lUi

il\~rl\l!1fI\l>t.,;;,q{ ¥,ea,U:h, ~,.te!l/,"~,\H), ~nopl1e~ ,tY,l>e~f, ~UfiV~~, 'Y0ll\~ f,Q,cuS,9tl; the ~,eJ"tIV, ,'L,fr~~,U, e, l/" ,I ~)~~, O("!I~, c, h, ~f, s~yer," ,aJ ,~mm9IlJ¥',",\d,tlllt!, ged ',l1\~I, ,f9rm~ti,oil., In,' hOlWit~IS co,n~unl;f~¥ ,~Miat"'c ,sur~er~. ~owe¥,~r", ,tb.ere ,IS ,ol\J.y,.one larg~ hWr pita, of .this type,and,because It is In Saigon, obvious.11mitlltlons are impQsed~ ~,t,., "t,~QOrdS ~o, ''",491'', ~ <!IWJ)r, ,0\>,' ort,,!QIl.:te i"'~.,' in, J9,6~ ,aJ1.d 1968 ,ot t)i>o ,,*oma, II,es, cle,~t'J:lal~te and' spi!lfi',~IJ),il,a. I~''''o,uJd, I>e Important ~oexal)ll:ne'these tre,nds m:o,r~::'(!\9.13ely. 'IStill,. ft8~s Gqul~, ~~ver ,p.~ove -11' ca1l,sa;t!V',t(, -.c~ne,ction wjt~ herbi­clde~.; "The, ,surver _ :approa.,ch oN~J:'s l~t~1.e l?-Qpe -o~, prOVlllg ,or dtsprovlng:'"any :r~la&~oIl~-;t)e,tweeri her~lcid~ ~~po~ure, an4 .the.,J~oi.denQe: of ;bi};tP· ,q~feQts unless one,,: .'f!!l, ,n,' ,f\!l, ' d _S,i~eaQl,e: gr"OlJ.PS 0, ,f,' Siin,i~ar : peQ:pJ.e ·living, ,unqEfr . $~,:r:uila, r cQn, tiitions, one h~aY41Y ;expQ~ed ,~nd ,the' other, not expose-g. If s~c~ populatlop,s exist and can: bEf,s~-q,4ied, l~rrwould"be, ,wortl?while to surV,ey children ,at.,yario~s ages for"anomalies. ' ,'", c, , '.' ,,- .:.. "

It: may 'well be that we, ,can lefk~~ ,Diore aboJlt. t~ ,s\1,bj,ect frO}ll the- Jnditect approach of determining t4e' amo\tll,ts. '0:(, herbIcide residues in the, diet ,and ',in hmna'I;J. ti,$SU~; waiting f,Qr 'tut.ure .. research to de,termine 'tb,? impl1~at1ons, i~ any, otwli~tevet.:levelsare,follnd, .. , ,< '_,., " ,,,

'5., Orop De8tr.upflo.n-~-:-:-Some. 2,000 ,square kiloro,eters of land in' South VietI;lam have--been spra,yea in .order to d~stroy ,fpod,crQps. It has ,been. authoritatively estiniated that :this ,entailed tbe destruction of enough food to teed .approxl~ , mately 600,0C1Q, ,persons"for a year. Our observations:in Vietnam lead us to be~ Heve that. precautions to avoid destroying the crops of 'indigenous civilian populations have b~fl:n a".failure. ·anti. that nearly all. of the food 'destroyed wOJlld actually; actually haVe _ beeJ;l., con~utlte(i. by ,such . populations;, J~Jven so, if the aff~cted,civllians,.were .dIstl,'ibuted throughout the 'country, or if they ,Jive:'i.in,fo?llsurplua areas" .. the iInpact,woqld He small cOlllpareCl to othe~ hard, J?hips,.,sin~e, tbe food,',destroyed .awounts, to less. than two percent., of the .na~ tional crop;i:n' ,any one ye~. ,Bo\:v~ver;! anti,crop ,sPJ;'aying ha$ been,',larg~ly ,con~ fined to the 'f<lOd.~scarce Central. High1Ilndl';lj.'"tp.e entire population.,of which is ()nly about one million. Most of these are Montagnards, . tribal peoples l,'acially and llngl,l\stij'!allY ,di.SV~c~. f~.?llt: th~" lowland ,Yietn~"-mese, The.se ,peoples. are animists, closel;r tied to "their.18J)d by 'trttd,ition .and religious 'b~Uef. We beheve the ant~~p,rQP ,prograUl,: ~ay hav~,.ha~ ,11 v,rofouni,1 impact on ajarge.- ~raction of the ;total l\'Iontagnurd populatio;nf,of South,. VietlJam. and we believe tbis to be ft, poiJ::j.t for. ul1gent ,'(!onslderatlon, A-s for l!,€!trospect1:ve studies, these, could ,best be, don~ ,py Qpe~ or mp:r;e of' ,s~veJ;l;ll, 4igbtt resp.e,c,~~d antbropolog~sts who' have sp.ent many yel\.rs studying ,and, liv~ng,am.ong the Montagnard~.

6. MiUtary Oon~¢erat,ionlk:It ,SP-QUld', .b~; ,m'ade"v~ejl:r that. t4~ stpdies' under~ ta~en, ,~~d:, r~colll~end~d by' :th,e 'a~rbi~de, :AssefjSmeI;lt .ComD;l.is,sion are afte~ the fact .a:u4 -w~tb-<>\1t iefereDf':~' '~~)' llie ,ltdl1,t~ry. ~utU~ty,,Ol: ,d,esh;abiHty of'tbe use of, herlii~i4es., Alth~ugh th,ese are 'cef,tItipJy'- matters that"could' be·subjected,·to st~d,y i~nd ~valuat1on, ,this, ,w'ould ;be, completely ;,Qutsldei ·the ~ssigproent given the C~D\mlssl,on by the, 444S., ',' '" '>, , ,

BAOKGROUND"M:aTEln~:t; RELEvAN1?'ro;,~nEsENTATIO~,S, AT Tlim,'19'nl,'ANNuAL MEET~ INS, OF THE AAAS-HER~ICItiE ASSESSMENT OOMMISSION O;£i' 'THE. AMERIOAN ASSOOIA>PION FOR 'fHt!:"AnVANCJli:MEN'l'. OF SOlENOE,. ' ' '

, .' . . i' '. ..,' ."

(,By 'Matthew S. ~reselson~ Harvard <(jn1versity, Cambridge,' Mass1 j Art}:du' H. Westing, Windham College; Putney, -V'ermont; ,and' JOhli' D. ~o~stable, Harv'ard Medical School;~ Boston, Mass.) "' .

J • '_,"

The observations and evalufltio:ns"oi'ithe,1ierbicide Assessment"Qommission arE! those of'-1ts indivldual::participants'and shouldlnot be'attrtbuted,to·ti1e AAAS or ~:hy of tits componep.t Qrganizati'ons. '.)1\,

INTRonpOTloN

Over 'the past nine years, app~oximatelY one~seventh; Q(-'.the lal1:d, arel,t of S,qp.th Vietnam has been. t.reo,ted,: wtth chemical herbicides i~· order, to. ,reduce vegetation". u'n4' t9 del1ltroy fooq cr.ops in connection wlth miI}tariY' activities. Tnis, lJ~,rge: 'scale ,~pplication of, her'bicides'" has ,QccasioI).ed concerfj, wltJiin the ~c!t:~.~,ftc, cOIh~unity that: ,ther,? '~8:r __ :·be, ser1o~s ~ffects ,Dn the, t~d ,and, p'.eo~le

.Ite);bid,d~s' ai-e ~b~mica~s int~~dkd ·to kill; or reduce ,v~getatton. '.When they 'c~~Be leaf ,fall

i with or wtthoqt. kUling the entire plant, they are sometimes called defoltants.

We shal use the more general term. herbIcides. '

of VI~triilnr) Urirortri!)~tiily,.larg. 'at~~.· '6i' 1!!D'6ra)lcehll'/e,pr~+ent<idanY's.at!., f.act6~y' eva~trIi\jWn o.(th. o"posSfble '..,ftects;' of' tIIelrlnlp.lllcatlciWs'."tW 'e"anomle and health plani1~ng 11\ ''Vlefu~jn ';' and' o:/tli.~r'lirmider')'IllplfCa~Wnsregar<!lng the use-'otiherbiCldes;" ',_~" . ',r,,-' ., I,: ,,,;, ""," ',1'" -~., _' "',' ,;

In order to' obtalnr<\ltabl~:'i'nfortn~t\o)\, th~Jl.IJII~!'Iilal): Ass~cI.tl6~'tor' the Advancemeilt of Sclenee, the1argestotganl'tatlo11"o!"scjeritlsts I'll tile 1'Jnlted states, h •• soUl/ht to en¢otiral!ie and, p.~tlclpat~' iUtilEi ~ollliuct <if,. sy.temi\tic on •• lte study of the effects of herbl~lde •. on th<,1~cor61tya:iid pn hum.\l'welfa~e In SoiltlrVletnam'. Asa 'fi~st.ph.se' of such Iflltudy, t!\e AAAIl'Boardofl'l)ree. tors, jjj''Decembe~''1969, commlsslbnedthe'pret!arlttl"n"of a,dOtaUed opef.ttiollal plnn fOjldeteTmlnlng ,,; , ; the'short·term.'nii'long'1;<!ro:I cons.quenc~'''''6f the use of Iierblcldes on the ecology of South Vletnatn'lfhd'on'hUman We)'6rre:" The AAAS, Herbicide Ass_essmen.t CQmmissiQn, the .name under which this, 'AAAS end~ayor Is known, 'be8'4nlts work InF~brti#~ ~970 .. ' .'. " I, •• ~. , HerlJlclde~s Mve been Wtdely used' slrice, W-o~ld Wllr It h\ 'many par\sof the

world' fotsuch 'beneficial purp6ses"s' ilgrlcuitUtal alld' aquatic .. Weedcolltrol, forest, rangel" and watershed management, and' the' creating,'of 'lightS 'Qt' way. In the 'United States; about 150inillioD pounds of synthetic organic heiblcides were used hi' 19615 'to treat approXimately 140' 'mi1iton.-_acres, o:ne 'fQu.tteenth of the'land area of the 'cQuntJ.iy. HQwever; there are' seri'QUs 'difficUlties in' extrap6~ lating this backlQg .of ex:perience- to the assessment .of the etfects .of 'herbicides in Vietnani. " ";' ,

First .of all, the ChQiC~, .of area~' tQ b~, sprayed is 'baaed on- very di~~!,.ent Co'n,7 sidetatiQns'1n the"two cp.-ses. 'DQlllces'tiCiil1Yf 'herbicides are generally "used- tQ imprQve land, values.' In military' ap"llcatiQn:s, 'Hind "values I.lre 'clearly' nQt .of prima~y CQncerli.' FQr' eX'ample, her1:licldes are·use,d dQmestically t9 ,Jni'PtQ-ve 'Vinie forest$'by selectively killing less de.irable'specl~s, Militarily; the objective of sprayIng It forest is slinply tQ'remove as mUe,lccQver'ns possible. '~gain, h~rb1-cides are 'lsed'in farb,1iDg,to)kill weeds but in 'wa't they 'are u'sed to destrQY fQQd crops.' _' "_',' '<'- ' _,' , ',' ,- , _ ,"

Beyond the' 'Cl~ar difTerences" in objectives' bei'weeIi civil, and military appU­catiOl:1s of he'rbicldes,- there' al'~ several -additiQnal factQrs which limit the apPlicability: '.of ·dQmestic <e:xperlen~ _ to the." evaluatiQn:, of PQssible' effects in Vietnam. Among them 'ate:- (i) little experience with the applicatiQn .of herlJi~ cides- in ,_comp'arable tropical eCQsystemf; j (11) little, pr~viQUs 'attenti'on to the possible 'ecQlogical consequen'ces of he'rbiclde application .over' a _ very larg:e cQntiguQus area;. (iit) l1mi~d experience with fhe 'mUita~ ,rate of applicatiQn, which' is mor~ than ten ·times higher"than 'the average dom.estic rate; _ ('tv) ,a meager baCkI91!"'of 'd;,mestli! experience witll t\\lO' of the font ,berblcld,es that are usedmllItaM1Y; (v) n6moriltor\ng'ilHh~ ~quantltles Of 1ierblelde$ 'or herbi­cide, impurities' and breakdQwn pro~uqts, thft,t f m.ay be etitering the 'V:ietllamese diet: and (vi) a need ~or Dlor~ Information regarding the possible negative medical or ecolQ~Cal side ,effec41 -of herbicides even as they are: t1~ed aQmElsti~ cally. In this last regard, it must be remembered that althQugh the use .of berbi­cides' is -very f:widespre~d,,'~t is also quite, recen~ .mQre .or, .l~~SJ parall~ling, and DQW exceeding that .of Chemical 'insecticldes. -'

Direct examinatiQn .of herbicide-treated areas!' in Vietnam by qualified scien­tists bas so far been quite limited. HQwever, an impQrtant start .on the 'studY of "prayed timber stands was made dl1rlng 1967 and 1968 by the USAID For­estry Branch': On,the basis of aerial observatiQns; -it was estimated that apprQx­imately nhi.e ,thousand square kilQmeters of forest had been sprayed by mid-1967. After condncting brief grQund inspectiQns at three treated sites in early 1968, Dr; BaVl:f "Flamm; -Chief '-Qf tbe-"Porestty ,Branch, tentatively' cQncluded that While Q-'shigle spraying cauSes 10 t6'OO, percent',kllIing of merchantable trees, tWQ treatments in successive years kill 50 to 100 percen:t"in the type-'Of forest stud~ed. An increase in grass cover was nQted in sprayed areas and it was anticipated 'that bambQQ alsQ 'would "increase. Flamm suggested further studies. a:t;J:d recQr;qm~,~<'1:'i'd .that fQrest ,reser.v.es r~?eiving twp ,Qr mQre ,treatments ue p,~~nlled, fQr refQreft~o.tion. _, :', __ ''-: " . , .

1'l.urln~ 1968 the tl:,~. Mf~slon In'i'letn~m' '~(md1ic~d a revle'\'( Qf vanous aSpects .of the'_herbiclde"prQgram~_ In .order ,tQ o'Qtah;l ~ })relin'iina~t~ ar:,sessment of ecolog,.ca('~ff~cts,Di. 1!'red,S,Tschlr\ey~,f ,the V ... fl, AgrAcult\\r,al, Research Service' was askea to particlpate. Tschirley" ~ botIDlist, toured Vietnam from mid-April to mid-March 1968. He made aerial observations .of mangrove forests , " .', ,': ". , ' , . . ,1" '..

"

',-' 117

and semi-deciduous upland .forest .fu:eas., Be."alsQ rev~slte.d' the three sites estab~ lished by Flamm and came to the same conclusions regardillg' the effects of s1.n~I" and' 'multli>le 'herblctiievtl'\!atment' o!:('tiJllifforeSt, Tilchlrley: alSQnoted, that mangro\'e 'specles a:r~ 'kllled':b~'a slngl" ·t""atin/mt, . and, •• Ulmltted tllat Sprayed lDangro~e foregtls 'might· ;leturn· tQ their o1'lg\1ltt1 . ~ondltloll' Inc r"pptox!ma1ely tw'entjr. yeaTsl (Tsclitrel1 ,'lStressed,' the' need fOr, tntor-mation on' the. :successional behilvlof ,of-' herbictde-treat,ed1!'_\Tletnamese' 'foraats: andi')E}trongbd'lJrged the ini-tiation of, long-term ecological ,research. after the cessation of hi)stili!1es., '

tnMardhl9.69 two . .&m.rlcafi'~ool0l!lstS' conoerMd,lIdth':.~M· ecological Impact of .herblctn .. InVletriam,' Dr. GordonH."0rlansOf the' University ,of Wa:.4Ing'

. ton· and Dr. EgberfW. ·Pfelffer Of'the UttI"erslty of ?,<Ion tan a, visited,' Vietnam for 'two ·weeks.', Th~y· made "aerial·' obsen'atioris' of. spraYed '-upland: forests and also' tnspooted "a mangrove: areal' bY motor ·launoh., 'Tll~y to'tind,' fno :evidence, "Of recoloni~at1on along the ,aho'ie Une' and: reporte'd -a . !lear absence' of fructivorous and insectivorous birds, i'n ,the sprayedl"tll'eas. ,They t6'O,' strongly-·recommended H major l'eaeatCh eO!ortJ to be conducted. jointly with' VietDa:me!!la scienti$'fiI!J . .. ' Following the estabUshnlent':of'the AAAS (iJommission, bUi', 'wbrlt/'was, con~ ducted in',several stages,including:8. trip to Vietnam in',Augui!tt~and ~SePteD;l~er 1970; We'illspected several types :of herbtNde-treated ateas in order .. to acquire fnformation Upon which tnore' extensive studies 'Muld be lJkSed.'-0ur observations extended' 'intd several 'areas not' prevl'ousl.y stUdied and, '-1n eertalri _instances, significantly differed with 'prior'·.-:reports. _ > , ' _ •

Pre~iously, the, Commission ~onducted a ;survey of the relevant <'literature. At', the same' time; numerOus" expei1;s and ofticif\ls in varlouB fields ·were con­Sulted' for information and,i advice."n,. list of questions for ),)ossible stUdy -was drawn'u~ and circulated for',comment to' over 200 individuals and-.'wgencies as a· means"of identifYing important pl"oblems and building a bft'se of information. Then,An J,une,', a 'ftve~day', work-iug corife1l9Jice' was held at· WOOds,' -Hole, Massa­chusetts in order to further define a tractable' number of' spet!J:ftc !ptoblems fOll systiimatll! ·.tody and to Iis.l.t Inc planning the subseq,uettt to1\l!' o~ Sb'tlth Viet­nam;'-The''C(I)nferenee was uttendedll'by twenlly~three·speciallBts til vill1-ous fields including tropical' ecology, ',forestrY, agrIcultural' economics, Ih'icrobiOlogy; soil science;; _plant ,physiOlogy;' ?herbicide 'cheililatry, ,photogrametry~' 'mediCine', and antnropolog!' .. >Ele ... 11 of the.,pill'tlmp.antshad vadous ·degr.e~ of '~erlence In Southeast-:·Asia. Altlltntgn all . Were-' pttesent as: p1:'ivate individUalsj they include'f!. _persons'lfrom uni'Vierstties in th~'United:States and -abroad, from'Industry, and from severaldepartmmits- o~ tile U:'S.i:!overllll'lent, . ,.,,' " ,

:'In VIetnam, ,-our 'objectiveS' were "to impro'Ve our Identificati'OIi' of important problems -.for 'study and· to;·c;l.etermi1ie 'the facilities; .methods; tltl'd·· gebg,faphical areas that would be most '"suiflitble"for future work; We attempted, -to"obt-ain enotigh '. sp'ecHlc "intorrnatlon 'and' e::xperience to 'partly bridge 'tlie, gap Hetween the very limited ·pl~t1lli',,"f·the situation Avallab1e fronLreaditlg aM consillta-, !Ibn' In th.·Unltedf·St.,te .• ·.and· actualcoDdltiOn. a.theY 'exlst In Vietnam. In fact, we- 'we:re able to<Jnntke -BOttle spe(1fic observation's' that should be of value even :at thb:l'prel1mlnnry stage. ~ " j':' ,'~" ,,'J- :

. Although we went to "V,letnfttn a. 'Indep~ildei!t sctenttstsdtl· behalf ;,etbe AAAS;-wo we)ie gh'en:the j!Dil'otllcta! SUpport of theU. S. Mlsslolr and of·the Government of·,the :Republic of Vi~tnam, ,who showed their ,concern with the pr..obleJ;ll: :by snpplying'lettens of· .1ntr-aduction and '~:Y-ery 'assistfthce, :tn, Saigon and In'',the provinces. Our living quarters;' Office fae1Uties an~-' grountl: tra,nspo,-,~ tation were generousl,y and expeditiously, provided Ib'Y 'the' -U. _S.' ,Agency 'for Internatinnal' Develounlent .. Extl'etnely vallIl1ble' helic6pte't overflights and other air trips Were' arranged'by'~'USAID, the 'Am-erican:Elmbassy, abd, especially, by' the U. S;' Military: A'SSistanae, ,Command. However~' our itinerar'Y"f!nd dailY activities were !de'cided 'Upon 'tmlely by 'Ourselves.

We cOIfsUlted with VJtettnamese univerSity and 'mi'nistrln:$ecHtUsts: in b'otan:v, zoology, soil science, ~,9,gronotny, -',chemistry, forestry, 'and':medicine. We made several 'fields tripsl~witl1';Vietnan1e'$e professors "anq --gr,ad.ttate §tudents. We interviewed. "numerous farmeI'S and v1llage ofHc)tils .for-,ftl'st"hp,nd information on 1rerbicld~ e:ftects~' 'We conducted'. aerhtl and ground ingp:ectlbilS of herbicide treated ~nd- untreated,;Q.reas;nnd conductea stulttes of possible' health, and con; genital ,anolllAly'.fchanges'-ln' seiected' reglotci> Food-ebf11:n COnil:lbnents' and human sample i materhtls were 'COllected' and b1"'f,I'rtght back'i' foro: chemical' 'analysis.

. I ,L: I ',"

n8 I LANJ)"X'ND' PEOPLES OF: aOUTH·tvIE'tN,!.!\.14H;-',(!, ';':L',,:.j;''';j,i'-'';' ~"J

, .... ; _ _ ;: ,". " ,', """ r,' ;)J f,!;' I.,"'" ~),', " _,~;. "'\ !' ~\')(: , : ~outhVietn.m oceu~i~s ,tbe soup~elll!ter!l,e"t~~m.\t1 'o~,tJw,Soutl\e •• t" A.1I>1l< P.nln.1\la,",nd'l!a~ ,1"Jlre.cen,t,~<lI>ed', '~rea.of 17Q,O~. sguarel<llomete.s"if,tla ab91lJ.l.300 k,llom.et~.long, 'el<telldjng,,,fiom.&18a', ,to ,17:~ .no~til,l.titude •. ,lt.· a¥,~Jiage, _,width I·is_ abp:ut;J.5,Q '.knpll1ete.tIll;~,faill.ngJ',llet~e.eD,' Jl'bQut'·'1.O-~Q" :&:nd,,"lOQ-?; . east IOn\lltud~ •. ll~ .ne, "' •• t.Jle"I;aos,andO.m~o(\i.aISo,.til. ,<wat.!ne Sou»> C!lIM. Sea. L;;-~"::'; ',' ", ".' " _." ,;-.-,. , .. ·b~n'. > : ';:, _, ',', _," .,:,

.. ,PopulotiP~: ']lb., 10,,0 ;population of .So.util.,,¥letD,UljI,,ls ".stimated:tobe .17.5 , m~m.9b,.-,(lon~entra·ted·"i:Q- tlle~ s9uthefD, thj:rd.l9il;tlie 'c9Ul1..t~iY: an<'44n Ta Jifili,\ll'QW-.fiItrip a~oD:g ,the: eastern _ coast. }\for,e Ul~n',SO ,-pellcent are, ethnican~", ;Vi~tnaDl,e~~1 ,FJi'he .. l"'fgest.mlnorlt;v, ''I!I'e j;)le ,;IiL.lghlanders: ·ot" Montalllla.ds.,:a. group',o! trib~l p~oPle ... racia1W· And, U;ngu\$tically.,distinu! feom, the'. etbnl.c·Vietnal1l"se. :jps!llmated to

'uurobel' <approxim-,flotely; Olle""J+).UUOll,, the':Montagllardj:!. :Ul!e . .'distributed, tbrQug];:lO,ut th~ upland ;,ar~(l~', in' the, no.i'~her_:(l: tW:o~thlrds, of thEfi Icou;nttW. '-: C! ',~~,'~)' ,.

Geo{#top/>io /louig"': ,South. Vietnam Is ;dl~I.,I/)le Into four main Physlogran)llc regiOt;lf(l .. The Mekong Deltw_region constitutes the southernmost quarte~, ,extend­ing, over ab9,Ut, ,*O~OOQ f:jquare ki1ometers'~with ,about _5 :m~lIio:n inhabitants. Flat and. ofte~;;'ma:rS:.by,'lt,tS'~;diss_eQtedbY;,,;btre ftv.e Mirna of the',;;MelwD.g ~iver, several les,ser rt:vers, an~,. ,~any, navigable':1stre~iund canaU;1 ,along which th.e ru~al population is concentrated. '.rhe' !rivers are~so' sedb:nent~laden, that"in 'some-,places the coastline advances by as much as 75 mete1;,s 1P~r year; . ,

The very fertile central part, ,where most -of the D.elta- population -liv:e,:,.,i-s the principal, ,r\ce.',pfod'JIctton llrea-, ,:tu 'Vietnam ,and also, i~ .a; lllajor, ,SQuJ:,ce of coco­nut" banana" ,and, oth,~r 'fl'iUits. In the ,u9rtliern PQrt~on of the Delta, extending: fro;m tI:~el,9aIlJ,bodlan.jrontier, there lies ,an Extensi~e, pOOJ'ly draine:d"ma-tsh, the Plain Q'f Reeds., ,]\t!angrove ,fQrests line:"llluch 'of the coast·, of ,tlJ.e ,Pelta· and occ;uPY.,' tWQ lQart;ic. ulafly lac rge ,ar~as:!: ~e' Oama-u :'Ee. :ninsrua. in, the, 'far. :so. ut!), ,and' t)le U,;Minb.Jl'oKesUn',the"w,est "', •.. , ': ",' '" """ ; Xb. M:e];o"uTem:~oeiregloll,CQnst1t\ltes Ii ",Ide .ban\lI~lng,nortb oftbe .:polta

region/, ~fl:xit~m,ding, from; ,Ca:tnbodia' to the 'ses., Its area Is about 8~OOO-"squalJe. lj:jlomet0r •• ,Som.wha~ moreelev:ated t!la"the :Oe\ta,~i't"atill;mostlY flat. this 'l'e~on Is --~eavily fovested in the no,l'th·;.and :m.o.stly :clea-red -f~r f.a,rming in,;the sout:q. .. It: pOAIsess:es,,~ wide ,Yl,lri~ty, of solls','and,-"dr~tna.ge cOnd.ltiQnS, -' ~upporting not. only rice_, but, -ll)any -other ,cr9Pf:!, including: 'ff.uits, fibres,' suga:r -a,n9-;'rub'b,er;' The, population, is appl'_oximately six mllUon,· hal:C' of fit ':'in ,.s~igon and, its en ...

, virons. Two of , the pl'i-ncipal' rfvers_ of this:~eglo:q",the' S,aigQ,n: and:,th~ Dong Nai, jOin ,j.ust- south, .Qt,_ Saigon and ;thend)ranch,""lnto a eomple~:fof ,Jll_eandering 'chap.­nels-incQ.,.m~ng,rov~ fQrest,lmown as ,the 'Rung ·Sat. One of,these channels ,is the m~fn:.$hlpPlng,Ny.te linking ·Saigon to tbe'South'c\1ina"Sea. '.', ',' "The}ligh,andJ,reg:ion of South Vietnam,. occupying about-.;6f5,QOO square 'kiloDl-

eter!3, ,but ~Rntaiui'M,,_o+Lly abo:ut, ,n; million·"peopJe,. 'extend-a.:n:orth'\Va'rrd -from;- the Terrace 'region' alli the, wa-Y, to, the de;r.qili.tariz·ed; zo,ne,; wl1ieb.-",di-vldEls.: Vietnam at the sevent!lentb par&llet-.:,j)n the e4st, it :is-bounded by-,the Truong~S,on ,range, whi~b rises steeply out of the coastal plain,' and 9ll the W$stJ)Yr'_Ca~bodia',and Laos;;'';rhe.,_Truong·Son s!o'pes_gra,dually -to,'the iwesttorm)Dg an area.. ot,rugged m'ountains -aAd'·-plateaus·'PEmetrated -In,;places by·'IQW,·plains;-top_eni:qg i-ntl;r'Oam1. bodia. "'" " , _ ,,', _:,' ,<" ";,:,'" .'t'_ ,. i ' ,

As recetltlY;i~s ,twentY",fe,ars ago--thhhxtegi()ll_ was,.inhabi~d- almost entt.:reliY,',by! ~~ontRgnl;ln4,s'1 -Eyen ,now:,: j ufter., a-, major i;tl:O,ux of- lowland;i Vietnamese;' tb.e Montagnards con'sUt,ute Jl':l:Qre-thall"half ot~,Ure"population.,,;: "\'~'''': -,~''','' _ "_' . Mo_st_..of th&,I~)gJlland region, is _foreE!-ted. There-'are also: large-'area-s':CQvered

with ,grass'l brush, or: balD-boP!, ,A, large 'fr·action ,ot:,:the forest is, 'kept ,at an' early stage ·ot,· gevelopment, by, the ;Montagnanl. ,practice ,known as _I3Widden.'- agdcul· ture. Th:e 'forest Is cut and '~urXled, fQ.l')lled, for rice, vegetable~. ,and" other, erops for tW'o or more: W:8o,rl:1: l!ntil'the If}.n9--'~os~s itS:'productiVity", and· then. alloWed to lie tallo'Y ~tOl: '_~~vel;~1 years, before;'tl:te"cy,c~e .lS repeated::;", ~ _ ,_ ,

.Althoug,l)._:;ntost '_of,~the ,inbabit~D,.ts' ~f tp-e·.highlan~ region are' sUbsistence farIller,s, there i~ .in~ensiv·e ,~o~tu;nerclal: cu,tivatiou' of 'vegetables, fruits, coffee, tea, and rubber',-i:4.'.sO.II\~· areaS. ':r,he' large~scale production of vegetables:,fo~;'the'

. Saigon market InthevJ¢l)\tY;<irI>al~t.,i$,parti~u)arly \lotewortby,.·' .. ;, " , ',T~e a(iM~aZ __ ,·.R~n~>,regiop.,' CQvt;lring.!·about- 25,OOO:.squ,are ']iil'o!Jleters, is, a.

c:1 n~'rrow, -strip ,loQa~p.. -be~W8~u, t):le mountains and, the sea"" exteIl;4lng ,trom: the IyIekong Terrace regiOl;J.' north to the·,seventeenth ,parallel. Th€( 'strip' is con~ ~tric~ed in, several places wliere branc~es of the Tru()ng~Son range reach 'li~arly

, " -' :, - ,:' , ' ~ ", '

to tile sea, fot'rilbit'"Ia\\ri~.'o'fl*fg~'eoallt.iFpldn •. ·Tlielpo'ti\)tatlonlsapprori. matelyfonr million. eLlttle of the region Is fQre$ted, most of It being planted to . rice;: mtO:liQ!J) !1'J:W~6lt"pobat()" peanuts; and sugar cane:" , ";.'->,

, 'OWfnai~":-f$-OUQ:l:'Vlet~:ram.-:has 11 ,warm huniig7'Cl1m~te. The mean temperature is 25-27',0 arili ille, avefage;vearfy' preclpltatlOlj \s a:pj)ro:<lm~tely 150 to BOO em, 4ependlng~Qn"locat1on,,!, The, seas~~_I;l~ ran~~",'_9f tempe~fttitres lii~,,:t:v~t large,·les,s, ~han 5~Q In ~Qst pllj.~es. Precil?~tttbQn~ _,hQ):VeveJ,', is:;y~)j~ect tQ great ~easQnB:t, variatiQns. Jrn all regi~n_s,except .t1l:(t~,Ooastal\~lains, th~, W,ettest se$.son, oC(l'\Jrs iii the summetV whe~ "tb-e: "prevailing '_)vinds ,,;~q:~~ SQu~we$terly, bi-inging, warm humid ,*frpm the C\UIf.of Slam,a,\ld theB,~Y'oLllei>j!d~ During thls,tlme the, ,rains ~re ilSiIally, nol-steady, but,:'(),CQur, 'as; ,'heavy 3:fteJ,'DQQn :$h9Wers. ,.A: pr:,Q. nounced" c'l_:ry;,season .occurs during the 'win-eer~';"'when toe, wind is generally ;from toe" nq,rtneast;, On the "Coastal..:Plain$,- the .:dl'Y. seafil_Qfl;)st~rt1il, late in: the winter and Jasts npp.roximat.ely;',:half, the ye~r. In this region!--' -r~infaJl is "hjg~e/ilt in the, autumn! -with serious.-ll09:ding in, some years. 'iu,the-laoo autumn, the entire, ,

",east -~,Qast .of ,S~l,lth Vie.tp.~m is subject 'tQ.,,~y,phoQns coming, fr,9m ,tile, Elqu'th ,-Ohina Sea. -. . , " , . , " .. ' "

Lf!I1!a Oover,:. T.pe' c()ver types :Qf' SQuth Vi~tnari1 ,are estiin~te'd __ to' ,b.f 'dtstrib-uted as follows:' j • l' ' '"':, - ,

Forest: SqUa.t:6 kilomet6t'1t

~~~~~~:: ::: ::::: ::::::: :::: ::::::::::: ::::::::::::: :~~:: lilg;"ggg ~~!~~~~~r:o:~e:_::::::::i:: ::::!:: ~::::::: ::::::::::: :::::::~., ' ~: ggg

Other':_ App.roxiro~~_~j,'~9tal" fores,~(,~te~~:<~,:, -!'~:~'-:' ~ -~ -~ -:~'~",- ~ ,- :;~)~,,~,'~';'_~ '1 101J '~~9 Brush woocJ; coft'e0',,," 'and,tea phit,itations~' ~~~ _,,. ~ __ *,_':' __ ,,,,~ • .;.',. ___ ~_-~ if; 'bUD

~t[}r!~~i;~~t-~~~~'~,;'~'~;~~~~~'~'~'i~;;~"~'~'~:~'~'~'~~~~~~~I~~'i·~,. ,srt~1 Water and, unaccounted_ ~~ ________ -- ~ ___ .. ~ '_ :',":,. j.:..;_ .... _ .. __ ,~;_ ... ~,,_._,c, 7,' ~09

. To'tAl. ~rEla'~'~' _.~-;- _;:-,_~ __ ~ ___ -~ :-":<:: ___ ,.. ___ '-;- ~,~:;.. 'i-"", ~':~ ~, __ .. ~,:\.; - -:_ 173, 800 Under the'deE1ign"atiQn "fprestl' are included "iI.11 'ia'nds .. !;v:lth :-tre~~t~~~se crQwn~ cover mQre ~an, twe~ty percent ,of the area.,_ Onl;Y:,Jtbout ,half .of -the total fQrest area is stocked. W-itb tre8,$, of sufficient siz.e for 'cQnimer.cta.llog-glug.' rrhus, the area covered l~y merc'hant&,ble ,J.1ardwQods i~)~ppr-oxima,tely:: 50,090 square, kilQmt:lters. Of this, abbut tWQ-thirds is in the Centra;! ¥ighli!.ndS and,'one,--ijlivd in ,theJ\'lekQng Terrace regiQnJn a 'brQtid arc: e:x:tending; a'cross. the, <lQUI!., try :nortll of .'S-aigon.

Af1mit1;istrative, Division8 ana ,MiUta,ry RegiOn8:._ ~Qutli Vtetnam;'ls adminw istratively, ,di;vided into forty-four provinces, ,plus six' autonomQus" muniCipalities. E!1ch· provirlce is divIded into, a 'number of distl'ict~ which ~i,e.. :,su,bdiyi~ed into vi-llages. ,'~a~~,Yillage CQntaus several hamlets. . >, ',Of" . ."

For ntll1tal'Y purposes,,~::pl'ovinces are ,grQuped into" fQur', .. ¥ilitary regiQns, formerly kllQwn, as: Corps' ,T~ctical Zones. ,l\filitary Regions'-rIl and IV gen­erally correspon,g tQ the Mekong Terrace ,and -the Melrong Delta regiQns, _re,­spectiv~ly. The ,northernmQst :ave prQvinces comprise MiUtary RegiQn I" while the twelve,_r..~ma'ning m:ovirices ... to. the, SQuth .make ,ul?.:'Military: RegiQn II, both r~~iQns in?_lud~",,~t,~p.la~!is o,nd C?astal"plains. -; _,' <; "., '

", ___ ,' , "¥Ii.l~AR~ 'v~~'o~, n'mJlBIO~pES IX'{ S~UTB;,ymTNA'M; .,:,,:1

.~ ~e ,mtlitary, ~~~,i)f \ h~rbicides, in SQuth' Yietnam be~,au ,on ~'n experIm,~tal se&le In-1,961. It'be~a:nwoperational'ln'1962 with the ae~tltl spray\n!:' of twenty square,kilometers:,Qf·"ft?rest_and three squate kno~eters ot cro'p'Umd'..-}~1Y~h _.of the ,'S'pra,ying ,that-,;yeaI";wa~i-cond1,lcted in ,the" .mangrove -fQrests_-,Qf_ tl1~ '::0a:rnau peninsUla, ~at.the'·'s_outh'erh: extretnity .of, phe :c'oulltrj>In successive ,yea~;' :the "use .of 'herbicides grew 'rapidly; ~r(!f!.ching' a peak: in ,~967, 'ahd then deGHning somewhat in 1968 and 1969. Data:"f9;r'1Q70 is not 'yet available. An-'estimate of the area treated 'tn' each year throq.g:tt"1969 Is as fQllQws: '

l-"

,);" ',i, "d i::I'$r,V,\~l~D,AI\I!A.iTn'~T£D :WfT~"H~RB,cl~,IiS'N$OVTij,V'\T«Mllw" ,'0"

tl .. j "i(t 'f),'J . "Hi 'f!!:', :;', ,AcreS'.,,;; L:' . '~,l!" Sqllarii kllomiltel'i',(l kml,"',247i8Cl'eS) .

'I'll,) Y~/lr 'J '" ,Ii ", : /9t?,~~.!lln~;:~:!;' ~~rOp'l~iI,d', ':' :'" : rot;l;,;>;/o,re:~V_:6~- 'Crop W~,~ . :,',', _~\,::{\~otal

" hhfnulii'litfr of acrei tr'ilaidd is car~uidtlld by cn'iJItiPIYlllg't~l~gdIIGrlS~O) her'bldfd'e' used ,1,;,;: otla-:third. Tbls prcitedure I~ . based on thlt, fact th~t the average spraying rate is taken to be approximately 3 gallons per acre of defoliated 'sw.ath,pro~ dUlled.:;Jj~e qu.antity.oth~rb.IPI~:,USlI-d'ls,'kflOW!lJP:thePlccur~tely J)utthp esti'1llltlOn,of4,h&',averne an~a of the sPfqy ~wath could be. somewhat In error. For, example"recor s of actual spray flights sugge-st that.at [east under $,ome conditions ap· proxlm~telll.4 acreS of swath are produced for each 3 gallonli or herbicide sprayed. The total area '$'tln'tates given here are'subJec to at least 2 ,additional corrections. However, /telther is very great. First; the'cs[culated areas should be in-

, cr,&8sedlto, ttlke pc!Il(l~I1t of'spraying by helicOPters and by ground equipment: This is not included In the estimates given ill,th,e table, which rele( on'y to ~'prayin~ done by C-123 fl/C.ed-wlng'alrcraft. Judging from the reported lOtal amount d~ he~lotd&' used by,all types a eqUIPmant In 1968 and 1969, it appears that'no more than:20 percent was ap~lIed by means 'other ,than C-123 aircraft. Second, the calculated areas should_be reduoed ,Ily a Jactor estimated anUeast 16 /lercent, ,b~use of the fact that some areas halle been treated more than,once. As these two corrections ,tend to,cancel, each othe~, JI'11'a8 neither is verr, gr6<lt;,they are not tllken into accounrin tl18 table. ,'J' ,- ' •••

~":' 'Dat~ not yet aval able. . , . .: "

.. ,¥er(7),i&td(J8_,Used in Vietnam. Three d1ffere:Q,t fQrm:ulatio:qs ,ac~ount for nearly, !l'/lof the herbicides disseminated In V;letnam, They are known by the deslgna­;tipns. prange, White, and, Blue correspo:qdPll' to the ~olor of the, stripe painted :8;foui:\d the,~~g.llon drums In which they"are shipped from tM United ,St.te~, , ,'they ~are used 'in' Vietn,n'm as r<;iceived, wit,hQut dilution. Their' compo~ittons as ;weU ,as -that 'of ag~nt Purple, an' et;trly fo~mulation very SiLq-ila,r:'to .:9range, are ~11,OV(n In :rable 1; , '.,' , . . ,. il" TABLI!f 1,-MiUtarjJ Herbtoiae. '

\: ',' ", 'c

\lI.)uent Oranla":':~,4-D and fJ,4,ij-T; , " ' : )0" Active In~redients: A, 1-:1 mixture' of.- the n-butyl esters, .of. ~,4-dtchloro·

\ " phenQ~~acetic acid and 2,4;5-tricblorophenoxyacetic .acid. "", II'

concentratIons : ~,l anll ~,t II'J~al, " ' , "Kpp1!~iltrop,; 'u\)i1Ilttte'(I;~t8 '$_l:/"o;'e,'" )' ,c,", Au",,! 'Wlttt.i U"li 'iihd'l'iCtohim' " " : ,'" i " i ), ;,' ,

','" ,.#~t!~vell~~i~E!df,;e~ts~:,·gqff1~::nil~~ure, df' th-e', 'tri-'is~~:p,r~:p'an6~,a,min.e salts 'of ,: 2,¥Ihmd !!"altHnq,!!',5,6-ttlchlOril·plcom:dc 'acid In 'Wl!t~r, " ,'J C~'!"~1itrilt\l>~S:'2,6 a)l4o,/lf1b:/g'J,L" ' , " , ' ,:

, 1l-:W1\c~tlb* ~ ',Wi<ll!uted ~t,,8 ,g&\lacre;' AUMt'Btue; (Jao»iimUtj;'?oid' ",~', , ' ;, " ., " Ac\lv,!', rngred!~ntk:,~i '~':1 "inrl'tUre lif ' sodIum dlinethYI arsenate and dl-

, 'metliyl'ariMnlc actd'lji#/ttiit:' , , , ,,'" " , "Ii'"

i' X~~~iclttl~~Y'ijhtilJf~~~:~'R glil)acre:":'" , , '."", ,Or.n~e ''\'l\isb~ell th~ IJlQst,"exteps1'VSW used, 'accdtn~tlngfOr approximately slxty'percent of'all')\erbictde consumption In Vietnam, It is, an undiluted mlx­tur,eof. tl)e:n'i~obutYle.ters 6f24:-J') and 2,4,1i:"~, Ornnge',.<!t~ a~both a de­fohant atld asystemtc'pJilntknie~Q~ ~roB~J~.tetl atld,W,~04~ ,~el!'etlitlon, It has been used ~ainly;· for forest ,cleal'1ng and 'to In leSSel.'-"~te~t fot crop ·de~ _ atructiQn. In tropical dlcotyle,denous forests, leaf, fall ,occurs in tlll'ee_ to six weeks 'after applicatlo:Q, ~ith' 'srtt-lviving trees or; branches retaliating within a . year/" f'imqar formulations are_ kn9wn,;on tp.~ dpme;sth:! ·he,I:b~Ghie"JD.8Jrket under tlie ,~,j;merlC, 11', ,arne ,,0'1. br,ush kUlers. Qne of ',fh,eSfll-ld, itfe,rl, n,~' SU, g, htl, Y l,ro,In Orange by ,eO\1t~(nl!l$l~, gnutrl,. 2,4,r;:"r a'~1 ~n il441t10ri','1 ,,~gredl,l'!\t .)¥~, s use In v, letnam untllt~65 under tbe n8J;\\."Purpl~, ;tho, 'ISe, of,,O,raI)ge was"o~der.d stopped ',byth,e Depar,tJji~Pt of De(il'4~ .. :tjtA.r?r\1191Q,pecau~ •. ,?f c*l>Gern:arislng frpm tests Qn labW'atory, an,iriltlis, .s~owfng, ·cofp.w~rcial, sflmples _ ~f ,2,4,5:-T ,to be, tef~~9'~etAc,' I,: "1 ( . ""~ <'._' ".:~,," ,-,' n

The ~ next, mbst- cdmomIily, used' h:e'l'bicide: is agent 1Vhloo,:' a- water solutiQ:n ·of the t»i:,.lsopropanolamine;' salts of '2,4.-:.Diland ;piclol"'Qln, 'ltogeilher ,With :~sur';

. fnctantfl 'and- ,n,' 'fust' irihibitor.,,'A.'Ccounting for approximatel~ 'thi1't)p.tp.ercent .of total herbicide cpnsumption,-'it--Jwas,-ftrsf;illtrbduced 'in',~t1ant1ty in '1967 when the military ,demand for"Orange outstripped thcf"U.S.,'pt6duotfoll', lcapa-clty,'for 2,4,5..-T; White is 'llia1lrty':used- ifor! fotrest· 01ea'i:'1ngj giv1,ng somewhat' longe~ lasting results than Otliulgei llSimilar 'fortnula1!ions' l(r~f iused ;', in th~: U~S. fo~ sprk·ytng power :lino·i1g'hts 'of ~/waY'," a:lthough LpiclOl'amJ'is- not -,perinitted for agricultural; applications. ' ' ,. .

Agent Blue is a water solution of the 'sodium salt 'of cacodylic acid (sodium dimethyl' , RrsenaM) ~ Plus surfactants~' rust inhibitor,,' ana-, antifoRm. ,It makes up somewhat lessithan ten percent of' all herbicide use~Vlt'acts to desiccate 01' dry 'out'vegetation 'with which ,it comes into- eontact.-<I:t' HI' tn'ote e.ftective. on grasses than' Orange or White 'and acts'more rapldl!y, withering all, types of vegetation within a ,few 'days. It is used btitlh.;'for defoliatJion and' for crop

. destruction, particularly a'gainst rice. , ' . Piclor-am,-.2 j 4-D, and '2,4,5-T'18.pe all known as plant growth' ,regulators and

cause, similar physiological responses, in<lluding defoliation, ·stimulation of growth, iiidu(!tion ,of "callus formation j', and striking Changes in !bhe shapes- of stems, fruitsj leaves, and other'-Plant parts. These herbicides"may be absorbed either through the· leaves 6r"the poots. Under some 'conditions, herbicide de~ posited·,OD the leaves,'le,aUses them to fall before enough is' -transported ,to cause systemic -poisoning of th'e entire ·plBint. In such 'eases the-, plant ,often recovers. The biochemical ·mechanisms of action 'of these chemicals are ,unknown, in spite' of a great' deal of:',research. However', the main cause' of plant death following systemic pOisbning appears to be unbalanced growth- of tissue,' par~ ticularly phloem, resulting 'in blo~kage of nutrient :fI:ow, and in the formation of lesions'vulnerable td microbial infection. '

M f}~hoa of AppUoation. Herbicide spraying· in Vietnam' is done by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, _,and various types of 'ground" equipment. The principal means of application has been the' twin~engine 0-128 cargo.' aircraft. 'Betwe'en January' 1962 and January 1969, 0-128s mader'more than 19,000 individual spray flightsl The airomft is fitted with· a 950-gallon tank from Which the 'liquid herbicide ·113' pumped a:'t· approximately. '250 ·galloris 'per minute' to spray' booms under each wing and to a, third boom at th~ tail.' It is' discharged' through thirty-two. l'lozzles o:li.9,.5 lnnlim~ter inter~1!"dlameter distributed along the three booms. When the. herbicide, hits the airstream, it is disI?ersed into. drop­lets 'having, :a, mass mean'diameter of 0.85 mll1metel's. Oire aircra,ft produces a rather ,sharply qefined swath,:of' affected ve8'etaiti'0n 'appro:xhnately 85 ~eters w.J:de and 15 kil'o:ti1eters long,' \ de-pending:'son1eWhat' on :t(jpeJiwting condi'tions. Records, of individnal swray! flights 'sugg'esh ttlat, Js'<)tne swatHs 'ar~' up ,to. '100 meters wide and '18- kUoIDeters-: long. Standnr.d:::ot)ellati,ng 'condi~ions ar'e an ~air speed of 240'-kilonietelt's per hO'tlr"and an' altiitude of 60 'meters' above tree top level. 'J' " .

In order tO I 'mlttin1ize inadvertent. 'applieations ,from drift alnd, volfitization; spraying is''not;:supposed toi1be done when 'wind·~~peed exceeds' 15: kilometers per hour or temperature exceeds 29~t], "GtrlcUlations 'bs:sed:'on) assumed -drdp size distributions. suggest that even with a 15 kilometer per- hour wind, drift should not be" an, -ltnp6i1-tant- problem 'beyond' about 8 kilorriete'rs< ,from the line of appUca,tion, 'Hmveve-r,-, tlhe ab'tual' drop ~iz-e· -distribution) !fUr the 0-128 equip~ mellt has not been 1!I~,s11red in t1je 1Ie)<'I,. " , " .'" ' •

Aerial ".l'raylng ~y' belj~opt~r 'IS .done by tbe U¥-~ "RJ/eY!'airctaft mounting ,a 200 gal~9n tank: 1f.~r :GI'~P, d,a~ ruction Pli,~si?n~, the ~ppHc;!a~~<;l~ 'rate i~ some­times reduced t~ aboue ''\lalf lobe xalueU.llver.", by 0'-1~3, since even aMut 1 gallon of 'lllqe 'l'er''l9r~ 1.'ep.Q.u~h to preve)l.~, 'tn. llu!J1iratioJ;\ of rice.

LbcaUon of herbi&UlQ'Up/rUcatlons.'N'o' systematic and detailed infolimatiQn oI). the,.1ocat1ons of herbictd~ s~l·Q..Ying, in, Vietnarv. ,has, b~e~ made genernlly 'avaH-' able. HoWever, tbe J1.~. ,,;\pnY, Jibemlcal Stalf' In ,,~.!gbn has kel?t a log :f.or each 0-128 mission since' July 1965: Records for spraying be'fore that tUne may be. qn file in o:ql<;hl1 ~i'chives ,lJ;ept in, Omal1a, Nebraska,. 'and St. Louis, Missouri. The log 'in 'Sa:igbn includes' the data most ~elevant to, any fijtudy of herb~c,1de ~ftec~. ~hese are the dates and ,map; coo:r;,dina,tes of spraying; the type of herbicide, and' the ,quaQttty' ac~p.~U~ .!$!lrayed: Map coorpj.nates ar.~, given to the ne.re~t 100 meters: At I'r\l~.nt; tlIis)!J.formatton IS ~l.ssilled Oonjldentia!.

AlthOUgh'r".truIY ~f!.tiBflil¢tory 'ln~Qrnuit1on ,1s ~lut;lavallable at present, it is

possil>J;e,:tQ' put: :tOgether u rougll idea-· ofi)tlre ~ amou-nt {Qf."terraih. ·_o~ :diri'ere:Ilt .tYP~!3 ~that ha$J been, $p.vRyed and'i'of'tberlocnUoD<9t the,.,pI,'Incip.aLq.J!el}s ():f hea:yy exp,ds:p,re. T4is:,has_',beelt;,done .on ~he',basis. o:ll;<PU1111Sh,ed:~'inf~rm~tj9n and" ae),1.al . .observations rila'de.by ,our$elvel:jl~a:nd,'by .otJJ,ers., '--:-_ :, ,', ~; .- _,~':~,.,. -: '

.: TropiOahlifwraw_ooQ,8,. The 'gr,eatast exp,~n4ittire Qf. her,blctde$:jI):~ Vl~lnam. has been .oD_ fairly ,ma:t':l~e::tront~alf:ha'rdwo.od torest.,-:,~lalPl):).",places",tJ:H~ aYen ·.of such fore.tspr~yed, 'lihrOllgh ,1969, ,at 18,500, sqnare ltiiQmet¢rs, about a t~lrd 'l,t it Stlvay:ed_,mor~ t~an ,once./,llardw.o_od for~&tsof one,;'kind'))f another andY'in

. , :v:~rio'us 'conditions mnke up about nil1e-tenths Df forested land" in JSDuth V1et­nam~,<.ri'he forestny_\{serviGes' of the }t~rench ,coIDniaL.gDVernment ,esfhp.ated, the tQ~al area ,~of' eCDnom,ically caluable, hardwODd 'forests at ,'50,000 equaTe 'kilD­meters, leav.1ng !=mt ,fQfe,gbr that were badly degraded, very,_young, or .:located on

,J par,ticularly -iURc'ces,sible, :lllQun_tain tellrain. ~ ',recent estimate', .ot _' the_ tota.'! h,~ rflw,oo,' d ',fDre.st estate, ,baS,Cild on, IQw ,resolution-~ ae, rial p~otograp,p-y and on UIS. Army terr-a1n travel ,di;tftculty maps is 100',000·, square kilometers; How­ever, this includes a large fraction of the' fDrest Ju. the cep.tral -highlands that ,is' ~ept at a 'W~l'Y ·,E!arly:·' aueces/HQnal stage QY_ ,s'wldd,en 'agriculture .. An.-,lnter,riIedi-

. ate 'va-h1,e, about 75,00Q, ~qnare. kilQmet~rs;,.can be· eatimated from a :,y:egetatiDn map,'publish~c,i ,by the,}'il'Dyernment o:f'Vietnam. As' a rDugh-·'apprQx1.mttttDn;then; It·.appears that , I!!ome: twenty ,percent Df th.e,~elatl.v:ely mature hard'wDod' fQ~e$:t has bee1\l,treated'Jwith herbicide,!:;, ,a third Df ,it.-nlore'JJhan Dnce: ;, "" .' ..

Mangro.ve, ana Rean Mangrove. To th~ sOl,1thw:est .Df.'-S~gQn{;·,and alQng ,much' Qf-Ahe coast, of "the "D~ltaJ: are dense mangrove forests j:!overlng -, -abQut ,8;000 square'-.knQmet~.r,$. Aocording to;'JXschirley', about Qne·third:'Qf-.this f~l;e&t;r_,type .uad been ·,sprayed: by the end Qf 1961. ''Yjith.,cD;p,t,inued ,herbicide ,Qperations in'

, the Pelta) the p1'OPQrtion,:is:,JlOW ·probabtv ,-,<,!lo.se', to. Ol)e half. Inlan,d from the mangI;'Qves: in the· w~st~rn 'pur.t. o.t the delta 'are nearly 2,000, 'square Jdlometers . Df fDrests of Melaleuc9' ieuoadendron, sometimes: CEiI~ed: ref.!,l" ptnngrDve, We fl,re llnaware 'of hDw,much,' if any, of this fQr.e.st. type, has ,.been spr.,ayed "~_

StriP .fipr.-aying."·4I=dde frDW -bJocl~s Qf ,fQ1'est, within which her.bicides. have, bee)! ext~nsi-vely -applied, 'a' ,c()Ilsiderabltt- aJ)lount Df sprayfll~,; ,has, been ,done;, in 's)iort',nar,rQw strips" scattered_ widely' thrQughDut SDuth Yietnam., :Strip (as oPp,Q~ed, .to blQ.c) sPray-~ng' l:lAS peen dDne alQng rQadsides, pel'hneters of "J;Uili,.. t.a,rYi'installations and also -in fQlle$ts. In:the Delta, it has'been,dQne, along 'canals. ~il(l rivers. , Altl)DUgl). m~ch Qf ,it: ,has_ been' accDmpUshed by 0-123s, a large fra.ctiQn:;h,as been done by helicDpt~xs and therefo.re may 11Qt ha:ve been, system-atically I:ecQr4e~. , ';' - 'J., , "J', _"~' ."," .

Orop De8truotion. Finally, somewhat 'mDre than-:2 j OOO squaxe kilom,eters Df Gr'Dpland, -is rep.orte4 t9 have, ibJl~P' ~prayftd. If. little of -,this: area includes. -re­$praying, it WQuid represent,abQut .. tlV'e pe,rcent Dt the 38;OOO,:,square' kilometers Qf 'crop land ,in South, Viet:p.am, Qf which ia little over ~WD ,percent, was, sprayed' io, the, peak year Qf 1l)67. "Beb.lg.",~oC!ated almQst entirely A,n, the central highR

lan,d/i!, ra-tJ;t,er than Dn mQre' ,prDductive ,.soil, the :p.ercentage .of ,the_ total national crop' prQduction affected would be less than the percentage Qf 'SDuth Vietnamese farinlan~ that -has been ,$pt:ayed., However, Dn,J.y abQut a -tenth,·ot. ,South Viet· nam'g"farm land is ~A tb~, J;dghl~d,s,':.~D that within, this region a' '-cDnsiderable frae.tiou_ .of the farmland has-,been sprayed. -,

, ' ",', .'-( ~ q'. ~ , .,-',

HEABIOWE-TPX1COX,9GY: -I3TILLBIRTl(S,'AND BIR'tH ,P1llFli:CTS . RAq DBSERYA.'f.:(ONS-'A,NP PJ?OBLEMS FO.R',S'rltD'I', "

, ;rpefollow,ngjs ~n, an~iysisot th~ "'Wk, Wh[ch*~~ 'doneh the,liAC fn th¢ ,evaluation .ot, t)W_, feas.i,b1Uty Dt ,d~rop:iIst~at1ng ,~y __ chang,e, in t,he, .. patt,ern, qfJ;ilr~hs !nVlHna)n,Whlcl1 )l)lg.1,thave res'llteil,fromthe"e,;P?rure ot "orile :of the Vietnamese p,opulat1o~l' to. ?,i4,1:i-~, 0.1', ita ¢Qntaminant <ho:x:pi, a~ents, wltlch have ,~een ,repQrttici"tQ 'bl{tera'tQgEfqlc, 'under 'cer~ft,i~' l#~_~,r'ato'ry- ~c~nditions -,IIi

~e:~'t;d:~maa~~. ~iiG,h effe~t's' cit: the ,2,4,!r-T ~xpos~~e: ~ 9ft; _th~ "~ietiia~es~, p,opuia­tlOIl are, to b,e,\lete~te(j,ItWQ)lld be appropriate to stUdY ,tb.ese In ,at iea$t fOUl" WJlYS,JDoking fDr: ' ,.' " '-/' "'}~'f"'" -. __ '-: ,':, "":':,>:,, , _' ,,_',

.:-1; Cha,:nge,s tn the:o~uJ·te:p.c~ Of ,It'alfo):mationa,;~r.td/or EiUIl,births in.-a , relatively ~t&,~le poriillatiol),., , " ':, ' ' " " " ',' > ' :l': Ohanges" in tlte" fi'~queIlCY Of anY: Of tne more c<\in;)(6n,!ilen~lfilible '~~I*orlD.at1o,os ,iiI.. ~el~tiQ~ ,to ,'9~I:er;. c~~m~~ m,~~~ormatJ.op~'. ; ", i, ~ _ _ ..,

31\"rh~'_<relat1V~IY _sudden apearanc~ ,o_~. an,'<o_~her~vi$e, very' "rfi::t~:"or-;un­known deformity iii" SigI).ificant . numbers (th~ classicaJ prevf~>us-"ex'alnple being thalidDmide induced phocDmelia).

12a.

" 1<.qhfrW!~S;.lri<the'I)lCI~e'lce of ;'V';'IfI~.~hnoFJIltilltie.; "QIj;~OlDlc.l.· or ,.·,;b\ologlG;ithat, J;la~ve-,b.~en: 'SJ:tOWrll tQ, res1J.lt :_from la»,o~atQry 'exper.~~l;ent~ w~th ;, ,2-4.r~/r t~ ltnl~als.<_ . _ _ _, "'.!: _ ,,' . "~,, _, ,"_"" _. ..:'

- '_" -;OonSi4e_~ .. at.jOll.·." 'W,il.l, be _~.I~.,en' :to __ each" -M . these >POS~ltlUitie.s .. ,-, .AU, .. 9~ ·them: are - ,some,wfuJ.:t -,d1fijcute:- to examine precisely but. n'q.ll1~er$ _ two, t.tnd thre,e' are;, " we'

l?elieve, ,s,u~j~ct,_to.'I:elative1y: ,p;t'egi'se evaluation .e~~n_,ul1:der,.war tim~: c.onditio'ns_ . in Vietlitfm, wbtle thejlrst:~d,last are Ii great;(.(eal':,mo,r.e diJfic:u1t to ~.1ucldate. ,These m,ethodS):of study- alie ,,~ll",subjeQt, tp ,very signifi9ant:1i~itatiQns, -some.' of wh1ch:a'f,ei'I,lpW'p~ese~ted. , ", ,,;:, ,'.' 1 , _,;'. , ' " ' ,

'Size, ,(tn-d' ACo.epsibiUt'l/"of. t1w. Pqp,ulatiQ,n Jj),«JPQSed Direotly ~o' 1(m;1)_icides., AI· though; atS freq,uentJy )wte(j.; t1).l'ougho_ij,t tIlts report" pt;~cise JnforIU~tton as to aU the ,1ocation~" of l}el'bictde .'sprayin~ AAs not' be~n", made -,_ava:ilab~e -to, the ItA,C',; and it, is tl),erefore,: d!Piqwt to: be cel~tai:l,l:~b,qW much ,detol~~tiQJl''',bas in fact been done in -more depsely popUlated ar~as" it; nevertneless,',appears to be tr:ne, that. Jhe b,v,l,k: of Ag~nt Orange, used illj "Vietng,m has -been ,spray~d in -"rela·' _lively "retnot~ :·an,d.- sparsely: pQp'Q.lated' areas of ,;,PIangrove- _and, a.ther forests, ,~his fig'Qre is 'J)a:t:~icul~rly Ihfp:.:d; to: estimnte" slp.ce ,the c,rop ~estruction, _pro: ,grllm is. carried' out' iJ};,~ore P9ptilated ar.ea~, and ulthoUgl:) Agent Blue, (with· out, a,4,~':(1) has ,been +.avored _.for' this, Agent Ol1ange, AIitS, al~o, been .-used._, ' T~e,populatio~ ,q.irecny expose,,-:, to,,',2,4;,5::--T presl,lm!,lbly d,oes not exceed ,jiv.e

pe:r;c~nt (an(i, maY, ev~n -be ,one, perc,ent or, lesfiI) of the tot~l population,: of,,, Viet· J;lftInJ "q.lthough' this, must be mor~ .ac~~~ately determined ,trom .precis,e ,spray

, data, ,ThisAactor, a,lphe' s,trikingly dilutes' 'Rny- ,app~rent effects of the spraying o~ birth statistics, wh.~tl those directly ,exposed are,·adde:d to,,·the tota1 statistics ~k{the .couI\try/. ,put , th~s effej:!t, is ,ev~ri ':mpre aCcE;!ntuated, by :thq- ::Cact that -m,Qst of, thif:J POP~lllti~l1~,if! ~ecessarily ip re,mote and usually insecure' a:reas and ~~~;I;ffot;~. infor~at~.op regardi.ng-:Jll:ed~cal ,~ffects, if any" 'cfI;n only be gradually ~'*Plfcted:;,t9 fil~er ,-put from h~.-,~te,s ·of direct exposure, An -unknown .proportion, ,b¥t"probab~y, q:u~te significant" of the exposed' pppulation, con~ists of Montag· n~d people wbose births ar~ Iip.:t;'mally- at home or in villages -and are -rarely rec~rded ill: .the ,qQv~rnm~nt "of Vietp,aro' medical sy.~tem or allo~ed ,for in the PVN sl;ljtistics.,. .' . ...: '. .,.,." .

Stat'U8 of Ji,eoord8: Availability and Aocuracy." In"gem~rall mateN,lity records (tr~ tn i_SOlpe, respec~s"amotlg t.b.e J;U9st ,r.,!!Uable, available, to ~he field" investigator in Vietnam. ,-Tradltionallr, midwifery in -. Vietnam has b~en strictly inde· pepd~nt and,r £;mplojr.i:IJg,.' female: ni~c;lwivesJ' has been, rather less 'subject to ,change-pf personnel :tbl,ln 'h(ls,the rest_of the Vietnamese healt1:l, system, J;n all ,l.1o.t;lpi,tal,~:' Ii\t'"d'ifJj)ensa:ri~s, .S,tn-fted by B.,;.'mid;wife', wheth.er"naUonal or Imral, a d~Jl:r ,recor~ booJr is" kept -,in, .-which, all, deliv.~:n·ies -are recorded,: It is agreed ,by _alm9st ,all "ob.s~rv.~rl;i. t,hat >;~h1.s l'ecord" pro,viding th~ original ';,has not beell lQ~t" I§ "Xe.3:l?p;nal?ly',,~~cur,4'te a,S, ,tal:- as' the_ Itlnit~d" informationdt: contains, Tii-qsl it: i~: oUl· .. ,f_ee1ing.- that. alJ1l(?,~t comple~~ ;accuracJ7 is tlvailable" concer,ning the,uumher ot births, :;Iex",of the ohildren, weight of the newborn and, wheth~r 01', '40t the hifant-,suJ:vlv,ed":);u"theory,, obstetrionl 'abn()rmaUties or infant mal· f6:rmati\:>Ds ~~e' l,'ecoi.'ded,,:~f: these,'.api po~iti:v~ly'~;noted in 'a record, then they

" ,~are.'li~1iable, :~t least ,:w~tWn -t#.~ di~gnostie:acumen of the -midwife recording ,'them,- _butl as will be 'shown subs~quentlY a negative record is. of, 'no sigtiifi· canc~ 'd)Yh~t,$o~vl}!r, I~ Is _our ,;b¢~ief 'that,_, within "tJu~.S.~, 'isjmp~e' statisti(!s, the IW. ~ut.a., c.~, .of .. pr9v.ln~i1~ll;h0f;1Pitals, distr,~c., t, ,hospHala; {ltid:rym .•. ge' msp,en. sarles is ~~mparitb~e.,,,;rliis a~sumptlon;.may not ,be,s.tJ,'ictl,y:, tru"e and is,.subject, t9 factors SQ<;h as :the: 4~sirab1lity of regh:;ltr,ation' 'ofJiv.i-J).g_ children, which -;might lead to t. he c6nc~al~~p..ti ,of _~.' stM. lQir~h. or .neonat.al de!ith i' 91:1.": t.he, reluctance, of village or dls~~ict ·m/i\i\Vlve. ,to·.,reno't'~"rge nUl)lb""s ... Qf.stUl)*t]lswhen transfer. of !ii#1<tlllt, ~'as~~ to ,the, -provlucj.al r;t'l9~pi~al is\f:}xpeet~d by 'th,e- 'Minil!Jtry Qf Health. ~{)n:ethel~ss, ,14e. 'unl(o~lll' ~agreeDlent of·;numerous, V:ietnaw.ese doctors ,a,ld" miO­~i",es _with _ Whom ,:w~,; ~q1,l~lJ~e,d, t};lat"this reporting, Is riuS:l,lPilly; -,relia~le, sUpp~)rts 9,JIr 0»1. nion ... In .. tll.e ca.PI.t:q.\.· ar~. (~ajgo:q.,G.!la PI.l\h. ) 'lD.o,der.n sta.t!stlca\. m.et.hodS )i~n~e, ~e~t;I ~ntr04po~Sl;i ,paJtic~1.arly, 'fltl:mWbu,:t,and oinct;e,asing __ accuracy .i&, re ..

n~~:" !m~~~~#~,lfe~iih)~8tem: Tb,., \IIlp1shy ofk~aitl; pro;jsl~n foutlle mdl~~t f~re"oUlteliie~nle ,of, Vletnal)l ,I. th,rougb a system of r,ather strictly grad~d ,.I¥eg~c~ ,la~ it~es.:, A, v~llage ,:wilt oft~D" ,but. no,t-, al Waws, contain a dis~ 1/.,\\~rYA>,f .. ,e'ltr~~.~IlI!pll~I\Y "st;;Jted,JiY .• a ,rural Pea.lt'l worker and/or' mill, wife with -only a few 'months training. Nonetheless, in one--province studied by the HAC nearly -twiee as many births Were tecorded in village dispensaries as In the provjncial hospit~1- for a comparable period,

Al~ diafullpt'capitais"have"a,dispensary' anll 'at 'the 'time' 'Qf,tll~'VI$lt" of the HAC 'It'was"l'eported bY"I;lJ~ MInistry of Ji!ealth'tli.at"~ll '9rtjl"~' )V,el'~'at',least ' parthtlly staffed. PerSOllll.el- usually in_elude nfltl()1la~:.healtbJ:'W{)rk.ers','fJ.nd. xp,id­wives; iliany-, bt~-whom>Jtte--' well.1!1'ainei:1 •. but tihe'se!'facHities' do:'~ '~ot-'n~rrna~ny, have, adoator .",allable' and except for dellvlNlos USUally db, not' hn'fe In-'!5atitnt facilities, In 'the province' .tuaNd In' aetall 'bY',the HliO' the' ,distriWldTspehsarles .del1verr<!' somewhat 'tewer' children than the.l?~{)vincial H0S}Jital. r,"', ,(", _, ':

i AU 'p'rovlncial"capitals 'have a "hosplMl"wit-h-1 :do'e'tors·' as well~'-as '1l:_ntlonaUy trained nurse~ and,; midwives. There is. it ve~t Wide rh\1Jge of. quality': at,n~mg these faciUt1~~ and . some' overl'api with 'certain _ district dispehsaries __ better staffed ahd' equipped than .some provl.nclal.! hosp1tn,l~,; In" addition, there are the' medica.!, t'n:ciHties in the"''larg~r', cities" ,not provincia:l'<:capitals,' -i-J;'tcludtlg ;Pa~ Nang 'and. 'Saigon: These include specialty hospitals and, in' _general,' tile, best facilities in the -country: , , ,. It ' _' - __ ', ,'j, _ "

Because- of, ,Weir' acce,ssib111ty andJ!concentration, of_:roore interesting, patients, most studie::W'of ,Vietnamese' medica:! statisfjcs- have been madel : at the level 'of provincf:aI-- 'and city hospitals 'alth.ough nl()st',patlt':ttts, and', particularly· a large number of deliveries, fire, in fact;; 'cared for'at the district and village,,~evel; Records 'of these' smaller- filcilitles show a 'strikingly lower -level of-,stillbirths and obstetrical difficulties. than do provincial' hospitalS. _-';I.'hi9 'is believed to be a t"uestatetnentofthe'faclsbyl~I1nlstry ofH,ealth officials and, the IiIAO, and pr~sumably'_reflects We referring of· dl'ffiC'ult (!ases, to 'proy-in¢ial 01' c~tr h6'8-pitals;' Military security and"'-8.d:eqtlact of transportation "will, of eou;'_se,' im­prove' We' degree of' referral 'and, tend to, -increase the df,fferential reported 'I)e­tween'the twO' g,roups of~rep6rtitig hospttali3(;In the- capftaJ, :approxlmatelY ottt! quarter of the: babies 'lire- delivered at Ttt Du, a large te~chlriir hOsPita.l devoted exclusively to'mater'tilty, another quarter are,:,_delive,red 'at other, gQverntilen,,~, hospitals, ahd 'abont one~half a~ private -nlll;ternities. These 'l'attt~r;",-are 'very quick to refer patients'to the government hos1>ita-ls ,anl'l,.~'eport'essehtially·no complic~tions· ,Ifo':r feaF of difficulties' with thE! Ministry' of':' Health. ',In '-thIs respect, it is- of interest to note -that--nearly o:rie-halfCot',the total ,maternal deaths reported ,by Tu ::pu in 1965 were, in fact" ref,erred "in ,e~treirlls", from outside hoapifal'S; -T-he:" efficial"health statistIc' l'epoi1' 'of- the gb-vel'ntn'etlt of Vietnam- for" 1961 : states :' "Moreover, ';priv~te maternities, dare not"'tell the truth on the deaths'of who came for delivery.", ',' , ,'" J" <

The registration of' 'births in:- 'th~ Republic Qf; Vletna~In-' iSI 'stin' ~ery JincOlil­plete, It is ,believed that close to all,of 'the" births iit the' capital firea a-re reg1steved', In'tlle~-rr-ema:inder of ,the: country, ctirreht go'vetnm~nf','eat1nlates- are that about one~half of all'-births, are- registered tn"anY"forrn 'and, as ~~ sn~n :;lee in 'the'-CIl-se' of Ta'Y Nlnh, 'the';provlnclal hospital",itself may 'DOt' 'be an R'C­curate' reflection of figures' -for, the entir'e proviIice. 'Although ·we empblJ.~ze' tl)e accuracy 'as to birth we~ghts an'd"stillborns',of the,m~'dwife rec6rd'boQI't~ when they can be Mn~lted iii th,eir _,original fortil it' ca'1;lilOt be' ovet;'-stres,sed '~hat the recording of 'Gonge~,it-al'· abnormalities' is 'eX:tt'~):!1'ely ,p~tchy anq. '_se~ms tp reflect'the interest of the; midWife af diff~rent periods;~ ,'The n'li<i:\'Vi-Ves froIn whom we received such good help in tliis:',study nea'fly luilformly'agreed as to, this deflcIEmcY. I ,', ''-'',_ tj' 1'-" " .1, __

Even when malformations are recorded, tlieil' nature ill! otten~ 'in:completely noted;, OnlY in the Mpl1iaT IS cleft pat.vt~ distingulsped from cleft lin' In' the records ',and' a numbe'r of: ~idw1Ves ,agreed -that the inside Of ,the :moufb. 01 the infants was, 'almost neV'et' examined, The' 'nature of' fatal an9trJaUe'S: f~ ver:Y rarely recorded'Rnd esse,nt~ally;'no' autopSies, !:'Ire performed O~'$til1bo~ns, '"

Rate. 0' Stl!!blrtlt8 a1i!l;:iRepo.lea.'O/mfll!i\l!fdAntnnaUe. In'the'Oapltld an!! Province.. The extensive' Sfmdy of" congenital mMformatlons hYdatid,U:otri! moles aud .tillblrthll1n, the ;RepUblic of Vietnam '1960'1009 carried out Uilder the auspices of the Depa;,~m~nt'of the Army aud'the V'tetl!ameseMlnlsfrf of Health by a team headed by Dr: Robert T. Cutting h •• nowbec6m. a'vall.lile aM'mdsf of the moreUtnltedln"e.tJgatlons catiied ont bitJi.' HAO 'millie '~lated to thiS, major army underta,Jdng. Unfortl,mately" in SVi_W"Of per"slstent, e:ffc:>tts, ,"',tJrl.'s material was not available to the HAO at the time of' thei". vlolt to Vleloam:

flalgrm. Studies of, the reeord. 'of T'IDu' for, Jhe last, decade, which -i1,clutle about one-quarter" 9f' registered -Saigon _ deUveries and (!o'Verlhg -betwtren 12,OQO and 80;000 birth. a ,Yea~I •• h~w a dej!ulte deerens"),, stlll\JI!'tl> , 'rate~; The'r~

, ,- ',- ',.

w~s' "hoteable dltlcollt:lnuftyf In' 1967' 'Whei>ltlie ra:re,tellfJlrom: 86"IfertbUilsan~,I"; 'l~66':and '88', per"t1tditstind In 1965 to, '26 !lilt thOusaitd ilindi:feuialn~d?lIt, this,' lowet-"le'VeI .for, 1~~ a·tidr at- 129' 'per tbdusand·" in', tt96~ DuriiIg::" the" 'same ~pe~e<t, . there ,was a slight reductioQ..ln the ove,raU- rate of reeorded ·ma:lformat1.()tte. It.:1a the opon~ou. ,ot tlt(l, medical statl' ~t Tu D:u. that some, at least, of the- re­,d'!~t1011'iPt the st,llIblrth, rate Is ,from ,conSiderably hnPNVed, medlclll care its .-shown [)y the :tact tl\filtl in,' Jtbe "yea~s 1~8-1964 ,no ~ables und_er a ldloatAnl in weight- survive,d .. ·out of 310- being born alive while in 1.90ti, and_1966, 51:Lsul'=­vlved out Qti891 delly,er~d. ,,' " " " ""

," The rate 'Of 'hy(lratldllorm moles at 'I'u Du also, dropped sllglitly. ,~t'shQjll4 be noted tllat the tlgures form"les at Tu' Du report<>d by Cuttlngld~'notlil' -elude chol'iocarcinomas which, at most prOVincial hospit'rils' are included-in the mo\e.ilHlt\'fIl' ,'¥lllf wpulil,,' ~als~ !pe, !VuDu, pe~ce~\~~e, by ,M~FIY tl'f'ent1 ,p'erc~nt

d¥fofJ,,~::,w1~~:,n~~,r, /li,~ :Mtilll: ,slUd;?; r~1f9rt,a, ,afJ'},M,'~,i;8:t .i,~w, '1\,,'i>tIi'ii,::i1,: ~n", sh!l,-bl~ths uurlng tl)i!;'~~1)Ipdl~IiOi~96~,,'t,a~~lIg IIUo! tue, ,data, t0ll'ethe~ .. 'T~IS I~ ShOWll."II~j"tp,e,'~~~,.I)~~ 4l, ',' ",~ ~ X:Jlr, :?'4)ilng" t,,~.e,cq1UMr~'Y'(le, ~a~",lnfOl're, ~nd'll~h~"1W"lflllR'Y~fi~~,a9 I1,Wpo) and he~,vy, sl'r~Y\1\g ,~e~~,:f i!!l~-~969~ ,tne stl pl~~II, r~tes,!4F!\'f~Urid',t,oa:ver~g,e ,S6.1 lind' ~2;O,~e,F:t)\~and ,', y~ 11I,tl:\\ respect vely. lrinding a' siniiI~r' downw.ard tretid itl mol(fs- ail'd de't~fmU:te~, CU ,. tlng conclUdes that "Sorting the data mto two time periods, betor. (,1960-1965) and after (1966-1969) tbe large scale military use of herbicides, falIe" , to shoW any -,effect of herbicide~. Rather,' a downward trend lY~n, 9bswv~fliil-"itll llategoriei( of "abnormal birth events." "However; these trends' 'ar~ cait'sw:by the d.ata,1 froni_lh_e capital area, (Tu Du, Hung,_ v,tfong, Bieh' ,Boa)", which';'Rccount for, p.pproxlmately.two-thlrds, of the births ,studied, W1f.JjA);t~ data!·~or the capital are subtracted the tre_rids are reversed. 'Tliis may b,e 'seen bel-ow.1

,

".'.'-:' ,..... ',<1')'; ), t: ABNORMAL BIRTH EVENTS AS REPORTED. BY CUTTING

, '",' '.>,

;! '

. 60-970-7b-pt. 1--9

. 'Rllte&;p'erthou'sa~'dliv~.bltths :,1.

• .l\~)~8r!l!~; H~'it~~r.!

32,~ . 5.6 4,S

38,S as 3..l

126

shown f_rom ,these :~ecotds in Tay, Niu;h<.tlutn rlacorded *"uy;wb,ere .el~~,.by _ C~tt~g and .hls group. Tl1e HAC noted 851 stlllbirthain the ye~", 1968 an(!.19~9dl1e years for-.w.hioh Cutting reports,208.· The data for Tf\Y Ninh Olty provinCial ho~tlital 'are as follows: - ; -"

1'(','

Livebirth!J ' . Stillbirttis Rat. ~9r l~OOO

' I vebirths

2,765 v

161 . 58.0 2,361 190 .80. , 1,68~ III lO~o'O

1~8 ___ . __ •• _. __ ."_" __________ . ___________ . __ ·_. ___ .~ ___ . __ o •• _ ••••

1969 ___ ••. __ , ••••• ·" •• ,~. _____ ._'~_. __ " ____________ • ________ ~. ____ ._., 1910 (7 months). _.'" ___ • __ .' •• -.--"-,t- .• ".~~.- _. ________ '._'. _____ "_ ..

. It :was vei'Y striking that among',2,551 ;b'irths' r_eco~ded' iii 1969', Dot 'R slnglt~ specific cO)lgenital; deformity or IDl!-lformation WlJ.S noted,. <~b:e -'midWives, the chief>,af whom' had b:een there fo~, ,ten Years, agreed ',that a tair number of deformities had beeu seen but had not been, in 'fact; ,recorded. ' " ..

W were ~ble to survey all of the rep,orted, ~i~ths from, _ vil~age, di,"'~,ict$j and 'provincial facilities, in -Tay Ninh for some recent months and in this way try 'and weigh approp,rtately the importance of th~ proviricial hospital as are· porting agency. . '

Year: . . , Lwebirth8 1967 (9 months)' ________________________ --------------:------- 1,818 1968 _____________________ --------------------.-------- _______ 2,765 1969 _________________________________________________________ 2,361 1970 (7 months) _______ , ______________________ . ___ , _________ , __ ,.1,688

. , 1 As recorded by outtIng. Orlginal data book unavailable to HAC.

Tay Ninh City provincial hospital has shown a remarkable monthly uniform­ity in births since 1967 with annual totals something under 3,000. Records have also been fairly consistent from the two larger of the four district dis­pensaries in the province. The largest, Heiu Thien, with 1,000 births per- year approximates a provincial hosp1t~1 as a facility. For four, months in 1970 essentially complete figures are available from all of the districts and villages in Tay, Ninh :province as well as 'the provincial hospitals. The_se inClude all medical facilities reporting to the ,Ministry of Health and are said: by their officials to include over seventy perc~nt of total births in the distr,~~. Th~y show that during this period, February tl1rough June 1970 (exclud!Jlg April for which reports were incomplete)' 2,281 birtlts with 20 st11lbirths (i.e., 8.8 per thousand livebirths) were reported from -the districts and villages with the village dispensaries accounting for about two·thirds of this number, while during the same'-period" Tay Nin,h Olty Provincial HOf;lpital, reported one-half .s many blrllis, 1,028, wltl1 89 stUlbirths (I.e., 95 per. llionsand liveblrths). more than ten times that of the outlying districts. Cleady, therefore, the birth staUsttcs ,from Tay Ninh Oity Provincial Hospital, with a stillbirtll rate- of 95 per' thousand, are q:uite diff,erent -f,rOIn_ those froIn all .Qf Tay N~h Pl'ovince including villages and districts which reported.a combinejl total of 3,309 births with 1,09 stillbirths or a rat~ of 34 ,per 1,000 l!vebi;rths. 'Although specific deter~ minations were not made:in' other p;rovinces, except partially in th¢' ~ung Sat, it is e;xpected that differing degrees ,of. variations of thi~ sort will be found in l1ll prQvinhlal capjt.~l hospital atatiRtics as coru,pa;red to complete :p_~o"1nces. It Is noted that If ilie districts and villages were able to reUuce their stUlblrlli rate by one-half, by referral, this" would' 'not be sufficient to fully explain the .d~scrEl:pan~y,.in ,stillbirth rates. Hetter than fiftY,percent prenatal diagIt,9sis of Impending stillbirth Is unlikely to be consistently pOssible. We do not know the rea,son fO,r- this strikil;lg. difference, in Tay Ninh. W,e. note, tp'at all districts surveyeq by Cutting i~"various parts',of Viemam also'showed very low still-birth rates: -

• It was noted that in, 19,69, :Wb,lle 184 stillbirths w&'Ili, reported In the summaries glven at the end _of each mOlith tn the data 'book if eVery birth registeted 'wall tDcU­vtduallY examined'; '190 stillbirths were n~ted.

127

AIJ,lnCi<l#lJti" s~udY",lV~s,wad., of the, ,~revalence, of, twinning at Tay Nlnh qt~:li:osP!,t'U., t',the,<p,erloll July 196Wl:O July l~70(excltldl1,lgthe twolllonths 11I'1970,,~o~ \ir~h,jWlliiUi;~$ at. <avanatile) < 1~1nultlple births occutred.i\1-cludi~,<~9~ se~,of :trlplets. otit 'Of, 'a <total' of 7.019;, ot aPllroxlmately 11,2' per

. ,1,Q6Qr:41~ost exactly: the'sRme flgu,re a:s r,eported by·Drs.;,-Oliver and Hong ·for !!alj;qtl<ln1952 to 1962<' " < < ,,< , ' ' " , <, < ,<

l!.ung'Sqt, . . ",. ,~lmnar" ~ess extensiv-.E: survey, 'of the RSSZ, area ,was cnrrJed out. DispenSttries at Cati' Gfo .and"Quang XUyeD' Closely bordering the defoliated mangrove 'forest -annually reported several hundred births with. very low' rates ot stillblrths ~n« no deformities recorded. We were ,defipitely' informed that any patient ,Wjt\>'lniP,eDding stillbirth or evidence of obstetrical complications w.as_ :reter~ed to VUll$" Tau. A,lthoug)l ,Vung Tau serves as ,the' provincial -hoSM pital 'for',this area. it 1s' not ,in fact the prov!hcial capital but ,an independent 'ctty. Vung 'Tau, Hospltal with' a m0l1,th1y, birth rate ver'~ 'Close to ,that of" Tay Ninh snowed a .strikingly lower rate of· Stillbirths; 26 '_per 1,000 'in _1968 and 3o<pe~<1.000 In 1969 (9 months) and 22 per thousand In 1970 (7 months')<· The rate o'f'twirinhig was 8.9 per 1,000 ,(54 out of 6.198).- It is 'of interest that.' among this large number of births only one mofe is recorded; This patient was transferred -to Tu Du in Saigon.' During the same period., 'R total of '6,198 births, were repoJ,'t~d, with no co~gen1tal abnormaUties'T~corded. ' ' "'i, h

Although Vung<Tau includes in its referral area a fi:one of intensive, defQlla­tion 6f m(lJlgJ,'o,,!,es, most ofUts patients may be supposed to ha,ve"had minimal herbi,cide, 'exPQsure ,either dirt:ictly or"possibly'through the food chain. ,They a,pparently do' Dot . regularly eat fish from, streams' emanating- from -sprayed forests as' do inhabitants of Tay Ninh. _ ' ; ,

Oonolusi0n8. 'Fo:r the proper comparison of prOVincial 'birth 'statfstlcs, it is ~sseJ:!.tial that,total prov-incial figures, including district and village dispensaries and allowance for referral out of the province be obtained. This has beel\-' done by the HAC for TllY Ninli. Other, total ,provincial figures not being iIt ,hand for comparison, the _faot nonethel(~ss' remains that 'I'ay Ninh City Pro-v-incial Hos· pital, serving a he,av-ily de'foliated pro.vince, showed an average stillbirth -rate in 1968 and"1969 of 68 per 1,00.0 livebirths. During this' same time, the Tu Dti rate was 27.5 per 1,000 .and that of' the Army sample of the entire country 81.2 per 1,000. The rate of 68 per 1,000 is higher than any report'ed from any provlnci~l hospital by Cutting.

Okange8 fn, t1i,e, Prevalence of Common 'CongenitaZ A1tomaUes': Saigon C1!,iZM f!r6nS, .. H08pitaZ.,In attemptinK to analyze the frequency 'of different -congenital abnormalities, i,n'Vletnam, in ,contrast -to their absolute frequenCY, ,we are very fortunate to ha,ve the elaborate study 'of' fill of' 'the 'abnormalities_ seen at the Saigon Childrens Hospital prepared by Dr. Le Anh, an analYsis of the 4,002 cases of, .'~ongenitl,lJ abnormality seen for the period 1959 to 1968. Her study '1s complete in thJ.lt every case -Is evaluated and there are no "miscellaneous" or .. other" categories as is characteristic "of almost QneMh:alf of the' malforma· tions reported by the few "ma~ernity hospitals that do, in, 'fact, report any ~ignificant :p.urober of defortnities. Dr. Le _Anh is well, aware' of sophisticated .methods of describing and' subdividing anomalies and 0:( ,recent etio.1ogicai con· slderations. Whereas, most other VietDflmese' hospitals would "not ,distinguish cleft lip from cleft palate, if, reporting the deformity at all, Dr. 1;e Anh ~are-

,fUllY diStinguishes them< '., The annual ~dmissloil rate ,for congenital anomalies _ at the Saigon Childrens

~ospitaJ has been' almo'st the same for the years 1964 to 1968' (618; 565, 650, 667. and 554): ..'. . . <

Saigon Chlldrens Hospital is the only special chlldrens hospital in Saigon, or, in .tact in Vietnam, and durin~ these years would have re(!¢ived most chll. dren that, cou~d be referred for possible surgical correction of" congenital anom"Ues., ~centll' ,the establishment of' the CMRI Unit _ tit Cho 'Ray' has addOdlinother' faclllty< This unit sta~ted in July of 1968< The CMRI has tended to draw patients from the provinces "even more- than has the Saigon 'OliUdrens Hospital, and their activity' may account for the Slight decrease in Saigon ,Ohlldrens Hospital congenital anomalies adniitted in the last ,year. 'Nonethe~

·Th~ actual figuree were 2,:)60 births and 67 stillbirths in 1968; 2,179 blr.t,hs a'nd 64 stillbirths in nine months of 1969; and 1,4!}O' bIrths and 31 stUlbirths tn, seven month. of 1970. < •

:, ~ <.'-:' : i "-; , ,(' ::. '-,' " t-', ,; _ - , , ' les." .tlle .,vastlilImlOI!ltY. of ,tr,pe pt.ll'l\qin.lJl!,es 'tr~~\ilt )/7' .~~. S~. r~,' ~n. 'CI(I.lld. ,reJ,ls ij:ospltll;!,'ara I),ever, Sl'eQ ~t,P~I, q'\1O,.~I1), f"! ~illY$(),'~908'fu;Fe'IJrilary 191U repaired. 110 lelja .. th.' an' a§l .. · ~ase", O~.,pl.ef\·tll';". nli +. 8P. \ba •. ~Ji' Of.. .b .. l~f(till~~~, " SaigonOMlar_, l(:owltal'-!1IvfiJJ of., oa~e8, S .• ~Ojl Chlldren~ I'):cjsjJlta'i ~oes no~ have ,an obstetrical -un~t. and they accept only ca~$: fO.r . wll).Cili: sur.~. '1,'_'1 mlghtbo,;lndlcated an(l only chlldreJ,l th~~·surv)~e 10~eno1lih tor.trilli~erto be _ accomplished. 'D. heir. sta.tisti. ca,. tbe;oefDre; :*epr.~. S~p.t, .. \a,· 'v.,er. y . .r ,~1.~.'Cl!ecri.j,gr9,Ull ofe congenital· anomalies;.but. ,amo,r;Lg ~~s,e ,~lwfr . .sta~~~ lc~!.~;tloul~,.:i.'ellE!~t :any relattve:change;,of f:J,'equep.ciY.., 1"'" ::' ',' 'J" ',:. :;",1_

Saigon OMlarffl8 1I 08pitaI--;-Iloume8 ·Qt p,ati(j\\t8, Alilio1\~":oi',.:t~ An'h'~ report does .notJ analyze the individu~ ,p~ovi:w::ja~.~~~,;:tn: of ~4.ch .~~ JhE!.f;oQ2'1 ~oinal~es, there Is an ,"", analysis of 'IPrQv,,,clalofl¥lll' of all, C!\S.S Q~er the, 'ie~t ... Of 4,002 admissions, ,1572 came from Saigon, nnd·Oilo.I,on; 910"fro!il·.'c;tilI'DIJili, 298 from LQng An" 164 Dinil. Tuol!g ... 162. ffOIll Bien l1:o~,. AU' dt.,tiie$~ b~I'ng rather ,neat\ .the cQovital. 1!l~ht other provinces s,ent., in, fifty ,or. ,tn'ore , cQ$es during the decade. and' each of the other pJ;ovlnces of S'9:iI.tl1 Vle~ Nam1

,fsup_ pl:ied a· few ,eases. The Saigon ,C4n<tr~:s B;O$pi~l ·S~deK.,t~erefor!1 .~~edo~i­nate1y,JrepresentS'-.m;tlitevial from the capltal- and ,surrQu;nc;1.in~ Ilre,a~ t)~t, :all 'of the country ls,.l'epVe~lfmted.: , .:" ': ,._ " 'J ,', ::,','" " ,_,_ '.,

SaiOon ·OM/aren. H08pl/o/,;-De/prm'frle •. Treatea .... R.~i"ti®, to j"u#>ber. Treat.ea by'Mater>Mtie8. In the. years 1961>,);0 .1968 .Til' Pil rellorted atidtit'one­quarte. ,of all..Salgon .deUve~les 1~lu~l\lg a ~Qtal 'of 68~ .wo1't,6riliatlons,ap­proximately, ,Qne.holt ot which'l $ll~Y:iv~._,:DurJng ·th,e,·salU~ pe~lIO:d, th~_'~tl;~o;~ Chlldrens. Hospital admitted 3,054 case~ of which, about l,90Q. weI\! from Saigon,j1!lv,en if ,every .one· of the sU,J;:viving a:p.dD?-alies,fr?m Tu:D~,,(34,Q) w~re. 'nfact, ·admltted.to the .Salgon,.Clllldrens Hospital 1\ll4ti1ese .f~presented a quarter of all of tilose lJoro1u Salg\llt" then at th': D;l'Q~t pnlt .9Illethlnlnil~.t ·ov.er half .of all D.lJ,l,lformations_,occurmg .were b~lng.-r_ep_9fted by the 'cap'l~a1 area .maternltles .. It would appear that oomplet!!IIess of recofillpg bi. mater­nities iSI very different for different :~types of COn;g~ti~l ,atiomih~~$;. "Som~ obvious anomalies, such as -oleft lip would ,appear .to be: fai'r1y,., accurately, 'l:~­ported. During these. same 'years, Tu I>U repo~te<J._ ;1.32 survivin~f·patiell..ts with cleft lipS .. During this time, Saigon Chlldr.,..s HO.'$i>ltal adm.ltt.~II. 40.13. ol"ft lips, 55 cleft palates and 83 combln,ed cleft lip ·and pal~tes '6~ a total' of '04~ cleft i!P$ of aU types. of which ,Ilbout 38Q or\slnated in:Saig~n,If.a,l\ of tile children with ,cleft lips were \n fact r.aferred to .the, Saigon dnlldr~ns l'Io$pltal and if Tu Du ;was reportiD,g one.quart~r.·of those bO,rn in S'lligon.,t;hese'ilgqre,s would be conSistent with -ref',sonably accurate r,eportln$' by ,',Vu ,~1l. >, '"

Other deformities are, grossly incorrectly, reported lit;D,d o~~. of t'he !p.ost interesting of these is' imp~rforate anus., ';rhis, except . .1n, tpe ve~y \J\are -f,prms where the obstruction Is not at the· anal orifice itself" is vel?'. 'easf to recogn1z~, has -been known for a, long time, is subject, to . surgical l'ep~lr aild althou,gh requiring correction Is not. immediately:. ff,ltal ',SQ,.".would' not_,'J;'~sult fn tlle victim'. being ,reporte<l. as a stillbirth, The Saigon. Children •. Hospital figures show that this ·ls 'One \ of: the co~onest abnormalitles, admittea. t,liere With 45Sclises ,being :admltted!n ..ten rear .. In 1964,.1965 a.nd 19G6,'Tu Du teported -only eight li!urvlving cases o,f imperforate anu,s •. Durin; th~ ~ame peripd, Saigon

'. Chlldrens Hospital admitted 189 cases, about 120 coml~~ trqm ~8.!gQ!I' XU,s :of some inteltest -that. ,Cutting iI}.. hi,S lis~, :of ,aJ~ ,reportAA, .1llItl~QrD;l,a\W,n,s . ,~~ong 480,087 Uve, births report& onlY··s~ ,clJ.ses, ok.·1rqnerftXI;ate ,anu~ ~r6;tll, all !!la­ternities when very many more would have been expected. As.', an<?t1;i.er;,e~­ample; tile (Saigon ChUdren~ HOSl'Ual ~1\P<\l',ts 44 cas~~ <lfspln",. bl~dl' . dprl~ tile deoade with ,Tu Ou repovtiug ·only S. cas~s. <lurjJ1.~ most. Q~ th.ls J;>~~i04 A/ld C. uttlng ·.eportlng ouly 8 ca.~s,.o.ut o~, 480,087, 'I1~e . N~4. In.'' t.he .. ,~~me:!,e.r. iO.d';

. 01>ang68,.... (il;eria.in, Anom~Ue.81' Tile flgm;es; trppl Sal~Oll: C)l,ll(l!1ens }loSV\t.1 ShOW.'. nOi 1 apparent 'cb~nge In I~e. f,el~tliVje,:frM.u~n~x-: of ,tWy;;_~noma~~sl'"M~d,e from:th. ,three e"ceptlQnsd.tall~ MlplV •... ,., .,' "

. ,-,~ ., i !;; '~ ! , " , 1'1;; - . ; , "; "j, To., r",-"') ,

. ""il '!'. !

,,: II' ,ii""

'h ,t·., 1 ;-: I,., ''1f1 H ·:'.i ;'d'; : ""',

, ,1:a9 f", '-

';V~lIit~{rl'~) l;', . -",", .-~[ ;! .... ~:Total:C8.S,d,$pIn8!DIfld'a! ;"j.' Giuif~t CI8It~IBte-:Fdiltle.f~IIp!J '1"i!'C···,/,c. (1t1_Pj,jl' hf.<t"J)·· "ii_t' "-"Ii.l,,_,.!I!.: r l.lj,1

lm!~~~~~~~~~~?~:~!i~i!;@@[f" ,,,!is;''';:,~'.itr'', "J'.l':'," ,,:1 ;~::,,'f,(!r 1963 . ',,' '142 .' ');1ii;"2"1.1 . 1:',')'.·0 'jo,O /['" j- 171

li1I~~~lj~~~~~~,~~lllll~~jl~~~llf:'(\)~':fii\:;:,Ii~':'It,:i .,':,~':],,','" ',~~i~, ,"" ",:,; l,U, ·b:j, J ,d ,,!.,'

'~' F'(~rf. '~I:V',~ tor_:~d~~rr.J~b~:" .'.1' ,:. '{~> ',',rJ ':,' ,~~"; ", ',I,', ~\r'~,( '~.'J'.,. _!, ~.;) ., .

The ~uirlber '01 ClU»'feet 'repo1'ted)li1,'so,SDlan" and, so small "l'er,oentage of, those "M,i" lIf<i 'l:et~i!ie<l'to' tJj~' Salton' ChlJd"ell's'Hoavttal,:, itllat these: llgU •• s' are recorded'tOf dompleteness_ only. Great· ·ca;'UtioJ). ,is neoeslmrY'i'n, any: 'mterpre~, bItton' 'o'l!thtiB., fi®~M, .tltMillitt,the 'totlli<'case., iIOen, at,'SaigonGhI14rens, Hos" pitttl>,(lf both spinll blfidtt"and cleft, palate have shown Significant il):(irease· the rt\atl\teriltes ' (to'tota\atlmlsslon' foiicongenltai' dOl!eoto)",were. 'fal.ly"hlgh' In the _ p~riod 1969-t96!3i J~)~r1lli, tli~~ ,time ,thel ~ospiMv ,was', sublect to;/sev~re' v.icis-, s1tudetf-::'"polit1cal &i(d:'otiier~a:nd it, 'may wel,l be' that' .ser.tous 'anoiIlalies abso­lutely"N,qUlring ,trelit:ni.jlt" sU¢h '<ls' mostcas~s'" of splM bifid. ,but ,not cleft pfil-ate ',#ou:ld ~ riUiitively" 11Li:tt'~ase, but ·>th1fNs- 'only' a' suPPOSlijOll,' l:TIh-e 1ncrease in; spii)a blfida In'1967 and' i1l6S' m'aY'b6 "eca)ls. oj: b,.tt.~' •• cognitiGll' 'bY"x-ray but,' J:)r: Ile Anh In, ,noting tbts"ratlier, stlllk~ng, lMre" •• , did not, coilSld,~",:IIJ\jI. :possl- , blllty' 'aild J:)t,'Tr~il NgM Ntriil,' cillet, 'Qfltth.S.!gon 'Chiidrens,Ho.~ltal,' could offer tlol,e~anal!ibn 'fo't."the,lincrease. !]he, elIange,1n cle'fb,palafe::th'equency may;, of course; re:Hebt-ibetter let:ttminatim:is"with the -rpatie:nf's,'mouth heing' open.:­RecenJ\'enthusiasni_' and'-aVallnb1!Uty- 'Of ,Cleft (lip :repait ,has 'inc~!lased: Itlle search) . for these:' oase~o:t!ten by', Aitierioan . s01dler~atr(jysome' pure, :cl(iff1 palate ma'y' Mve b~en.,lneid.ntal\Y broug1\t"totreatliPeril:' 'I'he"rep.IT II1,1e6S'1970 9f, 180 'cUtft p~lates".al;IOMR;r,-i;,S Qf"ltr(en'est ,~ut','We have'llot,~determ1ned',how 'many ;of tli@~~"Wer~ pure'''cr<lft'p!lllite.''wltliorit",a.~ocl.ted'' ~left 'lipY",s 10 true' of the;

, S>(igon 0hl\diJ!eI1i!':poavi1jjwaerres.':(jJ""1liI1'.tudl.s:,,,,.e'lo.rtalrrlY',iIIIW~.ted as to, the "iln.tt1re, lU.fovln:eta:l :~'j)lt¢.t1:' and.l;fatu-re,', .freq)ieirey· of, thes_e': ,~~" ... :l '., '-"_,

:._ O{inoZUBion8. Most"su.rgt'call~' eor.lIectllbH~"({Qrigentt'al ftl1J.omo:lles,',1Weated Uy: ,-the)-, , sn1gon'-'ehildl'~ns HOBpi'tn!l 'ha'Ve' shOW11!no '.tnl\jor·~~C'ha:nge'li-n ;their -relative' fl'e~

quencY('of o(jour~_ence 'dQrtltlg the 'last:'dijIlMle'(!'l'h'Etl'_e .are ,two-' 'Dotable,:exceptions to th1§._ ~The "9ccufrenceJOf' spina .bUlda. aIi4 ,.pute {cleft,'palate (.wtbQout'~ssQclated cl~'ft iltO ha:'v'e'botb,<~hUw.ri une:x:plaine,d. iner-eases ,during', the last : three" yearsl bu:t as 'l)ote(Lmany fa~tors may bave cause~dhb;:,nulnedbft]j;-increase at 'Saigon ChildrenWHosPlt8(l, ""'c,' '!, ' ,,'

2'he'Oo()url'eiUJe'of Rffi-iJ Btfi1¢A>gl AnCim1>Ue8, ,Three p.lnclpllj' sources of In"' forlfi:a_tlon, are avai-iab1e. ·to try'" and determine', whether-' any str1Rthg t'visible unusual an6inaly',,~as,'oc.ourr~~,lnIYiQtn.at;n -iU"l!_epent 'yeal!r:/;I It)s 't(f be 'remen1 .. ,· bered that any alrol'iIalyitbah,esultedln 'astlllblrthUs ""lll(~IY "M'b."Dotedl Allto(jsLes -are 110t .\)~ing'; P6-t;f():rmed (il"tld;:: the,Lnatit!ttj",of-': mQnsters! -is' not !bei~ "

crecorded.<'0n1Y"nQHSlly detectabU, nbn:lfatal',llno\nal~'would'be' obse;,ved, Wd~' tbe belle£ of the F.lAO;tMt"suolichilflges Mv~;lnfa"t,i,"ob'bly::not ocCUrred' on the;ba's1s of three pl'itrciPIl1:'_'Mur~eS-"i)f'intoJ!njatlon,,' "1'" ,.'i " >. :: ::,'

'1, Th. ,Saigon' Children. HoSpital" report Which' shOws no' '!latlng, Of' ane"",ot strikins abo:riormal1ty., Saigon 'ChUdrens' H9spital !fnlght not !hltva'1>een~'awara( ~1 "o:n anomalwt'tb.-p.:t_, W!lS' 'h&~ ,app~op,J?iatei,_'for ,surg~ty.,l ,on the' '()llh~t 'hand; the ' autho,r- .(It,this study:·is ':eullY't,famlhar.'I~ithi ·fo_r ~aru.plej thnIMomide'''lududed'' phocomelia, and, 'no ,sugge~tb'e" a110man.~' appel1i"- on th~', t6tf1l'l1st;~ , ':,~,/, _:'

,~' 2, Am<¢her sourc.of' inforillatton" Is 'the' Milliater of !BeaW>. Dr,' ~ran: l'.I1nh Tang,! who ',feLt'~l)n:lldEmt that' Irti'erit:a 'single: cAse,:of 'anyf'strlklng' p1:l6comeUa:' type t;tbnormal1ty b9:rn anywhere wltb~n~the govel'>llm&nt system' would: lJe. re:." ported' to'jhtm: ~thitti<a, shQ~t time 'ftnd, Who was_'unaware, 'Of, any such- changes

. in,tnJite of a certain number of suggestlve artLde&·n1, tlle')Vletnamese'pre8s~,q"

" ,.. " : ".';' ',';:' I. ' 1 1 ",I;,',"., " '.-" ~

1~ 3. Perhaps- the' best sou~ce is Father: Lichtenberger, Pl,'ofessor of Gene,t1c.!s at

the Faculty of Saigon, geneticist to Tu Uu Hospital ,and,-tl1e ,best ·knol\lti 'exper,t on ·ohromosome abnormalities in .Vietnam.' :ilie has lived in Vietnam for ,:,ma~~ years and has seen many; of th4) interesting monsters Q.f ,Que sort Dr, another qccurl'ing in' Saigon and some .of, the_ othet.: parts .of the ·(!onntry. He bas .not' been aware of' 'any _suggestive changes. ';'" _ ,-" _: ',' " , .

,o1i,ainges in" the Inoidenoe, of Speof,ttc .t1bnormiiUtieB Related to L,aborato,ty EllJperiment'8" Laboratory experltnents'in animals, ,with· 2,4,5-T indioates- tox­icity t.o the' gastro-inte_sttnal-tract with hemorrhage a~d' other changes,', Cystic kidneys "have' been 'demonstrated as "well as a few ,c,as~s of cle£t .. palate tn -,the offspring _of exposed pregnant' animals. .

Specific search has not been made am,ong the exposed Vietnam€l~e .poPul~tio,n for gastro-intestinal tract 01' 'urinary tract changes that might be present. It must b~, remembere'd that only 'a' very, small 'percentage of cpngenltal·abnormali­ties- -and malformatione: are visible and' eal;lily',detected .. Mtb~y bioc4emical and other oMult abnormalities, although -with signiflcant effects, on life rexpectancy, only can ,be demo,nstrated ,with la,bora,tory: stu4y generally unavailable, in· Vietnam.' , " :~ '. ,

Conclusion: Labo,rp.tory study would indiclite that ppssU,le teratogenic effects of 2,4,5-T--may be-,of'a nature very, difficult to identify in Vietnam.

Overall Oonolus'ions: Studies of changing rates, of, stJUbir.ths, particularly as reported Iby the. government" maternity system a.re subject to. great errors, of interpretation even When they 'are- made somwhat more v'aUd ,by the inclusion of 'total provincial -figures\ Although .. ,tbe, "reporte,d, rate of stillbirths, in Tay Ninh province, :extensive area,S of' whioh wer~ ,tr,eated by 2,4,5,-T" are_ high.er than the hi~hest .provincial hospital rate,s repo.rted by ,Outting, this type of evt~ dence is not sufficient to dr.a w' any firm etiOlogical conclusipJ1. The saQle must be said of the sharp, upward trfnd in' 'stillbirths recorded J?y .Cutting for .areas outside of: the ,.oa,pital. Eyen more _difficult 'is' any es~imate of the, ra~ o'f con­genital malformations, the vadatio:p.s, in ,the reporting by .different lllaternities making the ftgur"'es, useless for"statistical comparison, , ... -. ,e,,' , ,'",,'-

There has be.~n- a considerable increase "ip. the' caSes o~, spill_!\, hiflda a,rid c~e,ft palate' (without eleft lip) reported,at tbe S'aigon,Childrens!iHqspital.,Otb~rwil!le, the HAC i~-,;,tAirly confident in reporting' that· -tbel'e~ .)las -b~en ,:no signiticant change in frequency· of, any, of the" relatively- ~oIJitt.l0n~ -congenital- anomalie;s. consistent -with life.:-that might "appear' at a ,childrens -bospital among those patients 'presenting themselves" for treatment in the GVN, health· system:. 'rhe HAC found no evidence_.Qf, any new;;striklng abnormality)' of a congenital type and consistent with life oceurring,in 'Sietnam' in ,recent years-'but, thil1!! $tnte-, ment is made with the recognitiQn that much o!- the directly" e:x.poE!ed, population Is una-vailable' for study at this' .time. .', " ,_. " .

]I1ttture Direction oj Stu(Ues. The following areas would 'seem to, -require more exhaustive investigation along- the lines,'of tJll,ought of tl1e preceding chapter.,

.1. With, the aid' of local-'Nietnamese ,authorities 'and, it,: Is to be hoped, with the complete spray data available from ,the U.S. Dep4rtment,- of' Defense, the Vietnamese, population exposed'to 2,4,fPl' coUld be'-'mueh more' precisely " identi~ fled and 'isolated and the ,individuals, ~uclies fOl' possible effeGts of the:, agent~' 'l')lts would ,particularly._'.include ,very, careful ',studies :of ga$tro~intestinal-, tract, urological traGt and, biochemical ,chang~$ of children' born after exposure. .

2: In specially, selecte'd"defoliated, areas'of the country,' more careful- autopsy: ot _monsters and other stillborns, and neonatal 'deaths -·with congenital abnor­malities should b.e carried out.

,3. Further study Is certainly indicated 'of the, 1ncidence of "spina beftda and' cleft palate in Vietnam_ wltb" particular, stu_dY"'9f_ the -provinCial ,origin. and possible herbicide 'exposur,e of- the patients involved.

4. Further careful-, provincial ,stUdies,"ni-i :t:ates 6f stillbirths_ 'with 'efforts to, accumulate: data from ,aU of a number ,of 'provinces both ,sprayed and :un~ sprayed for comparison shm;tld be done. . '"

5. Those, children with defects S:hould, have careful.._,stu<Ues_, as' to thei;r: or.igi~ and,possible exposure, to 2j4,5-"T .. ' " " i_ -;f:' '

6. Notes should be fm.'ther taken of reported -iU effects of 2,4,5-.T by l)oth GVN and NLF, inCluding chromosome, changes r~porte'd by the latter, and .&.tudY mad,e 'seeking for these effects speciftcaUy -among the Ol',a,nge exposed_ popu~ latlon. .

13,1

'Incidence, "of' stillbirths" f-

per JOOOHvebirths 1960 .... /969

55",..------....... -----,..0-------,

45';'

/ 'l

A' Q /

'\ I \ l \ I \ 1 \1 ' o

" .,'.

o '" " ' ' ,1\ " 'It I \' I \ I \ I \ 1\ I \ r 0

,0 , /' '0

1960 ·62 64 66 68

'Year '-' - 0 -'.- 'Total, ".', ' - - '- 0 -- - - Total minus Oapital Area-·'.(;Sa:igon~Bien :aoa) ,

. " ,,: . ,_ ... .• i::- • , " ,

FIGURE: 1.--:-ln~ldence of Stillbirths, per ',one; ,TllousRnd Llveblrth's! 1900...1969 .. Data'illre from the U.S. Arn>y-GVNMlnlstry of Healbhstudy by Outtlng,.' aZ. Th.anomalously high stillbirth rate for 1960 for births outside the OaPitall,; based on relatively few reports.

ANNElc}t .L~T'lJER-1i1~9~,'~~:A-AS liERBIOIDE 1:~~1!l~S~~Nll',_O~MY,ISBION TO ;" ,: i, ,. ":A;M)ll\.,.ADOR El),QiwOR1;1i:,jBU~}r:.·' :: .

_'. ,. • < " ,~'\, 0"., NOVEMBER 12, 1970. Hon. ·ELLS:WOR'l'R "BU'~If~" ,\; n ': " ~:.~ , Amerioan Amba.maaor"Saioon~ 'B~PubliC"6{Vi'et+t.amt APO San Fra,noi8oo" GaUf,

DEAR AMBASSADOR 'BVN:tiIm~---, On ;b61haIi·~Q'f·:',tbe 'flerbic1de Assessment Commis,· sion of the American Assoc1a:tion" fur the' 'AdvRneement of Science, _w~ < wish to eXplle6&·9\H.·, '8.pJilHcia·ti@uH .f.or-·the gsnerou.s...assistan(}e~Jd9Q".bF"'jt~~~"t.~mbassy <.luring our recent, tour. of the Republic of Vietnam. , "

We are now preparing our report for presentat1()D to the AAAS"t-t the end of. : December and \Y1)-1 send a copy to you -as,' soon as it _Is ,·avallable,,· .Before that

_ time, hDwever,'we; wish to relay s.ome .observati.ons"that we' believ merit y.our m.ore immediate;; attenti.on because they -challenge the basis .of i .tb~ current chemical cr.op, d,estructiDn prDgram. . -, "',., '.'

On Augua;t 2i: and 28 ,we' .overflew, an area in Quang Ngai pr?vlnce where chemical crDp' destructiDn .operatiDns ha.d been e.onducted a few days befDre. '1'he respDnsible chemical Dperati.ons staff .officer acc.ompanied us qti .one .of the .overflights, ,ami we spDke at lepgth with .other .officers and civilian' .officials .on the scene. It was eXplained tD us that the targets were VC/NVAit;l:l'DJ,) prDduc~ UDn ar~as and that 4tDSt .of the fDDd destrDyed wDuld' .otherwise haVe been -con­~umed by enli,ipy fDr~s. The reaSDns given fDr this assessment weJ,'e that:

1. The' target aJ;'ea had only a very IDW pDpulation density. ! 2. Th~ area und#r-cultivation had expanded strikinglY .. in rec4n. t. years. 8. Tb.e cultivatd;l area was much larger than that needed t~' ,s~pport the

small ihdigenDus population. <--'.;~ - ".

4. r;rhe existenc~' .of numerDUS terrace(i rice fields indicat~d the influx .of VC/NVA fDDd rlroductiDn units, since the l\t~1itagnards. ''fhD cDmprise the native population dD nDt practice terracing. '.' . ' -..

Our DbservatiDns are sharply at varlance with all·fDur .of these pqints. I.::. Baolcgr.ound inf.ormation. One' .of t_he -target ,!),v£ias is shDwn in PhotOgraph' 1.

Three 0123 aircraft sprayed lierbiciae"'aiDll'g<N-te SDng R~, ri~r:',ya:lley frDm map cDordinates BS 8;i:'55 tD BS 8()48. The ,photograph was taken n¢ar the :latter coordinate, looking p.Drthward up the valley'. The spray swaths (lre, generally visible as brDwn streaks. Spra:ying-<w'as cDnducted cDntinuDusly f~r a distanee of ab'9-ut ten miles, resulting in cov~rage .of approximately 1000 acres. PhotO­graphs 2 and 8 ShDW the ground m'qre' c~DselY. NumerDus crate_:I;$ liave b'e\ID baused by the preparatDry laying .dowll, .of maximum ..rIDpppe'sslve fire, ~ncluding the applicatiDn .of 800 per cent saturation with: cluste:h bDmb units, a meaSure required by th~ Seventh AirfDrce to protect the slow-flying C128's_ against hDS. tile grDund fire. Many dwellings may b~, seen in, h"oth close-~ps, ,especially, in phDtDgraph 8. '.rhe site .of each .of the photographE(is indicated .on the accom· panying 1 :50,000 scale U.S. Army map;,', I' ...... ".

PopulaU,on aen8ity .. Xhe map ShDWS a 111gb pDpqlation density tJ:lrDughout the ~ar~et area. In the twenty-seven 1 km2 grid -:,bDXes thrDugh' which ~ the spraying passed, there are more than. 900 dw:elli. ngs, In .. dfo.cat. ed as small 'blaCk. squares .. Detailed comparisDn of the map ,with photOgi'q,bhs .,2 ~nd 8 suggests that tb.e number .of dwell1ngs in the target area is at ,1Mst as great as it. 'Yf1.s in -1965, the year in which, the map was last revis~d: Xssuming, fm." exan1ple", an DCCU~'" pancy .of six persDns per dwelUng, the pDpulation in th~ ,sprayed a:rea'~'wo'uld- be approximately 5,000. This corvespDnds to -180 persons per square kilometer, hardly a IDW pDpulation density. _ :

Ea:pan8ion of oultwae4_ area. The bDundaries .of cultivated fields .on the enclDsed map (and, alsh .on .a matching. 1 :20,()00 scale piptDmap) ,agree well with the 'bounaarl~s seen in .our, ph'Dtograp'hs, oifel'ittg_ 'tin" evidence fDr any major expansion .of (!rDP prDduction' since 19.65;' Also; \the fields -seen in the photograph. look well established and not of recent origin. . .' '"

The que8tion .of 8urplu8. The amD,llnt .of land und~r cultiva.tiDn in the target area may be estimated frDm- the' m1lp tD be apprDximately 800 hectares, about one ,l)ectare fDr each dwelling. Contrary, tD the view that a large surplus .of fDDd was being grown in the valley, .one, hectare Df'mDuntain land_is just"about enDugh to_sustain a famUy::unlt. .' (; ,: ,. " .

Signi;ftoance Of terraoed field8., Authoritative DDD',"'puplicatiDns .on' -the Monta'gnfl,rd peoples as, well a/!!,'knQwledgeable offiCials 1n Saigon.is.tate tbat the Montagna.nds of QUB:ng'Ngai, ·the Bre" ha:ve long grDwn: rioe on teJ."r8.c,ed:,.flelds.

,"',' ,

" ,-1:,>:( ,"",r~, ',;1"""iI- {'ltl"';:1 "', .,'::" ii','_' .I'".j_ ",:-;:"11'" ,,'J ,', ,,:,,:,'

W .. ·,r~~Il~.,:,th!it ,this ',l'l\rtl~ulftr cr~p.,qestructlori· fuissIQnmo;f . 'have .' been . ~~ple.1. tj:.ol"SVer.,It w~~.qlted byth.ql\.ml~~l st~ft QllIcer,:al'ld at".r .oJl!elaIs as b.~ pap;I~]1~~rll\,,<!ffOj)tI,fe al/dw,enp~al\lled. . . .. :.. i,.. \' ':,

· '. ':-!II: .. .o . .r. ~.(>.V.fI r,...o",. r.fI ..• b.I~. v .. :a .. t.'\.Q.\\' ¥. ,I., ~n .. ,~ ..... B,~dltl.O.I' •. kjv .... ,elg);.. ..t. (. to .. ~. le~e~.!l;\ .. ame. I. ,aI ... '.'. "' .•... ' .. 11. d. I.'. e~ itone J.!l) Vlejn!li'l'.,w: iJb. ·i.e, <;,wclUf1flll· tMt: "e!l;d;y.:~I'!,j6f ,tli."fuml. 4~~tra~e'l by tJ:W cmemIC!l;i,cr 1I, ... de~ uc.1J.oIl, I/ra. gram. '. ,.wo,\ldnqrma1\Y be .. coll.llmed: by clvilians, not by enelU;s';,s()ll~l'SII .'/'" ",- :,"" j ,,-,':- _\'-"

A,~.::t . .o '.t.h .e. lie.: !.Ile . .of,tlle ,01'.'.' .• Ji~llt ct;O)j,destru .. ctl. p .. " p. ~i>i!r,am. . •.. W.fI. wrre. .. dlst\o.~sse. d. 1;>)' .t\\~.~mpll~aftons .at an .analysl. prepared ~Y tlls GVN:.~t the.pr.ovlnce ,level'

· .s.tll!l.flP~ the quantity, 'ot :~Ice and ,a!l;\er ,~rop. marked for. C1lemlc.al. d •• trll\t . ti.on 'In.d.~. r. ,tll.~"iQ.70-'.71. ) he .. ~bl~lde, .. pro~.rIi,.I1l .. rn~Iudl.)lg. :.)ll.I.s1ons,: r~9Ue~tedb.~

U.S., ~\.mfl)lt.).a~ w~ll. a~,;'b~!lreqlle$te~ .bythe. 'V,letnflIllese . .themselve •• · the· ~. 0 .. t!t.I Q1'1al)t1by. ,of, fqOd ...• "h.dul."4fO.l\lde.tr.lIe.~IQ1! is· Pill. ~~ .. i\: .•• t.l.4,57~' m. etr.lc ~ons 11),Qual!i\.Nga;1 ~~dQUJlng.;Clnpro~ nces :a4>I1''', Th.ls .J)ould be e-l\ongh to 8U .• ,

. . taln MDJ.~I.~f)-,70,\J\\QII~r~011' tor. ~ :y.~a,\" :~, b>;ge4i ,are Iocate·dJXlalnIy 11\' up1a'l4 · region. wh •. >'e I ~.o""t"gnards are the tradUlonal poplliation. 'J'he SPecial 00)0' mission for .a:1g11Iand £#>I\>,; estlmal:<js t.be total MontMnard 1I0puiation of the two provinces ,as just under"ftO,ooo,:: Therefore.,,Jf, the' ar,eas' ~e inspe~t~d are anyJndieatpr,- ~4e~des~ructi9n..~f(so ;OlU~ food ~r'iev~n> o~ aJ?Y,~sub:st~:nt1al frac~ tion- ,ot. ,it :_w,P.'Ql<1 ,h~-'ve,j4ievastaqn~ conse"Que:nclts'~fo~. the MOllW.g~ard p,e,ov1es ,Of Qllall¥l!!lgal andQJlang . Tin. and f.or indlgeuQ1!. peoples :Ill other Provinces where .s.impaF J:!on(litions.;may prevail., ',r . " " ,.: 1: I"

i, rWh~l}'~;', we ,)v~re J,n, ;Quang Ngal. v:.;ovince we. had', $eyerl,1.1 occ~sipns tq inter-· v!ew M . .o. nt!tgnard refugees Wi!9§e 1!.l-,ndS .. i!~d, re~entIybeen .prayed wltll,h.er.bl.

Old.e. w,@,.wer,e I1D~ressed witl\·th.,way \ll whlcl1 they PerCeive the USeof,;the. chem\caI~"~pp.~~tly,,,wh.ntlleland Is.Jr.cte!) by. herbicides. the Ure people cpnslder It to be; tM P1anlfestatiol), qfan evll.splr\t •• nd .• ~c9rd(ng to; their ~~dlti .. ·on. w!II a~.n\\Q. n SUCh. land in the ~e.!lef, that It: ".a. fa\1eil un. der . a •. urse. Thus ,the ~on. ,b.lIe~,;of. t.beHre may Int~nsljty. the effects of the. c~op de$truc, . tlon prQllram' Q!l. their 1I~..., ,." . , ..... , .,.: ,. ;'" , ., ....

BefQlte .. ,le~v:~nB' Vietn~l;l we made,,~ pre~tminary report ot,,'pur O~~~V8.t1on~ to GenerllJ·AbDam. and to Mr. SWphel\, Winship and ~r. Terence '~"nt of .·tlle, 'EmbQ.ssy Political ,Military section.: Up.on our r~turn, one of us ,wa.s _requ~st$A "

· to Present 1\.] brletlng 'at the Stljj;e .PeP .... tmen~,ln Washlngtol\ .. , ,The,: br)ei!Illi' tOok. Pla.e,.on"()Atpber. ~9 .b. at.a .. r. e • .., WO.l·klng :I •. ~.I g.roup, CO. n.ls(hig mal.nly ot personnel tli~m: th~ B:urf:\8-;u of-Enst:Astan" al),u,.PQ.cttlo, Affairs, and.; the .B1,1rea-g. ~ o~ Intel1ll!~I)ce.'1d: -R. esea .. "e.h. W ~ ar~. aIs. o. 'se"lilln. g coples.Qf t.h .. 1., report \0 .. ' SecretarYll1)ger. and to q.nerJ!l A~aI9s.,;", "', .,; . ." f,' W:~>filtrongly_ ,hope ,tll-ak Ollft obl3ervatiqn" .,can. ~alte, a' positiye, c,ontributlon .,to~ w~J.'d bringing unde~,revi.e,W,.,~,program w:ht~,J1'·seems to·us 'Yie-ry ,m"~h iill, need. ot'IL '" .

Sinc.e17elY:.four~1

-','

, ':",

-'-"'-' I' ", "- ,I .'

MAT'l'B;IlfW ME~ELS6N. ,JQ:S;,N GQNSTABLJ!l. .

,_[Fro~ :\he WasJ1.1/lg~OD ~ost, M$l'. 8, 19111 )'

THill' O~EM-~A~~WOUNDS"":"EF:FEOTS OF VIErNAM"DEJ!'OLIA1'ION;

,By Edward P. Morgan)

BOSTON .-Ame~icans, xns;y be ,remembered, in Indochln'~ more for wb:at' 'they.­did t'o, the mangrove swamps _ than ;for what they did .. for democracy. At 'least this is the concerned conclusion of Harvard biologist-Matthew S. Meselson, an international a'uthorlty on C13W-chenlical and- biological warfare-who is try~ Ing to encoura:g~ the Nl"on adlnlnl.tI'atlon to eIimlnate'itear:j! •• anti herbicides from the U.S. ,arse:p.al ~f ~~apons..." , , ' . '_ "_!

Last summeJ:':Prof. Meselson headed a team; baoked by' the'American Associa~ tion for the Advancement of" Sclence,):w~_ich :sPepil ~ve w~eks in' South Vietnam surveying the eCOlogical effects of -the U.~. command's 'defoliation programs." Whe:teani found he~b1clldes had been usedrfar. more ettensively th.an .was 'gen~ eraliy;)knbwn, ',causing:1W1despread damJt~i'whtcb:, may 'leavel.permadent· wounds in 'South Vietrtam1s __ ecolo",1~111 'str,uctui"ei \' Furtliermore" 'evidence emerged,;. tha·t this" ,damalle 'Was' I1eedIe!l.lY,."odmpounded.l~y'·f"uIty, ,Intelligence, and that the whole operati9,l1 maY bave ,done more 'harm to civilians than to the. enemy"

184

MeS~lson, .C,onVi:r?-ced ,that ,sucll.' chell!;icfi11y,: induced_ d,estruiftlQ:n w111"le'~y~ a hardcore 'reSid,ue of _ h.atl'ed of _ 'Amel'Jcans ,iil ..<\.sia, '-'-llRs been, .discll'sSing 'the proplem with high 'adJ)llnistration "oll)clals. He 'argUes th •. t'th~ .'PreS,ldent'. laud,able, decisiolJ.' 1n ,Noyember,,: 10a9,' i:enouucbig 'blUl(igi,c.a'l . mapt)DS', ~nd:: the. use (."cept In. retidlntlon)of lethlihhemicals,' Is ble'i(ii$ell. by ·theadmllililtr",. tlon's refuen,I, '_so, ~a~, 'to. i incl'ud'e ~ln' the' i:lan' such "rlot~control'-agents 'as __ (!)S..!!.'th~ typeo! 't!ia'r gaii'Jjs.l1ln Vietnam.'Heftnds t111slnconSI$tentWitl1 the~liaditlonal .

. Amer~can position ag~inst',,;;as, weapo~s in anf-klnd:'-b,f"Warr ' '",'. .')" " , ,- ',' troidcally, 'dom~stfc ,Gonsider_ation.s complicittft_he ·p~ctUre. A" militarY, ban on '

08 might ba','pr9tested':by 'the mit~on's politW for :wJ;l.9ID: tear ;gas'hris:'b~t}om~:fl standa'l'd weapon in dealing with turbulep,ce On -tlie,'carhp1Is and"in tU~].$lutDs.' But some authoritative -~'egal ' opinion -'maintains the' Gene:va' '_prot9co'l" of 1,925 'bans tear gas and~ herl:!1ci'de_s' along with' other'-c1).etnfcal.'''and biolbgicarweapons . . "Whether the Pre~ident .iSi pers,tuid'ed to. "that interpretation' (lie 'has_ not been yet) in urghig the -Senate belQ.t'edlY to' ratifY'"the' Pl'otOCQ( remairiti to·be: seen. (Tl1e United States~I. the·on)y.najol' powe~ left w41"hha.n'to~l~n't·In the, process of'rntifyfng it.)' But: the' dubious value of"AIl'leri~a:n:~OBW''-PDlfcies- in' VietQam shDuld 'add impetus tD- a more, <!,(;msist~nt:S'tanci against such warfare.

Here'are some,tliings the MeselsDnteam foun(t-:'" '1:. _ .

Sirice 1961, '11) per cent of, Soutl:!- Vietnam"-arl~:)area' 'larger"-than Massa­chusetts-h~s' been sprayed :-to' a "saturat.(on·!level with ,va.rlou~,_',herbicides.

- ApprDxima"ilily 800;000' RoFes of'coastal' mangrovtf, ,fOl"ests-e!!lsential;',fpr fuel and cDnstruction7"':"wlped'out " .-: ",; .,c·,. ,to:' :,_",."""

Five million acres~ of trO'pical' fo~est "sprayed, br!nging."~O'~slbi'e·. r.uin t~ one~fO'urth of SO'uth Vletnam',s total t,ore~t LfI-:rr(ls., :_ ". ,'.-' , - ',- "', '"

Granted certain- military value in defoliation:,to exposa,'Jenemy':J:Xftlebuts'and J,'educe the- danger of'''ambu!SheI~/''tne''disad:vailtRges\',4av_e'' ~een;,'inlnitnl~ed~n9t only, in Ilermanent ,ecological ;:damage -but l,h crO'P d~structllon.,'. 'A new: Ca,Fii.e~e En.d6.~tnent f?r: '1;flte~natjonal: -Fe~ce. bulletin, ''''.£.he C<?~{rq~" o!. ,<?~~tnic,a1 '~r.~h'l BiO'IO'gical, WeapO'ns," reports that crop destrucfion'-'efforts':"hav~ 'had' a ,'prO'-noullced negative' impact O'n the, Vletnalnese rural PO'P111atl'On.~' ':' Of' •

"Friendly" crops have: beeri oamagect and_ m4ny farmers alleged~'lP._:'addition that the ,j/spray made children, chickens and pi:gs 111 and 'some 'thn:es IdIlea. them":' _: . . ,,' ,

Last: November" the Mese1sO'll'team, lT~ported tl?, U;S~i'Ambfl-ssatto'r Bunke'r'iIi Saigon ,thelr"experlence with"'an -,I'exemplary'" crO'P destrudti0n,,':O'peratl-O'n' in Q,uangngai prO'vince.' The <target had been, singled O',ujj~ as :8. virtual Vietcol)g" granary., Army intelligence justified" -its 'impO'rtance on fotll"',poiht'$')' (1) the target 'area _had O'nly a. very -'low ·,pop,ula~lon. ,deIisitY.:: (2)', cUltlva:Mon"had e%:­pa:nded"striklngly;. (3)- the cultlvatei:1.l"area wl).s much 'larger·-than neede~' to' support ~-sm~l1_indigenO'us popula.tiO'n and (4)':the existence:'of many, terraced rice :fields- indicated th~ .influx O't':enemy productiO'n .teams ~tn~e the Montag­nards, who cO'mprise the nlltive population, _presumably dori't .'Use"terraclng.

, PersO'n~l O'bServatiDn, supported', by . aerial photO'graphs, fO'und arrily intelli­gence almost'totally wrong ,Dn all fO'ur points, Meselson to'I:d Bunker. He_ alsi7 was distressed to' find that:the current herbicide 'progrfl-m calls fDr destructiO'n of nearly 15;000 mett;lC tons of 100(,1 in Qua,ngngai" a:r;td, Quangtin tn.;ovlnces alone-enDugh to' 'sustain from 50,000 _ to' 70,000 persO'ns for .a year, The to'tal MO'nt~gnard population of tbe twO' prO'vinceS is estimatedt_fts.just under 70,000.

There's military efficiency for you-especially when yO'U discover tM,.t the concl_usions Df the Meselson team 'of scientists_ endorsed previO'us studies' which fO'und that nearly all the food !iestrO'yed' by the crO'P destruction prO'gram would normally be cO'nsumed ,b~-,clvil1ans, not by' enem'y, soldiers.

'[From Technology :.):tevl4)w. ,U.-I.T .• ,CambridgE!. 'Mass .• ,Mar. U7.1-J

HERBICIDES IN VI~TNAM: JUG~ERNAUT OUT OF'CDNTROL

(By Victor ~cElheny). ,

August 9" 1970i:was a'bad day fO'r thDse whO' have cO'nfide_nce in the beneficeht power of science., On·that day(Americ~n C-128, ail'craft<Jsprayed cacO'dyllc', acidl·

s. cr9P~ldIling chemical, DntO' rlce.·paddles"in·ta' '!I:reJ,IlO'te, UUpoP111ated"-.v-a;l1ey', of Quang Ngal provlneelnVI.tnam. 'The military tho.ught tM"he~vlly popu'

la5 .!ated',valley'wa.i,CIIlefiy,c.ulti~atM.by Vletname.e,cto: ralse'~ood;tor"t\\e' XI~tcong or North Vieti:l~ese(lltegularl:k\ " .,,' _" -, ' _ ",;~,,, :;'.-i,;" __ ,:-iH, ," ,). __ ;.:,~~" _,,' ,-, :'11-;

, But the, 'l4;'l,ii0.!,t!1;old:i1l\tel!lgenCO"1JPojl:Wl1lch thls!11!Ssl0'l "was, basOd WaS, all, ' '''frong, : 'A""lh{D)peIl~,.nt,ass~s:sment' ,by dl~vtngul!!h.d,,¥n~ICR.l) ;MI.!l~lsts \w!lIL have ~eslle.tful,ti!W;,Wi'tIi'it1Jt!lority ullco"erOd Jla,.ts'ial>o1Jt:~;rt,can ,¢rop'spr~~, !ng In . i\!'.i!>tnit'l" ·<#!tleh ,lIr'" moredlst1ur\\lng<; t1uui, .tue iN OW "Lett, m.lght ,Mv. Imi!gined,: ln~~~d 'ot,:.vldeJiCe'lInk\ng:herhlcljle',spraY>4ll',M·,cong.IlIt~J.'m.alfo,r-m, a~J.o, nSi-CObclu~I~."prO,O,f 'one", WRY,:oj)',tbe"O",ther, ,.\s, pr,g,ibal)l¥;jmn~.s~~.!.to, oln, tahlh-'A' co(lljllisslon, ,l"d:,by' a:Rrva~d;blologl.t, Ma$thew Mesel.oll tou,nd,' signs of ,what an:, Indellpn<jent observer can:1~1l1Yfe~l,I., wantol!d.struqtioll ,of 01-,' vilians: tolidi( 1!ior"a;,'<I, •• orlpUon of tke ,.fJ.ot~ of herbioldes on :torest. and"on 'publu)' ICettlth in' Vietnam, 'e~' pp. :61-62.) ".", ':', :;.", "

Jus,t, 12 days after t!le,~rop,destructlon lIIg'lIt, M.~lso)1;!I.W ,over the Song Be ~vall~y, '. in R heUeopte:rrescorted<l)Y ft'l1plf :Ga:a1ard, ,.the, c~n~.mical, operatif:rus ~ffi­'-ce.I'; o:e"the: :n,o;r:bhel'p pro:t'rlnces' of>·South'iVietn~m.,JJol. ,Galliard· -assured 'J~.{f}~el~_~n' that tpe rd:id:,·of August '9'"was-'"1lyplc8l1 of cl'QP.·destnuctionoper,atlon.s, and "very, well planned.-. H'e: atitd:c.thereh:wete- nO",houses below~",~eselson" saW no. -houses either bllt<took '>nlri.ny photographs,' These, pl.wtograpl).§I,,'o$howin~' hunqreds of

. houses, were 'R key: piece of ,~vlden,ce to e:;plode ,:-virtulllly every-,- roiUtary as-'sumption about:the p,u-ppose and"effect ,of tl1e crop spraying,,_: '

Mesels!-,/n' waa,tbeV€l_"as_ part' o~\,'a<' one-nionth ,fieh): surv~y, ,he and, three other,S were making -tJ.s,:,pal't of, an," $80,000, s~udy of' Ule ~mp:act upon, Xietnamese "pl~nts and people ,of the _massive U-.S .. -hel'Qici,derSpra:YiIW .program !y.; J,n~tnRm, After years of,wra~gJi.ilg, the st1.1dy, was"O'rdere4 by the"A'tneriean,Associatton for the .A.dvancement of Science at ita 196!),arutUal meeting". in Boston.

The study is not detll'liUve. It, really' is an attempt,to e~tabliSh the feasibility· of studying herbicide, effet!ts '!before -th,e' iwar ends and 'thus:.aid postwar reo covery., l-t 'aims"at, 'opening': the ·dootrifto' studies "that shoul~'b .... itJ. MeselBon~s vl~w-be,conducted almost-entirely by Vietnnme'se sci~nt.rsts; who are quite ci\.U· abh~" ,with sdtl,lci'ent- gO,verriment ,support,; of doing.· their' 'own wor~- ~t:hout, the

. all~too .. nol!mal' American pushing;" " '. ' " ' ','" - .:; -,' . ~ The 'A.A,A.S. study also' 'opens" the door 'to and 'defines ,theJ,J)fOblems for a 'Cqngressionally ordered_' study of _' the ,problem, "b:y, the Nati(irial Academy' ,of Sciences;, ,whlch-'presumably wilL'get- access, t,9' some clas-sifled infor:Qlation

'denied) to, Meselson. ' ',:--" 'f· ,

AN' ES'TABLISltMENT SHOW

'-,.It must ;~e .realized' that.jhe /3tudy .. ,¥as ,'an, He.'!i!tabliallment., show:" ,'p:r,~pa1-'a. )tions ,for t4e_, survey :in ,Vietn.am~ which, rej:!~iveC!,i, 'f,uU, cqopey_artion frol\l' ,all, a,n·

, ,tllori~\~s in'Sa,ig.on, inc, Ivded,: tl ,two-wee.k :gathering ,o~ leadi,n,,~A~xpel;'~ ,on 'her~j,. 'cldes-"'ha-wks" and,-",dpres", and' 'J;le:ntrals-.4t -Woq\'ls:- Ho~e:,~· M;ass.' " ':-l', .-,,,During the,:montp:; 'in Vietnan;t" ~e only. .. httc\l, ,in_.-01;llerwise. generous coop~ eration. from U'~"- anc;l VJ~tnaQlese"officialdom was' a,:..re,fusal--almost certa~nly prQmpted by the attitude- of one Qr ,two. official~ in tl;te feI).tagon:-:"""to' ,re\eas~ the Jogpo.oks kept in, ~aigo~ o.f the exact ,times" amotJnt~, places,'" and types ,(If herbicide' sprayilig~ " , ,", . " _' '_ , ,-,' "

The A,A.A.S. study was,:Ifpt,{ilu:pPQfJed,tQ consider either :the Ip.oralfty,or/the military 'efficacy' of ;the ~praylng, and, in g1vlng".t~eir reports, in' C~icago, 'M:-esel­son and the others,':_,fl'om the Herbil(:ide' Assessment" Co.m~lsSion ,stayed: cl~ar'

OfJ~tS8.;ts~~:~$ cRm.e upanyway.Th~first".~ults ,of the 1~~~stigatiO/lP~inted <:,learly to a,.,p.erbicide~sp1!aying prograqL:,un,de:rt~e!l with as ,'Uttle h.eed .. for efficacy -as the', ,Vorld ',W!-\r II campaigns' of destructi0:tl again!;lt ',German cities. ~he vast, intense, prog.rap:t in, VletnaDl showe4 up as -,8," blind use of a technol· ogy rea~y tQ:'b.a,ud_!by a military orgau1zation:supel',;~ndg,~ed' with weapons an., ,apparently incapable, of Gon'duc~lng :t:a:tional,studies of w;bat it was'l'dol,ng, arid al~p._incapa~le,of paying 'attention t'o. jbe results of the-few stu(Ues whiCh ,were performed, _ ' "",' , _,

The A.A.A,a,_c6qlmi~ion' m,eI}lbers could not he,lp;S~elng what so .QulAY"otiier cool obs.ervers 'of the' .A.tneric,an . iuy;olyemeIit .in. __ Vietnam. ha.ve seen: -a .. jus:ger,. ,naut;'fmt. _of cont,ol~ .. riddeJl;i,br 'm.~n ~ufl!ering trom an _ll-ppalli,D,g I'culu:t~l'lpls­matc:ij"-to us:~: ¥eselson'~ ,:phras~_Witp a, people they wpre -,SUPPQsedly; 'try~ll,g to IIB~v:e" fr,?rn communisr:n._ The 'ride~s ,Of,'1J;1,~" juggefnaut are sotd~",rS';'op..! I*" J;l.1onth t~urs '9~i' <:1lltY",who .. ~,l)-itr, rpuny of th~ir ~t:eports j:p.' ,~awaii" on the: way

136

-home. Arm:"ed' with 'ail -but' the' ,'J,ultimate" weapons' tu laD overwhelming arsenal, these soldiers caD, with detachment, destroy a country to ·saVe . .it. hi

'The, 15~sqtia'riHhne :"a,r~a of \ the Song' Re')'MUey: tl1rough'i 'whic_h -the Q..l23's Passed last AUgUst'lg niight have "appeared to an,,.untuto~ed: eye: to -contain .no bouses, as CoL -.Gatlini'd thOUght. But· e:x:amin'atiOn. o:lt'Me~lson's Jphctographs showed: even more :l:Itructnres than,:,tbe 940 -shoWn in,a U.S.:Army map-1)repared in 1965· trolh 'French :(lata. At an 'average 'of six Inhabltants· . .per:.,hOlise,:- there were; ,cQns,ervntlvely, '15,000 people in the path: of the-'spray,"'planes, living: in houses With 'fresh-appearlng·,thatch"'(lt must be replaee!i annua11w~. and- keep-ing their 'fleldl1l"trim arid free of weeds;' ,.:,- ::.,,'; ·"'c. ' '-, ."

'Instead of a sharp inerense.lri:" the- amount .of cultivated'limd in: th'e valley ....... taken by the U.S. military as a sign of cultivatiQn"fQr' enemy :sQldiers-the area cultivated 'was _ act-utiny' abQut the" same as in 1,1)65.' ' i

There was -terracing in. !the valley-taken' ,by the 'mil1tary as l a sign' that Vietnamese were dQing the farming) even thorlgh' U.S •• anthrQPologfsts iU'··SaigQn confirmed for Meselson's study-' that the Bre tribesmen, the' actual Mont,agnard inhabit~nts .or the SQng Re valley, have, practiced terractng fQr decades.

The· Army _.had thought th'at the valley's inhabitants might have quit their homes in resPQnse to 'previQus, much less extensi",e, spraying by helicopter, but they had clung tQ their land. Thinking the valley uninh'abited, the U.S. mili­tary assumed it produced a large surplus of fOQd for the Vietnames communist fQrces. In fact, the -cultivated area was about enough mountain land to feed the 5,000 in~abltants at a ~,Ubsistenc~ level.

Ji.:N ISOLATED INSTANCE?

If the·-spraying in the Song Re valley had been au isolated instance, it might have been dismissed as just another unpleasantness in an unpleasant and UD­productive war. But it was not an iSQlated instance.

OVer 'the past decade, chiefly since 1965, -crop-killing ch,emica-ls have been sprayed .over some 600,000 acres in South Vietnam, destroying, by a conserva­tive estimate, :eno'Qgh fOQd tQ feed 600,000 people for a year. FQr ,fQur years, 'crQP destruction was proceeding at the rate .of '150,000 people's food supplies each year. The amount of -herbicide sprayed on tQ crops amounts to about 10 per cent of the tQtal weight of plant-killing compounds the U.S. has used in Vietnam since 19661.

The brunt .of the crQP spraying has just happened to fall on to "remote, uti­popuI~ted" areas of -the Oentral Highlands .of SOUth Vietnam,' inhabited by 500,000 or more 'members of the several dQzen Montagnard 'tribes," who dQ not speak Vietnamese, .or ,~hare the religions or -phYSical ,'appearance: of the Vi~t-, namese majority. The Montagnards (see p. 61) are ,mi1writy grQUps regar~ed with nQ special affection by the Saigon gQvernment, from whose ,local repre­sentatives emanate fQrmal requests for each spraying operation. , The MQntagnards k11l their water buffa10-after a spray raid, either as'prQ­

. pitiatory offerings or out of a mistaken belief that the animals are poisoned. Water buffalQ are the chief badge of wealth among the Montagnards.

Driven frQm' their land, forced into refugee camps, deprived of a normal livelthood, the Montagnards nQW get theil':Hc~ froni- the government-and pre­sumably no lQnger -pay a small rice tax to nearby Vietcong.'

Whether the MQntagnards are grateful :(or this "protection," and thus u won" tor the anticommUnist cause, may be doubted. The circumstances .of the crop sprayIng point 'sharply toward'utte':t poUtical failure in a war 'whose chief goals are politlcal.'; , Studies by the RAND 00rp. 'Rnd others, still -classified, show conclusively

that crop destruction_,simply does, not achieve the military PU1'POs~ 'ascribed tQ it: denying food to' e:b.em.;v sQldiers. Stu4ies completed as long agQ as· 1967 show that no more 'than '1- per cent of the food eaten by Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam ,comes from, that cQuntry. ".'

Questioning' of enemy sQldiers captured in. South Vietnam show that their average daily rntake of rlce varied' between- 400 an~ eQQ gram,s~ This variatioll Is explalhed chiefly :by distanc~_ from CaD.lbodia, ,the "main ~(;mrce, and riQt ·ex:. plained at all b;t any lQcal crop 'destr11~tion program. Despite 'years of "de­forestation with herbicides anil enlness 6ofublng, th.dood SU,l>p1f system of the Vietnamese communists has ,not 'been meanihgfuny'''interdlcted:'Y'' 'J

137

, What Is more, crop destruction is conti:p.ulng in t4e heavl~st·hit 'Oentral High .. land areas. Meselson was told in Vietnani that the A;,ugust 9 raid in _ Song- Be

". valley was just' part of a ,program designed to destroy 15,000 metric tons of fOod In Quang Ngal and Quang Tin before the end of the 1970-71 harvest sea­Bon. This 'Would be enough to feed 60,000 to 70,000 people for a year. That, Is just ,the number of Montagnards estimated to live in the two vrovlnces. AI· though the White aQuae annoUD_ced December 26 that herbiCide sp~aying would be rapidly phased out in VietIiatn.:-per:tiaps by spring when supplies already in that country ,could be e'xhausted-the language of the anno-q.llcement allowed for continued spraying- around the _ perimeters of Army' "firebases", Qnd in "remote, l.mpopulated" areas.

As"of this writing, there is rio official confirmation that. the crop-kilUng oper­ations have 'ceased.

AGAINST 'THE RULE-BOOK

After Meselson and two colleagues; Dr. J,ohn Constable of the Massachusetts General Hospital and Dr. Arthur"Westing, of Windham College in Putney, Vt., had present~d' their rep,orts to the ,19~0 A.A.A. S. meeting in Chicago, another disturbing aspect of the crop-destruction ·program came, t9 light: It violates the Army's own rules. "

This point was made 'by Dr. ,,George Bunn. professor of law at the University of 'Wisconsin alid former ·general counsel of the Arms Contl'ol and Disa,rroa-ment Agency. ' .

To make it, .Bunn did n9t invoke the 1925 Genev~ Protocol banning first­use· of chemic'al and biologi~al warfare,. which President Nixon resubmitted to the Senate last A\J$Ust 11;}. Although, the ,U.S. drafted this protocol, the Senate referred it back to committee and never acted. In subsequent years, the prot()col became so widely accepted in interpational law that the ,U.S. :probably WOUld, be bound J>y its terms ev:eil without President Roos,evelt's unilateral 'pledg,e to observe it in 1948. or the finaLraUfication expect,ed sometime this year.

In the early 1930's, the US. objected to the Bl'itish' interpretation that the .protocol prohibited tear gas along with lethal gases; ,and' today the U.S. holds that the protocol does not cover either tear gas or herbi~ides. This position was formally stated in a letter from Secretary of State ,Rogers to President .Nixon that went· to the Senate alo;ng with the treaty. '.rhe inter­pretation in Rogers' letter goes against the opinion of the 80 governments who voted for a UN. resolution in December 1969 saying the Geneva protocol does cover te~r gas and he.rbicides.

nut instead .of re~ying on the. Geneva protocol, Bunn finds that the Army's OWl;l field manual 27~10, issued in 1956 and still current! containlS clea+ lan­guage ruling out destruction of civilian food supplies.

The manual interprets both the. ·1907 Hague 'convention against poisons in warfare and the 1949 Geneva convention governing behavior in occupied terri­tories.

Noting the provisions of the Hague Oonvention! the manual says food crops can be destroyed by ,harmless ch~mical or biplogical agents, if they are in­tended solely for enemy forces and if that fact can be determined.

Although the US. does not view itself as an occupying power in Vietnam, the field manual makes "t clear that the Geneva convention building military forces not to destroy nonmilitary: property or civtlian food supplies is. regarded as applying to any areas where troops are passing. '

Bunn commented: "It seems clear from the Herbicide Assessment Oommis­sions! report here today (December 29, 1970) that the United States' cannot show'that all the crops destroyed by. herbicides in Vietnam were Intended solely for consumption by enemy armed forces.

"The continued use of h.erbic1des to kill crops intended for civiUans would seem to violate the rules of land warfare as understood by. the Army itself!'

Bunn gently pointed out that charges of needless destruction or denial of food supplies to civilians were included in the war crime' indictments at Nuremberg and in Japan after World War II.

The crop destruction program's uselessness and destructiV"eness did not re­ceive, enough publ1c attention at the Chicago meeting: It is a serious example of applied sclen,ce out of control. It Is worth. noting that the llrst objective examination, of the subject was performed by' scIentists.

,~, ,.; I

"1:: '''I

AppeM!x IV

• ~lIE 'OHAyL!!lNGl\l AIIl\l,AP (By Robert Sli.plen)

. '. ' [FrOD1'C~l1Jm,~l~ Jo~r'n.a~lsni·Bev~e~1 ,winter 1970.-71] t, .

. . 'rhe ,100Uger" one st~y~"~*' VH~tzi~in and' ~e nior~ o~e ·tx~velS ',arbu:nd~ the ,coJin~ . t~y,. ,frqJl1.: the ,llortlrernrnol;lt ··pr9vince§. ·b~low the" Demilitarized 'Zone tQ! the

, .south,erntnost parts Q~ tJle Delta;' t1;le'more apparen.t ':it becomes tbat'the war's .overall effects on. the 'Vietnamese have' been ,cataclYsmically dstrnctlve, not only 1n,ph;vs!cal terms bQt"psyc:hologically and socially. Yet, as In all 'wars, the p.attern is uneven. Poverty~ridden ·urb.a:n 'slums' and rural wastelands are in

.predqmihant contrast to spots ,of "ri-ew, ,wealth"'"for,'il minority 'and 'of con­.sideraple prosp~.rity .for a go.od"many ~iddle-class el)trepreQ~urs" contractors, restaur'1)..t,eurs, newsp,aper publis;hers, dance hall opetators,',and so.:' 00, as well

. as for What might be called'."proleta.rian profltee'rs" of the America;n invasion --CY,Clo and taxi dri,vers, prostitutes,' and vendol's' of black-market gOdds stolen from American, Post E~.c4,anges . ." ", " ,," : . .,'

What "the long-term socioeconomic results of· the war have been and will be are"as iInportant',.as, the 'politico-military' consequences, yet they ,have scarcely b~en written about. Oonfining the d1~cusSi()n of South Vietnam, let us consider the 'imp~'ct of tb~ war .to date, in human' and sQ,cial terrofJ. The single biggest ·effect .of·,the long and tragic conflict, has been the, urbanization of the 17 million

. people in the South. Some, 60 Per .ceut of the people now live and 'Work, or. are unemployed ,a.n~g ~teal or 'be.g, ..tn"and around tOWl).~, and cities. 1;lefore' the war, o~~y 20 per cent W:~~e \lrl;)J~,n'. dwellers. While ~cores of thousands of 'city­bouJ;ld refugees, driven from the countrysJde by" bombib.g', are gradually l,'e~ turning -t,o their, .old rura,l homes or haV'e been resettled: in· new areas, it seettls likely that t~e .urban and, suburban population' will not go below, a 40, per cent level,. particularly as' 'the slow, postwar process" of industralizatfon begins ..

The principal. in;lPact of urbanization has. bee:p. ,:tb,e destruction of family life of ,',·tbe close~Imlt' family and inter-family,' relationships, ·that have marked Vietnamese lif~nd Asi~ Ufe in generql-for centt;ll'ies., Even' in the cOUOM

tryside, ':where the fragmen~,ation .of family life has perhaps, been less drastic, the' war has cause'd the 'breakdown '.of :family life as}t used to ,exist. .The families, of regulat army soldiers '(ARVN)' accompany their men from place to place but mostly live in hovels that pass for ,"temporarY ,camps/, and they :are separated "much of tbe time anyway. Even in the case of the Regio;nal and, Popular Force elements that stick closer to their homes, the old peaceful village and hamlet' existence has been' destroyed, .at least fQr the war's dura- , tion., Politically,,' there ,has been' some effprt to restore local autonomy through -recent staggered hamlet and village elections. TJl,ls .J;laS somewhat ameliorated the social dislocation, but the, effects· so., far, a.re mor.e, artltlcfal than real, ~nd it will be some ,time befQre reunited families can liV'e and, work together again under common:....roofs and in common flelds.· , , There are relatively few a1:eas of popul~ted Vietnam ,that have not felt the

brunt of the war. One of them, in, the Delta, is An Giang, a wealthy prQvince dominated by the Hoa 'Hao sect, whi()h has, eS,tabUshed its own accommoda~ tion with th,e Vietcong. Here peasantfhtill; their land u,nmolested, prosp~ritY reigns"an(i one could ha:rdly tell that a war has been taking place. But almost 'everywhere' else;tli varying degree, there is ample prQQf that in tb,~ American effort to "save" a nation; we have 'done much .. to destroy it. From, the,higb.~ lands·:;to the lowlands, whole hamlet~ and: villages, (a. village Ip. Vietr,ulm generally consists of from four tQ six hatp.lets>, have bee~ wiped out: Not long ago, I tlew:',fn a helicopter over w:hatr llsed .to. b.e the VIllage ot Ap" l,3ac, in the' Delta: i1~ar Saigon. ~ears agQ at the 'beginning, of the "big war" j.t, w:~,s

, ,<,' (la9)' '> ,. , 'I"

140

totally destroyed in a -major battle the Communists claimed as 8. great' victory, because, it px:oved their ab1l1ty to defeat" a helicopter~borne' government force. Like many 'Q,ther such places, it has never :been 'rebuilt. In fact, if my friend . John Paul ,Vann, who is in charge of the combined Amerlean~South Vietna~ mese pacillcat~on program in the Delta, badn't pointed out the site of Ap Bac I wouldn't have recognized it, for it WM nQthlng but burned-out brown fields spotted with bomb craters. Even the: rutil>Ie I was gone., '.

Wbat bappened to the, people of. the. l1u.u)"eds; .of Ap Bacs througbout tbe country? The answer is, Who 'knows'? Certalnty'si!ores of, thousands of ordi­nary civilians-no one' rea11$<ki)PYffl l1oW· ma~y-were killed, and' countless other thousands, were permanently Illaimed. Mnn:y thousands more became refugees in nearby'clt1es; mclUding"Saigon, Whlle:6tb'er~ h'8;ve·resettled in far­ll~ng villages. pro~~Q~f:',1VQr~iri$',,as t,~ant¥ or ~ol1e:Ultel~ ,a~ slHl,rf;!croppers,. or living Wltll".relaUv,es,., ,.T he I"OllO of th~, su.·rv.· Mllf. £OiJ1.I.llo. S. ~re, In ,dlff. e.'h~\l, t.·. c. OlD­munltlOi1 either serving ,wth ~b~,VI.,HJong, or wltb,,,the.AIt\?;!\1ortlje ~ern· tor!aIForces, .wljlch, ar.ewhat the:f\eglQnal and .. Pop\)lar Fb~ces togethet are I)Qwcalled. . . .. .. ' . .,,: .... :' Vietnam has lndeeo.',become a natiqn of migraJ1ts, but'tna ttagedY"dr the Ap Bacs.is not 'universal."I hav:e vi~ited fuany otl;ier v~llage$ ,~~'tbe; De.1taJh~t bavepeen reestablished an<\ repopu\(l,ted witb a mixture of .fQrll)er !nhabftants and, new cit/zens, New, \lall\lets and yillages h~ve been cr~ated alL Ilv~r. tM countrjy, mOE:!tly .along or rilose to rpads and highways that are' protebted by , Sou,th Vietnamese troops, inc11J,d,ing local l?eQple);1 Self De~ense' :!forf!es·. But these new places' 'usually l~ck the natural symmetry and c'l1arm_ ,-of: their now~ devastat"ed tree-fringed pr,~d~cessors, ,and ~any of thelli look u~~ sJ1~ntytowns.

TJ:ie most ubiquitous sign of i'restor~t1on" in ,Vietnam is t~e gleaming' ,tin roof. All along the S,tf,eet,Without Joy, the northern strip of d~h coastalfarm.! l~nd in Quang Tri province, Qne can see, hamlet after hamle't where -,~.hattered mu(j-briclc homes have been rebuil~ and topped with tiri, roofing'supplied by the Americans. Flying at, sunset over the once~beautifur city of Hue, one is' almost

'blinded, by the reflection bouncing off these brJght -'new roofs. Though it, will ' never' again be as beautiful as it was. Hue, wpich was"largely destroyed' during the 1968 Tet offensive.: has ,_made, ,an astopishlng recovery_ .. Though at least 5,000 people were, Jr~lled in the city~ome say many mor.e---it ls' 'prospering again, the marl~ets, are boomi~g, and in ,the surr9,undtDg rural, h'QU,ilets the rice har-vests aTe once more rich, and new crops of vegetabl~s _are being' grown.

VIETNA'M B;aa BEClOME' A NAT,ION OF ,:MI~RANTS

One of the most common ~sultsof the war has 'been "de-peasantrlflcatlon" due to widespread American bombing and defCilia;t!ion. All along the roads of the .country one sees small crude shacks with 'wooden' slabs announcing GI W.A:SB: CLOTHES OR COKE, BEER, SOFT DRUfK OR WE FIX' TyRE. These pIttces are' operated for the 'lllOst part -by diSpossessed farmers. Only as the 'level of the fighting has de~rea_sed-as it has done markedly in the last year, although lit may pick up again-haye peasants again begun to' ti~l the land; and one now begins to -see :many small Japaile.se-mechanized plows 'run by one'"man, alongside ,the tradi­tional ones hauled by water puffaloes. However, Vietnam, a prewar exporter of rice, will still have to import this staple commodity indefinitely. And though the use of miracle rice seeds from tp,e Philippines is starting to increase the yields, it will be years before the e:lfects of the newly introduced land reform, ' distributing land to the tiller, will be felt. In the meantime tremendous shifts in the peasant population are continuing. Given the movement of peasants back to their old villages or to new ones, and some continued movement into towns and cities, one can only say the population as a whole is in a state of flux -that is likely to continue for several yet,trs more.

What is thus evolving is a new kind of mixed urban-rural society, th()Ugh I think the basic trend remains' urban. Saigon-Cholon (Oholon is, the Chinese section), a city of 400,000 before the war, has now swelled to 2 million, and it is not apt to diminish in Size or numbers. The great majority live in slums or in areas that are so overcrowded that they' are' psetido .. slums, where small wooden?frame or corrugated tin houses are tlghtly'packed.to'get.her in,-nar.row lanes like So many sardine cans. One of the most familia~ 'sights- in' ddwntown Saigon today is that of small girls, aged nine or ten,' wandering around begging with their infant sisters or brothers strapped to their backs. Their I;Ilothers and fathers, if both are still alive, are working, -by day and by night; the father

14l

perhaps al~ ·.".eyclo dr~yer, ~ncl tb,e .mqther as ~ bar-gf;rl, whexe she m~,e8 herself available to.' A1hel'lcarl"sQldlers,'black '6't *"lte, If they o~CasIQnal1yw.nder In­:flo gUll:rflrDte,~, agaIJl,sp ,VD., ',Che ,cPoa~qe$ lare, ;that, ~e I ·members. of; SUqp families •• ," e~~h qth~f IIp,)nore.tban .f~I1" or .Jlve hQUrs, •• ;lI' .• ok . .sa,lgo.n.LtQo,; lik •. tlle rest ,ot_.Vie-,Wa,n, ls"full of .wi(lQwa andi~agrant8. " , ,'- ,'" , L' . "

~pbo.dY l"eal1y':,knows, h,ow Inany~,p:Jiphans tllere, are,1n,V'letnam. Re,cently I rQ_~e baal~!~rp.lll P~r1s to Viet~~m, with, a ,y,oungJ3~lg~an :DUfse- wbQ' rUIJS a BIDall PJiP~t,tnag~.t~ Gla'jDinh-,~!the- province alpDgside,"Salgpn. ,She told me that. her hoW.eo ,regul~rl;v.: hM about twenty-fiVe orpl,l.ans: offered for adoptipn, llnd that haif,.!are:r¥ietnamese alld·,thEl_·other halt the products ,.of, GI fatl1,ers, and Viet­naIJ1·~se,'girls. ~,t is:,nQ eafiy process to ,adopt an orphan.....--tl)e 'pl,lperwor.J,r alone takes:.~»~\lt-fl yeal"0S~ J~ is sate to assume that the' permanel).t .orphan pDpula-tion:w-i)H~Jso run.tnto, s~ore$'.or l1Undreqa'of,·th.ousands. , :,:, _" .' '

"This is''If}nlY ope ,tragic_s~de of, the waJ:;,~-:Q.. Vietnam. ,'Wpat maYi,pr . .ov..e equally tragic, thQugh,in,a diiferent,wf,ly,ds _th~,s~ial,.dislocation that. wU~ Desult when the Americans 'fin,ally le(t-ve' and, -the Al11er1can-privilegeq ·V1etnamese flre dis­persed. These_include-l\.ot,.only. the 400,000 or' 600,090 ~en and .women wh.o have wD,rked _dit~ctly fDr ,the .Americ~ns_ but alsD the million .or, mDre w,J,lo are their wive~ and, sons-and 4a,ughters, and perhaps their sisters, bJ.'others,. uncles, a~unts, and -cQusins-fot" the,,,circle .of, Vietnamese, dependents .is j w1de-., ;Already ,there have been seri.ous ,strikes caused OY workers wh.o have rebeJled against ihaving to go back to w.ork at Vietnamese wages in Saigon's inflated econ.omy, wages that are f.our .or five times l.owel'·'thfJ,n what the Americans .paid. The' inevitable- re­su~t, -aside from ~.ol'e, lab.or,. tr.oubles, will be .'an acerbation _,of what has al­ready occurred-an ~ncrease -in the rate .of' crime, delinquel;lcy, and ho.oliganism, with all ·the, attendant ab-qses of ,drug addiction fl,nd other forms of vice. A familiar sight along Tu D(>, ,tl)e main -thor~ughfare in Saigon, is the empty bars where the bar~girls who used. to drink .','$aigon tea~'--:,,:high~prieed colored water~-with prowling American" soldiers, n.ow sit bY, themselves, hDur after hour, waiting for the stray cus;tomer and l,lot even talking to each other;' just staring ,emptily. The same is true ,in the res.ort cities .of Vpng, '.rau and ,Nha­Trang, .on the coast and in other c~ties.

The pDlitical effects of sDcial upheaval and dislDC;atiQn are even more ditHcult to analyze an(l predict. 'In -,1966, when the s9,~.called Student and Buddhist St:ruggle Movement was destroyed in 'Danang and., Hue by the' g.ov.ernment of Prime Minister Nguyep. CaQ Ky, with ,the appr.oyal and L.ogistical-support of the Americans, the ,Buddhists dropped out· of, sight as·;a political force. Many weJ"e jailed, some were 'killed, others just went _ underground, whUe still others became tradi1liona't Vietnamese ,attenUate8-the French-inher.ited term' :!lor ",waiting to see what,happens." During the, September, 1970, election -f.or the Senate, the ·Buddhi'sts reemerged politically, stopped their b.oycott of electi.ons, and captured ten-'of the sixty seats'in the- Senate (only thirty seats -were at: sta'ke, this off~year election). ~he' student movement is also active a,ga,in, aud while the Communist minoritY is resp.onsi,ble for m.ost .of ~he demDnstrati.ons anI;! makes' the most- noise, -the ,majority of student leaders and members .of the important 'student groups are non;CDmmunist but pro-peace. AJQhg with -the veterans-both ,the disablt:;ld and :.:health;r ones-the students are li~ely tD become more importaI)t p-olitlcally ,in tl).e pe:r:iod qf re/ldjustment that Ues ahead, It may even· turn .out· that the ,growing movem~nt ,for peace, lllPstly urban-ex­pressed, may become and r.e1X\ain strong enough: to. avert the new civi~ war that so many fear will foll.ow this one.

In the countryside as well as in: '"the -cities, 'milli.ons of people who are n.ot dem.onstrating are simply "walting"-wa~ting for- the Americans to leave so t~ can determine who will be, stronger, the Government or the Communists, and therefore with whom they should make their accommodation. The easy aCCDm­modat.orfil- may yet .outnumber the more ardent nati.on{l.Usts in·,.the South and the ultimate outcome of such a development would, undoubtedly, be its domlna~ tion by' the North, Which is partly. what Hanoi- means when Jt speaks of HprQ_ tJ:acted warfare" and of being_ "patient." If there is a cease-fire as a result of negDtiatiQnS, 'and a real political contest begins; HanDi and the Provisional Rev:olutionary Q'overnment it controls will quickly concentr~te on ,the accomm.o­dators, includ1;rig most importantly the fragmented- religious elements iIi the South; ,The process_ of influencing :them _ maf take -several years, if there Is no neW war, l)ut ,the hardheaded and dedicated m~n of tbe North wUI meanwhile flnd time tQ rebuild their .own shattered nation.

60-97Q--71-pt. 1--00

144 ,~:J;[~' POSSIB~JT.Y- O~_ :MztIT4~ -,~EJ,i~i.~Q'~ i-,oir:iJ~,O:Ti ~~ '~~~~~~T~'.

Thel'_e has,·,bMll' -mllCh.',s~ecula;ti~n','ahd 'c'dnSidei'9.ble' ·Viriflitg-,Vhb6.ut'iter~OriSm and the Jioss!blllty ,of llrMdbRtll!i ol\c~th!lj"w"t'!s over; 1 MvereM' countless dOCll~ents_ in which>the Oomhi:un1s'ts conillta:iltly 'speak-:o'f :eUm~natfng"H'ty:i'ants"_ ~nd, evell 'Het, oy indh1'dual titt~es Hi -$pe_~:Pc' ~mageSj' the _.'p-eqple', t~~y,-'Wan~' t9 kill.....,;;;mostly' government' 'cadre~! :'teachers,' au:d any'one who -haiS -wor~~d for:;-,or cooperated with' the' Americans. -On the- basis' of 'the 'number bf~,Etssassina11ons and· kldnapp~s' s~ill takl,ng "place, ,h~t_ alolle :the'i'proven ,hi:story o~"reprt¥s~lon and killing that Qccurred in North~lletiinm 1n,1945 .... 1947 and again_:du'ring'the abortive'Jand'l',eform ex:periments tn tli~ mid-Fifties, there'lf:r:r~lison 'enou'¢1i. to, believe that- the:CommllDists~mean wliat th~:V::sa'Y. I liave had fong,'Jal,ltjl'witp ex·Vie_uminh friends of, mine, ~ho' have' out#ried wllOlEf_sceharios' of, what:: 11ley think wll1-h,appen '''when the' Comm\)nists come;""'-'of thel): pla-n-s to'use village and to'wn hooligans, t~ turn people, -agafris,t- ettch" o,tlier, and_ of ',othet terrorIst, ' tactiCf; --that 'have !Jeell appUed befQre. :There is no ,piitson to 'b,elieve ,-th(lt ,terror 'Yill not beget terror ~and that 'R "repressiv.e, ,'gbver'n'lrian:t on the' Sl\\gQn' .si~e would, be a~y less ,re'criJninatory or would fsclle'w _ vtolence. ~oth:, ',sJdes .at ,tl~e Pads peace','talks" in their endle~s' propagart~a; ,ha:ve\';spokeIil!of, ""guarantees"_ ,against ter~'br1sn1'a-nd- reprisals,: and 'ff there',rs nny 'attempt ',at"ia _rationaFpeace ' settlement 'an effort will undoUbtedly have'to be made -,uttdei" some sort df'inter· national sup~rvl1son' at least to ltmit,' the 'degree":~f', such "violence.' The inter" regnum between peace- and a p6tential"Third In~ochina, Wa'!\ howeyer long the interv~l lasts-perhaps"iI. yeai'.' or two;.;-will ,be c.!rucial" ',lind the most crucial period of all wilJ' be the, <fl'rst six months; " ' , .' _' '

EconOJ;nic dislQcation and po'Verty" also enter the equationl " Altbo~h steps have recently been taken to- raiSe' the level o;f' wages .of civil servants and soldiers, the mounting_lnflatiQn 'in the South; '-parti<mlR,-rly-'1n SaigQn' and .other cities (the pea:~,ants: in' the Delta are relatively, better off), 'threatens to' burst the seams Qf"the u'rhan- eCQnQmy. At the same time the possibility- of military rebellion ar~"not-tQ be dlscounfed~'So long as men 'in the army, :trom the,rank. of -private up tQ captain ,especially, but in the higher ranks' as 'well; 'are not paid \~tl6ugh to l:!!usJ;ain thelpselves and their ,fam'iUel;l" the threat o'f' arme~ re~ bellion will r'emain.';'(A :h!lrd,wo,rI;ting whore or, cyclo driver can' malre ,two .or three times,-mo're a'month,than, a general or a' cabinet minister, thoug-h'of courf;e -they ,don't have the>,sai)le opportunities to make, as much through cor~ tuption.} ;,'rhe posS~b1lities ot,'Gi'Vil strife ' within a civil- wa-r are thUI)J .not to be

, diseounted_. Right now, unless the United, States. is willing tp give Vietnam an· , oth~r $200 miUidnto $300"mU\!on on top 'of.the more than $100biZUon the war

has already' cost uB, the danger 'of -economic: collapse -and ,fresb internal vlo~ lence are serious; Should such outbreaks in,' tlie Government's own ranks take place, the obvious beneficiaries WOUld, be' tqe 'Communists.' " U-Vietnamization" in this sense has, an Inbuilt fallacy~/ IJ:Ihe' Vietnam'ese can

s:aarcely finance the matntena:nce of 'delicate, helicQpters and modert;l _jet flghter~ bombers in '-the ,manner'iD',whicb' we, are accustomed,-let alone /Support an army of' a mUlion In a nation 'of'17')nilliQn. ,In fact, three·fourths ,of the 'Vietnamese national budget of some 280 billiQn 'piasterA! -currently, is-,devoted' to 'military expenditures, 'under already 1nflated:: conditions;' The social 'in:J;pl1catlons, herein, tQO, are thus dire to contemplat~. Grandiose postwaJ;" plans llate been drawn Up ,by (!ombined' American and,;,Vietnamese' experts-the chief American archi· tect .of the ofllCial ,700·page plan haljL been J)avld Lilienthal, former chairman' of the Tennessee, Valley Auth?rity..:....bu~ ,in" the opinion of, most Vietnamese economists I have talked tQ, these l,ong:-term p~anners have had their heads in the clouds: Far better are some much mQre modest contlng~ncy plans, beln~ worked .out prlvately by small" groups of Vietnamese in SaigQn and in. Pari's, fQr postwar recuvery b~sed .on --agrieultural improvemen'ts and then -oil light· industry development on' a: yearr·by~year baSis: ' '\ TIle dichotomy -of prosperity ,and poverty";that bas already 'afflicted lhe "Wealthy nations, notably the, United State's;,: tae,already evident fn,' wartime Vietnam,' tQO,,' and One shudders, to ,think what w~ have, wro,ugh't ''iIi- this re· ga,rd~ In tl:;re_'shabby, shanty .. towrl cO,Inmunities 6f Saigon-'a-nd ot4e,l''' cities, ~nd parts o:t~ tlte: ','Delta, : too,"'one' 'can see thOuaf1Dd{3: _ of ':television ' ;a.:erials pokfng up ilito the sk~-the;v: a,~~ by :t;Lo' m~an~,4estric~ed t() fancy, ~eW::,DJodeJ;A: ,sl~uc. turesbe!ng bmltby theget·rick·qul~k 'wllr'prollteets and ,corrupt llur~au/),rat. The bug of the affluent society has alre'ady 'bltteiI the 'Vietnam'~'se" iil" many

"f43

ofh.e~ :;war. ~j/ 1\'elli)v~4 a'!lid th.~reakdoivn' of clas~s;~h<J tile '~estitiJttoh of t4" :war: Ti\~re"lsl);, gen~flc ,.rm' tOr It all-"the, Hond~ so~ietY"-and It. dates back:s"veral y~ar~t,o'tliel??l~QY ,Instituted 'by ,t):l~~et!~.,,:~to. soak 'lP plas­tete by ore.tl~''''CQn.um.f 'cUlllate.1'l1erels' notlllng',wrong In 'every Vlet­

,I1amese'!ia1ring"Et: HOllda; (except for' tqe ln~rease' hi ponutlpir,'tbls '. cRuses)" but as -one, Vle:tnflm~se: ecorromist and: somet1rii.e cRllhi'et .nfeml?e;r I have ktiowit· fo'r, many yeii~s says; "You' 'shoV~cl all, these' expe_:nsive<'thlngs _ \ve didn't need' d<YWll our' thrgats 'in orderl :to' -k,eep' your' kfud, of 'war, .,gotng, and then, overnight, you otder, us ,hito 'Ausferity .arid tell 'us 'to., tighten" oitr belts while We -go on 1}ghtlng

. a war ~ can't' possibly pay, fofwlth ouiLresources." 'It 18 no idle prediotion/to' state fuat, sort of the Unite?', States" continuing to give the Vletnlimes~'$2, bilUon<: worth' 'of economic assistance "a . year for at ,least' five years a'fter' the wa;r";ends (which se~ms hardly Jikely, given the curren,t mood of _Congress)" the 'couJ}try' may _ :stmpiy blow"uP :or' fflll apaf.t'. ;~bilomfcally, with QbvH)\lSI,y more disastrous political and _ s'octal 'co:hsequences~ _ -; ,,_ \ ,

These and other 1laQtors hate contributed -to -the growirig anti-Americanism In Vietnam. _We'are'1;lot" as'the, CommuniSts, repeatedly, accuse us, "tleocolonialists" ill, tIl,at .. We' are 'not out to "conquer" 'o,r occupy, Vietnam j but what we have dop.e" unw.1ttinglY;- -is to create an: ambience ot colonialiSm,,' in social ',and 'QCO-' nt)'mic' ways, and',the"'ultiinate 'effectEf are not 'that· different from ·What the Frenc'h did before"us. ':Perhaps th,ey ar:f, 'worse in'some WaYs, because' ,so much· mor~ 'wa~te 'has, been involved'- 'In ,th1s"'.'sense -the dislocation we have ,caused. -in'the South, let 'alone the' destruction by-bombing and: artillery,. may prove to ,be .as disastrous -'a~ the daIllag~"caused' by bombing' in North Vietnam-.

WE ABE NOT REALLY A'l'TEMPTING, TO DISCOVER WHAT -WENT SO WRONG

;:' 'What do -the Vietn~~ese think' of it all,_-and of, :us? They are divid~d-and' be­wildered. One reads the'-'~ally' translation,s of the, Vi.etnamese newspapers, and talks to friends wl),o·, are 17$povt.ers apd editors; to authors and, writers of <ly!li!cal songs" 'anli ,thenfeelipg one -comes away, with is not that they -are bitter or unfovgiving, but .that' ,they have:'begun.'to ,,'wonde},' wheth.er' It was-- all worth the: price '·after all'--'.l-t isi'llot that they feet_ they were :not' ,worth saving 0.1' even that ~E!Y: did not need and -welcome ciutslde help, but' that they now realize, belatedly, they ,could,,_ and should primarily. have done more to" save' the:mselv.e,s, from Communism 91' 'anarchy, and that ,what we did was, stmply sh~ye them over ,a di;eferent kind of prec1pic~. dne ponstantly asks oneself the_ quef:!tion of whe,,ther 'a totally controlled society such as that in North Vietnam is 1])ot -bound to win, one' way or another, over' a partially controlled 'one" sUch.

, as has' existed in South. Vietnam Since 1045. There, has, been co:n,$lde~able difference, of opinion, ,both in Vietnam and 'in

the ,Vnited> States j about ,bow. the, foreign pres~spec1ally the American corre~ spond,ents-:--have covered the -war. I thinlt ,our coverage, generally, 'has been fairly: ,goqd" though spotty., ;At the, same ~me, however, far .too little has been ,wrlt,t~n, in f;l.-nyJund ot, depth1,. about ~,~iU,l.er the politics or .the ~9.cial, and' ,eco~ nom).G aspecw .,of th~ 10:D,g, con,:o'ic;~and "this, has been made more dUllcult by t~e ,fact ,tbat ·the longer_ the w~r b,as lasted, the less willing the",Vletnamese themselves ,have been to ~lk to any Americans, officials as well as reporters. Among other things, the Vietnamese haye bec(u;Q.e mighty tired of the con­stantly changing American faces---tlle ave_rage tour 'Of 'duty for a corre:spendent has' roughlY been si~iJar to the eighteen months for an embassy official)' though there have been, some notable' exceptions._" "

T have alw:ays been astonished at the lack' 'ot intere~t iii the,' politics of the war shown bY,}l)DSt Ame;rican reporters. This may Qe due, In' part, to .the, fact that_a great,-many ,Qf t~eni have,pe~n YOl,l.ng men:ln,thei~ tWenties ~ho were gung-ho and eage;r to, ,g~t Qut, 'where "the., action was. Actio~ stor!~s,1 and. action" shots, were "what the Amer.ican pul)lic wanted,'~, and I do think that much of the'revulsion of the-.war ,pa,.ck ,home<"!ita.:~~use<l:;b~. t,he o~etemI1hasis pIttoed, by televis:iDn on ,battIe cPY,erage. It ~ec,aft.\e virtuupYc <tm~()s,sl!,le" agai'n with, somE! raTe-"exceptions, ,forI a ,WV" man_, t~ ~erf;l»ade ,l#~: rome _ o~ce, th.at·,there'were othera.p.ct.ot,'tlle,w,ar,an~ of Yl~tnaWcese hie , .. orth sl1Qot1ngIn t1lm. I remember l(me' Pi'OdUC~.r"iAl 'Vassermap., p'( ;NBC, who' spetlt- two, a-rduous months preparing'tan', hour_~long . ~ho~ abo~t tlle_ "politics, o:(Vietnam ',at ,'the' time of the 1967 elections,. He spol{e to dozens of politicians and' othe'i' people, both- in

8alg9n .and In the, .proylnces, andtp~. BIlOW "WIl~: sche'lllled to .. be teJecMt.ln ~ew York at 6 o'olocl< ,In the. eyening of ,what"",a. ·.lectc1~!1i1ay. In,Nletnain. At. th.l.st .!Doment ,Ws; ~!!Jle .)'l~s' .pr~e!D.!'ted 'bY~i ~?'f, m.~;.aht( the. ""icollent job Wasserman <lid .. wa. y\ewed .. bY ~ small.audrenc.e lattl thllt,~ght: '.: .

. ')'here,.havebeen"".few oth~ .. good .l\our-1O\\g I'sp,,,/,,\.':'dpne bytbe net­",.orl<:o, notably CBS • • 2',"'~,MiM 01 t.h~ YlcloonQ, and to~,tb. p.lit thi .. yearS ~(lt~9,nal ,Educa~lonal Tele'YJsiOJ;t;)la;;;, con.<luct~d, pane1, ,show.&,-di~cussio~s among (Iorresponqents--.that, h,a:ve be_~n pi(ormatl,ve 'and Ifv:E'l~jV •. ~n ,my' ppin~on" most Qf the -!la,ce ,the Natton and. Meet- t1],e ,Pres8 interView sbQWf:i_ that have dealt wit4. VJ~tna,m-and, tlH~:re, have bgen mq.py-cpave been cut and d:fled and fitlrly stUte.d",with l,1ttle:in:fQrmo.tion.,qpmlng out of: thel)l,' though there have been 'e~ceptio»s. ,S~>lne of th,e. best TV WQJ;·k PttS be~Ii done. by fqrelgriers, nQtably by Inqepe¥pent ;Fl'enGl1 P-Jld ()-erJllaI1j-: prQd\lce~s. '.', ':, .

·.Comp{lral;>~e .to·, the ,TV spe"<l~~.1s 'have been, t:tV:~: occasional ,,','~lockbllste~s"-' stories of three or four columns-1,lsu,ally, w·l1itten· by departi1)g Saigon corre~ spond~nts}.of·majol·: n.ewspapers',:>r tl;le wire.lservt~e.~. ,Am~mg ,the best of these that, I' recall,. ,were· the, summar.ies.. and opinions ;of R. .W. :Applej \ J~, Peter. Grose,,,and' Gene·.Roberts of -the, -New ~ork,·TiW68, and Rol;l.el't.Kaiser of the Washington Post. Iu·var1.ably, by the, tim~' a ,correspon!lent lefLVietnam he bad become· .pessimistIc; so .most of thw;e, ,bloc~J:msters. ,have tended t~· b.e gloOIJlY, wIth cpnside.rable· justificat.i.oll,' During ,their periods: of aSSignment, th"e majority of correspo~dants have. tendec"t to be 'so 'bu$Y competing .for· daUy stories,·.or covering, routine ones" th,at they seldom, had time to sit: back and do some quiet reflection., The result, has shown, tn the generally gray copy that often appeared on page l-how many men lost in how many battles, and who did what to whom. ~ '.' I '

There have been some notable exceptions to this. kind of reporting. Two . outstanding daUy 'men 'were Ward Just of the Washipgton. Post and ·Willhim Tuohy of the Los Angeles .Times, while Peter Arnett ·6f Associated' PresS" stood out a'olo~g' the wire service men. All three' constantly.' worked hard to present tl proper' mixture, "of reporting and intervre'tatlon,' and they .. did better than most in Ip.ixlng I;l:lUltary 'and politica1 'heWs. Perhaps because they wrote less often" some o~ tpe '~orresp6ndents from, other countries: of~~n did a more reflec· tive and interpretive job. This'lias partlculi.lrly, been true'! of Mark Frankland of the Ob8erver .of LondoU" and Jean~Claude Pomonti of Le .Mondc. On the other';.hand, Robert Keatley and',Peter Kann,both of thei'WaH'Street JournaZ, have done similar fine work', and some excellent feature writing has been done by Bernard Wientraub and Gloria Emerson, both of the New York Times. Strangely enough, it has been only fairly ,recently. that some Of the most subtle and poignant reporting of this sort h'as begUn to' appear on a more regular basis. It has been as if, belated,l'y, 'we have, realized' wbat we have: done not only in but to Vietnam aud hav~ looked in the mirror at'ou!, own faces'as well as those. of the Vietnamese. , ~

I. sincerely doubt that either the Vietnamese or the American~ will recover from the trauma: of this, long .an"d ni1~fought, ,misconstrued" and often misre· ported. or unreported war-at least ,n:bt for several generations. In having sought to dist.ingtlish' between invoI'VemEmt and intervention, 1 continue to feel that, ,originally, we made l\ valtd CODlJl?itment politically in Southeast Asia and specifically, ,in Vietnam. We sp.ould, 'not, however, ·have overcotn~ mitted c;mrselves militarily once it became cl~al' that our efforts to, initiate reforms 'as far baclt as the period after the Second World' War' when the French 'were still in control, were ,getting 'nowhere.

But as the years, have passed, what has' dlsmaY,ed me most, beyond the. dam~ age we have. wrought, is that not only have we inhibited or eVen helped lose a revolution that might have,been won-that is, a true natrol1aUst revolution as against a Communist one-but that we have done and suffered more than that: we have ,confounded and divided ourselves, an4 we haye done the same to the Vietnamese, perhaps more serioul:fly because more permanently. To make it worse, we aJ:e now :flag~llating and mea~ou'tping ourselves without really at~ tempting to discover 'what actually happened, why and, how things went so wrong; It may be too soon for tha.t, but given all o~r other national and international problems and our short memories, I fear, that when we do find time-tf we do-to thi~.k back to Vietn!!,m, it may be .too late' to learn."

.,.' "';

" . Appendl>:V

GROUND RULES FOR A P()ST-WAR AID POLHJY , " .' - -'

(By Don Terrier)

(Note: The foll~wing policy pa~er was pr~pared for, the' ,Subcommfttee by Mr. DOll Terner, MIT/Harvard: University Joint, Center for, Urban Studies. He has conducted' field reseaTch in South Vietnam in 1969 under contract to· the n;s. Agency' for ,Internatlonal:-))evelopment.)

, Once the formidable task· of' restoring peace to lindochina has been aCCODl~

pUshed-and it ,mu8t be accomplished-our n~tlon still' faces the troublbig qu~st1on of- how, 'if at all, should we participate- in' the enormous task- of post­war reconstruction 1-

Of course, ·it is not a certainty! 'that_ tbe United States wlll be asked to' par~ ticipate, as,' evidenced recently in remarkS by Mr. Nguyen Tang Canh,' a Viet­nameSe ecwnomist with the World 'Council of Churches. On a trip to Wasliing­ton recently he not~d that 'despite : .. the suffering' and dislocation that, win. inevitably be '.present whtm the fighting stopsr "It may be better to ,leave us alone ,for a certain time ... To allow us to regain our lost identity- ... To tighten our belt and start over on our own." Similar sentiments were expressed in a letter '-by, :a: Vietnam., Ohristian-Service worker who .recently returned to the U.S. after three years in Indochina. rHe recalled the fable of ,"the elephant who was taking a stroll through the- woods when he suddenly became aware that he had just stepped dn a mother"partridge; Around his feet he saw the little COVey, of, orphans scamperi~ tragically. But 'moved, in his heart, the kind elephant loolted dow~:' on the-little partridges, an\i with tears 1n his eyes he said, 'Ah, bufl too have maternal'instlncts,' whereupon he sat on them."

'The"warning is clear: "Somethries:eveh our"best intentions can bring woe to '_our _brothersi" . "

There haS been yet another warning against 'discussing reconstruction while a wa.r'still goes on. It stems in part from ,the optlmi,s~' born from our 'previous successes witH. such- programs as the Marshall Plan tvhich helped to rebuild Europe following, World War_ II, and other- programs which aided Japan, Tai­wan and Korea'. Th'e argument goes: "Why 'can't we rebuild Vietnam too?" An underlying, I-broke-if·so-l'lHlx-it attitude coUld develop from this, which some view as possibly influencihg our bombing polJcy 'in Indochina-as if to say, " ... we wU! reconstruct after thei-war, so everything will be aU right, let's ~o ahead and bomb." ,~' . Nonethel~ss, there is a reaS'onable probability that -sooner or later requests for post-war assistance wilZ be made to the 'll.S. by the various gov-ernments in Indochina after the' fighting stops. It and, w-heii that bappens, we"'cannot es­cape the question: how should 'we' respond?

In formulating an overall policy to guide our n'atio'n's' response, three key questions emerge: What aspects of recobstruction are spe:cifically linked to the past policies a'nd actions of the U.S., and 'fiow directly ~t~om them? How:wouM %Tantlng reconstruction assistance to Vietnam, Laos,,: and CambodIa fit in with OUr overall policy Qf for~ign assistanc~ to various natiOn's.-, throughout the world? And finally, 'ho:w dQes, the enti-re- program- ,of foreign' aid fit in to our conception of U.S. -priOrities, 'both at homij and' abroad? This diScussion focuses most di~ectIy on, ~pe -fir~t of these three' points" altl1ough:.1t 'indirectly touches and relies on assumptions from the other two. 'I •

" "I' .. -"... ')/1

. T~REE GUI'DELI~S

The first task for us is to artiCUlate Rnd debate 'the various possible gro'und­,rUles that will guide our post-war policy. These rules could take the form of a set of general- poli~y criteria or a series of fundamental tests which various <

(145)

r.ecpnstruetiO:~: i)roposa:l~ -must ,meet '~e,fore they are implemented Qf even con­,sld~r~d"l11,._detan by. the--n.S. Thus;- we may~_'b~gin, ~t lell$t, to. circumscribe thtLlimits of our -post-war involvement in VletJiaut alid ,other -areas of Indo.-'chinn. ,', ,', .. ,', -",' " ;,

There are thr;ee ,general ~are.as 'where, OUl" help W'oUl~ 'be" avprQpria,te, 'andi. 'in; fact,.-"crucial:' "',' _ -:' .;.' .. ,:: __ ,'_.' ," '.~, <,' '-~

. . (1) ReqUests "for assIstance in retlI1:IliD.( Vietnam to 'R -self~sutllcient ·produc~ ,-' tJve society;, '_ - ! -" ,-:

. '\2) Request~,;tQ~,hew.:;allevlate_:acute war"re\ated; :tiU,man ,suffering" (S) Requests' to-,heJJi' decontaminate poIsoned and'cde'foUated areas, ",and'- to.

help reIADVe and- diSpDse o~ unexploded ordinance.' ,',' .' FQr .the sake 'Of, cQmpletion, we- Sh,DUld alsD· mention a :fourth potential pDlicy

areaWl1t<ih wij, sMulUstrongly, reje9t:· .. . . . ;.,' (4).·'Requests,to help VIotnan>. maintain (or change) Its existing polltloal 'status .Q:uo~ " ',<1 '\; '_ ',' .

, Befo:re discussing each Dt' tbe pl'inciples jw dtltaH, ,it:is impDrtant "to', emph'a:~ size- tha,t the 'Objective is tQ ,guard against· CQutinued piecenieal and disjDinted­C~:HisideratiDn::'Df 'Our ,vaDiDUs ;econ()mic prDgrams -In ,Vietnam, bY' Clearly (lefhiing

,-the areas, and'Atbe 'extents.tQ, which 'Our ,lielp, is ,apprDpriate, -and the: areas wbereJt is' nDt." Central to t.h,iS issue is deft,ning ,at"-which, pDint Vietnam ce~ses ,to require 'Our special cDnsiderati'On-be~ause' we, have acti'veJy partiCipated in ;tb:e'whr·and,destruetiDn there; ,and vvhen'it-b'e'CDmes, fDr, policy purp'Ose,s, mDre 'like', Dther;'ldeveIQPing' nations 'nDrmally seeking U.S. fDreign "aid 1;0 meet the IDng--term chaJlenges"Qf :t:lDcial 'and_'"ecpnQmic 'trall,$itiDn. Clearly".oul': m'Oral and _ ~ractical considerati'Ons -differ, ,biatween~,:the ·two cases. ,:':, ,,: '.

NQw>1et us examine more) cl()l)Iely' theqneaning and impUcatlo)lS of the vari-QUS policy tests: . ' . - , ' -

- ,".' ,':,:, ,,1_' '. ',- -::, • ' ;:':, ' •• :

.-' I':!, l'·RE~UES,TS FOB A:SSlS'£A'NCE'-IN_ Rm'l'UltNING' V'Il!iTNAM TO A: SELF::$UFFICIEN'J)' . , , . " . "." " " PRoDUClTIVE SQOlE'l'1" > , ! :'." : .

. 'Clearll?,tliis is the br.Qal'l;~st:~:p,-p4 nl~$t g~ne~al stfl.temen~l.oithe objective",?f any_ vQst~war U.S. econQmie~aid'_,tQ"Yietnam~,:a()w:ev.e,r, ~peclftc :r~qu~l;Its in tins _area _shQ~~d cQ~'e frQm ~ Vi{\p1am~se pi~,~ ,fcir,-'rec!>Dstru(!thm, and th~lr precise nature; cannpt be, anUcip~ted at",th~s,.,tlp1e.&,N'Onetheless" we have ,~onsiderable knoWledge about the .sltuatlo!, there- aMeertrtln,cpollcy.guldelines Should. be fQrlhul~ted nQvv1 tQ "forge, -a consensus and understanding, in, pltncipl~' .~~thin our_ own natiDn, a.s to ,the natur&:and, extent 'Of 'Our, future"i~V:olvement._ " On~ :tl){Ilg th~lt lls, ~~e;~~cansjve,\~,~,~ul(f oqs~r;ve and understan2:, abD~t Viet­

nam IS the' fact ~h,at ItS' pre-war a~rarlan ,sQciety has ,eyolved (in: part, due tQ the war itself'f into',a partiaHY indu'striaU~ed urban -,ecQnomy. A studied de­t.ermi,~atiQn, 'must, PQW be made ~f.I ,tQ the. apPlmprlate ,mix: of ,post-war ag:.;i­culturat,and industrial activities ,and, investments-----fi1;st oy the Vietnamese, in deCiding',for: themsetves what k1tl-q",of ecqnonii£ base they wish to" b\1Ud" an_d t4~n 'sec.oJ?dIY bY Qurserve~ 1-U'deci4ing whlch"of",thetr:, requests' to .supPQrt-and 'On what basis. _ , .' '

In no waX ShDUl~ the ;Vietl\amese Pt:H~t-war, plan he pr~empted "by 'Our 'Own analysis, ,v-~:t:it _is'-vital tha,t w~"pei'fDrm onE;'! tDo-for failure tQ dQ_ SQ- WDuld be i,rresnOl1.l)Itb,1e"in th~; ex;t~eIllf!!':~,l1f~,,'O~mgi'e,ss ~:us_~ tak~" tp,e_ resPQns~bil1ty· fQr appropriating, tl).e nation's_ taX: dollats with car_e ,and prudence-ll,Qt ,to. buUd :mQnuments :~9 Qui's~ly_es ~)1;, ,o;thers i;o: foreign la~d~,- but .tQ. ,asAlure, tha~ the P1~nies ~:PI1,vt tr\11y -:~~~~flt, t~~ ,Jnte~9~~,:.recipien,ts, And,~'.1n tttis' case" the t~rm j/-beneft.~'; IS'.'deu .. ,per~te.1Y ... r.ll.the.r. na~r.o<~lY de.ftne.d,. fo.r., it spectfte. s, ,a,n e. nd ... t.o VletnamJs:, eCQl),Dmic (fep'endence,.:uPQ;n the , .. American taxpayer." It .speciftes

::,Americ,an', .1n:vDl~ement :only ,iilsotar "p'_S:, help+og ',-Vietnam:,return to.: a 'state of ~cDnom~~ s~lf-~u#lci~~,(:y. It if;!!~Qt'_f.l;[v:wen~e~ded relatiO~hfp.' _ , . " }t r,eQpg.tt~~es..'that-opr n~tion~,\~,n ,';l1ursuit of ''Our' own nfi:tional Interests, be,~

.. came involv.ed, in·,«wfJ..:tfa),'e ;'Qn _.'\fietn8J.llese sDil; that _,has, 'lS<i tQ a _,de$tee ,'Of iiepleti911 ,and ,~esthiotiori~, in V~etl),alJi t,J).,at h,as r~ndered, -,tPN:~ .. c9pntry 'almQst totaIlY,'belplesfi\,-as Qti, inde_pendent eCQnomic t;!ntlty. Thus the·comtnitment called f'Or here is',-c~ose~ended., 'H.'!~klj!~)t~dl1elp: repa!t;',-'~he damaged· economic infra­structure, and ,to compensat~,for sD~e of tb~ dep1etion,of.the:war 13'0 that Vtet~ nn;tti ,can''''s,tand_, on:Jts 'Own 'fElet 'without 'an, urobWca.1 rela.tiDnsl;llp to,:us in -the ~re .. .; ..

. ,,"/ "" ! "

~: ( ,

l47

Such a. position does, nOt. deny, however, that. V~etnam might 'ill the 'future wish' to'_ turn'JigaiI,l to. the United States :(Qr ot1t'~r nations) for longer range assista~ce)n 'me_~tin,g the',,~r~blems of'eco~omI~ ~nd, socia!: 'de'!elopment. If that should' hapl)en, thIs poHey' does not preclude -further eonslde~ati9n at that

. Ul!\e,'_ it~ simply "states that __ short~rUn llppropriations should ')'ec~ive o$pecial consid~,ratit.?n . a,n~- be ',-based ,,'exclu~v:_ely Oll, ,ni~tigatip:g' the ndY,erse effeCts' of the' war. - . , ' " . :, '

Once this 1'8 done, then longer"r~nge requests from tb;e Vlet,namese should 'be processed without special consideration ...... along with the' otlIer requests for U.S~ foreign aid b;rdeveloping nations tlU.'9Ugbout the ,world~ _ " "

Basic to the propol;3ed -poltcl' of productive, self~sumdency ,for Vietnam are corollary, considerations, p,articularly relating to' the" size _ of the Vietnamese armed forces. The hard fact emerges that II nation with' a,'total"population -of just, over 17 million can-not continue to maintain- $,.' Jp.1litary force-of 1.1' mil­lion men without impossible strains on 'both productivity :'and self~SufH.ciency. For (tom.J?~r1s'on; Vietnam's mobilization is the highest" in' th'e wodd-nearly 400% greAter than ou~ own. (S,ee Chart 1.)

'60

50 III IV

40 . ~8. &~

30 'd !.!

eat 20 <>:

10

0

So", Israel u. S.· VN Average

CHART 1

Yet we are a fully industxtalized -and relativel~ Plore 'Wealthy nation, -and we can sllport a heavy defense effort- with less sacrifice, and less drain and de~ pletion' of our prqductive 'capacity. Nonetheless, there are still ,lUany in out country 'who "-argUe that we spend ,too much -for, defense. But -for Vietnam. mahitenance 'of;,th~'"tlurrent' level of in1Utary outhfy woni'd be' totally debilitating unless we or some other country-pon,ted in massive, and COJiUnuing-_economic a-id ...... not only -to' pay -for th~· army"";";';'bUt' to aid the civilian economy since It would continue to be deprived of, the 'bulk of ita able-bodied' manpower and other valuable productive 'resources.

However, it the' Vietnamese' choose; to continue' to ·maintaln a large army, that -must become an internitl matter of reSource allocation with-in their own government and economy. If asked, we ,should be willing-to provide a reason· able amount of assistance in helping their economy ree;over; but the quantities of additional assistance that would ,b~ ,.-equired to maintain a giant. Vietnamese army ad, in-fi:nitem, would be totally inconsistent with our other foreign and domestic priorities. . -.

148 " : '1\' _ " '" "'. _.,',. __ ' .

This would not me~n that.Y1etnitPr c01l.1d not or would ;not ,.c:hoos~~ to 'maitltain a substan1;\al);i', !,,~ge, arn!y, ~,\I!ce It ,a)rlll'dy bas. one, ,o{the :\t.l!Inerlcal\y: largest anil best ~91jIi\P~d t1g~ti!Jgtorces In the world, It: mer~I~ m~ans: ,that !n~i\opt. IIfg tbls aBa priority, Soutb Vl.etnam··wpuld bav~.to propose Btrlct, aUBterlty ,mea'sures (lllJjch' a,'s toe ,North' 'Vietriainese.'l),fiV:,e. do,ne', fQ.r: year~.) and .it woulq. have to faee the conseqt.i~itces of' depleting itS'society of'its productive CQ..pac}tY and, Of, any hope ,:it Uiay,.pave,of r,et1.lrnlng to ;a. state: o:f '''peace th:Il~ .. norinalcY" within- tP.e fores#e,tible' future.. _:. _ ' ,", " _ _' . , . .

However, austerity ,wUi ,pe. a'Ii ;!.Bsue in 'the post-w~l' econo:QlY,: regardless of "the size. of the Vietr-amese armed fore,es. For exampl~ ,.in",Saigon alone there are novy ~aome:,89U,POO:!eg~stered civilian vehicles"w~i~,1s,an average ot more than two, ,;p~r famil,Y. , ~_n. J;ecent years,_ the; ~:p.nua-l yal\le i of _imported motol;' scooters a,nd fuel ,for; clvma,J.1 uses, totaled :$77 m~llio;n, and exce~c;led, _aU of Vietn'am'~.,.exp.orts bY'r7~: ;percent! ~hls-is, pf;trt~cu14rly s_erious fot;'· a, country wblcn has lost tl1e,abillt;Y,}o feed Itself, and IPuot Import tooq and vItal raw materials. . \ ' .. "" .' < ' '

When Robert H. Harlan, U.S. Counselor for EconomiC Atrairs, ~decried this lack of austerity,- and .urged belt-tightening economic, -and tax reform's, he was quietly transferred from "his, post in the __ U.S. l!lmbassy, in Saigon-and the Vietnamese economy continues to bristle with galloping consumption and

, infiation. As a specific example of our participation, in helping Vietnam return to a

state of economic"selfRsufHciency, the United States migh~,agree 'to- help mainR tal,n some of the U.S. machinery and equipment' alreadY' In' VJ,etnam, such as bulldozers, tractors, 'and graders, Which now exist as a potential resource for peaceful reconstruction. -If for lack of minor repairs, spare parts, or tools they are allowed, to rust and deteriorate -at the roadside, as countl~ss vehi'cles and machines' now -do, then no ,~ne benefits. :Our assistance· wit1h this tYP,e: o~ aCR .tlvity could entail ,relatively modest appropriations, and " M.uld:· keep these valuable assets pr.oductive. -t" -

, h" ;

II. REQUESTS TO HELP ALLEVIATE ACUTE "W ~~RELATED ~t,rMAN :S,UFFERING

In ~ffect, this second area de,als with helping to mend" the war's. hroken bodies: In addition there: may also -be some requests to help provide emergency food, shelter, and clothing for those who, bec8:use of the .war,: cannot 'provide for ,themselves-for ·"example war .orphans" Widows; and other wounded or maimed adults; However .. in considering these. requesta, .our. policy again must attempt to diff~:rent1ate between problems> that., can be directly traced to the war, and the general-problems' of human health and welfare-from whiCh, of course, we have no immunity' ourselves.

There are Jstrong traditions in our- society that 'beckon- us to help the inno· cent Vietnamese child accidentally woun<led in the fighting-that is clear. We have unquestioned responsibility to do ,our best to help al.leviate war-related suffering. .

Hpwever, as to, the general nonRwar·related problems of human health and welfare, Vietnam niust be placed in the' conte:xt Of. pther requests to our gov~ ernmemt for aid-as in the recen,t Pakistani typhoon,- the Peruvian earthquake, or, the most pressing of our -own social and economic problems 'here at home. Thus, any.assistance for Vietnain' in, this general area should' not co-me from a fWe~al war-rec!Jnstruction' fund; rather U should come from- our -general forR i'lign aid, tu,nds·. which are shaped, b~ our own domestic and foreign priorities.

Fortunately, in the entire area of em~rgency hUman sufteJ;!ing-war~related or Ilot-voluntary action_is, an ~mportant,-part of AmerfCatl"9'ulture. Individual an4. g'roup efforts often, reduce or minmwe -the, ,need -tor" ofll~ial government action, which_ reqtiires use of the taxing: power" in effect, ,"foJ.!cfng" Americans to participate :i.n, international humanitarian, eft:orts. , ";' ,

, Philanthropic' ·and rellgious contributions: shoulde.red th~' major burden of our' assismnce to Blafra, for e:x:ample" during'the recent' civil war. In addi­tion, as lndivJduals, We 'provide~onRgoing support,to agencies ·such as ,UNIOEF, the International Red Oross, OARE, 'Oatholic Relief Ser:v:ices, the _World Coun­cil of; Churches,' ,and ,many others. ,

.1 Assoctated Press report, Oct. 22~ 1970., ' I Swiss Review of World Affairs, Vol. 20, May, 1970.

149

, :'Ille iViettlaIilr- in -'Particular,- " Vloluntary J agencl~s, :haJ!'e - played a c~t1dal tole. In 1969, -groups" such -"as the -:Vietnam 'Ohristian -Service, the 'World Council of Ohurches, and others provided $48.91Iniill1on f.or ,emergency- human 'needs. This compared to the budget for, the same year of approxllnately $2 million for the alItlre VletrtamelleMlriistry' of Sociai' Welfare, LII.t,jlea~ ,\>,oluntllry cdntl'i­butlons for food from the Oatholic Relief Services alone, accounted <tor $12 m11l1on more tpan,' the official 1;J.S. gflverm;nent- aUocatio;nln the sa,me fl:re.p..

ThuS; there Is re"Sbn to :belle"e ,th~t fultintary' activities coUld cotihnue" to play ari'lmpoi<tant'1:rijle In,~,the pdst"War'perfod as 'w~U. 1n fact, 'recently, 'o,lla rei!gfdus agency adlillttejlunotllclally that It had already: collected more money tor 'Vieenam rellet' than-tt' ,COUld ratlonallyaild .tlIcI~ntly ,spend, Therefore, With ~pect to U.S .. R_ssistQ,nce in the area _of enlerg~ncy ,:lluman needs, any government'tospons''''u'st cOordlnat.«nd work clos.ly with ~he 'philanthropic groups wl~ln our~ s?ciety~> " ':_';,' '

III. REQUEST TO HELP DEC0l'i'J;',4.'M-INATE THE' POISONED AN:D DEFOLIATED AREAS, OF , FORl!lS~ A.ND CO~T1tYEiIDE;' A.Np' TO HELP DIG OUT A.~D ~EMOVE, UNEXPLoDED

ORDNANOE ' . !',

The, extent to which' ,we have deliberately defoliated vast areas of Vietnam is unp'tecedented !ht,th'e histo'ry' of,:W-arfare. Over 'one~sixth of the entire land area of South'vtethllDlhQlt'beeri spr4yed'wltb chemical herbicides (vegeta­tion" killer.s) c:rellting en~irO,nmelital -afitl. ecological dis'ord~rs of a magnitude and SMps' llever b~ore' '8(!en 'b;f scientists.' ., ' . 'Pro'fessor' 'Matthew'- S.- M:es~Ison; an _emInent ',molecular biologist from Hal'­va,rd' Univ'e'rSUyLundertoolt, a' r~cent pilot study' on the, :e'ffects' of defoliation tactics in 'Vietnam for tlie"jn"esUgiolls AmerH!an AssoCiati&n' for the Advance­ment of Science. His, preliminary 'oonclusions' [see Appendix III] underscore the eilornlous dang~r!S, hih'erent in' the la:rge~~ca1e' uncontrolled _ poisoning o~ natural· environments-:"'not~ onlY' tn Vietnam, but in' the 'United 'States and other countries as well. H~" p'otnts out'that our dome'stie' production of herbicides is .nmy-' greater: than' tbaCof inst;!cticides, and, yet scientists know- relatively little abou~ the; ,ej'(ects of herbicides. Ip. fa:_ct U' 'has only. been recently that seie:q.tists have'.'begbn to understand the h~zar4s of the' famiUar and traditional insecticides, suck'as DIY,r, an<i ,~tb,eh' tendency to app~Jtr in'da'ligerously in­cr~sliig> eonc.Emtrations as tHey' move up thrQugh the -numf\.n food'sehain.

AlreB:dy'~arl1 evidence hlls'tentatively linke~ the use of'~erbicides :~~ Viet­iram to st1l1blrths, birth deformities,' and illness as well as,. the proven loss of !l:g~cul~~:ral an~, f~re$ 'prodtn~tiviiy for' fn~~fin1te time periods.,

As tbe,se: danger/;! Bav~ come ,to~ light, President Nixon res,Ponded with an I~Ytructlo~ to the 'military ~9r .. phased a.nd oru~rlY wlthdr,(wal. Of this type of v(,a:rfare,:, ,$ls In()fI,ns th~~ ,~O: new. $ipments, 'Of thE} herbicidal agents 'will be, permitted i aIthottgJi pr~s,ent' stocltPUes already in Illduchina can still 'be used;'up~, ".',L ,"-,' ,.': i .. ,'. :' .'

It. reinl\ins important however ·that at the earliest possible, date, our gov­ernment undertake' the large scale research necessary to __ learn p,ow, . if pos~ sible, t9 rest9,re"spr~y,ec;l ~r'ealjl. 'to,. their ('Ormel' li~~_ 's,upp?r.ting ,PQ~n,tial. Som'e areas, however,' may' be (lestroyed for ,generations wllere, for exa~ple, the !lead root!;! of' t,he ,:to;l'mer vegeta~l'Qn no long~l' hold -,the, soU and i~ erodes and wasbes' away into ~he .sea. Some' sprayed areas such as the Mangrove For~ est in the 'Delia Reglo:p: stjJl J1h!>w: n() trace whittever of any" veg!;ltation re­growth ,flftei:: sprayingg tha.t occurred _some S years ,4g,P in 1967. ,J,\.re~s in other' sections of, ~~e .~ount1'¥', sprayed, with dl:trerent, chemical a,gents, at (iiffel'ent time' intervals, ,e:X:}1ibit a' full ra~ge o~. ~fter~~ffe'ct'~ri.orte, .of~' which are com-pletely understood.",or., predictable. " " , _' .', ,C,_, .ii;r

At t~e earliest possible, date, the, p, S:' sbimld "ptllclilltv fund advanced re, search into this aJ;"ea, not ,9nly ,for its, potential '~pp1ication in a post-war IndochJna, but also for use here at b,ome against inadvertent PQisoning of our o~",E}nvironllletit.' It is, clear, ,t4at,:the ,effects, of defotfation. taQtlcs ,'in, In(lo­china- present n'ew p;I:"oblems of a s<iale and -scope that :Call: b~' broac4ed only by the ,Jarg~r., ~leIit1-tlc c'Ommul)1ty-, _.ncluding th,a,t, outside 'of Vietn~m; and that the'Untted States, as the user ,at ,these ~hemlcaI agent~ as weapons, and as a peaceful user for agriculture and forestry, assume {t"major role,:in mak­ing this research Qvl,tiIable to the world community.

150

We -f Sbou!d,' reje'ct : a fourth" potential,_ area ;for .:n.s. aSsl$tan~'i' althorigh: 'it IS mentioned here bot1\ -, for the ~ sake; of :completion,. and. 'because 'it has· ~Hi~ the past beenliR prlmarY':JUStWlcati'Otl for' 'funds,' .-,J,' Jl~i

, '_, .,. ,«"~·'-_.,,j:--:"i~ ':-. ',';,,",' .. ',- ,,:.. ~tj't -;'il'i : 'J,' "

IN. REQV~STfo'- ~o- HELP.-' YI.E.T~ AM: M;arNTAIN (OR-- Ol{ANG£);, I~.$ POTE~'l!IA.L ': \, , ST'ATUS 'Qtto,'.

O!l.,i~tlS!y, any as§IStU!1qe, I,!cludlng toat ~Ijj'o~ously jtlStlft.-d on the three pnnclples ,above, will to some extent have poILtlcal undertones and impli­cations. The very fact ,that, ,it- program may e~istr. that ~~nuinelY- affect$ , the people of it country, c~1J.DQt help but.refiect some credIt ,~or discredit) o~ the government in power llt the time. ,

T!>us our rejection of t\lls principle would not <lfsqiiaUfy a program lIlerely b-ecause it~ turned out to have some potential' ramlflcatiolUl: but it does reje~~ programs which "find major justillcation in the ,fact that. lndeed they' WiU affect" the stafQs quo. ,. '. " ;, ,'0.' - ~ , .':rIle 'United :~tates."ean no lon:ger attempt tp '''purchase'' the, cooperation of

foreign governments, can we continue to pursue' forms of l'welfare, diplomacy" designed to buy grass roots support for foreign governments that fail to achieve it on their, own. _ " ,

There are sweeping implicatitms that flow from this,' firu~J policy principle with regard ,to ;OUl' present'arra)" ·of· ~ld and"'as~istance,,programs in VietnaID,:~ For example, our lllllJ.<l,reform pr9gra~, whicp. is·,regarlied, by many to :·be the most socially interesting 'and ,pr9gJ;'essiv~, 'o~ ·alJ of, Qur, aSSistance pro·, grams in, Vietn$-m'. would 'cQme under close: scrutiny. For, despite the fact that, it is socially and 'economically progressive,- it, has, been attacked as b,e!ng a rather purely., :po.1ttical."program-an effort ~~to "b-q.y" grass, 'roots ,pote,ntii;tl support ;from the Viet~Jlmese 'peasant farmer.. .'

It.is seen as a U.S. 'commitment to bankuoll the orJ,gfnal Viet qong land ,re· form 'progra1n in ;the natP,e qt 'the ,Thieu~KY ,government'. , The continuatlo:p. of this tYPe of ,political, program in tl)e post wnr period, is., highly questtonable. Land, retorm ,is not_ essential" to· returning Vietnam to, a prod'Q,ctive society. The c6unti'Y, has beep. productive before without Land reform: but if it is desired, therJ~ -- sbouJd. be' no ,pnrticular . rea,Bon .why" tl;le American Jaxp,6-yer should be the only .~e'ans to "acnieving it.. It seemB,.- _~n fact, ,.that aD:Y:orViet~ nameB~, goyernment.:;which places a ,high pno:ritir on Land.,reforD;). a~ a ·wayc of reachi;ng: and,_rela~inl; to the Vi~tna'me,Se ,~ariner might well insti,tute 81.lch a program on its, own-tbrough it,S,: own -powers. ,·In4eed, this was fundamental to the, original. Viet O(mg bli]eprint, for ;tbe pjfogram., ~. __:

) Als? ;land .xeforpl does not quaUfy within eUber' ,of the other c~iteria.; it Is not an em~rgepcy· huma,n need caused. by the waf, m;)]:" is it ,r~~ated to decon~

, tamjnation. 1t ,Is fundamentally a program designed to proaden t!)epUUtlcal base ,of the 'Thieu~l<r,' r~g[me', using an. A,merlcaIi.".bougb,t hand~out program that Vietnainese taXpayers would not support. Furthermore, it .is npt cleilr Why land reform aSBlli!tan~e· should be- part of ,0:, specHll post"war reconstruction program, tather than a part of our regul~r foreign. assistance progratn, poten· tinUy a:v~nable to aU nations. '"".,' "'" "

Not onlywould land,reform be exHuded by "ot,falllng wlt!)in the ,criteria prqposed here" _ but aisd most of our cur:rent economic a$sisiance programs would be curtailed too . .According to a r~cep.t letter from ,a high .,rl:lnking AdminI~tration offtcHtl ~~ the, PreSident'~ OtD.~e of Management and lIudget;

< "In- the, flna~. :analysis, the only relevant' ,crit.erion is, the' contribution whtcb, th~ program makes'to the Yi~tnamization pro,ce.ss . ' •. For example, .Uhlted' States p'rograms and: associated' V1etnain~se economic 'policies are ju(Iged',.-In' terms .of the,ir etrects on renl iric9mes In''the rural sector, ,('co~tr1bu:tion,.to. paciflcati(),ll), th, e, urb, an ,sector (Poltt,:ical sta, bnttrh ~~d" the ,PUbliC .'sector~ (rqlIlt~ry morale and ~ft'e'ctiveness)." The. "o~ial in<:luded the exPIat~~~,ory p~renfiie8is as it to belp c:Jecu"e the tl;'ue 'meanlng$ ·behind the, 'econ,om1c dev.elopblent ja,rg;on.

'T.hus,·-there.:is stron~ evl(ience th.3~' p'C).st-war assistance"pro~ams ,nlust 'be fundamep.ta111, ~, __ rl\l'formUlated., If we' are, truly "concerned, with,' the return, ot Vietnam to ~ pro~ucttve' so'ciety . our ,D'oat-war "program.:s, cannot be merely inertial continuatiop,s .of, :pre,sent, progratr1s, which ~s the- A.\1ministr'atlon'states, are pri¢arily d.es'i~iIe'd· to augment' '-Ipa~.ncation / pOlItical' 'stabiuty" and "military"morale! and' e1'fec~tveness:u , ' .

151

'It ':';e,Ao~la~ilnyrble in po,t;wa,r Iti4q9b1l\a.,6ur, .J"~lstanqe poli~\'es'injjst lle, tll9roughly re·e1<amllled 1I\,I1g!it., per)lI'PS;',ot,thep, rmclples pro~qsed 11). this paper, o:(,possib1t some v~riabion,';l:ms~d 'Qil,,9;U' exi)l'ess~on Af;.~)Ur own Dntion~ conSen:SUf:l.

AL;ERNATIVE IMI;!LEMENWA;ION MECHANISMS

However,' bey'o~d "the i

policies ithat guide, ou~' future tole,- we m~st :lo9~ 'as W.~ll:-<tQ alternative implenientation m_echanisms. The record",is clear- that in InJiochlna as'·jn .other areatil".of_,·tbe,world, l1~S. ·ecoDQmic assistan~e programs hav,e suftere~ nO,t only fro:ql_ "J"a,pj;f, _lnconsiljltencies;-',and oCQRsional contra,dic'~: -tions, in policy, but also from p~,o.P~eJD.s, of executlOJ;:l; "·~ect:Luse, Ame:rican aid policies are W1'.ong RUd because ,aid pr,oced,'Q,t'es are compUcated,and,~,arbitrQ,ry," complained Vice ,-,Presi(lent Ky l.'~C(.mtlY';:' "United States aid has, not helped, Vietna.rn toward, self·su'fficiency-"anp':,~as ch;:mrly not bee.n ~Q.t1rely. helpful to tqe,-,,&91'!:th Vletnf!,Il).ese people." 3 " _, , ' '

In an atte:rnpt to-more.flllly probe Into,tl~e imple~entat1on of _our past pro~ gra.ms"in; Vi4i!tham, "thi~', :writer r,~e.ent1y _ PllrticIpated in a pilot ,su,rv,CY 1 of indi~ viduals who -had worked in Vietnaml and, other parts of Indochina, on various economic" civic action, and develQpment, programs. The respondents to the surv~y, incluqe<'t civn~~n,volunteer workers, ,Stilt€! Department personnel, £!,nd military s,er:vic'emen,~"lncluding_ Green :aere~s", 'who, ,had recently returned ,to the, United &tntes. ,'tn'eir combined experience totated- over 137 -man·years of actual experIence within ,Indochina itself, pluS, substantial additional experI~

- ence in 'both -administrative and' field positions in the -U.S. and' other develop~ irig areas. Although: this survey ,was,,~dequate for fornlUlating hypotheses and worklp.g';{lSsulhptions, regarding the-'conduct of our PJ'ogNms, the results' still rnust-'b~,r~validated b;y a h;lTger and-mol,'_{,l: complete ,sample 'before- being trans~ lated,;intd ,statutory requirements.

, :,N()I~e.1;.pel~S!i", sOlJ,le,',tentatively ,hnpQ~tat:lt, ahd significant "pat.terns emerge­and with,;: sUFPrising unanimIty among the respondents. .GQod prQgraD?-s, ac­cQrdl~,~to 'the respondents, wel."~- those which trained t]le Vietnamese tQ do

.-, ,sometbing af~r the aid.:t,ea~, left. Bad' p;rogrl}lUs" -,~:ver,e, those. whIch .utilized , foreign SlJe~iali~t,s:wl).o :perft;n:med ,a \gerv,ic~, eIther ~or n' short time_,9f spor4di~ ~a:ll1, aml -then, If).ft. Ne,gatlve ,e~_~mples :iJ;tcluded . prQgrru;ns' ; as, food handouts, Or ·tpe ,dispensing',of -p1lls:-Jitnd, 'medicines 'l(w1t;b. no estaPlishniElDt of a relation- ,

'ship', w,lth,,the patient1 or attempt to help ,hilQ.; keep 'fr.Qm getting' _Sick again." lJn~Qrtuna:tely, ~Qst o~ ,Qur,.ofHcial ,programs;, and ,~any U.S.-sponsored volun ...

't,nry p:rog'fams: were groupedcip: th~. negative, category. ,-- " "The point t4at was made,m_any times, by th€!, survey .group was tha,t whatever

we d'o ,Should ,!:I,e, aimed toward the 'l9ng, ratlM 'peneftt .of, the Vietnamese people" ' It, ,was,}, elt., ,that ,this CQUld ,be' 'accompU,Sh, ed, only::_;by- .l9(1.,vIng,- .the' .Vietn,amese with some kl'nd- -of, _Skip: or ability..,-but not with, '~'~,andoutsl' or' mO'ney ... One returnee, emphasized '; this pOint by citi" the story .of,: "Give a man ,an ea·r .of. corn, and you've giv~n h~Ip a meal. ;Pl~nt an.'.a<:re of corn"and you've given him provision f.or the winter. Teaoh him how t.o' plant, ~nd yt;:lU've given him a lifetime SUPplf." ,

Anotper majo:r poiJ;lt ~a<1:e .by, nearly all, of tJ;te people, surveyed was that non,e of. tbe progra'ijls, rio matter. how w~U concebred; will be ,effective ,'Unless they are adm,inist~red with, cOU1P~t~nce and_ ~ensi~vity. The adr:ninistrators .of official D.'S. programs were frequently characterized as 'Ialoof" and without an ability ·'toispeak __ yi~tD:ames,e nor'-'an adequate unders~auding of Yietnamese' culture. This led-, to such 'blu'Qders as one incident, in the U.S. Plow:~for~Peac,e program, in, Quang 'Tri' Province 'in t,969, in which ,several, Ameri~ns, in a sincere effprt to, ,demQnatrate ,to Vietnamese; ;farm-ers, the advantages of" inodern tractors, proceeded ,to plow up a,'field, unear.thing a gr.oup, of ,ance~tral' graves, W:llJch f9r generations ~ad, been :Qleticulpusly ,and reverently, c1pcl},m,scrlbed by t,he farmerl;J, WJlO cult,ivl,tted, the area." :,.' 'r; ,f',- :" , , " : Not only was a l~clf o~:, sensiUyity G?nJ';)tstentlY ,r~orted: i,p., the stirve~, but

also many of the personnel within USAJ.D in Vietnam w~r~Arit1~ized as being "ol(~,:_: ,and-. "tired". :In,tereB~ingly,- .thif?, vleyv, was ~ cj}rrobor,ateci; during ',discus~ sipn.-s:;with '"State Departmen~ administrators in Washin3top, who, allowed," that a'Vi€ltnaJ,U'"tour usually came :at_ the enc,l, not during tbe pr~:pl~, .,of!,~ man's' (lare~r; In ,Il;dq-ition it w~,s suggested that a ,,Jnan's '~:b~lity-,.,"t6 ,fit\,tnto- the

8 :N.Y. Tlmef!, Jul;V 5, 1970.

v?~ org,~a" p,iz8;fJlo,n" ~Il,d,~t~,:,:ge" tjlO]lg"" ,r.;, It, h the, 1n, illt., r y,': ", B, W,.en, a,B, ~;, 11, hI,I, itY. ,to, obtain, a secur1&'cl~.rknce 'w~t\l'1teM"9.u8;lill.$tlotis tor '."Vletnali;l tour, "

Ali!d' mentldiledwtl. 't1'~'utit~rtU¥a«i ',f~cl;, ,tli.t '):/~~'llse r'tJ'S~U¥III.,~::hre, nO,t permitted In Vletruth>', "'any ot 'tJie"llu!!l"WhO~Oiul1t~erfor dUty there ofteil do so as- a. way, to. escape' from unhappy' family situations back 'in tlie:,1 ~StMes, and not outof"il',pa~ttoUlar Interest' 111 ftbe, area Or ,Its ,p!!ople;Oddly enough, qualities }~Uch as empathy, an:'abillty to relate. to people of other cultures;' or I1l1g)llstic.abilitywere rar01Y'inentlbned"ltI tMse dlscus,slonk fi ,'"f'", "

, 'In, fairness; hllwe"er,' nelttIY'~iv~rydMHwho, took, the opportunity' tb Cl'ltlcl •• USAID 'per,80nnol In Vietnam,' mentioned, 'eertiiinHtldlvl,!ualexceptlons;' al.

1;1>, ough ,genCraUY'!heY '~, tided tMt'tbese eJ/c,ej)1if6hai:peoPI~:we,re al,I)I08t always "buried at"th'e lovves:t IeveIW'!,of the' orgai11zatfo'B:.1' fr'" ': .,,:,' ,

ThO qu~stlonn.lNn\t""et' .Iso poIIlCM"l\ut'some of tlle'most worth;vhlle altd positive -of"our current\'progrit'ms, 'fti"Vi'&tniu:'i1PTypicaF responses of this -nature cited' benefi'Cial' programs' as ··'beilYg "-'tliO$~':'which emphaslze' s~lf-help 'and ,le~rning a~ the vi1l~ge level, partioul~rlY i;n. the _ ;fields 'of 'iagri~u~ture~t)'ublic healtb '(hygiene and ,prevolitlon), eduMtlol\ '\lna villall" Improveme~t, Another answer, ref~r-red" to,' ~'pl'()'jects :where ,the, Yretnitmese Ha_v~:l_'assp.rap:ce, it's ·th~ir project:-h'l.tv'l::{pbUcy"makbl'~ and' chahgitig PQwers,'-," t",·,. ::-, , - ,"

. Specific' programs most often. mentioned'las working best..t,:o-both -In, terms of policy ahd ,admiriist:rat,lon-w.e:re _ ·medMaI .. ··1ttgpcultu:ral,'j ~.4uc'at1.onal'· -and, voca~ tional;prO'grams. 'Not srtrpriijirl#ly,~:the'se sam'e' types 'of,-program!:3 'wet'e also' feIt to have the' besf overa.ll'·chan"Ce"~of' being genuinel':y h~lp;eu:t -hi' ,:the, post~war period, 'and these ,are :preci'self"-the kind' allowed -for 'within t11e t,hr~e policy points meptioned'ef!.rlier." ,,-, .J ',' 1-', _ _' ,f,· ",'" , ,,'

. ManY' .6t,the'peopfe' sqrveye'd were' 'o'ufllPoken- oh ~th~ le,s8, betif!ficlal. programs, alld nearly all alludecl" in: some:'way fa' '8?:tBell1e ·-that~plagues· nny ,{ypc{"of -w,elfare program, the'woHd 'over. ~'h"y objeCted'to "'piltegIve-ih\'ay 'prbgt.,ns which destroy integrity,_ and m~ke the V1(~tnaD.?-.e8e ,ffel:"ch;f;!ap' "':,1 Also:'clted:,-Were 1)ro­gram'Sj{~(requlrin,g:'large .amo'tlr1ts of,li;tlpor1!e'd--equi'pment' and,rto'reign~I:p~r$om'!.el, e:g" la:rge~scR'le publ1~,' works ~0~ect:a\1'-n)'el:!hai11,za.tion:. scllem'es, etci'f:'Thete, ""as' virtually 'complete 't1nnnl'iiiity-' that t-he)'tefuge~( resettletherit~; programs::, retire­sent4~d 'our worst' 'eirol'tsi':an~/ltlb1-s' ::v:ie_w was·'conftJ.'lne'd' r,ecentb',' by :th~' jGoV~' ,,:, ernh)ent A:ltco'1ntlng: 'Oflle. ("'h1ch".e"~retf'Mmonl.h~d th~Se,. ~~O,g'r~m~I'" "," ' 'Anlntere~t1ng",po!ltlCRl andJ,1d¢.ml>'glMl ~<itn()t"cc,()mp"'\e§ -tfte' gues!lon

> on the 'prl9ritie!3 'for po's-t:-war- 'a-m.,- ,'At: ,first '!thos~f 'polled 'Were",' aSked :' ,"Wll1.ch programs, If any, sllOuld 'be "continned"(,or Inltlilted) atter the. figli~lng .tg~~, ass-u, inlng, a . neutral -or',,~pro._west,ern Vietnames.u.,e,I ' ,gOVer, nment'?"',' Tlfe:;ique$:M,on" ' was then nSked a s('cond' tHlte ,u" , , as'sumtDlt 1)~le¥e is tI/eit1ter al ne'U-tral 1).6.1,." I1r()~ West~J,ill' Viet.nam~se' 'g()vernme~t~" ::~he'J;t1ns~~i's to' the two ·qu·est1on's ,':were

'Vlrtu,aUy tdentI'cal,proJ?ilbl)" '1.Il'd'l<'fitlpg "tUnt '1,he .r~spondents 'felt' little "or no relatIOnShlPbeiw¢ebiNhe t~p~ ijf,~1<'1'programtbat 'ou«!lt tq 'be ~,vai1~ble, and t)J,~ ul.fllnate formAt -(if _VUttnantese:politics,'and'g6vernm~n:f;-'" , y - ". - _', _,r,,' ':'-Tn,e survey aIM' :sought to 'ijeterinln,-e' ,"HoW- should 'U.sU po_st-war e'conOniic as.!iIstance' 'be ~charlneIed\'lnt6 iYietnruti, -'I.e" 'Whf¥t 't:ype."6f'~l>rogram adminffjfl\a~ t16n woulCl' Y011' 'favor?" .,l ' • • ,~' c '

'Respondents ,. strongly - favored an internationaItzlng of ot11';' foreign _ as­si.siance·"prog~am:s; thro~gb the--Unlted Nn;tfons,\Tl,te_ WOl'ld ,Bank; or''''Sithllar agen'c1es. Str'i;l:r:lI~: 'sentlmen~ 'waS·lalsd:e,:t!preSl~ed, (or:'greater,' :Voluntary 'partic.1»a .. bon,' OVE;!r 70% ra,nked-8:,cont1nuQf!ion of th~ ,eurreilt 'USAID format as least acceptable~ e, . ',': : ,,' >',' , 'f! "," ,.. '''.:, ,,"

. Actually these senttnients mlrro~- --offichil' g'oyermp.ent ,tec~ommendat1ons _ al­ready:tnad~ by Rudolph A.-,Pe;tersdi1, Pr~,sid~nt' olJhe,Ha'nk of'America. In his Report t,(PPresident Nixon e'rltitled ,~"UJ~f, Foreigln 'Assls!ance,'in the"1970's': A New ApJ?i'ottch/' Peterson Ul'ge!s:,·'t?lntf(:fur -ai(t:prqgranpo-e ref:1t¥uctuT'ed' to';focus

_ on a new ',agency ,such:: as _an Interntttional :f)evi!lopment', BArtIt'. Although -the Peterson Re'P'Ol$t l'e$.ves many,.,"',Questf6ns unatiswered j it:' does ',<, supPort _ the' sentimE,lnt, of the Vietnam :workers: If USA:ID is, to, 'continue to,fexist, 'it must be overhiluled; t,op'to"bottiom,altb6agha l)iultlnatlOliM dra development bank in:oq~l Iii1ght well'be'}ft preferable'nlternat1ve. " " '. ,_ _ . ,

'TbE{:performa,nce,;'of USAID In' V~etnanii whiCh ,IlJts' occupied approxlma,tely barf of "all the "staff' ,(t11d bu(!get It hasilvailablEii,16r assignment', throughout

.: '-', the world, :emjihaticaliy un~er~cores -the :point,_ Tt'!3'l'eputatiOil and 'cl'edibU1fy 'in , assisting "other deyelopi:qg 'l~aUons in the Thlrd' Worl~ has'bee,n s-et1ou'sly, '1~ 'liot '

f ~ ,

1'53

:i;~"m,a~:;#.lr'y,d~~~ged;~r'l,t~ ~oIJ'I;;}~dbc~!~a:: ~nd !t{rrpeatedlY al\e~ed ~o1~ '1~~,:~~~t;:lt~lr~l~t,~~~~:~i~ un,' J~iW,I,ty oi!, 'm" , oild~~u.,~,I)~e ',"~SPOild,< en:t;'~e~~,' "Sh=Q\rd"y:~de«(,on .. \wo Pohif~" I1'lrst"iI.\ey,I,m,~~gr.eejl,as to' ,how n./!, 1Il0ney ""quId" •• ,cha~,\lelea, ~l'to, v\etl\am,~pll1~ s.!d' tqat mpre careful, control ",.8 ll~~eSS,a;ry: !t, ° ,!pJ;~ye_q,lt qorrUPti,o, q,,, W~,~"~,te,,_!,a~rl, ,pOP,f, man~~, ement., 0, th,"el,'e; ·.favore«:J, leSS c01).\r.o~ slfy!n~,th~t ,\I;~(mo!leY ,fih0,lll ,q01lle '''w!tllno "trings,attached!' "

ThIs \\'lco!ld, g.ouP'iel\pre~ed cww~r.n t.t, !t",.eco1>st.Ueti,OIl,..S,S!st,'~ nce,' were not provided in such form -as unrestncted block grants, that "the, ,Vietnamese pos,t-wM' ,go,l',erl)l\l'l"t , wo~l<!;\w,s»bjec~, to • COI)J;I1juatlon,.of U:&, Polltlcal pres' s'\lre:to aAt~·.Q.ndlb~have a,a we: f#le.;flt-.--::no:t, th~y._ 'j\ " , .;

~,q~(~e~qnd_',g;~Jleral :ar~a-,4t(l~alP#~e:Qte(J;l,t w~~bin,:the :~urVp.~, gr9t1P focuses'''on \I!~,ro\eof ,V'fiI',.verl!OnJl,eJ,qo,lI)l¢qte.(L"li\'jJ,,~~ a:~s\sfance,.trort. The respondeniS, aU of whom were at one time in Hits role themselves, d.ivided along ,the lines tl;iat w~(~~quld: get all qt 9.u;r"aQ.v~sorS-,QuLof ,the country, versus the"opinion t,~~t ,thd)~?~I~i!>, IjV!tJ;t, ady!~ors ll,~~ 'I':!,t4, th';'~ '19c~t\W\, an,d at,tlt,ude, ,not ,tbe!r p~,~ef;lence, per,' ',~'(}" '.I:pe_,latter,' g~OUp ',~au,te, q ~ewe~,.reglQllal ~,dvAs,oral,'"but ,more vl)·Nw;e, h.~~pe.r~!.(wUll~ tQ!idrrt~,--tl\~~,.·ha;~qS.i'" 'fewer ~igh-leve~ province rep­re~en, j'll.ive;" HYfiig,in lU~W~,', t,' Wlt)1}belr, V,re~na,D\ese, Pl!st~ess, es':,), ,and, mQre people who can speak Vietnf!.:r;tte~e i~d: ~l;lo, 'Ullde'rstand, t1\e .p~Qvle and their customs. '

Finally the survey indicated a strong need for program reporting procedures to b~ rationalized-not only for, post-war' aid to Vietnam --or other parts of Indochina, but in fact for our entire foreign aid program.

CONOLUSIONS

There has been no shortage of attempted measures in Vietnam j however they -fall far short of adequacy. Vast 'networks_ of computers in Saigon com­pile enormous quantities of statistics as to the "progress" of every conceivable aspect of our programs. It is easy to discern, increases in the number of people pacified, the numbe,r of, hamlets loyai to Saigon, the number of local elections held, etc. But does this_'mountain, of numbers really say anything? Does it indicate any ,progress by President ';,rhieu in 'broadening the base of popular support for his government-above 'and beyond the meager 36% of the vote he captured in the last election? Perhaps it tells us no more than the statistics Which used to be compiled on the "enemy body count" to prove that our side was 'lwinning" t4e war.

In the area of human and economic assistance, reports may show such data as how many tractors aud plows have been sent to Vietnam, but they fail to show -the animosity generated due to operational problems within a program. Such statistics may have looked- excellent for Quang Tri Province, but as· to whether the people there viewed the tractor program as a success Is certainly dubious.

The statisticS also indicate such things as the number of tons of milk solids that 'have been distributed. The measurement infers that _people ,who are hungry are being fed with milk purchased by tb.e U.S. Itlooks straightforward enough j howeyer in this case, as in others, the measurement itself does not actually indicate whether the program goal of nourishing people is being accomplished. In this case it is not-since· in order to digest milk, the digestive enzyme lactate is needed. When people go for prolonged periods without milk, they lose this enzyme, and the milk makes them sick. As a young Marine ofilcer 'reported in the survey, lIthis has l1appened to vast numbers of Viet­namese, and as often as not the powdered milk -ends up as an ingredient in cement or hog food. II,

Again and again we find this problem in Vietnam. The reports back to the Administration, the Congress, and the American pe'ople do not give us the information we need to ,make sound fiscal and -pragmatic judgments. They do ilOt provide the proper feedback to correct or modify lagging programs j nor do they help us to reinforce and augment our better programs.

Actually, "this lack ot good evaluative data is not peculiar to Vletnam j 0.1-~hough clearly the _programs there represent some of the niost troubling and expensive examples of inadequate feedback.

Unfortunately, it is in'the interest of the field administrator or bureaucrat to thwart the public interest on this point. To report anything but an unquali-

1M

~led success hi ~ls -ar~a. is to-:re~ec~,>.dlscredit~(~l;l-ht~.~~lr.aJ).4 '_~i8 ~1i;p~ry~~9rs. In bis.'eyes no:_ reporttl)g' Is -bes~," tit sav,es'time,-' ,rEl,d"''tt\Jle, ,,"nd; PtlP_er.wor4~:"h_~

,. ~rgue:s). ~e;porttng .~n,_, e.asily~g~th~red, tam;!bl~ stat!~.t1C,-l~: n~.t" Ues~\: pt:\rticu;. larly _wllere _ the -actual :"benellts,_ 'or ,lack_ tbere()f" ~lU"'not in~rfere 'with a _measurement: indicating :how' mU(!h bc;mest eifort'is golpg- Into 'the ·pro'gr~m:'.::· That way the field man at least getS!<credlt for disttlblItlhgnls tnilltor trac­tors-even if they :do'notprove "to. 'lle:'beneftclal. And 'tl(is.'is the critical point, ,for the' m.~n '011. .the spot'is'. threatened 6'y_,perspect1ve.meh~ures;: he. understilnds that his-.job!')a~d pr01llotion pJ;esen~ly, dep~nd DlOr,e"qn:--st9.:tfstlc,s tlmlI 'OveraU ~rogralllljeheftts. ':",:,-' ,"_ ", _, "-_~,-; . " _ '

Thu$,' 'any: set' of' 'Overall 'post-#ar policy guldel1n:es, such as .-the ,'til,ree' out­lin,ed be~e, need not" 'Only aI?-, o.:vera1f coherence, 'hqt _also all' acc'Onip(inying set 'Of effectlve m~asu;res., In tIns ,way, prog~a~ re_sults, may be_ funneled back t'O both, the taxpaying public and- t'O' the 'pl'Qgram designers"for necessary chaIige 'Or modification., ,,': ' '_ ' ,'" " ,

'. The 'Executive' Office 'Of Mana~ement and Budg~t 'bas 'already mad~ ,impor­tant strides_ in thiS: area, ,parti~ularlY' 'in 'many areas :of d'Omestic sPending. Nonetheless, the,se management .. teohb,iques-'stHl lag for. 'ec'O,n()miC asslstanc_e program~and the record "'fa pl1~ticulai1y :P'O'Or' in! Viettl.run;:"i':Iowever, ,o,nIy thrQugb 'these techlil~ues c,a_D 'Our a$ai~tance prograJ]ls, 'nQ. ~matter hbw well intentioned, acbieve tHe ends deSired 'by' all 'Of us. "