© Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

20
© Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge

Transcript of © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

Page 1: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Chapter 1

The problem of knowledge

Page 2: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Value judgements

• Our personal mental map of reality determines what we perceive to be:– true/false– reasonable/unreasonable– right/wrong.

• These are value judgements or opinions.• TOK applies critical analysis to highlight the

limitations of how we think about things.

Page 3: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

The paradox of cartography

• Mercator Projection = traditional world map– Poles look bigger.– Northern hemisphere is at the top so looks more important.– Centred on Europe/Africa.

• Hobo-Dyer Equal Area Projection– Relative land sizes are more accurate.– Southern hemisphere is at the top.– Centred on Pacific.– Changes perception of the importance of countries.

Page 4: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Maps: conclusion

• All maps distort reality.• The map is not the territory; it is just an attempt to

represent it.

• Distortion on maps can distort other

views/opinions/decisions.

Page 5: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Certainty: discussion

Many ‘facts’ may be questionable, e.g.:• Did Neil Armstrong land on the moon?• Strawberries are red.• If a > b and b > c then a > c.• Murder is wrong.

Page 6: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Ways of knowing

• Perception• Language• Emotion• Reason

Page 7: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

1 Perception

• Can our senses deceive us?• Are everyone’s senses the same?

Page 8: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

2 Language

• How do we know that what we find out in words is true?

• Are other people reliable sources of knowledge?

Page 9: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

3 Emotion

• Intuition/gut feeling is not always 100% reliable.

Page 10: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

4 Reason

• Lots of people struggle with logic, especially mathematical logic.

Page 11: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Radical doubt

• Is life just a dream?

Page 12: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Relativism

The relativist argument:• There is no absolute truth, so truth may be

considered relative to culture or individuals. • What is true for some people is false for others. • Relativism allows both views to be valid.

Page 13: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Relativism: the counter-argument

• Truth can be considered to be what someone really believes.

• However, belief does not make something really true.

• For example, Santa Claus does not actually exist even if you really believe in him.

• This means that relativism cannot be true. (Unless you argue that it is true for people who believe in it!)

Page 14: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

What should we believe?

• There is a problem with the word ‘should’, which implies subjective judgement.

• TOK is more interested in how you believe.

Page 15: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Judgement, gullibility, scepticism

The role of judgement• Assess evidence → provisional conclusion.

The danger of gullibility• At what point do you start questioning what you

read/hear?

The danger of scepticism• May mean you close your mind to new ideas if they

do not agree with currently accepted theories.

Page 16: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Reasonable knowledge

• There are two criteria for deciding whether a claim is reasonable:– evidence– coherence.

Page 17: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

1 Evidence

• Is there any supporting evidence?• The fact that you cannot prove something is not true

does not show that it is true. • Thinking that it does make it true = argument ad

ignorantiam.• Confirmation bias: people often only notice

evidence that supports their beliefs.

Page 18: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

2 Coherence

• Does the claim contradict current understanding?• The more it contradicts, the stronger the evidence

needed to support it.• Carl Sagan (astronomer, 1934–96): ‘Extraordinary

claims require extraordinary evidence.’

Page 19: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Does it really matter what we believe?

• Socrates (470–399 BCE): ‘The unexamined life is not worth living.’

• van de Lagemaat (Coursebook author): ‘If you never examine your beliefs you end up leading a life that is not genuinely your own.’

• Voltaire (philosopher, 1694–1778): ‘People who believe absurdities will commit atrocities.’ (Question the ‘will’!)

• Beliefs affect actions and can have serious consequences.

Page 20: © Cambridge University Press 2011 Chapter 1 The problem of knowledge.

© Cambridge University Press 2011

Conclusion

• A problem of knowledge (knowledge issues) exists. • What we believe we know may be questionable.