The Battle of the Airfieldsb4uc.xyz/resources2020/MH_20_1_06_bodenplatte.pdf · 2020. 3. 5. ·...

Post on 01-Mar-2021

12 views 0 download

Transcript of The Battle of the Airfieldsb4uc.xyz/resources2020/MH_20_1_06_bodenplatte.pdf · 2020. 3. 5. ·...

Unternehmen BodenplatteThe Battle of the Airfields

Allied Intelligence Allied intelligence failed to detect the German intention. In

Ultra transcripts, there are only a few indications of what was happening on the other side of the front.

On 4 December 1944, II Jagdkorps had ordered stockpiling for navigational aids, such as "golden-rain" flares and smoke bombs. Allied intelligence made no written observations of this communication.

They also disregarded communications to Junkers Ju 88 groups regarding the use of flares when leading formations.

Intelligence concluded that these instructions were designed for a ground support mission rather than an interception operation. This was reasonable, but no indications of possible ground targets were given.

Codenames Varus: Indicating that the operation was "a go" and that it

would take place within 24 hours of the Varus order being given.

Teutonicus: Authority to brief the pilots and to arrange for the aircraft to be armed and ready at the edge of the airfield.

Auftrag Hermann 1.1 1945 Zeit 9.20 Uhr: Giving the exact date and time of the attack.

Dorothea: Indicating a delay in the attack.

Spätlese: Cancelling of the attack after formations are airborne.

Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)

Aircraft Type

Commanding Officer

Jagdgeschwader 1

Twenthe/Drope/Rheine Stab and I./II./III. Gruppe

Fw 190 and Bf 109

Herbert Ihlefeld

Jagdgeschwader 3

Sennelager/Paderborn/Bad Lippspringe/Gutersloh

Stab./I./II./III./IV. Gruppe

Fw 190 and Bf 109

Heinrich Bär

Jagdgeschwader 6

Quackenbruck/Delmenhorst/Vechta/Bissel

Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 and Bf 109

Johann Kogler

Jagdgeschwader 26

Furstenau/Furstenau/Nordhorn/Plantlunne

Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 and Bf 109

Josef Priller

Jagdgeschwader 27

Rheine/Rheine/Hopsten/Hesepe/Achmer

Stab./I./II./III./IV.

Bf 109 N/A - only III and IV Gruppe took part.

Jagdgeschwader 54

Furstenau/Vorden III./IV. Fw 190 and Bf 109

Siegfried Freytag

Jagdgeschwader 77

Dortmund/Dortmund/Bonninghardt/Düsseldorf

Stab./I./II./III. Bf 109

II Jagdkorps (Dietrich Peltz)

3rd Jagddivision (3rd Fighter Division) (Walter Grabmann) at Wiedenbrück

Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)

Aircraft Type

Commanding Officer

Jagdgeschwader 2

Nidda/Merzhausen/Nidda/Altenstadt

Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190and Bf109

Kurt Bühligen

Jagdgeschwader 4

Rhein-Main/Darmstadt-Griesheim/Rhein-Main

Stab./I./II./III./IV.

GerhardMichalski

Jagdgeschwader 11

Biblis/Biblis/Zellhausen/Gross-Ostheim

Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190and Bf109

GüntherSpecht

Schlachtgeschwader 4

Bonn-Hangelar/Bonn-Hangelar/Koln-Butzweilerhod/Koln-Wahn

Stab./I./II./III. Fw 190 AlfredDruschel

Jagdabschnittsführer Mittelrhein (Fighter Sector Leader Middle Rhine)

Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)

Aircraft Type

Commanding Officer

Jagdgeschwader53

Stuttgart-Echterdingen/Malmsheim/Kirrlach/Stuggart-Echterdingen

Stab./II./.III/.IV

Bf 109 HelmutBennemann

3rd Fliegerdivision (3rd Air Division)

Parent Unit Geschwader Base Unit (Gruppe/Staffel)

Aircraft Type

Commanding Officer

Kampfgeschwader51

Rheine/Hopsten/Hesepe/Munster-Handorf

Stab./II./.III/.IV

Me 262 Wolfgang Schenck

Bf 109G and K series Fighters

FW 190 A series Fighter

FW 190 D series Fighter

Me 262 series Jet Fighter/Bomber

Ju 88 and 188 series Bomber/Night fighter

8.8cm Flak

2,0cm Flakvierling 38

Allied order of battleRAF No. 83 Group

Wing Number Squadron Numbers Aircraft Type Airfield

121 174/175/184 Typhoon Volkel

122 3/56/80/274/486 Tempest Volkel

124 137/181/182/247 Typhoon Eindhoven

126 401/402/411/412/442 Spitfire Ophoven

127 403/416 Spitfire Evre

143 168/438/439/440 Typhoon Eindhoven

39 Recce Wing 400/414/430 Spitfire Gilze-Rijen

RAF No. 84 Group

Wing Number Squadron Numbers

Aircraft Type Airfield

131 302/308/317 Spitfire St. Denis Westrem

132 66/127/322/331/332 Spitfire Woensdrecht

135 349/485 Spitfire Maldegem

145 341/74/329/345 Spitfire Deurne

146 193/197/257/263/266

Typhoon Deurne

35 Recce Wing 2/4/268 P-51 Mustang/Spitfire

Gilze-Rijen

RAF No. 2 GroupWing Number Squadron

NumbersAircraft Type Airfield

139 98/180/320 B-25 Mitchell Melsbroek

34 Recce Wing 16/69/140 Spitfire/Vickers Wellington/de Havilland Mosquito

Melsbroek

Spitfire Various Marks

Typhoon

Tempest

Mustang P51 Mk1

Bofors 40mm Autocannon

American Tactical Air ForcesNinth Air ForceFighter Group Squadrons Aircraft Type Commanding Officer

366 389/390/391 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Norman Holt

352 486/487/328 P-51 Mustang Colonel James Mayden

48 492/493/494 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James Johnson

36 22/23/53 P-47 Thunderbolt Lt Colonel Van H. Slayden

363 33 F-5 Lightning Colonel James Smelley

373 410/411/412 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James McGehee

365 386/387/388 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Ray Stecker

362 377/378/379 P-51 Mustang Colonel Joseph Laughlin

50 10/81/313 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel Harvey Case

358 365/366/367 P-47 Thunderbolt Colonel James Tipton Laughlin

Mustang P51D

Thunderbolt P47 Series

Lightning P38

Maldegem, Ursel and St. Denijs Westrem

FW190 III/JG1

Maldegem, Ursel and St. Denijs Westrem

Units I, II, III./JG 1

Aircraft 71

Aircraft lost 29 = 41%Damaged unknown

Pilots killed or captured 25 = 35%

Sint-Truiden

Low Level High Speed Attack

Sint-Truiden

Units I, II, III./JG 2 and SG 4

Aircraft 144

Aircraft lost 46 = 32%

Damaged 12

Pilots killed or captured 23 = 16%

Volkel and Heesch

Volkel and Heesch

Units I, II, III./JG 6

Aircraft78

Aircraft lost 27 = 35%

Damaged 5

Pilots killed or captured 23 = 30%

Antwerp-Deurne and Woensdrecht

Antwerp-Deurne and Woensdrecht

Units I, II, III./JG 77

Aircraft59

Aircraft lost 11 = 19%

Damaged –

Pilots killed or captured 11 + 19%

Metz-Frescaty

Metz-Frescaty

Units Stab., II., III., IV./JG 53

Aircraft80

Aircraft lost 30 = 38%

Damaged 8

Pilots killed or captured 17 = 21%

Le Culot and Ophoven

Le Culot and Ophoven

Units I, II, III./JG 4

Aircraft 55–75

Aircraft lost 25–26 = 46 to 35%

Damaged ~ 6

Pilots killed or captured 17 = 31 to 23%

Asch

Asch (Y29)

Units Stab. I, II, III./JG 11

Aircraft 61

Aircraft lost 28 = 46%

Damaged unknown

Pilots killed or captured 24 = 39%

Brussels-Evere/Grimbergen

Lt Theo Nibel cops a Partridge right up his Annular Radiator

Brussels-Evere/Grimbergen

Units Stab., I, II, III./JG 26 and III./JG 54

Aircraft127

Aircraft lost 40 = 32%

Damaged unknown

Pilots killed or captured 30 = 24%

Brussels-Melsbroek

Brussels-Melsbroek

Units I, II, III./JG 27 and IV./JG 54

Aircraft 43

Aircraft lost 21 = 49%

Damaged 1

Pilots killed or captured 17 = 40%

Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven

Bombed Up Me 262

Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven

Units Stab. I., III., IV./JG 3 and KG 51

Aircraft81

Aircraft lost 15–16 = 20%

Damaged Unknown

Pilots killed or captured 15–16 = 20%

Possible V-2 Missile Launch Attempts

Results of raid The results of the raid are difficult to judge given the confusion over loss

records. It is likely more aircraft were destroyed than listed.

The Americans failed to keep a proper record of their losses and it appears the U.S. 8th Air Force losses were not included in loss totals. I

It is likely that the correct figures are 232 destroyed (143 single-engine, 74 twin-engine and 15 four-engine) and 156 damaged (139 single-engine, 12 twin-engine and five four-engine).

Researching individual squadron records confirms the destruction of even more USAAF aircraft. This suggests at least a further 16 B-17s, 14 B-24s, eight P-51s, and at least two P-47s were destroyed on top of that total.

A total of 290 destroyed and 180 damaged seems a more realistic summation than the conservative figures given by the USAAF, RAF, and RCAF. Including the 15 Allied aircraft shot down and 10 damaged in aerial combat, 305 destroyed and 190 damaged is the sum total of the attack.

Effect on the Luftwaffe The operation achieved tactical surprise, but it was undone by

poor execution due to low pilot skill resulting from poor training.

The operation failed to achieve its aim and that failure was very costly to German air power. Some of the units of the RAF, RCAF and USAAF on the receiving end of Bodenplatte had been badly hit, others not so badly, but most had sustained some losses.

The Germans, however, launched Bodenplatte under a set of conditions, such as poor planning and low pilot skill, which clearly indicated any advantage gained would be outweighed by possible losses.

Bodenplatte weakened the Jagdwaffe past any hope of rebuilding. General der Jagdflieger Adolf Galland said, "We sacrificed our last substance".

The Luftwaffe lost 143 pilots killed and missing, while 70 were captured and 21 wounded including three Geschwaderkommodore, five Gruppenkommandeure, and 14 Staffelkapitäne—the largest single-day loss for the Luftwaffe.

Many of the formation leaders lost were experienced veterans, which placed even more pressure on those who were left.

Thus, Bodenplatte was a very short-term success but a long-term failure. Allied losses were soon made up, while lost Luftwaffe aircraft and especially pilots were irreplaceable.

German historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that it left the Germans "weaker than ever and incapable of mounting any major attack again".

In the remaining 17 weeks of war the Jagdwaffe struggled to recover sufficiently from the 1 January operation to remain an effective force.

In strategic terms, German historian Werner Girbig wrote, "Operation Bodenplatte amounted to a total defeat".

The exhausted German units were no longer able to mount an effective defence of German air space during Operation Plunder and Operation Varsity, the Allied crossing of the Rhine River, or the overall Western Allied invasion of Germany.

Subsequent operations were insignificant as a whole, and could not challenge Allied air supremacy. The only service in the Luftwaffe capable of profitable sorties was the night fighter force.

In the last six weeks of the war the Luftwaffe was to lose another 200 pilots killed. Girbig wrote, "it was not until the autumn of 1944 that the German fighter forces set foot down the sacrificial path; and it was the controversial Operation Bodenplatte that dealt this force a mortal blow and sealed its fate. What happened from then on was no more than a dying flicker".

Das Ende