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Iraq Intel/InfoOps Assessment & Summary of Joint Lessons Learned

Robert David Steele

Updated 24 October 2003

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Seven Generations of War

Evolutionary Eras

1st Generation

2nd Generation

3rd Generation

4th Generation

5th Generation

6th Generation

7th Generation

Linch Pin

Low Tech Mass

New Tech

New Doctrine

Non-State

RMA (C4I)

RIA (IO/Intel)

RGA

Means of Winning

Attrition

Attrition

Maneuver

Asymmetry

Precision Weapons

Precision Intel(!!)

Everything, Always

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DefinitionsIntelligence• JCS: product• JCS: knowledge• CIA: knowledge and

foreknowledge as prelude to decision and action (covert action silent)

• OSS: global coverage, all sources, all languages, 24/7, NRT analysis at all times

Information Operations1. Electronic Warfare (EW)

2. Operations Security (OPSEC)

3. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

4. Military Deception

5. Computer Network Ops (CNO).

6. Supporting InfoAssurance– Counter Intelligence

– Physical Security

– Physical Attack

7. Intelligence

8. Public Affairs/Civil Affairs

9. Public Diplomacy & Assistance

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Seven Generations of Intelligence/IO

Evolutionary Eras

1st Generation

2nd Generation

3rd Generation

4th Generation

5th Generation

6th Generation

7th Generation

What Do We Need to Know

Easy: Where is the army?

Easy: Where are the trenches?

Moderate: How many with what?

Hard: Watch every non-state actor.

Hard: Watch everything on the fly.

Hard: Make sense of billions of bits.

Very Hard: 24/7, 29+ languages and get your own house in order.

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US/Allied Intelligence in Iraq

Successes

• Good last minute exiles sent in with money and forged documents to recruit and observe

Failures• No deep clandestine assets• No new nor firm knowledge on WMD• Intel vacuum allowed WH adventurism• Did not locate Saddaam• Could not keep up with battle forces• Unable to do guerilla/urban intelligence• No peace/reconstruction intelligence• (Note: the US corruption is *amazing*)

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US/Allied InfoOps in Iraq

Successes• Saved the

Oil Fields• Inspired

desertions & no fires

• Kept most civilians out of fight

Failures• Sunglasses & armor--aid as PSYOP• Girls forced to urinate publicly (rdblks)• Saddam as Elvis (cowboy IO)• Poor impact on Arabs (bye to Al J.)• Poor impact on Europe (bye to Old E.)• Ignored non-Arab Muslims world-wide

(Central Asia, South Asia, India, Pakistan, Muslim Africa)

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Net Assessment of Iraq Intel/IOF Reconstruction intel

F Post-war Guerilla intel

F Global IO Images

F Covert Ops Options

D WMD actual status

C Battle damage

B Kick-off OOB

D Congressional debate

Bottom line: Intel/IO had no coherent strategy, conflicting or absent capabilities and messages, earns a 3 out of a possible 7 on the continuum.

Note: Policy decisions can be said to have handicapped intelligence.

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Joint Lessons Learned I

• Did great, need to sustain and improve:– Joint Integration and

Adaptive Planning

– Joint Force Synergy

– Special Operations Forces and SOF-Conventional Force Integration

– Mission rehearsal

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Joint Lessons Learned II

• Did good, but need enhancement– Urban Operations

– Information Operations

– Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconaissance

• enemy perspective• tactical bandwidth• proper dissemination• analytic toolkits

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Joint Lessons Learned III

• Fell short, need work:– Battle Damage

Assessment

– Fratricide (Friendly ID)

– Deployment Planning and Execution

– Reserve Mobilization

– Coalition Information Sharing

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Joint Lessons Learned IV

• Lower Tier Issues– Joint Fires – Time Sensitive Targeting – Overmatching Strike – Training – Theater Logistics – Public Affairs/Media Integration – Shaping Interagency Involvement – EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam

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Joint Lessons Learned V

• Insights to future concepts – Emerging Battlespace

– Knowledge-Enabled Warfare

– Effects-Based Operations

• NOT MENTIONED:– Iraqi incompetency.