensations and sensori -motor reactions from di ff erent senseorgans . It is late in its history of development thatthe child begins to gain fu ll control of its actions andadjustment to the stimuli coming from the external environment.


ment draws its material . Withou t the lower momentsthe principal , controll ing moment cou ld not have re

ceived stimu lations from the external envi ronment,nor

would it have been enabled to make proper motor respou ses . In fact we may say that without the lowerforms o f moments , the moment- nucleus would have lostits vital ity and even its meaning .

The perception of an obj ect and the proper adjustments to it depend not so mu ch on what is directly present in the focu s o f consc iousness , but on the wealthof accumulated material lying ou ts ide the moment focu s .In reading a book, for instance , the handling of it , themotor adjustments in keeping it, the perception o f theletters , of the words , of the phrases l ie outside the focuso f consciousness , and sti ll it is this mass of perceptionsthat forms the matter of the controll ing moment. Theinventor in working on his particular invention has amass of accumulated material and experience indispensable for the development of the invention , subconsc iou smaterial lying in the background of his consc iousness .Similarly the mathematician in solving his problemwhich forms the focus of his consciou sness possesses abody of knowledge or a mass of material which , thoughit l ies on the margin of his consc iou sness , forms the mainstay of his parti cular investigation .

There is more in consciousness than is actually directly present in the focus of the moment. While I amwriting these last phrases my consciou sness is occupiedwith them alone

,but they are supported by a body of

subconsc ious thought. All our perception is largely determined by the results of our previous experience whichfalls outside the central point of consciousness . Many

pe rceptual i llusions find thei r explanation in habit. An

M ental Organization 259

otherwise novel experience surrounds itsel f with fam ili ar experience which disgu i ses the novelty and transforms the percept by substituting what is otherwise familiar and habitu a l .This mass of famil i ar experience is not presentin the focu s o f the moment - consc iou sness , i t l i esou ts ide the centre and is o ften submerged in re

gard to the direct introspective scrutiny ; i t has ,however, a powerfu l influence on the activity ofthe moment . The submerged moments , though lyingoutside the direct group of the main focus , still exercisea great influence on the course of the moment’s growthand development. The consc ious controls the materialsupplied by the subconsc ious , whi le the subconsciousby the quanti ty and qu ality of the mass of its material ,in its tu rn modifies and determ ines the course of consc ious activity.

CHAPTER V

THE GROWTH AND FUNCTION OF THE : MOMENT

E may turn now to the study of the moment’s functions . This can be best investigated in following up its history, in watching the growth and development of the

most elementary momentconsc iou sness . In its perceptuals tage the momentconsc iou sness may become modified inits subordinate psychic elements only, indirectly reactingon the nuclear sensory elements , giv ing a fu rther determination of the total moment w ithout changing i ts fundamental character. The moment may express then onlymore distinctly the final a im to which it i s striving . The

changes brought about in the moment are of such anatu re that the latter in its whole tendency becomesadapted for reaction to the external environment, a teaction for which it primarily mainta ins i tself in being.

The moment as perceptmay have at first an inadequate content which brings about a reaction inadequatefor the pu rpose of the given psychic moment. The reaction brings more content, both primary and se condary.

The new content enriches the moment and gives rise to amodification resulting in a reaction which in its turnfurther enriches the content , unti l a reaction resu lts fullyadequate to the purpose of the moment. The momentreaches for the time being its full maturity . To g1ve aconcrete example . A small pu ff - fish is thrown into atank containing a hungry tau tog . The tautog perceivesthe puff - fish and comes up to sei ze it ; the puff- fish be

260


consciousness of what sort of psychic process i s goingon , nor do they del iberately a fter weighing the pros andcons o f their actions , finally dec ide on one which isconsciously to be rej ected on trial and so on , at lengthhitting on the right solu tion of the problem . Suchis not the state of their mind . To ascribe to them conscious thought , cunning, knowledge , is to ascribe modesand forms of adult human consciou sness to a lower stagewhere all this is absent. Their psychic processes are farsimpler. The growth of the momentconsc iousness inthe stage under consideration is altogether di ff erent innature from that of the adult stage .In the momentconsc iousness under consideration each

sensory response to a given stimulus along with its resulting motor reaction brings abou t a modification o fthe total moment. Each new modification brings themoment nearer in its sensory and motor elements ,to a more perfect adaptation to the specific conditionsof the external envi ronment ; this modification is reproduced on the recu rrence of the moment .Let a be the moment and b

,b, , b2, b3 , the success ive

modifications , then the modified moment at each stageof its growth may be represented as follows : a, ab , abb1,abb,b2, abb l bzb s , etc . The reprodu ced su ccessive modification s do not emerge singly. The reactions of themoment do not occur in repetition of the order in whichthey have primarily followed each other . In otherwords

,the reactions are not gone through in the order in

which they have taken place . The series is not l iterallyrepeated . Each subsequent modification is super- imposedon the previous ones and modi fying them becomessyntheti zed in a single complex reaction . The last success ful reaction is the only one that emerges in the oc

The Growth and Function of the M oment 263

currence of the particular stimulus under a given set

of conditions .All the intermediate , unsuccess ful reactions , al

though they have gone to determine the last stateo f the moment with its parti cular reactions and areimpl i ci tly conta ined in it, gradually drop out, and onlythe last forms of reaction occur. The last momentconsciousness at each b i rth generated by a given stimulus under appropriate conditions possesses in a vague outl inethe history of its previous stages . Most o f the stagesseem to drop out, only the ones that are indispensable rema in .

The momentconsciousness in i ts growth and development expands into a series o f moments , each subsequentmoment being an expansion of the preceding one . Inthis expanded series each succeeding moment is richerin content than the one that has passed away, and ismore adapted to the origina l end for which the momentas a whole subsi sts and ma inta ins itsel f in the strugglefor l if e . The last moment i s an epitome o f the precedingseries , an epitome in which by adaptive selection manyl inks have dropped out, and in which the ones that survive appear not in the i r bare isolation , but in a synthes iso f organi c uni ty.

In respect to synthesis the moment may be comparedto the percept in which the moment- elements are not ina free state and cannot be separately reinstated . In themoment as in the percept the elements are firmly boundtogether, and in this bondage they are reproduced . Inthe psychic moment i tself the previous stages are notdiscriminated

,s ince the whole moment emerges as one

compound in which the elements are firmly held togetherin a form of “mental - chem istry” by a process of cumu


lation , a process which , as we have pointed out, is essentially di fferent from the process o f association ofideas in which the ideal elements are free .A momentconsciousness lacking free elements in itsconstituents cannot know i ts own history ; in otherwords , i t cannot recognize the identi ty or sim ilarity of itselements with the ones that have been present in a previous state . The recognitive element is entirely wantingin such a type of momentconsciousness . A momentconsciousness of such a nature may be termed reproductive. A reproductive moment

- consciousnes s reproduces

its contents , but lacks the element of recognition .


sensitivity. We may say that sens itivity , meaning byi t psychic processes aroused by stimuli , is a fundamentalcharacter of the momentconsciousness , however elementary.

The momentconsciousness is not only sensory, butalso motor in character. The whole purpose of the moment’s being is adaptation to external conditions . Theseadaptations , however, are brought about not by the mere

sens itivity , but by motor reactions . I f the moment showssensitivity towards the play of definite exte rnal stimul i ,i t shows itsel f still more ready to give vent to its activityin definite sets of motor reactions . In fact we

'

may saythat primari ly sensitivi ty i s readiness for reaction . Thestimulus that i rritates the naked protoplasm of theamoeba resu lts in movement of its pseudopodium . Theirritation of the nerve endings of the ascidian or of themedu sa results in the contractions of the muscular coat .In the more highly organized animals the excitation ofthe peripheral sense - organ results in contraction and telaxation of mu scles or secretions of glands .This is clearly mani fested in the l i fe - phenomena ofinvertebrates and lower vertebrates . The fly, thebee , the ant, the butterfly, the fish , the frog reactimmediately as soon as they are acted upon byinfluences o f thei r external medium . In this respectthey almost resemble highly complicated mechanismsthat mani fest definite sets of movements when actedon di ff erent parts of structure . Especially is this manifested in the lower centres .The fly, the ant, the bee , the butterfly, without theirhigher central gangli a are pu re au tomata . Thus i f thefly i s deprived of its frontal ganglia , or head , i t remainsquiet as i f dead, until i t is stimulated, when a motorreaction immediately follows. I f such a

“headless ” fly

Relation of the Moment to the Environment 267

is turned on its back, i t rights i tself, or fl ies some distance , alighting on its legs , and again rema in ing in thesame state until a new stimulus brings i t out of its torpor. I f the thorax is stimulated , the front legs passthrough the W1p1ng movement. I f the del icate ha i r onthe lower patt of the abdomen are irritated, the hindlegs react . I f the side ha ir are stimulated, the s ide legsrespond , and so on . In short , the stimulus is followedby immediate reaction of the stimulated organ .

With the centra l ganglion present, the fly differs butl i ttle as a reactive being, only the reactions are morecomplicated , more co - ordinate , more adaptive ; they donot occu r in a uni form and automatic fashion in the directly stimulated organ , but in some other organs distant from the stimulus directly applied and in a series ofco - ordinate movements , responding to the stimulus in aform advantageous to its needs , or preservative of itsl i fe .In the frog we meet once more with the same state o fthings . Without its bra in the frog is an automaton responding to external stimul i immediately withsome simple set o f movements . W i th its bra in presentthe response di ff ers only in the fact that it is more complex and more adaptive . The same holds true in thecase o f the higher vertebrates , in the bird, in the rabbit ,in the dog, in the monkey, and also in man . When de

prived of the bra in they are automata immediately re

sponding to stimuli with simple movements of but l ittleadaptation . With thei r bra in in full and hea lthy function they are , biologically regarded, highly organizedbeings responding to external stimulations with complex movements of more or less perfect adaptation .

Should we l ike further illustration and evidence we can


find it not only in phylogenesis , but also in ontogenes is .Young animals react to any passing stimulus ; their l i feis fu ll o f movement and activity. The movements arenot adaptive to the spec ial conditions of the environment ; in fact these reactions may often be of such a nature as to hurt and even endanger the l i fe o f the younganimal . External stimuli s imply l iberate pent- up en

ergy in centres which are but l ittle co - ordinated . Inthis respect o f lack of co ordination and adaptationyoung animals resemble vertebrates or invetebrates deprived of their frontal ganglia .The restlessness of children and of in fants is notorious ; in an infant under my observation, I have observedkicking of legs as many as 2 5 -

3 5 per minute , and thiswas kept up for a quarter of an hour, sometimes forhal f an hour at a time ; each kick of the leg served asa stimulus for another one , un ti l fatigue was induced .

An external stimu lus at once calls forth a reaction inthe chi ld or the in fant . The reaction is usua lly notadaptive , pu rposeless , and frequently hurtful .There are also purpose ful reactions , reactions thatare of a purely instinctive character, useful for the l i feand growth of the animal . These react ions , however,are

,physiologically regarded , of a more complex te

flex character. G iven a definite stimulus and a certa inset of conditions , a series of reactions immediately follows in a certain order and success ion . Thu s the aphissecretes its l impid drops of sweet ju i ce , when its abdomen i s tickl ed by the antennae o f the ant only. No otherdelicate t ickling stimulations can bring about the reaction of secretion . The ant on seeing the aphis runs atonce up to i t and begins to pl ay with its antennae on theabdomen of the aphis , and the latter on feel ing the par


the suck ing movement began .

The experiment was then sl ightly modified, thebaby a fter ceas ing its sucking movements was leftkeep ing the nipple in its mouth , and instead oftaking away the nipple and putting it back, thusenforcing the stimulus directly, some other stimul iwere employed . The infant’s legs were tickled, theskin of the body was rubbed, pricked in di fferent places ,and every time as the stimulus was applied the suck ingmovements were started .

A few hours later when the baby became sensitive tosound, I tried the same experiments with sound stimuli ,and obta ined the same results . Sensory stimulations followed by motor reactions are the elements out of whichmoment- consciousness from the lowes t to the highest isformed . I f one aspect of the momentconsciousness i ssensory, the other aspect i s motor. The two aspects areinseparable, correlative .The sensori -motor relation is observed not only in thelowest forms of psychic l i fe , but also in the highest .In the highest form of menta l l i fe we still meet with thesame factor of motor reactions . Mental activity tendsto pass into action . Psychic processes , motor andglandular reactions are interrelated . All along the courseof mental act ivity reaction is present as its invariableconcomitant. Some muscles are in a state of tens ion,others in a condi tion of relaxation . According to the flowand content of ideas , representation is now retarded,now accelerated . The functioning activity of the glands ,of the vaso -motor system is influenced, the ci rculation'

of blood is a ff ected, more blood rushing to the brain .

This reaction aspect of mental l i fe, and especiallyof a ff ective , emotional li fe , can eas ily be demonstrated

Relation of the Moment to the Environment 27 1

by appropriate instruments . By a id of the sphygmograph , the tromograph, the pneumograph , the plethysmograph, the automatograph, the galvanometer, andother instruments registering physiologica l results, it canclearly be shown that mental activity with its a ffectivetone results in some end effect, muscular or glandularreaction . With a very del icate automatograph , or swinging pendulum , it can even be shown that the movementsm an i fested often expres s the content of consciousness .This is especially striking in case of di ff erentforms o f automatisms— in people who are of the motor type . When the subj ect’s hand is put on theautomatograph , and the subj ect begins to think, thepen o f the automatograph begins to move and write .When the person thinks of the le ft s ide of theroom the movements swing to the le ft ; when the subjcet thinks of a series of definite movements , movementsof a s imi lar order and character are followed out by thepen of the automatograph . Subje cts who are of a pronounced motor type when thei r attention is distractedwrite with the automatographic pen the ideas of whichthey happen to think at that moment. The remarkableexperiments made by Pavlow and his pupils are here tothe point . The experiments clearly prove the closeinterrelation of mental activi ty and glandular function .

The reaction character of mental l i fe is still more distinctly mani fested in the various forms of menta l dissociation , such as are to be found in the psychopathic andneuropathic diseases and in the states of hypnosis , and infact in all the phenomena belonging to the order knownas the subconsc iou s . Many o f the most important methods in psychology and psychopathology are based onthis reaction aspect of the moment- cons ciousness .

CHAPTER VI I

THE ASSIMILATION OF THE MOMENT IN NORMALSTATES

HE fact that the momentconsciousness expands , grows , and develops in its organizationunti l it reaches a point of perfect adaptationto external conditions clearly shows that the

moment is capable of working new psychic materialinto its constitution . The materia l which it gets is ofsuch a natu re as to help to perpetuate the psychicl i fe o f the moment . The moment cannot possibly goon growing withou t having such material at hand . I fthe moment comes in contact with any psychic elementor experience that can fu rther its content, the experienceis at once sei zed on and synthetized in the moment . Thepsychic element is not simply taken in and associated orannexed to the rest of the content, i t i s actually trans:formed in this process .When the moment is stimulated to activity by an external obj ect, the sensory stimu lations of the presenttime -moment are new . Just these parti cular stimulationsand sensory processes awakened have not occurred asyet in the li fe history of the animal , and still the obj ectmeets with its appropriate sensory response and motorreaction . The moment that has more or less like content to the given new psychic experience arou sed appropriates the new states , works them into its own psychiccontent, and sends out i ts characteristic reaction in re

Spouse to the stimul i . The moment that gets hold of272


the same which caterpillars call out in chicks,namely,

sei zing and pecking . The new experience of taste gotthrough the reaction may further modi fy the reactionof the chicks when confronted with cinnabar caterpillar .The young infant pu shes indiscriminately everyth ingin its mouth , everyth ing is for sucking, and only by experience i t learns gradually to modi fy its reaction towards objects . On seeing a lemon , a child that is onlyacqua inted with oranges will take it as an orange . Thechild wi ll perceive the new visual experiences given bythe lemon, as di fferent from orange , but they will beassimilated to his sensory orange experience . The special visual experiences will give rise in the ch ild’s mind tosome qualification of the percept “orange ,

” the obj ectbeing a kind of orange , a bad orange . The reaction inrelation to the lemon will then be of the kind relating toorange in general . This reaction will be of course modified by repeated experiences resulting from a series o freactions in relation to the lemon .

Savages confronted for the first time with the horseor the ox, consider them a species of pig, an animal withwhich they are well acquainted, and they expect fromthe horse , or the ox s imilar mani festations . Their reactions towards those new species o f animals will be ofthe same kind, as i f those animals were pigs .The same relation is sti ll better illustrated in cases ofyoung children with a definite momentconsciousness ,which for convenience sake may be characterized as thefamily-moment. The chi ld’s moment - content of li ferelationship consists of his experience gotten from hisrelation with his papa and mamma . Baby, papa , andmamma and the i r variou s relations go to make up thetotal moment of the child’s family l i fe experi ences .

Assimilation of the M oment in Normal States 275

When the child i s confronted wi th younganimals , thelatter a re regarded in the l ight of “bab i es ,

” they arealso babies , they have thei r papas and mammas whogive them cookies , tea , and oatmeal , undress them ,

and put them to bed .

A young child of about three years and a halfasked me whether the baby- calf’s mamma gave i t

pic to eat . Another time the same chi ld on seeing a young kitten inquired a fter i ts mamma andpapa , and when the baby kitty was going to have i tstea and put to bed . In one child of less than threeyears old , young animals , pl ants , such as young treesand flowers , and even l ittl e sta rs were so many

“babyWi ll i es . ” Thei r l ives were fully ass imilated to hi sown , they were eating oatmeal , drink ing m ilk andwere having tea , sugar, and bi scu its for thei r supper .The same chi ld was greatly surpri sed and pa rtly evenhorrified at finding that baby-Will i e - flowers had nopapa and no mamma . The momentconsciousness i sawakened by definite specific tra its in the obj ect, byfam il i a r experi ence sense - data constituting the contento f the moment ; the rest and di ff erenti al tra its of theobj ect a re worked into the general plan and cha racte ro f the functioning moment .The ass imila tive power of the nfoment i s clearly te

vealed in the very character o f perception . Thatpitted obj ect yonder i s perceived as an orange with alli ts a ttributes o f color, shape , s i ze , weight, fragrance ,and taste . The synthesi s o f so many senso ry elementscorresponding to such a complex of stimul i was gradually eff ected in the course o f ontogeneti c development,and no doubt determined by inheri ted dispositi on o fphylogeneti c evolution .

276 Normal and .Abnormal Psychology

Suppose the orange turns out to be a new speci esnever met be fore by the individu al ; it feels di ff erentlywhen tou ched, i t has di ff erent weight, speci al taste , andfragrance . When such sense data a re experi enced te

peatedly , the percept orange i s modified by ass imilation of the new sense data . On seeing another timesu ch a sort o f an orange all the previously sepa ratelyexperi enced sense- data appear together in one synthetized percept . The momentconsciousness which we,for illustrati on sake , have assumed as consi sting onlyof experi ences relating to oranges and with co rresponding psycho -

phys iological reactions , has enl a rgedits content, has increased , and modified its adaptationto external conditions .The assimilative power of

! the momen t- consciou s

ness is well b rought out in the activity o f the higherfo rm of consc i ousness . The desi re to go to the post- o fflee to get my mail forms the central point of my presentmoment- consciousness . Round it a s a focus a re groupedideas , feel ings , and sensati ons , all more or less tendingin the same di recti on . The actual walking to the postoffi ce gives a seri es of new motor sensations which aresubconsciously assimilated by the moment as a whole .The tactual and motor sensations coming from eachstep a re assimil ated by the moment , leading in theirturn to new series o f reactions . Each new step i s followed by new sensations that give rise to new reac

tions and so on , until the end of the moment is reachedand the purpose accomplished.

The whole sensori -motor seri es is guided by thenuclea r elemen ts of the moment, although the successive stages o f the s eries a re assimilated subconsciou sly .

In reading a book the successive stages are guided by


the minimum of consciousness , or l i e on the margin ofthe sphere of waking consc iousness .The influence of the subconsc iou s is in proportion tothe du ration and intensity of the activi ty of the mentalprocess . We are well acquainted with the fact that anaction requiring at first great stress of attention , finally,with its repetition , drops out of the focus of consc iousness and becomes , as it i s called , automatic or unconsc iou s . They who have observed a child striving tostand by himsel f or beginning to walk real ize how suchseemingly automatic acts as standing or walking areat first accompanied with intense attention . Thechild, when standing up all by himsel f, does i t hesitatfugly ; he shakes and trembles , as i f occupying unsa feground , or doing a di fficult act ; he looks a round forsupport, stretches out his hands , asking the help o f hisparents or nu rse , and i f he does not get a id in time,begins to cry from fea r and drops on all - fours . It i sa di ffi cu lt feat for him . Withdraw hi s attention fromhis pe rfo rmance , and in the first stages of hi s seri es oftrials he drops helplessly to the ground .

The same holds tru e in the case of walking . The childin beginning to walk, does it with great hesitation andfea r. It can only be compa red to the attempt o f anadult in learning to walk a rope , or a narrow board ona high place . Each step requi res intense attention . Theleast distracti on o f attention and the baby falls downin a heap . The least change in the touch , muscularand kinaesthetic sensations a rrests the success ful attempt at standing or walking . Thu s in the case of mybaby of fourteen months a fter the first two days o f moreor less success ful tria ls at walking, a new pa i r o f shoeswas put on . This arrested the walking. When the

Assimilation of the M oment in Normal States 279

baby became accu stomed to the new sensations whichfell in the background o f his consc i ousness , he oncemore sta rted a series o f trials , and with such success thata fter two days’practice he walked almost a whole m ile .After a period o f long practice the complex muscularadjustments , requi red in the acts o f standing and walking , gradually retreat to the background of consciousness and become automatic . Not that consciousness inthose acts i s lost : i t has s imply reached its necessaryminimum

,leaving the focu s o f consciousness free for

other new and unaccustomed adjustments, which inthei r turn retreat from the centre to the periphery andfa ll into the subconsc ious . The usual movement ofmental processes i s from the conscious to the subcon

s cious .

Experiences , however, may first be perce ived by submerged subconscious moments and then transmittedto the focus o f consciousness , the movement o f theprocess thus tak ing a direction opposite to the usual one ,from the subconsci ous to the consci ous . Experi ences ,for instance , l ived through in hypnoti c states , i n trancestates o r in dreams , may come to the su rface as hypnoidal states and then become synthetized in the upperwaking consciousness , or they may be l ighted up inhypnosis , and then permanently syntheti zed in the centre of attentive consciousness .Sim ila rly experi ences fi rst l ived through in the sub

consc i ou s states indu ced by alcohol ic intoxicati on or byanaesthetics may be brought by hypnoidal states or

by hypnosis into the focus o f cons ci ousness . Hypnoidal states are up rus hes o f the subconscious , and bymeans o f them many a hidden and obscu re region ofthe subconscious may be di scovered. Thus the Hanna


case was largely marked by hypnoidal states . In manyof my cases hypnoidal states are the means by whichsubconsc iou s experiences become completely revealed .

In cases o f amnesi a the hypnoidal states give gl impsesinto subconsc i ou s regions which even deep hypnosiscan not reveal .The method of guesses is valuable in showing thereverse p rocess o f mental activi ty, the passage o fsubconsci ou s state into the focu s o f consc iou sness .I f the anaesthetic spot o f a psychopathic case i s stim

u lated, the pati ent i s unaware of such stimu lati on ;should he , however, be asked to guess , or to tell anything that happens to come into his mind, he i s oftenfound to give correct answers . The patient perceivessubconscious ly . This perception , often in a sl ightlymodified form , i s transmitted to the upper consciousness , or to what for the present consti tutes the pati ent

’sprinc ipal moment consc iou sness , or personality.

I f, for instance , the anaesthetic spot o f the patient ispricked a number of times , the patient remains quiet andis seemingly insensible . Should we now ask the patientto tell anything that comes into hi s m ind, he will s ay,“pri cking and will be unable to ‘

tell why he happenedto think of “pricking ” at all . Should we now ask himto give any number that may enter his mind , he wi llgive the correct number, once more not being able togive the reason why thi s particu l a r numlber happenedto enter his mind, considering i t a mere

“chance number . ” The subconscious sensations experi enced aretransm i tted as abs tract ideas to the focus of con sc i ousness .O ften instead o f the particular idea being trans

mitted , only the genera l aspect of i t reaches the focus .

2 8 2 Normal and Abnormal Psychology

edge them as my past experience . But placed as they werebefore me in dreams l ike intu itions and clothed in allthei r evanescent c i rcumstances and accompanying feelings , I recognized them instantaneou sly.

”

Hypnoidic states reveal the wealth and extent of

psychic experi ence hidden in the subconsc i ous regions .Gl impses into the subconscious are also given in hypnoidal states which are induced by the p rocess o f hypnoidization . The pati ent is asked to close his eyes andkeep as qui et a s possible without, however, makingany speci al effort to put himsel f into such a state . Heis then asked to tell anything that comes into his mind .

The patient may also be asked to attend to some stimuli ,such as reading or writing or the buzzing of an electrical current, and he i s then to tell the ideas , thoughts ,images , phrases , no matter how disconnected , thathappen to fl itter through his mind .

This same condition of hypnoidization is sometimesbetter accomplished through mental relaxation w ith concentration of attention in a definite direction . The pati ent i s put into a quiet condition , and with his eyesclosed and the experimenter

’s hand on the patient’s forehead , the latter is u rged to mental e ffort and strain , and ,i f necess ary, given some hints . Experiences seeminglyinaccess ible flash lightning- l ike on the upper regions ofsel f- consciousness . In all such cases the active momentconsc iou sness seizes on and assimilates any cognate experience , consc ious or subconsciou s .

CHAPTER VI I I

ABNORMAL MOMENTS

HE power of the moment’s assimilation i s

well brought in the activity o f abnormal moments . D i stress ing thoughts , gloomy ideas ,pa infu l s ensati ons , and feel ings o f depres

s ion form a nucl eus round which other mental statesbecome firmly organi zed . A delusion a ri ses whichconsti tutes the momentconsc i ou sness o f the melanchol

iac . This moment assimilates all other cognate experi

ences . Everything that takes place is seized on by themoment and assimilated . The patient who believes thathe has no intestines , or that he is made of glass and istran sparent and hence hides himself from people , as hisfunctions a re open to the s ight of outs iders , such apatient will make all experi ences confirm and strengthen the delusion . The delus ion constituting the p redominant momentconsciousness in the pati ent’s l i fe absorbsand assim i lates most, i f not a ll o f the materi a l thatga ins access to the pati ent’s psychi c l i fe . The momentlike a cancerou s growth expands , grows , and develops atthe expense o f other moments , starves them by cuttingo ff thei r mental food supply. What cannot be used bythe moment is rej ected as waste materi al .A s imi la r state o f a ffa i rs we meet with in pa ranoi a .

as well as in many paranoidal states o f a pu rely psychopathic character . A momentconsc iousness is formed ofhigh organiz ing and assimilating power. Any experiencerelevant and i rrelevant entering consciousness i s greed

283


i ly absorbed and assimilated . Any fl i tting thought , anypassing imp ress ion i s worked in and organized into themoment. All other moments fall a prey to this dominant all - absorbing moment.In some cases the assimilating capac i ty of the mo

ment seems to be l imitless . In fact, the more it assimilates , the greater grows its craving and capacity forgetting more materi a l . The most trivi al facts , thesl ightest sense- impress ions a ll a re pressed into the service o f the despotically ru l ing moment. The ins ign ificant becomes s ignificant and points to the central delusion .

In other cases the l imit of the process o f assimi lationsoon reaches its maximum point, more psychic materiali s rej ected by the moment . Such conditions are to befound in variou s states of dissoci ation mani fested indi ff erent forms of psychopathi c di seases . The moment’s capacity for ass imilating new material i s ofl imited range, soon reaches its utmost bounds and losesfor the time being all capaci ty for further assimilation .

Such states may be found in amnesi a . The moment 18then sa id to be dissociated from the main current ofpsychic l i fe - activity. Spec ific stimuli under definite conditions a re requisi te to resu scitate the moment anda rouse its power of ass imilati on .

It i s certa inly interesting and instructive to study thefluctu ations of the moment’s power o f assimi lation inabnormal mental states . In some forms of mental diseases and general psychi c derangements the momentmay be o f ephemeral and unstable characte r ; i t maydi ssolve soon a fter its bi rth . Such conditions a reto be found in va riou s forms o f maniacal statesand in the initi al stages o f many cases of general


en as a good i llustration. The mental activity of theidiot resembles the lower types of animal psychosis .

Although as we have al ready pointed out, the consciousness of the i di ot and that of the animal are byno means identical , sti ll both belong to a low type ofmoment, and as such , they may be put on the same level .In pathologi cal cases where mental degeneration sets

in We also have a s imila r course . The moment of thehigher type becomes degraded and falls to the level oflower and lowermost types , according to the advance ofthe process o f degeneration . Such states a re to befound in the degenerative psychosi s characteristi c o fsecondary dementia . When the pathologica l processis wide , intense , persistent, and lasting, then secondarydementia resu lts in most cases of mental degeneration .

Should, however, the process become arrested then themoment simply falls to the level of a relatively lowertype .

CHAPTER IX

MENTAL CONTINU ITY AND THE PSYCHIC GAP

HE activity o f the momentconsciousness i scontinuous , Wi thout break and interruption .

Should the activity become a rrested and theb reak be s eemingly absolute, continuity i s

sti ll present with the resumption of activity. Thethread is taken up where i t was dropped, the momentappears as a whole without any break. There is no le

s ion in the moment cons ciousness,at leas t as far as

the moment itself is concerned. In going to sleep andwaki ng up aga in we may be indirectly conscious o f theinterruption , but the a ctivity of the moment is stillcontinuous, the moment begins i ts activity at the pointwhere i t has left 03 . In fa inting, in coma , in hypnos i s ,or somn ambul ism the periods o f unconsciousness areimmedi ately bridged over by the awakening a ctivi ty o fthe moment.Objectively considered , we have the moment

’s activity, then break, or absence of that activity, andthen the resumption ; subj ectively, however, the moment’s activity is felt as one and continuous without a break and gap . In cons ciousness the psychic content and activity p receding the b reak along with present cognizance o f the break are syntheti zed into aunified continuity ; the present consci ousness o f theb reak i s taken into the syn thes is, the very gap thu sform ing the bri dge for unity.The cognizance of the break may, however, be com

287


pletely absent, and the edges of the mental woundmay become closed, healed, and united with thefunctioning activity . of the moment, the moment,withou t even the least consciousness o f the in

tervenn ig gap , resuming its l ine of work preciselyat the place where i t had been arrested . From the moment’s own standpoint, the gap is as i f non - existent,there is no break in the moment’s psychic li fe- activity.

The break formed by the interruption of the moment’s functioning activity, obj ectively regarded, maypresent an actu al gap in which , for all intents and purposes , i t

‘may be supposed that no mental activity istaking place . Such cases a re found in the state ofdeep sleep, undistu rbed by dreams , or in the states ofunconsciou sness produced by toxic and narcoti c agenci es , in states of deep corn'a , in the attacks of typicalepilepsy, petit or grand mal, in s tatus epilepticus , in thestates of unconsc iou sness produ ced by intense mechan i

cal stimuli , su ch as a blow , or a fall , or a strongelectrical cu rrent . In all su ch cases we often finda state that may, for all intents and purposes, becharacteri zed as unconsciousness . No other momentcomes to the surface , even temporarily, to fi ll the

mental gap caused by the interruption of the moment’sfunctional act ivi ty. The gap presents a mental blank .

To the important qu estion :“How, then a re we to

expla in amnesia where consc iousness i s indicated ?"

R ibot answers “By the extreme weakn ess of the conscious state . ” This explanation i s inadequate . Forfi rst of all , What i s the meaning o f a weak state of consciousnes s ? Is i t a state felt as being weak ? I f so , theexplanation is obviou sly wrong. We may far better teta in in memory the whisper of a dear friend than


di stinct, as in the case of hypnosis o r of artificial somnambulism ? In these states the senses a re almost hyperaesthetic, the sense of discrimination i s extremelyacute and memory is in a state of exaltation . Why i sit then that amnesi a can be enforced in the case of almost any experi ence immediately a fter the trance i sover, or even during the very state of hypnosis ? The

s tate of cons cious nes s is intens e and s till there is am

nes ia.

How is it in cases o f double consc iousness orof multiple personal ity ? Surely the explanation of“weakness ” o f the states of consc iousness cannot beadvanced by any one who has a personal knowledgeo f these phenomena . How i s i t in psychopathic caseswhere the amnes i a i s brought about by an intense pa inful state of consciousness , such as fright, fea r or greatgri ef ? On the theory o f weakness o f consciousness allthese phenomena are mysterious , incomprehensible .On our theory o f momentconsciou sness , however, thephenomena presented could not possibly be otherwise ,in fact, we shou ld expect them a priori, i f our theory becorrect.A psychic blank , however, i s not the only poss ibleconsequence of the moment’s lapse o f funct ion . Themoment’s activity i s interrupted, but only, what i s mo reoften the case , to give ri se to activi ty o f another moment. The break produced in the moment’s l i fe isnot a real gap ; for the gap i s fi lled in with the functioning a ct ivity of another moment which is usually of alower, though sometimes i t may even be o f a highertype . From the standpoint o f the a rrested moment,however, there i s a di stinct gap , not that the momenti tsel f i s cognizant of the gap , but it is so for the ex

M ental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 29 1

te rnal observer that takes that moment for his standpoint. The gap exists in the moment, though not forthe moment.Su ch states may be found in hypnosis especially

in that stage of it known as somnambu lism . Whenthe subj ect falls into a deep hypnotic state , i t ispossible to make him pass through a seri es of complicated actions , changes o f personal i ti es without the leastawareness on awaken ing . The whole series o f hiswaking consc iousness it is as non - existent, in short, i t isa gap .

This gap however, i s far from being a mere mental blank . On the contrary there may have beenintense psychi c a ctivity, but only that o f another moment which in the waking state has become submerged .

This submerged moment may be b rought up in thewaking state by suggestions or by means o f hypnoidization and be syntheti zed in the uppe r consciousness .Sometimes glimpses of the submerged moment maycome up in dreams , in reveri es , in sudden fl ashes during the wak ing state , or in spontaneous hypnoidalstates , the subj ect doubting whether they re fer to something actu al or are simply mere whims and fanci es .In the cases o f the so - called “psychi c epi lepsy” whichare really amnesi a o f a psychopathi c cha racter, onemeets with psychi c states in which the gap i s not ab solute , but relative, being filled with the activity o f another moment . Thus , M . carri ed on conversations ,a rguments , and di scuss i ons while in the abnormal subconscious state and could not remembe r anything of itwhen emerging from i t and retu rning to the normalcondition . Simila rly F . in hi s subconscious state travelled a di stance, sold horses and retu rned, but knewnothing of what had taken place from the beginning to


the end of his j ourney.

In the H . case the gaps formed in the secondary state by the manifestations of the primary statewere as i f non existent for this secondary consciousness . The same held good of the primary consciousness : the two were working independently ofeach other, each syntheti z ing i ts own experi ence, eachbeginning at the place where i t had left o ff . Neitherof them knew of and felt subj ectively the gap . Therewas a gap , only i t was filled in by another momentconsciou sness o f which the present functioning momentwas not aware .In cases o f typical epilepsy subconscious states a re

sometimes found , states that constitute gaps in the activity of the normally working moment- consci ou sness .Thus in some cases o f idiopathi c epilepsy under myobservation , the pati ents in the stuporou s states succeeding the epi leptic attack answer questions , but donot recognize me , nor do they know the nurse who takescare of them , although they can remember and recognize other names mentioned to them . In their normal state, however, they neither know of thei r attacksnor do they remember anything of the conversationsand experimentations during the stuporous post- epilepti c state . In other severe cases o f epilepsy with f requ ent attacks of grand mal and petit mal

,the patients

du ring the pe riods o f thei r stuporous post- epilepticstates answer questions often mistaking persons andenvi ronment, refe rring to events and incidents o f thei rearly childhood . On emerging from their abnormalstates , the patients are completely unawa re o f whathad taken place , the epi leptic attack wi th stuporouspost- epilepti c state form ing a gap in the functional


ually of a lower grade . The condi ti ons that b ringabout an aggregation of moments are o f such a nature asto allow of the activity of a high type o f moment . Notappearing in the mental synthes i s of the organi zationof moments characteristic of consciousness in the normal state , the moment is poor in content and simple innatu re . Falling as it does ou ts ide the complex normalaggregate of moments , the moment lacks the harmonyand balance in its psychomotor and psycho - phys iologicalreactions , since the counteracting balanc ing and henceregu lative psychomotor tendenc i es of other systems ofmoments are wanting.

A moment that enters into a highly complex aggregation of moments , when stimulated to activity, sets alsoother moments into functioning,moments that are closelyassoc iated w ith it and o ften of di fferent and even contrary psychomotor and psycho - phys iological reactions .Strengthening other systems against the lines o f its ownactivity the moment is thu s controlled, inhibited, andregulated in the very act o f awakening to functioning activity . For it must be clearly understood that there is nospec i al controlling agency somewhere in the mind sending out orders , mandates , inhibitions , l ike a despoticallyruling autocrat, l ike a psycho - analyti c censor, o r l ikean omnisc i ent , omnipotent , omnipresent, invisible deity.

The regulative, inhib iting con trol to which a moment

is s ubj ect is in the mutual interrelation,balance

,and

harmony of the sys tems and cons tellations of moments,

entering into an aggregate, and forming the organized

activity of a highly complex momentconsciousness .

When a moment becomes dissoc iated and isolatedfrom other systems of moments , i t loses its balance andbeing freed from control , mani fests i ts psychomotor re

M ental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 295

actions in the full force of its origina l powers . The lacko f control and the moment’s energy of mani festationsa re just in p roportion to the dep th and extent of dissociation or o f disaggrega ti on o f moments . D issociationand over- action are co - related.

The intimate relation of dissoc i ation and over- actionis clearly seen in cases o f so - called “psychi c epilepsy.

”

The dissoci ated subconscious states mani fest themselveswith an overpowering activi ty, with an energy that canneither be resisted nor controlled , they come l ike i rres istible, uncontrollable , imperative impulses , which areclosely related to them in nature . I f, however, thesestates are brought out from the hidden subconsciousdepth from which they make invasions ; i f they arebrought to light be fore the court o f the upper consciousness one by one in hypnoida l states , and are forced tobecome associated with and syntheti zed into the principal momentconsc iousness , the impetuosity and energy ofthei r mani festations are gone . All my cases o f dissociation give experimenta l confirmation o f this law of dynamagenes is o f dissoc i ation .

The dissoci ated clu ster, although inaccess ib lethrough the ordina ry channels o f intercommuni cati ons ,on account of the di saggregation of the aggregate intowhi ch i t enters a s a consti tu ent pa rt, may sti ll bereached through other channels , coming from othermoment- aggregates . For a moment, or a comb inationof them fo rms a consti tu ent pa rt not only o f one ag

gregate, but o f many other aggregates . Lo s s o f communication th rough a certa in channel does not necessarily exclude loss o f all communications . I f the lostchann el i s habi tual , the activity o f the seemingly lostmoments may b e awakened through unhab i tual chan


nels .I f the moment cannot be set into activi ty by theorgani zation of constellations constituting the conscious personal i ty, on account of disaggregating processes , the moment may sti ll be set into fuctioning ac

tivity through aggregates falling outside the focus ofpersonal i ty, but which work with that focus i n closeco - operation, namely the subconsc ious . In other words ,in the process o f disaggregation , conscious , or rathersel f- conscious expe riences fall into the region of subconscious l i fe ; what i s absent in personal thought maybe present in impersonal , subconsc iou s states . All psychopathic functional disturbances consist just in suchan interrelation of menta l aggregates ; i n the processo f disaggregation of the sel f- consc i ous personal i ty ag

gregates of moments drop out and fall into the domainof the subconscious . What di sappea rs from attentiveconsciousness may fall into subconsciousness . The disaggregated moment, ceasing to enter into relations withthe upper personal consciousness o f the highly com

plex constellation , may still form a component of thelower aggregates of the subconscious .


ta in l imits , there i s for all the senses which admit of exact measurement a constantly uni fo rm quantitative telation between the stimulus and the just noticeable stimulus - di ff erence . Experimentation by di ff erent investigators have confirmed “Weber’s law” for the di ff erentsenses by showing that, within a certain range of intens iti es of stimul i , there is a more or less constant t atio between the increase o f the stimulus necessary toproduce a just noticeable di fference o f sensation andthe total stimulus intensi ty . Thus , i t has been shownthat nois e stimuli mu st increase by one - thi rd ; pressu restimul i by one - forti eth ; stimul i o f muscula r sensati ons ,su ch as l i fting weights , by one - forti eth ; a chromaticl ight stimuli by one - hundredth . Weber in hi s paperD e Tactu expressed his law as follows : “

In observan

do dis crimine rerum inter s e comparatarum non differentiam rerum

,sed rationem dif erentiae ad magni

tudinem rerum inter s e comparatarum percipimus .

”

Gustav Theodor Fechner, the founder of psycho

phys ics and its methods , sta rting with Weber’s law

worked out a general formula for the quantitative rel ation between phys ical stimu l i and sensations . As

suming that the just noti ceable di fferences of sensationgiven by ascending or descending seri es o f di fferentstimul i to be equ al units , he finds by means of di ff erentpsycho -

physical methods , fi rst elaborated by him , thethreshold of sensati ons or that stimulus which i s justnea r the l imit o f giving ri se to a sensory eff ect, butwhich is sti ll not suffi ci ent to awaken a sensation ; inshort , he finds the stimulu s the correlating sensation ofwhich is zero .

The minimum perceptible or stimulus - threshold isfound by measurements of the di fferent senses . Thus

The Moment- Threshold 299

two parallel l ines are for most people barely distinguishable when the distance between them subtends an angle of less than 60 seconds . In thesense of hearing the vibrations recurring between 30 - 3 5

per second are barely distinguishable . Below 16 vibrations per second no sensation of sound can be produced .

Thresholds have been similarly determined for allother sensations . Thus the sense of touch , when tested bythe aesthes iometer, an unsatis factory instrument, givesthe average for the tip of the forefinger about mm . ,

on the back of the hand about mm . , Sensib il i ty topa in as tested by the algeometer vari es from 10 to 15

degrees . Sensi tivi ty . to smell vari es with di fferent substances ; thus for smell o f garl i c sens i tivi ty va ri es indetecting 1 part in pa rts o f water to one p art in

parts o f water ; for oi l o f lemon from 1 toto 1 to Taste can detect the bitter

ness o f quinine in a soluti on o f 1 pa rt quinine to aboutto o f water ; the sweetnes s o f sugar

can be detected in a_

soluti on o f 1 p art suga r to 200 o fwater ; the taste o f salt can be detected in a solution of1 pa rt salt to about pa rts of water.After discovering the zero point o f sensation andthe minimum perceptibl e he finds the constant ratio forthe j ust noticeable di fference . The min imum percepti

ble fo rms the unit o f sensation . Each increase o f thestimulus giving a just noti ceable di ff erence i s countedas an additi onal sensation - uni t to the tota l sum of sensations .

LetA b e the threshold giving sensation zero , and letr be the constant rati o o f increase then we have thefollowing seri es o f stimuli and thei r correspondingsensations


Sensati on 0 i s given by stimulus Acc

Iu u

2 ( I- l- r)

2

3

3 ( 1+r)3

n ( 1- f- r)

n

Thus we find that while the stimulus increases in ageometri cal ratio , the sensation grows in an arithmetical ratio . The sensations stand therefore in the samerelation as the logarithms to thei r numbers . Hencewe may s ay that s ensation increases as the logarithm

of the s timulus . I f S be the sensation, R the stimulusand C the magnitude of the constant ratio , then wehave the following formula :

S=C log . R .

This formula i s known as “Fechner

’s law.

Fechner’s express ion of Weber’s law i s rather ques

tionable. Fechner assumes that the j ust noti ceable di fference o f di fferent stimu l i a re qual i tatively and quantitatively equal ,— a dubious assumption . A thi rd of anounce added to an ounce does not feel the same as athi rd o f eighteen pounds added to the same number ofpounds , or as nine pounds added to twenty- sevenpounds . These units even , i f they have a quantitativeexpression , do not stand in a simple quantitative relation and are rather incommensurable .Furthermore, i t may even be considered that Fech

ner’s assumption is fundamentally wrong and unpsycho;logical . In opposition to the first elementary principle ofpsychology Fechner tac itly postulates that sensations canbe measu red and that one sensation or a complex sens ation is a multiple o f another . Now the peculiar tra it ofthe phenomena of mental l i fe is essentially their qualita


The same relation holds true in the case of other senses .

This same truth i s still more clearly brought out inthe fact that, i f we take a certa in stimulus as a unit, giving ri se to a definite sensati on , then as we progress ivelyascend and add more and more units of the same stimulus, the intensity of stimul ation is far from ris ing proportionately . I f we take, for instance , the weight ofan ounce as our unit of stimulation, then the success ivemoments o f unit stimulations, that is, of ounces, willnot give ri se to as di stinct and simi lar sensations as theinitial sensation . The second ounce wi ll give a sensation fa inter than the fi rst one, and the third fa interthan the second, and so on unti l a point i s reachedwhen the sensation of an addi tional ounce will not atall be appreciated, will dwindl e away and almost reachthe zero point.In the same way , i f the pressure of a gramme

is excited in the hand, success ive increments ofgrammes will not in equal degree increase the sensoryeff ect ; the additi onal increments o f grammes , thoughthey are equal units o f stimu lation, give ri se to fa interand fa inter sensations, unti l finally all sensory appre

ciation of the added unit fades away and disappears .I f the hand is immersed in water, say at the freezingpoint, an addition of ten degrees wi ll be perceptiblyappreciated, while success ive increments o f ten degreeseach will be felt less and less , and finally wi ll not benoticed and will be diffi cult to detect. In short, thethreshold rises with the process stimulation .

To bring about a sensory response of an already stimulated sense - organ the intens ity o f the stimulus must berelatively increased . This is what constitutes Weber’slaw. The continuous progress ive sensory response of a

The M oment- Threshold 303

sense - organ requires a constant increase of stimulationswhich, within certa in l imi ts , bears a constant ratio tothe total stimulus . Thi s law is sometimes summed upby psychologists in the statement that “ the increaseo f the stimulus necessary to produce an increa se of thesensation bea rs a constant rati o to the total stimulus . ”

Activity ra ises th e threshold ; i t i s the begi nning o f fatigue .The rise of threshold a fte r stimulation holds true inthe whole doma in o f b iologi cal activi ty. I f the gastrocnemiu s muscle o f a frog, for instance , is stimu

l ated by an electri c cu rrent, the muscle , with each successive stimul ation, responds less readily with a contracti on , and this becomes more evident with the onset o f fatigue . Pffef er, in a series of extremely interesting experiments , has shown that spermatozoids offerns are attracted by mal i c aci d, the progress ive re

sponse o f attraction of the cell requi ring a constant increase of the degree of concentra ti on o f the acid , theincrement o f stimul ations , as in the case o f sensation,bearing, within certa in l imits , a constant ratio to thetotal stimulus . The threshold ris es wi th each success ive stimulation .

The rise o f thresholds increases with intensity anddura ti on of stimul ation a s we approach the state o ffatigu e . Through the influence o f exhaustion , fa tigue ,or the influence o f toxi c, autotoxi c, emotional , andother stimula tions, the thresholds o f certa in momentshave been ra ised so that ordinary or even maxima lstimul i can no longer call out any response. Whensuch a ri se o f thresholds i s present the moments withra ised thresholds can no longer enter into associati onwith systems of moments with which they are usually

304 Normal and Abnormal Psycho logy

associ ated, and the result is dissociation , giving rise tothe great multi tude of phenomena of functi onal psychosis with a subconscious background, the extent ofwhich depends on the number of ra i sed thresholds , onthe extent o f the dissoci ation effected.

When a moment or aggregate o f moments begins tofuncti on , i t radiates stimulation to other moments oraggregates of moments . All the aggregates whichthese radiated stimulations reach do not equally begin to functi on . It will depend la rgely on the state o fthe aggregate and its threshold . I f the radi ated stimuli be minimal , the many aggregates that have a highthreshold will not be e ff ected at all . Furthermore ,many aggregates whose a rousal could otherwise beeasi ly eff ected by the given stimulus may tempora ri lybe in a condi tion in which thei r thresholds have becomeraised and thus fall outside the sphere of activi ty ofthe functioning aggregate . On the other hand, aggregates that a re usually inaccess ible to those minimalstimul i may under certa in conditions be set into activityby minimal stimu l i , i f there i s a lowering of the threshold of the total aggregate . Thus the aggregates setinto activi ty by the functioning aggregate a re conditioned by the rise and fall of thei r thresholds .In case where the threshold of an aggregate i s ra i sed

the radi ated minimal stimuli coming from a particularfunctioning aggregate may become effi ci ent and reachthe threshold , when another aggregate begins to function s imultaneously. This holds true even in the casewhen the minimal stimu li , coming from two di ff erentaggregates a re just below the threshold- stimu lus . Thus ,under certain conditions , when vi sual stimuli a re ba rely or not at all di scernible, they can become intens ified


stages , with subsequent trance and suggested amnes ia ,the subj ect is made to perform a certa in action

,— to l ight

and extinguish the gas four times in success ion, or toopen and close the door a certa in number of times . Thesubject is then awakened from his trance ; he remembers nothing of what has taken place . I f he is askedpoint- blank whether he remembers any incidents o f hishypnotic state , he answers with an emphati c negative.I f now the subject is asked whether he knows how muchtwo times two are or his attention is incidentally directed to the gas or to the door, he at once becomes reflective, the subconscious memories are on the way to surgeup , and a few further indirect questions, the numberdepending on the depth of hypnos is , finally bring out thelost memories . The threshold that has risen at the endof the trance is stepped over by the comb ined eff ect ofthe many stimulations coming from diff erent directions,and the subconsciously submerged moment or aggre

gate o f moments surges up to the focus or nucleus of theupper consciousness .Once a parti cular moment is stimulated in its appro

priate way , it may go on developing, and usually doesso by stimulating and setting into activity aggregates ofmoments associated with it, or may form new combinations of aggregates . The solution of a problem maypresent great diffi culties , but once started on the ap

propriate l ine , the whole series of combination goes onunfolding, stimu lating other moments and aggregatesand form ing more and more complex combinations .Thus

, Archimedes , as the story runs , while in the bath ,made the di scove ry o f the law of specific gravity. Ac

cording to the popular account Newton was led to hisdiscovery of universal gravitation by the accidental fall

The M oment Threshold 307

of an apple . Hughes was started by the idea o f symmetry in his discovery of the laws of crystallography.

Goethe was led to his conception of metamorphos is andevolu tion by a skull on the pla ins o f Italy. Darwin byreading Malthus’economica l treatise on population wasinspired to work out the great princ iples of the struggle for existence and natural selection . Myers was ledby the greater redness o f blood in the blood - vessels o ftropical patients to his grand conceptions of transformation , equ ivalence , and conservation of energy. All theseexamples i llu strate the fact that once a moment hasbeen started i t goes on developing by stimulating othercognate moments and aggregates to functioning act ivity .

The same conditi on is al so found in psychopathi cborderland states , su ch as dreams . In dreams a peri

pheral stimulu s gives ri se to sensati ons that sta rt theactivities of moments , which in tu rn give rise tophantasti c comb inati ons o f di ff erent aggregates . Thisphantasti c comb inati on of aggregates , giving ri s e tothe functioning o f otherwi s e unusual , or what may bete rmed abnormal constellations , i s la rgely due to thefact, of redistribution o f thresholds in the dream state .The dream state is characteri zed by a rise o f

the thresholds o f moments and thei r aggregatesthat have been functioning during the waking states , thethresholds o f these aggregates having been raisedthrough activity. In the sleep state moments that havethei r thresholds relatively or absolutely lowered throughinactivity, moments or aggregates that are unusual orhave not been in use during the waking state , becomearoused , and begin to function . Hence the arousal ofhypnoti c dream states reproducing long lapsed moments of chi ld- life , hence the phantasms o f the worldof dreams .

CHAPTER XI

THE PROCESS OF MOMENT DISAGGREGATION

ACH stimulation leaves a fter i t some moment- disaggregation , a condition that makesfurther disaggregation more difficult. Themore intense the stimu lation is , the more ex

tensive and deeper i s the disaggregation, and hence ,the more di ffi cult further dis aggregation becomes . I fthe stimulation i s continued or made highly intense, apoint i s soon reached beyond which no stimulation canpass wi thout giving ri se to di saggregation having asits mani festation the di ff erent forms of pathologicalmental dissoci a tion . The pathological p rocess underlying the phenomena o f abnormal mental l i fe i s notessentially di fferent from the one taking place in normal states . I f di ff erence there be, i t i s not certainlyone of a qual ity, but of degree .The more intense a stimulation is , the more ex

tensive is the process o f disaggregation , the highermounts the moment- threshold giving rise to the di fferent phenomenon of psycho -

physiological and psychomotor dissociation . As expressed in a former work“The process of disaggregation setting in under theaction of strong and hurtful stimuli is not something new and di ff erent in kind from the usual ;it is a continuation of the process of assoc iationand dissoci ation no rmally going on within the functionand structu re of higher constellati ons . The one process gradually passes into the other with the intensity

308


vive, while in ontogenes is those habits are consciously orunconsc iously selected which are most firmly estab l ishedand are best adapted to the given end . At the same timethe older an instinct is , the more thoroughly organizedit becomes , the more i s i t enabled to withstand the onslaught of external hurtful stimul i . The same holdstrue in the case of hab its . A habit of long standing iswell organized, and it is o ften extremely diffi cult, i f notimpossible , to control.Food instincts , sex instincts , social instincts , and per

sonal moral l i fe from an ascending series both as to timeof appearance in the history of the spec ies as well as complexity of structure and function . Food instincts intime and simpl icity precede sex instincts , and sex instincts in their turn precede social instincts which antecede personal , moral l i fe . Now we find that the instab ili ty i s in the same ascending l ine . Food instincts are morestable than sex instincts , sex instincts are more stablethan social instincts which are more firmly organizedthan a highly unified personal l i fe , guided by a moralideal . The structure and functions of the system ofalimentation remain unchanged for ages ; the sex instinctsmay become sl ightly modified for some period of timethe functions relating to social l i fe vary from generationto generation , while the moral l i fe guided by the moralideal i s highly individual i zed and personal .In the downward course of mental disease - processes

the degeneration is from the complex to the s imple ,from the stable to the unstable , from the highly organized to the lowly organized . In the diff erent forms o fmental diseases first the moral l i fe , then the socia l instincts become a ff ected , the patient becomes selfish , introspective, morally selfish , then loses all regard for

The Process of Moment D isaggregation 3 1 1

others , becomes careless , waste ful and negl igent of hisvocations , l i fe -work, and duties ; his whole thought hecomes concentrated on himsel f. In certa in forms ofmental ali enation , such as melanchol i a and paranoia ,the patient becomes suspic ious o f others , of his near anddear ones , becomes cruel and revengeful , sometimesending by attacking his own friends and near relatives,and committing homic ide . When the deterioration ofpersonal moral l i fe and social instincts i s well under way,degeneration o f other functions sets in ,

— the patientgives himsel f over to excesses , to all kinds of debauches ,and indu lges in the di fferent forms of abnormal sexu alpractices . Only very late in the course of the diseaseare the food instincts in any way a ff ected .

Even in the l ighte r forms o f psychi c degenerativeforms that lie on the borderland of menta l al ienation ,su ch , fo r instance , as a re p resent in the various formso f psychopathic maladies we still find that the samerelation holds good . Moral l i fe i s the first to be affected. Soc i a l instincts , follow , while disturbances ofsex and food instincts set in very late in the course o f thepathological process of disaggregation and degeneration .

In the mentally defective , such as in imbeciles , idiots,and cretins we once more find that our law holds good .

The depth o f the congenital mental degenerati on i sfrom moral to soci al , then to sex , and l ast to food instincts . In the imbecile, only the moral , soci al , and intellectual act ivi ti es a re a ff ected, the imbeci l ity being according to the depth o f the degeneration , the other instincts a re more o r l ess normal . In the idiot and cre

tin the proces s of degeneration has gone still deeperand sex and food instincts with thei r psycho -

phys iologi


cal functions and psychomotor adjustments become affected, the idiocy being in p roportion to the gravi ty o fthe a ffection .

The phenomena mani fested under the action o f narcosis go further to confirm the same point of view.

Moral , personal l i fe is the first to succumb , other activities follow in the order of thei r complexity and durationof function . In other words , the law of disaggregationor that of degeneration is from the complex to the simple , from the highly organized to the lowly organized,from the least stable to the most stable . This stabil ityi s proporti onate to the complexi ty o f moment aggregates , and the frequency and duration of the ir associative activi ty.

In habits , formed within the l i fe time of the individual , the same law holds tru e . Old habits become inveterate, habits formed in chi ldhood and perpetuatedcan hardly be eradicated, while those that a re formedlater in li fe become more eas ily dissolved . Complex habi ts formed in late l i fe , relating to moral l i fe and soc i alintercourse , become dissolved at the first onset o f theprocess o f mental degeneration, while habi ts fo rmedearly in l i fe , su ch a s handl ing spoons , fork, and plateor dressing and buttoning the coat long resi st the degenerative process . Paretics and pati ents o f seconda ry dementi a in general , though fa r advanced on thedownwa rd path o f degeneration , are sti ll for sometime able to attend to the simpler functions of l i fe activity , such as dress ing and feeding . Once more Weare confronted with facts pointing to the same lawthat the process of degeneration of which disaggregation consti tutes a stage i s from the highly to the lowlyorganized, from the complex to the s imple .


be extended endlessly, making the whole moment- aggregate more and more highly complex and unstable .I f we tu rn to motor adaptations , we find a similarcourse of development . It took the infant time beforeout of the aimless series of spontaneou s motor reactionssome definite adaptations emerged relative to externalvisual stimuli , so that he learned to grasp the obj ectyonder. These grasping motor reactions are at firstcrude and inexact. The distance of obj ects is o ften mistaken , and the child stretches his hand to fetch distantobj ects , while small obj ects cannot be picked up ; thehand often goes in the wrong di rection and obj ects areoften dropped , because the reactions are not exact andsteady. Sti ll these grasping movements form the nu

cleus for the formation of new and more complex strataof motor reactions . He learns the delicate adaptationsof grasping small obj ects and the fine adjustments ofproducing a series of highly complex and extremely delicate motor reactions , su ch for instance as one finds inthe handling of instruments , reading, writing in theexecution o f mu sical pieces , in singing , and piano playing . All these motor reactions as they become morecomplex and delicate are further and further removedfrom the organized nucleu s .What happens now in the descending process of dissolution ? The reverse process takes place . The morecomplex the psycho -motor structure is , and the furtherit i s removed from the original nucleus , the more easi lydoes it become disintegrated in the downward courseof the process of degeneration . In the di ff erent formsof mental diseases , such as the variou s types of maniamelancholia , paranoia , general paresis , primary dementia

,dementia praecox , senile dementia , and in all those

The Process of Moment Disaggregation 3 15

chronic forms that end in secondary dementia , adaptati ons and acqui s itions further removed from the original nucleus , constituting the s imple relati ons of thingsacqui red in ea rly youth and childhood,gradua lly becomedisintegrated . The more remote the stratum is fromthe central nucleus the earl ier does dissolution set in .

With the setting in of the process o f dissolution thesci entist , the professor, the student loses by degrees thelately acquired wealth of knowledge , the complexand delicately balanced conceptual structure ofsc ientifi c relationship ; the more remotely related to theorigina l nucleus of sense experience is the first to become shaken and tumble down . When the degenerative process has gone far enough , the original meagrenu cleus of sense - experience becomes disintegrated in itsturn .

With the onset o f the process o f degenerationthe banker, the business man , the speculator, gradually begin to lose the understanding of thosespecu lative aspects o f business adaptations and adjustments that are remotely related to the original nucleusof self- preservation . With the further advance of theprocess of disintegration , more stable strata , more nearly related to the original nu cleus become a ff ected, untilfinally the nucleus itse lf is reached and its consti tuentsare a ffected , the patient is unable to take care of himsel f.In motor react ions we find that the same law holds

true . The finer, the more complex a given activity is ,the more remote i t i s from the primary nucleus of motor adaptations , the easier and sooner does it becomedisintegrated in the cours e of the pathological process .The musici an, the vi rtuoso loses the power o f inf using ha rmony

,l i fe , and emotion into the play ; the


pa inter loses control over his brush , the singer over hisvoice ; the watchmaker, or the mechanician is unable toregulate the fine movements of the spring, the wheels ofthe del icate mechanism , and the mechanic is unable tohandle his instruments . Drawing deteriorates , writing isimpaired and defective . The liquid “r ” a sound whichchildren acquire late becomes diflicu lt, i f not imposs ibleto pronounce . The speech test of general paralysis iswell known . The patient is unable to repeat such a simple formula as round about the rugged rock the ragged rascal ran, or

“truly ru ral . ”

With the further advance of the process , such simpleact1ons as picking up a pin , or threading a needle are executed with great di ffi culty, and much hesitation . Toproduce a stra ight l ine or to draw a c i rcle becomes impossible . Involuntary tremor is predominant, a tremor,the rhythmical regulari ty of which becomes fully manifested in senile degeneration, and which is also observed,though without its rhythmical regularity, on the veryeve of mental l i fe , in infancy.


accompli shed . A second stimulus wi ll call forth a repetition of the activi ty, a recurrence of the phenomena ;a third, a fourth , a fi fth stimulus of the same kind willeach time cal l to l i fe the momentconsc iousness ; themoment will be produced again, will be reproduced. A

repetition of the specific appropri ate stimulus wi ll befollowed by a reproduction of the moment .The reappearance of the moment presents a seri eso f moments s i tuated at a distance of di ff erent time intervals . The members of thi s series are di sconnected,inasmuch as each member does not conta in the fact o fits previous appearance . The present functioning ac

tivity i s not felt in the moment by some modificationeffected in the content, it i s not cognized as a reappearance . This is imposs ible from the very character ofthis form of reproduction , s ince the emerging momentis supposed to appear with an unchanged content,while modifications , feeling, and cognition of previousappearances requi re something added to the momentwhich makes it di fferent in content. The members insuch a seri es are disconnected and do not enter into rel ation . Each moment presents a separate beat of consciousness . The previous appearances of the momenta re not represented in its subsequent appearances ;each one stands by itsel f . No modification is produced in the organization of the moment by theprevious histo ry o f its l i fe activi ty, no

“trace i s leftby and of former experience. On each occas ion thesame psychic content is reproduced.

Since the form of consciousness , now under cons ideration , is of such a nature as to have no modification left byeach separate beat of the moment, no connections areformed by the fact o f functi oning. Only that connec

Reproduction and the Reflex Moment 3 19

ti on exists which i s given in the organi c consti tution .

In other words, we may say that a being with such atype of momentconsciousness does not p rofit by individual experi ence ; i t does not, and cannot get any ac

qui red characters during its individual l i fe existence . Itl ives only by what has been obta ined by the p rocess ofnatural selecti on , during the l i fe histo ry of the species .Primary sensory elements are certainly present, butsecondary sensory elements may be ab sent a s it depends enti rely as to whether such connecti ons requis itefor secondary senso ry elements have been establ ishedby vari ation and natural s electi on i n the phylogenetichistory of the moment . We may possibly say thatwhile such connections a re absent in a lower stage ofthe moment, they a re p resent in a higher stage . Bothstages , however, lack the formation of acqui red cha racters during thei r individual hi story .

Such states of the moment consciousness may be largely hypothetical , but they are probably present in the verylowest representatives in the scale of evolution . Thethrowing out o f pseudopodia in the amoeba are as perfeet in the daughter amoeba as in the mother be forefusion has taken place . The young vorticella i sj ust as effi cient as its parent in its sudden spring- l ike reactions of contracture and expansion , both of its bodyand of i ts long attached thread- l ike fibre . What i s present is in all probabil i ty some primitive primarypsycho - b iological element , a germ out o f which the elements of the higher forms of psychic l i fe have di fferentiated.

The stru cture and functions o f the higher formsof li fe have become di fferentiated out of the homo

geneous act ivity of lower forms . The sensory nerve


cell , the recipient of the stimulation , l ike the

muscle cell , the reagent to stimuli , has evolvedfrom the primitive ce ll by greater and greater diff erentiation , both of structure and function . In the crustaceans , invertebrates , and lower vertebrates where motor reactions to stimuli are more or

,less complex and

varied , the sensory aspect of the moment is probably correspondingly complicated,— o rganic connections arepresent giving rise to secondary sensory elements , constituting the material of perceptual l i fe .The soft- bodied hermit crab as soon as he hatches outfrom the egg looks for a shell to fit his body in, to proteet it from danger, and does the fitting and measuringof the shell with as delicate a nicety and c i rcumspectionas his seemingly more experienced older relatives . As

a matter of fact, experience does not count here ,— a

baby he rmit- crab is as lea rned as its parent . Not evenorganic modifications are acquired , the organization ormechanism 13 ready, and the first appropriate stimulussets into activity reactions to external conditions in themost perfect way of which this organization is capab le .The butterfly, the ant, the bee on emerging from thei rch rysal i s are as perfect in thei r reactions as any of theadult individuals . Acquired characters count for nothing, inherited organization is everything.

In the lower vertebrates such as fishes , acquired characters , modifications formed during the l i fe timeof the individual begin to appear, but this is only in itsgerm ; here too inherited organization is everything .

The mechanism is ready and perfect as soon as it comesinto l i fe

,and enters into relation with the condition of

the external environment . The momentconsc iousnessconcomitant with such a type of organization is perfect

CHAPTER XII I

DESULTORY CONSCIOUSNESS

HE characteri sti c feature of the reflex momentconsciousness i s i ts activity on singlelines o f sensori -motor reaction . This i s wellseen in the more di ff erentiated form of thi s

stage of psycho - phys iological organization . In the ascidian , for instance , we meet with one sensory nervecell connected with the muscula r reacting apparatu s .This i s o f the nature of refl ex a ction found also in thehigher representatives of the l i fe seri es . In the higher forms of the fixed moment some connections areformed, several sensory gangli a a re connected ; the acti on may then become more vari ed . In the still higherstages of the same form many systems of gangli a o fseveral organs become connected , thus giving ri se toa highly di ff erentiated sensori -motor apparatus .At thi s stage secondary sensory elements enter intothe content synthetized by the moment- cons ciousness .What, however, characterizes all these forms as belonging to the same type o f moment - consciousness , isthe fact o f thei r being unmodifiable, fixed in thei r or

ganization . The moment does not get modified by itsrecurrent mani festati ons . The organization does notget improved by repetiti on. Things a re in s tatu quo

s ince the time of bi rth . The moment, not being modifiable by its p revious occurrence , when stimulated,emerges each time with an unchangeable content. Eachtime the moment recu rs , i t shows not the sl ightes t trace

3 22

Desultory Consciousness 3 23

o f its former l i fe activity.

The various rep roductions of this type o f momentconsc i ousness presents a disconnected seri es . The momen t at each time of its occurrence may, psychologically, be rega rded as an enti rely new moment, inasmu ch as it bears no trace o f i ts having been in activityonce be fore . To an obj ective observer confronted forthe first time with this type o f moment, the latter ap

‘

pea rs , and rightly so , as i f i t were j ust come into theworld . The moment is rega rded as rep roduced, notby a mark inherent in its consti tution , due to the facto f its recurrence, but by modifications in the observerIn short, the moment in i ts recu rrent mani festationspresents a di sconnected seri es .I f we look at consci ousness from the standpoint o f

seri al relati onship , then the disconnected moments inthe seri es appea r as separate , as isolated . This i solation of the members in the se ri es i s the chi ef cha racte ristic o f th i s type o f momentconsciousness which maythen be termed des ultory consciousnes s .

The moment consci ousness o f the desulto ry typemay also be represented in a more hypothetical form .

There may be a type o f consciousness in which the moment does not recu r at all . Each moment appears andvanishes . never to come aga in , and i s followed by an

other moment o f a totally di ff erent content . The mom’ents have no rel ation to one another. The antece

dent moment i s totally, and we may say absolutely di sconnected from the sub sequent moment . The seri es o fmoments appea ring a re unrelated and a re also di ff erentin content . The moments appear l ike a seri es o f success ive bubbles , each bubble bursting, vani shing, givingplace to a new bubble , and so on. There is n o conn ec


ti on between the success ive moments , neither in relation nor in matter. Such a moment i s a purely desulto ry form of consciousness and may possibly be present in the completely unorgani zed, non- nucleated protoplasm .

The lack of a definite stable organization may resultin an indefinite mass of sensory responses and motor reactions , hence with a changeable , indefinite psychic content. When li fe becomes more differenti ated and or

gan ization appears , then the psychic content becomes organized in a recurrent desultory moment- consciousnes s

,

with a more or less definite content. Amorphous lifehas as its concomitant amorphous psychos is .

Reproduction probably begins w ith the more or lessdefinite formation of the moment and its nuclear element . When the momentconsc iousness appears to bedefinitely organized then reproduction is present . Inother words , reproduction is a fundamental characteristi c o f the formed momentconsciousness . The reproduction of the moment, the type of which we have just analysed, i s fixed in i ts activity, unmodifiable in i ts function from the very start of its entering into relationswith the external envi ronment . This type of momentis of such a nature as not to admit of further growtha fter it has come into the world and has begun to function ; i t admits of no improvement, of no modification .

It is interesting to find that such a type of momentconsc iousness is not altogether absent in the very highestforms o f psychic l i fe . Under certa in conditions wemeet in the higher mental types with a form ofmoment- consciousness closely resembl ing the fixedmomen ts of the lower forms of psychic l i fe . Inthe degenerative states o f idiocy,we find the momentto be of thedesultory type. The moment is fixed, adm i ts

CHAPTER XIV

THE SYNTHETIC MOMENT AND ITS REPRODUCTION

N our last analysis we have examined the tra it ofreproduction in the lowest types of psychic l i fe ,such as the diff erent forms of desultory momentconsc iousness . We may now turn to the higher

types of moments and show that in them , too , the samefundamental character is present, only of course, becoming more complicated and more di fferentiated withthe progress o f psychic l i fe . The moment which wehave thu s far studied is one in which growth is impossible as the reproduction of the moment does not embodythe previous mani festations of the moment . In otherwords , the type examined is o f su ch a character as onlyto synthetize content within the occurring moment, butit lacks synthesis o f moments themselves . The repro~du ction is of inherited content, i t is phylogenetic in na ;ture . We turn now to higher types of moments in whichcontent and moments are syn thetized al ike . Such a typeof psychic activity may be termed synthetic conscious

ness,and its moment the synthetic moment- cons cious

ness .

The reproduction of the synthetic momentconsc iousness i s not isolated , i t stands in relation to the antecedentand subsequent moments . Each reprodu ction modifiesthe next one to a certa in degree , however , sl ight thatmay be . The moment is essentially modifiable and capable of improvement up to a certa in point of which itsinternal organization perm its . The reproduction of the

3 26

The Synthetic M oment and Its R eproduction 3 27

synthetic type bears in i ts organization the stamp of itsprevious l i fe history. We may say that j ust as the moment of the desultory type is an epitome of phylogeneticevolution

,so is the moment of the synthetic type an epi

tome of ontogenetic development.

In its lowest fo rm the syn thetic moment undergoesmodificati on by the fa ct o f previous functi oning ac

tivity . The syntheti c moment in its reproducti on maybe represented in a seri es o f moments , each reproduced moment i s modified by the preceding momentand in its tu rn modifies the succeeding moment . Theseri es i s interrelated and interconnected . Each l ink inthe se ri es includes the p revious link, and i s in its tu rnincluded by the succeeding l ink . Each member in theseri es possesses i tsel f o f the wealth and being o f i tspredecessor, and i s i ts el f inheri ted by i ts successo r. Thewhole seri es i s really a histo ry o f the continued growthand development of the one moment- consci ousnesspass ing through va rious stages in the way o f reachingmaturity, both in structu re and functi on .

It i s tru e that once the syntheti c moment has reachedits matu rity it may go on reproducing in the same wayas the desultory moment, but the element of modifica

tion i s still present, although it cannot be so clea rlyseen by a superfic i al examination . To detect thiselement o f modi fying influence o f one rep roduction onthe su cceeding one , we mu st watch the moment closelyand , i f poss ib le , experiment on it . As long as the content o f the moment remains rel atively unchanged , nochange is observed in its reproductions a fter havingreached the a cme of development . Should , however,some change be introdu ced during the funct ioning ofthe moment, at once this modification reappea rs on the


reproduction of the moment.A change may be introduced in the moment in asomewhat di fferent way , namely, by letting it rest fora time longer than requis ite for its resti tution by arresting its activity. This introduces a change in the internal consti tution of the moment, weakening the intensi tyof its activi ty, or loosening the co - ordination of its internal relationship. The co - ordination and activi tyo f the psychi c elements synthetized in the moment become shaken ; the stabi l i ty o f the moment i s interferedwith ; i ts equi l ib rium gained in growth and development by the success ive seri es o f modifications i s pa rti ally overthrown ; the moment becomes unstable , i ts struetu re and function regress and fall back a few stepslower in the course o f its adaptation to the conditionso f the external envi ronment, adaptations acqui red during the l i fe hi sto ry of its individual development. Themere arrest o f the moment’s function for a shorter orlonger period at once tells on the subsequent reproduction o f the moment. The function of the moment succeeding the period of arrest is less perfect ; the momenti s less adapted in ifs reactions to external stimul i .These facts , i t seems , clea rly indicate that in reachingmatu ri ty the moment has not lost its capacity foradaptabil i ty and modificati on .

Fu rthermore , the fact o f arrest with subsequ entmodification and degradation of function shows thatthe adaptati on reached by the moment in its maturestate i s really kept in stable equil ibrium by its moreor less continued reproducti on . Each reproducti on o f

the mom-ent i s indispensable to the existence o f thenext one , and mani fests its influence by mainta iningthe succeeding moment in the stage of maturity reached

330 Normal a nd‘

Abnormal Psychology

of the states it is living‘

throngh. The on ly knowledgethe synthetic moment possesses is the one characteristicof sensory li fe in general ,— it i s somewhat l ike whatsome writers term knowledge of acqua intance . Thecon tent of the synthetic moment only approaches to thisform of knowledge , which is really di ff erent in nature ,inasmuch as “knowledge of acquaintance ” is only alower stage of mental activity characteri stic of a highertype of moment than the one under investigation .

Knowledge of acquaintance implies a sensation also thefree image and free idea of that sensation . The synthetictype on the contrary has only the sensation , the freeimage and idea are totally wanting .

The psychi c l i fe of the infant i s probably the nearest that comes up to the natu re o f knowledge or ex

perience cha ra cteri stic o f the syntheti c moment. I saythat the infant’s psychic l i fe comes nearest to that ofthe synthetic moment, but sti ll the two a re not exactlythe same . In the infant’s consciousness , howeveryoung, free images and ideas a re potential and on theway to germinate , while the synthetic mioment lacksthi s potenti al ity, inasmuch as the syntheti c momentreaches its full development wi thout giving rise to freepsychi c elements . The consci ousness o f the infant i s alow stage o f a high type of momentconsciousness ;while the syntheti c consc i ousness i s a high stage of alow typ e of momentconsciousness . The high stage o fa low type and the low stage of a high type may berespectively i llustrated by the algebrai c fo rmulae :( a

- l—b )“ and )

l where a, b , c, d

are the functions of the moment and n the degree o f development o f the moment .

The consciousness o f the young infant as closely te

The Synthetic Moment and Its Reproduction 33 1

sembles the synthetic moment as the fish stage of thehuman emb ryo resembles the fish itsel f . Sti ll the analogy i s use ful as it gives a closer ins ight into the constitution and relations o f the two types o f moment- consciousnes s . The infant in i ts psychi c growth no doubtpass es through the infe rior types of moment - consciousness , but in a most genera l and sketchy form . Theontogenes is o f psychi c l i fe is probably as much an ep itome o f its phylogenesi s as the ontogenesi s o f f biosisi s an ep itome of its phylogenes i s . Both give a mostgenera li zed ep itome modified by adaptati ons and bythe specific type of organ1zat10n i n which the ontogeneti c evolution i s tak ing place .

CHAPTER XV

THE ACCUMULATIVE CHARACTER OF THE SYNTHETICMOMENT

HE experi ence of the syntheti c momentmeans not consci ousness of the presentedcontent, but simply modification of psychicfunction . The experi ence of the functioning

moment influences the content on its next reproduction .

I f A i s the original functioning synthetic moment andb i , ha! , ha, b i i ts modifications due to the functioning ac

tivity, then the successive rep roducti ons of the momentmay be represented by the following formula : A, Axbx,

Azbz, Aabs, Asb t , Asbs until i t reaches its maturity or state

o f stable equil ib rium , s ay Anbu

. The whole seri es maybe represented by the formula : A, Albl , Aabz, Asba

Anbn . Each member of the series reproduces in an

epitomized form all the members that preceded it andthe last one , the mature moment in i ts state of equ ilibrium, representing an epitome of the whole seri es .The seri es in its success ive stages represents the l i fehistory of the growth and development of the syntheti cmoment.Concrete examples may help to make the matter

clearer. The fish in making repeated attacks on an

other fish conta ined in the same tank and meeting re

peatedly with failu res will finally desist from i ts at

tempts . The fi sh that has been snapped at many timesand has escaped will keep away from the dangerous

pl ace . This does not mean that the fish remembers itsexperiences

,that it is conscious of its fa ilures, of the

332


her the steps of thei r experiences. What happens isthat the activity of the organs , along with the growthof the corresponding motor cells , so modifies the function that the wa lk ing becomes more and more perfectunti l i t reaches perfect adaptation .

The same thing occurs in the tra ining of brutes . Itis not that the brute remembers the steps of the process ,and knows how improvement has taken place by a givenway of action . In the process o f tra in ing modificationsare brought about by each success ive reproduction of themoments in response to the action of external stimul i .Modifications due to successful chance action, beingmore satis factory to the brute , are stronger and modi fythe moment in their own direction , while unsuccess fulreactions tend to drop out and thus adaptation , improvement is brought about. The cat in scratching for thedoor to open it scratches at first a imlessly and does notopen , -the actions are unsuccess ful . Should the cat happen to scratch the handle and open the door, whichcerta inly is probable , cons idering the activity of the cat

’s

paw, the result is satis factory. The repe ti tions ofsuch chance actions will gradually so modi fy the cat’sscratch ing that it will become more and more definite .The success ful actions alone will be repeated, the nu

success ful will drop out . Finally the adaptation wi llbecome so perfect that the s ight of the closed door willat once result in the reaction of scratching the handleand openingthe door.The young bird is brought in the world in a rather

helpless condition as to movement o f co - ordination ,especially flying movements . The apparatus for flyingis undeveloped

, but it soon reaches its perfect adaptation through act ivity, exercise, practice , that modi fy

Accumu lative Character of Synthetic Moment 335

both structure and function. The b i rd does not remember the steps of its acqui sitions and profits by its fa iluresso as to make consciously better and more adaptivemovements . The process that takes place is far mores imple : Each act of functioning produces and reproduces modifications , bo th : in structure and function , untilthe apparatus and its activity reach perfect adaptation .

The total moment is modified on each reproduction untila

' po int is reached where further growth and development ceases and maturity of function is establ ished.

The same holds true in the case of the chi ld. The

child on learn ing to s it is doing it in a very clumsyfashion , tumbles over every time ; i t must be supported by pillows to keep it in the same po sit ion and alsoto prevent it from being hurt . The structure works imperfectly. The exerc i se o f the apparatus , along withits further growth , brings about a more perfect adaptation , and the child finally learns to main ta in its equil ib rium when in the sitting posture . The s tanding up

right passes through a simila r history . When the coordinating apparatus for walking begins to appear, itworks at first in a very awkward manner. The chi ldfirst walks by holding on to some obj ects , such as cha irs ,or the wall , or the hand of his parent and nurse . Whenhe makes a step all by himsel f, he is almos t frightened ,and when le ft alone often cries .Practice and growth of the walk ing appa ratus be

comes more and more perfect . The chi ld makes twoor three steps hes itatingly, stops , asks for help and suppo rt . G radually hi s movements become more ce rta in,and more steps a re taken until finally the child lea rnsto walk

,still imperfectly, in the waddling fa sh ion

characteri sti c o f young age . The walk ing apparatus


grows and keeps on fun ctioning. The function reactson the further growth making the movements moreand more perfect. Each a ttempt makes the next oneeasier. Adaptations develop not only by the meregrowth of the apparatus , but also by functi on . In factfunction la rgely determines the growth of the apparatu s .

It must, however, be pointed out that the exampletaken from baby l i fe may be used only as an i llustrati on o f the way the synthetic moment grows by functi on or reproducti on . The child’s growth does not exactly follow the same lines as those o f the syntheticmoment, s ince the psychic l i fe o f man develops on ahigher level belonging to a higher type o f moment . Inthe efforts of the baby to walk some germs of del iberation and refl ection may be observed, but it i s hardlyprobable that these elements a re present in the firstattempts of the cat to walk or of the bird to fly. The moment of the syntheti c type grows by s imple modificati ons of its function brought about by its repeated re

productions .The modifications , howeve r, o f the moment

’s functi on a re not mere chance modifications . The function ,i s modified on a defini te l ine in the direction of moreperfect adapta ti on .

Reactions to stimu l i coming from the externa l environment become more defined until a definite set o freactions i s establ i shed . This involves the selective activity of the moment . Certa in fit reactions a re selectedand assimi lated by the moment, whi le others , unfit a rerej ected . This , however, i s a tra it which is characteristic not only of the synthetic moment, but of the momentconsc iousness in general .


first functioning of the simple sensori -motor apparatusas given by phylogenesis , and i f a be the modification effected, then the accumulative process may be representedby the powers of a; thus the first will be A, the nexti s Ana

‘

, the following i s Aza’

, then Asa and so on . Thetota l process to the point of maturity may be representedby the following formula : A, Ana

l

, Aza’

, Asa’, Aia

‘

,

Ana“

. A,,an represents the highest stage o f perfection

reached by the S imple accumulative syntheti c momentThe syntheti c moment may also have a higher stage

where many di ff erent sensori -motor elements are synthetized, the accumulative modifications occur alongdi ff erent l ines o f sensory responses and motor reac

tions . The mom en t reaches here the highest form ofcon sci ousness as mere perceptual in cha racter. Thefish perceives its prey not only by smell , but also bys ight along with muscular and tou ch sensations ; allo f themgo to form the percept of the prey yonder, a sfar as perception o f fish space is concerned .

TheAmerican flounder of the Atl an ti c coastmay betakcn as an i llustration . Although the flounder i s perfectly qui et, almost lying moti onless at the bottom o fthe tank , only . occasionally moving hi s small protruding,

.eye, no sooner i s some small fly thrown into thetank,_ than the flounder at once darts in that direction,

and attacks its prey with a snap . I wanted to find outhow f ar visual percepti on i s concerned in the tracingof the

”prey, and how fa r sense of smell and touch a re

importantimthis particular fish at least. The flounderwas deprived o f its organs o f sight, and a fter havingbeen given f about twenty- four h ours t ime to recoverfrom the eflects of the operati on , it was thrown into a

The S imple and Compound SyntheticM oment 339

tank teeming with l ittle fishes on wh ich it feeds .

The flounder settled to the bottom , but in about a fewminutes raised itsel f in the attitude of attack , so highlycha ra cteri sti c o f thi s speci es , ei the r smell ing the littl eones or feel ing the vib rations made in the water by theswimming movements o f the l i ttle fish ; i t made a d artin the di rection o f a whole mass o f them , but m issed .

Thi s has been repeated many times over, the flounderfa i l ing eve ry time and only snapping wate r o r ai r bu bbles . The

'

little folk soon became emboldened and

avoiding hi s front they came from behind pecking athis

'

blind eye . The flounder could not reach these little fellows .Moreover, the bottom of the tank where the

blind flounder was lying was full of smal l sea - rob in swhich l ike to walk on the bottom with the i r h ighly sensitive leg- feelers . The bl i nd flounder did not attack them , although with his eyes in good order, hewould have instantly attacked the sea- rob ins . It appears then that the flounder tracks i ts p rey by the senseo f sight mainly, while the other senses are indefiniteguides . Sti ll the other senses seem to take an activepa rt in tracing the prey, a s the blind flounde r was mostof the time in an a ttitude of attack . Evidently he wassmell ing the prey or feel ing i ts movements all the timeand was aware o f its presence, though the senses without s ight cou ld not give him the definite di rect ion inwhich the p rey was to be found . In other words , theother senses awaken only the sensati ons o f presence o fthe food , but do not give i ts direction and location .

It is highly probable , then , as fa r as we can in fe r fromthis expe riment as to the psy chic s tate o f the fish , thatthe flounder does not get a definite percept, unless


many di ff erent sensory el ements are combined in asynthes is giving rise to a well defin ed motor reacti onof more or less perfect adaptation . The synthetic moment, then , in thi s p arti cular speci es at least, seems tobe of a highly complex character, inasmuch as manydi ff erent sense - elements go to make up its content .S imi larly it is affi rmed of the sea - robin that, i f its delicate leg - feelers are cut o ff , the fish is unable to feed . I fthat b e true , then the touch sensati on is important hereand enters as a determining element in the momentalong with other elements coming from other senseorgans . In the dog smell i s ma inly the dete rm iningfactor, but the functi oning of othe r senses a re requi si teto form seconda ry sensory elements ; here too the moment i s made up of many seri es o f various sense- elements . In the bi rd, in the ape , in the man, sight i s thechi e f element in perception , but the percept ari ses notfrom visual elements alone , but from a synthes is ofa multi tude of elements coming from other sense - or

gans the visu al elements o ften taking the lead .

From a purely biological standpoint we can understand the importance o f the leading part played by thevisual elements in the psychi c l i fe o f the higher vertebrates and especially of that of man . It is of thegreatest advantage in the st ruggle for exi stence to develop a sense organ that admits of the most deli cateobj ective discrimination . No other senses , not eventhat o f hearing, a re so free from the general organi csensation as the sense o f sight. Hence the sensoryelements coming from the sense organs other thansight are confus ed and lack the obj ective clearnesscharacteri stic o f the sense of sight . The visual sensefurther is o f the highest sensi tivity to extremely low

34 2 Normal‘

and’

Abnormal Psychology

T, Tat, Tat’

, Tst'

, T.t‘

Tu t”

Tnt“

.

O , O«o‘

Ono”

Ono“

.

M ,Mxm,Mem’

,Mam’

,Mun‘

Mxom1° Mum

“.

The process of composition begins not at the firstmembers of the seri es , but rathe r further on . Someaccumulations mu st be made first in each series separately be fore combinations of the di fferent series cantake place . For simpl ic i ty sake we may postulate thatthe process of composition of all l ines begins in eachalike , although this may not be the case ; let us assumethat such a process begins in the tenth stage of the seri es . Before that , say in the thi rd stage compos itions maybe found only on two or three l ines , su ch as s T st

° orstill further or The Vprecedes in the formula indicating its primary importance in the case o f the moment where the visual sensoryelements a re mainly the guide for senso ri -motor reactions , the visual sensations constituting the leading andcentral elements o f the compound . In a moment ofthe same type but with a di ff erently related content O orA may be the main elements of the compound, an element round which other sense - elements become grouped .

The formula may then be or in the casewhere A i s predominant AsaT at

‘

Msm’, etc . The syn

thetic moment w i ll from its starting point, say Vzov not“

proceed onward , reaching its height ofdevelopment and adaptation in the compound a ,

TntnO

noflA

nanM °mm This last stage of the moment

has at its di sposal the accumulations o f all the

previous synthetic moments both simple and com

The Simple and Compound Syn theticM oment 343

pound . The compound synthetic moment i s the hei ro f all previou s acqu i s itions and accumulations , and , a ssu ch , may be characterized as the compound, accumulative

,syn thetic moment.

Although the simple syntheti c moment and the com

pound moment di ffer in character and complexity ofconten t , they sti ll agree in one general tra it characteristic o f the synthetic moment, namely, fixed synthes i s .The seri es o f sensory elements , both p rimary and secondary , that enter into the content o f the moment a refirmly combined . The elements o f such compoundscannot get disengaged and do not therefore exi st i n afree state , they fo rm s table compounds .The form of reprodu ction common to a ll the

moments thu s far examined is that of reins tate

ment. The sensori -motor elements of the momentare reinstated in all their reali ty . The momentin its su ccess ive stages o f reprodu ction is broughtto l i fe by impress ions coming from external stimul i .Prima ry and secondary s ense - elements ente r into themoment’s consti tuti on whenever i t reappea rs . In bothforms o f the syn thetic type , the moment w i th the recu rrence of the reprodu ctions , becomes enriched in sensory elements , primary and secondary ; but these elements mu st be pres en t, and , from the very nature ofthe types o f moments under considerati on , no otherelements can possibly be present . The seri es in whichthe success ive steps o f the moment, desultory or synthetic , mani fests i tsel f i s composed enti rely o f sensory elements , most or all o f which va ry but little fromone beat o f the moment to the other.The fact o f the s imple reinstatement i s especi ally

cl ea r in the case o f the desultory'

moment. Each re in


stated moment indu ced by external stimul i i s an exactcopy of its predecessor . In the syntheti c moment thecontent of two adj oining stages i s a l i ttle vari ed , stillthe sensory elements consti tuting the content of thepreceding moment i s reinstated in the succeeding one .It i s tru e that even the desulto ry moment i s not absolutely smooth in its course o f repetiti ons or reinstatements . Interruptions of functions due to unfavorablestimu li o ften occu r within the seri es , interruptions ,which may be b rought about by artific ial conditions andin which di ff erent psycho -motor responses a re interpol ated , but these responses do not enter into the contentof the moment when the favorable conditions a re restored, — the responses do not become habi tu al . Thusthe rhythmical pulsations of the vorticella may betemporarily a rrested by the evaporation o f the liqu idin which it i s conta ined, but no number o f evaporationswi ll change the seri es o f rhythmical pulsations by having stages of a rrests interpolated into the seri es . Similarly i t i s highly questionable whether a fly, beetle , orcockroach cou ld contract any habits .Some eminent psychologists go to the length o f af

firming that even the lowest representative animal li fe ,the protozoa ( possibly bacteri a , bac i ll i ) , possess ideational and volitional processes , that the lower stages ofmental l i fe mani fest assoc i ation, reproducti on , memory, cognition , and recognition . Other psychologistsa re more moderate , they regard the acqui si tion ofknowledge as adaptation through hab it , characteri stico f the lowest representative of animal l i fe . Thu s onepsychologi st propounds the question , “How i s i t thatwe or the brute learn to do anything ? Does the amoeba learn at all ? What belongs to our type o f con

CHAPTER XVI I

THE DESULTORY TYPE IN PATHOLOGICAL STATES .

FORM of reproduction analogou s to theones present in the desultory moment i s tobe found in various psychopathologi calstates . The natu re of reproductions of the

hypno idic states comes very near to the s imple form ofreinstatement cha racteri sti c o f the desu ltory moment .The main feature of this pathological state is its re

cu rrent sensory character i solated from the rest o f theindividual’s psychic l i fe . Experiences emerging inthis state are actu ally l ived over again . The hypnoidicstate is desu ltory, it forms no connected relations in itsvarious reproductions , i t does not become modified byi ts many occu rrences , and the first stage is as richin psychic content as the last stage . The hypno idic state is relatively fixed . O f course , between thedesultory moment and the hypnoidic state there i s onlyan analogy in the natu re o f functioning , otherw ise thestates a re actu ally di ff erent , inasmuch as they belongto altogether di ff erent types of moments .The nature of reinstatement characteristic o f the re

producti ons o f the synthetic moment i s clea rly revealedin the way modificati ons are eff ected and non - adaptivereactions are el iminated . Senso ry responses and motor reacti ons that have met with fa ilure and evi l consequences a re modified by degrees , in portions so tosay. The law that regulates the success ion of the modification s e ff ected i s the order of the degree of harm

346

The Des ultory Type in Pathological States 347

consequent on the reacti ons to which the senso ry re

spon ses l ead. I f then the most harmful rea ctions belong to the middle o f the s eri es o f motor react ionsconsti tuting the moto r aspect of the moment, thesea re modified by being gradu ally dropped ou t and oth

ers substitu ted . The rest, the more or less indi ff erentreactions of the seri es a re gone through , although theybea r no longer any relation to the sensori -motor reactions that have immedi ately preceded them . To anexternal observer su ch reacti ons a re ridi cu lou s and un

intell igible , s ince they cannot be understood with reference to thei r immediate antecedents ; the i r nature canonly be made clea r from the hi story o f the moment .Such traces in the organiz ation o f the synthetic mo

ment a re vestiges o f previou s u sefu l functions , o f aseri es of adaptive reacti ons ; they a re like rudimenta ryorgans in the economy o f the o rgani sm . Thu s a chickmay peck repeatedly at hi s waste products o r at a burning match and repeatedly wipe hi s bi ll ; finally a markedmodification i s b rought abou t in i ts sensory responsesand rea cti ons . When the chick i s confronted withthose obj ects , i t comes up to them , looks at them , doesnot peck, bu t wipes its bi ll . To an external obse rverto whom the hi story of the chick’s experi ence i s unknown , the w iping o f the bi ll would have been enti relyunintell igible .R einstatement can be simila rly observed in cases

where conditi ons have changed , but the modificati onhas not yet been e ff ected within the content o f the moment . Thus the sto ry o f the actions o f the hen thatb rought her brood o f chicks to the river and urgedthem to swim would have appea red strange , possiblymysterious , i f not for ou r knowledge o f the hen

’s


forme r expe ri ence with a brood of duckl ings . Themode of reproduction o f the synthetic moment i s aseri es of successive phases of more and more modifiedreinstatements which can only become intell igible onfollowing up more or less closely the history o f themoment’s development .The forms of reinstatement characteri sti c of thesynthetic and desultory moments a re to be found inhigher types of moments . When undergoing the process o f dissolu tion , secondary dementia , the terminu s ofchronic insanity offers a wealth of facts at ou r disposal .The mental states o f secondary dementia a re like theruins of great castles, l ike fossi ls o f former growth ofvegetation and animal li fe . The active l iving momentsare dis integrated , decomposed and only some of theconstituents a re l eft to function . These constituents ,remnants of former li fe - activity, are simply reinstated .

One who has not known the history of the case willha rdly comprehend the actions of the patient. Thusone dement may keep on covering himself with ablanket, or hiding himsel f into corners . He who i s igmorant o f the history of the case wou ld regard the act ion as caprici ous and meaningless , he would hardlyguess from the patient’s actions that the latter when in astate of chronic melancholi a labored under the delusion that he was made o f glass , and that people couldsee the a ctions of his guts . The synthetized and systematized delus ion itsel f was swept away in the generalru in and decomposi tion , only some remnants were le ft,a few sensori -motor elements remained . These elementsare now being reinstated in the same fashion as the s imple types of the synthetic and desu ltory moments . Similarly i t would be hard to guess from the frequent mum


gic states . In these states moments are artificiallyfo rmed in the di ssoci ated subconsc ious moments whichri se to the surface of consc i ousness with all the energysuppl i ed to them by the sub consc ious . They reprodu ceand perpetuate themselves a fter the mode of the synthetic moment unti l thei r end i s achi eved, when theygradually fade away, or, what is sti ll more often thecase , vanish in the same sudden and abrupt way as theycome .The a rtific i ally indu ced posthypnotic or hypnonergic states studi ed from the standpoint of the momentconsciousness a re found to be analogous to many psychopathic conditions . The main characte r of thesestates i s thei r di ssoci ati on and rep roduction , or ratherre instatement on the basis of lower types of momentconsciousness .In psychopathi c functional states not only does dis

integration o f content occu r, but there i s also presentfunctional degradation of the type of the moment . Thefunction of the moment reverts to lower types o f psychic act ivity, while the content cons i sts o f constituentsfo rmed on higher l ines o f psychic l i fe . Hence thelack of adaptati on , the confl ict in psychopathic statesbetween function and content. It i s like the formationof a barbaric soc i ety out of the remnants of a ru inedcivi l ization.

We may then aflirm that the characteri stic mode ofreprodu ction , both of the desultory and syntheti c moment, i s reins tatement. The di ffe rence between thetwo moments being that while the moment of the desultory type reproduces by reins tatement only, that ofthe synthetic type reproduces by both reins tatement

and modification.

CHAPTER XVI I I

PRESENTATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS

N the cou rse o f our analys i s of the lower typeso f moments it has been shown that the psych icelements entering into thei r synthetized contentoccur not in a free independent state , but in fixed

accumulations and stable compounds , having reinstatement as the mode o f thei r reproduction . There i s ,however, a higher type o f moment in which psychicelements occu r in a free independent state, having ac

cordingly a mode o f reproduction di ff erent from thato f the types we have ju st examined . Let us see nowwhat the natu re of these free elements i s , how th eycome to arise and what i s the peculi a r mode of thei rrep roduction .

I f we look at the tree yonder and then close oureyes , we can represent to ourselves the tree in its general outl ines at least . We see its trunk, i ts b ranches ,and its green foli age . After ou r fri end’s departu rewe continu e to see him in ou r mind’s eye . We l iveover mentally, in ou r imagination , all ou r relations ,our mutu al en joyrnents . We seem to watch him actand hear him talk . The representative elements cannot possibly be identified with or derived from a fterimages . For a fter images are really af ter- sensations

and consi st o f sensory elements . The elements involved in the state of representative psychic l i fe a refreed from all immedi ate coexistence with sensory elements , primary or secondary ; in fact, they appea r

3 5 1


when the sensory elements di sappear.The two sets of psychic elements , the presentativeand representative , stand in inverse relation to eachothe r. When the one i s at i ts maximum the other i sat its minimum. When senso ry elements appear thefree elements become fa int. This fa intness is in proportion to the intensi ty of the sensory element . It i sha rd for us to look at a color and imagine it at thesame time ; and the more intense and b ri ll i ant the colori s , the harder it i s for us to have the color, at the sametime, represented. Look at an obj ect, say the lightedlamp , take in well its sensory elements and you willfind that it i s almost impossible to rep resent it to yourself at the same time . Try hard to represent to yourself the obj ect and you will find that its sensory elements will begin to va cillate and become fa int

,or less

Vivid. When absorbed in our ideas we often do notnoti ce even very intense stimu l i . The two seri es of elements , the sensory or, presentative, and the free ones ,the representative , cannot run together without interfering with each other, nay, without arresting eachother .Representative elements bring with them a newfundamental departu re in the mental activity of themoment, they may keep up its activi ty when flagging,may intensi fy i t, but may also deflect i t, or distract i t,giving rise to another confl icting moment . Thus on theone hand my continuous thought about a certain scientific proposi ti on constitu ting the substance of the present active moment may begin to flag, but i t is soon keptup by new observations and experiments ; on the otherhand, the occasional glance at the morning newspapermay tend to defl ect mental a ctivi ty to quite a di ff erent


a palm ‘ seen in some di stant country may ri se clearlyand vividly before the mind’s eye , and temporarily interrupt the course and trend of our thought .While I am writing these lines a fleeing copperhead , apulsating vorticella , a fish

’s ta i l , a cow’s head and a pu ff

ing steam engine have flashed across my mental field andgone . They may be u ltimately traced to some sensorystimu lu s and positive a fter images , but these are far inthe background of consciousness and remain unnoticed .

Representative elements come and go in consciou sness ,they appear independently of all other elements , theyare essenti ally free elements . We call this coming andgoing of these independent elements the

“ free play ofthe imagination .

”

Where sensory elements appear in synthetized compounds , or in the precept, they cannot be separated ,they are fi rm ly bound together. It i s only in repre

sentation that the corresponding representative elements free thmselves from the bonds of union whichthe sensory elements cannot throw o ff . The orangeyonder i s a syntheti zed compound of many sensoryelements, prima ry and secondary, but as long as theyremain sensory the elements a re kept in union and cannot be dissociated. Such a di ssociati on , however, i sfully possible with the representative elements entering into the rep resentati on of the orange . We can thinkof its color, s ize , shape, weight, smell and taste separately .

The freedom of the representative elements i s cl early brought out in the s o - called free pl ay of the imagination . Sensory elements a re syntheti zed in the compound in definite relations which cannot possibly besevered unless the stimuli a re rearranged, and in many

Presentations and R epres entations 3 5 5

cases the sensory elements do not admit even of thatprocedu re . The sensory elements in the perceptionof a p a rti cula r obj ect, s ay a house , have definite relati ons which cannot b e modified without first changingthe color, stru cture , shape , s i ze , o f the house and rearranging its relative pa rts . In imaginati on or repre

sentation , however, all that i s done in less than notime , without in the least interfe ring with the externalstimu l i .Rep resentative elements mani fest even more free

dom . In many cases a modifica ti on o f certa in relationsin the sensory elements cannot possibly be e ffected , because the relations o f the external stimuli constitutingwhat may be termed the external obj e ct do not admito f a rearrangement . Thus we cannot have the moutho f the horse on hi s back, horns growing ou t o f hi ss ides , the mane on hi s hind parts and the ta il on hi sb row. We can , however, easi ly accompl i sh su ch a re

a rrangement in ou r imagination . Fu rthermore , in representation psychic elements appear in combinations ofwhich sensory elements do not admit. Pegasus , ahorse wi th w ings ; mermaid, a being hal f woman hal ffish ; centau ru s , a being hal f man and hal f horse , andother combinations of the most impossible character

,as

far as sensory elements are conce rned , may be formedin representati on .

At fi rst representative elements a re started by sensations and a re thu s fa r bound up with them , but theygradually free themselves from it . Thus in a baby under my close obse rvation , the representative elementnever came unless the ob j ect was present . I f the oh

j et t was taken away, he soon forgot it . In the un

educated m ind even o f a high type of moment- con


sciousness representations are still bound up with presentation s . The gossip can keep on talking as long asthe thought i s fix ed on the concrete . Persons who lackscientific , conceptual thought cannot grasp an abstractgeneral p ropos ition without having it first expressed inconcrete terms , or fixed in sensory pictures . The savage gets a headache when his thought is forced toflow in a stream of representation . In the imbec i le ,in the idiot we find the same thing mani fested . Theycan only think in concrete sensory terms . In mentalastheni a which approaches the state of the higherstages of imbec i l i ty and also in secondary dementia ,states consequ ent on psychic degeneration , we findthe same tru th illu strated . The patient

’s mental activity falls many stages nearer to the level o f pres entative l i fe . It i s only in the higher forms of psychicl i fe that representative elements become free , independent

,and are freely and eas i ly associ ated and dis

s ociated.

I f looked at from the standpoint of control , we findthat sensory elements

,on account o f thei r fixed rela

tions in the combinations and compounds in which theyenter

, are uncontrollable. The compound with all itssensory elements , primary and secondary, i s given , andcannot di rectly be controlled ; it i s highly stable , i t resi sts attempts at decomposi ti on . The combinations ,however

,formed of the free representative elements

are of unstable equ i l ibrium , the elements can be easilyshi fted , displaced , rearranged, easi ly dissoc i ated , andnew combinations formed . The mode of function ofthe representative element is free association .

Even when entering into the associative play the representative elements do not blend and fuse so as not to


sentation . Just as the sensation black is not black, so isthe idea or representation of black not a sensation‘black .

’

CHAPTER XIX

REPRESENTATIONS AND THE LAWS OF THEIR COMB INATIONS

EPRESENTATIVE elements form whatmay be characterized as mental tra ins . Theelements of a menta l tra in are connected byrelations o f contigui ty, resemblance , and con

trast . Assoc iation by contiguity depends on the fre

quency , recency with which the elements have been associated, while resemblance and contrast may be re

garded as two or more mental tra ins o f representativeelements ass ociated by contiguity, crossing and intersecting in a few points , in other words having some element in common . From this standpoint associations byresemblance and contrast are often regarded as cases o fcontigu ity which is therefore considered as the mode ofassociation characteristi c o f representative elements .From another standpoint, however, resemblance mayequally be cons idered as fundamental . It is nearer tothe truth to regard both contiguity and resemblance orsimilarity as fundamental modes o f association of representative elements .Association by contiguity may be expressed in the follow ing genera l proposition : Ideas or images which havefrequently followed one another tend to recur in thesame order . I f a

,b,c,d,e be images or ideas that

have frequ ently followed each other in a definite ordero f su ccess ion , then the tendency i s that the ideas or images w i ll occu r in the same order, i f the initial idea orimage is awakened . Thu s i f a

,b,c,d,e,be that order.

3 5 9


then i f a i s awaken the rest, b, c,d,e,tend to emerge

in the same order in which they have followed each other previou sly.

The formu la for association by contigu i ty may beexpressed as follows :Representative elements , however, as we have pointed

out are derivative , they are functions of sensory compounds , and vary concomitantly with the wealth and di fferentiation of sensory l i fe - experience . Blind peoplehave no visual images , nor can dea f persons form anyidea of a sound . Although representative elements areessentially di fferent in natu re from sensory elements andtheir compounds , sti ll it remains true that sensory experience i s the soil from which the rich variety of representative l i fe grows up. Sensory elements and theircompounds are prerequis ites of representations of thei rcombination and organization .

The course of assoc iative relations of representationsmay be determined by the course of sensory series . I fa series of sensations and perceptions have frequentlyfollowed each other pretty uni formly, then thei r corresponding representations will tend to recur in thesame uni form order. Let A, B , C , D , E . be theorder of succession of the sensory series , then the ordero f the series of representations will be : a, b, c, d, e .

When sensation A with its corresponding representationa are awakened , or i f a alone occu rs , then the rest o f theseries of representations tend to emerge . The formu lafor association of contigui ty may be somewhat modifiedand represented as follows :

a b c d e Representations

TTTTT

A B C D E Presentations


determ ined by contiguity will tend to run on new l ines .The course may be represented as followsa,

— b ,— c,— d,— e ,

— f

l

p1_ b 1'— "

g— 1

’

i_ 'm

l

q,— r,

— k ,— l, — n

ls ,

— l, — x ,—

y ,— z

Let each series be represented by a row of squ aresformed into a rectangle and let each crossing series berepresentd by a s imi lar rectangle intersecting the preceding one at right angles , then the cours e of assoc iation by s imilarity may be diagrammatically representedas follows :

The course of the mental tra in of ideas is changed anddeflected along lines which are otherwise unhabitu al forthe particu lar mental train . In association by s imilari tythe mental tra in ever corruscates along new l ines .

Representations and Laws of Combinations 363

Association by s im ilarity may be expressed in the general proposition : like s tates often follow each other.

What that l ikeness cons ists in we have already seen ,it is some common characters , some representative elemen ts which two or more crossing tra ins of contiguousrepresentations possess in common . The crossing ofone tra in by another at a point where the representations have common features is purely accidental, as faras the crossed tra in is concerned ; i t is the play of theimagination . As an illustration of such a crossing oftra ins we may take the example when one , from a series of images and ideas about the recent Americo - Spanish war, is led to think of the Anglo- Spanish war in thei 6th Century, the common representation being the destruction of the Spanish fleet ; and from the mental tra inon the Anglo- Spanish war to the Franco - Pruss ian warthe common representation being invasion , and fromthis to the Napoleonic war, then to the pol itica l aff airso f France , and thence , to the peace conferenceo f European powers . The course of the tra ins o f ideasi s every time deflected along new channels . The deflection depends largely on the complexity and number ofthe tra ins and thei r activi ty.

The relation of l ikeness is present not only in tra insof representations , but also in presentations or in whatis termed by us psychic compounds . Thu s twins wesay look al ike , so do eggs , so do animals of the samespecies ; a picture say o f a landscape looks l ike the actua llandscape , and a portra it or statue resembles the original . In a ll these examples the l ikeness is consti tuted bythe sensory elements common to the presented psychiccompound . Not that the sensory elements are exactly the same ; subject ively cons idered, they may be


totally di ff erent in their psychic stu ff , in the psychic relations that cluster about them , as no two sensations , notwo psychic compounds , are really the same , as far asthe mental state is concerned, but they refer to the samecharacters in the external obj ect. It is this common reference to the same tra its or characters in the external object that constitutes the bond of association of likenessin sensory element or psychic compound . On the samegrounds may be expla ined the likeness between the representation s and the psychic compound , the percept ,which it represents .


I see a house, a horse and carriage standing near by ; Iclose my eyes and imagine the whole s i tuation overagain . We say then , incorrectly though , that the representation i s a copy of the presentation . Evidently therepresentation is regarded as not being the same as thepresentation just as a copy is rea lly not the same as theoriginal . The psychic elements of representation havethe function of cognizing again , or what is more correctto say the function of recognition which constitutesthe very essence of representation . In representationevents are l ived over again without the actu al recurrence of those experiences . In representat ion the moment becomes independent of the present, i t becomesfree from its immediate environment.In order that a representation be a true copy of

its original, i t must be cognized as a“copy, that is, i t

must be cognized as something already cognized, in other words, it must be recognized. This fun ction of tecogniti on is the s ine qua non of representation . Theimage, representation , or idea of a table is not itself atable, nor is it a syntheti zed sensory compound referring to the obj ect, table , i t is a psychic element referringto the sensory compound on its objective aspect. Therepresentation of the table does not re fer directly to thetable as i t is the case in the sensory compound, but to thetable as perceived. The image or representation refersnot to the object immediately, but mediately, to the objcet as object of the sensory compound . Hence the ob

ject is cogni zed over in representation , in other words ,is recognized .

This recognition may be of a general or of a spec ificcharacter. The function of recognition in its generalaspect is mani fested in the idea . The idea possesses

R epresentation and R ecognition 367

this function of general recognition . The idea manrecognizes its content in a general way, i t re fers to manin general , but does not identi fy its content with anyparti cular individual . I may represent to mysel f an oh

ject recognized as a table , not as any particular table ,and I may also represent this parti cular table on whichI am writing . The representation I have of my friendJohn refers specifically to John not to any one else . As

in my imagination I scrutini ze the features o f myfriend’s face , I all along recognize that i t is my friend

’scountenance . Recognition , general as well as particular, i s involved in the very function o f representation .

In immediate perception itself there is no recogn i

tion present. It is not true to fact to say that in theperception of a horse we recognize the obj ect by perceiving i t as horse and not as anything else . The factthat I perce ive the obj ect as it i s depends entire ly onthe sensory compound which has cognition as the function of its psychic character. The sensory component,the percept horse , is the cognition of the obj ect

“horse . ”

Some psychologi sts attempt to find the origin of recogn ition in the feeling o f fam il iarity. Familiari ty, however, i s not a primary state out of which recognition develops , but on the contrary recognition i s the primarystate and famil iari ty is derivative only. Familiari ty iss imply the feeling of vague , marginal , or subconsciousrecognition . O f course , i f by the term famil i ari ty i smeant not that psychic state observed in the adu lt consciousness , both abnormal and normal , but that primarystate of recognition out of which more definite recogn ition develops

,then it may be admitted that familia rity

i s the germ of recognition , but then it i s only the givingof a spec ial term “ famil iari ty ” to an elementary fo rm of


recognition . The definite form of recognition develops out of the indefinite form of recognition , recogni

ti on mu st be a primary element. Recognition theni s an i rredu c ible mode of psychic a ctivity characteristico f representative mental l i fe .Some psychologists regard famil iarity as a pure ‘feel

ing of at homeness’or as Fou i llée puts it in the decrease

of the inward shock of surprise . This is however to

put the cart before the horse . It is not the feelingof famil iarity that gives rise to recognition , but it isvague , indistinct, marginal, or subconsc ious recognitionthat gives rise to the feeling of familiarity . When aperson , a scene , an event, or situation is famil iar,the psychic state is one of having gone through thesame experience be fore . We cannot local ize its date inour scheme of time on which we proj ect our past experiences . We have experienced the same before , but weask ourselves , —where and when have we seen that person , the scene or the si tuation before ? O ften we succeedin form ing a complete association with the past, we 10calize the given famil iar experience , and then completerecognition ensues . Familiarity is incomplete, vague,

indefinite recognition .

The pecul iar experience of a present novel s i tuationas having experienced or lived through the same beforehas been mysti cally referred to a previous existence , thetheory of Platonic reminiscence . The explanation , however, o f this phenomenon is quite s imple , inasmuchthat it can be shown that in su ch cases somesimilar experience had been gone through before . Thesubject cannot close the c i rcuit, so to say, and effect aconnection with his previous l i fe experiences , he cannotassociate fully the present experience with his form


ri ed out on subj ects in subconsciou s states , hypnotic ,posthypnotic, hypnoidal, and others .When an experience enters into a number of systems ,or as James would put i t into a number of “settings ,

”

then the special character of the “sett ing ” becomes confused or even obl iterated . The experience present callsforth so many di fferent systems or “settings ” that therecognition element lapses and reverts to the psychicstate characteristic of the lower forms of moment consciousness , passing through the more elementary formso f recognition to cognition . When the recognitive moment reproduces itself so that it becomes habitu al andautomati c, i t falls in the scale of psychic li fe and revertsto the type of a. lower moment .A psychic state which recu rs under a great number

of conditions and c ircumstances loses all special andlocal psychic color, so to say, and hence becomes degraded in the type of its mental activity. All

ordinary experiences which have been recognizedover and over again , all sorts and conditions ofmental li fe , under di ff erent and Opposite tendencies , feelings and emotions , under various sett ings and confl i ctingsystems cease to be surrounded by a nimbus of pastnessand become cognitive in character . When too often repeated the experience becomes so much worn by use, i fwe may use such an expression , that it can no longer bereproduced voluntari ly in consc iousness . Thus a strangeface seen a few times or only once can be clearly represented, but the faces of familiar people with whom weare in constant intercourse can no longer be clearly te

produced and represented . Such a reproduction can onlybe brought about by a perceptual state , or by varioussubconscious states, such as dreams, hypnosis, or hyp

R epresentation and R ecognition 37 1

noidal state . In such cases there i s present a feel ing offam il iarity due to the series of recognitions and cogn i

tions . Famil iarity here is lapsed recognition .

James brings i t out clearly : “ I f a phenomenon is metwith , however, too often , and with too great a varietyof contexts , although its image is reta ined and reproduced with correspondingly great facil i ty, i t fa i ls tocome up with any one particular setting and the projection of i t backwards to a parti cu la r past date con se

quently does not come about. We recognize but do notremember it— i ts assoc i ates form too confused a cloud .

”

In other words , recognition does not reach its full development. There is recognition of the phenomenonas such , but not as having had the experience in thepast . The halo of pastness is gone . James quotesSpencer “To ask a man whether he remembers that thesun shines , that fire burns , that i ron is hard , would be amisuse of language . Even the almost fortuitous connections among ou r experiences cease to be classed asmemories , when they have become thoroughly famil iar.Though on hearing the voice o f some unseen personslightly known to us , we say we recollect to whom thevoice belongs , we do not use the same express ion re

specting the voices of those with whom we l ive . Themeanings o f words which in childhood have to be consciou sly recalled seem in adult l i fe to be immediatelypresent.

“James then goes on saying These are thecases where too many paths , leading to too diverse assoc i ates , block each other

’s way, and a ll that the mindgets along with its obj ect is a fringe of felt familia ri tyor sense that there are associates . A similar resu lt comesabout when a definite setting is only nascently aroused .


We then feel that we have seen the object already, butwhen or where we cannot say, though we may seem toourselves to be on the brink of saying it . That nascentcerebral excitation can aff ect consciousness with a sorto f sense of the imminence of that which stronger exc itations would make us definitely feel, i s obvious fromwhat happens when we seek to remember a name . Ittingles , i t trembles on the verge , but does not come .

Just such a tingl ing and trembling of unrecovered assoc iates i s the penumbra of recognition that may surroundany experience and make it seem familiar, though weknow not why .

” In other words , imperfect, di ffusedrecognition with no special system , or setting to come inl ive contact with and be local i zed in a mental series o fan individual moment consciousness fa ils to give thatmental synthesis which is the essenti al characteristic ofthe fully developed momentconsc iousness . Recognitionof an experience l ived through in the past is the basis ofwhat is known as the sense of familiari ty .

Perhaps we may refer to the Bergsonian view of recogn ition , namely that recognition is interrelated withand based on spec i al motor adaptations . “Every perception ” says Bergson “has its organized motor accom

pan iment, the ordinary feeling of recognition has itsroots in the consc iou sness of this organization .

” Whileit i s true that recognition deals with the use of obj ectsand with special adaptations to the external environment, as far as such recognition is expressed in motoradjustments , it can hardly be sa id that this view holdsltrue of recognition in general . In the process of recogn ition i t i s not the motor accompaniment, it is thefeeling of sameness of experience , the feeling of pastness with its loca l ization in a series of “settings ” or o f


memory, or recognition and remember of my think ingabout i t the night before and disagreeing with i t, themotor element can only enter by a great stra in of imagination . If there are any motor elements they hardlyplay any s ignificant part in the process o f memory andrecognition . We must deny emphatically the sign ifi

cance and importance of the motor element in recogni

tion . The essential element in recognition is not themotor, but the psychic elements .Bergson himsel f is driven to take this aspect of recog

n ition when he develops his theory of pure memory withno action in contradistinction to the memory which inserts i tsel f edgewise into the flux of sensori -motor adaptations . Bergson not without some contradictionstrongly contrasts the tru e pu re memory with thememory image sharply inserted into the plane of action .

I f we grant Bergson that such pure unadu lterated memories are present, memories free from all motor reactions , then we must necessarily agree to the fa ct thatremembrance , recollection , and hence recognition canexist without any motor accompaniments . In otherwords , recognition cannot be resolved into action , intomotor accompaniments , into behavior and reactions .Recognition is a psychic quale s ui generis .

Each set o f particular representative elements carriesalong, as James te rms it , its spec ial “setting” oras I describe it “system .

” It is thi s special setting that helps the process o f recognition in havingthe parti cu lar experience projected in the past, in havingit oriented among many other systems of associ ationsand having it locali zed in its parti cu lar past. Recogn i

tion then arises when the present experience calls forthits special system , or setting in a series of mental events .The present experience must close with the past experi

R epresentation and R ecognition 37 5

ence and form a ci rcu i t. At the same time the experience must not be short - ci rcuited , because in such a casewe have a state o f dissociation . The present experiencemust form a ci rcu i t with its system or setting and withthe personali ty as a whole . Recognition thus requires aspecia l setting in the complex web and woof of thepresent total moment consc iousness constituting the individuality of the subject .In the higher forms o f mental l i fe where self- con

sciousness is developed, the experience forms a live cir

cuit,s o to say, with the whole personality . The higher

states o f recognition appear in the form of the “I ” consciou sness .

“ It i s I who experienced all that in my past.It is I who remembers that this b i t o f experience hastaken place in ‘my’experience some time ago .

” Thereis the my present self thinking of the experience as lived

through by my pas t s elf.In the lower forms o f recognition where the

sel f is not present, a s in the higher verteb rates andposs ibly in infants , there exi sts the present cogni

tion of the experience and the te- cognition of itin the shape of a vague memory that it had been experienced be fore . The present experience o f an already ex

perienced event floats in a cloud of pastness . It is thispsychic state o f pastness in a present experience thatmakes i t felt to the subject who experiences it— as recu rrent and recognitive . O f cou rse , not every recu rrentexperi ence , even of the higher types o f moments isrecogn i tive , as there are psychopathic recu rrent stateswhich , l ike the lower forms o f momentconsciousness,recur and reproduce themselves with no element of reoognition present. We can

,however

,fully as sert that

every recognitive experience is recurrent. Recognitionrequires former or past experience.

CHAPTER XXI

THE RECOGNITIVE MOMENT AND ITS REPRODUCTION

ECOGNITION is one of the essential attributes of representative l i fe . The faintes tand most obscure representation requires thepres ence of recognition in the background .

We may say that without recognition representation becomes an impossib il i ty. Recognition is the function ofrepresentative elements. Just as cognition is the function of sensory , presentative elements so recognition , orsecondary cognition i s the function of representative elements . Now that moment consciou sness which has representative elements among the constituents o f its contentmay be termed recognitive momentconsciousness .

The recognitive moment is of a higher type than thesynthetic moment. Like the synthetic moment, material or psychi c content of the recognitive moment is ass imilated in a synthetized form ; l ike the synthetic moment, i t goes on reproducing not on the desultory, buton the accumulative type ; and moreover, i t approachesmore the compound , accumulative type . Unl ike the synthetic moment, the recognitive moment is possessed ofrepresentative elements having recognition as the i rfunct ion . Representative elements with their functiono f recognition , present in the recognitive moment, butabsent in the other lower moments , make a fundamentaldiflerence in the nature o f reproduction .

The reproduction of the recognitive moment is totally difierent in character from that of the desultory

376


may fu rther represent to mysel f the fact of representation itsel f which in its turn may be once more represented , and so on . The content of the recognitive momentin this mode of reproduction , becomes more and moremodified, more and more di ff erent as it proceeds alongthis l ine , becomes further and further removed from theoriginal experienced moment with its sensory elements .In the more prevalent forms of the recognitive mo

ment the process of reproduct ion does not proceed inthis way ; reproduction keeps nearer to the lower types ,to the content of the types of the synthetic moments , or,in other words , it keeps nearer to sense - experience . Therepresentation has a direct re ference to the object aspresented in sense - experience , and in its reproductionthis direct reference is more or less preserved throughout.The recognitive moment is every time reproduced inrepresentation , and although having di ff erent representative elements with each success ive reprodu ction , it sti llre fers to the same object as presented . The modifications that occur in the moment take place only in therepresentative elements . Adaptations , instead o f taking place by means o f changes in the sensory elementsdue to success ive modification e ff ected by the direct influence of stimul i from external envi ronment, are nowfreed from the direct in fluence of external conditions ,and may be effected within the representative elementsof the moment itsel f, withou t having recou rse to themodi fying influence of stimul i .We have already shown that the characteristi c traito f representative elements is their freedom from thebondage in accumulations or compounds in which sensory elements are kept ; representative elements can be

Recognitive Moment and Its R eproduction 379

eas i ly transposed , they can enter into new free a ssociations wi thout requiring special external stimuli to breakthe stable compound . The free associations o f representative elements may be dissolved by other representations . The stick lying near by may be kicked away bymy foot, but may also be represented as a support ; i tmay be imaged as a means of de fense and attack, andfinally the representation may be changed in another direction , the stick may be used as an instrument forbringing down apples from a tree . Adaptation iseffected within the process o f representation before anychanges are introduced into actu al , presentative li fe .From a teleologica l standpoint

'

one can realize thegreat gain in the economy o f l i fe reactions by a modeo f reproduction independent of and free from the di rectinfluence o f external stimu l i with their consequent sensory responses and motor reactions , resulting in furtherand further modifi cations o f the original moment . Therecognitive moment in its growth and development by aseries o f internal representative modifications spares itsel f i ll adapted sensory responses and motor reacti ons .This is an immense ga in to li fe , a great a id and powerful weapon in the struggle for existence .Regarded from this standpoint of modification the

momentconsciousness may be sa id to pass through impo rtant stages in the course of i ts development . The

s tage of non - modifiability of content, then the s tage ofmodifiability of the sensorimotor content

,and finally

modifiability in representation . The special importanceo f the recognitive moment for the bein g possess ing it i sthe greater freedom from the dominion o f the externalenvironment. External conditions are not so l i terally,so slavishly reflected in the moment. Changes may oc


cur in sensori -motor reactions and adaptations due torepresentations alone , without any previous materialchanges in the external conditions. The recognitivemoment carries i ts external world in itself, in its represcu tation , and by a ffecting changes there , may bringabout changes in the environment, thu s controll ingexternal conditions , instead of be ing controlled by them .

Instead of being driven by external forces into blindobedience , into unintelligent adaptations , the moment ison the point, even in its lowest forms , to acqu i re someintell igent character in seeing ahead, by l iving over itsformer experiences in the states of representation, thesensori -motor reactions being accordingly modified.

The reproduction of the recognitive moment is notinduced by external stimuli only, but mainly by thecourse of other representations . Without actua lly beingconfronted with the object the representation of it mayany time arise in the m ind and call forth new adaptations to the external environment.The representation by which the recognitive momenteffects i ts reproduction is not at all a mode of reinstatement, partial or complete , a mode characteristi c of thelower types of moments . What the moment reproducesi s altogether di fferent in nature and content from whathas been experienced, or directly presented . What ispresented is sensory material , what is reproduced is imagery, ideal

“stu ff . Imagery, ideal stu ff as it is , i t sti llm i rrors, substi tutes , represents the material ” certa intyof sensory experience .From the very natu re o f the moment and mode of

its reprodu ction the original emotional tone of theexperience is not reproduced by the recognitive moment. The emotional tone l ike the rest o f the


In the child we find that the time local i zationis quite indefinite . In very young children the future and the past such as yesterday and to -morrowhave no definite meaning. Thus in children of threeyears that have come un der my observation the appre

hension of the past and future , such as yesterday andto- morrow is still wanting. When the child is told thatsomething took place , he referred it to a

“yesterday” indefinitely locali zed in the past. The day before, a weekago, a month ago , years past a re equa lly proj ected intothe vague past. The same holds true of the child- senseof the future . “When is to -morrow is a question Ihave been often asked by intelligent children of three ,four and even five years old. The child recogni zes hisold friend a fter a departure of several months , but helocal i zes this event far off in time, say

“yesterday. ”

The reference to the past becomes more and moredefinitely local i zed in time , the higher the recognitivemoment rises in the scale of evolution . This process ofloca li zation of the recognized event in the past dependsentirely on the time - sense becom ing fu lly definite withthe more or less greater perfection of the conceptualtime scheme . Thus savages and the ignorant classesof even c ivi l ized soc ieties have an imperfect formof time local ization . The defin iteness of local i zation , however, is not of material consequence as far asour point of view is concerned . For all we knowUlysses’dog, the ape and the infant have no time - localization at all , what i s enough to state from our psychological standpo int is the fact that recognition involvessome form of pastness belonging to the impl i cated representative element, a pastness which in a higher stagebecomes time - local i zation .

Recognitive Moment and Its Reproduction 3 83

Under the in fluence of toxi c matter, of narcoti cs , andin some forms of mental diseases , this time - sense mayswell, thus giving ri se to the proj ection of experi ence ona larger scale of obj ective time . Such states are to befound under the influence of opium or cannabis , alsoin some mental diseases when the patient cla ims that heis many centuries old . This function of recognitionwith i ts aspect of pastness i s certa inly present in thepassing recognitive momen t. The process becomes morecompl icated and also more objectified in the highertypes of momentconsc iousness . In short, the recogn itive momentconsciousness in addition to its reproduc

tion involves some form of awareness o f i ts being a teproduction by its re ference to a past experience . Be

ing freed from its bondage to the present circumstances ,l iving in the by - gone past the recogni tive moment getsa gl impse of the not yet born future into which the freerepresentative elements a re proj ected.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SYNTHETIC RECOGNITIVE MOMENT

HE recognitive moment in its reproductionsmay be arranged in a series . The first linkin the series is the sensory elements or compound . Let this be expressed by A where A

i s the senso ry experi ence , and let a be the representationof the first reproduction , the next reproduction may berep resented by a: and the succeeding seri es by an, as , w,

as , as, Each one of the series refers directly tostate A with its external obj ect . Each of them recogn izes in the reproduced representation the represented,formerly perceived obj ect of the primary state A . Eachlink in the series makes easier the occu rrence of the succeeding one . The series forms a progresswn m whichthe l ink further removed from the beginning di ffers to acerta in degree from the ones that preceded it. Thisprogress ive di fference is due to the continuous progresss ive modifications eff ected in each success ive l ink by theoccurrence or reproduction of the preceding l inks . Theprocess is one and continuous , and with the progress ofthe series o f reproductions each following l ink becomesmodified, emerges with greater ease , while the recognition i s effected without any diffi culty. Each previousrecognition makes the next one easier.In the character of its modification the lower form of

the recognitive moment does not di ffer from the moment of the synthetic type o f consciousness . Like thesynthetic moment, the modifications are not e ff ected con

3 84


In other words the representative states in the seriesof reproduction all refer to the original experience AA

and each preceding state modifies the succeeding one ,but the succeeding state does not include consciously theprevious reproduction and recognition . The partial intersecting of the circles indicates that the success ivestates do not include their predecessors , but are only influenced and modified by them . The state , however,gets enlarged the further s i tuated it i s in the progress ion of the series. Each state inherits only the modifications accumulated by the preceding ones , but it doesnot inherit the cognition or recognition of the stateitsel f.In . this respect the series of states going to make up

the recognitive moment di ff ers from that of synthetictype . The synthetic moment reproduces by re instatement with modifications accumulated in the course ofthe process of reproductions . The recognitive momenton the contrary does not reproduce by reinstatement ofpresentation , but by representation . The precedingstate need not be actually repeated, and i f such a reference i s present it is represented.

Representation is effected by di ff erent psychic elements . ‘ The same or like elements need not be reproduced in the moment of the recognitive type . In therecognitive moment of the stage considered by us sucha reinstatement is altogether absent . The states following each other are di ff erent. Moreover they are isolated,disconnected in the series . The l inks in the series referto the same obj ect as presented, but they do not re fer toeach other in the order of thei r progression , state a

’

does not refer to the state a1 that p receded i t, nor doesa'

refer to a’

, nor a‘

to a'

, and so on . The series of

The Synthetic R ecognitive Moment 3 87

states of the recognitive moment in the stage under consideration do , however, eff ect modifications in the orderof thei r su ccess ion , a

1 modifies a’

, a’modifies a

'

, a' modi

fies a‘

, and so on each preceding state modi fying thesu cceeding one .The dog on seeing a person for the secondor thi rd time may recognize the fri end o f his master, but he does not remember that he has recog~

n ized him already on previous occasions . S imilarlywhen the baby sees a strange person for the first time , i tmay become scared and begin to cry. Subsequent repetition of similar experiences may reduce or on the contrary may increase the fear element, but the baby learnsto know and recognize his man and the psycho - physiological and psycho -motor reactions follow as soon as the“man ” i s caught sight of. Reproduction and recogn i

tion become easier, but it i s questionable whether thebaby. l ike the intell igent dog, in recognizing the person ,i s aware o f having recogni zed the person on previou soccasions . The dog and the child are aware of the person and recognize him , but they are not aware of theseries o f preceding recognitions . A form o f momentconsciou sness with a series o f i solated reproductions andrecognitions , but with accumulated modifications maybe termed the synthetic accumulative recognitive mo

ment.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SYNTHETIC MOMENT OF SELF - CONSCIOUSNESS

N the higher stages of the recognitive momentthe states in the series are no longer isolated . Eachsu cceeding state embraces or truer to say includesand represents the preceding one . The whole ser

ies is essentially an interconnected one . The states inthe series not only re fer to the original experience of theobject as presented, but also to each other in the ordero f thei r su ccession . Let A be the original experience ofwhich A i s presentative and a is representative , then thestate of the recognitive moment may be represented byaA

. State a re fers to aA , and the su cceeding state a1

re

fers not only to a“, but also to a . The same holds true inthe case of the other states ,— a

’refers to aA and a

1 andnot only to ai alone but also to a ; a

' refers once more tonA and also to a

’

, a‘

, a, and so on ; each su cceeding statere fers to the original experience and also to the preceding states o f recognition . In other words , each state represents not only the original sensory experi ence , but alsosome though not all of the preceding series o f representations . There is

,in short

,awareness in the act of rec

agnition . The preceding state modifies the su cceedingone , and this latter is fully aware of the former. Thisawareness is present during the very occurrence of eachstate in the se ries .The reproduced state in its recognition recog

3 88


All along our analys is of reproduction we have at thesame time by impl ication discussed the various types andforms of what may be conveniently termed as germinalmemory in the states of consciousness o f the lower animals. Memory, however, is not present in the lowertypes of momentconsciousness . Memory really beginswith the recognitive moment and reaches its full perfection in the adult human consciousness , - in the syntheticmoment o f sel f- consciousness . It is only in the momentof sel f- consciousness that all the characteristi cs of memory are to be formed , namely, reproduction ; not reinstatement, but reproduction a fter the kind of the recogn itive moment, recognition , definite local i zation in thepast and finally awareness o f its own activity, or rathersel f- awareness . Memory germ inates and grows in therecognitive moment, and blossoms in the personal i tymoment.

APPENDIX I

CONSC IOUSNESS

In opposition to the metaphys ical view that there exists one consciou sness and a separate content, James mhis article “

Does Consc iou sness ex ist ? ” flatly denies theexi stence o f su ch a consc i ousness . He lays stress on thefact that such a consc iou sness is of a pu rely hypotheticaland speculative character . Psychologically speaking allthere ex i sts i s thought , experi ence , while an abstra ct undi ff erentiated consc iou sness may as well be omittedfrom the scheme of things . All we deal w i th is men talfacts . James ridicu l es the pos iti on o f those who regardconsci ou sness a s being independent o f content : “Toconsc iou sness as su ch nothing can happen , for timelessin itsel f, i t i s only a w i tness o f happenings m time, inwhich it plays no part

”

.

“Consc iou sness assu ch 13 entirely impersonal self’ and its activities belong to the content ” . James’view is that lnstead of an impersonal consc iou sness we shou ld substi

tu te thought as a function of knowing ( James’s ital i cs ) .

“To deny plumply that‘consciou sness’ ex i sts seems so

absurd on the face o f it— for undeniably ‘thoughts’doexi st— that I fea r some readers w ill follow me no farther. Let me then immediately expla in that I mean onlyto deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insistmost emphatically that it does stand for a function .

That function is knowing”

( James ital ics ) .

We can thu s fa r agree w i th James . When howeverhe begins to specu late on unitary stu ff and pu re s impleexperience which is both obj ective and sub j ective wemu st part company, for he leaves the domain of psychology and enters the domain of metaphysics .

“Mythesis

gyi s’ he writes “that, i f we start with the suppo

s ition that there is only one primal stu ff or material inthe world

,a stu ff of which everything is composed , and

39 I

392 Appendix I

i f we call that stu ff ‘

pure experience’ then knowing can

only be expla ined as a part icu lar sort of relation towardsone another into which portions of pure experience mayenter In this respect James approaches perilouslyclose to Wundtian Voluntarism which he does not favor.It practically means double barrelled experience whichon the one hand is obj ect ive while on the other it is subjective. As James pu ts it, the same experience is countedtwice over in one stream which is external and the otherwhich is internal .All obj ections u rged against Voluntarism may bebrought against this view which is really nothing butthe voluntarism of Wundt under a di ff erent garb . Weare not better o ff by the assumption of the same experience partic ipating in two di fferent streams . We do notunderstand the streams any better by assumiu di ff erences which really amount to the di ff erences o matterand mind , or of matter and consciou sness .James on the one hand is too metaphysical and on theother hand he wishes to eliminate the inactive , impassiveconsc iou sness o f the idealists and of the Neo - Kantians .He is metaphys ical in assuming a pure experience whichis both material and mental and which in its purity isneither mental nor material . His true psychologicalsense tells him that an inactive , pass ive consc iou sness isa useless , fu ti le assumption . James draws a sharp di ff erence between internal and external experience . “Wefind that there are some fires that will always burn sticksand always warm our bodies , and that there— are somewaters that will a lways put out fires Mentalfire is what won’t bu rn real sticks ; mental water is whatwon

’t

’

necessarily ( though of course it may ) put outeven a mental fire . Mental knives may be sharp,but theywon’t cut real wood In short , James himsel f strongly contrasts the two sets o f experiences . Thatis all that the psychologist requ i res . The rest o f thespecu lation , - the identification of the two streams inone unitary

,primitive stu ff - experience does not belong

to psychology as a science .

394 Appendix 1

fire that does not burn , the water that is really wetfrom the water which is not wet, the motion that obeysthe laws o f mechanics from the motion that does notobey Newton’s laws . In order to constitute water thechemist does not mix oxygen w ith his thought of hydrogen ; in order again to constitu te the idea of water thepsychologist does not requ i re tubes , retorts , so manyvolumes of gases o f oxygen and hydrogen . The chemist does not put his ideas into his chemical compoundsand the psychologist does not subject his mental statesto chemical tests . It is only in metaphysics that thefundamental di fference of mental states and phys ical objects can be expla ined away in one unitary experi ence .I may add that James himself realized the truth of my

contention , for in a private discu ss ion w i th me he ac

knowledged that the View taken by him was purelymetaphys ical , that for the psychologist consciou sness isas mu ch of a reality as matter, atoms , molecule , ether.election , in short, as some form of materi al substance i srequi si te for the physi cist.Recently some neo - real ists attempted to identi fy con

sciou sness with energy and espec i ally with that formof energy known as potential energy. Now we cannot possibly identi fy mental states and processes withphys ical forms of energy, whether kinetic or potential .Arthu r Gordon Webster in his Dynamics ” points out

ML2

Kinetic energy i s o f the dimensions the same asT2

those of work . Potential Energy is defined as work .

The C .G .S . unit of energy i s , therefore , the erg.

I f mental states or consc iou sness be potential energyof the hys icist, the neo - realist shou ld define it interms o f

Pphys ical work . How many ergs are there

in the ideas of virtue , goodness , and beauty ? Itis clear that i f we u se the term energy in thecase of mental states or processes , we can do it only ina figurative way. Energy in psychology cannot be usedin the same sense as the phys ic i st uses the term in the

Appendix I 395

case o f kineti c or potential energy. One cannot takethe mass o f the idea and mu ltiply it on the squ are of itslength . Su ch a procedu re is meaningless , i t i s thereforeidle to talk of consc iousness as potenti al energy. Energy i s used in mental l i fe as a figure of speech , as an illustration or substitute taken from physica l l i fe , but energy and consciou sness can not be identified . When wesay that an argument is clear, we do not mean that thereare no particles of du st in it, or that we can u se i t as amedium through which we can see obj ects distinctly ; orwhen we say of a stupid person that he is dense , we donot mean that he has a high spec ific gravity. Consciousness is not phys i cal energy .

It is , however, u i te poss ible that the potential energy

- consc iou sness oil the neo - reali st i s ne ither the potential energy of the phys ic i st nor the consc iou sness of thepsychologist . In this case we once more dea l with somegeneral metaphysical uni fying substratum akin to thepure experience ” of James or to the “unitary experi

ence ” o f Wundtian Voluntarism ; in other words , wedeal here again with metaphys ics and not with science .One cannot help agreeing with Calkins : O f late yearsvigorou s attempts have been made to ej ect the termconsc iousness from our vocabu lary, but, in my opinion,these efforts , though richly significant, are metaphysical ,not psychological , s ince all a re mainly concerned toovercome the du alisti c oppos ition of psychical to physical . For whether accu rate or inaccu rate , the attemptto balance the account o f thought and thing, that i s , todistingu ish psychical from phys ical , i s concerned withthe problem of ultimate reali ty, not w i th the explanation and description of observed facts , and is there foremetaphys ical , not sc i entific in character .

”

While on the one hand there i s danger that psychology, dealing w ith mind, experience , knowledge , is apt tofall into epi stemological and metaphysical pi tfalls , onthe other hand there i s grave danger on the side of hys iologists and biologists to identi fy psychic Factswith phys iologica l and b iological facts. Recently

396 Appendix: 1

students of animal l i fe have made violent effortsof merging psychology into biology. There i s nodoubt that motor reactions

,adjustments , adapta

tions , behavior must be taken into considerati onin the stu

dyof psychic facts , but motor manifesta

tions are 0 psychological s ignificance only in so faras they lead to an interpretation of the inner subj ectivefacts , facts of consc iousness . This knowledge can onlybe given through an introspective interpretation of thefacts of behavior .

We can fu lly reali ze the non - psychological attitudewhen we find writers l ike Watson who wish to cl iminate ideas or kindred mental states from psychology, orwho like McDougall define psychology as a science ofanimal behavior. The peristalti c movements of the intestines , the action of the heart, the lungs and the l iverbelong to animal activities and still they can hardly beincluded under psychic activities . McDougall think sthat “psychologists mu st cease to be content with thesteri le and narrow conception of thei r science as thescience of consciousness , and must boldy assert its cla imto be the positive science of the mind in all i ts aspectsand modes of functioning, or as I would prefer to say,the positive science of conduct or of behaviour. Buteven from McDougall

’s standpoint mere movements do

not constitute psychological material , they are psychological in so far as they are the indications of some inner subj ective experience , su ch as sensations , feel ings ,emotions

,strivings , conations . Now it is j ust these

phenomena that form the subj ect matter of psychology.

The psychologist regards behavior as the means for anintrospective comprehension of what that behavior mayindicate subj ectively.

Psychology,even from McDougall

’s standpoint, i s

a fter all the sc ience of the mind, the science of consciou sness which we can study through an introspectiveinterpretation of motor reactions or behavior. Knowing introspectively what fear is from our own introspection and from the observation of the motor reactions the

APPENDIX II

PHYSIOLOGICAL TRACES

My attention was called to a very valuable paperFurther Studies in the Chemical Dynamics of the Central Nervou s System , by T . Bra ilsford Robertson , published in the “Folio Neu ro - Biologica ” Band VI I , 19 13.

Robertson advances an extremely interesting hypothes isbased on his bio - chemical researches . Basing himselfon the fact that “the performance of mental work initially fac i l itates its fu rther performance and subse

quently depresses or fatigues it,” he bu ilds u a far

reaching chemico -

phys iological hypothes is of e mainphenomena of normal and abnormal mental li fe . Iquote freely from his paper as it is of importance andhighly stimulating to those who w i sh to go into the moretechnical sc ientific deta ils o f hys iological research inregard to the phenomena of

)

normal and abnorma lmental function .

“We meet therefore in the exerc ise of a given intellectual function w ith two apparently contradictory facts .Performance facilitates the exerci se of the function andit likewise depress es the exerc ise o f the function . Wenote fu rthermore that the faci l i tation and depressionbecome evident at di ff erent periods of time , the formerin the earlier and the latter in the later stages of performance. Now this phenomenon i s not at all l imitedto the functions of the central nervous system . It isdisplayed in a very striking way by a variety of otherfunctions

,for instance in the contraction of the muscles

in response to stimu lation , whether direct or indi rect .The phase of fac il itation is displayed initially in the wellknown ‘stai rcase phenomenon’ and the phase of depress ion by rigidity and inabi l ity to contract to stimu liin response to stimuli which formerly evoked a maximalresponse . Again , as I have shown in a series o f com

398

Appendix II 399

mun ications , a similar phenomenon is displayed in

growth which initially undergoes acceleration and therea fter slows down . Indeed acceleration and slowingmay alternate a number of times in the same organismproducing what I have termed ‘growth cycles .’ Thistype of phenomenon wou ld ap ear very generally displayed in the performance of

)

l i fe - activiti es,and in

deed I am inclined to think with Loeb that the sel fconserving character of the l i fe - process will ultimatelyfind its solution in the study of phenomena of this description .

”

Thi s principle of growth cycles i s significant, inasmuch as it falls i n l ine with the fundamental principleo f rese rve energy developed by James and myself fromdi ff erent standpoints .Robertson assumes the presence of phys iologica l

traces . “I f the central nervous system conditions thesephenomena at all , as we believe i t does , then the passageof a stimulus through the central nervous system mustlead through a changed condition which for the sake ofform ing a concrete image we may term in the languageemployed by Maudsley, the deposition of a trace or inthe terminology of Exner, the excavation o f a channel( Bahnung ) The dynamic conception oftrace formation regards i t as being due to a chemical

alteration of cell-material along the path of the trace.

’

We have seen that trace format ion is at first faci l itatedby the process which brings it abou t and later depressed .

At first a stimulus passes over the ‘trace’morereadily

,becau se it has previously done so , but at a later

stage i t passes over it less and less readil unti l finally theresistance is s o great as to almost‘ inhib i t its pass agealtogether. Recall ing this fact we find ourselves in a

‘po

s ition to crystalli ze our problem and state it in the ol

lowing terms : ‘What is the natu re of a chemical reaction which at first takes place the more readily in consequence of having previously taken place , but at a laterstage is inhib ited by i ts own progress When this uestion is addressed to a physical chemist he does not es i

400 Appendix II

tate in replying : ‘The reaction is either ca tenary ( cons i sts of two reactions the second of which uses up theproduct of the first ) or it is autocatalytic, i . e . one of theproducts of the reaction accelerates the reaction .

’No

other chemical reactions are known to the experience oftheehemis t which display at any s tage pos itive accelera

ti on .

The various experimental works carried out by Robertson lead him to the rej ection of catenary reactionsand to the assumption of autocatalysis . Basing himsel fon this hypothesis o f autocatalys is Robertson goes on toexpla in from a pu rely chemicho - physiological standpointthe phenomena of memory, of amnesia , of hypnosis andof all ied phenomena .

“Adopting the working hypothesi s outl ined above,

we perceive that the canalisation hypothesis of Exnercan now be expressed in a much more defin ite and concrete form . Each incoming stimu lus ca rves out for itsel f in the central nervou s system or deepens a pre - existing channel in the central nervous system , but thechannel is not a trough formed by the physical displacement of particles , i t is a chemical channel, a thread ortrace of the autocatalyst of central nervous activities, athread which need not necessarily be supposed to

,

bemore than a few times the diameter of ‘the sphere ofmolecular influence’ in width. This deposit necessarilyfollows fa i thfully the path pursued by the origina l impulse and permits succeeding impulses to pass over thesame path more readily by vi rtue of its presence . It ispossessed of course of a definite spatial location, but,and this is a very important po int, i f by any chance i tshould be obliterated or destroyed it is not irreplaceableeven i f the continu ity of the original path be forever interrupted. For it is only one of a conceivably enormousnumber of paths which might be traversed by a stimulusin its passage from one extremity of the origin al athto the other. Fu rthermore , the trace is capable 0 be

ing traversed by other subsequent or performed tracesin as many different ways as the axons and ganglion cells

402 Appendix II

s iological hypothesis instead of the facts themselvesfor which this hypothesis was constructed . When aphys iologist or biologist constructs a phys iological hypothes is as a correlative of consc iousness he 13 so carriedaway with it that he soon forgets the purpose of thehypothesi s and proceeds to deny the main facts . From apurely sc ientific standpoint we must postulate that eachand every act of experience, of consciousness has a phys iological correlative , apo int on which I have la id special stress . The reason ing of a Newton , Aristotle , andPlato as well a s the moral thoughts and feelings of prophets and sa ints have their physiological correlatives.This however would not mean that all those experiencesof genius , intellectual and moral, are unconscious cerebrations devoid of all consciou s awareness . Under suchconditions it is best to stick to the facts and regard thephysiological hypothesis as a pretty speculation whichmay do more harmthan good, inasmuch as it distractsthe a ttention from the facts at issue .What I claim is

‘

that a good deal , i f not the most ofwhat is described as subconscious , i s essentially of thesame inn er, subj ective experience of what we otherwisedescribe as consc iou s awareness , inasmuch as introspective experience , both direct and indirect, given by immediate experience and by memory , as well as by reactionsand behavior are the same as found in fu lly consciousstates . I f we deny awareness to subconscious mani festations , su ch as hypnosis and allied states , we should alsocall 1n question the awareness of all other s imilar states .It goes without saying as I have pointed that hypnosisand all ied states being phenomena of consc iousness musthave a phys iological correlative , but i t is still to beproven that m su ch states there 13 only a phys iologicalprocess without any consc iou s accompaniment. We mayas well cla im that the Iliad , Hamlet, the Princi 1a, theParthenon

,Venu s de M i lo and other creations ofgeniu s

are the result o f physiological processes . In a ce rta insense the cla im 18 true , there 13 a physiological

o

correla

tive to the highest fl ight of genius, but it i s man

Appendix II 403

ifestly absurd to omit the consc ious elements that go toconsti tute the very essense of what we regard as genius .Consciou s and subconsc iou s phenomena have alike phys iological correlatives and both of them are characterized by consciou sness , awareness , and feeling . The

subconscious is a consciousness,an other - consciousness

,

a consciousness other than the usual personal conscious

ness .

Robertson is fully aware not only of the crude at

tempts o f what he terms static phys iological theories ,but also o f the fallacy of denying consciou sness and insta ll ing in i ts place phys iological currents , traces , anddepos its . “It mu st be admitted ” he says ,

“that thesporadic a ttempts which have been made from time totime by biologists to advance interpretations o f the phys ical correlates o f psychic phenomena have seldom beeneither well judged or attended by any measu re of success . ” In another place he says ;

“The static conceptionas that developed by Munk and Z i ehen , re ards the‘trace’as some structu ral modification , some phys ical alteration , an alteration in other words in the distributiono f cell-matter in space . I have elsewhere dwelt ratherat len gth upon the more mani fest obj ections to thispoint of view , at least in the crude form in which it hashitherto been presented . It wou ld requi re each idea ,mental image and conception to be very stri ctly loca lized. Su ch a local i zation of ideas has , o f course , neverbeen demonstrated .

”

The “trace ” i s conceived by Robertson in dynamicterms . This dynami c “trace , the correlative o f memory

,consciou s and subconsciou s , i s more o r less per

manent,because “

the persi stence o f memories provesthat the ‘trace ,

’ whatever it may be is ra ther permanent and only very slowly fades away.

”

Robertson fu lly real i zes the importance of the subconscious for the consci ou s activity .

“The phenomena o fsubconsciou s memory reveal clearly that memories maypersi st from childhood to advanced maturity withou tintermediate sel f- consc ious recollection to reinforce the

404 Appendix II

trace . Occasional subconsc ious recol lection cannot ofcourse be ruled out, but it must be rare in many cases ,for otherw ise , as Sidi s has pointed out, our entire mental l i fe wou ld be occupied in recollecting.

”

In speaking o f the static physiological theories Robertson s ays : “

Sidi s proceeds to dispose of all thesetheories collectively on the ground that a mere modification le ft behind as a trace cannot possibly expla in ,memory, recollection , the fact of referring a parti cu larbit o f experience to an experience felt before .

”Robert

son fu lly sees the function of the physiological theoriesas correlatives o f consc ious states , not as substitutes . Herealizes fu lly that the function of a good physiologicaltheory of the physiological correlatives o f consciousstates is not the rul ing out of the subjective phenomenawhich a fter all form the real material o f investigation .

He assumes the presence of consciou sness as a datum towhich he wishes to find a physiological correlative .“Such critic i sm ” he goes on to say “ i s perfectly sound , i fthese theories are seriou sly advanced as ‘explanations

’

( rather as substitu tes as I wou ld say considering the hypothes is of the subconsc iou s advanced recently by somewriters on the subj ect ) of the subjective experience ofmemory . A subjective experience of recollection can nomore be identified with a physical modification of anerve element than the subjective experience of a givencolor can be identified with a particular wave length oflight . But I submit that regarding memory from anobjective standpoint as a pure ob

'

ective fact (modifica

tion o f the present as a resu lt of!previous reactions to

stimuli ) i t demands objective interpretation w i th precisely the same force as any other objective fact .

”

That memory has physiological correlatives we mustregard as one of the fundamental assumptions of psychology , both normal and abnormal What I protestagainst is the metaphys ical “Unconsc1ous

” which cla imsto take the place o f subjective facts . The Unconscious(with a capital U ) as formu lated by Ca rpenter, Z iehenand by other modern writers , under the bel i e f and pos

406 Appendix II

think the theory of neuron disaggregationwould rest ona sure chemico - physiological basi s .The theory of neu ron disaggregation may wellbe stated in Robertson’s theory of autocatalysiscorrelative with psychic phenomena . In fact, Robertson himsel f calls attention to - the fact that his theorydoes not fundamentally cl ash with m ine, the two mayin fact be in full accord .

“Abandonment of the postu

late o f neu ron di saggregation,”

( rather neuron retrac

ti on ) Robertson concludes his paper,“does not in the

least involve , however, rej ection of the really essentia lfeatures of S idis’hypo thesis of ‘moment consc iousness .’

My hypothesis does not traverse the hypothesis of S idis ,i t merely sup lements it and renders necessary a readjustment of t e phys iological equ ivalents of his terminology . From S1dis’point of View the fu ll wakin consciousness may be l ikened to a pyramid having f

gor its

base a greater or smaller number of ‘moments consciousness .’ From my point of view it may be likened to acomplicated text i le fabric bu i lt up out of the psychicalcorrelates of a greater or smaller number of interconnected traces . It is obvious that for the purpose ofpu rely psychological analysis the two hypotheses are almost completely interchangeable ; but for S idis

’ ‘moments consciousness’we m u st read not ‘neu rones ,

’ but‘traces

,

’ ‘channels ,’ or ‘depos its of autocatalyst.’

The critic ism passed on Robertson’s theory that it

fails to account for conservation of memory is unju stified. Robertson’s theory is fu lly adequate to expla inconservation of memories .

INDEX

Abnormal , 47 , 48moment, 283psychology , 1 19 , 122 , 203 ,230

type, 45 , 47 , 48Absence of controlling agency ,

294Absolute moment, 23

desu ltory moment,240

Acciden tal processes , 96variations , 96 , 98

Accumu lative moment, 248moment, s imple, 241

Acqu ired characters, 3 19 , 320

230,

change of , 26

men tal , 79 , 97 , 186mental , of moment, 287 ,

Adaptation , 88Aes theti c, 18Afi ect, 44Affection , 44Affective state, 134Agency , absence of controlling,

294Aggregate, momen t, 248 , 254,

threshold of , 304Amnes ia, 46, 284, 288 , 289 ,

290, 29 1, 325

posthypnotic, 305 , 306Amorphous l ife, 324

psychos is, 324An imal l i fe, 38Antechamber of consciousness ,

9m. 98

Aphas ia, 46Arc, reflex , 12

Aspect, soc ial , 27teleological , 90, 9 1 , 95

Ass imilation by moment, 272 ,

284Ass imilation , power of , 275 ,

Association , contigu ity of , 359 ,

36 1

contrast, 35 9 , 36 1immediate, 2 10, 2 12

indissoluble, 208mediate, 209by resemblance, 35 9 , 36 1by s imilarity , 363

Assumption , 16 , 69 , 70, 203 ,206

Attention , proces s of , 99Attributes , sensory , 160, 163Automatic, recogn itive moment,

3 70

Automatism, 186, 192 , 249 , 27 1,285

psychology , 190

Baldwin , 164, 166, 167, 168 ,169 , 172

Behavior, 119

hypothes is , 42Behaviorist, views of , 43Bergson , 1 19. 139 , 140, 141.

203 , 204, 372 , 373 , 374B iological activity , 301, 302 ,

303

process , 87 , 90, 9 1, 92 ,

95 , 96. 138

408 Index

B ios is , 39Brain currents , 190cu rrents , local ization of ,24

Bfichner, 5 7

Caban is , 5 7Cau sal necess ity , 85Causation ,

efficient, 88 , 92final, 88principle of efficient, 9 1pu rpose, 88

Cause, the, 101

Censor, 10 1Central elements , 134, 13 5

experience, 235 , 236Cerebration , uncon sciou s , 175 ,

184Chance, 100

thought, 99Chemo taxis , 130Co- con sciou s , the, 207Coefficien t, ideational , 165 , 170

memory , 166

of real ity , 166 , 168o f representation , 165sensory , 165 , 170

Coex isten t, 80, 1 10

Cogn ition ,immediate, 365

mediate, 365Complexes , mental suppressed,

Compound, perceptual , 15 1psychic, 133

synthetic moment, 241,

3375 341, 343

synthetic moment, accumulative, 34 1, 343

Conditional reflexes , 2 11stimulus , 2 11

Consc iousness , 13 , 15 , 19 , 20,

23 , 24, 30, 3 1, 32, 37 ,4 1, 42 , 5 9, 60, 62. 7 1,79 , 82 , 83 , 98. 106 , 107,

296

an techamber of , 97content of , 186desu ltory , 25 6 , 25 7, 322

323double, 290figu red, 15 2focu s of , 25 8 , 25 9 , 279 ,

moment, 2 14 , 229 , 232,233 , 234 , 235

passwe, 194selective, 96

Constellation of momen ts , 254,25 5

Conten t, 49 , 23 1mental, 49 , 194, 195 , 23 1

of the precept, 132psychic, 46

Conten t of conscience, 14, 15 ,186

Contigu ity of association , 359Continu ity , men tal, 287 , 293

principles of, 82 , 83 , 86 ,

96

Contrast, association of , 359 ,36 1

Controlling agency , absence of ,294

Corporeal individual , 37Criterion of perceptive tru th,

165

Cros s section of moment, 236Cumu lation , process of , 263

Curren ts , brain , 190

'

4 10 Index

Experience, immediate, 69, 70mediate, 70un itory ,

‘

5 7, 68 , 69External real ity , 26 , 130, 164,

166 , 17 1, 172 , 182 , 183External ity , 27

Facu lty hypothes is , 35 8Faith, realm of , 196

Fallacious percept, 14 1

Fallacy , 2 1 , 24, 35 . 190

psychological , 35 , 1 13 ,

345

psychologist’s, 229

Famil iarity , 367, 368 , 369 , 37 1,372

Family moment, 274Fatigue, 303Fechner, 59 , 298 , 300, 301

Figured con sciou snes s , 152Final ity , 83 , 88 , 89

principle of , 83Focu s of con sc iou sness, 25 8 , 259 ,

Food instincts , 3 10, 3 1 1

Forgetfu lnes s , 203Free assoc iation , 3 5 6 , 35 7

aggregate. 304 , 305Function of momen t

, 260, 265 ,

of percept, 128

of substitu tion , 162 , 163

periodicity of , 2 17 , 2 18

Functional diseases , 75 , 76psychos is , 154 , 163 , - 192 ,

304

Galton , 97Gap, mental, 293class ification of , 293

psychic, 287 , 288 , 290,

29 1, 292, 293

Generic recogn ition , 242 , 243 ,244

Gen ius , 99Geometry , 1 1, 14G rowth of moment, 260, 262,

263Guesses , method of , 280

Hab it, 2 14 , 3 12 , 3 19 , 345Hallucinations, 27, 141, 142 ,

15 6 , 15 8 , 164, 165 , 171

Hartley , 125 , 36 1

Herbert, 199 , 200

H igh type moment, 250, 25 1,252 , 25 3

Hobbs , 126

Hij ffding, 170, 205 , 207Hume

, 125Ii ypnogogk s 39Hypnoidal state, 99 , 2 12 , 279 ,

Hypnoidic state, 346Hypnoidization , 282HYDIIOSIS , 46 1

“84: 176 : I77 :

349'

Hypnotic individual ity , 189facu lty , 3 5 8

Hypothes is , 201, 202facu lty , 3 5 8material istic, 5 7psychological , 73psycho -

phys iological, 73spiritual istic, 5 1, 5 2transmiss ion , 59 , 6 1

Ideas , 44, 66 , 97, 1 14, 1 15 , 116,

pain fu l , 203pleasurable, 203

Index

Images. 43 , 122 , 123 , 125 , 135 ,

memory , 166object, 204subjective, 204substitu tion by , 162 , 163

Immediate as sociation , 2 10, 2 12

experience, 69Imperative concepts, 349impu lses , 295

Impu lses , imperative, 295uncontrollable, 349

Increase of sensation , 300, 302

Indissoluble association , 208Individual , 89 , 90corporeal, 37

Individual ity , psychic, 23 1Inhibition , 2 14 , 2 15 , 2 16, 2 19 ,

Ins istent ideas , 170In stinctive reaction , 268 , 269In stincts , 309 , 3 10

food, 3 10, 3 1 1

periodic, 2 17sex , 3 10, 3 1 1

social, 3 10, 3 1 1

Intellect, realms of , 196Inten s ity , 160, 16 1 , 162 , 163

of stimu lation , 297Intermediate l inks , 208 , 209 ,

2 10

men tal l inks , 2 12Internal real ity , 17 1

Introspect ion, 44, 192Investigation , methods of , 49Irradiation , 146 , 15 2, 15 3 , 304

James , W ill iam, 5 9 , 122, 15 2 ,200, 270, 374

Kinetic energy , 20

Kiilpe ; 120

Ladd, 5 2Lamark , 9 1Law of degeneration , 3 13 , 3 15

of disaggregation , 309 , 3 11,

3 12

of thresholds, 2 15Weber’s , 297 , 298

Life, 87amorphous , 324an imal, 38mental, 100, 101

moral, 3 12

personal, 3 10, 3 1 1, 3 12proces ses , 87

psychic, 24 , 230, 23 1

Likeness , relation of , 363Logic, 18 , 22Low types of moment, 250, 25 1,

Mach, 102Maimon , 187Man ia, 3 14Material nature, 19Material istic hypothes is , 5 7Matter, 20, 24, 5 7, 204Mechan ics , 15 , 20

Mechan ism, defin ition of , 90

Mediate association , 209experience, 70

Melancho l ia, 3 11, 3 14Meltzer, 223

3 74, 390

image, 166

Men tal activity , 79 , 97complexes, suppressed, 198,

I99 , 200: 203conten t, 194 , 19527 1. 287

4 12 Index

Men tal con tinu ity ,236 , 249 , 25 3degeneration , 286

disaggregation , 3 10, 3 13diseas es , 3 1 1 , 3 14en ergy , 2 1gap, 293l ife

, 100, 101

movemen t, 278process , 16 , 80, 87

pu rpose, 3 15selection , 162

state, 37synthes is , 5 3 , 54, 294syn thes is , principles of , 114sys tem, 162 , 2 13 , 2 14

Metaphy s ics , 15 , 22 , 23 , 29 , 30,

Method of b iology , 50of content, 46of function , 46

of gu esses , 280of psy chology , 50

Mill, J. S. , 120, 202

Mind: 241 3 3Modification of moment, 262 ,

Moleschott, 5 7Momen t absolu te, 239

absolu te desultory , 230,

240

aggregate, 25 4 , 25 5 , 25 7,2941 3049 305 9 307 3 3 11 9

3 14ass imilation by , 272 , 273 ,

284ass imilative power of , 275 ,

compound syn thetic, 24 1consciousness , 6 6 , 116,2 14 , 229 , 232 , 233 , 234,

Moment,cross section of , 236

cumu lative, 240, 387desu ltory , 239 , 243 , 323 ,

desultory of self - consciousness , 245

disaggregation , 295 , 308 ,dom inan t, 284family , 274forces , 25 9function of , 260 , 327, 328 ,

339

gener1c, recogn 1t1ve, 243 ,244

low forms of , 25 7 , 25 8

percept, 260 , 277

perceptual, 237 , 260, 273

pu rpose of, 260

recogn itive, 241 243

recogn itive of self - consciou sness , 345

recu rrent, 324reflex , 239 , 240, 3 17 , 32 1,

322

representative, 38 1, 386reprodu ctive, 264, 265 ,

self- con sciousness , 388 , 389 ,390

sens itivity of , 266

s imple, accumu lative, 241s ingle, syn thetic, 337, 338specific, recogn itive, 242 ,

stage, 260, 277structu re of , 237synthetic, 240, 241, 326

327 , 329 , 330, 33 1, 332 ,

4 14 Index

Precept, social, 26Presentations , 35 1, 3 56Presentative elemen ts , 3 52 , 35 3Primary elements of objective

state, 137Principle of continu ity , 83 , 86

of efficient causation, 9 192

of final ity , 83of fin iteness , 83of necess ity , 85 , 86of reserve energy , 2 19

Processes , accidental, 96accumu lative, 263b iological , 87, 9 1mental , 16 , 80, 87

psy chic, 26, 84, 85 , 87.107

psychological, 96Psychasthen ia, 223 , 226Psychic compound, 133

content, 49 , 23 1epilepsy , 2 18 , 292gap, 287 , 290, 29 1

modification , 265object, 29 , 30phenomena, 26pos tu late, 106process , 24, 25 , 26, 76 ,82 , 83 , 84, 85 . 87. 105 .112 , 135

series , 78state, 3 1

Psychiatry , 74Psycho- b iological element, 3 19Psychological fallacy , 35 , 171,

172

hypothes is , 73laws , 16methods , 50

processes , 26

Psychology , 13 , 14 , 16, 17, 18 ,19 , 20. 2 1. 30. 3 1. 32 ,

Psychology , 36 , 3 7 , 39 , 40, 5 1.5 7, 6 1, 69 , 7 1, 72 , 8 1,86 , 92 , 106 , 107 , 1 10,

111, 1 12 , 1 17abnormal, 1 19 , 122 , 203 ,230

automatism, 190

sources of , 40Psychopathic, diseas es , 84 , 2 12

distu rbance, 296maladies , 3 11state, 3 50

Psychopathology , 75 , 175 , 220

Psycho-

phys ical relation , 109Psycho -

phys iological hypothes is ,73

relation , 109Psychos is , 24, 39 , 78 , 324

functional, 163Pu rpose, 38 , 90 , 9 1, 95 , 99 ,

100: 135 , 3 15Pu rpos ive life, 38

Reaction , 3 7, 128 , 130, 136,

347Real ity , 23 , 33

external, 130, 164, 166,17 1, 172 , 174 , 182 , 183

Recogn ition , 182 , 183 , 242 , 244 ,

389Recogn itive, element, 182

momen t, 24 1, 324, 370,

momen t, threshold, 246

Index

Recu rren t momen t, 324Reductive, the, 2 17Reflex arc, 12

momen t, 239 , 3 17 , 32 1

Reflexes , 25 5 , 2 56 , 25 7un conditional, 2 1 1

Rein statemen t, 343 , 344, 345 ,

390

Relation , psycho-

phys ical , 109psycho-

phys iological, 109type of

,1 1 , 12 , 13

Represen tation , 160 , 165 , 35 1,

law of, 3 5 9

Reprodu ction , 239, 240, 24 1,

Reproduct ive moment, 264.Reserve energy , 2 19 , 22 1, 225 ,

226

principles of , 2 19Ribot, 182 , 288

Rise of threshold, 2 13 , 2 15 , 22 1,

Rou tine of experience, 104

Savadsky , 2 1 1

Science, 1 1 , 13 , I6, 2 1Secondary consciou sness , 18 1

Selection , principle of , 285Selective con sciou sness , 96Self, 175

Self - con sciou sness , 175 , 176,

Self- cosm ic, 197Self- preservation , 3 15

4 15

Sensation , 20, 138 , 140, 147,

cen trally excited, 12 1motor character of , 14 1

threshold of , 298 , 299 ,

301, 302

un it of , 299 , 301Sense of real ity , 173 , 174

of perceptual tru th, 165Sen s itivity , condition of , 2 13Sensory coeffi cient, 165 , 170

Sensory elemen ts , primary , 137elemen ts , secondary , 137,

Sequence, causal, 105invariable, 10 1, 1 10necessary , 105 , 1 10

Series , phys ical, 78 , 87psychic, 78

Setting, 370, 374, 375S ignal of reality , 135Sim ilarity , 36 1 , 362 , 363

association of , 363S imple synthetic moment, 337Sleep, 83 , 84, 99 , 108

Sociality , 172

Somnambulism, 287, 290, 29 1

Soul , 5 2hypothes is , 5 5 , 56, 5 7

Soul—consciou snes s , 194, 195Sou rces of psychology , 40Specific, recognitive moment,

243

Spencer, 122

Spinoza, 122

Spinoz istic doctr ine, 64Spontaneous variation , 95 , 243Stage, momen t, 260, 277States , pathological , 346

psychic, 3 1psychopathic, 3 50

Stimu lation , 308 , 309

4 16

Stimu lu s threshold, 2 14, 298 ‘

Structure of moment, 237Subconsciousness , 84, 175 , 184,

205 , 206, 207 , 208 , 2 12 ,

350

Subject, the, 23 1, 235Suggestion , hypnotic, 176

pos t- hypnotic, 176St , 120

Suppress ion , theory of , 203Synaes thes ia, 15 2

Synthes is , 92 , 1 16, 1 17, 133 ,

263 , 275mental , 17, 5 3 , 1 13

Synthetic momen t, 240, 326,

moment compound, 337,

34 1, 343momen t of selfconsciousness , 245

Syn thetic;3type of consciousness,

3 1

Synthetic uni ty , 1 16, 230

System,mental , 163 , 2 13 , 2 14

Taine, 120

Teleology , 92 , 93 , 95Theory of suppress ion , 203Things , 27Thoughts , 34,Threshold, 54, 2 13 , 2 15 , 22 1,

223aggregate, 304fatigue, 303momen t, 2 16, 297of sensation , 298 , 299 ,

301, 302 Z iehen ,176

Threshold, rise of , 2 13 , 2 15 , 22 1,

stimulus , 2 14 , 298 , 304theory of , 175

T ime, objective, 244Tran smiss ion hypothes is, 5 9 , 6 1Tropism , 130, 187Type, abnormal

, 45 , 47, 48moment, 25 3relation , 1 1 , 12 , 13syn thetic, 38 1

Unconditional reflexes , 2 1 1stimu lu s , 2 1 1

Unconsciou s , the, 185 , 198 , 199 ,202 , 205 , 207 , 2 12

phonation , 15 5 , 15 6, 15 7,15 8

Un iformity , 1 10, 1 1 1Un it of sensation , 299 , 301Un itary experience, 5 7Un ity , synthetic, 1 16

Variation , 3 19 , 337accidental, 96 , 98spon taneou s , 95 , 96

V iews of behaviorist, 43V ividness , 160, 161, 162, 163V ivisection ,

Vol ition , 83 , 230

Voluntarism, 67Voluntaris tic school, 64

VVanon , 42 , 43 , 44Weber, 298

Weber- Fechner law , 300

W illers , 28World of appreciation , 196

description ,196

Wundt, 209

...PREFACE In this volume I made an attempt to formulate the fundamental assumptions and main...

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