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The Ghost In The BrowserAnalysis of Web-based Malware

Niels ProvosDean McNamee

Panayiotis MavrommatisKe Wang

Nagendra Modadugu

Google Inc

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Overview

• Introduction

• Detecting Malicious Pages

• Content Control

• Malware Trends

• Conclusion

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Introduction

• Internet essential for everyday life: ecommerce, etc.

• Malware used to steal bank accounts or credit cards

• underground economy is very profitable

• Internet threats are changing:

• remote exploitation and firewalls are yesterday

• Browser is a complex computation environment

• Adversaries exploit browser to install malware

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Introduction

• To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server

• Very easy to set up new site on the Internet

• Very difficult to keep new site secure

• insecure infrastructure: Php, MySql, Apache

• insecure web applications: phpBB2, Invision, etc.

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Detecting Malicious Websites

• Malicious website automatically installs malware on visitor’s computer

• usually via exploits in the browser or other software on the client (without user consent)

• Using Google’s infrastructure to analyze several billion URLs.

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Detecting Malicious Websites

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Web PageRepository

MapReduceHeuristical URL Extraction

Virtual Machine

Internet Explorer

MonitorExecution Analysis

URL

Result

Malicious PageRepository

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Processing Rate• The VM gets about 300,000 suspicious URLs daily

• About 10,000 to 30,000 are malicious

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11-01 11-21 12-11 12-31 01-20 02-09 03-01 03-21Time

100

101

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Num

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f URL

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MaliciousInconclusiveHarmless

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Content Control

• what constitutes the content of a web page?

• authored content

• user-contributed content

• advertising

• third-party widgets

• ceding control to 3rd party could be a security risk

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Web Server Security

• compromise web server and change content directly

• many vulnerabilities in web applications, apache itself, stolen passwords

• templating system

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Advertising• by definition means ceding control of content to

another party

• web masters have to trust advertisers

• sub-syndication allows delegation of advertising space

• trust is not transitive

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Russia

USAPopular Web Site

advertisementAds

CompanyJavascript

Ads

Company

Javascript

Ads

CompanyJavascript

Ads

Company

Javascript

Exploit

Server

HTTP

Redirect

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Third-Party Widgets

• to make sites prettier or more useful:

• calendaring or stats counter

• search for praying mantis

• linked to free stats counter in 2002 via Javascript

• Javascript started to compromise users in 2006

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http://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?homepagehttp://expl.info/demo.phphttp://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?type=MS03-11&SP1http://expl.info/ms0311.jarhttp://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?exploit=MS03-11http://dist.info/f94mslrfum67dh/winus.exe

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Malware Trends and Statistics

• Avoiding detection

• obfuscating the exploit code itself

• distributing binaries across different domains

• continuously re-packing the binaries

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document.write(unescape("%3CHEAD%3E%0D%0A%3CSCRIPT%20LANGUAGE%3D%22Javascript%22%3E%0D%0A%3C%21--%0D%0A/*%20criptografado%20pelo%20Fal%20-%20Deboa%E7%E3o%20gr%E1tis%20para%20seu%20site%20renda%20extra%0D...3C/SCRIPT%3E%0D%0A%3C/HEAD%3E%0D%0A%3CBODY%3E%0D%0A%3C/BODY%3E%0D%0A%3C/HTML%3E%0D%0A"));//--></SCRIPT>

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Malware Classifications

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01-11

01-14

01-17

01-20

01-23

01-26

01-29

02-01

02-04

02-07

02-10

02-13

02-16

02-19

02-22

02-25

02-28

03-03

03-06

03-09

03-12

03-15

03-18

03-21

Date

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

Uniq

ue U

RLs

disc

over

ed

AdwareUnknownTrojan

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Remotely Linked Exploits• Exploits are leveraged across many sites

• Popular exploits are linked from over 10,000 URLS

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0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2001

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100

1000

10000

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f URL

s

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2001

10

100

1000

10000

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f hos

ts

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Discussion

• increase of web-based exploitation over time

• installed malware allows for remote control

• observed botnet like structures:

• pull-based: frequently checking for new commands

• observed user agents such as: DDoSBotLoader

• binary updates can be interpreted as command & control

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Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Conclusion

• Web-based malware is a real problem

• millions of potentially infected users

• Automatic detection of malicious web pages to secure web search results

• Identified four areas of content control

• Observed botnet-like structures

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