Post on 04-Dec-2014
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Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
Case Study:Contemporary UK Counter-
terrorism – Strategy, judicial review,
and review of police powers Dr Paul Norman
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Session Aims To examine the development of
contemporary UK counter-terrorism strategy Drivers Legislative development Government machinery
To consider the effect of the judiciary in reviewing legislation / police powers
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UK experience - Northern Ireland – “de-escalation”
(secret) political dialogue; N.I. Peace Process; agreement on power-sharing
26 March, 2007
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Northern Ireland: securityExceptional police powers and
judicial process Armed police Special units (allegations of “shoot to kill”) Diplock Courts (no jury)
Military and Security Services British Military Intelligence Security Service – lead on intelligence
Temporary counter terrorism legislation Emergency Powers Act (NI) Prevention of Terrorism Act
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Developing Islamist threat – ‘new terrorism’
Development of mass casualty ‘international terrorism’ World Trade Centre, 1993 Luxor massacre, 1997 USA Embassy bombings in Africa,
1998 GIA [‘Armed Islamic Group’] and
Algerian civil war
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Review of UK Counter-terrorism strategy, 1998
Terrorism Act 2000 Made UK counter-terrorism legislation
permanent Detention extended up to 7 days Proscription extended to international
terrorist groups (i.e. al Qaeda) Wider ‘stop and search’ powers
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Further post-9/11 review
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Expanded Terrorism Act 2000 Funding of terrorism (UN Convention) Indefinite detention of non-UK
suspects (Part IV) – derogation from ECHR (Art. 5)
► ► enhanced powers but lack of overall strategy
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UK counter-terror strategy?
Home Secretary has overall responsibility, scope too narrow
Military CT operations in Afghanistan 9/11 ‘critical infrastructure’ insecure
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UK counter-terror strategy?Home Secretary has overall
responsibility, scope too narrow Military CT operations in Afghanistan 9/11 ‘critical infrastructure’
insecure
Coordination with Foreign Office Tasking/support of Ministry of Defence Local authorities / utilities / atomic
facilities
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UK counter-terrorism - current
Home Secretary
Ministerial Committee on
Terrorism
International terrorism
Resilience
Cabinet Office FCO MoD
MI5 MI6 Police
Intelligence and Security
Coordinator, July 2002
UK Counter-terrorism Strategy
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Assessing the Threat - Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)
The international terrorist threat to the UK has evolved considerably since 2001. There has been a significant increase in the number of people involved in Islamist extremism. Al Qaida continues to pose the foremost international terrorist threat and the most significant long-term threat to the UK. It has developed increasingly sophisticated methods, in particular using the Internet and videos/DVDs, to promote its propaganda which has helped to spread extremist ideologies and techniques to a worldwide audience. However, a more diverse threat picture is emerging. Al Qaida's affiliates and allies across the world pose an increasing threat to the UK and to UK interests in their regions. There is also an underlying, unpredictable threat from people who are inspired, but not trained or directed, by Al Qaida.
JTAC created in 2003 to coordinate all terrorism-related intelligence
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre.html
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The UK’s Terrorism Plots
Guardian (2009) www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2009/apr/29/alqaida2
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UK Counter-terrorism StrategyPriorities Understanding causes /
motivation Identify trends / developments Prepare for attacks
Identify risk, reduce threat and vulnerability
reduced risk
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UK Counter-terrorism Strategy
CONTEST – approved 2003, revised 2009; ‘refreshed’ in 2011. Four strands: Prevent Pursue Protect Prepare
Downing Street Presentation (2009) www.youtube.com/user/DowningSt#p/u/112/mTMS7IqikL41.45/13.24
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CONTEST: “Prevent” Stopping attacks Averting prospective attacks – ‘next
generation’ UK Govt. – Muslim Council dialogue /
community leadershipPreventing “radicalisation”
Tackling “drivers” to recruitment – Middle East Peace Process, good governance, counter-terrorism capacity-building abroad
International diplomatic action
reference only
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CONTEST: “Pursue”Security: Main focus of current efforts Current terrorists Financing of terrorism Immigration and asylum controls Legislative development
Costs? 2001 £1 billion2008 £2.5 billion2010/11 £3.5 billion
projectedHMG (2008). UK National Security Strategy, p.5
reference only
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CONTEST: “Protect”
Target hardening National ‘Critical National
Infrastructure’ (10 key sectors – telecoms, energy, transport
etc.). embracing wide range of Govt. Departments + 50 private companies
International Aviation and maritime security
reference only
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CONTEST: “Prepare”Dealing with consequences (inevitable) Effective ‘first responders’ – blue light
services (others?) Maintenance of essential services
whilst under attack National disaster management, CBRN –
detect, deal with mass infections, mass casualties, evacuation, restore services
National Resilience
reference only
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andCriminal Offences
Use of Police Powers
Countering Financing
Criminal Offences
UK Mainland
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Up to 10 years imprisonment for:• Membership• Inviting support• Arranging / addressing a meeting in
support
Up to 6 months imprisonment for:• Wearing an item of clothing or
display an article in a public place to suggest membership
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• Possessing articles for the purpose of terrorism
• Inciting terrorist acts• Seeking or providing training for terrorist
purposes at home or overseas• Providing instruction or training in the use
of firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
• Acts preparatory to terrorism• Encouragement to terrorism• Dissemination of terrorist publications• Terrorist training offences
Criminal Offences
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Extended to 7 days by Terrorism Act 2000
• to 14 days by CJ Act 2003• to 28 days by Terrorism Act 2006
Government proposal for 90 days rejected in 2005. Extension to 42 days as a “reserve power”
to 14 days? – Coalition Review
Detention of Suspects (before charge)
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From:Detention without
Trial ACTSA 2001 A v Home Secretary
(2005)
To:Control Orders
POTA 2005
Detention without Trial
Detention without Trial – Control Orders
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Use of Control Orders imposed on those that the Home Secretary has:
‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity’ TA 2005, s.2(1)a
individual discretion, based upon evidence/data that generate the suspicion, in climate of uncertainty, with potential catastrophic consequences
Detention without Trial – Control Orders
Detention without Trial – Control Orders
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Use of Control Orders
Total: 48 people (most less than 2 years)
28 foreign nationals 2 for more than 4 years, subsequently
revoked 10 others, subsequently deported
7 have abscondedCurrently: 8 people (all UK nationals).
HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers. Cm 8004
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Alternative ‘justice’ system
Control, restriction of liberty: No evidence, or Evidence that cannot be publicly
presented (or therefore tested) in court Leads to the need for pre-emptive action via the:
(closed) Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), with vetted advocates
reasons unknown, evidence unknown
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The contemporary relevance
‘We will urgently review Control Orders, as part of a wider review of counter-terrorist legislation, measures and programmes. We will seek to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court’
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOm17KH1SKc 4.41
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1. Unsafe. Dangerous terrorists should not be in their living rooms but convicted and imprisoned. A genuine terrorist can easily remove plastic tags and disappear, as some controlees have.
2. Unfair. Innocent people should not be subjected to years and years of punishment without trial. Control orders place dehumanizing sanctions on people based on suspicion rather than evidence.
3. Against the British traditions of justice and liberty. They undermine the presumption of innocence,… right to a fair trial.
4. There are alternatives to control orders... Liberty urges the government to use criminal law and the courts to lock up …terrorists, and to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.
Liberty: “Our objections to Control Orders”
www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/terrorism/control-orders/
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Conclusion: organisational breadth and resources
Comprehensive national police, intelligence agency and overseas military strategy
Government, other Public agencies, Private companies offences gradually defined in the broadest, and most imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in preparation’
Dramatic increase in resource human, technical, military, border security
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Conclusion: precautious, precautionary, & pre-emptive social control
Uncertainty, leading to extreme pre-emptive measurespreventative detention, control
Legal precision is a hindrance offences gradually defined in the broadest, and most imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in preparation’ From knowledge equals power, to lack of knowledge equals increased executive power
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Conclusion: Coalition ‘review findings and recommendations’ for Control Orders
From ‘suspect’, to ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ Time limited preventative control; more ‘flexibility’; ‘restrictions should facilitate surveillance’
Continuing legal duty on police to gather evidence No substantive changes to breadth, and imprecision of ‘any conduct in preparation’. - SIAC to be subject to later review of ‘sensitive material in judicial proceeding’
HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers. Cm 8004