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Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Whistle-Blowing Wrongdoing Behavior
Yin Xu Department of Accounting
College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3554
E-mail: yxu@odu.edu
Douglas E. Ziegenfuss Department of Accounting
College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3514
E-mail: dziegenf@odu.edu
June 2003
Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Reporting Wrongdoing Behavior
Abstract
This study investigates the issue of whistle-blowing arising from known company wrongdoing in the process of preparing financial information. An experiment was conducted to examine whether reward systems such as cash incentives or employment contracts have an impact on auditors’ whistle-blowing behavior. The results indicate that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing to higher authorities when cash rewards or continuing employment contracts are provided, suggesting reward systems have a positive effect on disclosing company’s wrongdoing or even fraud. In addition, the result reveals that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning are more sensitive to cash reward incentives.
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Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’
Reporting Wrongdoing Behavior
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the issue of whistle-blowing arising
from known company wrongdoing in the process of preparing financial information. The
basic question to be addressed is whether certain reward systems and individual moral
reasoning on the part of auditors have an impact on disclosing company wrongdoing or
fraud. The reliability of financial information is always a legitimate concern in financial
reporting. Highly publicized audit failures lead to close examination of the role and
behavior of auditors. Previous research suggests that whistle-blowing can be used as a
preventive mechanism for possible wrongdoing (Hooks, Kaplan, and Schultz 1994).
Studies indicate that the nature and extent of the retaliations have a negative impact on
the prospective whistle-blower’s decision in the disclosure of company wrongdoing (e.g.
Near and Miceli 1986; Arnold and Ponemon 1991). Issues have been raised about the
effect of significant monetary rewards or long-term employment contract as an incentive
for reporting organizational wrongdoing to mitigate the negative consequences of
retaliation on the whistle-blower (Ponemon 1994). However, little study has attempted to
empirically examine such an effect.
The results in this study indicate that auditors are more likely to report
wrongdoing to higher authorities when cash rewards or continuing employment contracts
are provided, suggesting reward systems have a positive effect on disclosing company’s
wrongdoing or even fraud. In addition, the result reveals that, to some extent, auditors
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with lower levels of moral reasoning are more sensitive to cash reward incentives or more
willing to blow the whistle when cash incentives are provided.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
brief overview of the basic research in the area and a development of hypotheses. Then
the research method and the results are described. The final section discusses the
implications and limitations of the study.
BACKGROUND
The psychology of moral reasoning is based on Piaget’ theory (1932, 1966). The
theory assumes that cognitive and moral development proceeds hand in hand, and that the
cognitive schema and structure are innate, invariant, hierarchical and culturally universal.
In his research Piaget used the “clinical interview” technique to top the child’s underlying
cognitive-structural capacities, rather than merely measure observable surface
performance in behavioral terms. In contrast to emphasis on education and development
as adult influence on children, Piaget’s cognitive-structural approach attempted to show
how social-moral knowledge developed out of a background of authority and constraint
and then moved in a direction of autonomous cooperation and equality. In Piaget’s
scheme, once the child resolved some of the difficulties inherent in distinguishing his
own reality from the givens in external reality, a more or less natural process of gradually
unfolding moral development would occur (Rich and Devitis 1994).
Kohlberg (1969) made enormously important contributions to the moral
development theory by continuing what Piaget’s theory had left unfinished. Kohlberg
not only shared Piaget’s assumption but was also concerned with the principle of justice
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rather than simple cooperation and equity. Kohlberg’s research showed culturally
universal stages of moral development. He advanced a stage-sequence model that
defined a series of cognitive levels and stages somewhat akin to the rungs of a ladder.
Within each of the three levels of ethical judgment are two developmental stages, thus
producing a total of six discrete states as follows.
Pre-conventional Level: Stage 1: Obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical
harm. Stage 2: Serving one’s own or other’s needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete
exchange. Conventional Level: Stage 3: Playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their
feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.
Stage 4: Doing one’s duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.
Post-conventional Level: Stage 5: Upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when
they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group. Stage 6: Assuming guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity should
follow (Kohlberg 1981). To the pre-conventional person, resolution of an ethical dilemma is simply based upon
the immediate cost and/or benefit of ethical action. To the conventional person,
resolution is based upon the avoidance of harm to others belonging to one’s social
institution. The post-conventional person frames an ethical judgment based upon an
internalized and self-chosen set of principles.
What is important in Kohlberg’s theory is that stages are organized system of
thought and they represent invariant developmental sequences. All movement is forward
and does not omit steps. The stages come one after another and in the same order, even
though children move through the sages at varying speeds. The stages are hierarchical
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insofar as thinking at a higher stage comprehends within it thinking at a lower stage.
Based on longitudinal, cross-sectional, and cross-cultural studies carried out in Chicago
area, Turkey, Britain, Canada, India, Israel, Honduras, Taiwan, and Yucatan, Kohlberg’s
model has been widely influential (Rich and DeVitis 1994).
Ethical reasoning research in the accounting and auditing profession is important
because the concept of professional ethics is more than an external measure by which the
profession maintains a virtuous image (Ponemon and Gabhart 1994). For many
practitioners, it is a concept that implies a reasoning capability that permits the individual
to render judgement unaltered by self-interest that could impair his or her professional
responsibility. The ethical reasoning process is part of the individual’s overall moral
consciousness from which he or she deals with difficult conflict or dilemmas in every day
practice. It is this personal dimension of the moral universe in the auditing profession
that attracted attention of researchers. Since the mid-1980s, an increasing number of
studies have addressed the ethical issues in accounting and auditing from the perspective
of moral development theory (see Louwer, Ponemon, and Radtke 1997).
One aspect of these studies that relates most closely to the present study is the
relationship between moral reasoning and the whistle-blowing phenomenon. Whistle-
blowing is defined as the “disclosure by organizational members (former and current) of
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons
or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near and Miceli 1985, p.4).
Research in the whistle-blowing phenomenon has been pursued in various aspects
including accounting and auditing (see Hooks et. al, 1994). Many factors may influence
whistle-blowing behavior, among which the factor of retaliation against whistle blowers
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is “perhaps the most significant determinant to behavior” (Arnold and Ponemon 1991).
Evidence suggests that retaliation is part of rational and planned process initiated by
authority not only to eliminate the whistle blower as a witness but also to suppress future
whistle-blowing decisions (e.g. Near and Miceli 1985, 1986). In retaliating against the
whistle blowers, management tries to signal to others that confronting authority has high
risk and can ruin one’s career (Glazer and Glazer 1989).
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) conduct an experiment examining the effect of moral
reasoning, retaliation, and the position of individuals on internal auditors’ perceptions of
whistle-blowing. More specifically, the study examines the internal auditors’ perceptions
about whistle-blowing in the context of three variables: (1) the level of moral reasoning
of the individuals, (2) the possible retaliation imposed by management or co-workers
against the whistle-blower, and (3) the position of the whistle-blower in an organization
(internal auditors, external auditors, or marketing analysts). The experiment asked 106
internal auditors to predict the likelihood of another person disclosing wrongdoing under
two different manipulated conditions: (1) the nature of retaliation posed against the
whistle-blower (2) the position of the individual discovering wrongdoing. Findings of
this work show that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning were unlikely
to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, and this effect was particularly pronounced under the
condition of retaliation by the organization. Findings also reveal that the position of the
prospective whistle-blower has a significant influence on whistle-blower’s behavior.
Arnold and Ponemon’s (1991) study is consistent with other findings (e.g. Near
and Miceli 1986) indicating that the extent of retaliation reduces the likelihood of
reporting wrongdoing. Moreover, Near and Miceli (1985), applying reinforcement theory
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(Skinner 1953), point out that when similar wrongdoing is consistently tolerated or
encouraged while whistle-blowing act is followed by retaliation, “the wrong doing setting
serves to signal ‘don’t act’” (Near and Miceli 1985, p.6). At the same time, they have
argued that when similar wrongdoing is consistently followed by successful opposition
and by positive management reaction, the wrongdoing serves as a stimulus for action.
This point has important implications, but little empirical research has been done to test
how the wrongdoing setting may become stimulus for whistle-blowing act. An obvious
issue raised here is whether offers of significant incentives can result in an increase in
disclosing wrongdoing.
Based on the same framework of reinforcement theory, this study suggests that
people are motivated to engage in certain behavior because of past rewards associated
with those behaviors. If wrongdoing is reported by an individual, and if the individual
who blew the whistle has been rewarded, the wrongdoing setting serves to send the signal
that whistle-blowing behavior will be encouraged. While an organization may provide
different types of incentives, monetary rewards may be considered one of the most salient
economic resources.
As evidenced by the previous studies, job termination is one of the most common
forms of retaliation against whistle blowers (e.g. Glazer and Glazer 1989). It seems that
individuals often put themselves at very substantial risk of losing their jobs eventually if
they blow the whistle on organizations’ wrongdoing, the situation is probably more
notable in private organizations than in public organizations (Alford 2001). One way to
offset these negative consequences of retaliation and to curb management power in the
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event of whistle blowing situations is to develop some control structure by offering long-
term employment contracts to individuals who disclose wrongdoing (Ponemon 1994).
Based on the previous studies and the above discussion, it is expected that
individuals will be less likely to disclose and report wrongdoing even when they think
they should. However, individuals will tend to disclose and report wrongdoing when a
substantial amount of cash reward is offered after whistle blowing acts. Similarly,
individuals will be likely to blow the whistle when continuing employment contract is
guaranteed after whistle blowing acts. Accordingly, H1 and H2 summarize these
expectations.
H1: Internal auditors are more likely to feel they should report wrongdoing than they would report.
H2a: It is more likely that auditors will report or disclose wrongdoing when a substantial amount of cash reward is offered. H2b: It is more likely that auditors will report or disclose wrongdoing when a continuing employment contract is guaranteed.
As discussed earlier, the experiment conducted by Arnold and Ponemon (1991)
demonstrates that internal auditors with relatively low levels of moral reasoning are less
likely to blow the whistle, and this is especially true when the potential retaliation exists.
This finding is supported by Kohlberg stage theory (1969, 1981) that individuals with
lower levels of moral reasoning will make the decision to do right to avoid punishment
(stage 1) or to serve one’s own interest (stage 2). By the same token, it is expected that
individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning will be more sensitive to incentives such
as cash rewards and continuing employment contracts. Accordingly, H3 summarizes this
expectation.
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H3a: Individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood of reporting or disclosing wrongdoing when cash rewards are offered. H3b: Individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood of reporting or disclosing wrongdoing when a continuing employment contract is guaranteed.
METHOD
General Design
A mixed ANOVA research design with repeated measures and between-group
independent variables is used in the study. The primary reason of using the repeated
measure design is that it provides good precision for comparing manipulations because
all sources of variability between participants are excluded from the experimental error.
Only variation within subjects enters the experimental error, since any two manipulations
can be compared directly for each subject (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman
1996).
Participants
A list of members of two regional internal auditor chapters was obtained and the
decision cases and questionnaire were mailed with a cover letter to each auditor. Due to
institutional constraints and the relatively high response rate, a single mailing was used.
Of the 570 surveys mailed, 26 were returned as undeliverable, leaving 544 available to
participants. 201 internal auditors returned the questionnaire. The response rate was
37%.
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Procedures
All participating subjects are provided with five pages of a research instrument.
The first page consists of a case involving a situation of an internal auditor discovering
wrongdoing in an organization. It provides descriptive information about the wrongdoing
setting. The internal auditor recently completed an audit of the company’s billing
system. The billings had been audited before and no major problems were identified.
During the present audit, however, the internal auditor discovered a series of inflated or
falsified invoices to customer that had already been paid. He reported this finding to the
director of internal audit. The director said that he would report it to authorities within
the company. But a few days later, the director changed his mind. The scenario is
adapted from the previous work of Arnold and Ponemon (1991). After reading the case,
subjects are asked to indicate that the internal auditor described in the case should report
wrongdoing to higher authorities on a 9-point scale (1 = definitely shouldn't, 9 =
definitely should). Subjects are then required to give a prediction that the internal auditor
would report wrongdoing to higher authorities on a 9-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 9 =
very likely). The task is presented in the third-person to reduce potential self-reporting
bias that frequently go with studies of moral issues (see Arnold and Ponemon 1991).
Then subjects are given two manipulated situations assuming that the reward systems are
provided by the organization and asked to provide a prediction again about the auditor’s
whistle-blowing act after each manipulation. The two manipulated situations are as
follows:
Assume that the company has a policy that encourages the communication of organizational wrongdoing by guaranteeing continuing employment to the employee for truthful disclosure.
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Assume that the company rewards a substantial amount of cash (instead of guaranteeing continuing employment) to the employee for such reporting.
The procedure is taken to minimize the potential order effect, which is connected with the
position in the manipulation order. The order of manipulation presentations are balanced
by using a half of the instruments in the order of (1) employment and (2) cash, and the
other half in the order of (1) cash and (2) employment.
The next three pages of instruments consist of the measure of moral reasoning via
a three-story version of the Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979). The final page contains
questions regarding subject demographic information. The DIT is a well-known and
widely utilized measurement instrument. It provides a surrogate measure of an
individual’s ethical reasoning and judgement. The DIT is basically a self-administered
questionnaire that contains a series of hypothetical moral conflicts. For each dilemma,
the subjects are asked to select and rank order those issues or items which they consider
have most significant influence on the resolution of each conflict. The issues represent
the most typical mode of thinking in terms of the underlying cognitive-developmental
theory. The various stages of moral judgment are exemplified in the issues, and the
assumption is that a subject’s developmental level will influence how he or she rates and
ranks the issues. The P score is calculated from the sum of the weighted total of four
most important ranked issues. The score is expressed in term of a percentage ranging
from 0 to 100%.
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RESULTS
Sixteen responses were dropped from the analysis due to incompleteness or
failure to satisfy the consistency check in the DIT. Thus the final useable responses were
185. Table 1 presents participants’ demographic information. On average they have 21
years of work experience and 12 years of audit experience. They supervise an average of
12 individuals. It appears that the sample meets the experience characteristics desired for
the study.
Insert Table 1 about here
The results show that the mean and the median DIT P scores are 32.67 and 33.33,
respectively. The DIT P scores were then post-stratified into high (n = 58, mean =
51.15), mid (n = 56, mean = 33.51), and low (n = 71, mean = 16.90) DIT P score groups,
corresponding to Kohlberg’s (1969) post-conventional, conventional, and pre-
conventional levels of moral reasoning development discussed earlier. We used P scores
of 27 and 41 cut-off value, based on the previous studies (Rest 1979; Windsor and
Ashkanasy 1995), to define these three groups. Mean dependent variable scores (the
perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior) for the three groups
are displayed in Table 2. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of mean scores and
standard deviations for variables in the study.
Insert Table 2 about here
H1 predicates that, when an observed wrongdoing occurs, internal auditors are
more likely to feel they should report wrongdoing than they would report. A two-way
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ANOVA with repeated measures was used to examine the hypothesis. No significant
interaction exists between the levels of moral reasoning and reporting behaviors, F (1,
183) = 0.09, p = 0.769; but the main effect on the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing
behavior was significant F (1, 183) = 147.03, p < 0.0001. The means are displayed in
Table 3, which show that the mean likelihood scores of the whistle-blowing behavior
were significantly higher when auditors believe that they should report wrongdoing
(mean = 7.87) than when they believe that they would (mean = 4.65). Thus, H1 is
supported. This result suggests that individuals will be, regardless of their levels of moral
reasoning, less likely to report wrongdoing even when they think they should.
Insert Table 3 about here
As expected, when the reward systems are present (under both guaranteed
employment and cash reward conditions), the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing
behavior is higher than that when no reward systems exist. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA), repeated-measure design, was used in the analysis of subject
predictions of the whistle-blowing behavior. This analysis revealed a significant effect
for the manipulation, F (2, 368) = 145.36; p < 0.0001.
H2 predict that the auditors will be more likely to blow the whistle on wrongdoing
under the conditions of cash rewards and employment contracts, respectively. The
contrast analysis was performed to examine the mean differences between the control
group (would report) and each of the two manipulated groups, which directly tests the
two hypotheses (H2a and H2b). The results of contrast analysis indicate that the mean
likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior in the control group (would report) (mean =
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4.65) is significantly lower than the mean likelihood in the continuing employment group
(mean = 6.79), F (1, 184) = 220.81; p < 0.0001. As predicted, the mean likelihood of the
whistle-blowing behavior in the control group (mean = 4.65) is also significantly lower
than the mean likelihood in the cash reward group (mean = 6.78), F (1, 184) = 182.74; p
< 0.0001. The results demonstrate that the auditors are more likely to communicate or
report wrongdoing to higher authorities when the reward systems in the form of either
guaranteed employment or cash reward are implemented in the organization. Therefore,
both H2a and H2b are supported. The evidence suggests that providing some types of
incentives may in fact increase reporting wrongdoing behavior in an organization.
H3 predicts that individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood
of whistle-blowing behavior when cash rewards and employment contracts are offered.
A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was used to test the
hypotheses. Table 4 presents the ANOVA summary table. As shown in Table 4, the
interaction of incentive manipulations and levels of moral reasoning on the likelihood of
the whistle-blowing behavior was significant, F (2, 366) = 4.74, p < 0.01, indicating that
the auditors’ prediction of whistle-blowing behavior was influenced by their levels of
moral reasoning.
Insert Table 4 about here
Tests for simple effects were then used to compare the mean differences for
guaranteed employment and cash reward manipulations among the three DIT P score
groups. The results showed that the mean likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior under
the guaranteed employment condition displayed no significant differences among the
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three levels of moral reasoning groups, F (2, 182) = 0.86, p < 0.42. The findings suggest
that the auditors with low, mid or high levels of moral reasoning measured by the DIT P
scores do not influence their perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing
behavior under the condition of guaranteed employment incentives. Thus H3b is not
supported. However, the mean likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior under the cash
reward condition did indicate a marginally significant difference among the three levels
of moral reasoning groups, F (2, 182) = 2.65, p < 0.07. The findings indicate that the
auditors with different levels of moral reasoning measured by DIT scores influence
auditors’ perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior under the
condition of cash rewards. A post hoc test shows that the auditors in the low DIT group
(mean = 7.17) are more likely to report wrongdoing under the incentive of cash rewards
than the auditors in the high DIT group (mean = 6.36), p > 0.02. Therefore, H3a is
supported. The results suggest that internal auditors with relatively low levels of moral
reasoning will be more sensitive to incentives of cash rewards and more willing to blow
the whistle as a means for disclosing wrongdoing when monetary incentives are
provided.
DISCUSSION
This study attempts to explore the impact of reward systems and individual moral
reasoning on the prediction of whistle-blowing behavior. Findings support the notion
that reward systems such as cash incentives or guaranteed employment contracts have a
significant influence on the likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior. Although we
designed this study to integrate findings from previous research, our work is different
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from previous efforts in some ways. One aspect in which this study differs most from
prior research is that we directly examined what motivate auditors to report or disclose
wrongdoing or fraud. The whistle-blowing decision on any types of organizational
wrongdoing or fraud is never a casual matter. This study shows that, under the
experimental condition, the availability of monetary incentives and employment
protections will encourage people to do a “right thing.” Such an effect may not only
offset the negative effects of observable or unobservable retaliations imposed by the
organization on the whistle-blower but also help foster a positive moral environment that
increases the probability of the whistle-blowing behavior in organizations.
Further, findings also demonstrate that individuals with relatively low levels of
moral reasoning are more likely affected by the cash incentive than individuals with
relatively high levels of moral reasoning. This result is consistent with the findings that
auditors with lower moral reasoning are more sensitive to retaliation (Arnold and
Ponemon 1991). While the previous research shows that highly moral individuals are
more likely to blow the whistle because their moral disposition does not permit inaction,
the current study indicates that low moral individuals are more likely to blow the whistle
because the reward of a substantial amount of cash is provided. The findings can be
readily explained by Kohlberg’s stage theory (1969,1981). Individuals with lower levels
of moral reasoning (at the pre-conventional or at the conventional levels) will focus more
on self-interest and relationships with others in organizations. Accordingly, they would
blow the whistle only when the perceived personal benefits such as monetary rewards
prevail.
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Many issues and concerns have been raised regarding how to prevent future
financial fraud and misconduct. One of the issues is the responsibility of corporate
leaders. Practitioners and academics have called corporate leaders to take steps to
“decrease the probability that managers will become either victimized or otherwise
involved in such frauds” (Gangossy and Kanter 2002). It is not entirely clear how and
why corporate leaders may be motivated to make efforts to reduce or eliminate
wrongdoing or fraud in their own organizations, since they are often implicated directly
or indirectly in, and financially gained from, such behavior. Assuming the top corporate
leaders are willing to run their organizations with highest ethical standards, there is an
important issue of the role and behavior of accountants, auditors, and other members of
organizations who are involved in preparing and disclosing financial information. That is,
how and why employees may be motivated to report wrongdoing or fraud within
organizations when retaliation against whistle blowers is often a lived reality.
The implications of this study suggest that economic incentives are one of the
crucial factors to motivate individuals to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in
organizations. This is true regardless of individual levels of moral reasoning. The issue
may be raised regarding motivated versus unmotivated whistle blowers (Ponemon,1994).
It is argued that the motivated communication of wrongdoing may provide or report less
reliable information of wrongdoing than the unmotivated communication because the
motivated whistle blower chooses to act for the purpose of personal welfare. The
scenario presented in this study, however, assumes that all the information reported
regarding financial wrongdoing or fraud would be true and verifiable. Moreover, the
critical issue in the present business world and in the financial reporting aspect in
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particular is that people simply fear of blowing the whistle on any wrongdoing or fraud as
few whistle blowers’ stories end happily (Glazer and Glazer 1989; Alford 2001).
Some limitations exist in the current study. The data were collected using a short
hypothetical case and with a sample of convenience. The study was conducted under the
experimental condition, which may limit the ability to generalize to the population.
Therefore, care should be exercised when extrapolating the results to other situations and
contexts. Nevertheless, the findings of this study provide initial evidence that
organizations can develop some internal control structure to encourage employees to
report or dislose wrongdoing. Further research may investigate whether organizational
management tends to implement economic incentives and what would motivate them to
do so. We hope that the present study will stimulate other researchers to pursue these
issues.
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Reference
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., and D. Gabhart. 1994. Ethical reasoning research in the accounting and
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Table 1: Participant Demographics
Demographic Variable Number of Participants Male 108
Female 77
Mean Years of work experience 21 Years of work experience as auditor 12 Number of individuals supervised 12
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Table 2: Mean Scores on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior by Experimental and DIT Groups
Should report / Would report /
DIT Groups No Reward No Reward Cash Employment Low DIT 7.69 4.46 7.17 6.76 Mid DIT 7.92 4.85 6.73 7.07 High DIT 8.05 4.69 6.36 6.57
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Table 3: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior
Standard Variables Mean deviation Should report / no reward 7.88 1.97
Would report / no reward 4.65 2.24
Continuing employment 6.79 2.05 Cash reward 7.78 2.06
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Table 4: Analysis of Variance on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior by Incentive Manipulation and DIT Groups
Source df SS F-value p-value Between-subjects
Level of DIT (A) 1 5.74 0.61 0.437 Error between 183 1729.93 Within-subjects Incentives (B) 2 339.25 89.49 0.0001 A x B Interaction 2 17.98 4.74 0.0093 Error within 366 693.76 Total 554 2786.66