Post on 01-Mar-2021
Unternehmen BodenplatteThe Battle of the Airfields
Allied Intelligence Allied intelligence failed to detect the German intention. In
Ultra transcripts, there are only a few indications of what was happening on the other side of the front.
On 4 December 1944, II Jagdkorps had ordered stockpiling for navigational aids, such as "golden-rain" flares and smoke bombs. Allied intelligence made no written observations of this communication.
They also disregarded communications to Junkers Ju 88 groups regarding the use of flares when leading formations.
Intelligence concluded that these instructions were designed for a ground support mission rather than an interception operation. This was reasonable, but no indications of possible ground targets were given.
Codenames Varus: Indicating that the operation was "a go" and that it
would take place within 24 hours of the Varus order being given.
Teutonicus: Authority to brief the pilots and to arrange for the aircraft to be armed and ready at the edge of the airfield.
Auftrag Hermann 1.1 1945 Zeit 9.20 Uhr: Giving the exact date and time of the attack.
Dorothea: Indicating a delay in the attack.
Spätlese: Cancelling of the attack after formations are airborne.
Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)
Aircraft Type
Commanding Officer
Jagdgeschwader 1
Twenthe/Drope/Rheine Stab and I./II./III. Gruppe
Fw 190 and Bf 109
Herbert Ihlefeld
Jagdgeschwader 3
Sennelager/Paderborn/Bad Lippspringe/Gutersloh
Stab./I./II./III./IV. Gruppe
Fw 190 and Bf 109
Heinrich Bär
Jagdgeschwader 6
Quackenbruck/Delmenhorst/Vechta/Bissel
Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 and Bf 109
Johann Kogler
Jagdgeschwader 26
Furstenau/Furstenau/Nordhorn/Plantlunne
Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 and Bf 109
Josef Priller
Jagdgeschwader 27
Rheine/Rheine/Hopsten/Hesepe/Achmer
Stab./I./II./III./IV.
Bf 109 N/A - only III and IV Gruppe took part.
Jagdgeschwader 54
Furstenau/Vorden III./IV. Fw 190 and Bf 109
Siegfried Freytag
Jagdgeschwader 77
Dortmund/Dortmund/Bonninghardt/Düsseldorf
Stab./I./II./III. Bf 109
II Jagdkorps (Dietrich Peltz)
3rd Jagddivision (3rd Fighter Division) (Walter Grabmann) at Wiedenbrück
Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)
Aircraft Type
Commanding Officer
Jagdgeschwader 2
Nidda/Merzhausen/Nidda/Altenstadt
Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190and Bf109
Kurt Bühligen
Jagdgeschwader 4
Rhein-Main/Darmstadt-Griesheim/Rhein-Main
Stab./I./II./III./IV.
GerhardMichalski
Jagdgeschwader 11
Biblis/Biblis/Zellhausen/Gross-Ostheim
Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190and Bf109
GüntherSpecht
Schlachtgeschwader 4
Bonn-Hangelar/Bonn-Hangelar/Koln-Butzweilerhod/Koln-Wahn
Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 AlfredDruschel
Jagdabschnittsführer Mittelrhein (Fighter Sector Leader Middle Rhine)
Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)
Aircraft Type
Commanding Officer
Jagdgeschwader53
Stuttgart-Echterdingen/Malmsheim/Kirrlach/Stuggart-Echterdingen
Stab./II./.III/.IV
Bf 109 HelmutBennemann
3rd Fliegerdivision (3rd Air Division)
Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)
Aircraft Type
Commanding Officer
Kampfgeschwader51
Rheine/Hopsten/Hesepe/Munster-Handorf
Stab./II./.III/.IV
Me 262 Wolfgang Schenck
Bf 109G and K series Fighters
FW 190 A series Fighter
FW 190 D series Fighter
Me 262 series Jet Fighter/Bomber
Ju 88 and 188 series Bomber/Night fighter
8.8cm Flak
2,0cm Flakvierling 38
Allied order of battleRAF No. 83 Group
Wing Number Squadron Numbers Aircraft Type Airfield
121 174/175/184 Typhoon Volkel
122 3/56/80/274/486 Tempest Volkel
124 137/181/182/247 Typhoon Eindhoven
126 401/402/411/412/442 Spitfire Ophoven
127 403/416 Spitfire Evre
143 168/438/439/440 Typhoon Eindhoven
39 Recce Wing 400/414/430 Spitfire Gilze-Rijen
RAF No. 84 Group
Wing Number Squadron Numbers
Aircraft Type Airfield
131 302/308/317 Spitfire St. Denis Westrem
132 66/127/322/331/332 Spitfire Woensdrecht
135 349/485 Spitfire Maldegem
145 341/74/329/345 Spitfire Deurne
146 193/197/257/263/266
Typhoon Deurne
35 Recce Wing 2/4/268 P-51 Mustang/Spitfire
Gilze-Rijen
RAF No. 2 GroupWing Number Squadron
NumbersAircraft Type Airfield
139 98/180/320 B-25 Mitchell Melsbroek
34 Recce Wing 16/69/140 Spitfire/Vickers Wellington/de Havilland Mosquito
Melsbroek
Spitfire Various Marks
Typhoon
Tempest
Mustang P51 Mk1
Bofors 40mm Autocannon
American Tactical Air ForcesNinth Air ForceFighter Group Squadrons Aircraft Type Commanding Officer
366 389/390/391 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Norman Holt
352 486/487/328 P-51 Mustang Colonel James Mayden
48 492/493/494 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James Johnson
36 22/23/53 P-47 Thunderbolt Lt Colonel Van H. Slayden
363 33 F-5 Lightning Colonel James Smelley
373 410/411/412 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James McGehee
365 386/387/388 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Ray Stecker
362 377/378/379 P-51 Mustang Colonel Joseph Laughlin
50 10/81/313 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Harvey Case
358 365/366/367 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James Tipton Laughlin
Mustang P51D
Thunderbolt P47 Series
Lightning P38
Maldegem, Ursel and St. Denijs Westrem
FW190 III/JG1
Maldegem, Ursel and St. Denijs Westrem
Units I, II, III./JG 1
Aircraft 71
Aircraft lost 29 = 41%Damaged unknown
Pilots killed or captured 25 = 35%
Sint-Truiden
Low Level High Speed Attack
Sint-Truiden
Units I, II, III./JG 2 and SG 4
Aircraft 144
Aircraft lost 46 = 32%
Damaged 12
Pilots killed or captured 23 = 16%
Volkel and Heesch
Volkel and Heesch
Units I, II, III./JG 6
Aircraft78
Aircraft lost 27 = 35%
Damaged 5
Pilots killed or captured 23 = 30%
Antwerp-Deurne and Woensdrecht
Antwerp-Deurne and Woensdrecht
Units I, II, III./JG 77
Aircraft59
Aircraft lost 11 = 19%
Damaged –
Pilots killed or captured 11 + 19%
Metz-Frescaty
Metz-Frescaty
Units Stab., II., III., IV./JG 53
Aircraft80
Aircraft lost 30 = 38%
Damaged 8
Pilots killed or captured 17 = 21%
Le Culot and Ophoven
Le Culot and Ophoven
Units I, II, III./JG 4
Aircraft 55–75
Aircraft lost 25–26 = 46 to 35%
Damaged ~ 6
Pilots killed or captured 17 = 31 to 23%
Asch
Asch (Y29)
Units Stab. I, II, III./JG 11
Aircraft 61
Aircraft lost 28 = 46%
Damaged unknown
Pilots killed or captured 24 = 39%
Brussels-Evere/Grimbergen
Lt Theo Nibel cops a Partridge right up his Annular Radiator
Brussels-Evere/Grimbergen
Units Stab., I, II, III./JG 26 and III./JG 54
Aircraft127
Aircraft lost 40 = 32%
Damaged unknown
Pilots killed or captured 30 = 24%
Brussels-Melsbroek
Brussels-Melsbroek
Units I, II, III./JG 27 and IV./JG 54
Aircraft 43
Aircraft lost 21 = 49%
Damaged 1
Pilots killed or captured 17 = 40%
Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven
Bombed Up Me 262
Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven
Units Stab. I., III., IV./JG 3 and KG 51
Aircraft81
Aircraft lost 15–16 = 20%
Damaged Unknown
Pilots killed or captured 15–16 = 20%
Possible V-2 Missile Launch Attempts
Results of raid The results of the raid are difficult to judge given the confusion over loss
records. It is likely more aircraft were destroyed than listed.
The Americans failed to keep a proper record of their losses and it appears the U.S. 8th Air Force losses were not included in loss totals. I
It is likely that the correct figures are 232 destroyed (143 single-engine, 74 twin-engine and 15 four-engine) and 156 damaged (139 single-engine, 12 twin-engine and five four-engine).
Researching individual squadron records confirms the destruction of even more USAAF aircraft. This suggests at least a further 16 B-17s, 14 B-24s, eight P-51s, and at least two P-47s were destroyed on top of that total.
A total of 290 destroyed and 180 damaged seems a more realistic summation than the conservative figures given by the USAAF, RAF, and RCAF. Including the 15 Allied aircraft shot down and 10 damaged in aerial combat, 305 destroyed and 190 damaged is the sum total of the attack.
Effect on the Luftwaffe The operation achieved tactical surprise, but it was undone by
poor execution due to low pilot skill resulting from poor training.
The operation failed to achieve its aim and that failure was very costly to German air power. Some of the units of the RAF, RCAF and USAAF on the receiving end of Bodenplatte had been badly hit, others not so badly, but most had sustained some losses.
The Germans, however, launched Bodenplatte under a set of conditions, such as poor planning and low pilot skill, which clearly indicated any advantage gained would be outweighed by possible losses.
Bodenplatte weakened the Jagdwaffe past any hope of rebuilding. General der Jagdflieger Adolf Galland said, "We sacrificed our last substance".
The Luftwaffe lost 143 pilots killed and missing, while 70 were captured and 21 wounded including three Geschwaderkommodore, five Gruppenkommandeure, and 14 Staffelkapitäne—the largest single-day loss for the Luftwaffe.
Many of the formation leaders lost were experienced veterans, which placed even more pressure on those who were left.
Thus, Bodenplatte was a very short-term success but a long-term failure. Allied losses were soon made up, while lost Luftwaffe aircraft and especially pilots were irreplaceable.
German historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that it left the Germans "weaker than ever and incapable of mounting any major attack again".
In the remaining 17 weeks of war the Jagdwaffe struggled to recover sufficiently from the 1 January operation to remain an effective force.
In strategic terms, German historian Werner Girbig wrote, "Operation Bodenplatte amounted to a total defeat".
The exhausted German units were no longer able to mount an effective defence of German air space during Operation Plunder and Operation Varsity, the Allied crossing of the Rhine River, or the overall Western Allied invasion of Germany.
Subsequent operations were insignificant as a whole, and could not challenge Allied air supremacy. The only service in the Luftwaffe capable of profitable sorties was the night fighter force.
In the last six weeks of the war the Luftwaffe was to lose another 200 pilots killed. Girbig wrote, "it was not until the autumn of 1944 that the German fighter forces set foot down the sacrificial path; and it was the controversial Operation Bodenplatte that dealt this force a mortal blow and sealed its fate. What happened from then on was no more than a dying flicker".
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