Post on 17-Jun-2018
SPEA UNDERGRADUATE HONORS THESIS
Transboundary Water Conflict
The US-Mexican Case Along the Rio Grande
Jesse I. Martinez Spring 2013
Faculty Mentor John Karaagac
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SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT: THE U.S.-MEXICAN
CASE ALONG THE RIO GRANDE
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELORS OF SCIENCE IN
POLICY ANALYSIS
BY
JESSE I. MARTINEZ
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA
APRIL 2013
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Abstract
Although 70% of the surface of the Earth is covered by water, 97.5% of it is saltwater. Saltwater
requires a difficult, expensive, and altogether impractical desalinization process to become usable. This
leaves 2.5% of the Earth’s water that is actually consumable. Physical limitations on consumable water
foreshadow intense competition for a resource neither producible nor substitutable.
When World Bank Vice President Ismail Seregeldin stated, “the wars of the next century will be
about water,” he expressed a point of view including assumptions regarding the ability of states to engage
in cooperation or conflict. Seregeldin’s prediction is clearly not without merit. However, it is only one
theory within a broad field of international relations known as hydropolitics that attempts to understand,
explain, and predict the role of water in state decision-making and how national choices to secure water
resources affect the global order. Hydropolitical relations are exacerbated in regions most vulnerable to
water scarcity such as the Mekong Delta in Asia, the Jordan River in the Middle East, the Nile River in
Africa to name a few.
North America presents a particularly interesting example of water relations. U.S.-Mexican
hydropolitics date as far back as the late 19th century when access to the Rio Grande was a contentious
issue along the Southwestern border of the United States. The Rio Grande continues to play an important
factor in transboundary water relations, a subset of hydropolitics, between the two states.
This paper will incorporate hydropolitical literature regarding conflict to infer whether U.S.-
Mexican transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande exhibit escalating conflict, cooperation, or
“eternal conflict,” conflict that will remain static throughout time. The analysis will distinguish the
international and domestic stakeholders of each country to understand who is affected at each level, what
their motivations include, and finally, what policy dimensions the literature suggests are achievable.
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ABSTRACT 0
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 2
Hydropolitics and Water Scarcity: Limited Supply for Unlimited Demand 2
Literature Review: Contextualizing Transboundary Water Relations 3 Theory #1: Conflict as a result of Scarcity 3 Theory #2: Cooperation as a result of Scarcity 4 Theory #3: Conflict & Cooperation as a result of Scarcity 5
The Spectrum of Conflict Analysis: From ‘Water Wars’ to ‘Water Interaction’ 7
SECTION 2: U.S.-MEXICAN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RELATIONS 8
Past to Present 8
Problem Identification: Conflict along the Rio Grande 10
SECTION 3: CONFLICT ALONG THE RIO GRANDE 11
The Unit of Analysis 12 The International Boundary & Water Commission 12
The Dimensions of Conflict 13 Citizen Sensitivity 13 Issue-linkage Strategy 14
SECTION 4: REEVALUATING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S.-MEXICAN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RELATIONS 17
Pre-TWINS Framework 17
The Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus 17 Conclusion 19
APPENDIX 20
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Section 1: Introduction
Hydropolitics and Water Scarcity: Limited Supply for Unlimited Demand
Earth is endowed with a finite amount of freshwater which today is under greater strain
as exponential population growth leaves less water for more people. Consequentially, wealthy
and developing countries alike turn to the sea to harvest otherwise unusable saltwater into
potable freshwater via desalination technology hoping to mitigate water shortages. The
desalination process, however, is expensive, environmentally destructive, and an altogether
impractical panacea to solve the problem. Thus, water scarcity foreshadows competition between
states and nations for access to an irreproducible and unsubstitutable resource. When we talk
about water scarcity, we inevitably talk about water conflict.
Hydropolitics, defined as the “politics of water,”1 is a new academic endeavor that
analyzes the intricacies associated with water scarcity. It is by nature interdisciplinary and
incorporates fields including hydrology, international relations, international law, and philosophy
to understand the political dynamics between two or more water sharing states2. There exists a
plethora of definitions for “hydropolitics,” so for the purpose of this analysis, it is described as
“conflict and co-operation; involving states as the main actors; and taking place in shared
international river basins”3.
The hydropolitical research analyzed in this paper focuses on transboundary water
conflict, defined as conflict that arises between riparian states. Research on this conflict primarily
consists of case studies that analyze water scarcity within historically volatile states and regions.
1 Ariel Dinar et al., Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007), 154. 2 States that fall under this category are also referred to as riparians 3 Anthony Turton and Roland Henwood, eds., Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective (Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit, 2002), 15.
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Literature Review: Contextualizing Transboundary Water Relations
Theory #1: Conflict as a result of Scarcity
Thomas Homer-Dixon is among the first hydropolitical scholars to analyze the link
between resource scarcity and violent conflict. His research at the Trudeau Center for Peace and
Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto focused on the link between water scarcity and
acute transboundary conflict (Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex Ecological-Political
Systems 1995 and On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict 1999).
At the Trudeau Center, Homer-Dixon produced case studies that analyzed water scarcity in high-
stress regions including Pakistan, Haiti, and Mexico. In his 1994 case study, “Environmental
Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” he hypothesized that environmental
scarcity will inevitably lead to violent conflict (Figure 1). He posits that the nature of this
conflict will, “[tend] to be persistent, diffuse, and sub-national,” and that, “[i]ts frequency will
probably jump sharply in the next decades as scarcities rapidly worsen in many parts of the
world” 4.
The scenario hypothesized by Homer-Dixon is often sensationalized as the “water wars”
narrative. It suggests that as water scarcity continues to grow worse, regions with historically
poor relations will be tempted to resort to armed conflict in order to secure water resources.
Although Homer-Dixon cautioned against, “[slipping] into environmental determinism,”5 the
overemphasis his research places on violent conflict and the lack of credit6 given to the
institutional capability of transboundary states to mitigate conflict constrains the applicability of
his research.
4 Thomas Homer-Dixon F., “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
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Despite theoretical shortcomings, Homer-Dixon’s research is an invaluable first step to
understand hydropolitics. His work contextualizes the severity of water scarcity in high-stress
regions and represents a conceptual shift of understanding conflict. Subsequent hydropolitical
research, however, questions whether Homer-Dixon’s theory places too much significance on
instances of conflict without duly considering those of cooperation.
Theory #2: Cooperation as a result of Scarcity
Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe, and the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University
(OSU), mark a paradigm shift in hydropolitical conflict analysis. The OSU group, in
collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational, study the empirical relationship
between water scarcity and violent water conflict through data-intensive methods. One of their
biggest contributions, the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), was created “to
aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution”7 and adds depth
to hydropolitical analysis by exploring instances of water cooperation. Another contribution, the
“International Freshwater Treaties Database,” (IFTD), documents over 450 instances of
transboundary water-related agreements from 1820 – 2007 to distinguish the number of instances
of cooperation versus violent conflict. The TFDD and IFTD provide hydropolitical research
something it previously lacked: comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the frequency
of violent conflict versus cooperative arrangements.
The Basins at Risk Project (BAR), Yoffe’s dissertation under Wolf, similarly sought to,
“[provide] a quantitative, global scale exploration of the relationship between freshwater and
7 Aaron Wolf T., Lynette Silvia, and Jennifer Veilleux C., “Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database,” Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/.
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conflict,” and to infer, “whether…theories and claims hold true”8. Yoffe concludes her
dissertation by flatly debunking the “water wars” narrative: “International relations over shared
freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative. Although conflicts over water occurred,
violent conflict was rare and far outweighed by the number of international water agreements”9.
The OSU group use the TFDD and BAR projects to conclude that not only has freshwater
scarcity between states and nations rarely lead to armed conflict but has in fact historically lead
to cooperation10. The group highlight the institutional resiliency of transboundary states and
dispel the myth that water scarcity necessarily leads to acute conflict. While the TFDD and BAR
projects excel at recognizing the propensity of transboundary states to engage in cooperative
arrangements, they are ineffective tools to measure the level of genuine cooperation that exists
within these cooperative arrangements. By solely focusing on instances of cooperation without
modeling the level of cooperation, the TFDD and BAR projects bind hydropolitics into a bipolar
system of analysis where cooperation is sought as a means to an end.
Theory #3: Conflict & Cooperation as a result of Scarcity
Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi provide a profound expansion of the either-or
paradigm of conflict analysis that is poorly modeled by the previous two conceptual frameworks.
They argue that a framework that fails to identify the levels of conflict and cooperation between
transboundary states risks oversimplifying complex nuances within cooperative arrangements.
Zeitoun and Mirumachi propose renaming “transboundary water conflict” to
“transboundary water interaction” in order to move away from the “paradigm that any conflict is
8 Shira Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, Mark Giordano “Chapter 4 Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources” (PhD diss., Oregon State University, 2001), 65, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/basins_at_risk/bar/BAR_chapter4.pdf 9 Ibid. 122. 10 Ibid.
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‘bad’ and that all forms of cooperation are ‘good’”11. They further recommend utilizing a tool
developed by Mirumachi: the Transboundary Water Interaction NexuS (TWINS) matrix of
conflict and cooperation for a deeper assessment of hydropolitical relations (Figure 2). The
TWINS matrix models the levels of conflict and cooperation that exist within cooperative
agreements and helps untangle presumptive paradoxes of “cooperation versus conflict,” when
analyzing the hydropolitical behavior of states.
The use of a matrix to model hydropolitical dynamics between two states allows the user
to identity complex instances where conflict and cooperation may concurrently exist. The matrix
consists of 5 X 4 cells where the x-scale represents ‘cooperation intensity’ on a continuum
ranging from low to high and the y-scale represents ‘conflict intensity’ using the same
continuum. On the x-scale, the intensity of cooperation ranges from low “confrontation of issue,”
moving into “ad hoc,” “technical” “risk-averting,” forms of cooperation and culminating with
high “risk-taking” cooperation. On the y-scale, the intensity of conflict ranges from low “non-
politicized” conflict towards “politicized,” “securitized/ opportunitised,” and culminates with
high “violised” conflict intensity.
Zeitoun and Mirumachi are certainly not the first to realize the multifaceted complexities
present in transboundary water relations, however, they are the first who attempt to identify and
understand them via a framework. The superior ability of the matrix to model conflict and
cooperation reflects the matrix’s ability to categorize social, institutional, and political nuances
that exist between riparian relations.
The TWINS matrix is the new paradigm for transboundary water analysis. It corrects
transboundary water relation myopia that previously limited the scope of conflict analysis to a
11 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, “Transboundary Water Interaction I,” International Environmental Agreements 8 (3 September 2008): 297.
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bipolar conflict-or-cooperation versus conflict-and-cooperation perspective. More importantly,
the matrix allows critical analysis of current relations accepted as “cooperative” in order to re-
evaluate whether such arrangements are truly robust.
The Spectrum of Conflict Analysis: From ‘Water Wars’ to ‘Water Interaction’
I have outlined three theories of transboundary water conflict. Although by no means
exhaustive, these are the most prominent and well-established theories that explain water
scarcity, conflict, and cooperation. Here, these theories are grouped into a spectrum of conflict
analysis where the theories gain greater contextualization regarding the concept of conflict and
also gain the ability to incorporate institutional dynamics in order to understand transboundary
water relations.
In this first section, I introduced the concept of hydropolitics and remarked that when we
talk about water scarcity we invariably talk about water conflict. Next, I discussed three theories
of transboundary water conflict and classified them along a spectrum of conflict analysis. This
spectrum begins at the “water wars” narrative that speculates water scarcity will lead to acute
conflict within particularly volatile regions. The next theory highlights the historical tendency of
states to engage in cooperative agreements rather than resort to violent conflict. Finally, the last
theory suggests that transboundary water relations are best understood through the TWINS
matrix framework that simultaneously analyzes instances of both conflict and cooperation.
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Section 2: U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Water Relations
Past to Present
The Rio Grande spans 1,900 miles12 beginning in Colorado, traveling through New
Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border before it empties into the Gulf of Mexico. Riparian
relations along the Rio Grande date back to the sale of Mexican territory to the United States
following Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican-American War. The agricultural development and
successive economic boom during the late 19th century along the river made it clear that the river
would play an important dynamic in US-Mexican relations for decades to come.
Among the first instance of conflict along the Rio Grande occurred in 1895 when Mexico
protested that water diversions within the U.S. were affecting the flow at Mexico’s expense. To
settle the issue, the U.S. requested the legal opinion of Attorney General Judson Harmon.
Harmon’s decision, referred to as the “Harmon Doctrine,” ruled that the U.S. had “absolute
sovereignty” within its borders and had no obligation to curtail its water use. The U.S., as the
dominant country and upstream beneficiary of the Rio Grande, thus had the option to apply the
doctrine to all transboundary rivers between Mexico. Based on diplomatic and economic
dynamics beyond the scope of this analysis, however, Harmon’s legal opinion was largely
ignored. U.S.-Mexican transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande improved thereafter,
largely as a result of proactive engagements of cooperation between both countries.
In 1944, after several boundary treaties were created to delineate territory and access to
river basins between the U.S. and Mexico, the two countries signed one comprehensive “Water
12 U.S. Department of Interior, Geological Survey, Largest Rivers in the United States, by J.C. Kramer, open-file report, U.S. Geological Survey, pt. 87, serial 242 (Washington, DC, 1990).
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Treaty”13. The treaty united numerous individual treaties concerning the Rio Grande, the
Colorado, and the Tijuana rivers under one administrative agency: the International Boundary
and Water Commission. There is an incredible abundance of information regarding all three
rivers, however, this analysis focuses on the transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande.
The terms of water allocation and distribution specifically along the Rio Grande are explained by
Shlomi et al: “The U.S. is to receive one-third of the flow reaching the Rio Grande from
specified Mexican tributaries, provided that this is not to be less than 431,721,000 cubic meters
annually”14. Mexico receives the rest of the flows after accounting for the U.S. allowance.
Mexico allocates a larger proportion of water flows from the Rio Grande to the U.S. than it
receives; however, the U.S. similarly delivers a larger sum of water flow from the Colorado
River than it receives.
During the 1990s, an “extraordinary clause” was implemented to reflect the demographic
and environmental changes along the Rio Grande15. The clause allows Mexico to deliver less
water than its legal obligations in a five-year cycle but requires that it make up the deficit over
the next five years. Since the clause was instituted, Mexico has fulfilled its obligations only once
and is currently indebted to the United States. In the same year, the treaty was also amended to
“rehabilitate” the quality of the Rio Grande and reduce the salinity. Minute 28216 was established
to “control the salinity problem in the waters of the Lower Rio Grande”17.
The institutionalization of conflict along the Rio Grande through the IBWC has proved to
13 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 14 Ariel Dinar et al., Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007), 164. 15 Allie Alexis Umoff, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1944 U.S.-MEXICO WATER TREATY: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal, Volume 32, Number 1, Fall 2008, 69. 16 U.S. International Boundary and Water Commission, Report of the Principal Engineers Regarding the need to Rehabilitate the Saline Waters Disposal System for Control of the Salinity Problem in the Waters of the Lower Rio Grande, prepared by Principal Engineers, El Paso, TX, 1990. 17 Ibid.
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be a resilient method to address the violent consequences of water scarcity. Both nations
continue to work in unison to address concerns of water quality and quantity. The current
framework between the U.S. and Mexico is a useful system to alleviate conflict; however, it
would be counterproductive for future U.S.-Mexican hydropolitical relations to presume that all
measures undertaken by the IBWC, the primary instrument of cooperation, are solely responsible
for increasing the level of cooperation among the stakeholders between the two countries. The
analysis presented hereafter argues that hydropolitical relations between the U.S. and Mexico
along the Rio Grande are oversimplified and will use the TWINS matrix to demonstrate that
transboundary water relations exhibit particularly dynamic instances of transboundary conflict.
Problem Identification: Conflict along the Rio Grande
The majority of case studies that are the basis for hydropolitical theory occur in regions
where access to water is historically volatile such as the Mekong Delta, the Nile, and the Jordan
rivers. Thus, the aim of hydropolitical studies within these volatile regions has tended a) to
analyze the extent to which water scarcity could exacerbate existing riparian relations,
particularly militarily, and b) to devise a framework for cooperation that institutionalizes
cooperation between riparians in order to prevent or end conflict over water resources.
The case along the Rio Grande is different for several reasons. The most significant
difference is that the U.S. and Mexico have a very limited history of violent transboundary
aggressions and enjoy a relationship that is largely positive. Despite indications of high water
stress along the Rio Grande (Figure 3), the institutionalization of conflict via the IBWC
reinforces cooperation rather than division. In fact, Shlomi et al. refer to transboundary water
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relations between the U.S. and Mexico as “good, even if not perfect”18.
The purpose of analyzing the transboundary water relationship along the Rio Grande is to
explore the nuances that make the U.S.-Mexican relationship “not perfect.” The analysis of the
cooperative framework along the Rio Grande is oversimplified, overestimates the degree of
cooperation, and does not adequately consider unconventional sources of conflict. This reflects
two problems: the propensity to classify any form of cooperation as ‘good’ and the lack of
institutional capacity to adapt to demographic and geological change. This negatively affects the
ability of policy makers within the United States and Mexico to gauge problems and craft
effective solutions.
In this section, I provided a brief history of riparian relations between the U.S. and
Mexico. I argue that even though the U.S. and Mexico exhibit many characteristics of a
cooperative relationship, the current institutional arrangement oversimplifies cooperation, fails to
consider more dynamic features of institutional conflict, and as a result, is not sensitive enough
to identify problems that may exist between stakeholders along the Rio Grande. The next section
explores the complex sources of conflict and analyzes the main stakeholders behind U.S.-
Mexican riparian relations using the IBWC as the unit of analysis.
Section 3: Conflict along the Rio Grande
This section uses the institutional framework for cooperation, the IBWC, as the unit of
analysis to identify stakeholders who either ease or exacerbate conflict or cooperation along the
Rio Grande.
18 Dinar, Ariel, et al. "Hydropolitics and International Relations." Bridges over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2007. 68. Print.
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The Unit of Analysis
The International Boundary & Water Commission19
The establishment of the IBWC in 1944 created a bilateral, territory-delineating agency
tasked to, “[apply] the boundary and water treaties between the U.S. and Mexico,” and to
“[settle] differences that may arise in their application”20. The commission derives its legal
mandate from the Water Treaty and has historically focused on the technical aspects of
transboundary water management. As a bilateral international body, its authority and jurisdiction
supersedes national law. This allows the IBWC to ideally operate outside of regional political or
cultural dynamics that may otherwise hamper the agency’s effectiveness.
The IBWC is composed of both a U.S. and Mexican section. The U.S. headquarters are
located in El Paso, Texas and the Mexican section in Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. The head
commissioners of each country are referred to as Engineer Commissioners and recommendations
for institutional change, known as ‘minutes’, require the approval of each respective government.
The IBWC primarily deals with technical issues of infrastructure, pollution, conservation, water
distribution, floor protection, and water quality standards along the Rio Grande, the Colorado,
and the Tijuana rivers. These functions can be broken up into three categories21: liaison,
adjudication, and administration functions, as demonstrated in Table 1.
The IBWC has gained a positive reputation for its, “technical efficiency, procedural
19 The United States of America. The State Department. The International Boundary and Water Commission. The History of the International Boundary and Water Commission. The International Boundary and Water Commission, n.d. Web. 20 Ibid. 21 Stephen Mumme, “U.S.-Mexican Groundwater Problems: Bilateral Prospects and Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 22, no. 2 (1980): 31.
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conservatism, and diplomatic skill,”22 and is largely portrayed as a model for transforming
transboundary water conflict into cooperation. The Commission has cultivated a reputation of
conservative institutional change within the IBWC, due to its “jurisdiction and functions [being]
narrowly conceived and carefully defined so as not to conflict with those of domestic agencies in
each conflict”23.
As the foremost authority on transboundary river management, it is expected to address
and mitigate the impending consequences of population growth and increasing water stress along
the Rio Grande. Yet demographic and geological changes along the Rio Grande today pose
immense challenges for the conservative institutional capacity of the IBWC. The next section
demonstrates that despite its reputation the commission may not possess the institutional
capability to adapt to demographic and geographic changes along the Rio Grande.
The Dimensions of Conflict
Citizen Sensitivity
Citizens affected by water scarcity along the Rio Grande exemplify significant defects of
the current cooperative arrangement. Citizens face an institutional framework that has failed to
modernize water management techniques and that continues to overlook public participation.
These deficiencies show that although the IBWC successfully internalizes violent conflict and
other major instances of transboundary volatility it has failed to adopt changes that are receptive
to the new demographic and geological status quo along the Rio Grande.
In Tamaulipas, Mexico, citizens are forced to cope with severe freshwater constraints.
22 Mumme, Stephen. “Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico.” Natural Resources Journal 33 (1993): 93-119. 23 Ibid.
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Matamoros, Tamaulipas, the last city along the Rio Grande before it empties into the Gulf of
Mexico, surprisingly saw their river run dry June 2000. Indeed, hydrological modeling of this
region suggests that Tamaulipas will continue to experience severe droughts that constrain the
availability of freshwater to the city (Figure 4).
This region requires exceptional changes to its water management system, which the
current cooperative arrangement fails to provide, in order to adapt to a consistently arid Rio
Grande. Currently, the IBWC focuses its attention on supply-side water allocation practices and
increasing the availability of water resources. Casey Walsh, anthropologist at the University of
California at Santa Barbara, explains the new paradigm of demand-side water management in
one of the Mexico’s most water scarce states. Tamaulipas first began to experiment with a
decentralized water management approach in 2008, instituting the Programa Cultura del Agua
(PCA) or the “Water Culture Program.” This program, initiated by the municipal Junta de Agua
y Drenaje (The Water and Drainage Council), is crafted to “work through the public schools to
teach children to value, monitor, and enforce water efficiency.24” Although highly altruistic, the
program underscores the dire need of water management institutions to influence new sets of
behaviors that the IBWC has been unable to foster.
The IBWC rarely engages in proactive instances of water management. It is difficult to
imagine the commission crafting a minute designed to change the institutional focus of the
agency from water allocation to water conservation. Unfortunately, this is precisely the focus
that many of states along the Rio Grande (Figure 3) require.
Issue-linkage Strategy
Issue-linkage is a diplomatic strategy that allows states to “make concessions on issues
24 Casey Walsh, “Managing Urban Water Demand in Neoliberal Northern Mexico,” Human Organization 70, no. 1 (2011): 54-62.
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they care little about in exchange for gains on matters that are of greater political or economic
importance to them”25. Itay Fischendler’s analysis explains, however, that the use of this strategy
within transboundary water relations may prove difficult to maintain due to the “inherent
uncertainty” associated with natural resources such as water. The consequences of issue-linkage
include short and long-term instances of conflict between the U.S. and Mexico. Long-term
consequences are paid particular attention as they reflect conflict that is endemic within the
cooperative arrangement between the U.S. and Mexico and may be modeled using the TWINS
matrix.
The linkage strategy was adopted during the early 20th century as a way to expedite past
diplomatic deficiencies between both countries. Mexico, worrying that the U.S. as the upstream
riparian would limit the flow of the Colorado in the future, sought to establish a cooperative
arrangement to link the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers. Mexico’s goal was to produce a
mutually desirable allocative outcome: Mexico would allot greater flows of the Rio Grande to
the U.S. in exchange for greater flows from the U.S. along the Colorado. Further, in exchange for
linking the rivers together, Mexico agreed to back the establishment of the U.N. The U.S.,
engaged in a ‘Good Neighbor’ foreign policy during this period, stood to gain greater
international prestige.
Transboundary water relations have benefited from a “stable and reciprocal regime that is
difficult to overturn,”26 and that institutionalizes cooperation to prevent conflict, however, the
linkage strategy has also undermined the framework’s overall efficacy and has concealed
25 Itay Fischendler “The Short-Term and Long-Term Ramifications of Linkages Involving Natural Resources; the US - Mexico Transboundary Water Case,”Environmental and Planning C: Government and Policy 22 (2004): 633-50. 26 Ibid.
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instances of institutional conflict. Changes along the Rio Grande have increased the
unpredictability of conditions that the linkage strategy relies upon to satisfy the stakeholders.
The problems of the issue-linkage strategy are illustrated by the short and long-term
consequences that the strategy is responsible for harboring. The short-term consequences,
described by Fischendler as “delays in [related] negotiations, engendering domestic
opposition…on the basis of alleged threats to sovereignty from linked water sources,”27 are
instances of historic conflict that reflect the practical difficulty of using one institution for three
river basins. The long-term consequences highlight the current problems that the cooperative
arrangement struggles to mitigate. These problems include what Fischendler terms “managerial
legacies.” The first legacy deals with the problem of the water trade off between the Rio Grande
and the Colorado. Fischendler notes that the current trade off between both rivers reflects, “an
agreement concluded during a period characterized by a low level of development along the Rio
Grande and high water flows,”28. Since then, demographic and geological conditions have vastly
changed and the ability of Mexico complying with its water obligations is no longer the case.
The second managerial legacy of the linkage strategy reflects fundamentally entrenched
conflict created at the onset of the linkage strategy. As Fischendler describes, “…neither nation
has an incentive to renegotiate the treaty in order to adapt the linkage to new hydrological
conditions, because so many issues that were once contentious could be reopened,”29.
Renegotiation of the treaty is out of the question unless both countries are willing to risk
destabilizing their relative gains along both rivers. Thus, the strategy of linking the Colorado
and Rio Grande represents a complex dilemma that pits political constraints against necessary
solutions.
27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.
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Section 4: Reevaluating Transboundary Water Conflict:
Implications for Future U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Water
Relations
Pre-TWINS Framework
Prior to the TWINS Matrix, hydropolitical literature primarily focused on the link
between either conflict or cooperation that resulted from water scarcity. Homer-Dixon’s research
emphasizes the role of scarcity as a catalyst for institutional, political, and societal conflict and
theorizes that the instability will stoke acute wars to secure such a vital resource. He
contextualizes this violent premise, however, by maintaining that it is only likely to occur in
regions where political volatility is the historic norm. The U.S. and Mexico have no such history.
Wolf, Yoffe and the OSU group are largely credited with debunking the “water wars”
narrative. Based on the TFDD, the IFTD and the BAR projects, Wolf et al. theorize that
problems of transboundary water scarcity will be mitigated through cooperative arrangements.
Here, cooperation is understood to be constructive and leading to facilitation of even greater
degrees of cooperation. One of the main drawbacks of analyzing transboundary water relations
through this framework is the binary classification of cooperation as good and conflict as bad.
The databases established by the OSU group fail to adequately identify nonconventional
instances of institutional conflict and limit the framework’s applicability along the Rio Grande.
The Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus
The TWINS Matrix is best at identifying instances of “cooperation that is not pretty.”
Here, Zeitoun and Mirumachi move away from the old paradigm that “international agreements
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are generally seen as the pinnacle of cooperation,”30 and establish a framework designed to
gauge the levels of conflict and cooperation within an institutional framework. Both authors
further note that “some conflict” may even be a necessary prerequisite for “real” cooperation31.
The issue of institutional insensitivity to the water management needs of citizens along
the Rio Grande highlights Zeitoun and Mirumachi’s point that, “aspects of cooperation- such as
treaties, river basin organizations or regimes – may reinforce [conflict],”32. The changing nature
of the Rio Grande demands rapid and proactive solutions in order to effectively mitigate the new
geographic status quo. It is not clear that the IBWC can simultaneously focus on water allocation
and water conservation.
The legacy of the issue-linkage strategy highlights one of the most severe instances of
conflict within a cooperative framework. It is clear that linking the Rio Grande to the two other
rivers may have been a favorable action when the population along the rivers was relatively light.
The acceleration of economic activity and the swell of the population along the Rio Grande
should have been taken into consideration when all three rivers were linked, however, this was
not the case. As a result, the very essence of the 1944 Water Treaty is built on shaky ground.
Opening up the treaty for renegotiation is hard to imagine, as both nations would choose to
reformat previous conditions that are no longer political or economically convenient. Thus, the
institutional framework designed to facilitate cooperation between both countries now runs the
risk of institutionalizing conflict.
Transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande represent complex instances of
conflict and cooperation. The TWINS matrix analyzes these dynamics in order to determine the
30 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, “Transboundary Water Interaction I,” International Environmental Agreements 8 (3 September 2008): 297. 31 Ibid 32 Ibid.
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levels of conflict or cooperation that exist within the arrangement and to determine the
institutional resiliency that is or is not present. The significance of the levels of conflict or
cooperation described by the matrix is that it allows more accurate assessment of problems and
forces users of the matrix to critically probe a relationship assumed to be cooperative.
Conclusion
Hydropolitical relations between the U.S. and Mexico are generally understood to enjoy
high degrees of cooperation. This analysis has demonstrated that the level of cooperation is much
more important and difficult to recognize than the mere presence of a cooperative framework. To
rephrase a quote from Yoffe,33 the mere presence of cooperation does not signify the absence of
conflict. In fact, in the case of transboundary water relations between the U.S. and Mexico, the
presence of cooperation may actually be facilitating conflict.
The primary instrument for conflict mitigation along the Rio Grande, the IBWC, has a
well established reputation. The commission’s technical efficiency, procedural conservatism, and
diplomatic skill are consistently referenced as the ideal institutional model for transforming
conflict into cooperation. This positive reputation may lead policy-makers without prior
knowledge of the institution’s dynamics to assume that the IBWC suffers little problems.
Demographic and geographic challenges today threaten to render the IBWC obsolete as it
struggles to react to rapid demographic and geological challenges.
33 “The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict.”
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Appendix
Figure 1: Thomas Homer-Dixon's "Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity"
Figure 2: TWINS Matrix
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Figure 4: Projected Change of Physical Risk to Quantity and Quality of Rio Grande in Tamaulipas, Mexico
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Table 1: Functions, Legal Derivatives, & Purpose of the IBWC Framework
Function Purpose Derives Legal Capacity From
Liaison Information Sharing Article 24 Section A, E, G
Adjudication Power to mediate problems brought forth by Engineer Commissioners
Article 24 Section D
Administration Tasks the IBWC with legal obligations and enforceability
Article 24 Section C
al., Ariel Dinar et. Bridges over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and
Cooperation. Vol. 3. 5 vols. Energy and Resource Economics, Edited by World Scientific. New Jersey: World Scientific 2007.
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