... Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone 4th April 2002 { jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk.

47
... Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone 4th April 2002 { jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk
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Transcript of ... Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone 4th April 2002 { jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk.

...

Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone

4th April 2002

{ jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk

2

Two-Party Communication

Alice Bob

Adversary(Passive)

unsecured channel

secure channel

3

Two-Party Communication

Alice Bob

Adversary(Active)

unsecured channel

secure channel

4

Public-Key Cryptography

AliceBob

Adversary(Active)

unsecured channel

5

Key Management

A3

A1

A4

A2

6

Key Management

A3

A1

A4

A2

TTP

7

Public-Key Certificate

Vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the subject entity

Usefulness:

• To prove identity (authenticity of an entity)• To avoid denials

Good: trust can be used transitively

Bad: all trust placed with one single entity if TTP is compromised, comm. is insecure

8

Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Certificates Trust Relations

Evidences

Conclusions

associated(confidence) values

associated(confidence) values

9

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

A widely used software package (Zimmerman)

Stalling’s notation:

(entity, key)

A

B

pkA signed by pkB

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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

certification path web of trust

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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

Confidence Values = { unknown,no trust,marginally trusted,fully trusted }

pkA is valid if either

orpkA pkA

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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

Bob

Alice

Is Bob’s key valid for Alice?

: Yes

Bob

Alice : No

13

Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence

(R. Kohlas – U. Maurer)

Agenda:

Formalism• Basics & Graphical Notation• Principles

Modeling Public-Key Certification

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Conclusions

14

Formalism: Basic Definitions

• Piece of Evidence (Assumption) A statement we suppose is true.

• Hypothesis A statement not generally known to be true.

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Formalism: Basic Definitions(2)

• Argument for h

Collection of assumptions from which (along with the belief) h can be derived.

• Belief Composition of statements taken as a fact.

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Formalism: Graphical Notation

Hypothesis and Evidences:

h E

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Formalism: Graphical Notation(2)

Σ

Belief:

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Formalism: Graphical Notation(3)

Argument:

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Formalism: Graphical Notation(4)

Validity and Arguments:

h

Σ

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Formalism: Basic Definitions(3)

• Confidence Value Degree of certainty for an assumption or hypothesis to be true.

• Confidence Assignment Entity’s initial belief w.r.t. each assumption.

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Formalism: Basic Definitions(4)

Reduces a priori information to a singleconfidence valuefor the hypothesis

• Confidence Valuation Function that takes a hypothesis h and a confidence assignment and returns a confidence value for h.

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Formalism: Graphical Notation(5)

Confidence Values:

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Formalism: Graphical Notation(6)

Confidence Assignment:

24

Formalism: Graphical Notation(7)

Confidence Valuation:

e ( )=, h h

25

Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence

(R. Kohlas – U. Maurer)

Agenda:

Formalism• Basics & Graphical Notation• Principles

Modeling Public-Key Certification

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Conclusions

26

Principles: P1

e( )=, h hthen

If

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Principles: P1 (2)

e( )=, h hthen

If

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Principles: P2

then e( ), h

If

e( ), h

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Principles: P3

f

h1

h2

If

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Principles: P3 (2)

and = f ( )

then

e( ), h1 e( ), h2=

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Principles: P4

h2h1

If

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Principles: P4 (2)

then

e( ), h1 e( ), h2

33

Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence

(R. Kohlas – U. Maurer)

Agenda:

Formalism• Basics & Graphical Notation• Principles

Modeling Public-Key Certification

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Conclusions

34

Modeling PK Certification

In the particular case of PK Certification:

• Pairs of entities and keys can be seen like statements• The confidence values must be assigned to entities

To realize the abstract formalism in a concrete problem:

• identify pieces of evidence• identify possible conclusions• define confidence values

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Modeling PK Certification

Alice

Bob

Carol, K1 Carol, K2

Bob

Carol, K1

Alice

36

Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence

(R. Kohlas – U. Maurer)

Agenda:

Formalism• Basics & Graphical Notation• Principles

Modeling Public-Key Certification

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Conclusions

37

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Statements:

CertK1,X,K2

AutX,K

TrustX,K

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

CertK1,X,K

AutY,K1

TrustY,K1

AutX,K

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

e( )=, h hthen

If

P1 holds

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

then e( ), h

If

e( ), h

P2 holds

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

f

h1

h2

If

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

and = f ( )

then

e( ), h1 e( ), h2=

43

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Bob

Alice

Is Bob’s key valid for Alice?

: Yes

Bob

Alice : No

P3 does not hold!

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

h2h1

If

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Confidence Valuation in PGP

then

e( ), h1 e( ), h2

P4 holds

46

Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence

(R. Kohlas – U. Maurer)

Agenda:

Formalism• Basics & Graphical Notation• Principles

Modeling Public-Key Certification

Confidence Valuation in PGP

Conclusions

47

Conclusions• Summary• Two parts:

– Logic– Confidence ValuationBoth efficient!

• What are and how to assign confidence values.

• In light of what was said, how adequate is it for trust management.