Post on 07-Apr-2022
US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Aircraft Protection Programs Overview
James TuttleProgram ExecutiveAircraft Protection Programs703-235-0272james.tuttle@dhs.gov
2James Tuttle August 23, 2005
OutlineThrust Areas for Commercial Aircraft Protection
Counter-MANPADS Program
MANPADS Threat Summary
National Strategy
Counter-MANPADS Program Overview
Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability Reduction
Chemical/Biological/Explosive Countermeasures
Summary
3James Tuttle August 23, 2005
Commercial Aircraft Protection Thrust Areas
Counter-MANPADS
Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability ReductionLaser Eye Protection (LEP)/Adaptive Flight Controls/Propulsion Control Aircraft Recovery (PCAR)/ Hardening Aircraft Structure
Countermeasures – SabotageChemical/Biological/ExplosiveDetect, Contain, and Notify
Directed Energy and Directed Fire WeaponsRF/Laser-based and Kinetic Energy Weapons (e.g., High-Powered Rifles)
Communications/Navigation InfrastructureEmergency Notification/Secure CommunicationsAnti-Jamming/Spoofing
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MANPADS Threat SummaryMANPADS are readily available worldwide and capable of destroying any aircraft
Civilian aircraft are easy targets: slow, predictable, have large signatures
Aircraft are most susceptible near airfield and when traveling below 15,000 feet
Russian SA-18
Danger zone of MANPADS attack is large:Largely outside of airport boundaries (greater than 40 nm)Attack corridor may be up to 8 nm wide
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National Strategy A Multi-Layered Approach
Non-ProliferationDepartment of State
Tactical OperationsDHS TSA
Counter-MANPADS
Technical CountermeasuresDHS S&T
Re-engineer and demonstrate technologies to counter threat
CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI
Intelligence
National Airspace SystemFAA
Global weapons stockpileGlobal export controlsBuy-back program
Airport vulnerability assessments and mitigation plansGuidelines for identifying and reporting threatsElevated alert guidelines
6James Tuttle August 23, 2005
Program Description and ObjectivesAdapt CM to commercial aircraft for MANPADS protection
Continue to evaluate emerging Counter-MANPADS technologies
Multi-Phase Program
Provide analysis and data to support decision-making by the Administration and Congress on deployment and implementation
Balance costs, schedule, and performance
Gain support from aviation industry stakeholders
Interagency cooperation among DHS and Departments of Defense, Commerce, State, and Transportation
Phase II will result in two deployable Counter-MANPADS systems
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Schedule and Activities
Aircraft Component Testing
Phase I – Jan 04 to Jul 04
Establish a Preliminary Design, 6 Months (COMPLETED ON TIME)
Phase II – Aug 04 to Jan 06
Develop Prototypes for Test and Qualification, 18 months(On schedule, within budget, and meeting goals)
Phase III – Feb 06 to Dec 07
Perform Spiral Upgrades to Incorporate New Requirements
andPerform Operational Test and Evaluation(Designed to further reduce technical risk & cost)
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Key Challenges to be Addressed by SPOSystem Performance Requirements
False Alarm RatesMissile Warning SystemsCountermeasure EffectivenessOperations Concepts
Aircraft Integration and FAA Certification
Multiple aircraft types, models,and configurationsCost-benefit Weight / Space / PowerDrag and performanceSafety of flight / personnel safetySystem reliability
SupportabilityReliabilityMaintainabilityTraining
Test and EvaluationModeling & SimulationHardware in the LoopFlight TestingOperational Testing
Technology Protection Measures/ Security Management ConcernsNational Air Space Integration for Emergency Notification SystemCriteria for Potential Deployment Options (Civil Reserve Air Fleet; Overseas; Regional)
Life Cycle Cost Analysis
Concept of Operations
Program Faces Technical and Programmatic Challenges Ranging From Aircraft Structural Impacts
and Technology Protection to Supportability Costs
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Interagency and Stakeholder Interaction
DHSCounter-MANPADS
SPO
Requir
emen
ts, $,
Dire
ction
Design
and P
erform
ance
Commitment
Operational Requirements
Feedback
CommercialAviation
Community
SD&DContractors
Operational Insight
Aircraft Protection
DoS
DoD FAA TSA
International Aviation Community
FAM
FBI
Department of Defense Federal Aviation Administration Transportation Security Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Air Marshall Service
Department of State
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CONOPS: Detect and Counter-MANPADS
MANPADSMANPADS
Threat Limit
$$
Autonomous – No action required by aircrew
Missile Warning System (MWS)
Laser-Based Countermeasure
Provides protection for Commercial Aircraft againstMANPADS During Low Altitude Flight
• Counters Multiple, Simultaneous Threats
• Performs Emergency Ground Notification (EGN) and Cockpit Alert
• Minimizes Impact on Airline Operations
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Aircraft InstallationDesign Approaches
BAE Systems - Locates most system components inside the aircraft, with MWS and PTH external to aircraft
Northrop Grumman Corporation - Locates most system components are within the external pod, with MWS and PTH external to pod
Program involves two distinct design approaches that meet systeminstallation requirements
A300A310A318-A321A330A340
B727B737B747
B757B767B777
DC-9/10MD-10/11MD-80MD-90/95L1011
Phase II Aircraft List
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Counter-MANPADS Suite: Northrop-GrummanFlight Deck
Indicator Unit for Emergency
Ground Notification
Pod with IRCM Equipment Set
Universal Aircraft Mounting Scheme Computational Fluid
Dynamics to Optimize Aerodynamics
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation
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ITAR Compliance ApproachBoth Contractors (BAE and NGC) configured their Counter-MANPADS designs to separate the defense article from the structural supports and integration components
A-kit: primarily common structural materials and components to supportinterface for the DIRCM system to the aircraft
o Developed specifically for commercial aircraft
o Manage A-Kit as Commodity Jurisdiction
B-kit: defense article/DIRCM system (pointer-tracker head, sensors, and laser)o B-Kit Managed as USML
o Developing Security Management Plans to reflect
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Installation Progress Report
A-kit structural and electrical provisions are in placeB-kit fit checks completeCompany flight tests are in progressConduct FAA flight tests (Oct-Nov)
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Counter-MANPADS Phase II Master Schedule
CDR – Critical Design Review FAA – Federal Aviation Administration HITL – Hardware-In-The-Loop H/W – Hardware SPO – Special Program Office STC – Supplemental Type Certificate S/W – Software
J A S O N D
2004 2005
Hardware /Software Development
H/W Fabrication S/W Coding
Installation Kit
System Design
H/W and S/W Build
J F M A M J J A S O N D J
Aircraft Installation and Integration
H/W Install
Environmental Testing (Airworthiness/Performance)Environmental Testing
Flight Test
FAA Certification Ground and Flight Test
Counter-measure Effectiveness Testing
FAA Ground
Contractor HITL SPO HITL
FAA Flight
2006
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Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability Reduction
Programs to Reduce Susceptibility/VulnerabilityAircraft signature measurements
Hardware in-the-loop testing
Signature reduction (landing lights/auxiliary power unit)
Pilot vision protection
Aircraft structural hardening
Thrust-only control / propulsion controlled aircraft
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Aircraft Susceptibility and Vulnerability ReductionPropulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery (PCAR)
PCAR Project Objective is to develop and demonstrate propulsion control technology for improved airliner security and safety
Throttle Only Control (Manual)
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft
Provide pilots with the ability to safely land an aircraft that has lost use of aerodynamic control surfaces
Software changes to existing systems; no added hardware
Focus on Existing Fleet
Threat independent solutions to increase commercial aircraft survivability
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Laser Vulnerability Analysis/Tech Demonstration
Measure actual COTS laser effects at cockpit
Evaluate Laser CountermeasuresEffectivenessHuman Factors
Evaluate supportability and cost impact to airlines
Evaluate ITAR considerations
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Sabotage CountermeasuresAddresses Chemical, Biological, and Explosive (CBE) threats onboard aircraft
Emphasizes materials likely to elude screening and greatest potential to do harm
Intelligence indicates greater terrorist interest, activity, and investment in chemical/biological weapons –particularly biological:
Chemical/Biological threats can be small
With biological agents, the victim may be contagious
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Sabotage Countermeasures (continued)
Desired Capability BenefitDetect/identify/contain chemical, biological, or explosive material onboard aircraft
Situational awareness to mitigate threats
Warn crew and passengers to take protective/precautionary measures
Knowledge of threat enables effective response
Neutralize the material Limit exposure
Record and communicate details of event to ground authorities
Reach back
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Sabotage Countermeasures Roadmap
Requirements Input to & Technology Deliveryfrom HSARPA
Requirements Definition
a priori Risk Assessment FAA
coordination on environmental
background
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
BAA, RFP
Chamber Test
Multiple Awards
Integrate Sensors
System Demo
Down Select
Supplemental Type Certificate
Operational Test
Initiate Spiral Development
Review of COTS/GOTS
detectors
Modeling & Simulation
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Commercial Aircraft Protection SummaryCounter-MANPADS is part of an overall DHS Aircraft Protection Strategy
Counter-MANPADS provides data on:Performance Cost-benefit trade-offsSupportability planTotal ownership cost
Laser vulnerability assessment underway
Other vulnerability work in progress
Developing a sabotage countermeasures roadmap
FAA-certified prototypes for test and integration are required