Understanding "Red Forest" - The 3-Tier ESAE and Alternative Ways to Protect Privileged Credentials

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Transcript of Understanding "Red Forest" - The 3-Tier ESAE and Alternative Ways to Protect Privileged Credentials

Sponsored byUnderstanding “Red Forest”: The 3-Tier Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) and Alternative Ways to Protect

Privileged Credentials

© 2017 Monterey Technology Group Inc.

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Preview of key points

Very important concepts PtH Logon types are not created equal Security dependencies Clean source

The problem with AD Forests

The 3-tier AD security zone design

Deploying Tier 0 in a “red” forest

Completing the Enhanced Security Administrative Environment

Beyond How far does ESAE get you? Alternatives and gaps Privilege management

Pass-the-hash

To view this webcast: https://www.quest.com/webcast-ondemand/understanding-red-forest-the-3tier-enhanced-security-admin-environment8121798/

And related to credential artifact theft

Randy Smith/Quest Webinar: Deep Dive: Understanding Pass-the-Hash Attacks and How to Prevent https://www.quest.com/webcast-ondemand/-understanding-

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Logon types are not created equal

The difference between interactive and network logons

Same goes for other logon types

Interactivelogon

Networklogon

hash

hash

Security dependencies

Control relationships create security dependencies

Subject Controls Object

Security dependency

The problem with AD forests

Domains inside a forest are not security boundaries

The forest is the “security boundary”

A lot risks with admin accounts in the same forest they administer Privilege escalation Credential theft Control over each other No security zones

The 3-tier design

Tier 0 – Domain Admins

Tier 1 – Server Admins

Tier 2 – Workstation Admins

Tier isolation Accounts

Servers

Workstations

Logon types

Cross-restrictions

Deploying Tier 0 in a “red” forest

Tier Zero should be in a different forest

Production forest trusts red forest

No domain admin or similarly privileged accounts in production forest Except emergency access account – built-in Administrator

Red forest dedicated to simply holding Tier 0 accounts for administering production forest

Tier 0 accounts do not have privileged access to red forest

Accounts needed for that purpose might be consider Tier -1

The parts

Domain Admins

Administrators

Administrator

The parts trust

Domain Admins

Administrators

Administrator

Delegated Permissions

Domain Admins

Administrators

Administrator

The parts trust

Domain Admins

Administrators

Role B

Role A

Role C

Administrator

Domain Admins

Administrators

Administrator

Delegated Permissions

The parts trust

Interactive logon

Domain controller

Network logon

Completing the Enhanced Security Administrative Environment

Identifying who needs what

Classification into tiers

Creating roles

Cleaning up old accounts

Quest Enterprise Reporter

Training

Privileged Administrative Workstations

Beyond How far does ESAE get you?

Alternatives and gaps

Privilege management

How far does ESAE get you?

Manages risk for Active Directory Windows OS

Doesn’t address Many applications aren't compatible with being administered

by accounts from an external forest using a standard trust UNIX/Linux Devices

Alternatives and gaps

ESAE doesn’t stop with a red forest Tier 1 should be secured with a privilege management solution

Check out Quest PAM/PSM solutions

2 factor authentication MS assumes smart cards But one time password has significant advantages

Quest Defender

Alternative: proxy technology Active Roles GPO Admin

Bottom line

Really need to understand security dependencies

Identify control relationships

Implementing ESAE Need good reporting

How best to address them Red forest is one way to address those risks in AD and Windows Privileged Account and Session Management Solutions

Go beyond AD and Windows

Proxy technologies provide a compelling alternative or compliment to isolated red forest

Understand the limitations of smart cards and the advantages of OTP

Check out Quest

© 2017 Monterey Technology Group Inc.

“Red Forest”Bryan Patton, CISSP

Identify who is doing what

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Executive Order 13636 issued February 12, 2013NIST Framework

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Identify applications on assets that require administrative rights

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What are some privileged accounts in an environment?Identify Privileged Accounts

• Domain Admins• Enterprise Admins• Local Administrators• SA• Helpdesk• OU Admins• Service Accounts• Unknown

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Identification of known Privileged Accounts

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Identification of unknown Privileged Accounts

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Identification of Privileges on computer accounts

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Identification of third party software on DC’s

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Identification of what accounts are doing

Protection

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Changes to Active Directory via proxy

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Protect Active Directory- Enforce Least Privilege Access

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Protect Workstations- Enforce Least Privilege Access

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Protect hardware- block USB

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Protect- Implement Group Policy

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Protect- Workflow Approval Process

Request Review Approve Commit

ImmediateSchedule

EmailApprove?

Approve

Deny

ViewDetails

Rejection

CommentsEmail

Approve?

Approve

Deny

ViewDetails

Rejection

CommentsEmail

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Protect- Prevent “Privileged Users” from performing actions

Detect

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Detect- What can we do?

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Detect- GPO Changes outside of version control system

Respond

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Respond- Quickly search to identify relationships

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Respond- Changes through Active Roles

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Respond- Changes outside of Active Roles

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Pre and post actions enable users to execute custom scripts before or after a GPOADmin action to facilitate integration with internal processes and systems.

Respond after making a change to a GPO

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Respond- use data to change what accounts are allowed to do

Recover

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Recovery Active Directory from attribute to Forest level

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Recovery a GPO to a specific version