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© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 1
Ohio State University Advanced topic in Corporate Finance
(Spring 2005) Dr. WalklingSlide Set 2
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 2
Options
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 3
Problems with NPV
May ignore valuable options imbedded in projects
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 4
Fundamentals of Option Pricing
Black Scholes - 1973 Replicating portfolio idea
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 5
Types of options
Call option Put option European option American option
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 6
Inputs needed for Black-Scholes Analysis
? _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 7
Call option
the right to ________________________________
Example: see WSJ
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 8
Put option
the right ________________________________
Example: see WSJ
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 9
Put option
the right to sell an asset at a specified price for a specified period of time
Example: see WSJ
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 10
European option
__________________________ __________________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 11
American option
_____________________ _____________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 12
Inputs needed for Black-Scholes Analysis
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 13
Intuition behind each of the inputs
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 14
Value of the underlying asset
As value of the underlying asset increases, call values _________________
Intuition– As what you are obtaining becomes more
valuable, the option to obtain it __________________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 15
Variance of the underlying asset
As variance increases, call values– __________
Intuition:– ?– An increase in the variance of the underlying asset,
___________ the chance your option is in the money
– Remember - downside risk is _________________________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 16
Puzzle
– Don’t we measure risk by volatility?– Isn’t it true that investor’s dislike risk and that
we traditionally penalize a project with increased risk by raising its discount rate?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 17
How can an increase in volatility increase the value of an asset?
– Because we are measuring risk • _______________________, not risk of the option
– An increase in the volatility of the underlying asset, __________________ the chance that it will be in the money.
– The downside risk from a call option is ____________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 18
Exercise price of the option
As the exercise price of the option increases, call values– ____________
Intuition:– The more it costs to exercise the option, the
_________ valuable it is
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 19
Time to expiration of the option
As the time to expiration of the option increases, call values– ______________
Intuition:– ?– The longer the option is valid,
_______________________ it could be in the money
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 20
Risk free rate
As the risk free increases, call values– _____________
Intuition:– The exercise price is not paid until _________.
As the rate increases, the present value of the exercise price _____________. This in turn ______________ option value.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 21
SOME Intuition reversed for put options
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 22
The Black Scholes Model
See Brealey Myers or Comparable text
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 23
SP 10:3
Briefly explain why a call option price rises as stock price increases, exercise price decreases, time to maturity increases, volatility increases, and risk-free rate increases.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 24
*SP 10:8
– Why can the equity of a firm be viewed as an option on its assets? How would you calculate the value of this option?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 25
*SP 10:9
Briefly explain how the option analogy can be used to value loan guarantees and debts.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 26
Real Options
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 27
Problems with NPV
May ignore valuable options imbedded in projects
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 28
Real Options
Options embedded in investment decisions
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 29
Examples of Real Options
Option to delay Option to expand Option to abandon
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 30
The cost of delay
Equal to the foregone dividends or cash flows
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 31
Quantifying the inputs
Exercise price– _____________________________
Risk free rate– Usually measured ___________________
Value of the underlying asset– Usually measured in traditional ways (NPV,
etc.)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 32
MeasuringTime to expiration
Generally, the time till the option would expire
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 33
Estimating variance
Previous experience Comparables Estimated probabilites Simulation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 34
Option to delay
As a project’s inputs change, so does its value
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 35
Option to expand
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 36
Some implications of real options
More valuable in volatile industries Barriers to entry can increase the exercise
period– e.g. patents
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 37
Multi-stage investments
Often have added value because of the option to expand
Downside - loss in economies from piecemeal expansion
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 38
Option to abandon
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 39
Examples :
Valuing Natural Resource Options Valuing a gold mine Valuing an oil reserve Valuing a patent
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 40
Dangers of Real Options
Can be used to justify bad investments– Try to quantify benefits– Understand ranges of possibilities– Be objective
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 41
Valuing Film Studios
Refer to class notes and discussion
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 42
Hostile Acquisitions: Takeover Defenses
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 43
Why does target management resist?
Shareholder welfare
Manager welfare
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 44
Takeover defenses
Maximize your share price Concentrated ownership Legal challenges
– Pro-active• State anti-takeover laws
– Reactive
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 45
Miscellaneous defenses
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ _______________________ _______________________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 46
Financial characteristics
uncontested offers (n=57)
contested offers (n=38)
total assetstotal salesdebt/assets
mkt equity/debtnwc/t. assetsmkt. value/book value
ROAROEtrend in ROAtrend in ROE
Betadiv. payoutdiv. yield
ro
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 47
Bid characteristics
Uncontested offers Contested offers
$ shares controlledby bidder
26.8% 11.4%
solicitation fee $0.23 $0.37
% conglomerateoffers
33% 50%
% successful offers
% bid premium
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 48
Significant determinants of the probability of success
__________________________
Payment of a solicitation fee % of shares held by bidder prior to the
offer
% bid premium
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 49
“Selling Shareholders face a Prisioners Dilemma
Prisoner B
Prisoner A Don’t Confess Confess
Don’t Confess A gets 5 years
B gets 5 years
A gets 8 years
B gets 3 years
Confess A gets 3 years
B gets 8 years
A and B get 10 years each
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 50
Corporate Governance
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 51
Historical developments in corporate governance activity, 1960-Present
1960's: Acquisitions popular 1968: U.S. William's Act 1969-1977: First generation state takeover laws, few hostile acquisitions 1982: Edgar v. MITE strikes down Illinois law
– Start of 1980's takeover wave– First poison pills (Bell & Howell, Enstar)– First second generation state takeover law (Ohio)– Moran v. Household Int'l poison pill decision - 1985
1987: CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America upholds Indiana law 1987-91: Corporate governance proxy proposals gain momentum 1990: Aggressive state antitakeover laws (Pennsylvania), Ohio; widespread use of stakeholder
statutes 1992: Large outside shareholders/independent directors flex muscles:
– --General Motors– --Sears & Roebuck
1993: "Relational investing” 2002 Sarbanes Oxley
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 52
Increase in size and influence of institutional investors
1981 Institutions own 38% of U.S. equities 1991 Institutions own 53% of U.S. equities
• Source: Brancato and Gaughan (1991)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 53
Change in institutional voting activity
Before 1987• institutional investors are generally passive
During 1990’s• Over 80% support shareholder initiated
antigreenmail resolutions• Source: Bergin (1988) and Biersach (1990)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 54
Corporate Governance & Performance
A Comparison of Germany, Japan, & the U.S.
Steve Kaplan, The University of Chicago
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 55
Outline
Corporate Governance Systems
– Germany
– Japan
– U.S. Anecdotal Theories Research & Empirical Evidence Conclusions
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 56
Corporate Governance Systems
Germany
Japan
U.S.
Executive Comp
Moderate Low High
Board of Directors
Management /Supervisory
Primarily Insiders
Primarily Outsiders
Ownership High family, Corporate, &
Bank
High bank, High corp., Low mgt
Diffuse & Non-
corporate
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 57
Corporate Governance Systems
Germany
Japan
U.S.
Capital Markets
Relatively Illiquid
Somewhat Liquid
Very Liquid
Takeover/ Control Markets
Minor
Minor
Major
Banking System
Universal Banking
Main Bank
System
Fragmented
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 58
Anecdotal Theories
Relationship-oriented systems (Germany/Japan) Pros
– decrease agency costs• banks & S/H have power to make changes
– monitoring more effective• avoid costly hostile takeovers & proxy fights
– more long-term focus• no short-term earnings pressure
– financing more available• banks & S/H have better access to information
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 59
Anecdotal Theories
Relationship-oriented systems (Germany/Japan)
Cons
– managers become entrenched
– banks may charge abnormally high fees & rates
• compensation for bailing out poor-performing companies
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 60
Research & Empirical Evidence
Selected large companies is each country
Focused on the top managers (e.g. CEOs)
What incentives do different systems offer?
– Why are managers fired?
– Why are managers paid more?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 61
Research & Empirical Evidence
Performance Measures– company stock returns– sales growth– change in pre-tax income/total assets– dummy variable of 1 if pre-tax loss
Regression Analysis - dependent variables– probability of losing job– percentage change in compensation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 62
Why are managers fired?
Company stock returns– In all 3 countries, poor performance increases
likelihood of firing Sales growth
– Except for Germany, slow sales growth increases likelihood of firing
Change in pre-tax income/total assets– In all 3 countries, earnings losses increase the
likelihood of firing
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 63
When are managers paid more?
Japan & U.S. only
% changes since U.S. managers get more $
Mgt compensation is strongly related to:
– Company stock returns
– Sales growth
– Change in pre-tax income/total assets
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 64
Conclusions
3 different systems generate similar outcomes Anecdotal theories do not hold
– no long-term focus for Germany & Japan• not more sensitive to sales growth
Successful governance responds to current performance measures (earnings & stock price)
Bank & inter-corporate relationships partially substitute for U.S. market control mechanisms
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 65
Conclusions - Explanations
Successful market economies in all 3 countries
Governance differences are less important when:
– product market is competitive
• including growing & changing markets
– firms require more capital
• will not allow for wasteful spending
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 66
Sarbanes-Oxley Act – Key Provisions
• Creates a new oversight board to supervise the accounting profession on standards, discipline, etc.
• Fundamentally changes the relationship between auditors, audit committees and management teams
• Enhances the role and independence of audit committees
• Requires that CEOs and CFOs of public companies certify their financial statements and attest to their internal controls over financial reporting.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 67
Sarbanes-Oxley Act – More Key Provisions
• Creates new auditor independence restrictions
• Bans a public company’s auditor from also providing financial systems information technology consulting, internal audit services (“outsourcing” the audit function), and from representing the company in Tax Court
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 68
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Act’s major provisions include:– Requirement of CEO/CFO certification of financial statements
and internal controls.
– Requirement of auditor examination of company internal controls
– Creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to serve as an auditing profession “watchdog.”
– Prohibition of certain client services by firms conducting a client’s audit.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 69
Sarbanes-Oxley: Management’s Responsibility For Financial Reporting
One of its most important provisions (Section 302) states that the key company officials must certify the financial statements. Certification means that the company CEO and CFO must sign a statement indicating:
1. They have read the financial statements.
2. They are not aware of any false or misleading statements (or any key omitted disclosures).
3. They believe that the financial statements present an accurate picture of the company’s financial condition.
Source: U.S. Congress, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat/ 745 (2002).
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 70
Reasons Behind Sarbanes-Oxley– SOX was enacted soon after the significant corporate scandals
most popular ones are Enron and WorldCom,
– Factors cited as contributing to scandals
• Equity compensation linked executives interest to the share price.
• Motivations to meet market expectations among concerns.
• Long term bull market effect (1994-2000),
• The failure of gatekeepers e.g. auditors, lawyers, analyst… in the scandals. (deterrence, bubble)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 71
Enron•Enron stock price was $90 in August 2000 - America’s 7th
largest company,•Chapter 11 (bankruptcy) on December 2, 2001, promptly after
restating their financial reports, •The largest bankruptcy reorganization in American history, •Stock price at that time - 60 cents.• The most highlighted event at the collapse of the Enron is its
relations with limited partnerships (Special Purpose Entity- SPEs),- Executives got personal gains being on both sides
(Fastow -CFO-more than $ 30 million) - Enron failed to disclose the extent of these relations
(off-balance sheet and related party transaction)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 72
Enron (Cont’d)
•Failures all levels of monitoring within the company including the board.•Gatekeepers such as lawyers (Vinson & Elkins) & rating
agencies severely criticized.•Some investment banks charged with aiding and abetting the
securities fraud.•Enron’s both internal and outside auditor Arthur Andersen,
indicted to obstruction of justice, shredding of Enron-related documents,•The whistle-blower, (Sharon Watkins) vice president of Enron
resigned,, letter to the top of Enron highly emphasized by media.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 73
ROGUES GALLERY
Company Share Price % fall (Jan 1st 01- Jun 26th 02)
Enron 99.9 Filed for bankruptcy after fiddling accounts; top management resigned
Global Crossing 99.7 Filed for bankruptcy after fiddling accounts
Adelphia Communications
99.1 Filing for bankruptcy after off-balance sheet loans to directors; CEO resigned
Peregrine Systems 95.8 SEC is investigating accounting practices; CEO and CFO resigned
Qwest Communications
95.6 CEO Joseph Nacchio resigned
Worldcom 93.8 CEO sacked after cover-up of $3.8 billion fraud
Dynegy 88.9 SEC is investigating accounting practices; top management resigned
ImClone 79.4 Former CEO Samuel Waksal charged with insider trading
Tyco International 78.4 CEO Dennis Koslowski resigned after being charged with tax evasion.
Source – The Economist, June 29th 2002
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 74
Common Accounting Tricks
Revenue Recognition (Qwest, Global Crossing, Dynegy, Merck-Medco)
Understating Loss Reserves Off-Balance Sheet Activity (Enron, Dynegy) Expenses being capitalized (WorldCom) Cookie-jar Accounting – setting reserves for rainy
day Big Bath – Realizing excessive losses when the
going is bad to set a lower benchmark
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 75
Deal Design
Deal design
Form of Reorganization
Form of payment
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 76
Factors in deal design
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 77
The form of reorganization is important because it affects
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 78
Deal Design
You name the price. I’ll name the terms. (And I’ll so better than you every time.)
– Old saying
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 79
“Deal Structures are Solutions to Economic Problems”
Bargaining on many fronts
“First, seek to understand”
Factors in deal design
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 80
Form of payment
Why does it matter? Types of payment
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 81
Form of payment
Choices:
– Stock
– Cash
– Other
Effects
More exotic strategies
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 82
Historic Evidence on the Market Reaction to Security Offer
Announcements Smith 86
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 83
Table 1The Stock Market Response to
Announcements of Security Offerings(Source: Smith JFE 86)
Types of Issuer
Type of Security Offering Industrial Utility
Common Stock -3.14% -0.75%
(155) (403)
Preferred Stock -0.19% +0.08%
(28) (249)
Convertible Preferred Stock -1.44% -1.38%
(53) (8)
Straight Bonds 0.26% -0.13%
(248) (140)
Convertible Bonds -2.07% n.a.
(73)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 84
Empirical Evidence on Form of Payment in Acquisitions
Heron - 2002
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 85
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 86
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 87
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 88
Characteristics of Stock DealsAdditional evidence
As these variables increase/exist
6. Hostile deal 5. Ownership structure % managers
own 4. Buyer’s stock price 3. Deal size 2. Buyer Liquidity 1. Bidder avoids dilution of control
The probability of a stock deal:
6._____________________
5. 4. 3. 2. 1.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 89
Other factors affecting form of payment
Perspective – investment vs. financing Competition Control Accounting earnings Financial Flexibility of parties Transaction costs Size – relative and absolute Information asymmetries
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 90
Tips for the deal designer
Listen Learn Be creative Be flexible, but understand the value of
your tradeoffs Bargain on multiple dimensions Strive towards a ZOPA
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 91
Ch 19: Choosing the Form of Acquisitive Reorganization
Types of Reorganization– See text for varieties including
• Purchase of assets for cash or debt
• Purchase of stock, substantially with cash or debt
• Triangular Cash Mergers
• Statutory Merger
• etc
– Why important?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 92
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 93
Contingent PayoutsRisk management in M&A
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 94
Contingent payouts in M&A
Contingent payments are options Extremely useful in negotiations Extremely useful in motivating and
retaining talent
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 95
Characteristics of Earnouts As these variables increase/exist
1. Divestitures 2. Acq. of private targets 3. Size of acquiror 4. Non-horizontal combinations
*
The probability of an earnout:
1. increases 2. increases 3. decreases 4. increases
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 96
Structuring earnouts
Avoid excessive complexity Be realistic Warning: lack of autonomy creates
frustration in striving for earnouts
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 97
Exhibit 22.2
Compares earnout to call option Interesting comparison of similarities and
differences Example – On Assignment
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 98
Speculation Spreads and the Market Pricing of Proposed
Acquisitions
Jan Jindra
And
Ralph A. Walkling
Journal of Corporate Finance
Summer 2004
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 99
Example
$40 - Bid price
$20 - Pre-offer stock price
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 100
Subsequent market price at t+1
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 101
Objectives
Develop & test a simple model of speculation
spreads
What determines the
– magnitude of the spread?
– cross sectional variation?
What factors are priced when the spread is set?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 102
Motivation
The spread is the foundation of “arbitrage returns”
Better understand
– acquisition pricing, acquisition trading, and the
arbitrage process.
– arbitrage returns
– No existing evidence on the spread
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 103
Interpreting speculation spreads
SSi = (BP – P1)/P1
Smaller spreads greater market
adjustment
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 104
Components of Speculative Returns
TRi = (PFi – P1 i) / P1i – Hi
– where TRi total % return
– PFi is the final price received
– Hi is the % holding costs
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 105
Components of speculative returns
Let BPi = first announced bid price
PFi – P1i = (PFi – BPi) + (BPi - P1i)
TRi = SSi + RRi – Hi
– where
– SSi = (BPi – P1i)/P1i and RRi = (PFi – BPi)/P1i
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 106
Expected total return
– E(TRi) = F ProbFi (PFi – P1i)/P1i – Hi
• Or equivalently,
– E(TRi) = SSi +Fi ProbFi (PFi – BPi ) / P1i - Hi
where ProbFi is the probability of being able to sell the shares
for PFi dollars.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 107
Hypotheses
H1: SS RR
– a negative relation
H2: SS deal duration
– a positive relation
H3: high abn. volume (arb activity)
– stronger effects
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 108
Sample Selection
Securities Data Corp. (SDC) Target firms 1/1/81 to 12/31/95 Cash tender offers > $10 million Bidder seeks 100% Target on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ Covered by Lexis-Nexus. Financial and public utilities excluded.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 109
Data
First formally announced bid.
Ownership - proxy statements, S&P Stock
Guide
Managerial attitude - outcome of the offer -
SDC, Lexis-Nexus.
Price, return and volume data - CRSP
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 110
Probability factors
Target Attitude Distribution of power
– shareholdings of officers and directors, – institutions, – blockholders, – bidder toeholds. – volume activity – runups – Rumors
size of the bid premium, target and industry characteristics experience of the bidder.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 111
Distribution of speculation spread
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5SPREAD
0
100
200
300
Cou
nt
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8P
roportion per Bar
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 112
Calendar Portfolio Returns
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8103
11
8203
08
8303
02
8402
27
8502
21
8602
19
8702
13
8802
10
8902
06
9002
01
9101
29
9201
24
9301
20
9401
14
9501
12
Calendar Time
Raw
Ret
urn
0
5
10
15
20
25
# o
f fi
rms
in p
ort
foli
o
Cumulative Target
Cumulative VW
Cumulative EW
# of firms
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 113
Emory Handout on Article
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 114
Summary and Conclusions
362 offers 1981 - 1995,
speculation spreads on average, positive,
considerable cross-sectional variation
Over 23% are negative
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 115
Summary and conclusions, cont.
Spreads are significantly associated with
– outcome of the offer (revision)
– magnitude of revision
– duration of the offer
Effects more dramatic in high abn. Vol. offers
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 116
A Brief Analysis of M&A Arbitrage
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 117
Risk Arbitrage
“Ivan Boesky They Ain’t”
Arbitrage vs. Risk Arbitrage
How much risk?
Rumor or announcement?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 118
Simple M&A Arb Strategy
Buy the target (long) Short the bidder More exotic strategies
– options
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 119
Arbitrage examples
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 120
Objective: Understand
Alternate methods of pricing takeover transactions
Techniques of hedging and allocating market risk among participants
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 121
Unprotected transactions
Fixed exchange ratio Examples
– US West Media& Continental Cablevision– Walt Disney & CapitalCities/ABC– Time Warner & Turner Broadcasting
Reasoning? - – companies operate similar or complementary
business– are will to share market risk
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 122
Fixed Exchange Rate Pricing
Fixed exchange rate– Bell Atlantic’s $21.34 billion stock swap
acquisition of NYNEX Corp• NYNEX shareholders receive 0.768 share of Bell for
each share held
– Boeing & McDonnell Douglas• $13.34 billion
• 0.65 share of Boeing for each McD share
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 123
Advantages of Fixed Exchange Rate Pricing
Certainty?
Acquirer can determine dilution of
ownership in advance
Depending on market movements one party
gains --
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 124
Disadvantages of Fixed Exchange Rate Pricing
and the other loses! Both parties may face significant market risk If Bidder price drops, target may want to
cancel– Modest decline in price of LDDS
Communications (now WorldCom) caused termination of the agreement to acquire ACC Corp in 1996
Rise in bidder’s price before closing may prompt bidder to terminate
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 125
Fixed Value Pricing (floating
exchange rate pricing) Nominal per share value fixed at inception Exchange rate altered at closing to deliver
fixed value (regardless of the number of shares needed)
Calculations typically involve average market prices
Pricing period - length and timing - may be difficult to negotiate
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 126
Pros and Cons of Fixed Rate Pricing
Target gets known value
Bidder faces uncertainty over share dilution
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 127
Hedging and Protection
Increasingly used Deals
– IVAX Corp/ Johnson products– Bank of Boston/Multibank Financial– Examples of protective tools
• Floors, Caps, Ceilings, Collars, Temination Fees, Contingent Value Rights,
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 128
Floors, Caps, Ceilings & Collars
May be used separately or in conjunction with fixed exchange or fixed value pricing
Floor - if bidder’s price drops too low the exchange rate is amended
Cap - places a limit on the number of shares the bidder would have to issue
Floor + Cap = Collar
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 129
IVAX acquisition of Johnson Products
Fixed exchange rate with a collar
One to One exchange - could be amended if
IVAX stock fell below $24.50 or above $29
during the post agreement period
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 130
Cancellation Options and Walk Away Rights
Target can terminate if bidder’s price drops dramatically
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 131
BANC One’s acquisition of First Community Bancorp
Target will receive $31.96 of BanC One Stock but also had stipulations for a maximum (and minimum) exchange ratio if Banc One drops below $47
If Banc One drops below $43, First Community could cancel
Bidder can also get walk away rights
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 132
“As-You-Like-It-Options” and “Top-Up” Rights
As-You-Like-It-Options Used to create
exotic takeover derivatives
Top-Up” Rights aka revival rights - induce
a target to complete a deal
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 133
Contingent Value Rights and Variable Common Rights
CVRs require the bidder to pay additional cash depending on subsequent performance
VCRs give extra compensation to the target if the bidder’s stock drops in a subsequent period
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 134
Empirical evidence on types of collars
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 135
M&A Valuation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 136
Valuation
How much should a bidder pay?
Types of value
Methods of valuation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 137
How much should a bidder pay for an acquisition?
Maximum = ?
Minimum = ?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 138
Some thoughts on maximizing the acquisition price
Maximize value
Recognize the bidder’s motivation
Know your bargaining strengths
Enter the negotiations as informed as possible
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 139
Merger Valuation
A capital budgeting perspective Similar to any other valuation
– NPV– Multiples– Comparables
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 140
Important Issues in M&A Valuation
What cash flows do you discount?– Existing?– Under new management?
What discount rate do you use?– Targets?– Bidders?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 141
Important Issues, continued
What are the alternatives?– Build vs. buy
Don’t double count cash flows– Allow for needed investment
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 142
Bid premium sizeReasons for importance:
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. Provides opportunities for insights into
managerial motivations
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 143
Significant determinants of bid premiums
As these variables increase (or exist) 1. Debt position of target 2. Market/book ratio 3. % of shares bidder controls prior to bid 4. Offers where control is sought 5. Offers where another bid exists 6. Liquidity of target 7. Offers where management resists 8. Conglomerate vs. nonconglomerate
The % bid premium 1.______________ 2. ______________ 3. ______________
4. ______________
5. ______________ 6. ______________ 7. ______________ 8. ______________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 144
Experiment: The controller has the power to choose the outcome number without consulting
the other participant, but both parties may
negotiate to split the total payoff as desired. Outcome Party A Party B
1 $0.00 12.00
2 4.00 10.00
3 6.00 6.00
4 7.50 4.00
5 9.00 2.50
6 10.50 1.00
7 12.00 0.00
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 145
Coase - "The Problem of Social Cost"
Journal of Law and Economics, 1960 Background - What is the optimal amount
of pollution? Coase's critique of government intervention The farmer and the rancher
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 146
Coase Theorem:
The outcome (with regard to externalities) is invariant to
the prior assignment of rights Cooperative games Trading pollution permits
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 147
Problems with the Coase Theorem.
It works well when: There are _____ parties to a bargain Property rights are ___________ Bargainers have ______________ of one
anothers' profit or utility functions
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 148
Continued
Bargainers behave competitively There is ___________ bargaining Courts will __________ enforce any
bargain Agents strike advantageous bargains and
avoid bargaining breakdowns There are no income effects
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 149
Does the Coase Theorem work?
Acid rain Oil Exploration Experimental results
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 150
Reasons for bargaining breakdowns
Transaction costs Property rights are not well defined Disagreement over information
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 151
Oracle/Peoplesoft timeline through 11/19/2004
June 2, 2003 PeopleSoft announces its intention to acquire J.D. Edwards for $1.7
billion in stock.
June 6, 2003 Oracle stuns the world with a hostile offer to buy PeopleSoft for $16
per share in cash, or $5.1 billion.
June 12, 2003 PeopleSoft rejects Oracle's offer; J.D. Edwards and PeopleSoft sue
Oracle, claiming interference with their merger.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 152
June 16, 2003 PeopleSoft, seeking to accelerate the J.D. Edwards deal, amends the agreement to pay about half in
cash.
June 18, 2003 Oracle raises its PeopleSoft offer to $19.50 per share, or $6.3 billion. PeopleSoft rejects the offer
two days later.
June 30, 2003 U.S. Department of Justice begins investigating Oracle's offer.
July 18, 2003 PeopleSoft completes J.D. Edwards acquisition.
Jan. 12, 2004 Larry Ellison splits chairman and CEO roles at Oracle, relinquishes chairman spot to Chief Financial
Officer Jeffrey Henley. Safra Catz and Charles Phillips are promoted to co-presidents.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 153
Feb. 4, 2004 Oracle raises bid to $26 per share. PeopleSoft rejects the offer five days later.
Feb. 26, 2004 U.S. Department of Justice sues Oracle to block proposed PeopleSoft takeover.
April 22, 2004 PeopleSoft issues second-quarter guidance well below Wall Street estimates.
May 14, 2004 Oracle lowers bid to $21. PeopleSoft rejects offer 12 days later.
July 7, 2004 PeopleSoft says it will not meet second-quarter guidance and blames shortfall
on publicity surrounding Oracle bid.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 154
Sept. 9, 2004 Oracle prevails against Justice Department as big regulatory hurdle is cleared.
Oct. 2, 2004 PeopleSoft CEO Craig Conway is fired, having lost confidence of the board. Founder David
Duffield, who stepped down from the job five years earlier, is installed.
Nov. 1, 2004 Oracle raises bid to $24, sets Nov. 19 deadline for tender of a majority of PeopleSoft shares or it will
drop bid. PeopleSoft rejects offer nine days later.
Nov. 10, 2004 PeopleSoft provides 2005 guidance that many on Wall Street see as unrealistic and unattainable.
Nov. 19, 2004 A majority of PeopleSoft shares are tendered in favor of the takeover. PeopleSoft invokes its poison
pill defense, which Oracle seeks to have voided in court or otherwise.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 155
Due Diligence
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 156
The Due Diligence Process
The Deal Process Stages of the deal Important factors in due diligence
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 157
The Buyer Always Pays!
Caveat Emptor Surprises now or surprises later?! Be fact based but knowledge oriented
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 158
Case Studies – CUC-HFS
December 1997 Cendant Corp. is created– By merger of HFS, Inc.
• Ramada, Days Inn, Howard Johnson, Avis, Coldwell Banker, Century 21
• And
– CUC International, Inc. • Sold memberships in clubs that offered travel shopping and
dining discounts
– Advantages – combining databases and cross selling
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 159
March 1998
Discovered that CUC had been engaging in accounting fraud since 1995– Up to 61% of 1997’s revenues were ficticious– Quote
Due diligence based on public information Problems discovered after the fact
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 160
Due Diligence Different but complimentary perspectives
from various sources
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 161
Due Diligence
Last Steps Before Finalizing the Venture or the Business Acquisition
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 162
Due Diligence Process
“Due diligence” - an examination of the business and legal issues concerning a proposed business partner, venture opportunity or acquisition target.
Process of obtaining reliable information about the proposed venture to uncover facts that would influence the offer or decision to acquire the business or enter the venture.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 163
Due Diligence Process Conduct at an early stage of the transaction. Address questions and issues that will reveal the
true nature, conditions and position of the business.
Factors considered: – price of the deal
– perceived risks
– urgency of consummating the deal
– gaining a level of comfort that makes the opportunity attractive
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 164
Internally-Generated Information
To verify seller representations To assist in determination of value
– Assets and liabilities To uncover problems, issues and concerns To gain a better understanding of the business
and industry– key customers, trends, regulatory
requirements To evaluate management and key employees
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 165
Externally-Generated Information
Public information regarding the company, its
principals and key employees
Key customers
Market research to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the marketplace
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 166
Case Studies – Quaker Oats/Snapple
11/94 Quaker announces acquisition of
snapple for $1.7 billion
4/96 Quaker agrees to sell Snapple for $300
million
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 167
The Plan
Grow Snapple as it had done with Gatorade Integrate Snapple with Gatorade and achieve
synergies Streamline distribution of Snapple
– Swap distribution rights
– Snapple’s 300 independent distributors would get to deliver Gatorade to convenience stores and Mom & Pop outlets
– But give up distributing Snapple to Supermarkets
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 168
The Problem
Apparently, No one asked the distributors Supermarket business
– Established
– Twice as profitable as convenience stores
Other problems– Growth of Snapple had been from cramming distributor
pipeline full of inventory
– Bottling production scheme caused blockages and stockouts
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 169
Late in the deal
Snapple discloses plummeting sales and profits and continued expected weaknesses
Snapple’s owners reject stock and cash plan in favor of ‘all cash’ deal
Quaker buys Snapple for $1.7 billion cash
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 170
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Professional judgement and experience is critical– if you are lacking in certain areas get help
Develop a questionnaire to guide you through the process– questionnaires are available in books and from
major accounting and law firms
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 171
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Document the findings of your investigation
Be aware of how the nature of the information impacts its reliability– internal vs. external– how and from whom it is obtained– Is it independently verifiable?
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 172
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Look for inconsistencies in verbal representations or
information
Practices, values and reputation of business
– Consistent with your approach to doing business?
Ask open ended questions
– Rather than asking for the confirmation of a fact, ask a question that leads you to the same answer
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 173
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Remember that past behavior can be a good predictor of future performance– Crucial in evaluating management's and
employee's values, practices and performance
May or may not uncover fraud
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 174
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Have the seller sign a letter of representation before closing the deal
– Confirm the representations the seller has made– That there are no known facts or circumstances
that would affect your decision to buy under the terms and conditions agreed upon
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 175
Tips for Conducting a Due Diligence Investigation
Balance cost of investigation against total risk exposure
Undiscovered pending liability could wipe out total investment
– Legal remedy is costly and time-consuming
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 176
Tech Coast Angel’s Six-Step Process
1. Submit Application – Register and complete Business Plan Summary form on TCA website
2. Pre-Screening Assessment – Meet with small team of TCA members; present business plan. TCA members provide same-day assessment: accepted for formal screening, or not
3. Formal Screening – Present to 20-30 TCA members at meetings in LA, OC, SD• Entrepreneur’s objective – Generate enough interest to advance to due-diligence… at least one person willing to
“lead” and at least 20 other “interested” angels• Investors’ objective – Identify promising opportunities: strong management team with a clear, compelling and
credible business plan
4. Due-Diligence – Starts after successful formal screening; ends with funding
5. Dinner Presentations – Present “tuned” business plan to TCA membership. Firm up funding interest
6. Funding – Close on equity placement
Submit Application
Pre-Screening Assessment
Formal Screening
Dinner Presentations
Funding
Due-Diligence ProcessFocus of this
talk
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 177
What Is Due Diligence? (courtesy of Akin Gump)
The process by which we discover, review and analyze material information in the context of a transaction
The nature and extent of investigation is dependent on, among other things:the type of transaction– Time constraints– Money constraints
Object: to get the maximum useful information in the minimum time
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 178
Why Do It?
Allows investors to:– Value the business– Assess risk exposure– Negotiate agreements to address existing or contingent
liabilities through appropriate representations, warranties and indemnifications
– Position for negotiation
Allows the company to:– Make full and complete disclosure– Make accurate representations and warranties– Position for negotiation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 179
Top 10 Diligence Subjects
People Creation, Development, Ownership and Licensing of
Intellectual Property Rights Ownership of Company Assets and Property Barriers to Competitive Entry and Third Party Barriers Market – Pain and Painkiller Financial – Revenue Model and Projections Differentiated Story Equity Ownership Material Contracts Litigation and Claims
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 180
The People - Often the Most Important Factor
Consider founders, management and other investors
Probe into backgrounds– Credentials– Prior business background– Reference checks– Background checks
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 181
Case Studies – Daimler Chrysler
What's culture got to do with it? DaimlerChrysler's bumpy post-merger road Despite significant pre-merger due diligence related to
finance and product line offerings, this marriage has failed to deliver promised dividends to shareholders with stock prices still below pre-merger levels.
Despite management changes (Germans now head all divisions) and personnel layoffs of over 30,000, the Chrysler division continues to under perform and drain resources.
The widely acclaimed PT Cruiser was unable to put the company back in the fast lane of automobile traffic.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 182
What's culture got to do with it?
Both the Germans and Americans anticipated issues related to their respective cultures such as language and lifestyle differences. However, they failed to consider fundamental differences in the operation of their organizations.
While the Germans viewed themselves as the superior partner in what they really believed to be an acquisition, they were surprised to find American management practices that segregated personnel, eg. reserved parking, separate cafeterias for staff and administration, and management compensation packages that were not tied to performance.
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 183
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 184
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 185
Creation, Development, Ownership and Licensing of Intellectual
Property Rights
Does the Company own/have proper rights to its intellectual property (patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets)?
Examine source of IP or way in which it is protected (employees, 3rd parties, transfer)
These are "Bet The Company" issues Solutions might include licensing,
transfer for equity, new development
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 186
Market What is the relevant market?
– Why haven't others attacked it, who might, and how big are the players?
– What is the real market size -- not what Jupiter or Forrester project it to be, but what it is now?
How you look for it: Talk to strategic investors. e.g., if the market is broadband wireless, talk to Hughes and TRW. What are their buying and investment plans?
Cost of failure to look: Pets.com -- is the market really $30 billion (i.e. market size over estimated); etoys (big market, overspent); Webvan (does the market care, customer acquisition cost?); EMC (keep eye on market, focused, driven sales team, helped create and drive the market through innovation)
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 187
Financial - Revenue Model, Projections and Recognition
How you look for it: Analyze all of the numbers--take nothing for granted and ask for back up and third party validation (e.g. talk to customers, sales persons; review contract terms and bank records)– Accounting and operational analysts with domain
experience– Review accounting procedures and policies– Research SEC and FAS positions on that industry– Consider who built the models (talk to him or her in
addition to management)
Cost of failure to look
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 188
Due Diligence
Learn & Confirm
Protect IntellectualProperty
Time and Cost
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 189
Establishing “Truth”
Learn
Term Sheet
Confirm
Reps & Warranties
Remedies
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 190
VC Due Diligence Basics
October 15, 2002
Craig Gomulka
Draper Triangle Ventures
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 191
Who is Draper Triangle? Located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
PA-based fund of Draper Fisher Jurvetson
First-round, early stage, lead investor
High-tech fund - Education, MEMS, Data,
Semiconductor, Advanced Software,
Medical Devices, Optical, Automation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 192
The DFJ NetworkTimberline Venture PartnersTimberline Venture Partners
Vancouver, WAVancouver, WA
Draper Fisher Draper Fisher JurvetsonJurvetson
Redwood City, CARedwood City, CA
Zone VenturesZone VenturesLos Angeles, CALos Angeles, CA
Wasatch Venture FundWasatch Venture FundSalt Lake City, UTSalt Lake City, UT
Access Venture PartnersAccess Venture PartnersWestminister, COWestminister, CO
Austin, TXAustin, TXDFJ PortageDFJ PortageChicago, ILChicago, IL
Draper AtlanticDraper AtlanticReston, VAReston, VA
Draper Triangle Draper Triangle VenturesVentures
Pittsburgh, PAPittsburgh, PA
DFJ New EnglandDFJ New EnglandCambridge, MACambridge, MA
Draper Fisher Draper Fisher Jurvetson GothamJurvetson Gotham
New York, NYNew York, NY
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 193
Draper Triangle Portfolio
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 194
The Funding Timeline1. Review business plan
2. Bring in management team to present
3. Evaluation of opportunity
4. Internal partners meeting
5. Term sheet
6. In-depth due diligence
7. Legal documentation
8. Funding
1 to 4 Months
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 195
Initial level of due diligence Level I (after the plan and initial go/no-go)
– Meet the team• Prior entrepreneurial experience
• Experience in the market place
• Would we enjoy working with the team?
– High level understanding of• Product, Market size and Exit Potential
• Competition and Differentiation
• Marketing, Sales, Competitive strategy
– Go or no-go decision
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 196
Secondary level of due diligence Level II (gets more interesting now)
– Market research, competitive analysis
– Marketing and sales plan validation
– Financial validation (numbers make sense?)
– Potential/existing customer/partner calls
– Independent industry insider/expert calls
– IP review, existing patent scan
– Better validation of likely exit scenarios
– Have we enjoyed working with the team?
– Go or no-go decision for term sheet
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 197
Final level of due diligence Level III (after term sheet, the boring stuff)
– Management team background checks
– Corporate and organizational (books in order?)
– Capitalization structure, benefit plan
– Intellectual property (legal review)
– Financials (historical audit/review, tax returns)
– Existing contracts and obligations
– Properties, leases and insurance
– Reps and warranties in the term sheet
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 198
The Oracle of Bacon
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 199
Best Practices in M&A
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 200
Today’s Corporate Environment in Historical Perspective
(Jensen - Presidential Address)
1st, 2nd and Modern Industrial Revolutions
Change
Forces at work on the Modern Corporation
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 201
The first industrial revolution
Originated in Britain
Late 18th century
Application of new energy sources to
methods of production
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 202
The second industrial revolution
Middle to end of the 19th century:– birth of modern transportation &
communication• railroad, telegraph, steamship, cable systems
– High speed consumer packaging technology– Mass production & distribution systems
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 203
Innovation and Invention
McCormick Reaper - 1830s Sewing maching - 1844 High volume canning and packaging- 1880s Interchangable parts for hand-tooled
components Coal replaces wood, water and animals as
energy source Paper industry: wood pulp replaces rags
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 204
Innovation and Invention
Wire industry: rod rolling - new technology– Wire nails replace cut nails
Woolen textile industry - advances in combing technology -– worsted textiles
Tobacco - Bonsack machine reduces labor cost by 98%
Bessemer process reduces cost of steel rails by 88%– Electrolytic refining reduces the price of aluminum by 96%
Chemicals - mass production of synthetic dyes
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 205
The Modern Industrial Revolution
Technology The internet PCs Revolution in Political Economy
– Socialist and communist becomes capitalist Globalization of Trade The greatest bull market in history
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 206
Change =
Crisis?
Sharp decline in production costs and prices
Widespread excess capacity
The necessity of exit
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 207
Change =
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 208
Rock and Finance
© 2005 Dr Ralph A. Walkling 209
Course Wrapup Valuation Options Capital Structure Arbitrage Financial Analysis Statistical Modeling Cumulative Abnormal Returns Altman’s Z-score Agency problems
– Informational assymetry Mergers and Acquisitions Guest speakers
– Tim Portland – Scotts’– Moe Modecki – Marathon– Cyndi Richson – Opers
Case AnalysesConoco-DupontScott’sHersheyYeat’s/TSE
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