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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
Yamamoto risked his fleet at Midway in June 1942. Evaluate how Yamamoto
addressed the operational and strategic risks. Did Yamamoto risk too much or too little?
And did the risks outweigh the rewards?
Introduction
Admiral Yamamoto of the Japanese Imperial Navy risked too much with his plan
to seize Midway in June of 1942, an objective that was insignificant to Japan’s overall
war plan. Strategically, he sought to lure the United States Navy to commit their carriers
to a decisive engagement in the intent that the Japanese forces would destroy them.
Operationally, Yamamoto determined that the seizure of Midway would be the catalytic
event to provoke a U.S. response and the commitment of the carriers to protect the
Hawaiian Islands from Japanese expansion. He assessed that the destruction of the U.S.
carriers and the seizure of Midway would be the springboard to secure Hawaii and
eventually harass the Pacific Coast of the United States, even though this did not nest into
Japan’s strategic plan. In his effort to stop U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific,
Yamamoto risked not only critically short carrier-based airpower to conduct unnecessary
offensive operations, but also risked the collapse of the already strained Japanese
defensive perimeter. Yamamoto and his staff irrationally “assumed away” strategic and
operational risk in order to achieve an unnecessary objective.
Strategic Risk in the Pacific
Aircraft carrier-delivered naval airpower served as formidable tool for strategic
power projection and strategic centers of gravity for both Japanese and American naval
operations in the Pacific during World War II. The strategic objectives of the Japanese
Empire were focuses on obtaining vital natural resources to sustain its wartime industrial
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
base that was depleted from decades of conflict with regional enemies. The political-
economic conditions imposed by the entente of America, Britain, China, set the
conditions for Japanese expansion in the Pacific for economic independence, political
autonomy, and to assert Japan’s divine destiny. Anticipating the impending increase of
U.S. combat power in the Pacific, Admiral Yamamoto developed a decisive strategic plan
to annihilate the U.S. Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor with a surprise carrier-based
air strike. Although the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor dealt a devastating blow
to the Pacific fleet, it failed to achieve all of its planned objectives, including the strategic
objective of crushing the American will wage war with Japan. Failing to destroy the U.S.
carriers during the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Admiral
Yamamoto determined that the strategic priority was the elimination of the elusive
American’s carrier fleet in order to secure the Imperial defensive perimeter and occupied
territories, protect the Japanese home island, and to set conditions for further Japanese
expansion. (Baer, 1994, pp. 164-180) The destruction of the American carriers, and the
subsequent occupation of American territory, became an obsessive, irrational priority that
drove Admiral Yamamoto to risk the overall success of Japan’s war in the Pacific.
To achieve these strategic objectives, Yamamoto was willing to risk critical
national assets on unnecessary operations that were not nested in the plans of the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. From inception, operations in the Central
Pacific and the Eastern Operation to invade Hawaii were considered frivolous and a drain
on Japan’s already depleted resources. From the Japanese Army’s standpoint, combat
operations in Manchuria, China, Burma, and occupied territories in the South Pacific had
its troops stretched to their limits. The rapid sequence of Imperial military victories after
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
December of 1941 expanded Japan’s footprint to point that was logistically cumbersome
and lacked the required combat power for proper defense. Land-based airpower was
critical to enabling the Imperial victories and the defense of the Japanese occupied
territories and synergistically increased the effectiveness of Japanese carrier-centric
offensive and defensive operations. Assuming that America and its allies would use the
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) to Australia in order to project combat power into
the region for an eventual push to recapture the Philippines and pressure the Japanese
main islands, Yamamoto advocated taking an offensive, rather than defensive, posture.
He envisioned the expansion of the Japanese by establishing footholds in the Aleutian
Islands (Operation AL), Midway and the Hawaiian Islands (Operations MI), while
Japanese defensive forces secured the South Pacific perimeter. Instead setting the
conditions to lure the American Pacific Fleet into decisive battle to interdict the
Australian lines of communication with mutually supporting Japanese air, land, and sea
power defenses (a mobile defense), the Imperial General Headquarters endorsed
Yamamoto’s plan to conduct a strategic offensive operation hinged on supporting
operational plans that were not nested in the Japan’s overall strategic plan. Furthermore,
the operational plans were not mutually supporting, and were not properly resourced to
achieve their objectives. (Parshall & Tully, 2005, pp. 19-38)
The cumulative strategic effects of Yamamoto’s erroneous risk assessment risked
the destruction of the Japanese carrier-based airpower and Combined Fleet forces
conducting offensive operations, a collapse of the Japanese Pacific defensive perimeter
and secured territories, the loss of critical resources, and set the conditions for the Allies
to secure a foothold in the Southwest Pacific for a push towards Japan. (Wylie, 1989)
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
Additionally, the “Imperial Navy Operational Plans for Stage Two of the Great East Asia
War” was not supported by the majority of the Japanese command and hinged on false
assumptions about the Allied will and capacity to oppose the Japanese Imperial forces’
expansion East of the International Date Line. (Parshall & Tully, 2005, p. 33-38) Driven
by a myriad of cultural, organizational, doctrinal, and personal issues, Admiral
Yamamoto’s strategic offensive plan risked too much on unnecissary objectives that were
insignifigant to achieving Japan’s strategic objectives. (Parshall & Tully, 2005, pp. 19-
114, 397-414)
Operational Risk at Midway
The primary operational objective of Admiral Yamamoto’s Central Pacific
Operation was the destruction of the American Fleet and their key source of combat
power, the aircraft carriers. To achieve this objective, Admiral Yamamoto intended
venture beyond the range of Japanese land-based airpower provided by the Japanese
defensive perimeter and seize key American terrain to entice the Pacific Fleet to commit
their carriers to the battle. Once located, the Imperial Japanese Navy could use its
carrier-based airpower to destroy the American carriers, thus providing uninhibited
freedom of movement for Japanese forces in the Pacific. Yamamoto and the Imperial
Command assessed that without the ability to project power in the in the Pacific, the
American fleet would not have the ability to disrupt Japanese operations and
subsequently could buy time and space militarily for Japan. Operation MI would serve as
bait to lure American carriers into a decisive engagement and set conditions for future
operations in the Hawaiian Islands. (Murray & Millet, 2000, pp. 169-195) Lacking
accurate intelligence and falsly assuming that the America and its allies lacked the
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
military or psychological capability to defeat superior Japanese war machine, Japan
unnecissarily committed critical assets to operational objectives without appropriately
determining or mitigating risk.
The successful attack of Tokyo, Japan on April 18, 1942 by a force of twelve
carrier-launched American B-25 bombers led by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle
codified Yamamoto’s argument of the imperative to actively find and destroy the
American naval airpower in the Pacific and that attacks on the Japanese main islands
were inevitable if action was not taken immediately. (Murray & Millet, 2000, pp. 190-
192) After the Doolitlle raid, the Imperial Japanese Navy assessed that the American
naval carrier force consisted of the Lexington, the Yorktown, the Enterprise, the Hornet,
and potentially the Wasp. At the battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese assessed that they
sunk the American carriers Lexington and the Yorktown, but in reality the Yorktown was
damaged and would make its appearance again at Midway. Coral Sea also took a toll on
the Japanese carriers Shoho and Zuikaku, leaving them combat ineffective and not
availaible as part of the planned Operation MI force package. Despite these losses,
Admiral Yamamoto assumed that he had enough assets to suceed with his Midway plan
based on the possible American forces availble in theater and the superior Japanese
military might.
Leveraging surprise and deception, the Imperial Navy intended to present the
picture that a small Japanese force intent on siezing Midway and trigger the commitment
of the U.S. carriers. Meanwhile, Yamamoto’s larger main effort would be out of the
range of U.S. scout planes and poised to fix and destroy the Pacific Fleet in the
engagement area before they realized the true asymmetry of relative combat power and
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
withraw. Furthermore, Midway was determined to be vital and proximate enough to
trigger a U.S. response, but far enough away from Oahu to be supported by land-based
airpower. Key to the success of the operations a Midway was the establishment of
forward refuling sites at French Frigate Shoals to support seaplane scouting operations of
Operation K gather intelligence on the American Fleet.
Unknown to Admiral Yamamoto, his operational surprise was lost with the
cracking of the Japanese JN-25 radio code by American cryptographers that knew of the
impending attack and postured forces to counter the Japanese assault. Despite indicators
of signifigant increased American activity in the area and the cancellation of Operation K
due to the presence of American forces at French Friggate Shoals, Admiral Yamamoto
pressed on with his original plan without regard to a change in the operational situation
and unnecessarily exposed the entire Operation MI mission and force to catastrophic risk.
(Parshall & Tully, 2005, pp. 92-105)
The Japanese Navy’s irrational decision to continue with its scripted Midway
invasion plan despite being under resourced to overcome the presence of increased
American combat power was too risky in the face of the new operational picture. The
risky gamble cost Japan the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, the success
of Operation MI, and essentially opened the door for the eventual American push towards
the Philippines. Admiral Yamamoto’s obsession with the offense led to the failure of
Japanese operational and strategic objectives.
Not Enough Risk
Some may argue that Yamamoto risked too little to destroy the U.S. carriers in the
Pacific and establish a foothold for the Eastern Pacific Operation. The American
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
bombing attack of the Tokyo and growing strength of the Allied forces in the theater
posed a serious risk to the Japanese defensive perimeter and the critical natural resources
that Japan needed to continue its war effort. The Hawaiian Islands were an American
center of gravity for the war in the Pacific and were critical for power projection and
logistics. Arguably, if Japan would have re-sequenced and committed more assets to
Operations MI and AL, then Admiral Yamamoto could have not only seized Midway, but
continue the push to Oahu without opposition from the deadly American carrier-based
airpower. Furthermore, the loss of the U.S. forward base at Pearl Harbor would have cut
the SLOCs to Australia and set the conditions for the expansion of the Japanese defensive
perimeter southward, thus gaining access to more natural resources. Essentially, greater
strategic and operational risk would have yielded greater strategic and operational
success for Japan.
While more risk may have yielded more gains, the ground truth was the
cumulative effects of Japan’s protracted war, the sheer enormity of the Japanese
defensive perimeter, political rivalry and infighting, no unity of effort, a depleted fighting
force, and an exhausted military industrial base, Admiral Yamamoto did not have any
more assets available to risk without diverting assets from Operation AI. While this
would have provided additional combat power at Midway, the lack of intelligence on the
disposition of American carriers and activities in Hawaii essentially would have exposed
more Japanese assets for destruction in the American engagement areas. The Imperial
Navy’s rigid adherence to the scripted battle plan, lack of operational flexibility, and
blatant disregard of indicators that the Operation MI attack plan was compromised would
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
have led to the destruction of the combined MI/AL fleet. In the case of the battle of
Midway, more risk would not have yielded greater rewards.
Conclusion
Admiral Yamamoto’s obsession with the offense and faulty assessment of
strategic and operational risk drove a plan for destroying American aircraft carriers in the
Pacific and seizing Midway Island that was unnecessary and irrational. Based on his
erroneous risk analysis, he committed Japanese forces to an engagement that was
destined for failure and not vital to Japan’s national interests. The defensive posture of
the Japanese perimeter, with it’s capability to provide mutually supporting land-based air
power, was the stronger strategy and would have brought more combat power to bear on
Allied expeditionary forces in the Pacific. Anticipating the Allied drive towards
Australia to eventually try to recapture the Philippines, Yamamoto could have still lured
the U.S. carriers into a decisive engagement area that had the support of land-based
airpower from the mobile defense. This would have nested into Japan’s overall strategic
objectives and bought time and space for the Japanese forces to refit and prepare to meet
the advancing Allied forces from a position of strength without unnecessary risk. In the
end, Admiral Yamamoto’s same audacious leadership that delivered a crushing blow to
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, caused the Japanese Imperial Command to risk critical
wartime assets on and irrelevant objective that signaled a turning point of the war in the
Pacific.
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NW3230: Ian Davis-Yamamoto’s Risk at Midway
Bibliography
Baer, G. W. (1994). One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Murray, W., & Millet, A. T. (2000). A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Parshall, J. B., & Tully, A. B. (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway. Washington, District of Colombia: Potomac Books.
Wylie, J. C. (1989). Appendix A: Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific'. In U. S. Institute, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (pp. 117-121). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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