Post on 28-Mar-2015
YUGOSLAVIA II: EUROPEAN SECURITY IN FOCUSPI5501 European Security after 1945
TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
European Security after the Cold War Questions of Intervention Questions of US withdrawal Dilemmas of intervention Dayton peace accords (1995) Peace-keeping and peace-building Europe, US, and Russia Kosovo and NATO’s first out of area
operations (1999) Where are we now? The Kosovo effect
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Return to Mearsheimer’s argument: 1945-1990 was an essentially peaceful time for
Europe. The end of the Cold War means a transition from
a bipolar system to a multipolar system. The distribution and character of military power
are the root causes of war and peace
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Mearsheimer argues that peace in Europe is the result of three factors:
1. The bipolar distribution of military power across the continent.
2. The rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe (the importance of parity).
3. That each superpower was equipped with nuclear weapons.
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Domestic Factors: Important in generating conflict, such as the two world wars (and the dissolution of two federal states). Fall of hyper-nationalism in the Cold War
International Factors: However, military power continues to remain an important factor in the peace and stability of Europe.
EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR
European Security and institutions What to do with NATO? From CSCE to the OSCE From CFSP to ESDP What role for the UN after the Cold War?
Busy in other areas: examples, El Salvador, Ecuador, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique
Delegating peacekeeping to regional organizations (Charter function)
Shy away from humanitarian intervention
THE STATE OF INTERVENTION
The principle of state sovereignty Forms of Collective Security
Pure – Maximum sovereignty Procedural – Power and Rule based Hegemonic – Power and no rules
DILEMMAS OF INTERVENTION
Peacekeeping SC generally agrees to peacekeeping only when
both parties have accepted third party mediation What happens when a party reneges on their
commitment? Ex. Former Yugoslavia
THE CONFLICT CONTINUES
Bosnia (in 1990) Demographics
Bosniaks 44 % Serbs 31 % Croats 17 %
Independence April 1992 (after
Croatia)
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION UN Security Council
SCR 713 Arms Embargo Effect on the Bosniaks Yugoslav arms and Serbs Yugoslavia initially called for the embargo
SCR 743 Peacekeeping and Aid Mission Established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) UN military escorts of humanitarian aid began in
August 1992 SCR 757 Enforcement Measures
Reaction to reports of concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and the use of rape as a war tactic
Banned air travel, financial transactions, sports and cultural exchanges, and scientific and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION
UN and NATO SCR 787 Authorized NATO to enforce SCR 757
Also authorised NATO to begin maritime inspections in the Adriatic
First time NATO was ever used as a collective security entity
Splits in the Security Council Bosnian Serbs threatened to kidnap UNPROFOR troops if
not neutral Thus, the UK and France were reluctant to see the UN
step up collective security Russia and China refused to allow for the use of force or
to provide humanitarian aid The US required a strong mandate for the use of force if
it were to send troops
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION
Alternatives to the use of force SCR 764
Established the precedent of charging individuals for war crimes
SCR 771 Stated that blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid
was a violation of international law SCR770 and SCR 776
Increased the mandate for protecting aid convoys Tied to original rules of engagement and existing troop
levels
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION
SCR 781 Banned all flights, but not enforced (Russia vetoed) Iraq no-fly-zone not authorised but enforced, Bosnia
no-fly—zone authorised but not enforced. SCR 808 (Revolutionised International Law)
Created an ad-hoc court to try individuals of guilty genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
OTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
The Vance-Owen Plan (January 1993) Confederation of 10 provinces split along ethnic
lines Russia, France and UK favoured the plan, China
did not have an opinion US (now Clinton) opposed it, calling it
appeasement for Serb aggression Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan because they
already controlled 70% of Bosnia
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
May 1993 Clinton Administration began to advocate lifting
the arms embargo and conducting limited air strikes against Serb targets
UK and France feared a backlash against UNPROFOR
Russia vetoed, China did not have to Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan by
referendum in May
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
What did it take? Throughout 1993, Serbs violated the no-fly-zone
and began bombing Bosniak villages. SCR 816
Allowed NATO to enforce the no-fly-zone First authorization of the use of force in the
former Yugoslavia Problem: each engagement had to be authorised
by the Secretary General and the commander of UNPROFOR Engagement requests were denied throughout 1993 to
prevent retaliation against UN troops on the ground
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
SCR 819 Made Srebrenica a ‘safe area’
SCR 824 Further expanded ‘safe areas’
SCR 836 In June 1993, NATO was authorised to use air
strikes against Serb forces surrounding the ‘safe areas’.
Russia and China abstained from all of these resolutions
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
July 1993 Serbs were about to take Sarajevo US prepared for air strikes against Serb positions
on the hills surrounding the city HOWEVER, the UNPROFOR commander
negotiated an arrangement that would place French peacekeepers on the front line between the Serbs and the city
So close that they prevented any air strikes The US began to openly criticise UK and France US pointed to SCR 770 as authority to use force
(enforced delivery of humanitarian aid delivery)
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
Getting past the impasse UK and France reluctant to use force US reluctant to go without allies
NATO threatened on 9 August 1993 to undertake strategic air strikes unless the Serbs stopped their offensive Sarajevo Airstrikes would also have to be authorised by
UNPROFOR command, all 16 NATO ambassadors and the UN SG.
Serbs made token efforts to withdraw No airstrikes were carried out
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
The Owen-Stoltenberg plan Divide Bosnia into three ministries
Serbs would receive 52.5% Croats would receive 17.5% Bosniaks would receive 30%
UK, France and Russia supported it US did not because it rewarded a ‘Greater
Serbia’ to the Serbs Serbs and Croats agreed, Bosnians did not
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
Serbs were close to capturing three safe havens in Dec 1993.
Serbs killed 69 at a market in Sarajevo in Feb 1994
NATO responded that it would use airstrikes within 20 kilometres around the city (Not UN approved)
Feb 2004: NATO shot down four Serb warplanes violating the no-fly-zone
This was the first use of force in the Bosnian war to enforce UNSC resolutions
FROM DIPLOMACY TO THE USE OF FORCE
Russian position was adamant against NATO strikes Yeltsin moved Russian ‘peacekeepers’ into place
near Serb positions to deter NATO strikes April 1994, NATO struck Serb tanks and an
armoured personnel carrier near Gorazde This was the first ground strike in the conflict
Yeltsin demanded to be included in any future military decisions Contact Group was formed in April 1994 to bring
together the positions of US, Russia, UK, France, and Germany
NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE In August, Milosevic ordered a withdrawal of
the JNA from Bosnia in order to reduce the sanctions against the remaining part of Yugoslavia
SCR 943 eased the sanctions on Yugoslavia Contact Group constructed a new plan to split
the country, but the Bosnian Serbs rejected it US wanted to raise the weapons ban and begin to
enforce weapons exclusion zones UK, France and Russia did not want to raise the risk
to UN troops In September, the US unilaterally breached
NATO policy by delivering weapons to the Bosniaks and enforcing weapons exclusion zones.
NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE
By 1995, the Bosnian Serbs accepted that the split among the UN SC powers would prevent significant intervention by the international Community
In August, the UN SC was drawing up withdrawal plans (SCR 998)
However, once withdrawn, the UN was able to strike without harm to UN peacekeepers NATO began a sustained bombing campaign
against Serb positions and facilities in Bosnia on 10 Sep 1995
FROM FORCE TO DIPLOMACY
After two weeks of bombings, several things changed: The Croat/Bosniak forces took control of the
nearly half of Bosnia (up from 28%) Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic combined
into a joint negotiating committee to communicated with the Contact Group
While the Serbs were willing to settle, the Croats and Bosniaks had to be pushed to accept any deal.
The Dayton Peace Accords, based on the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, was signed on 5 October 1995.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL FIRSTS
The war led to The first council resolution mentioning individual
responsibility for war crimes The first time NATO acted as a United Nations
authorised collective security entity The first time the council established an ad hoc
tribunal The first time NATO used force in Europe The first time American and Russian troops
worked together on the same mission The first preventative peacekeeping force (FYR
Macedonia)
KOSOVO
Context Kosovo declared
independence in October 1991
Evidence of massive human rights violations
Usual council split NATO was willing to
use force without council authorisation
NATO IN KOSOVO
Air strikes on Yugoslav forces
38 004 sorties flown820 aircraft from 14 states
Peace-keeping
RUSSIA’S RESPONSE Kosovo ended the dream of a European
security system without the United States NATO was invoking rules of empire rather
than of collective security Signed a joint-defence initiative with Belarus Expelled NATO representatives Withdrew from the PfP programme Withdrew mission to Brussels Withdrew communication with NATO forces in
Kosovo Postponed a vote on START II Began talks with India and China on alliance
FROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE
Autonomy Rambouillet talks
Independence 17 Feb 2008
Kosovo effects Force without UN
support Future secession:
Cyprus, Georgia, Azerbaijan