LCDR Hui Lee LCDR Ashwin Anupdev 03 Nov 2011

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE NETWORK IN SOUTH AMERICA

Background Network Model Network Formulation Analysis Conclusion

AGENDA

BACKGROUND

Dec 2004 – Indian Ocean, Tsunami from a 9.1 mag earthquake, over 283,000 death.

Oct 2005 – Pakistan, 7.6 mag earthquake, over 87,000 death.

Jan 2010 – Haiti, 7.0 mag earthquake, over 316,000 death.

Mar 2011 – Japan, Tsunami from a 9.0 mag earthquake, over 5,000 death

BACKGROUND

Global reach and provide an immediate response to distressed populations wherever and whenever.

Provide rapid, effective, low-cost and sustainable services.

Build key capacity in partner nations to promote national security and stability in the theater.

US DEPT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

An earthquake of magnitude 8.0 – Honduras.

USSOUTHCOM – tasked to provide humanitarian relief.

Network operation – deliver water, power generator, communication and medical support.

Purpose - analyze the cost savings and the benefits of network.

SCENARIO - HONDURAS

Nodes :• Fleet Industrial Supply Centers• Naval Air Stations• US Naval and Coast Guard ships• Fixed Air wings• Defense Logistic Agencies• NPS HFN team (Hastly Formed Network –

Nemesis Network Warfare Van, deployable wireless communications)

NETWORK MODEL

Intermediate node –FISC San Diego, NAS Forth Worth, Ships.

End node - USSOUTHCOM – all activities report back for completion.

Edges – (Transfer Cost, 0, Capacity)

Limiting factors – capacity availability and cost of modes

Ships Planes Trucks

NETWORK MODEL

NETWORK

Supply

Intermediate

Demand

NETWORK

FORMULATION

Primal Problem – LP – to find the min- cost multi commodity flow

Dual Problem – MIP – to find the best interdiction plan (arc or node)

To find the min-cost flow with the current interdiction plan

FORMULATION

Objective Function

Constraints◦ BALANCE OF FLOW◦ CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS◦ FIXING Y

PRIMAL PROBLEM - LP

ANALYSIS

Arcs – eliminate an arc completely by putting maximum delay.

Nodes – eliminate node completely by putting maximum delay in arc between fake start and end nodes.

ATTACKS

ATTACKING NODES

MIN-COST FLOW

OPERATOR RESILIENCE (ARCS)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9500

550

600

650

700

750

800

850

ATTACKS

CostCOST(IN 1000)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7500

550

600

650

700

750

OPERATOR RESILIENCE(NODES)

ATTACKS

CO

ST

(IN

1000)

For more number of attacks the Cost changes slightly.

Big jump from 1 to 2.

The cost does not change when NasFortWorth is attacked.

When FiscJacksonville is interdicted the cost goes up to huge amounts.

ATTACKS(NODES)

Pre-position the equipment and supplies in the near high probable disaster areas.

Shorter response distance and time will result less cost overall.

CONCLUSION

If the project presentation was next week?

◦ Time Element

◦ Stochastic Element

◦ Cost considered per unit of shipment

◦ Complex network

CONCLUSION

THANK YOU

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