THE NOT-SO-HAPPIEST PLACE ON EARTH

MKTG 371MW 10:00-11:50 AM

HaddockNovember 18, 2013Robin BersierCollin BrownSean Chang

Dominique HillJessica Vargem

YaoYao Wu

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THE NOT-SO-HAPPIEST PLACE ON EARTH

Introduction and Background

Walt Disney Studio was formed in 1923 by brothers Walt and

Roy Disney in Hollywood, CA. Disney’s first sound film,

“Steamboat Willie” was released in 1928 and was an instant hit.

Since its conception Disney has continued to push the boundaries

of animation year after year. Their first feature-length

animation film, “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,” premiered in

1937 and became the highest-grossing film of the era by 1939

(Pomerantz, 2010). Countless “American classics” have been

released since, resulting in the Disney brand as well as its

reputation having become infamous worldwide. Although the history

of Disney is filled with success stories, there is one which

failed to meet expectations: Euro Disney.

Financial and Personnel Resources

       Around the world the brand name Disney evokes memories of

childhood films as well as those of recent times. However, Walt

Disney as a conglomerate does much more than just produce

animated films. Subsidiaries owned by Disney include Walt Disney

Pictures, Walt Disney Animation Studios, Walt Disney Theatrical,

Walt Disney India Ltd, Pixar Animations, Marvel Entertainment,

Lucasfilm, The Muppets Studio, ABC, Radio Disney as well as an

80% share in ESPN and a 27% share in Hulu (Columbia Journal Review,

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2013).  Walt Disney also provides both services such as

licensing, as well as products and services in other industries

such as cable television, publishing, broadcasting, radio, and

web portals (Walt Disney Company, 2013). Given the massive size

of this conglomerate, Disney holds substantial power within all

industries in which they operate. Revenues for 2012 were posted

at $42.278 billion USD. This large amount of revenue allows for

investments in research and development, undertaking risky

investments, and allowing for innovation in all sectors.

      The first Disney theme park, “Disneyland”, located in

Anaheim, California, was opened to the general public in 1955.

The cost to build the original theme park was $17,000,000 USD

(Cal State Sacramento, 2013). The theme park was financed through

revenue generated from previous animated films.

Research Methodology and Research Findings

The methodology to the Walt Disney Company’s research when

planning Euro Disney was clearly not as sufficient as it needed

to be. Disney examined their past experience with other theme

parks and film success in foreign markets and made the assumption

that success in Paris would follow suit. Especially after Tokyo

Disneyland had opened in Tokyo, Japan in 1983 and was a huge

success (Burgoyne, 1995). This immediately made the Walt Disney

Company start thinking about opening a fourth theme park in

another foreign country. According to Burgoyne, the Disney

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executives believed that they had learned so much about operating

a theme park in another country, thanks to the success of Tokyo

Disneyland, that they decided to start looking for other

locations for a new park right away (1995). They instantly

thought of Europe as the home for the new theme park and plans to

build a European version of Disneyland had actually started in

1975 (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006). Europe was also thought of

first because Disney films have historically done better there

than in the U.S. (Burgoyne, 1995).

After they had chosen Europe, the executives searched

Britain, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy as possible sites

between 1983 and 1987, but finally narrowed it down to Spain and

France, since the others lacked a suitable large expanse of flat

land (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006). Spain was ultimately

counted out as well, even though it had the better climate,

because France had a larger population and a remarkable

transportation network (Burgoyne, 1995). The French location also

won because the executives believed that since Tokyo Disneyland

was located in a cold weather climate and had done so well, that

they would be able to operate in similar weather conditions in

Paris (Burgoyne, 1995). In addition to all of these reasons, The

French location had another major edge because of its close

proximity to Paris and its central positioning within Western

Europe. The proposed and ultimately realized location put the

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park within a 4 hour drive for about 68 million people and a two

hour flight for 300 million or so others. This was an attractive

element to the executives for future potential guests and

employees (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006).   

CEO/Important Leader Profiles

Disney’s leadership team is divided into two major parts:

(1)board of directors and (2)management (Walt Disney Company,

2013). The board of directors, currently consisting of 10

members, are those who have exceptional knowledge and

considerable experience to guide the company to a better way of

operating and delivering long-term value of the company to the

market. The management of the company is a unique group that aims

to create and lead creativity and innovation globally in order to

better position the company for future success.

    Michael Eisner served as Chief Executive Officer for The Walt

Disney Company during the product failure’s inception, launch,

and for a small time during the successful turnaround of the

product. Previous to The Walt Disney Company, Eisner had held

substantial positions within organizations including NBC, CBS,

and Paramount Pictures. Eisner was appointed CEO in 1984 and

helped Disney grow immediately with successful releases such as

The Little Mermaid and Who Framed Roger Rabbit (Michael Eisner

Foundation, 2010). It was under his leadership that Disney would

increase their product and service lines by acquiring new media

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firms such as ESPN and ABC. His position as CEO would come to an

end in 2005 with his resignation from the firm.

Philippe Bourguignon was appointed President of Euro Disney

in 1993 in an attempt to turn the product failure into one that

could thrive in the international marketplace. Bourguignon had

previously held high-profile positions at other organizations

including Accor Group, Club Méditerranée, the World Economic

Forum, and Miraval Resorts (Business Week, 2013). It was under his

strategic vision and guidance that Euro Disney would eventually

become a success, as will be discussed further within this

document.

Bob Iger currently serves as chairman and CEO for the

conglomerate that is The Walt Disney Company (Walt Disney

Company, 2013). He was named President of Disney in 2000 and

succeeded Eisner as CEO in 2005. Under his leadership Disney has

thrived in the numerous sectors in which they compete,

demonstrating strong leadership ability and capitalizing on the

competitive advantages Disney has in each respective segment.

Major acquisitions such as Marvel Entertainment in 2009, and

Lucasfilm in 2012 has helped Disney hold its top positions within

each sector.

Competitors

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        Disney is currently the largest media conglomerate in the

world in terms of revenue. Disney is able to command a strong

market share because of the amount of capital they have to fund

research and development, as well as undergo massive marketing

campaigns for its services and products. Currently, “Dreamworks”

is Disney’s largest competitor in terms of motion picture

animated films (Walt Disney Company, 2013). Pixar Animation

Studios has been another large rival in the modern era of Disney,

however in 2006 Walt Disney announced the acquisition of Pixar in

a deal worth $7.4 billion USD (Holson, 2006). This demonstrates

the aggressive strategy which Disney employs in order to remain

the largest media conglomerate.

    Because of Disney’s diversification into so many industries,

its competitors are too many too list in this document. Some of

these competitors within different sectors include CBS, Fox, NBC,

all other Broadway firms, any station which broadcasts sports,

and the list goes on. However, focusing on the theme park

industry, specifically relating to Euro Disney, the main

competitors would be “le Parc Astérix" which is also located in

Paris and “Le Futuroscope” which is located a little farther in

Poitiers, France. “Le Futuroscope” is an audiovisual and robotic

technology park based on multimedia and innovative films. Other

competitors could be "Port Aventura" in Spain and “Europa Park”

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in Germany. Although these parks are not as famous as Disney

theme parks, they attract a significant number of tourists.

    If Disney had decided to bring Euro Disney to Spain, its

major competitors would include: Cortylandia, Isla Magica, Monte

Igueldo, Parque de Atracciones de Madrid, Terra Mitica, Tivoli

World, Universal Port Aventura, Aqualandia, Aquopolis, L’Aquarium

de Barcelona, and Zoo de Madrid. As demonstrated, Euro Disney has

major prospective competitors no matter where the company chooses

to place theme parks (The Best Theme Parks in Spain, 2004).

    Disney operated theme parks compete with other attractions

such as rival theme parks, water parks, and amusement parks.

Disney also competes within service sectors such as recreational

facilities, cinematics, sporting events, and vacation travel.

Theme parks are also affected by economic conditions that include

gas prices and the general spending habits of consumers. Theme

parks remain competitive by finding ideal locations,

appropriately pricing products, and by differentiating said

products through innovation and research and development (Six

Flags, 2009).

Euro Disney and Why it Failed

After seeing the success of Disney theme parks within the

continental United States, Disney decided to venture into the

international marketplace. The first of these, Tokyo Disneyland

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in Japan, was met with near instant success, which further pushed

Disney to pursue other international theme parks and resorts.

      On April 12, 1992 the Euro Disney Resort and Euro Disney

theme park officially opened to the general public. Initial

expectations for the theme park were extremely high, with daily

attendance predicted to be 60,000 visitors per day (Cateora &

Graham, 2007).  Because of success in Japan, Disney assumed that

Euro Disney would follow suit. These expectations were short-

lived however, as Disney had made many critical errors in the

development and research of the park when planning the

introduction of the new theme park and resort. By the next month,

daily attendance was averaging 25,000 visitors a day, less than

half of what was predicted. The poor attendance can be attributed

not only to improper research but also to external factors such

as the economic recession which France was experiencing at the

time.

External Factors

       Ethnocentrism played a major role in the failure of Euro

Disney’s launch which is defined as, “having or based on the idea

that your own group or culture is better or more important than

others” (Merriam-Webster.com). “Americanism” is a term used by

many across the globe to describe the spread of American cultures

imperialistic style. Disneyland Tokyo is one successful example

of Disney benefiting from this spread of “Americanism”. Japanese

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consumers are naturally curious about American culture and have

regarded America as a capitalistic model since World War II.

However, Michael Eisner personally believed that American culture

must be welcomed with open arms no matter the location. It was

because of this mentality that Eisner thought Disney would see

immediate success in Paris as it had in Japan. A major oversight

is that Eisner failed to realize that French consumers possess

very different historical backgrounds and cultural values. French

history indicates that it was twice occupied in the last century,

resulting in a deep national commitment and high insecurity

towards the invasion of foreign cultures. This principle was

displayed through the first year of operations at Euro Disney.

Local French consumers did not feel a cultural connection with

the elements at the theme park and resort. This is displayed in

the fact that American Disney characters and the arrangement of

dining areas clearly represented “Americanism”. Rather than

implement these attributes, Disney would have been better served

conducting sufficient research concerning the ethnocentrism

present within not only the French, but European culture as a

whole (Cateora & Graham, 2007).

A famous Disney theme song states, ”It’s a small world after

all,” which emphasis the important trend of globalization,

however, the world does remain quite diverse. Disney failed to

properly understand the fundamental differences between its new

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and current target markets. Recognizing that the world we live in

is more globalized than ever is key to sustaining a competitive

advantage internationally.

Cultural Norms and Fundamental Mistakes

Disney leaders, such as CEO Michael Eisner, assumed that

cultural norms and values from the United States would be

accepted and embraced by the French, which we define as the

“assumption of similarity”. Much like the United States, France

has a deep sense of pride pertaining to their identity and

liberty; this stemming from having been occupied by foreign

nations twice in the last century, as mentioned above.

Organizational policies, such as English being the only language

spoken at the park by employees and the prohibiting of alcohol

sales and consumption, were not only conflicting with cultural

norms in France, but also served as an insult to the French

(Cateora & Graham, 2007). In the United States, a cultural norm

within society is that it is bad practice to consume alcohol

(especially excessively) when children are present. Therefore the

banning of alcohol consumption in some areas where children are

present has not been met with much opposition. An example of this

is that Disneyland Anaheim does not serve any alcoholic

beverages, however, there is alcohol served at the neighboring

California Adventure theme park, which has a more young

adult/adult theme. Cultural norms of the French & European

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cultures, on the other hand, embrace and view the consumption of

alcohol in a much different manner. Drinking alcohol such as wine

is a family affair in many European nations, as reflected in

their lighter laws regarding the sale and consumption of it. An

example of the differing cultural norms considering alcohol can

also be found within the legal systems of each nation. In the

United States, drinking in public is illegal in most places,

although there are exceptions such as the cities of New Orleans

and Las Vegas. In contrast, although municipalities within French

cities can decide through an "arrêté municipal" to implement a

'no drinking in public places' law in their town, it is generally

accepted to enjoy a bottle of wine while having lunch in a park.

The difference in cultural norms stems from the enforcement of

the law rather than from the law itself. The prohibition of

alcohol at Euro Disney not only deterred adults in the region

from the theme park, but demonstrated the lack of proper consumer

profile research done by Disney prior to launch.

Another example of differing cultural norms can be found in

the way Disney planned the resort aspect of Euro Disney. Disney

assumed that consumers would seek the three day vacation stays at

Euro Disney as they do in the United States, however this was

very far from the truth. Cultural norms in Europe often consist

of Europeans only taking a single day to visit a theme park. “The

French however were not accustomed to such practices and held

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true to their customs of a month long vacation in August”

(Cateora & Graham, 2007). The failure to recognize this

fundamental difference in vacationing norms lead to the Euro

Disney Resort not being able to profit in the way it had in the

United States.

Relating to cultural norms regarding vacations, Disney

failed to account for the fact that European parents behave

differently than their American counterparts. Europeans are more

reluctant to take their children out of school to visit a theme

park. Although there is no empirical evidence to point to such a

conclusion, it seems that French parents may in fact view

schooling and education in a much more serious light. This

resulted in the further eroding of Euro Disney attendance,

especially during the long 10-month period when schools are in

session.

Marketing Issues

      Disney’s insufficient marketing effort also heavily

contributed to the product failure. This lack of adequate market

research resulted in Disney marketing primarily towards children,

as how it’s done within the United States. This marketing was not

effective because French culture dictates that the final decision

on product consumption is made by adults, whom must be convinced.

This type of marketing strategy is effective in the United

States because Disney theme parks are well-established and adults

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already have positive associations with Disney theme parks by way

of their own fond childhood memories. French theme parks lack

such a well-established presence, and therefore must go above and

beyond expectations in order to convince consumers to consume

their products and services.

Planning Issues

      Disney expected that consumers attending the park would

have a global experience and were expected to sleep in the

resort’s hotels and eat in the park restaurants. The company

wanted visitors to view their stay at the resort as a complete

“holiday experience”. A locational issue which was encountered

was that the park was located just 35 minutes from Central Paris,

one of the most visited cities in the world. This resulted in

many travelers preferring to visit iconic Central Paris rather

than Euro Disney during their stay. Another issue which Disney

encountered was the pricing strategy that it pursued. Prices for

a stay at the Euro Disney resort were similar to the costs of

staying in a high class hotel in Paris. This resulted in many

tourists opting to choose to spend their discretionary income on

a “genuine” Paris hotels stay rather than at the Disney theme

park.

Weather Issues

Unlike in California, Paris’s weather is not very welcoming

during a large part of the year. Disney had underestimated the

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impact of the Parisian climate—cold and rainy—during this period.

Between September to April attendance was depressed far below

normal expectations.

Management Conflict

Unlike Disneyland Tokyo, which had been locally owned and

operated, Euro Disney was owned largely by foreign investors. An

issue was that the management was outsourced and operational

decisions were made by a management team with little

understanding of the European culture or market.

Disney should have considered opening a new park in Europe

as a new experience from which it could learn from, rather than

applying of a simple model which was originated in the United

States.

Difference in European and American Standard of Design

Historically, France is a nation whose past involved

kingdoms. Because of this distinct French history, Disney had to

adapt the design of its Magic Kingdom. This change incurred

financial costs, which included an increase in budget from $2 to

$3.8 billion USD. This resulted in breakeven parameters

increasing, perhaps beyond its ability to deliver.

Economic Climate

Poor financial understanding of France’s economy had a major

impact on Euro Disney. During the time that Euro Disney opened,

France was experiencing an economic recession; with its property

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market collapsing during the early 1990’s. Disney had based

roughly 45% of its projected revenue on this market, and failed

to forecast the impact that the economic climate could have on

business in the region. Park passports at Euro Disney were priced

30% higher than those at other Disney theme parks, which provided

little incentive for locals to pay a premium to visit a local

attraction. Rather, many opted to spend the extra money and

travel to Florida’s Walt Disney World, partially because it was

viewed as “the real deal”.

What the Company did to Remedy the Problem

In 1993, The Walt Disney Company named Philippe Bourguignon,

a Frenchman, President of Euro Disney in hopes of regaining

profitability and success (Cateora & Graham, 2007).  Bourguignon

immediately implemented a new marketing strategy in Europe which

was designed to target specific nations and cultures, learning

from the previous mistakes of the first year. In 1994, the name

of the park was officially changed to Disneyland Paris. This was

a necessary decision because during the first year of product

failure, the brand “Euro Disneyland” had developed a negative

brand image in the minds of consumers. “The name “Euro” was

considered as having a connotation of “business and commerce”

while the name of Paris held a connotation of romance and magic,

which was considered closer to the image that Disney wished to

project” (Liu & Wong, 1999). By using this, Disney executives

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hoped to get closer to the local French culture and that way it

would be more easily adopted by the French people.

After these changes, public perception and financial outlook

on the new product, Disneyland Paris, were much more positive. By

1996, Disneyland Paris had become the most visited theme park in

France, a remarkable turnaround from what seemed like a complete

failure just three years prior (Cateora & Graham, 2007).

Other changes within the company have also helped to sustain

the success of Disneyland Paris. The opening of Walt Disney

Studios in close proximity to Disneyland Paris, having

incorporated French filmmakers into Walt Disney Studios, has

shown local consumers that the attraction is no longer one that

is based solely upon American history and cinematic success. Even

seemingly small changes in food served has helped Disneyland

Paris become now the largest attraction in Europe (Cateora &

Graham, 2007).

In March 1994, the Disney Team publicly announced that a

restructuring of bank loans was necessary to prevent closure on

the theme park. Disney needed the banks to agree to a

restructuring of the loans which were acquired prior to the

product launch. The banks would eventually reach an agreement to

Disney’s demands. On March 14th, the banks effectively wrote off

or deferred virtually all of the next several years worth of

interest payments, and a three year postponement of further loan

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repayments. In return, the Walt Disney company wrote off $210

million in unpaid bills for services, and paid $540 million for a

49% stake in the estimated value of the park; as well as

restructured its own loan arrangement for the $210 million worth

of rides at the new park (Barrett, 1994).

To address the issue of the high entrance fee, Disneyland

Paris decided to slash admission prices by 22% in April

(Shepherd, 1995). In addition to that, the prices of restaurants

and hotels were also cut down; some hotel rooms reaching a price

reduction of up to 30% (Gail & Bloomberg, 1993). The Disney

company believed that cutting prices would help take the

threshold down and they would regard it as the first effective

strategy. In order to further fit into the French culture,

Disneyland Paris even cancelled the ban of alcohol in the theme

park and provided more French food to fulfill people’s needs.

Considering the different structure of workforce in France,

Disneyland Paris made a maximum working sheet, which allowed

French citizens to recognize their standard French job

classification. Moreover, Disneyland Paris changed their original

marketing plan to extend outside of France, which would focus

more on those who have a month-long vacation and made Disneyland

Paris as one stop of their European trip.    

Losses to the Company

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By the end of 1993, the outlook for Euro Disney was grimmer

than what anyone within the firm had predicted. During its first

year of operation, the theme park and resort suffered, losing

more than 1 billion dollars; a stark contrast from the financial

success the firm had grown accustomed to within the United States

and Japan. Euro Disney had also faced persistent problems since

it opened its theme park amid great hoopla; in the year 1993,

“creditors of Euro Disney discussed a restructuring of the firm,

as the company's shares lost nearly 19% of their value. Within

the French market, Euro Disney stock fell to a record low of

$4.61; but on the New York Stock Exchange, Walt Disney's shares

were unaffected, edging up 12.5 cents to close at $39.” (Reuters,

1993)

Company Reputation

During the years of failure, the Disney reputation took a

minor hit. The largest impact in regard to reputation was

isolated largely in Europe. After the turnaround, reputations

among Europeans became much more positive. Americans and Japanese

still viewed Disney as a very positive brand during the Euro

Disney failure stage and since have grown into strong, brand

loyal consumers.

Consumer Behavior Principles that Led to the Failure

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The biggest reason for the failure of Euro Disney was the

lack of research that the Walt Disney Company had done on the

cultural values of its French consumers. It completely

disregarded what was important to the French and what types of

things defined them. Instead, Disney had an assumption of

similarity between the two cultures, thinking that since the

French culture is similar to the American culture, then they must

also think, feel, and behave the same way, or similarly to,

Americans. This is just not true. Every culture is different,

even if they may seem similar on the surface; it’s the different

histories and experiences that a culture undergoes that defines

them, and makes each culture inherently different. Disney forgot

to consider this fact when planning Euro Disney, as was

exemplified by the blatant use of American traits, such as: the

initial prohibition of alcohol, vacationing assumptions, lack of

real French culture, and clear dominance of an American culture.

The company also over-estimated the connection that Europe and

the French had with the Disney brand. These consumers clearly did

not have that extended self, “this is me” relationship with

Disney or Euro Disneyland, and this was shown through the lack of

support for the resort when it first opened. Had the company done

its research beforehand, it would have found that the French

culture is actually pretty ethnocentric, meaning that they prefer

products from their own country, and that they actually despise

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having other cultures forced upon them, since they had been

invaded by other nations in the past. The overlook of all of

these factors ultimately-and shortly-led to the failure of Euro

Disney.

Current/Future Status of Disney

    It seems that the Walt Disney Company has overall learned its

lesson on building international theme parks. Since the opening

of Euro Disney (now Disneyland Paris), the company has gone into

two other international theme park ventures, both of which are in

China. Hong Kong Disneyland was the fifth Disneyland theme park

and resort to be announced (in 1998), built (beginning in 2003),

and opened (in 2005) (History, 2013). Shanghai Disneyland was

announced shortly after with construction starting in 2011 and is

set to open in 2015 (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). In the planning

of both of these new resorts, the Walt Disney Company took the

Chinese culture into greater consideration than it had with the

French/European culture when it created Euro Disneyland. For

example, Hong Kong Disneyland was “a joint venture between the

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government and

Disney under the banner of Hong Kong International Theme Parks

Limited;” with the SAR Government holding 57% control of shares

and Disney holding the remaining 43% (History, 2013). Also, the

Disney Imagineers considered “feng shui, the ancient Chinese

tradition of placement and arrangement of space to try and

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achieve a kind of harmony with the environment,” during

construction; using this principle, they made sure that neither

of the hotels at the resort had a level “four,” since this number

is considered unlucky in Chinese culture because of its close

resemblance to the word “death” (History, 2013). In addition to

this, the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland featured a mix of

Disney parades and Chinese traditional celebrations.

Despite these attempts at harmony, the general reaction to

the resort was still mixed. The main reasons were the small size

of the park and underestimating the size of the crowds (the

opposite of the problem Disney had with the attendance in Euro

Disney). Surprisingly though, even with the crowding of the park

it was still producing lower than expected sales, just like Euro

Disney (History, 2013). But it was able to bounce back from these

problems faster and easier than its European counterpart, and has

remained a financial and critical success overall. Increased

ticket sales and a steady flow of people through the gates were

the results of a “combination of local and international tourist-

targeted promotional activities,…ticketing strategies, holiday

themed activities, and a genuine attempt at meeting customer

needs” (History, 2013).

As for Shanghai Disneyland, it is following suite in trying

to cater more to the Chinese culture by using “cut-in Chinese

cultural elements” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). It will “include

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signature Disney experiences and feature exciting new elements

that will be unique to the Shanghai Disney Resort; and will be

authentically Disney, yet distinctly Chinese” (About the Resort,

n.d.).  According to Disney, it will be a blend of “classic

Disney storytelling with all new attractions and experiences

designed specifically for the people of China” (About the Resort,

n.d.). The resort is already being met with mixed reviews though.

Some are saying that it will boost tourism, service, estate-

industries, and provide job opportunities, but will rival Hong

Kong Disneyland, whose investment has yet to be recovered

(Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Other “voices from China say that

Disneyland is the symbol of American pop culture, an American

cultural spaceship of a successful joint of Commerce and

Entertainment, thus its settlement in Shanghai is a form of

“cultural aggression”” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Another

controversy is that the resort will be unfavorable for social

harmony because it will be “the land of happiness for children in

rich families and the land of grievance for children in poor

families”,even though Shanghai Disneyland tickets are the lowest

priced (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Despite all of these

negativities surrounding the resort already, “many visitors,

especially Chinese citizens, are excited about the construction

of Shanghai Disneyland” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013).

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Even though these other Disney international theme parks are

being met with problems as well, it seems that the company learns

a new lesson with each venture it takes and applies this acquired

knowledge to its next endeavor. Same as the company’s past

experiences have gone, it is sure to turn any mistake into an

opportunity and ultimately be successful. Apparently these

problems do not hinder or discourage the company, but rather

inspires it to do better. Besides Disneyland in Anaheim, CA, Walt

Disney World in Florida, Tokyo Disneyland in Japan, Paris

Disneyland in France, Hong Kong Disneyland in China, and now

Shanghai Disneyland in China as well, the Walt Disney Company has

also expanded into other vacation ventures. It has its own cruise

line with eight destinations and four cruise ships (complete with

its own island). It has also recently opened a new spa and resort

in Hawaii called Aulani and just within the past few years it has

renovated and expanded its California Adventure park at the

Disneyland Resort in Anaheim. In addition, it is also currently

discussing plans to expand the Walt Disney World Resort in

Florida by adding a new land. In 2011, Disney held 11 of the top

25 spots for global theme park industry attendance: spots #1, 6,

7, and 8 are from parks in Walt Disney World in Florida; #2 and

14 are from the Disneyland Resort in Anaheim; #3 and 4 are from

Tokyo Disneyland; #5 and 20 are from Disneyland Paris; and #16 is

Hong Kong Disneyland (Niles, 2012). Clearly it is doing something

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right and there is no doubt that the Walt Disney Company will

continue to expand its empire, especially in the theme park and

resort industry, domestically and internationally, far into the

future.

In addition, Disney currently is experiencing massive

success in both the cinematic industry as well as in many other

industries in which it conducts business, as mentioned before.

According to the Walt Disney Company’s Annual Financial Report

and Shareholder Letter, the company realized revenues of $42.278

billion USD in 2012. This demonstrates that Disney is clearly

doing very well. Because of this success they are able to

differentiate their products and invest heavily within research

and development, giving them a competitive advantage in order to

continuously innovate existing and projected products or

services. The results are that The Walt Disney Company is the

second largest media and entertainment company in the world.

Because of the excellence they have achieved in their respective

industries the future for Disney looks very bright.

References

About the Resort. (n.d.). Shanghai Disney Resort. Retrieved from

http://en.shanghaidisneyresort.com.cn/en/about/

Barrett, Frank. (1994).Lost in France: one damp mouse: Euro   

     Disney is very sick. It looks like time to go home.

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Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/life

style/lost-in-france-one-damp-mouse-euro-disney-is-very-

sick-it-looks-like-time-to-go-home-frank-barrett-reports-

1396121.html

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