User Behavior Intelligence Fundamentals: Behaviors, Characteristics, and Facts Ken Paiboon...

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Transcript of User Behavior Intelligence Fundamentals: Behaviors, Characteristics, and Facts Ken Paiboon...

User Behavior Intelligence Fundamentals: Behaviors, Characteristics, and Facts

Ken Paiboon214.274.3436ken@exabeam.com

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The Anthem Data Breach

• “…Attackers gained unauthorized access…”

• “…Information accessed may have included names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, health care ID numbers, home addresses, email addresses, employment information, including income data…”

• “…Believe it happened over the course of several weeks beginning in early December 2014…”

• “…contacted the FBI / retained Mandiant…”

“I personally apologize to each of you.”

What do these letters really tell us?

• We’re not completely sure WHEN, HOW, or for HOW LONG we’ve been breached

• We weren’t able to detect the data breach until well after the fact• DBA witnessed own credentials used to execute the queries

• An attacker obtained credentials that allowed for unauthorized access

• Due to either technology or personnel limitations we’re not able to figure out what happened so we asked Mandiant in to manually piece together the story of what happened

The Pervasive Data Breach Problem

100%

Ave ra ge n u m b e r o f d a y s t h e atta c ke r

w a s r e s i d e n t

100%… o f B r ea c h e s

i n vo l ve d sto l e n c r e d e n t i a l s

224

… o f t h e t i m e e v i d e n ce o f t h e

atta c k w a s i n l o g d ata

59,7461 % o f a l l s u s p i c i o u s

a l e r t s ge n e rate d o ve r 8 m o n t h atta c k atN e i m a n M a r c u s

What do these numbers tell us?

321

We have to know what to look for

We get toomany alerts

We don’t getthe full picture

We are focused on the attack chain phases…

S o u r c e : F i r e Ey e M a n d i a n t A P T 1 r e p o r t ( Fe b 2 0 1 3 )

Where most of our detection

effort and money goes

Some detection effort

and money goes here (DLP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L 7S o u r c e : F i r e Ey e M a n d i a n t A P T 1 r e p o r t ( Fe b 2 0 1 3 )

POSSIBLE CREDENTIAL USE

InitialRecon

Initial Compromise

EstablishFoothold

EscalatePrivileges

InternalRecon

MoveLaterallyMaintain

Presence

CompleteMission

Hours Weeks or Months Hours

…instead of what enables each phase

User Behavior Intelligence is the missing layer of detection after perimeter defenses

Employees use credentials to access IT systems to create business value.

Attackers use credentials to access systems to steal the business value employees create.

Attackers and employees have divergent goals resulting in different behaviors and access characteristics.

Defining a UBI Solution

User Behavior Intelligence Solutions• Learns and remembers normal credential access behaviors and

characteristics and score what’s anomalous• Provide information about what’s normal user behavior as context• Assemble the data into user sessions (log-on to log-off)• Keep “state” on the user across identity and internet address switches• Attributes security alerts to the credential (user) that was in use on

the system when the alert occurred• Creates efficiencies in security operations

Fits into CDM capability Security Related BehaviorManage Accounts for People and Services (Phase2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Undetected Attack: South Carolina IRS

At various stages of this attack, important anomalies went unnoticed:

• VPN access off hours

• VPN access from new device

• Unusual access to servers

• Crawling of sensitive servers

• Copy of large DB backups

Spear Phishing

VPN in withstolen credentials

Server & App Recon

File Data Theft

Exfiltration

13AU G U ST

27AU G U ST

29-11AU G / S E P T

12S E P T E M B E R

13-14S E P T E M B E R

10

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Undetected Attack: South Carolina IRSAt various stages of this attack, important anomalies went unnoticed:

• VPN access from new device

• VPN access from outside US

• Unusual access to servers

• Crawling of sensitive servers

• Copy of large DB backups

Spear Phishing

VPN in withstolen credentials

Server & App Recon

File Data Theft

Exfiltration

13AU G U ST

27AU G U ST

29-11AU G / S E P T

12S E P T E M B E R

13-14S E P T E M B E R

11

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Undetected Attack: South Carolina IRSAt various stages of this attack, important anomalies went unnoticed:

• VPN access off hours

• VPN access from new device

• Unusual access to servers

• Crawling of sensitive servers

• Copy of large DB backups

Spear Phishing

VPN in withstolen credentials

Server & App Recon

File Data Theft

Exfiltration

13AU G U ST

27AU G U ST

29-11AU G / S E P T

12S E P T E M B E R

13-14S E P T E M B E R

12

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Undetected Attack: South Carolina IRSAt various stages of this attack, important anomalies went unnoticed:

• VPN access off hours

• VPN access from new device

• Unusual access to servers

• Crawling of sensitive servers

• Copy of large DB backups

Spear Phishing

VPN in withstolen credentials

Server & App Recon

File Data Theft

Exfiltration

13AU G U ST

27AU G U ST

29-11AU G / S E P T

12S E P T E M B E R

13-14S E P T E M B E R

13

Using behavior modeling to determine – Is it anomalous?

C O N F I D E N T I A L 14

System automatically asks access context questions

To Server

From Device

IP

ISP

GEO

Time To Realm

ISP

GEO

To Realm

User PeerGroup

Org

ISP

GEOVPN Access

ExampleVPN Login

Custom Algorithms

Applied

To Server

Understanding Normal as Context is Critical

• SIEMs are not engineered to surface abnormal from normal

• Important for a learning engine• To learn or not to learn – that is the question

• Accounting for divergent behavior -- to a point

• Know when to say, “I can’t make a determination.”• Data distribution and amounts

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Example of a Proven UBI Approach

16

Extract & Enrich

SessionTracking

Behavior Analysis

Risk Engine

+ + +

SCORE

75Risk ScoringIncident RankingAttack Detection

IT SECURITY

MACHINE DATA

LOG MANAGEMENT

ERP CMDB

ACTIVE DIRECTORY

HRMS ITMSResearch + Community Insights

USER BEHAVIOR INTELL IGENCE

Solving the IRS Example Using UBIQU ESTION A NSWER R ISK

N O

N O

YES

N O

N O

YES

N O

N O

8:29AM

9:15AM

10:30AM

AC

TIV

ITY

TIM

ELIN

E

RIS

K T

RA

CK

ING

SCORE

95

Has Jerry connected during the weekend?

Has Jerry used this device to connect to the VPN in the past?

Has Jerry previously entered network from abroad?

Has Jerry previously entered network from Romania?

Has Jerry connected to this server in the past? (x4)

Has Jerry’s file share contained sensitive information? (x2)

Has Jerry’s peer group accessed this server in the past?

Has Jerry crawled file shares?

Risk score = 95

Risk score = 90

Risk score = 35

+10

+10

+20

-5

+40

+10

+5

+5

UBI Summary

• Focuses the security team on what attackers want and use—credentials• Extracts additional value from existing SIEM and log management data

repositories• Learns and remembers ‘normal’ user behaviors for individuals and peer

groups• Prioritizes security risks based based on transparent scoring of user activity

outliers and business role context• Security events seen in context – reduces false positives• Scales to hundreds of thousands of users • Detects cyber attacks and insider threats in real time

Q&AThank You!

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