Boethius (480-524 AD) Fluent in both Latin and Greek

Familiar with works of both Plato & Aristotle

Translated Aristotle’s logical works into Latin

Thereby transmits Aristotle’s logical works to early medieval western Europe

Aristotle’s other works remain unknown in western Europe until 1100+

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Appointed to the office of Consul by the Roman Emperor Theodoric

Christian, opposed to Arian heresy, which denied the full divinity of Christ and which was espoused by Theodoric

Accused of treason, imprisoned & executed

While imprisoned composed The Consolation of Philosophy, which includes an analysis of the problem of freedom and determinism 2

Is Human Freedom Compatible with God’s omniscience?

If God already knows with complete certainty whatever you will ever do, how could your future be up to you to determine?

How could you be genuinely free in planning your life and enacting your plans if God already knows what you will plan and what you will do?

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God foreknows everything that will happen So, God foreknows my future in full detail What God foreknows must happen exactly

as it does happen Hence, my future must happen exactly as

it does If my future must happen exactly as it

does, then my future is necessary Thus, my future is necessary If my future is necessary, then I am not

free Consequently, I am not free!

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According to Boethius The preliminary argument conceals a mistake pertaining to

how the concept of necessity appears in the argument It is true that if my future is necessary, then I am not free But the argument fails to prove that my future is necessary

In general: knowledge of X does not imply the necessity of X So, God’s knowledge of my future does not imply the

necessity of my future Augustine was entirely incorrect in supposing that God’s

omniscience implies the necessity of what God knows Hence, the Augustinian argument that begins with the

assumption of God’s omniscience fails to prove that all my actions are necessary and, so, fails to prove that I am not free

Hence, Boethius is a compatibilist in the sense that he maintains that God’s omniscience is compatible with human freedom

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