Post on 27-Sep-2019
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TABLE TURNERS
PREPARED BY: JOEL ARZAGA
KAYE BALDONADO AILEEN CRUZ
IJ CHAN-‐GONZAGA, S.J. PHILIP EVARDONE
GELO GENER RACHELLE GUTIERREZ
PONCE LOPEZ ALYSSA MICLAT
IJJI PARAS RAIZA RADOC ADRIAN TAN ERIKA VALDEZ
Reminders: • Use at your own risk. Although it is made with
the best effort, we cannot guarantee its accuracy.
• We’d appreciate it if you could please keep this within the block J
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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POINTS
I. Early Organic Acts
What is a constitution?
o Justice Miller: “A constitution. In the American sense of
the word, is a written instrument by which the
fundamental powers of government are established,
limited, and defined, and by which these powers are
distributed among several departments, for their safe
and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic.”
Philippine concept of constitutionalism came
from the American concept
o Purpose of a constitution: grant and limitation of
government authority
o The written instrument agreed upon by the people… as
the absolute rule of action for all departments and
offices of government
o Government owes it being to the constitution
o The supreme written law of the land.
Classifications of constitution
o Generally, the constitution is classified under: written
and unwritten.
Written constitution – a book of documents
(example: Philippine Constitution)
Unwritten constitution – supported by different
court rulings, documents, etc. (example: UK
Constitution)
o Alternative classification: as norms of government
action
Normative – direct government action and
government follows and adjust itself to the
norms
Nominal – cannot be fully operative because of
socio‐political problems; principal value is
educational
Semantic – tool for the perpetuation of power
in the hands of power holders
o Constitutional document: 3 parts
Constitution of government – set up
government structure
Constitution of liberty – guarantee individual
fundamental liberties
Constitution of sovereignty – outline process
whereby the sovereign people may change the
constitution
Is the Constitution and constitutional law the same?
o NO. Constitutional law is not just the text of the
constitution itself.
o It is “a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by
a high court of cases in which the validity, in relation to
the constitutional instrument, of some act of
government power, … has been challenged.”
o Function of Judicial Review – power and duty of the
Court of pronouncing void any such act which does not
square with its own reading of the constitutional
instrument; in other words, the constitution is what the
judges say it is (Chief Justice Hughes)
When did constitutionalism in the Philippines start?
o Ratification of the Treaty of Paris – transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to US
o US: released different organic acts
President McKinley’s Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission
Philippine Bill of 1902 – US Congress made this
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 – paved the
way for the 1935 Constitution
Introduction: Philippine Constitutionalism, Birth Pangs and
Traumatic Growth
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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o By 1934, US Congress passed the Tydings‐McDuffie Law
– provided for the establishment of a Commonwealth
Government under a constitution
II. The 1935 Constitution
Important dates:
o July 30, 1934 Constitutional Convention (CC) met
o February 8, 1935 CC ended
o March 3, 1935 US President approved the draft
o May 14, 1935 ratified by the Filipino electorate
o November 15, 1935 Commonwealth Government
became operative
o July 4, 1946 Philippine Independence
After independence, many felt unease that Philippines is still
following a constitution that is fashioned under colonial
auspices, hence a call for amendment of the said constitution.
III. The 1973 Constitution
Important dates:
o March 16, 1967 Philippine Congress passed
Resolution No. 2: a call for an amendment of the
Constitution
o June 1, 1971 1971 Constitutional Convention
o September 21, 1972 Martial Law was imposed
o November 29, 1972 Convention approved proposed
Constitution
o November 30, 1972 Presidential Decree 73 –
“submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the CC”
o January 7, 1973 General Order No. 20:
postponement of plebiscite which was originally
scheduled on January 15, 1973
o January 17, 1973 Proclamation No. 1102: proposed
Constitution was ratified by Citizens Assemblies; 1973
Constitution officially took effect
o March 31, 1973 divided Supreme Court ruled: no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect
Javellana v. Executive Secretary
o Supreme Court ruled there is no further judicial obstacle
to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect
o Executive Department, with vigor and with all the
resources at its command, proceeded to implement it
o Legislative Department was nowhere found to object it
o Ordinary mortals lived under the new Constitution
1976 Constitution was amended to give birth to interim
Batasang Pambansa – legislative body that affirms the wills and
whims of President Marcos under Amendment 6 of the 1976
amendments
1981 Departure from parliamentary to presidential
Interim Batasang Pambansa to a regular one
IV. Freedom Constitution
Important dates:
o November 1985 special presidential elections
(Ferdinand Marcos vs. Cory Aquino)
o February 15, 1985 Marcos declared as winner by
Batasang Pambansa
o February 22, 1985 Revolt against President Marcos
led by Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos, followed by
support of unarmed civilians (Edsa Revolution)
o February 25, 1985 Marcos regime ended
o February 25, 1985 Cory Aquino proclaimed first
woman President in defiance of 1973 Constitution and
Batasang Pambansa ‐ sworn in by Claudio Teehankee;
Marcos was also sworn in by CJ Ramon Aquino then
went to exile after
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Article 1: The National Territory
Section 1: The national territory comprises the Philippine
Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
Jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the Archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
• Barred by the processes of the 1973 Constitution, Cory Aquino
chose to govern under a Provisional Constitution designed to
enable her to meet the people’s challenge.
• Proclamation No. 3 – Freedom Constitution
V. The 1987 Constitution
• Article 6 of Proclamation No. 3 – Adopting a New Constitution
o Section 1: Appointment of Commission within 60 days
of Proclamation. Commission shall consist of 30‐60
natural‐born citizens of the Philippines
o Section 2: Accomplish as fast as possible to hasten
normal constitutional circumstances and draft a
document
o Section 3: Conduct public hearings
o Section 4: Plenary session shall be public and fully
recorded
o Section 5: Ratification by a majority of votes will make
Constitution valid; date is within 60 days following
submission to President
• Important dates:
o June 1, 1986 CC convened
o October 15, 1986 CC ended
o February 2, 1987 new Constitution is ratified
• 2010 – Constitution has already lasted 23 years
• Who wrote the Constitution? Ans: The sovereign Filipino people
POINTS
Baseline Law – RA 9522: G.R. No. 187167: Magallona vs. Ermita
Petitioner: PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY‐LIST REP.
RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., and University of the
Philippines College of Law Students, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE
ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT,
RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO,
VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN
DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO,
RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA
REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY
ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,
MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON,
JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,
NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III
Respondents: HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity of Executive
Secretary, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of
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Department of Foreign Affairs, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, in his capacity
of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. DIONY VENTURA,
in his capacity as administrator of the National Mapping & Research
Information Authority, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., in his capacity as
representative of the permanent mission of the Republic of the
Philippines to the United Nations.
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Case: Original action of writs of certiorari and prohibition that assails the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
Background:
1961 Congress passed RA No. 3046 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines. This followed the framing
of UNCLOS I in 1958, which codified the extent of sovereign
rights over territorial seas. RA No. 3046 remain unchanged for 5
decades.
Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 because of the
need to comply to UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III prescribes the water‐
land ration, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic
States and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.
RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago, and named
KIG and Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands”.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two
principal grounds:
o (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and
o (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
Petitioners also content the RA’s treatment of KIG as “regime of
islands” results in loss of large maritime area and prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen; RA 9522 excluded to
reference the Treaty of Paris and included the UNCLOS III’s
framework.
Respondents raised the ff:
o (1) Petitioners’ lack of locus standi and,
o (2) Propriety of writs of certiorari and prohibition.
Respondents defended RA 9522 as country’s compliance with
terms of UNCLOS III, preserving territory over KIG, and RA 9522
does not undermine country’s security, environment and
economic interests, and country’s claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force under
international law of petitioners’ assertion regarding the Treaty
of Paris.
Issues:
Preliminary Issues:
o Whether petitioners possess locus standi.
o Whether writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Merits: whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling/Ratio Court holds that:
1. Petitioners possess locus standi to bring suit as citizens.
Ratio: They are citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in
the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises
issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution; it is
understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing “a more
direct and specific interest” to bring the suit.
2. Writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test
constitutionality of RA 9522.
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Ratio: Court, by tradition, viewed writs of certiorari and prohibition
as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes;
statute involved in the case has relevance in the life of Philippine
nation so Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance
of the case.
3. RA 9522 is constitutional.
Ratio: RA 9522is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s
maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to
delineate Philippine territory. UNCLOS III is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea‐use rights over maritime zones,
territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves
that UNCLOS III delimits. It was the culmination of decades‐long
negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of states in the world’s ocean ands and submarine areas.
Baseline laws are enacted to mark‐out specific basepoints along
States coasts to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf. (Article 48 of
UNCLOS III) Baselines are nothing but statutory mechanisms to
delimit with precision the extent of maritime zones and continental
shelves and this gives notice to the international community within
which the State can exercise treaty‐based rights.
Regarding Treaty of Paris: baselines of Philippines would still have to
be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 to conform to UNCLOS III.
UNCLOS III plays no role in the diminution of territory.
States acquire or lose territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription. Territorial claims to land
features are outside of UNCLOS III; it is governed by general
international law.
RA 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, is not inconsistent with the Philippines’
claim of sovereignty over these areas. Petitioner’s assertion
of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters is unfounded both in fact and law as RA 9522
optimized the location of basepoints and therefore,
increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by 146, 216
square nautical miles as there is an extension of the reach of
exclusive economic zones. Also, Section 2 of RA 9522 shows
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal (…over which the
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction…).
Had Congress enclosed KIG and SS in RA 9522, they would
have committed the following breaches:
o (1) Article 47.3 of UNCLOS III (baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago).
o (2) Article 47.2 of UNCLOS III (length of baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for 3% of
the total number of baselines, which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles). Classification of KIG and SS as
“regimes of islands” is responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)
obligation under UNCLOS III.
Statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 is retained.
Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 is not incompatible with Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters.
The Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS
III affirms this. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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necessary, if not marginal burdens in the interest of
international navigation (international law principle of
freedom to navigate), thus, domestically the political
branches of the Philippine government may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. The right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.
The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters was a concession of participating States in exchange
for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines. Moreover, the recognition of waters enclosed by
State’s baselines prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III.
Regarding the petitioners’ claim of non‐executory constitutional
provisions in Article II: It must fail.
Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions
in Article II as mere legislative guides, which absent enabling
legislation, “do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.”
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones – Passage of RA 9522
is in the discretion of Congress. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones
and continental shelf is measured. It sends an open invitation to
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and weakens
country’s case in any international dispute
Wherefore, we DISMISS the petition.
Justice J.R. Velasco, Concurring
Philippines, when it signed the UNCLOS III made the
following Declaration: “The signing of the Convention by the
GRP shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the
sovereign rights of the RP under and arising from the
Constitution of the Philippines.” “Such signing shall not in
any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the RP
over any territory over which it exercises soverign authority,
such as the KIG and waters appurtenant thereto;”
Article 46 of UNCLOS III in fact recognizes that an
archipelagic state, such as the Philippines, is a state
“constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may
include other islands.
UNCLOS III pertains to a law on the seas, not territory
Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our
archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal waters of
continental coastal states.
o Article I of the Constitution: “the waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines. – ratification of people of 1987
Constitution veritably rejected the quid pro quo
petitioners take as being subsumed in that treaty.
CLASS DISCUSSION
24 nautical miles – 200 nautical miles: already considered as
high seas and not anymore part of Philippine territorial waters
o We don’t own the seas but we have rights
o Lands outside of our territorial waters such as KIG and
Scarborough Shoal – part of our exclusive economic
zone
UNCLOS – not about drawing territorial rights but about usage
of seas
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Section 2. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
POINTS
I. Sovereignty: People vs. Gozo
Ponente: Justice Fernando
Background:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an
ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the
municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building,
as well as any modification, alternation, repair or demolition
thereof. She questions the validity and applicability of provisions
to her by invoking due process. Her house was constructed
within the naval base leased to the American armed forces and
thus seeks emasculation of sovereignty’s rights by asserting
administrative jurisdiction is not present. She was given 30 days
from the finality of judgment to obtain a permit, failing which,
she is required to demolish the same.
Ruling/Rationale
No support in law for the stand taken by appellant.
o “By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases.” (Justice Tuason)
o Under the terms of the treaty, the US government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also all
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use
of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of
Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from
the express provisions of the treaty.
o Reagan: The Philippines’ authority may be exercised
over its entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit
to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal.
o Principle of auto‐limitation: a state, then, if it chooses
to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence. Even if there is diminution of
jurisdictional rights, there is no disappearance of said
rights.
o It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. They are still subject to
its authority.
o Jurisdiction does not disappear. From the military bases
agreement, bases under the lease of American armed
forces are not and cannot be foreign territory.
II. GOVERNMENTS DE JURE AND DE FACTO: Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh
Issue: The question to be determined is whether or not the
governments established in the Phil. Islands under the names of Phil.
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.
Ruling/Rationale:
Kinds of de facto governments:
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(1) Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
(2) Government that is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war and denominated a government of paramount
force.
(3) Government that is established by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
Government of the 2nd kind: Thorington v Smith
(1) Its existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established
and lawful government.
(2) While it exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
submission to such force, do not become responsible, as
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws
of the rightful government.
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are
regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907.
Article 43 provides that “the authority of the legitimate power
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all steps in his power to reestablish, and insure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty
to insure public order and safety – he can suspend old laws and
promulgate new ones but he is enjoined to respect the
municipal laws that promote public order and safety
Laws of political complexions are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation
Halleck, International Law (Vol. 2 p. 444) – the right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war,
and flows directly from the right to conquer
o Such authority and rules are delivered directly from the
laws of war, as established by the usage of the world
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and
decisions of courts – in fine, from the law of nations
The municipal laws of the conquered territory are considered
continuing in force, as far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent, and in practice they are allowed to
remain and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupation
Government of the 3rd kind:
Thorington vs. Smith
US recognized the government set up by the Confederate States
as a de facto government
Williams vs. Bruffy
SC of the US discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States said: "The same general form of
government, the same general laws for the administration of
justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the
States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance
and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or
tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the
just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in
general, to be treated as valid and binding.”
Horn vs. Lockhart
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen
the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws.
“No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity
of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States
touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not
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hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Constitution.”
Baldy vs. Hunter
De facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be
invalid merely because those governments were organized in
hostility.
Existence of war between the United States and the
Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the
insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor
destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government
or the regular administration of the laws.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23,
1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government
established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto
government of the second kind.
The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not
by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.
The so‐called Republic of the Philippines was the same
character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the
ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese
military authority and government.
However, as a belligerent occupation, being essentially
provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the
territory. Thus, Japan had no legal power to grant independence
to the Philippines.
Virtue of Postliminy (Potliminium) in international law
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and valid after the liberation
and reoccupation of the Philippines by US and Filipino forces
under the leadership of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and
remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant
III. In re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno
Revolution – the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who are previously
subject to it
It was through the February 1986 revolution that Filipino people
tore themselves away from the state
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has
been defined as “an inherent right of a people to cast our their
rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their
systems of government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making
change have proved inadequate or are obstructed as to be
unavailable.
Locus of positive law‐making power lies with the people and so
they can also abolish, alter, and reform the existing constitution
3 clauses that precede the Freedom Constitution:
o (1) New government under President Cory Aquino was
installed through direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people.
o (2) Action was done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution.
o (3) Cory Aquino promulgate the ff. Provisional
Constitution
Aquino government was “revolutionary” in the sense that it
came into existence in defiance of existing legal processes and it
was instituted by the direct action of the people in opposition to
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the authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown
government.
Was the existing legal order overthrown by the Aquino
government? YES. It is assumed that the legal order remains as
a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and
that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system
ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by
the population nor enforced by the officials.
Aquino government was a violation of the 1973 Constitution yet
it signaled the point where the legal system then in effect had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino people.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Background:
President Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG, which is tasked to
investigate former President Marcos, his family, friends, subordinates,
and close associates and recover ill‐gotten wealth. PCGG created an AFP
Anti‐Graft Board to investigate officials. AFP Board investigated the
respondent Major General Josephus Ramas.
THIRD ISSUE: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized
and therefore adminissible in evidence.
Raiding team seized ff. items: one baby armalite rifle with two
magazines, 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition, one pistol, caliber
.45, communications equipment, cash amounting to Php
2,870,000 and US $50,000, jewelry, and land title. Not all items
are included in the search warrant.
Search and seizure was during the revolutionary government.
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution, which
guaranteed private exclusionary rights.
Correct issues:
(1) Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum.
(2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“Covenant”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Declaration”) remained in effect during interregnum.
Ruling/Rationale
Court: We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals
under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect
during the interregnum.
o During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.
o To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution.
Freedom Constitution, as well as the 1987 Constitution
recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus: … it should
be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the
authority of the PCGG to issue them have received
constitutional approbation and sanction.
Father Bernas was against the amendment excepting the
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights in drafting the 1987
Constitution because it is against the Bill of Rights.
Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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o Excepting sequestration orders are like vices and these
are hard to shed.
o What matters are the results and not the legal niceties
are very disturbing. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer and the BOR on an auction.
o Nation will only survive and grow only if it would
become convinced of the values enshrined in the
Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary
estimation.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights in the 1987
Constitution.
Revolutionary government installed itself as a de jure
government so assumed good faith compliance of Covenant and
Declaration.
o Covenant:
Article 2(1) requires every signatory “to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.”
Article 17(1): “no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”
o Declaration: Article 17(2): “no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.”
The Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with it treaty obligations under international
law.
The Provisional Constitution served as a self‐limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
power entrusted to it by the people.
And so, the search warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant but those that are
not included in the warrant are considered illegal searches and
seizures. There was no legal basis to seize these objects without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless
search and seizures.
Therefore, petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
Section 2.
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Section 3.
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal
is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Section 4.
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Section 5.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6.
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7.
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self‐determination.
Section 8.
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Section 9.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life
for all.
Section 10.
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Section 11.
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Tondo Medical Center
Employees v. Court of
Appeals
Ponente: Chico‐Nazaro, J.
A petition for review of certiorari on
the CA’s decision of denying a
petition for nullification of the Health
Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)
Philippines (1999‐2004 DOH). HSRA
was issued by former Pres. Erap
through Executive Order No. 102
“Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the DOH”
Petitioner alleges that the reform
resulted in the inaccessibility of free
medicine and medical services to the
poor and thus counters the
aspirations and ideals of the Filipino
peoples. Reforms violated Sec.
5,9,10,11,13,15 and 18 of Art. 2; Sec
1 of Art. 3, Sec. 11 and 14 of Art. 8,
and Sec. 1 and 3 of Art. 15 of the
1987 Constitution
(i) Whether or not the
HSRA can be nullified
based solely on
petitioner’s allegation
that it violates the
general principles
expressed in Sec.
5,9,10,11,13,15 and 18
of Art. 2.
(i) HSRA cannot
be nullified
based solely on
the
aforementioned
allegation.
(i) In Tanada v. Angara the Court has
already ruled the sections found on
Article 2 of the Constitution as not self‐
executing and need legislative
enactments before they can be
implemented. Sections of Article 2 are
used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review and by legislature in its
enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Phil. Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, Sections 11,12,
and 13 of Art. 2 are not self‐executing
provisions as they merely lay down a
general principle and cannot give rise to
a cause of action in the courts.
Other non self‐executing provisions:
Sec. 1 of Article 8, Section 2 of Article
XIV
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 13.
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation‐building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well‐being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14.
The State recognizes the role of women in nation‐building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 15.
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16.
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Oposa v. Factoran Jr. Ponente: Davide, Jr. J.
Controvery started in Civil Case No.
90‐777 which was filed before Branch
66 of the RTC NCR. Petitioners are
minors duly represented and
enjoined by parents while
respondent is former DENR Secretary
Factoran, Jr. substituted by current
Sec. Honorable Angel C. Alcala. Addt’l
plaintiff is Phil. Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI) a domestic, non‐stock,
non‐profit corp. engaging in
concerted action geared for the
protection of the environment and
national resources. Complaint is
(i) Whether or not
Filipinos have a right to
a balanced and
healthful ecology
(ii) Whether or not said
petitioners have a cause
of action to “prevent
(i) Filipinos have
a right to a
balanced and
healthful ecology
as defined in
Section 16, Art.
2
(ii) Petitioners
have a cause of
action adequate
(i) Even though right is found in Art. 2
and not in the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights. Such a
right belongs to a different category for
it concerns self‐preservation and self‐
perpetuation. These different
categories of rights are assumed to be
in existence from the inception of
humankind and when it was written in
the Constitution, it is to highlight their
importance.
(ii) Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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instituted as a taxpayer’s class suit
and that petitioners are citizens of
the Phils. entitled to the full benefit
and enjoyment of the country’s
resources. Petitioners also assert that
they represent their generation and
the generation yet unborn. They
prayed that defendant and his agents
and representatives (1) cancel all
existing timbler license agreements
(TLA) in the country and (2) cease and
desist fron receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.
Phil. is a rich country with many
resources and scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the
country’s land area should be utilized
on a ratio of 54% for forests,
environment, etc. 46% on
agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial, etc. Disturbances in the
balances resulted in the ff:
(a) Water shortages,
(b) Salinization of the water table,
(c) Massive erosion,
(d) Endangered and extinction of
flora and fauna,
(e) Disturbance of cultural
communities,
(f) Siltation of rivers and waterbeds
the misappropriation of
impairment” of
Philippine rainforests
and “arrest the
unabated hemorrhage
of the country’s vital
life‐support systems
and continued rape of
Mother Earth.”
enough to show,
prima facie, the
claimed violation
of their rights.
intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to
preserve the rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Right to a balanced
and healthful environment carries a
correlative duty of not impairing the
environment. Right of petitioners is as
clear as the right of DENR with its
functions as provided in EO. No 192. A
denial or violation of that right by the
other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action.
Granting of TLAs violated petitioners’
right hence the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(g) Recurrent spells of drought
(h) Increasing velocity of typhoon
winds
(i) Flooding of lowlands
(j) Shortening of lifespan of dams
(k) Reduction of capacity to process
CO2.
Laguna Lake
Development
Authority vs. Court of
Appeals
Ponente: Romero, J.
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of our
Lady of Lourdes filed a letter‐
complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority to stop the
operation of the 8.6 hectare
dumpsite because of the harmful
health effects it causes and
possibilities of pollution. LLDA found
out City of Caloocan maintains
dumpsite without ECC and leachate
seeping through the waters can
cause pollution and so they ordered a
cease and desist order to Caloocan
City. Dumping operation closed for a
while then opened again when
settlements failed to happen. LLDA
issued another order and stopped
trucks from entering Camarin. City of
Caloocan filed a petition in the RTC
declaring a nullity of the orders given
by LLDA, claiming that it is the sole
authority empowered to promote the
health and safety and enhace the
right of people of Caloocan to a
(i) Whether or not the
LLDA has authority and
power to issue an order
(ii) Whether or not LLDA
have the authority to
entertain complaint
against the dumping of
garbage in the open
dumpsite in Camarin
(i) LLDA has
authority and
power to issue
an order through
Republic Act No.
4850.
(ii) LLDA has
authority to
entertain
complaint.
(i) Section 4 of RA explicitly authorizes
LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction; it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers.
(ii) The immediate response to the
demands of “the necessities of
protecting vital public interests” gives
vitality to the statement on ecology
embodied in Art II of the Constitution.
Section 16 – as a constitutionally
guaranteed right of every person, it
carries the correlative duty of non‐
impairment. Health is a fundamental
human right (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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balanced ecology. RTC issued a TRO
to LLDA, LLDA filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of Pollution
Control Law. CA upheld RTC’s
decision.
Section 17.
The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
Section 18.
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19.
The State shall develop a self‐reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Garcia v. Board of
Investments
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. J.
Petition to annul and set aside the
decision of the BOI/DTI approving the
transfer of the proposed
petrochemical plant site from Bataan
to Batangas and shift of feedstock to
naptha and/or LPG
Background: 576 hectares in Limay
Bataan was for the Petrochemical
Industrial Zone. Taiwanese investors
formed BPC with terms specifying
Bataan as the place and using naptha.
It was supposed to be a joint venture
with PNOC. BPC was accorded several
benefits in relation to the industry.
(i) Whether or not BOI
was correct in
approving the transfer
of BPC in Batangas and
the shift of feedstock to
naptha and/or LPG?
(i) The Court
holds and finds
that the BOI
committed a
grave abuse of
discretion in
approving the
transfer of the
petrochemical
plant from
Bataan to
Batangas and
authorizing the
change of
feedstock from
naptha only to
naphtha and/or
(i)
(1) Bataan was the original choice
hence the name of BPC
(2) BRC in Bataan produces 60% naptha
(3) Naptha was exempted from tax
because of petrochemical industry and
so neither BOI or foreign investors
should disregard or contravene
expressed policy
(4) Duty of the State to exercise
authority over foreign investments
within national jurisdiction.
Development of a self‐reliant and
independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos
(Section 19, Art, 2)
(5) capital requirements will be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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But in Feb 1989 AT Chong the major
investor of BPC gave BOI a letter
stating BPC’s desire to relocate in
Batangas
LPG for the main
reason that the
final say is in the
investor all other
circumstances to
the contrary
notwithstanding.
minimized if changes won’t happen
(6) PNOC can be involved to the benefit
and advantage of gov’t
> Every provision of the Constitution on
the national economy and patrimony is
infused with the spirit of national
interest.
> Petrochemical industry is not an
ordinary industry and essential to
national interest.
Section 20.
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21.
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Section 22.
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Section 23.
The State shall encourage non‐governmental, community‐based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24.
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation‐building.
Section 25.
The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 26.
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Pamatong v. Comelec Ponente: Tinga, J.
Petitioner filed a certificate for
candidacy last Dec. 27, 2003 but
respondent refused to give due
course to petitioners certificate of
candidacy (dated: Jan. 17,2004).
Petitioner seeks a petition for a
review of certiorari because the
decision was violative of his right to
“equal access to opportunities for
public service” under Sec. 26 of Art.
II. Petitioner argues that Comelec
indirectly amended the consti
provisions on the electoral process
and limited the power of the
sovereign people to choose their
leaders. Petitioner alleges that he is
the most qualified among
presidential candidates and also
attacks the validity of the form for
the certificate of candidacy of
Comelec.
(I) Whether or not
COMELEC violated
petitioner’s right to
“equal access to
opportunities for public
service.”
(i) The clause
“equal access to
opportunities for
public service” is
not a
constitutional
right but a
privilege subject
to limitations
imposed by law.
(i) Sec. 26 of Art. 2 neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to
the level of an enforceable right.
Provisions in Art. 2 are generally
considered non self‐executing and
merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.
Commissioner (now Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide, Jr. changed some words
of Sec. 26 (from “broad” to “equal
protection” and “office” to “service”) –
The provision is not intended to compel
the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many
people as possible into public office.
Words such as “equal access”
“opportunities” “public service” are
susceptible to countless interpretations
and so it is difficult to regard this as
operative as positive rights.
The clause is subject to limitations
(provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and
Comelec Resolution No. 6452) and the
limitations, as long as it applies to
everyone, is presumed valid. Petitioner
did not challenge the validity of the
limitations so they have to be accorded
due weight.
Section 27.
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 28.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1.
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Garcia v. Commission
on Elections
G.R. No. 111230
September 30, 1994
Ponente: Puno, J.
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
Serye 1993, Sangguniang Bayang ng
Morong (SBM) agreed to the
inclusion of the municipality of
Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone as accorded in R.A.
7227. Petition filed a petition with
SBM saying Morong didn’t acted on
the petition and petitioners resorted
to power of initiative under Local
Government Code 1991 and solicited
signatures for the repeal. COMELEC
denied the petition on the ground
that its subject is merely a resolution
and not an ordinance
(i) Whether or not
Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10
serye 1993 of SMB
Bataan is the proper
subject of an initiative.
(i) Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.
10 of
Sangguniang
Bayan ng
Morong is a
proper subject of
an initiative.
(i) Constitution clearly includes
resolutions as subject of a local
initiative. Resolutions as subject of
initiative was implemented by Congress
– R.A. No. 6735 Initiative – power of
the people to make amendments to the
Constitution or propose legislation
(rooted from original legislative power);
they can enact or reject any act or law
by Congress or local legislative body.
Eastern Shipping Lines
v. Philippine Overseas
Employment
Administration
166 SCR.A. 533 (1988)
Ponente: Cruz, J.
POEA awarded private respondent
P192,000 for the death of husband
(Vitaliano Saco). Petitioner challenges
POEA’s jurisdiction over the case as
Saco is not an overseas worker and
that POEA has no authority to
promulgate the regulation. Petitioner
argues that POEA’s Memorandum
(i) Whether or not POEA
violated the non‐
delegation of legislative
power.
(i) POEA did not
violate the non‐
delegation of
legislative power.
(i) Delegation of legislative power has
become frequent if not necessary and
has established itself to be a rule and
the non‐delegability an exception.
Modernizing society gave way to more
problems and thus, legislative’s
competence and capacity has become
limited. Delegation or legislative
powers are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies (power of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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No. 2 is violative of the principle of
non‐delegation of legislative power.
subordinate legislation). Memorandum
No. 2 falls into administrative
regulation and has passed one of the
tests of valid delegation of power which
is sufficient standard test (limitations
and boundaries of delegate’s authority
are mapped out)
Tablarin v Gutierrez
152 SCR.A. 730 (1987)
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Petitioners have made an argument
that Section 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 2382
offend against the constitutional
principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power by
failing to establish the necessary
standard to be followed by delegate,
the Board of Medical Education.
(i) Whether or not
Section 5(a) and (f) of
R.A. 2382 failed to
establish the necessary
standards and thus,
offend the principle of
forbidding undue
delegation of legislative
power
(i) Necessary
standards set
forth in Sec. 1 of
the 1959 Medical
Act and in
Sections 5(a) and
7 of the Same Act
and that these
considered
together are
sufficient
compliance with
the requirements
of the non‐
delegation
principle
(i) The general principle of non‐
delegation of legislative power, which
both flows from and reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers
among the three depts. Of govt must
be applied with circumspection in
respect of statutes
> Justice Laurel: complexities of modern
government – adapt to subordinate
legislation; there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the
legislature, and toward the approved of
the practice by the courts
Standards set for subordinate
legislation in the exercise of rule‐
making authority may be either
expressed or implied.
Free Telephone
Workers Union v.
Minister of Labor
108 SCR.A. 757 (1981)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 empowers
Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest and deciding and
certifying the same to the National
Labor Relations Commission
(i) Whether or not Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 is
unconstitutional for
violating the non‐
delegation of legislative
powers
(i) Batas
Pambansa Blg.
130 is not
unconstitutional
for being violate
of the non‐
delegation of
legislative
(i) Non‐delegation of powers appears to
be too strict and rigid for modern
governments encounter different
complexities and thus subordinate
legislation comes into the picture. The
difficulty with subordinate legislation
comes in the fixing of the limit and
extent of authority. Safest way to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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powers decide each case is according to its
peculiar environment, having into mind
the wholesome legislative purpose
intended to achieve.
Closer relationship of the departments
in our Constitution there is more
promptitude in framing our policies and
unity in its execution. Non‐delegation
would be an obstacle in our national
development. “Power should be
delegated where there is agreement
that a task must be performed and it
cannot be effectively performed by the
legislature without the assistance of a
delegate or without an expenditure of
time so great as to lead the neglect of
equally important business”
Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co., Inc. v.
Secretary Drilon
176 SCR.A. 24 (1989)
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
R.A. No. 6640 was passed increasing
minimum wage by 10 pesos. The
Secretary of Labor issued pertinent
rules in implementing the R.A.,
prohibiting the employer from
crediting anniversary wages increases
negotiated under a CBA against such
wage increases in R.A. No. 6640
(i) Whether or not an
Implementing Order of
the Secretary of Labor
and Employment
(DOLE) can provide for a
prohibition not
contemplated by the
law it seeks to
implement
(i) An
implementing
Order of the
Secretary of
Labor and
Employment
cannot provide
for a prohibition
not
contemplated by
the law it seeks
to implement as
R.A. No. 6640
does not prohibit
the crediting of
CBA anniversary
wages increases
(i) It is fundamental that in a case
where only pure questions of law are
raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
the administrative remedies cannot
apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. The question
raised here is a question of law. It is a
fundamental rule that implementing
rules cannot add or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to
implement. Administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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for purposes of
compliance
provisions.
Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy
G.R. No. 124360
November 5, 1997
Ponente: Puno, J.
Petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 15 R.A. No.
8180, which ends the 26 years of
gov’t regulation of downstream oil
industry. Full deregulation will start
after March 1997 and when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable and upon approval of
the President. EO No. 372 issued by
President Ramos approved the
deregulation of the downstream oil
industry considering the two factors
stated above plus including the OPSF
fund depletion as a factor.
Petitioners assail that no specific
time frame was set in the R.A. and
does not provide a determinate
standard to guide Executive Branch in
implementing the deregulation
(i) Whether or not
Section 15 of R.A. No.
8180 violates the
constitutional
prohibition on undue
delegation of power
and whether or not EO
No. 392 is a
misapplication of R.A.
No. 8180
(i) Section 15 of
R.A. 8180 does
not violate the
constitutional
prohibition on
undue delegation
of power but EO
No. 392 is a
misapplication of
R.A. No. 8180
(i) Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and sufficient
standard test of due delegation. The
law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. There
were also determinate standards set
forth in Sec. 15. The inclusion of EO No.
392 with the depletion of the OPSF
fund is extraneous and rewrote the
standards included in R.A. No. 8180.
The Executive is bereft of any right to
alter the standards in the R.A.. The
exercise of delegated power is given a
strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate
is a mere agent whose actions cannot
infringe the agency.
People v. Dacuycuy
173 SCR.A. 90 (1989)
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Sec 32 of R.A. No. 4670 expressed 2
alternative and distinct penalties:
fine ranging from 100 to 1000 or
imprisonment. No specified period
was indicated for imprisonment.
Respondents contend that having no
(i) Whether or not the
penalty of
imprisonment provided
in Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
4670 is declared
unconstitutional
(i) The penalty of
imprisonment
provided in Sec.
32 of R.A. No.
4670 is declared
unconstitutional
(i) It is not for the courts to fix the term
of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length
of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within
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Section 2.
The Senate shall be composed of twenty‐four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by
law.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty‐five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
People v. Dacuycuy
173 SCR.A. 90 (1989)
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Sec 32 of R.A. No. 4670 expressed 2
alternative and distinct penalties:
fine ranging from 100 to 1000 or
imprisonment. No specified period
was indicated for imprisonment.
Respondents contend that having no
specific period for the penalty is
violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative power as it is left in the
discretion of the court.
(i) Whether or not the
penalty of
imprisonment provided
in Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
4670 is declared
unconstitutional
(i) The penalty of
imprisonment
provided in Sec.
32 of R.A. No.
4670 is declared
unconstitutional
(i) It is not for the courts to fix the term
of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length
of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within
specific or designated limits will
constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation if not an outright intrusion
into or assumption of legislative power
Employees
Confederation v.
National Wages
Commission
G.R. No. 96169
September 24, 1991
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
Petitioners are questioning the
validity of R.A. No. 6727 Wage
Rationalization Act which provides
new wage rates, provides, among
other things, for various Regional
Tripartite Wages and productivity
Boards in charge of prescription of
minimum wage rates for all workers
in the various regions, and for a
National Wages and Productivity
Commission to review among other
functions wage levels determined by
the boards.
(i) Whether or not R.A.
No. 6727 is valid
(i) R.A. No. 6727
is valid
(i) The Commission noted that the
determination of wages generally
involves two methods: the floor‐wage
method and the salary‐ceiling method.
It is true that wage‐fixing, like rate‐
fixing, constitutes an act of Congress, it
is also true, however, that Congress
may delegate the power to fix rates
provided that it leaves standards and
the Commission has fulfilled this with
Art. 124.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs
Board
G.R. No. 161658
Dec. 23, 2003 COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6486 prescribing rules
and regulations for mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office
(i) Whether or not R.A.
9165’s mandatory drug
testing is constitutional
(i) Section 36(g)
og R.A. 9165 is
unconstitutional
Pimental argued that qualifications
under Sec. 3, Article 6 are the only
qualifications needed to be a candidate
in the elections. Constitution prevails
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Section 4.
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.
Section 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party‐list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party‐list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one‐half of the seats allocated to party‐list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
November 3, 2008 in connection with the May 10, 2004
elections
over administrative acts or laws
contrary to it.
> It can be argued that drug testing can
be optional but the provision in the R.A.
specified it to be mandatory hence,
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall
have to suffer to the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the
statutory demand
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781
October 6, 2000
COMELEC violated the legal
parameters of R.A. No. 7941 which
are: (1) 20% allocation (2) 2%
threshold (3) three seat limit (4)
(i) Is the 20% allocation
for party‐list
representatives
mandatory or merely a
(i) The 20%
allocation is not
mandatory and
merely a ceiling.
(i) First Issue: The Constitution simply
states “the party‐list representatives
shall constitute 20 % of the total
number of representatives including
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proportional representation ceiling?
(ii) Are the 2% threshold
requirement and 3 seat
limit constitutional?
How should the
additional seats of a
qualified party be
determined?
2% allocation
(ii) 3 seat limit is
constitutional
Method was
indicated in the
case
those under the party‐list” Section 5(2)
of Article VI is only a ceiling. A statute
remains a valid command of
sovereignty unless declared
unconstitutional.
(ii) Second Issue: All gov’t authority
emanates from the people, but is
exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient
no. of people. When the law is clear,
the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or
circumvention. Three seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest‐
representations into the legislature.
Third Issue: How to determine the
allocation:
(1) Rank and determine first party
(2) (No. of seats available to
legislative districts/.80) * .20 =
no. of seats available to party‐
list representatives.
Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Petitioners seek the disqualification
of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party‐list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented, not the
mainstream political parties, the non‐
marginalized or overrepresented
(i) Whether or not
political parties may
participate in party‐list
elections
(i) Political
parties may
participate in
party‐list
elections.
(i) First Issue: Under Sec. 5 Art. 6 of
Consti “members of the House of
Representatives may be elected
through a party‐list system of
registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.”
Commissioner Monsod and Sections 2
and 11 of R.A. 7941 further reiterated
this.
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(ii) Whether or not
party‐list system is
exclusive to
marginalized and
underrepresented
Whether or not
COMELEC committed
grave abuse of
discretion in
promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785
(ii) The spirit of
the party‐list
system is geared
towards
marginalized and
underrepresente
d
(ii) Second Issue: purpose of the party‐
list system was to give genuine power
to our people. Sec. 2 of R.A. 7941
mandates a proportional
representation by means of Filipino
style party‐list system. The emphasis is
on the “marginalized and
underrepresented” “lack of well‐
defined constituencies” and
“proportional representation.” It is not
enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented; they must belong in
these specific sectors and and factually
and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented. The party‐list
system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged. The intent is clear and
thus must be followed thoughout.
Ang Bagong Bayani‐
OFW Labor Party et
al., v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 147589
June 25, 2003
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
The instant Motions for
proclaimation contend that the
disqualification of many party‐list
orgs has reduced the “total number
of votes cast for the party‐list
elections.” Because of this, 2%
threshold has now been attained by
movants and thus pray for their
proclamation as winners.
(i) Should votes tallied
for the disqualified
candidates be
deducted?
(ii) Does the clause
“total number of votes
cast for the party‐list
elections” include only
ballots from qualified
parties.
(i) Votes tallied
for the
disqualified
candidates
should be
deducted.
Clause only
includes ballots
from qualified
parties.
(i) Subtracting the votes of disqualified
party‐list groups will make 2%
threshold attainable for marginalized
and underrepresented (proportional
representation)
(ii) Perceived “instability” can be
alleviated because COMELEC now has
the herein qualified and disqualified
participants’ list and COMELEC can now
be guided accordingly when accrediting
new candidates for the next party‐list
elections and will be able to set the
period for accreditation in such time
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and manner as to enable it to
determine their qualifications long
before the elections were held. There is
a need for patience and perseverance
in order to uphold the spirit of the law
of opening opportunities to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Banat v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179295
April 21, 2009
Ponente: Carpio, J.
A petition for certiorari and
mandamus assails the Resolution
promulgated on 3 August 2007.
(i) Is the 20% allocation
for party‐list
representatives
mandatory or merely a
ceiling?
(ii) Is the 3 limit seat
unconstitutional?
(iii) 2% threshold and
qualified voters
constitutional?
(iv) How shall the party‐
list representatives be
allocated?
(v) Does the
Constitution prohibit
the major political
(i) The 20%
allocation is
mandatory.
(ii) 3‐seat limit is
constitutional.
(iii) 2% threshold
is
unconstitutional
in the allocation
of additional
seats.
(v) Major political
parties are
disallowed and
(i) The Constitution left the manner of
allocating the seats available to party‐
list representatives to the wisdom of
the legislature.
(ii) New method is shown in the book.
(Table 3 pp.99‐100)
(iii) The Court finds that the 2%
threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats
when the number of available party‐list
seats exceeds 50. It frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House
of Representative shall consist of party‐
list representatives.
(iv) Follow Table 3 of pp. 99‐100 for the
method of allocating the additional
seats to the party‐list winners.
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parties from
participating in the
party‐list elections? If
not, can the major
political parties be
barred from
participating in the
party‐list elections?
are only allowed
on sectoral lines.
Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L‐114783
December 8, 1994
Ponente: Bitin, J.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality
of R.A. 7675 “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong”
Prior to enactment Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to one district.
Petitioners argue that act breaks the
one subject‐one bill rule since it also
tackles the separation of
Mandaluyong to San Juan. Separation
has resulted in the increase in the
composition of the House of
Representative and is also
preempting the rights of Congress to
reapportion the legislative districts.
(i) Whether or not
contentions have merit
(i) Contentions
do not have
merit
(i) Conversion of Mandaluyong to a
highly urbanized city is in compliance
with the “one city‐one representative”
proviso in the Constitution. Separation
from San Juan is a natural and logical
consequence of conversion to a highly
urbanized city. “One title‐one subject”
rule should be given practical rather
than technical construction. The said
act enjoys the presumption of being
passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of the
Congress of the minimum requirements
for the establishment of separate
legislative districts.
> Present limit of 250 members in
Congress not absolute because of the
“otherwise provided by law” proviso.
Congress itself drafted, deliberated,
enacted assailed law therefore it
cannot preempt itself on a right, which
pertains itself.
> No “gerrymandering” is present as
incumbent representative of San
Juan/Mandaluyong district’s powers is
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diminished and not favorable to him.
Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577
March 7, 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
Petitioners assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 7854 under
the ff. grounds: Sec. 2 did not
properly identify the proper land area
or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, Sec. 51 attempts
to alter or restart the “three‐
consecutive term” limit for local
elective officials, and Sec 52 is
unconstitutional for it increased the
legislative district of Makati only be
special law, increase was not stated
in the title of bill, and addition of
another legislation is not in accord
with Section 5(3).
(i) Whether or not there
is merit in
aforementioned
petitions
(i) The Court
finds no merit in
aforementioned
petitions
(i) Petitions failed to establish the
supposed confusion of not delineating
the territory of Makati. Section 2 did
not add or subtract and expressly
stated that area “shall comprise the
present territory of the municipality.”
Land area was not defined because an
ongoing dispute with Taguig was under
court litigation. So long as the territorial
jurisdiction is ascertained it may be
concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently
served.
> Reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special
law. Makati has met the minimum
requirements of 250,000 population
and thus legislative district can be
increased. Policy of Court favoring a
liberal construction of the “one title‐
one subject rule”
Montejo v. COMELEC
G.R. No.118702
March 16, 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
Petitioner pleads for the annulment
of Sec. 1 of Resolution No. 1736 of
COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte on the ground
that it violates the principle of
equality of representation. Petitioner
seeks to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from his district to the 2nd
district of the province.
Whether or not Section
1 of Resolution No. 2736
is void.
Section 1 of
Resolution No.
2736 is void.
Section 2 of the Ordinance (source of
power of COMELEC) only empowers
COMELEC to make minor adjustments
of the reapportionment herein made.
Minor adjustments do not include
transferring one municipality from one
district to another. The power granted
to COMELEC is to adjust the no. of
members “apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was
created.”
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 Art 6 Sec. 5 and Art. 10 Sec. 10, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 6.
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty‐five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party‐list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Gallego v. Verra
G.R. No. L‐48641
November 24, 1941
Ponente: Ozaeta, J.
A petition of certiorari to review the
decision of CA affirming CFI in
declaring petitioner’s win as mayor is
illegal.
Petitioner was a native of Abuyog,
Leyte. He studied in Samar. He found
Whether or not
petitioner is a resident
of Abuyog for at least 1
year prior to Dec. 10,
1940.
Petitioner has
maintained his
domicile of birth
in Leyte.
Despite working in several areas in the
country, specifically staying for 2 years
of in Malaybalay, petitioner always
returns to homeland. He ran for the
same office in Leyte and bought
property in Leyte. He kept close ties
with the people in the area and won
by a majority of 800 votes. There was
no clear intention of abandoning
G.R. No. 176970
December 8, 2008
converts and divides the City of
Cagayan de Oro as a local gov’t unit
and does not merely provide for the
city’s legislative apportionment.
authority to act of apportionment and
reapportionment is within the
Legislature. Art 6, Sec. 5 is a political
representation and the means to make
a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be
effectively heard. Sec. 5(4) specifically
mandates reapportionment as soon as
the given standards are met. In
contrast, Art. 10 Sec 10 talks of the
commencement, termination, and
modification of local gov’t units
corporate existence and territorial
coverage. Distinction between the two
articles is on the requirement of
plebiscite. No plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.
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work in Samar and in municipalities of
Leyte. He ran for mayor in his
hometown but lost and thus, he went
to Mindanao to search for a job. He
worked in Malaybalay but still
returned to his hometown whether to
deliberate on a job offer or to visit his
wife and kids who resided there. He
did not take the parcel of land offered
by the gov’t in Malaybalay and instead
kept real property in Leyte. He
registered himself as an elector in
Malaybalay and has stated that he had
resided there for a year and a half.
Respondent contends that petitioner
has already abandoned his domicile of
origin and transferred to a new
domicile. Petitioner states that CA
erred in holding him as aresident of
Bukidnon and that his election as
mayor of Leyte is null and void
domicile.
Romualdez‐Marcos v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
On March 8, 1995, petitioner provided
that she was residing for 7 months in
the First District of Leyte. Private
respondent contested that and said
petitioner did not meet the 1‐year
residency requirement. On March 29,
1995, petitioner changed the entry to
“since childhood” but the provincial
Election adviser in Leyte informed her
that it was too late already. Petitioner
Whether or not
petitioner was a
resident, for election
purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a
period of one year at
the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
Petitioner
possesses the
necessary
residence
qualifications for
election
purposes
The residence qualification in the 1987
Consti actually refers to domicile.
Domicile is one’s permanent home
with two elements: physical presence
in the area or having the intention to
go back.
It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his/her disqualification hence
upholding petitioner’s contention that
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contends that her first entry is an
honest misinterpretation and she has
always maintained Tacloban as her
domicile. Petitioner filed for motion
for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the case.
it was an honest misinterpretation.
Tacloban is petitioner’s domicile as
she was born and raised there, and
even when she moved to other cities
to find work and resided because of
her married life, she still visited the
place and kept close ties in the
community hence showing the
intention to return. Domicile of origin
is not easily lost unless there is an
actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning domicile, and acts
corresponding to the purpose. Also,
there is nothing in the Civil Code that
presupposes wife takes on the
domicile of her husband.
Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265
September 18, 1995
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Court agrees with COMELEC’s
contention that in order for petitioner
to qualify as candidate for
representation of the 2nd district of
Makati city, he must prove that he has
established not just residence but also
domicile.”
As found by COMELEC, petitioner
resided in Tarlac for 52 years. He was
born and raised there. Petitioner has
an agreement of lease of a condo unit
in Makati City and has admitted of
owning other properties in QC.
Whether or not
petitioner was able to
establish domicile in
Makati City
Petitiner was not
able to establish
domicile in
Makati City
The fact that petitioner himself claims
of other residences in Metro Manila
coupled with the short amount of time
he claimed to be a resident of Makati
indicates that the sole purpose of
transferring to a new residence is not
to establish domicile but to qualify for
elections. There is an absence of clear
and positive proof showing successful
abandonment of domicile.
Domino v. COMELEC Ponente: Davide, Jr., J. Whether or not the The judgment of First Issue: COMELEC has jurisdiction
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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G.R. No. 134015
July 19, 1999
A case of certiorari with a prayer for
preliminary injunction challenging the
disqualification of Juan Domino as
candidate for representative of the
Lone Legislative District of the
Province of Sarangani. Domino
maintains that he has complied with
the one‐year residency requirement
and has been residing there since Jan.
1997. He was disqualified because of
voter’s registration record and address
in QC. He also lacks the no. of days
from registration (June 22, 1997 –May
8, 1998)
Domino filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by
COMELEC. Hence, this petition.
judgment of the MTC of
QC declaring petitioner
resident of Sarangani is
final, conclusive and
binding;
Whether or not
petitioner herein
resided in the subject
congressional district for
at least 1 year;
Whether or not
respondent COMELEC
has jurisdiction in the
disqualification of
candidate
the MTC of QC
declaring
petitioner
resident of
Sarangani is final,
conclusive and
binding cannot
be sustained.
Petitioner did not
reside in the
subject
congressional
district for at
least 1 year
over a petition to deny due course to
or cancel certificate of candidacy.
MTC’s determination does not
preclude COMELEC’s determination.
Second Issue: petitioner lacks
intention in changing domiciles. Proofs
are lease of home in Sarangani,
registering for elections in the QC
area. Both intent and actual presence
in the district one intends to represent
must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by fundamental law.
Co v. House Electoral
Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191‐92
July 30, 1991
Petitioners asking for a reversal of the
decision of the HRET.
Background:
Private respondent’s grandfather, Ong
Te, came from China and acquired
land and certification in Samar. His
son, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China, but Ong Te brought him here.
Jose Ong Chuan met a Filipino girl, got
married, and bore their son in 1948.
On May 15, 1957, Ong Chuan took an
oath of allegiance to the Philippines
and around that time, the respondent
was only 9 years old.
When respondent became older, he
Whether or not HRET
acted with grave abuse
of discretion in declaring
Jose Ong, Jr. a natural‐
born citizen of the Phils.
HRET did not act
with grave abuse
of discretion
when it declared
Jose Ong, jr. a
natural‐born
citizen of the
Phils.
“Those born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.” – amended and
made to be retroactive as spirit and
intendment of the law must prevail
over the letter especially when the
latter results in absurdity and
injustice. Filipino father, alien mother
= natural born and alien father,
Filipino mother = natural born is on
equal footing.
Respondent is natural‐born. His
mother is a Filipina and his father is a
naturalized citizen when he was 9
years old. Because of his age, it would
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ran for public office and hence the
contention for his citizenship status.
be unusual if he undergone election
through a statement but since he
already exercised his right of suffrage
and established his life here in the
Phils and thus, he is a Filipino citizen.
“It was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such”
Bengzon v. Cruz
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
Cruz was a natural‐born citizen born
to Filipino parents in April 27, 1960.
(1935 Consti was in effect). Nov 5
1985 – Cruz swore allegiance to the US
without the consent of the Philippines
when he joined the marine corps. He
reacquired his citizenship through
repatriation under R.A. No. 2630.
Petitioner argues that respondent is
not anymore a natural‐born citizen of
the Phils because he got his status
from reacquisition but respondents
says that the phrase “from birth”
refers to the inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural‐born
citizen.
Whether or not Cruz, a
natural‐born Filipino
who became an
American citizen, can
still be considered a
natural‐born Filipino
through reacquisition.
Cruz can still be
considered a
natural‐born
citizen of the
Phils
There are 2 ways of getting Phil.
Citizenship: (1) by birth (2)
naturalization. Those natural‐born are
citizens who don’t need to go through
a process to perfect citizenship while
those naturalized went to a process to
prove that they possess all the
qualities and have no disqualifications
under Phil. Law. For Phil. Citizens who
lost their citizenship they can acquire
it through (1) naturalization (2)
repatriation (3) direct act from
Congress. Repatriation consists of
taking an oath of allegiance to the
Phils. and registering it to the Local
Civil Registry of the place of residence.
Repatriation results in the recovery of
original nationality. Cruz went through
repatriation and hence reacquired his
original natural‐born citizen status. He
is also not required by law to go
through the naturalization process
and hence, he is perforce to be a
natural‐born citizen.
Sandoval‐Gutierrez, J. dissenting:
respondent had to take certain acts to
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be a Filipino citizen again. The
provision on “natural‐born citizens” is
clear, precise, and definite. Citizen
cannot be considered natural‐born if
he went into acts of naturalization,
repatriation, legislation. Even if he
didn’t go through the tedious process
of naturalization, he still did
repatriation.
Valles v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000
August 9, 2000
The case is about the citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. She was born
with a Filipino father and an Australian
mother in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia. She was born a
year before the signing of the 1935
Constitution (May 16, 1934) and laws
governing before were the Philippine
bill and Jones law. Both laws stated
that all inhabitants of the Phils who
were Spanish subjects and their
children are deemed as Filipino
citizens.
Petitioner contends that private
respondent is not qualified since she is
a dual citizen, has renounced her
Filipino citizenship because of her
application of ACR and ICR.
Whether or not Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is qualified
to run for governor of
Davao Oriental even if
she is a dual citizen
Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez is qualified
to run for
governor even
with her dual
citizen
Philippines follow the jus sanguinis
principle – child follows the citizenship
of parents regardless of birth
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez did not
expressly renounce her citizenship in
her documents. Renunciation must be
express to be effective.
For dual citizenship to be counted as a
disqualification, it must refer to dual
allegiance. For candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon filing of
candidacy (this already terminates
their dual citizenship as this declares
the person is a Filipino citizen and is
willing to uphold and defend the
Philippine Constitution and ideals)
Section 7.
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
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Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991
Petitioner seems to confuse “term”
with “tenure.”
“The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature but the
period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure), may be
affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term
or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration
of the term of office.” (Topacio Nueno
v. Angeles 76 Phil. 12)
When an elected official covered
thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure,
not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its
unexpired portion.
Fariñas, et al. v.
Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 147387
December 10, 2003
Ponente: Callejo, Sr. J
Petitioners seek to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 14 of
the Republic Act 9006 (Fair Election
Act) based on the ff grounds:
1) It repeals Sec. 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
thus violating the one subject‐
one title policy. Sec 14 is a
proscribed rider because of
the differences between Sec.
67 of the OEC: Representative
Act 9006 primarily deals with
Whether or not
petitions have valid
points and have merit
Petitions do not
have valid points
and lacks merit.
Petitions are
DISMISSED.
1) Sec 14 is not a proscribed
rider. The provision in Sec
26(1) Art. 6 merely calls for all
parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in
the title. Court is convinced
that the title and the
objectives of Rep Act 9006 are
comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Sec 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Over time, Congress may find
it imperative to repeal the law
on its belief that the election
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the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election
propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election
practices while Sec 67 imposes
a limitation on election
officials who run for an office
other than the one they are
holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
2) Rep Act 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it
repeals Sec 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code and it
discriminates appointive
officials since they are still
considered ipso facto
3) Rep Act 9006 is null in its
entirety since it didn’t follow
due process (publication of
law before being effective)
4) Sec. 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is a good law
and is based on the
constitutional mandate of the
“Accountability of Public
Offices”
process is thereby enhanced
and the paramount objective
of election laws (fair, honest
and orderly) is achieved. It
cannot be claimed the
legislators were not apprised
of the repeal since it was
deliberated upon and even the
petitioners admit that they
have already expressed their
reservations beforehand.
2) Rep Act 9006 does not violate
the equal protection clause.
Equal protection clause is not
absolute but it is subject to
reasonable classification. It
does not demand absolute
equality among residents, it
merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and
conditions both as to
privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Substantial
distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and
appointive officials. Elective
officials got their office
through mandate, has a
definite term, can be removed
upon stringent conditions, and
allowed to take part in
electoral and political
activities. Appointive officials
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got their office through
appointing authority, holding
office may be in a permanent
capacity or at the pleasure of
the appointing authority, and
they are prohibited from
taking part in partisan political
activity.
3) The Enrolled Bill Doctrine is
applicable in this case. Under
the enrolled bill, the signing of
a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate
President and the certification
of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its
due enactment. The Court
finds no reason to deviate
from the salutary rule since
the irregularities petitioners
raised involves the internal
rules of Congress. “At any rate,
courts have declared that the
rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.”
“Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with
their observance, the courts
have no concern.”
4) Effectivity Clause is defective.
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But it does not render the
entire law invalid. Publication
is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the
usual 15‐period shall be
shortened or extended.
Main principle: courts do not
involve themselves with nor delve
into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch
of gov’t. Sole function of the court
is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of the
legislative power.
Section 8.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Codilla v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 150605
December 10, 2002
Ponente: Puno, J.
A petition for mandamus and quo
warranto assailing the holding of
office of respondent Victoria L. Locsin
despite losing to petitioner Codilla by
17,903 votes last May 14 2001
elections. Petitioner garnered 71,350
votes while respondent Locsin only
got 53,447 votes. COMELEC 2nd
Whether or not
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.
should be declared as
the duly‐elected
representative of the
4th district of Leyte.
Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr. should
be declared as
the duly‐elected
representative of
the 4th district of
Leyte.
The facts are settled and beyond
dispute. Respondent Locsin has not
challenged the Decision of the
COMELEC en banc before Supreme
Court and said decision has become
final and executor. Issue of who is the
rightful representative has been
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction
over the matter. The rule of law
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division initially proclaimed
respondent as winner but on motion
of reconsideration COMELEC en banc
reversed and proclaimed petitioner as
the rightful winner.
Petitioner gave a letter‐appeal to the
House of representatives but no
answer came. He sought the help of
party LAKAS NUCD‐UMDP to give a
letter to the House Speaker De
Venecia to which he replied that they
recognize the ruling of COMELEC but
Representative Locsin expressed that
she shall openly defy and disobey the
ruling of COMELEC and thus advised
the petitioner to take the matters into
Supreme Court.
demands that its Decision be obeyed
by all officials of the land.
Section 9.
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by
law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Tolentino v. COMELEC Ponente: Carpio, J.
In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term
expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated
w/ the appointment of then Sen.
Guingona as VP of the PH. The Senate
then adopted Resolutions which
certified the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate, called the COMELEC to fill
up the said vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously
(i) Procedural
a. Whether the petition
is in fact a petition for
quo warranto which the
Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole
judge,
(i) Procedural
a. Yes
The petition has no merit.
(i) Procedural Issues
a. YES, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction because what the
petitioners are questioning is the
validity of the special election in wc
Honasan was elected, NOT his right in
the exercise of his office as Senator. His
election is merely incidental to the
petitioner’s case of action.
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with the regular elections on May 14
2001, and declared that the
senatorial candidate garnering the
13th
highest number of votes shall serve
only for the
unexpired term of former
Sen. Guingona.
This is a petition for prohibition to set
aside the COMELEC’s Resolutions,
which the petitioners believe assail
the manner by which the special
election was conducted, violating the
precedents set by the 1951 & 1955
special elections, both of which were
held simultaneously & yet
DISTINCTLY w/ the regular general
elections. Thus, they pray that the
Court declare that NO special
elections were held & that the
COMELEC’s Resolutions that proclaim
the senatorial candidates who
obtained the 13th highest # of votes
be declared NULL & VOID.
…………………………………
Supplementary information
Petitioners contend that such
resolutions were issued w/o
jurisdiction because:
1. They failed to notify the
electorate of the position to
b. Whether the petition
is moot, and
c. Whether petitioners
have standing to
litigate.
(ii) On the merits,
whether a special
election to fill a vacant
3‐yr term Senate seat
was validly held on May
14, 2001.
b. Yes, but..
• Yes
c. Yes
b. Although the petition may be moot,
it is no bar for the Court to decide on its
resolution because the question of the
validity of a special election is likely to
be repeated
c. YES, the Court shall be liberal in
applying its rule of locus standi because
the issues raised are of transcendental
significance & paramount importance
to the people, for it involves the
people’s freedom of suffrage
(ii) On the merits, YES. A special
election to fill a vacant 3‐yr term Senate
seat was validly held on May 14 2001.
Although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY
w/ the requirements of R.A. 6645,
either strictly or substantially, it does
NOT invalidate the special election
BECAUSE (given that the special
election was held simultaneously with a
general election) the law already
imposes on the voters knowledge of
this statutory notice & the COMELEC’s
deficiency in allowing more notice
about it doesn’t negate having a special
election, and moreover, invalidating it.
> Had the election been exclusively a
special election for the House of
Representatives (as special elections for
Senate seats are ALWAYS with general
elections), the COMELEC’s deficiency of
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be filled in the special
election (required under R.A.
6645 Sec. 2),
2. It failed to require the
candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy
if they wanted to be elected
under special or regular
elections (required under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
Sec.73), and
3. It failed to specify in the
Voters Info Sheet if the
candidates were seeking
election under special or
regular elections (required
under R.A. 6646, Sec. 4,
paragraph 4)
failing to inform the public about said
special election will make electoral
process void as it will be well‐nigh
impossible for the voters in the
congressional district involved to know
the time and place of the special
election and the office to be filled
unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
> The test in determining the validity of
a special election in relation to the
failure to give notice of the special
election is whether the want of notice
has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the
result of the special election. In this
case, petitioners have neither claimed
nor proved that COMELEC’s failure to
give this required notice misled a
sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of the special
senatorial election or led them to
believe there was not such special
election.
> The May 14, 2001 special senatorial
elections cannot be declared null simply
because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to
canvass the votes separately. NO SUCH
REQUIREMENT EXISTS IN OUR
ELECTION LAWS. R.A. No. 6645 mere
requires that COMELEC fix the date of
the election if necessary and “state
among others the office or offices to be
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Section 10.
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Section 11.
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
voted for.” Furthermore, in the conduct
of the special elections, COMELECT
merely implemented the procedure
specified by Senate in Resolution No.
84 that “the senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term.”
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
People v. Jalosjos Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J.
Congressman Jalosjos (first district
ZamboNorte) was confined at the
national penitentiary while his case
for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness was pending appeal.
He filed a MOTION THAT HE BE
ALLOWED TO FULLY DISCHARGE THE
DUTIES of a Congressman, including
ATTENDANCE AT SESSIONS AND
(i) Whether or not
Jalosjos may attend
sessions despite his
imprisonment for a
non‐bailable offense,
which he committed
prior to his present
term?
(i) No Under the Constitution, privilege to be
free from arrest applies only if the
offense is punishable by less than 6
years of imprisonment. The accused has
not shown any reason why he should
be exempted from this.
The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the ABSENCE
IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The
confinement of a Congressman charged
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COMMITTEE HEARINGS, despite his
conviction for a non‐bailable offense.
He claims that his re‐election as
congressman proves as an
EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL,
and cannot be rendered inutile. (He
claims he has the MANDATE OF THE
SOVEREIGN WILL).
He further argues that under Sec
16(2), a Congressman’s function is to
attend sessions. He also relies on the
case of AGUINALDO involving the
administrative removal of a public
officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office where the
court said that a public officer should
not be removed from office for acts
done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be
depriving the right of the people to
elect their officers.
with a non‐bailable offense (more than
6 years) is certainly authorized by law,
and has constitutional foundations.
The R.A.TIONALE behind confinement is
PUBLIC SELF‐DEFENSE. Society must
protect itself, and serves as an example
and warning to others. A person is
taken into custody for purpose of the
administration of justice. It is the injury
to the public, which the State seeks to
redress in criminal cases.
The Aguinaldo case also does not apply.
It refers only to administrative removals
and NOT TO IMPRISONMENT ARISING
FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CRIMINAL LAW.
ELECTION TO HIGH GOVERNMENT
OFFICE DOES NOT FREE THE ACCUSED
FROM THE COMMON RESTR.A.INTS OF
GENER.A.L LAW.
What he is seeking is not mere
emergency or temporary leaves from
imprisonment. He is seeking to attend
congressional session and meetings for
5 days or more in a week. THIS WOULD
VIRTUALLY MAKE HIM A FREE MAN.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
(Additional plaintiffs:
Albert & Lukban)
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J: Case was
issued at the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
(i) Whether
Cabangbang’s letter is
privileged
communication: Does it
(i) No (i) It is obvious that in causing the
communication to be so published,
Cabangbang was NOT PERFORMING HIS
OFFICIAL DUTY, EITHER AS A MEMBER
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Jimenez (plaintiff) brought a suit for
the recovery of money as damages
for PUBLICATION OF A LIBELOUS
LETTER made by Cabangbang
(defendant). The former claims that
the Cabangbang letter is false and
intended to impeach his reputation,
expose him to public hatred,
contempt, dishonor and ridicule.
Cabangbang’s DEFENSE: (1) that the
letter was not libelous, and (2) it was
privileged communication.
According to Cabangbang, at the time
the letter was written, he was a
member of the House and the
Chairman of the House Committee
on National Defense.
The letter involved was an OPEN
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES dated November 14,
1959, when CONGRESS WAS NOT IN
SESSION. This was published in
several newspapers of general
circulation.
…………………………………
Supplementary information
The letter describes 3 OPLANS.
That there was an insidious plan or a
massive political buildup where DND
fall under “privileged
speech or debate”? Will
Cabangbang be held
liable?
OF CONGRESS OR A MEMBER OF ANY
COMMITTEE THEREOF.
Hence, the communication is not
absolutely privileged.
…………………………………
Supplementary information
Supreme Court: The Constitution
protects utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of:
1. Their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
and while the same is in session.
2. Bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not.
3. The acts performed by Congressmen
either in Congress or outside its
premises in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Secretary Vargas was plotting to
become the new President, that
P4‐million of intelligence funds are
allegedly being used to finance the
political campaign.
The letter mentions JIMENEZ AS ONE
OF THE PLANNERS of a COUP D’ETAT.
Cabangbang’s open letter also
recommended that Vargas resign and
that the AFP should stay away from
politics, and that all other intelligence
officials of the AFP should be
reassigned.
Antonino v. Valencia Ponente: Teehankee, J.
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal
Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the
Nacionalista Party in the election for
governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino
issued a statement that the loss was
caused by the support given by
Valencia, the Secretary of Public
Works, to the independent LP
candidate Maglana which caused a
division in LP votes. Antonino was
quoted in various newspapers that
had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and
“double‐crossed” them, the LP would
have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file
(i) Whether or not the
Press Release was
issued by Valencia
(i) Yes
(i) Yes, the fact that Valencia caused the
release and publication of the press
release is seen when the newspapers
reproduced the specific charges filed by
Antonino; the press release there was
marked “For release” under the date;
the press release indicated Valencia’s
answers to Antonino’s charges in the
same numerical order; the press
release said it came from Valencia; it
quoted Valencia and he admitted
making the statement in his office in
the presence of the press; the first page
of the press release consisted of quoted
statements by Valencia and reports and
information he received about
Antonino; it mentioned specific figures
which only Valencia could know given
the time constraint; and Valencia did
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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requests to have Valencia
investigated by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee on alleged
anomalous acquisitions of public
works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press
release that he will also file charges
with the Blue Ribbon Committee
regarding anomalous acts of the
Senator. This release was published
in newspapers.
Antonino filed this case of damages.
Valencia filed a counter‐claim. Lower
court ruled in favor of Antonino.
Valencia appealed. Antonino died
and was substituted by Senator
Antonino (Wife).
(ii) Whether or not the
Press Release was
libelous
(ii) Yes
not make any correction or denial of
the published statement!
(ii) Yes, because the statements issued
were defamatory and libelous in nature
as they imputed upon him certain
corrupt practices. Also, because the
statement was not issued privately or
officially, malice is presumed and such
presumption was not overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his
statements or that they were published
with good intentions and with a
justifiable motive or that they were
made in the exercise of the right of fair
comment on the character, good faith,
ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not
been motivated with malice, he would
have filed charges against Antonino
with the Senate seeing as Antonino was
not a candidate for election and that his
term as senator was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his
actions were justified in that Antonino
was first in making libelous statements.
The anomalous transactions charge was
duly filed with the Blue Ribbon. Also,
the statement on sabotage and double
crossing cannot be considered libelous
as contemporary politics shows that no
stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls
one who changes political parties.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 12.
All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business
interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors.
Section 13.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government‐owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Liban v. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352
July 15, 2009
Ponente: Carpio, J.:
This is a petition to declare Senator
Gordon (respondent) as having
forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Procedural:
1. Whether the Phil Natl
Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government‐owned or
controlled corporation,
2. Whether Sec.13
applies to the
respondent who is
Chairman of PNRC while
at the same time, is a
member of the Senate,
3. Whether respondent
should be automatically
removed as Senator
because accdg to the
relevant portions in said
article, no member of
the Congress may hold
any office (whether gov
No, the
petitioners have
no standing to
file this petition
THE GOVERNEMNT DOESN’T CONTROL
PNRC. THE PNRC IS NOT GOV‐OWNED,
BUT PRIVATELY OWNED.
…………………………………
Supplementary information
Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:
Action of the Government against
individuals relating to their usurpation
of a public office, position, or
franchised, may be commenced by
ONLY A VERIFIED PETITION brought in
the NAME OF THE RP against:
1. A person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position, or franchise,
2. A public officer who does or suffers
an act which by provision of law,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 14.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi‐judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government‐
owned or controlled)
during his term w/o
forfeiting his seat.
Substantive:
Whether the office of
the PNRC Chairman is a
gov office or an office in
a gov‐owned or
controlled corporation
for the purposes of the
prohibition mentioned
above relating to Art.
13.
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office, or
3. An association, which acts as a
corporation w/in the PH w/o being
legally incorporated or w/o lawful
authority to act.
Accdg to R.A. 95, or the PNRC Charter,
the PNRC is a private organization
performing public functions. It is a non‐
profit, donor‐funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization.
THE GOVERNEMNT DOESN’T CONTROL
PNRC. (accdg to the R.A., only 6 of the
36 members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the chief
executive. Thus, 24 members of the
board are not appointed by the Pres.)
THE PNRC IS NOT GOV‐OWNED, BUT
PRIVATELY OWNED. Vast majority are
private indivs and students. Under the
charter, if you contribute a certain
amount, you can become a member.
Thus, anyone from 6‐65 years old CAN
become a member, even foreigners.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Puyat v. De Guzman,
Jr.
113 SCR.A. 31 (1982)
Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J:
This is a case questioning the Order
of SEC granting Congressman
Estanislao Fernandez leave to
intervene in a SEC case.
Prior to this, there was an election
for the directors of Int’l Pipe
Industries (IPI). There were 2
factions: the Puyat Group and the
Acero Group.
The Acero Group instituted a QUO
WARR.A.NTO proceeding before the
SEC claiming that the votes were not
properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that
Congressman Fernandez orally
entered his appearance as counsel
for the Acero Group. Naturally, the
Puyat Group opposed Fernandez’
appearance as counsel citing that a
Congressman cannot appear as
counsel in any administrative
proceeding like SEC. So Assemblyman
Fernandez no longer appeared as
counsel.
Whether intervention in
the SEC case is in effect
an appearance as
counsel (indirectly)
before an
administrative body.
Yes Ordinarily, it seems that Fernandez was
not appearing as counsel as he was
theoretically appearing for the
protection of his ownership of 10
shares.
HOWEVER, certain salient
circumstances militate against this. The
FACT OF ACQUIRING A MERE P200
worth of stock of only 10 shares (out of
262,000) shows an OBVIOUS
CIRCUMVENTION OF THE RULE. He
acquired them AFTER THE FACT, after
the Quo Warranto proceedings had
been filed and one day before the
schedule SEC hearing. What’s more,
before he moved to intervene, he
already signified his intention to appear
as counsel for the Acero group, which
was earlier objected to.
Under those facts and circumstances,
there has been an INDIRECT
APPEAR.A.NCE AS COUNSEL BEFORE AN
ADMINISTR.A.TIVE BODY. The
“intervention” was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in SOME OTHER CAPACITY.
If we were to uphold the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 15.
The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16.
(1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two‐thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one‐fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
However, he later purchased 10
SHARES OF STOCK in IPI to qualify
him to run as Director. After the
purchase, Fernandez filed a Motion
for Intervention in the SEC case,
because now, Fernandez is owner of
10 shares.
SEC granted the motion.
“intervention”, then it would make the
constitutional prohibition ineffective.
All an Assemblyman has to do if he
wants to influence an administrative
body is to acquire minimal participation
in the “interest” of the client and then
“intervene” in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by
indirection.
SEC’s grant of Motion to Intervene is
reversed and set aside.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Avelino v. Cuenco Feb 18 – Senator Tanada requested 1) Does the court have 1) No 1) COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION. In
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
G.R. No. L‐ 2821
March 4, 1949
his right to speak on the floor to
formulate charges against Senate
President Avelino be reserved.
Request approved.
Feb 21 1949 – hours before the
opening of session, Senator Tanada
filed a
resolution enumerating the charges
against the Senate President and
ordering an investigation.
Senate President Avelino refused to
open the session at 10am. He
delayed
appearance at session hall until
11:35am. He read the charges against
him in
public.
At around 12pm, due to the insistent
demands of Senators Sanidad and
Cuenco, the session was finally called
to order. Sanidad however, moved
that the roll call be dispensed with.
Avelino’s allies, Senators Francisco
and Tirona, insisted that the roll be
called in an obvious conspiracy to
prevent Senator Tanada from
delivering his speech. The roll was
called.
Senator Tanada repeatedly stood up
jurisdiction?
2) Was the resolution
making Cuenco acting
president validly
approved? WAS THERE
MAJORITY TO
TR.A.NSACT BUSINESS
IN THE SENATE?
3) Can Avelino reclaim
his position?
2) Yes, if you
assume that SC
has jurisdiction
3) No
view of the separation of powers, and
the political nature of the controversy,
the Constitution grants the Senate the
power to elect its own president. It
cannot be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the Judiciary. The selection of
the senate president affects only the
senators themselves who are at liberty
to choose at any time their officers. The
remedy thus lies in the Senate Session
Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
2) ASSUMING THAT SC HAD
JURISDICTION, the session under
Senate President Pro‐Tempore Arranz
was VALID. It was merely a continuation
of the morning session and that a
MINORITY OF 10 SENATORS may not,
by leaving theSession hall, prevent the
MAJORITY OF 12 OTHER SENATORS
from passing a resolution with their
unanimous consent.
When the Constitution says that a
majority shall constitute a quorum,
“THE HOUSE DOES NOT MEAN ALL THE
MEMBERS.” Even a majority of all the
members constitute the House. There is
a difference between a majority of “ALL
THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE”, and a
majority of “THE HOUSE”.
Therefore, an absolute majority, that is
12, of all the members of the senate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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so that he could deliver his speech
but was continuously ignored by
Avelino. Avelino even threatened to
arrest any talking senator. Disorder
broke out in the gallery of the
Senate.
Senator David, moved for the
adjournment of session but Sanidad
still opposed.
Suddenly Avelino banged the gavel
and walked out of the session hall
(along with
David, Tirona and Francisco). The
pro‐Tanada senators remained.
Senate President Pro‐Tempore
Arranz, suggested that Cuenco take
over and
preside over the session. Cuenco did
and took the Chair.
Senator Tanada was able to deliver
his speech.
The position of Senate President was
declared vacant by a unanimous
resolution (#68), by those who were
still there.
Cuenco became Acting Senate
President, he took an oath and was
recognized by the President of the
Philippines the day after.
(23 only), constitutes constitutional
majority for the purpose of a quorum
to do business.
The office of the Senate President is
one that essentially depends on the will
of the majority of the senators.
Hence, Cuenco is the new Senate
President.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Avelino now filed a QUO
WARR.A.NTO proceeding to declare
him as the rightful
Senate President.
Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577
November 18, 1998
There was an election for Senate
President. There were 2 contenders,
Senator Fernan and Senator Tatad.
By a vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as
Senate President. (The 2 who voted
for Tatad were Miriam and Tatad,
himself!)
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested
that he was assuming the post as
minority leader since according to
him, only those who had voted for
him, belonged to the “minority.”
This was opposed by Senator Johnny
Flavier. He manifested that 7 LAKAS
NUCD Senators are also part of the
minority and they chose Senator
Guingona as minority leader.
Senator Guingona was recognized by
the Senate President as Minority
Leader.
Senators Santiago and Tatad
instituted QUO WARR.A.NTO
proceedings to oust
Senator Guingona as Minority
Leader, and to declare Tatad as the
(i) Does the court have
jurisdiction?
(ii) Whether or not the
Senate and its officials,
particularly Senate
President Fernan
committed a violation
of the constitution in
recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the Senate
minority leader? What
constitutes minority?
Was Section 16 (1) not
followed in the
selection of Senate
minority leader?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
(i) COURT HAS JURISDICTION.
MAJORITY IS DEFINED AS THE NUMBER
GREATER THAN HALF OR MORE THAN
HALF OF ANY TOTAL. Sec 16(1) simply
states that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than 1⁄2 of
ALL THE SENATORS. The Constitution
does not delineate who shall comprise
the majority, much less the minority.
While the Constitution mandates that
the senate president must be elected
by a number constituting MORE THAN
1⁄2 OF ALL THE MEMBERS THEREOF, it
does NOT provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall IPSO
FACT CONSTITUTE THE MINORITY. No
law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
HISTORY ALL SHOWS that “majority”
refers to the political party to which the
most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the “minority” normally referred
to a party with a lesser number of
members. MAJORITY = may also refer
to the group or party with the larger
number of votes, not necessarily more
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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rightful
minority leader.
Tatad argues that the term
“majority” refers to the group of
senators who voted
for the winning senate president and
accepted committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, they say that those who
voted for the losing nominee and
accepted no committee
chairmanships comprise the
“minority.”
than 1⁄2. è PLUR.A.LITY.
MINORITY = a group or party with a
small number of votes than the
majority.
Between 2 unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole, the greater
number would obviously be the
majority, while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more
than 2 unequal groupings, it is not as
easy to say which is the minority
entitled to select the leader, which will
represent all minorities. Because we
have a multi‐party system, there could
be several minority parties, one of
which has to be identified as the
dominant minority.
AS TO THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS IN
CONGRESS: While the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing the
Senate President and the House
Speaker, it is however, dead silent on
the manner of selecting the other
officers of Congress. The constitution
merely says that “each House shall
choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.” Hence, the method
of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of prerogative conferred by
the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(iii) Whether or not
there has been an
usurpation of office
thus calling for a quo
warranto proceeding
(iii) No
Such METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY
THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE
COURTS.
The RULES OF SENATE DO NOT
PROVIDE FOR THE POSITIONS OF
MAJORITY/ MINORITY LEADERS. In the
absence of and specific rules, THIS
COURT HAS NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO
DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF THE ACTS
OF THE SENATE. The Courts cannot
intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature.
(iii) If we were to uphold the contention
of Tatad and Santiago, that would
amount to judicial legislation. Since no
provision of the Constitution or any
other rule or law has been violated, NO
ABUSE OF POWER CAN BE SHOWN.
(Meaning Guingona acted correctly,
and Fernan also acted correctly in
recognizing Guingona as Minority
Leader).
Arroyo, et. Al. v. De
Venecia
G.R. No. 127255
August 14, 1997
Ponente: Mendoza, J:
Joker Arroyo brought a suit against
Speaker JDV, etc for the violation of
the Rules of House. They are
challenging also the passage of R.A.
8240 (which amended the NIRC by
imposing sin‐taxes on beer and
cigarettes,
(i) Was there grave
abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
when Congress enacted
R.A. 8240?
(i) No. Law
Remains Valid.
(i) What is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are MERELY INTERNAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE of the House rather than
the Constitutional requirements for the
enactment of law. Joker does not claim
that there was no quorum, but only
that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the House rules, he was
prevented from questioning the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The bill originated from the House, it
was approved on 3rd reading and
was transmitted to the Senate.
The Bicameral Conference
Committee submitted its report to
the House; Congressman Javier, Chair
of the ways and means committee,
delivered his sponsorship speech.
During interpellation, JOKER
ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING
TO QUESTION THE QUORUM,
ALTHOUGH UNTIL THE END OF HIS
INTERPELLATION, HE NEVER DID.
Joker challenged R.A. 8240 arguing
that is was passed in violation of the
rules of the House, which rules
embody the Constitutional mandate
in Sec 16(3). He argues that a
violation of the House rules is a
violation of the Consti itself.
Specifically, he alleges that:
1. The yeas or nays were not
asked, but was simply
approved only to prevent
him from questioning the
presence of a quorum.
2. The Chairman deliberately
ignored his questioning.
3. The Chairman refused to
recognize him and instead
presence of quorum.
Joker claims that the violation of house
rules is a violation of the constitution
itself. NO.
The rules adopted by deliberative
bodies (such as the House) are subject
to revocation, modification, or waiver
by the body adopting them.
PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY
PROCEDUR.A.L, AND WITH THEIR
OBSERVANCE, THE COURT HAS NO
CONCERN. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.
Mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will NOT invalidate
the action, when the requisite number
of members has agreed to a particular
measure.
The constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings.
The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is
a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within
the limitations suggested, and
ABSOLUTELY BEYOND THE CHALLENGE
OF ANY OTHER BODY.
The failure to regard the rule is NOT a
subject matter of judicial inquiry. A
legislative act will not be declared
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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proceeded to act on
4. Albano’s motion to declare the
report approved.
5. The Chairman suspended the
session without first ruling on
his questioning
6. That the session was hastily
adjourned to prevent him
from formally challenging the
existing of a quorum
invalid for non compliance with internal
rules. No court has ever declared an act
of the legislature void just because of
non‐compliance with rules of
procedure made by itself.
In this case, there is NO RULE IN THE
HOUSE which specifically requires that
in approving the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report, the Chair must
restate motion and conduct nominal
voting. The manner by which the report
was approved has a BASIS IN
LEGISLATIVE PR.A.CTICE.
The Constitution does NOT require that
the yeas and nays of the Members be
taken every time the House has to vote.
Only in the following instances were
yeas and nays are mandatory:
1) Last and 3rd reading of a bill
2) Request of 1/5 of the members
present
3) Repassing of a bill over the veto of
the President.
Also, while it is true that Albano moved
for adjournment, Joker could have at
least objected if there was anything he
wanted to say. THE FACT HOWEVER IS
THAT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING!! The
question he raised was not a point of
order nor a question of privilege
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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entitled to precedence.
As to the QUORUM, the roll call
established the existence of a quorum.
The question of a quorum cannot be
raised repeatedly, especially when the
quorum is obviously present.
LAW VALID.
Osmeña v. Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 (1960)
Osmeña (in his privileged speech)
charged President Garcia for
extending pardon for a price.
This prompted the creation of a
special committee to investigate the
accusations against Garcia. A House
Resolution No. 59 was passed,
requiring Osmeña to substantiate his
charges against President Garcia).
Osmeña submitted a petition for
injunction against Pendatun, etc who
are member of the Special
Committee created by the House
through Resolution No. 59.
Osmeña wants to annul that
Resolution on the ground that it
INFRINGES HIS PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY
He also claims that the statements he
made were no actionable.
(i) Can Osmeña be held
liable for his speech?
(i) Yes (i) The Constitution provides that the
speech or debates in Congress shall not
be questioned in any other place. They
are privileged speech. However, the
provision has always been understood
to mean that although EXEMPT FROM
PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTIONS for
the words uttered in Congress, THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY
NEVERTHELESS BE QUESTIONED IN
CONGRESS ITSELF.
Parliamentary immunity guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of
expression before the courts or any
other forum. BUT this is only OUTSIDE
THE CONGRESSIONAL HALLS. It does
not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
On the question of whether the speech
constitutes disorderly conduct, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Nevertheless, Osmeña was FOUND
GUILTY OF SERIOUS DISORDERLY
BEHAVIOR. He was suspended for 15
months. The Special Committee
invoked the Power of Congress to
Discipline Its Members.
Osmeña argues further: that the
House can no longer take action
against him because before
Resolution No. 59 had been
approved, the House had taken up
other business.
House is the sole judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior. These
are matters dependent on factual
circumstances which the House knows
best and cannot be presented in black
and white before the Courts. If the
court would review the act of the
House, then it is tantamount to giving
appellate jurisdiction to a co‐equal
branch of the government.
House Resolution No. 59 remains
VALID. The House has exclusive power
to discipline, the courts have no
jurisdiction to interfere. It is inherent
legislative prerogative to suspend.
Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 118364
August 10, 1996
(i) While Congressman Paredes was
still provincial governor, he was
charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violating the Anti‐Graft Law. On
his second term of congress, the
Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive
suspension on him pursuant to the
Anti‐Graft Law, prompting Paredes to
challenge the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to suspend a district
representative)
(i) Does the
Sandiganbayan have
authority to suspend a
district representative?
(i) No (i) Petitioner’s invocation of Section
16(3) does not apply. This is the power
of each House of Congress, inter alia, to
“punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,” and “suspend/expel a
Member” by a vote of 2/3 of all its
Members subject to the penalty of
suspension, which, when imposed,
should not exceed 60 days.
Such invocation mentioned does not
apply, as it appears to be distinct from
the suspension mentioned in Sec.13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, not considering the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on the
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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of the HoR of the Congress.
United States v. Pons
31 Phil. 729 (1916)
Ponente: Trent, J:
Information was filed against Pons
for illegal importation of opium (in
violation of ACT 2381). He was found
guilty and was sentenced to 2 years
in Bilibid Prison.
Pons appealed on the last day of the
special session of the Philippine
Legislature was on February 28,
contending that ACT 2381 was
passed only on MARCH 1, NOT
February 28. Hence, he cannot be
prosecuted.
According to the PUBLISHED
JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, (which
records all the proceedings), the
Assembly adjourned on February 28,
1914 at midnight. The journal shows
with absolute certainty that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight
on February 28.
Pons wanted the admission of
extraneous evidence to prove that it
was really on March 1 when the
Assembly adjourned. Pons insists that
it is of public knowledge that the
Assembly’s clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, and was left until
the determination of all other
(i) What is the real date
of adjournment of the
assembly?
(ii) Can Courts take
judicial notice thereof,
or is extraneous
evidence allowed to
prove otherwise?
(i) 12‐midnight,
February 28,
1914
(ii) Yes
TO INQUIRE INTO THE VER.A.CITY OF
THE JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE, WHEN
THEY ARE ALREADY CLEAR AND
EXPLICIT, WOULD BE TO VIOLATE THE
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TO INVADE A COORDINATE AND CO‐
EQUAL BR.A.NCH OF GOVERNMENT,
and TO INTERFERE WITH THE
LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
OF THE LEGISLATURE.
Since the journals clearly stated the
actual time of adjournment (12‐
midnight February 28, 1914), this
settles the question and the court
cannot go behind these journals.
Courts CAN take judicial notice of
Legislative Journals Courts are
bound to take judicial notice of what
the law is and to enable them to
determine whether the legal requisites
to the validity of a statute have been
complied with. It is their RIGHT AND
DUTY.
COURTS cannot go behind the journals
(cannot accept testimonial evidence) as
a matter of public policy and to ensure
stability. THEY ARE CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE AS TO THE DATE OF
ADJOURNMENT. Extraneous evidence
(such as the stopping of the clock)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
pending matters. The HANDS OF THE
CLOCK WERE KEPT IN THEIR LAST
POSITION, in order to enable the
Assembly to effect an adjournment
within the time fixed for a special
session.
Pons argues that by stopping the
clock, a resultant evil might result
because it alters the probative force
and character of legislative records.
On the other hand, the government
asserts that the contents of
legislative journals are conclusive
evidence as to the date of
adjournment.
cannot be admitted.
Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez
7 SCR.A. 347 (1963)
This is a review of the decision of the
Auditor General denying the claim for
refund by Casco.
Pursuant to the FOREX Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank issued a
circular fixing a uniform MARGIN FEE
OF 25% on FOREX TRNSX.
Casco, in order to import Urea and
Formaldehyde for its business,
bought FOREX and paid MARGIN
FEES.
However, it later claimed that Urea
and Formaldehyde are exempt from
the Margin Fees, hence they now
(i) Are the raw materials
UREA and
FORMALDEHYD exempt
based on the bill passed
in Congress?
(i) No (i) It is well settled that the ENROLLED
BILL – which uses the term “UREA
FORMALDEHYDE” instead of “UREA”
AND “FORMALDEHDYE” – is
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS as
regards the TENOR OF THE MEASURE
passed by Congress, and approved by
the President.
If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill, before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the President (which we
cannot speculate now), the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial legislation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
seek a refund of the margin fees
paid.
This was denied by the AG because it
says that only UREA FORMALDEHYDE
(the finished product) is exempt and
that UREA “AND” FORMALDEHEDY
(as raw materials) are not.
Casco claims however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the
conjunction “AND” between “UREA”
and “FORMALDEHYD”, and that
Congress intended these raw
materials to be exempt.
Astorga v. Villegas
56 SCR.A. 714 (1974)
A bill of local application was filed in
the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
passed 3rd reading without
amendments, referred to the
Committee on local governments,
which was approved with minor
amendment.
This minor amendment was that
“instead of the City Engineer, it will
be the President Pro Tempore of the
Municipal Board who will succeed
the Vice Mayor, in case the latter is
unable to act as Mayor”. (This is the
ROXAS AMENDMENT)
AT THE SENATE: Substantial
amendments were introduced by
Senator Tolentino (approved by the
(i) Whether R.A. 4065
actually became law
since it was not the bill
actually passed by
Congress and that it
lacked the approved
Tolentino Amendment.
(i) No. (i) IT NEVER BECAME LAW. ASTORGA
LOSES. Congress has devised a system
for authenticating bills duly approved,
by the signatures of their respective
presiding officers and secretaries
printed on the copy of the approved
bill. The function of this attestation
therefore is not of approval.
The enrolled bill doctrine is based
mainly on the respect due to the co‐
equal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department
to accept as having passed Congress, all
bills AUTHENTICATED IN THE MANNER
STATED. If the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity
of a statute, the courts may resort to
the journals and other records of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Senate). The Roxas Amendment does
not appear in the journal of the
Senate as having been acted upon.
Later, the Secretary of the Senate
sent a letter to the House, that the
House Bill has been passed by the
Senate with amendments. Attached
was a certification of amendment,
which was the Roxas Amendment,
and NOT the Tolentino Amendment
which were duly approved by the
Senate.
Naturally, Senator Tolentino made a
press statement saying that the
enrolled copy signed into law was a
wrong version!
Tolentino argues that the law signed
did not embody the Tolentino
Amendments which were introduced
and approved by the Senate.
The President of the Philippines
therefore was compelled to
withdraw his signature on the Bill.
As a result, VILLEGAS, THE MAYOR OF
MANILA, issued circulars to disregard
the R.A. 4065. He also ordered the
Chief of Police to recall the 5 officers
assigned to the Vice Mayor. Mayor
says that R.A. 4065 never became
Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
As far as the Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct
in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law making
process ends when the bill is approved
by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. IN OTHER WORDS,
THE APPROVAL BY CONGRESS AND NOT
THE SIGNATURES OF THE PRESIDING
OFFICERS which is essential.
Astorga’s claim that the attestation of
the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of the bill’s due
enactment HAS BEEN NEUTR.A.LIZED by
the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid, and issued a subsequent
certification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had
earlier signed had never been approved
by the Senate. Obviously, this
declaration has more weight that the
attestation which it invalidated.
Absent such attestation as a result of
the DISCLAIMER, and consequently
there being NO ENROLLED BILL to speak
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Section 17.
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Astorga v. Villegas
56 SCR.A. 714 (1974)
A bill of local application was filed in
the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
passed 3rd reading without
amendments, referred to the
Committee on local governments,
which was approved with minor
amendment.
This minor amendment was that
“instead of the City Engineer, it will
be the President Pro Tempore of the
Municipal Board who will succeed
the Vice Mayor, in case the latter is
unable to act as Mayor”. (This is the
ROXAS AMENDMENT)
AT THE SENATE: Substantial
amendments were introduced by
Senator Tolentino (approved by the
Senate). The Roxas Amendment does
not appear in the journal of the
Senate as having been acted upon.
Later, the Secretary of the Senate
sent a letter to the House, that the
House Bill has been passed by the
Senate with amendments. Attached
was a certification of amendment,
which was the Roxas Amendment,
and NOT the Tolentino Amendment
which were duly approved by the
Senate.
Naturally, Senator Tolentino made a
press statement saying that the
enrolled copy signed into law was a
wrong version!
Tolentino argues that the law signed
did not embody the Tolentino
Amendments which were introduced
(i) Whether R.A. 4065
actually became law
since it was not the bill
actually passed by
Congress and that it
lacked the approved
Tolentino Amendment.
(i) No. (i) IT NEVER BECAME LAW. ASTORGA
LOSES. Congress has devised a system
for authenticating bills duly approved,
by the signatures of their respective
presiding officers and secretaries
printed on the copy of the approved
bill. The function of this attestation
therefore is not of approval.
The enrolled bill doctrine is based
mainly on the respect due to the co‐
equal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department
to accept as having passed Congress, all
bills AUTHENTICATED IN THE MANNER
STATED. If the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity
of a statute, the courts may resort to
the journals and other records of the
Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
As far as the Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct
in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law making
process ends when the bill is approved
by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. IN OTHER WORDS,
THE APPROVAL BY CONGRESS AND NOT
THE SIGNATURES OF THE PRESIDING
OFFICERS which is essential.
Astorga’s claim that the attestation of
the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of the bill’s due
enactment HAS BEEN NEUTR.A.LIZED by
the fact that the Senate President
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party‐list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Angara v. Electoral
Commission
63 Phil. 134 (1936)
In the elections of September 17,
1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and
the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo, and Dionisio Mayo were
candidates for the position of
members of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial
board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member‐elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.
On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to
file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion
of Protest" against Angara and
praying, among other things, that
Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or
that the election of said position be
nullified.
On December 9, 1935, the Electoral
(i) Whether or not the
Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission
and the subject matter
of the controversy upon
the foregoing related
facts, and in the
affirmative,
(ii) Whether or not the
said Electoral
Commission acted
without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in
assuming to take
cognizance of the
protest filed against the
election of the herein
petitioner
notwithstanding the
previous confirmation
of such election by
resolution of the
National Assembly
(i) Yes
(ii) No
The Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against
the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly on Dec. 3,
1935, cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing protest against the
election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of protests within
such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe. The
petition for a writ of prohibition against
the electoral commission is hereby
denied, with cost against the petitioner.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Commission adopted a resolution
(No. 6) Angara contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral
Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case
Abbas, et al. v. Senate
166 SCR.A. 651 (1988)
Abbas filed an election contest
before the SET, against 22 candidates
of LABAN who were earlier
proclaimed as senators.
Abbas moved for the disqualification
/ INHIBITION of some senators (who
are part of the SET) on the ground
that they are all interested parties to
the case. He wanted MASS
DISQUALIFICATION of the 6 senators
who comprised the SET. (JPE,
Gonzales, Tito Guingona, Joey Lina,
Tamano, Ziga) He argues that such is
required by public policy, fair play
and due process.
Senator JPE in the meantime
voluntarily inhibited himself.
In effect, Abbas was also proposing
to amend the SET’s rules so as to
permit the
contest being decided by only 3
(i) May the senators be
disqualified from the
SET? Is the Abbas
proposal valid?
(i) No It seems quite clear that in providing for
the SET to be staffed by both SC
Justices and Senators, the Constitution
intended that both those judicial and
legislative components COMMONLY
SHARE the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the ERQ
of senators.
In fact, the prescribed ratio of Senators
to Justices is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable
indication that the legislative
component cannot be totally excluded
from participation in the resolution of
the contests. The proposed mass
disqualification would leave the SET no
alternative but to abandon a duty that
no other court or body can perform,
but which it cannot lawfully discharge is
shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying
that no Senator‐Member may inhibit or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
members (the 3 justices – Yap,
Narvasa, Gutz) Abbas proposes that
when more than 4 members are
disqualified, the remaining shall
constitute a quorum, and that if not
less than 3, it may adopt resolutions
by majority vote without abstention.
disqualify himself from sitting in the
SET. Every Senator‐Member of the SET
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of
the case when he sincerely feels that
his personal interests or biases would
stand in the way of objective and
impartial judgment.
BUT, what we are merely saying is that,
the SET cannot legally function as such,
absent its ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF
SENATORS, and that no amendment of
its rules can confer on the 3 remaining
Justice‐Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of senatorial election
contest.
Bondoc v. Pineda
G.R. No. 97710
September 26, 1991
Pineda (LDP) vs. Bondoc
(Nationalista). They are rival
candidates in the 4th district of
Pampanga. Pineda won by 3,300
votes and was proclaimed winner.
Bondoc filed a protest before the
HRET. The HRET ruled that Bondoc
won by a margin of 23 votes.
Moved by honesty, Congressman
CAMASURA of the LDP, told his LDP
party‐
mates that because Bondoc really
won, he was compelled to vote
against Pineda, consistent with truth
and justice.
(i) Whether Camasura
may be taken out of the
HRET, when he was
expelled from the LDP?
(i) No, because
expulsion from
the LDP party
due to “party
disloyalty” is not
valid ground for
expulsion from
HRET.
The ET was created to function as a
NONPARTISAN court even if 2/3 of its
members are politicians. It is a non‐
political body in the sea of politicians. It
was to be an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of
election contests. To be able to exercise
this exclusive jurisdiction, the ET must
be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election
contests is not to be share with the
Legislature nor the Courts.
The ET is a body separate and
independent of the legislature. While
composed of a majority of the
members of the legislature, it is an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
On the eve of the promulgation of
the Bondoc decision, LDP Chief Jose
Cojuangco
EXPELLED CAMASURA from the LDP,
stating that his act was inimical,
unethical, and immoral, and was a
complete betrayal to the cause and
loyalty to LDP.
The following day, a letter was sent
to the HRET Chair Justice Melencio‐
Herrera informing them that
Camasura’s nomination for the HRET
has been withdrawn by LDP, hence
they are rescinding Camasura’s
election for the HRET.
Because of this “distressing
development” the 3 Justices‐
Members (Herrera,
Cruz, Feliciano) of the HRET asked
that they be relieved from their
assignments at the HRET because
they felt that the unseating of an
incumbent member of Congress is
being prevented at all costs. They cite
political factors are blocking the
accomplishment of the task of the
HRET. The 3 justices are proposing
amendments to the composition of
the HRET that is: 3‐3‐3 (3 members
from party with largest vote, 3 for
second largest vote, 3 from the SC).
(ii) May the house
request the dominant
party to change the
party’s representation
in the HRET?
(iii) Can the house
reorganize
representation in the
HRET of the majority
party?
(ii) No.
(iii) No.
independent body.
The House Resolution removing
Camasura from the HRET because he
cast a vote against his party‐mate is a
clear IMPAIRMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PREPRROGATIVE OF
THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUGE OF THE
ELECTION CONTEST between Pineda
and Bondoc.
(ii‐iii) The House INTERFERED in the
work of the HRET, and in doing so
reduced the HRET into a mere tool for
the AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY
IN POWER (LDP), which the 3 justices
and the lone Nationalista member
would be powerless to stop.
As judges, the members of the tribunal
must be non‐partisan. They must
discharge their duties in complete
detachment and impartiality, even
independence from the political party
to which they belong. DISLOYALTY TO
THE PARTY, is not a valid ground for the
expulsion of a member of the HRET.
The purpose of his expulsion was to
nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so
that the HRET’s decision may not be
promulgated, and would clear the way
for LDP to nominate a replacement at
the HRET.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
The SC directed 3 justices to return to
the HRET.
The HRET resolved to cancel the
promulgation of the Bondoc ruling.
This is because without Camasura’s
vote, the decision lacks the
concurrence of 5 members as
required by the rules and therefore
cannot be validly promulgated.
Bondoc not being proclaimed, filed a
case to annul the decision of the
House to withdraw Camasura from
the HRET. Bondoc is seeking the
reinstatement of Camasura to the
HRET.
Pineda, on the other hand, prays for
the dismissal of the petition. He
argues that Congress is the sole
authority to nominate and elect from
its members, and that the House has
the sole power to remove any
member of the HRET whenever the
ration in representation of political
parties has materially changed. He
contends that Camasura’s expulsion
was purely a party affair, a political
question in the hands of the House,
and beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, Camasura has a RIGHT TO
SECURITY OF TENURE. Members of the
HRET, are like members of the judiciary,
who enjoy security of tenure.
Membership may not be terminated
except for just cause, such as:
expiration of term of office, death,
disability, resignation from the political
party he represents, etc.
Camasura’s expulsion is therefore null
and void. The expulsion of Camasura by
the House from the HRET was unjust
interference with the HRET’s
disposition in the Bondoc case, and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the
HRET’s decision.
The HRET’s decision in favor of Bondoc
is thereby PROMULGATED. Camasura
reinstated to HRET – House decision is
annulled.
Guerrero v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137004
Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify
respondent Fariñas as a candidate for
(i) Whether or not the
COMELEC has
(i) No (i) There is no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC when it
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
July 26, 2000 the position of Congressman in the
First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz
alleged that Fariñas had been
campaigning as a candidate for
Congressman in the May 11, 1998
polls, despite his failure to file a
certificate of candidacy for said
office. On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed
his certificate of candidacy
substituting candidate Chevylle
Fariñas who withdrew on April 3,
1998. On May 10, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition of
Ruiz for lack of merit.
After the election, Fariñas was duly
proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz
filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that Fariñas could not
validly substitute for Chevylle Fariñas,
since the latter was not the official
candidate of LAMMP, but was an
independent candidate. Another
person cannot substitute for an
independent candidate. Ruiz claimed
that Fariñas’ certificate of candidacy
was fatally defective. On June 3,
1988, Fariñas took his oath of office
as a member of the House of
Representatives. The COMELEC
dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
CLASS DISCUSSION:
committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding
that the determination
of the validity of the
certificate of candidacy
of respondent Fariñas is
already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of
the House of
Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
held that its jurisdiction over the case
had ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Fariñas as
Representative for the first district of
Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested
with the power to declare valid or
invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following
the proclamation and assumption of
the position by Fariñas is a recognition
of the jurisdictional boundaries
separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. Thus, the
COMELEC’s decision to discontinue
exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s
own jurisdiction and functions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
SC looked at "qualifications" rather
than election process which
concerned the manner in which
Fariñas took office.
Garcia et. al. v. HRET
G.R. No. 134792
August 12, 1999
Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J:
All duly registered voters in the
district (petitioners) filed for quo
warranto before the HRET against
Congressman Angping
(Representative for the 3rd District of
Manila). They questioned the
eligibility of the Congressman to hold
office in the House of
Representatives because the latter
was not a natural‐born citizen of the
PH, which was a constitutional
requirement. They pray that
Congressman Angping be declared
ineligible to assume or hold office as
a member of the lower house and for
the candidate who received the
highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidates to be
proclaimed the winner.
Petitioners filed the required P5k
filing fee, but the HRET later issued a
Resolution dismissing it for lack of
the P5k cash deposit. Petitioners
then paid said deposit and filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on the
same day, which was consequently
denied in view of HRET’s Rule 32
(i) Did HRET commit
grave abuse of
discretion in applying its
Rules strictly and in
dismissing the petition
for quo warranto?
(ii) Can the instant
petition for certiorari
prosper?
(i) No
(ii) No
(i) It was a judgment call of the HRET as
to whether or not it would apply its
rules strictly, which is clearly authorized
under its Rules. As long as the exercise
of discretion is based on well‐founded
factual and legal basis, as in this case,
no abuse of discretion can be imputed
to the Tribunal.
(ii) The function of the Court is merely
to check whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed in the
dismissal of the petition for quo
warranto before it. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will prosper only if there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion or
an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent
tribunal. There was an absence of such.
There is therefore no reason for the
Court to annul the decision of the
respondent or substitute it for its own
judgment. The instant petition must be
dismissed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
saying that the P5k cash deposit
should have been paid at the same
time they submitted the P5k filing
fee.
Pimentel, et. al. v.
HRET
G.R. No. 141489
November 29, 2002
Ponente: Carpio, J:
Before this Court are two original
petitions for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners
assail the composition of the HRET
and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). Petitioners pray
that respondents be ordered to
“alter, reorganize, reconstitute, and
reconfigure” the composition of the
HRET and the CA to include party‐list
representatives in accordance with
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of our
Consti, and R.A. 7941 (“Party‐List
System Act”), praying that the HRET
and the CA be enjoined from
exercising their fictions until they
have been reorganized.
(i) Whether the present
composition of the
HRET violates the
constitutional req of
proportional
representation because
there are no party‐list
reps in the HRET
(ii) Whether the present
membership of the
House in the CA violates
the same constitutional
req of proportional
representation because
there are no party‐list
reps in the CA
(iii) Whether the refusal
of the HRET and the CA
to reconstitute
themselves to include
party‐list reps
constitutes grave abuse
of discrection
(i) No
(ii) No
(iii) No
The direction of the House to choose its
members to the HRET and the CA is not
absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation, BUT under
the doctrine of the separation of
powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty.
The instant petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented
the party‐list groups in the House from
participating in the election of
members of the HRET and the CA. It
also doesn’t appear that after the May
11, 1998 elections, the House barred
the party‐list reps from seeking
membership in the HRET or CA. As the
primary recourse of the party‐list reps
lies with the lower house, the Court
cannot resolve the issues presented by
the petitioners this time.
It is a well‐settled rule that a
constitutional question will not be
heard and resolved by the courts unless
the following requirements of judicial
inquiry concur:
1) There must be an actual
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controversy
2) The person or part raising the
constitutional issue must have
a personal and substantial
interest in the resolution of the
controversy
3) The controversy must be raised
at the earliest reasonable
opportunity
4) The resolution of the
constitutional issue must be
indispensable to the final
determination of the
controversy
The petitioners also do not possess the
locus standi necessary to raise the
constitutional issue because in the first
place, they must have “such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” Such
petitioners have not alleged that they
are entitled to, or have even been
unlawfully deprived of seats in the
HRET and the CA. They have not even
claimed that they have been nominated
by the party‐list groups in the House to
the HRET and the CA.
Vinzons‐Chato v.
COMELEC
Unico has already been proclaimed
and taken his oath of office as a
(i) Should the Court
take cognizance of
(i) No
The court should not take cognizance of
Chato’ selection protest for it would
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G.R. No. 172131
April 2, 2007
Member of the HOR, hence,
COMELEC ruled that it had already
lost jurisdiction over petitioner
Chato’s election protest against
Unico regarding canvassing of returns
and alleged invalidityof Unico’s
proclamation. He then filed a special
civil action for certiorari in the SC.
Chato’s election
protest? If not, to who
is this issue best
addressed to?
(ii) Will his civil action
for certiorari prosper?
(ii) No
amount to usurpation of the
constitutionally mandated functions of
the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will
not prosper.
In an electoral contest where the
validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET.
It avoids duplicity of proceedings and a
clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies with due regard
to the people’s mandate.
Limkaichong v.
COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831‐32
April 1, 2009
Limkaichong ran as a representative
in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Paras, her rival, and some other
concerned citizens filed
disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly
not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was
born her father was still a Chinese
and that her mom, though Filipino
lost her citizenship by virtue of her
marriage to Limkaichong’s dad.
During the pendency of the case
against Limkaichong before the
COMELEC, Election day came and
votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over her rival
(i) Whether or not the
proclamation done by
the COMELEC is valid
(ii) Whether or not
COMELEC should still
exercise jurisdiction
over the matter
(i) Yes
(ii) No, the HRET
must instead
The proclamation of Limkaichong was
valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May
17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,
Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting
of the incorporated directive
suspending her proclamation. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively suspended the execution of
the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution. Since the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment
to the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2,
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Paras. COMELEC after due hearing
declared Limkaichong as disqualified.
About 2 days after the counting of
votes, COMELEC declared
Limkaichong as a disqualified
candidate. On the following days
however, notwithstanding their
proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the
recently conducted elections. This is
in compliance with Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy‐guidelines
of not suspending the proclamation
of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation
of the hearing and resolution of the
involved cases.
Paras countered the proclamation
and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’
petitioned arguing that since she is
now the proclaimed winner, the
COMELEC can no longer exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. It should
be the HRET which should exercise
jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC
agreed with Limkaichong.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure applies.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction
after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The
SC has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the
HOR, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to
hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the
latter’s election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the
word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution and in Section 250 of
the OEC underscores the exclusivity of
the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its
members.
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Section 18.
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party‐list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule
by a majority vote of all the Members.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Daza v. Singson
180 SCR.A. 496 (1989)
Raul Daza was a member of the
Comission of Appointments (CA),
representing LP.
LDP reorganized itself and 24
members of the LP resigned to join
LDP.
Because of this political re‐alignment,
the House revised the representation
in the
CA. The House withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza and gave this to the
newly‐ formed LDP. (Chavit Singson).
Daza filed a petition to challenge his
removal from the CA. He contends
that his election to the CA is
permanent and that reorganization in
the House is NOT based on a
permanent political re‐alignment
because the LDP is still not a duly
registered political party and that it
has not attained political stability. He
argues that a party must stand the
(i) Does the SC have
jurisdiction?
(ii) May LDP still be
represented at the CA
despite its being
unregistered?
(i) Yes
(ii) Yes
(i) The Court has jurisdiction. What is
involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of the House in
removing Daza from the CA. It is not a
political question. It is a legal question
on the manner of filling the CA, as
prescribed in the Constitution. Even
assuming that it were a political
question, the Courts still have the
expanded power to check whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction has been
committed.
(ii) DAZA loses. The COMELEC has
subsequently recognized LDP for
registration as a political party. This has
taken the wind out of the sails of Daza,
and he must now limp to shore as best
as he can.
> The LDP has been existence for more
than one year now. Its titular head is no
less than the President of the
Philippines ad its President is Senator
Gonzales. While there are still some
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test of time to prove permanence.
Singson countered by saying that
what is involved is a political
question. He argues that nowhere in
the Constitution is it required that
the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional
representation at the CA.
internal disagreements, these are to be
expected in any political organization.
In fact, even the monolithic Communist
Party has undergone similar dissension,
but surely it cannot be considered
temporary because of such discord. The
LDP now commands the biggest
following in the House, the party has
thus not only survived but in fact
prevailed.
> Hence, the House has the authority to
change its representation in the CA to
reflect AT ANY TIME, the changes that
may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is
understood that SUCH CHANGES MUST
BE PERMANENT and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation.
> Further, when the Liberal Party (Daza)
was allotted 2 seats in the CA, it did not
express any objection.
Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr.
187 SCR.A. 377 (1990)
On the Congressional Elections of
1987, Anna Dominique Coseteng was
the only candidate under KAIBA.
The members of the CA were also
elected, 11 coming from the
majority, and 1 from the coalesced
Majority.
A year later. LDP organized, which led
(i) Dose the court have
jurisdiction?
(i) Yes
Court has jurisdiction. Not a political
question. As held in Daza vs. Singson,
the issue in this case is the manner of
filling the CA and not the wisdom. Even
if the question were political, the court
still has the power to review grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction committed by
any branch or instrumentality of the
government by virtue of Article VII,
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to the reorganization of the
representation in the CA.
Coseteng wrote to Speaker Mitra
that as representative of KAIBA, she
should be appointed to the CA. This
was supported by 9 other
congressmen.
She later filed a petition for quo
warranto praying that the election of
some LDP congressmen in the CA be
nullified on the theory that it violated
the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because
the new majority – LDP (158 out of
202), would now be entitled to 9 seat
only. She claims that she has the
support of the 9 other congressmen
as well.
She further claims that CA members
should have been nominated and
elected by their respective political
parties.
The LDP congressmen opposed and
argued that KAIBA is part of the
coalesced majority which supports
the administration of Cory, and not
of the minority, hence she is bound
by the choice of the Coalesced
majority as to who shall sit in the CA.
(ii) Whether the
congressmen in the CA
were chosen on the
basis of proportional
representation from the
political parties?
(ii) Yes
Section 1 of the Constitution.
(ii) Coseteng loses. The composition of
the house membership in the CA was
BASED ON A PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL
PARTIES. There are 160 members of the
LDP in the house. They represent 80%
of the house. 80% of the 12 members in
the CA = 9.6 or 10. Hence the LDP is
entitled to 10 members in the CA. the
remaining 2 were apportioned to the
Liberal Party as the next largest party in
the Coalesced Majority, and the last
one to the KBL as the principal
opposition party. There is no doubt that
the apportionment in the CA was done
on the basis of proportional
representation of political parties in the
House.
> Even if KAIBA were to be considered
as an opposition party, its lone member
(Coseteng) represents only 0.4% of the
House membership, hence SHE IS NOT
ENTITLED TO ONE OF THE 12 SEATS IN
THE CA. To be able to claim
proportional representation, a political
party should represent at least 8.4% of
the house membership, that is at least
17 congressmen.
> The endorsement of 9 other
congressmen in favor of Coseteng is
inconsequential because they are not
members of her party. The claim that
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the members in the CA should be
nominated and elected by their
respective political parties is untenable.
The members have been nominated
and elective by the House (not by their
party) as provided for in the
Constitution.
Guingona, Jr. v.
Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971
October 20, 1992
Based on the rule of proportional
representation from political parties,
a compromise was reached for the
election of members of the CA.
However, Lakas was given only 1 (and
not 2) because the 1.5 was not
rounded off.
The 8 senators from LDP chosen for
CA were: Angara, Herrera, Alvarez,
Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and
Romulo.
Guingona (LAKAS) opposed the
nomination of Romulo. Guingona
also questioned the appointment of
Tanada as lone representative of LP.
Based on the mathematical
computation of proportional
representation, each of the political
parties are entitled to additional 0.5
seat, Guingona claims that by the
election of Romulo and Tanada, it
unduly increased the membership of
LDP and the LP, and reduced the
(i) Court’s jurisdiction?
(ii) What should be
done to the 0.5 seat to
which each of them is
entitled?
(i) Yes
(ii) There is
nothing to stop
political parties
from forming a
coalition with
another political
party in order to
fill up the two
vacancies
resulting from
the fractional
seat each party is
entitled to.
(i) Court has jurisdiction. The legality of
the filling up of membership of the CA
is a justiciable issue, not a political
question.
(ii) The LDP majority converted its
fractional half into a whole number, for
an additional of one senator, enabling it
to elect its 8th member, Romulo. In
doing so, the other party’s fractional
representation was correspondingly
reduced leaving that party’s
representation in CA to less than their
representation in the Senate. This is
CLEARLY A VIOLATION OF THE SECTION
18, because it is no longer in
compliance with the mandate that
MEMBERSHIP IN THE CA SHOULD BE
BASED ON THE PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES. The election of Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP, and
reduced the representation of either
the Lakas or NPC.
> By adding together 2 halves to make a
whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it
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membership of Lakas, and NPC.
(iii) Must the 12
members in the CA be
always filled?
(iii) No. So long
as the necessary
number for
quorum is met,
the CA may
exercise its
functions.
will give LDP an added member in the
CA, by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political
party, who is deprived of half a
representation. Section 18 is
mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the majority
party in the Senate.
> GUIDELINES:
1) In the senate, a political party must
have at least 2 duly elected senators to
be entitled to a seat in the CA.
2) Where there are more than 2
political parties represented, a political
party with a single senator in the
Senate cannot claim a seat in the CA.
(Differs from the case of Senator
Lorenzo Tañada where he was lone
minority, and the 23 came from the
same party)
(iii) The constitution does NOT
contemplate that the CA must always
include 12 senators and 12
congressmen. What the constitution
requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire membership. The
constitution does NOT require the
election and presence of 12 senators
and 12 congressmen in order that the
CA may function properly. THEY NEED
NOT BE FULLY CONSTITUTED (even if
the constitution provides for their
composition) to perform their
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Section 19.
The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.
Section 20.
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be
audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
Section 21.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
functions.
> The election of ROMULO (LDP) and
TANADA (LP) was clearly a violation of
Section 18. Their nomination was done
by sheer force of superiority in
numbers and was done in grave abuse
of discretion.
> IN SHORT, fractional seats should
never be rounded off. The seats should
be vacant.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon
Committee
G.R. No. L‐89914
November 20, 1991
This is a petition for prohibition to
enjoin SBR from requiring Bengzon to
testify regarding the sale of equity of
Kokoy Romualdez to Cory Aquino’s
relative Ricardo Lopa.
Case was about the control over the
biggest business enterprises in the
(i) Does the court have
jurisdiction over this
case? Can senate
conduct inquiry?
(i) Yes COURT HAS JURISDICTION to
determine the scope and extent of the
power of the SBRC to conduct inquiries
into the private affairs in purported aid
of legislation.
BUT there are limits on Congress’
power. The power of both houses to
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Philippines through massive infusion
of government funds thru Kokoy
Romualdez, and with the aid of
BENGZON LAW OFFICE who allegedly
maneuvered funds using dummy
corporations.
Senate minority floor leader JPE
delivered a speech before the Senate
on the alleged take over of one
company by Ricardo Lopa (Cory’s
brother‐in‐law), but contained
nothing about it being in aid of
legislation. They merely wanted an
investigatn.
The matter was referred to the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
(SBRC). Bengzon and Lopa were
subpoenaed but declined to testify.
EARLIER, civil cases were filed by
PCGG before the Sandiganbayan to
recover ill‐ gotten wealth of
Romualdez. The cases impleaded
Bengzon.
NOW, Bengzon claims that testifying
before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee might unduly prejudice
them in the cases before the
Sandiganbayan.
They claim that
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
NOT ABSOLUTE. The investigation must
be:
1) in aid of legislation,
2) in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure
3) the rights of persons appearing or
affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The Rules of SBRC provide that the
senate may refer to any committee any
speech filed by a senator which in its
judgment requires legislation. TO
ASCERTAIN THE CHARACTER OR
NATURE OF INQUIRY, resort to the
SPEECH under which such inquiry is
proposed to be made.
Here, THE SPEECH OF ENRILE
CONTAINED NO SUGGESTION OF
CONTEMPLATED LEGISLATION. He is
merely calling upon the senate to look
into the possible violation by the
President on prohibition of certain
relatives in gov’t dealings. NO
INTENDED LEGISLATION IS INVOLVED
HERE. Thus it is NOT IN AID OF
LEGISLATION.
Also, since there is a pending case
before the Sandiganbayan. There is a
possibility of conflicting judgments
between legislative and judicial bodies,
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1) The Blue Ribbon has no valid
legislative purpose (not in aid of legis)
2) The sale of the Romualdez corp is
purely a private affair.
3) The inquiry would violate their
right to due process
and influence of Committee judgment
on court judgment. (Separation of
powers).
Sabio v. Gordon
G.R. No. 174177
October 17, 2006
Former President Cory issued EO No.
1 creating the PCGG. She entrusted
upon this body the task of recovering
the ill‐gotten wealth accumulated by
the deposed President Marcos and
his close associates. To ensure the
PCGG’s unhampered performance of
its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1
provides that: “No member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.”
20 years later, the Senate invited
PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be
one of the resource persons in a
Senate investigation. However,
Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of
E.O. No. 1.
(i) May Section 4 (b) of
E.O. No. 1 be invoked by
Chairman Sabio to
justify non‐appearance
on legislative
investigations?
(i) No Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared
REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.
The Congress’ power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to
government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions
are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish.”
Note: Article VI, Section 21 grants the
power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but
also to any of their respective
committees.
Standard Chartered
Bank v. Senate
Committee
G.R. No. 167173
December 27, 2007
Ponente: Nachura, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition (with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Injunction)
(i) Whether or not the
respondent can conduct
investigation against the
petitioner despite
criminal and civil cases
(i) No, petition is
denied
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon committee, the petitioners
claim that since the issue of whether or
not SCB‐Philippines illegally sold
unregistered foreign securities is
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dated and filed on March 11, 2005,
by petitioners against respondent,
wherein Financial Institutions and
Currencies is represented by the
respondent’s Chairperson, Edgardo
Angara.
On Feb 1, 2005, Senator Enrile, Vice
Chair of respondent, delivered a
speech entitled, “Arrogance of
Wealth” before the Senate,
denouncing the petitioners for seling
unregistered foreign securities in
violation of the Securities Regulation
Code, and urging the Senate to
conduct an inquiry immediately, in
aid of legislation, to prevent the same
occurrence from happening in the
future. Through Senator Pangilinan,
the speech was referred to the
respondent. Prior to the privileged
speech, Enrile ha introduced PS
Resolution 166, “DIRECTING THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE
OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH‐RISK
SECURITIES BY STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED
IN BILIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO
THE INVESTIGATING PUBLIC.”
CLASS DISCUSSION:
against the latter
pending in courts
already preempted by the courts that
took cognizance of the foregoing cases,
the Senate Committee, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in these
courts. Petitioner’s argument does not
apply squarely to this case.
Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon,
that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
was without any constitutional mooring
to conduct the legislative investigation,
was the Court’s determination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation. The Court found that
Enrile’s speech merely called upon the
Senate to look into the possible
violations in R.A. 3019. The
unmistakable objective of the
investigation, as set forth in the
resolution, exposes the petitioners’’
allegation that the inquiry, as initiated
in a privilege speech by the very same
Enrile, was simply “to denounce the
illegal practice committed by a foreign
bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities”. This fallacy made more
glaring when we consider that, at the
conclusion of the privilege speech,
Enrile urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry with the help of
legislation, to prevent such acts in the
future.
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‐ very clear that it was in aid of
legislation
Indeed, the mere filing or an
administrative complaint before a court
of quasi‐judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through
the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
Senate Blue Ribbon v.
Judge Majaducon
Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J:
This case involves consolidated petitions:
1) For certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and preliminary
injunction, assailing the resolution
dated Nov. 11, 1998 of Judge
Madajucon (defendant) of the RTC
of GenSan City, Branch 23, which
denied the petitioner motion to
dismiss the petition for
prohibition, injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction filed by
private respondent Atty. Flaviano;
2) For review of the resolution dated
April 15, 1999 of respondent
Judge Majaducon declaring
petitioner Senator Pimentel guilty
of contempt of court.
Was the TRO issued by
Judge Majaducon ordering
the Senate to cease and
desist from proceeding with
its hearing valid?
No
The principle of separation of powers
essentially means that legislation belongs to
Congress, execution to the Executive, and
settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the
domain of the others. The RTC of GenSan City
or any court, for that matter, had no authority
to prohibit the Senate committee from
requiring the respondent (Atty. Flaviano) to
appear and testify before it.
The Bill of Rights grants respect to the rights
to a person appearing in or affected by such
inquiries mentioned above. However, this
must be exercised subject to constitutional
limitations, particularly adhering to
governmental action. In the case at bar, such
legislative action taken by the Senate to
secure the testimony of Flaviano.
There also exists the implicit limitation that
the legislature’s power to commit a witness
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 22.
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
only the heads of departments need consent of President.
Basically…
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
conducted an inquiry on the alleged
irregularities in the funds used by the
Armed Forces Retirement and Separation
Benefits system (AFP‐RSBS). This was
becase Senator Blas Ople filed a resolution
to the Committee on National Defense and
Security to investigate charges concerning a
group of active and retired military officials
planning a coup d’état to prevent then
President Estrada’s admin from probing
into such alleged irregularities. The said
Committee subpoenaed Atty. Flaviano to
appear before it and testify to such
charges, but the counsel refused to appear
at the hearing. Instead, he secured a TRO
against the Senate issued by Judge
Majaducon of RTC Branch 23 of GenSan
City.
for contempt terminates when the legislative
body ceases to exist upon its final
adjournment. “This must be so, inasmuch as
the basis of the power to impose such a
penalty is the right which the legislature has
to self‐preservation, and which right is
enforceable during the existence of the
legislative body.”
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777
April 20, 2006
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
September 21‐23, 2005 The
Committee of the Senate as a whole
(i) Whether E.O. 464
contravenes the power
of inquiry vested in
Congress.
(i) Section 2(b)
and 3 are invalid,
while Sections 1
and 2(a) are
(i) Validity of Section 1
> The coverage of department heads
under Section 1 is not made to depend
on the department heads possession of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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issued various invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear on Sept.29 as
resource speakers in a public hearing
on the North Rail Project. The
hearing was sparked by alleged
overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract.
September 28, 2005
Senate President Franklin Drilon
received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita a letter(s) requesting
for postponement of the hearing.
The president issued E.O. No. 464
which required “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of
Congress.”
Sen. Drilon received another letter
from Sec. Ermita informing him that
the invited executive branch officials
will not be able to attend as they
have not secured the consent of the
president.
AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Generoso
Senga sent a letter to Sen. Biazon
informing “that per instruction of
[Pres. Arroyo], thru Secretary of
National Defense no officer of the
AFP is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings
valid.
any information which might be
covered by executive privilege.
> “Question Hour” (where attendance
is discretionary) under Section 22,
Article VI needs to be differentiated
from Section 21 which provides for the
power of either Houses of Congress to
“conduct inquiries in aid of legislation”
(where attendance is compulsory).
> The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid. It cannot be
applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
> Section 2(b) virtually states that
executive privilege actually covers
persons. The doctrine is misused
because it is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of
information and not to categories of
persons.
> While Section 2(a) enumerates the
types of information that are covered
by the privilege under the challenged
order, Congress is left to speculate as to
which among them is being referred to
by the executive, or on how the
requested information could be
classified as privileged. It does not
suffice to merely declare that President
has determined that a piece of
information is so privileged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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without seeking a written approval
from the President.”
October 3, 2005 3 petitions (G.R.
169659, 169660, 169667) for
certiorari and prohibition were filed
challenging the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 464.
(ii) Whether E.O. 464
violates the right of the
people to information
on matters of public
concern.
(iii) Whether
respondents have
committed grave abuse
of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464
prior to its publication
in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(ii) The right of
the people to
information
cannot be called
to surface
because not all
exercises of the
legislative of its
power of inquiry
finds its root in
the people’s right
to information.
(iii) While E.O.
464 applies only
to officials of the
executive
branch, it does
not follow that
the same is
exempt from the
> An improperly asserted claim of
privilege is no claim of privilege.
> The need to ensure respect for
officials does not change the infirm
nature of the authorization of the
executive order.
(ii) The right to information does not
grant a citizen power to exact
testimony from government officials.
This power belongs only to Congress
and not to an individual citizen. The
right to information follows the
Congress’ power of inquiry only in a
highly qualified sense.
> To the extent that investigations in
aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit
disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public
concern.
(iii) E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the
right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. It is,
therefore a matter of public interest
which members of the body politic may
question before this court. Due process
thus requires that the people should
have been apprised of this issuance
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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need for
publication.
before it was implemented.
Neri v. Senate
Committee
G.R. No. 180643
September 4, 2008
Motion for reconsideration for the SC
decision granting the petition for
certiorari filed by Petitioner Romulo
Neri against respondent Senate
Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,
Trade and Commerce, and National
Defense and Security (“respondent
Committees”).
In the investigation regarding the
NBN‐ZTE deal, the respondent
committees required the petitioner
to answer the following questions:
(a) Whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN‐ZTE Project, (b)
Whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve it.
November 20, 2007 petitioner did
not appear before respondent
committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive
privilege.
Petitioner was issued with a
contempt order, but he insisted that
he had not shown any contemptible
conduct worthy of contempt and
arrest. He emphasized his willingness
to testify on new matters, but
(i) Whether or not there
is a recognized
presumptive
presidential
communications
privilege in our legal
system.
(ii) Whether or not
there is factual or legal
basis to hold that the
communications
elicited by the 3
questions are covered
by executive privilege.
(i) While
executive
privilege is a
constitutional
concept, a claim
thereof may be
valid or not
depending on
the ground
invoked to justify
it and the
context in which
it is made.
(ii) FIRST The
power to enter
into an executive
agreement is a
“quintessential
and non‐
delegable
presidential
power”.
SECOND, the
doctrine of
operational
proximity was
laid down
precisely to limit
the scope of the
presidential
communications
(i) In this case, it was the President
herself, through Executive Secretary
Ermita, who invoked executive privilege
on a specific matter involving an
executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the
subject of the 3 questions propounded
to petitioner Neri in the course of the
Senate Committees investigation.
(ii)
> The fact that a power (i.e. to secure a
foreign loan) is subject to the
concurrence of another entity (i.e. the
Monetary Board) does not make such
power less executive. The fact that the
president has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, does not diminish the executive
nature of the power.
> The danger of expanding the privilege
“to a large swath of the executive
branch” is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the
Cabinet i.e. her official family.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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respondent committees did not
respond to his request for advance
notice fo questions.
(iii) Whether or not
respondent committees
have shown that the
communications
elicited by the 3
questions are critical to
the exercise of their
functions.
(iv) Whether or not
respondent committees
committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing
the contempt order.
privilege, but in
any case, it is not
conclusive.
THIRD, the
president’s claim
of executive
privilege is not
merely based on
a generalized
interest.
(iii) The
respondent
committees have
failed to show
adequate
compelling need
that would justify
limitation of the
privilege.
(iv) Respondent
committees
committed grave
abuse of
discretion in
issuing the
contempt order
as the demands
of the petitioner
to be furnished a
copy of the
> The letter of Executive Secretary
Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relations with
another sovereign nation as the bases
for the claim.
(iii) The presumption in favor of the
Presidential communications puts the
burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the
presumption by demonstrating their
specific need for the information. Here,
there is simply a generalized assertion
that the information is pertinent to the
exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non‐specific reference to
pending Senate bills.
(iv) Witnesses have their constitutional
right to due process. They should be
adequately informed what matters are
to be covered by the inquiry, It will also
allow them to prepare the pertinent
information and documents, To our
mind, these requirements concede too
little political costs or burdens on the
part of the Congress when viewed vis‐à‐
vis the immensity of its power of
inquiry.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 23.
(1) The Congress, by a vote of two‐thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Section 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re‐enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
questions in
advance is
reasonable.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 26.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Garcia v. Mata
65 SCR.A. 517 (1975)
Ponente: Castro, J.
A petition for certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of First Instance
of Q.C., Branch XI in Civil Case 1‐
13466 declaring paragraph 11 of the
“Special Provisions for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines” of R.A. No.
1600 unconstitutional and there
invalid and inoperative.
(i) Whether or not the
provision in question is
a rider with no
relevance to any
appropriation item
contained in the act.
(i) Judgment of
the lower court
affirmed.
(i) The incongruity and irrelevancy are
already evident. While R.A. No. 1600
appropraited money for the operation
of the Government for the fiscal year
1956‐1957, the said paragraph 11
refers to the fundamental
governmental policy matters of the
calling to active duty and the reversion
to inactive status of reserve officers in
the AFP.
Demetria v. Alba
148 SCR.A. 208 (1987)
Ponente: Fernan, J.
Petition for prohibition with paryer
for writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality
of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
P.D. No.1177 otherwise known as
the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977”.
(i) Whether or not
assailed section is in
conflict with Section
16(5) of Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution.
(i) Conflict is
readily
perceivable as
the decree
unduly
overextends
presidential
powers.
(i) Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
empowers the president to
indiscriminately transfer funds from on
department, bureau, office or agency of
the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any
department bureau or office included
in the General Appropriations Act,
without regard as to whether or not the
fund to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Tio v. Videogram
Regulatory Board
151 SCR.A. 208 (1987)
Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J.
P.D. No. 1987 (An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board)
November 5, 1985 P.D. No. 1994
amended the National Internal
Revenue Code.
(i) Whether or not
Section 10 thereof,
which imposes a tax of
30% on the gross
receipts payable to the
local government is a
RIDER and the same is
not germane to the
subject matter thereof,
thus making the decree
unconstitutional.
(i) The petition is
without merit
because the
constitutional
requirement as
to the title of the
bill should not be
so narrowly
construed as to
cripple or
impede the
power of
legislation.
(i) The foregoing provision is allied and
germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of,
the general objects of the decree which
is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory
Board. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. The express
purpose of the decree to include
taxation of the video industry in order
to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles
2 and 5 (see p.254 for complete
preamble of decree).
Phil. Judges
Association v. Prado
G.R. No. 105371
November 11, 1993
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as
implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
9228. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its
Register of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
(i) Whether or not the
law is unconstitutional
because its title
embraces more than
one subject and does
not express its purpose.
(ii) Whether or not it
violate the constitution
as it did not pass the
(i) The title of the
act does not
violate the
constitution
because its
sections are
germane to the
title.
(ii) While it is
true that a
conference
(i) The title of the bill is not required to
be an index to the body of the act, or to
be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been
held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature of
the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
(ii) A conference committee may deal
generally with the subject matter or it
may be limited to resolving the precise
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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required readings in
both houses of
Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its
final form were not
distributed among the
members before its
passage.
(iii) Whether or not it is
discriminatory and
encroaches on the
independence of the
Judiciary.
committee is the
mechanism for
compromising
differences
between the
Senate and the
House, it is not
limited in its
jurisdiction to
this question.
(iii) It is violative
of Article3, Sec.1
of the
Constitution on
account of the
repealing clause.
differences between the two houses.
Even where the conference committee
is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produced
unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction.
(iii) The repealing clause is a
discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed for all persons or
things similarly situated.
Fariñas, et al. v.
Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 147387
December 10, 2003
See Supra under Article VI, Section 7
Tan v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 109289
October 3, 1994
Ponente: Vitug, J.
In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that
the enactment of R.A. No. 7496
(Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme for the Self‐Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the practice
of their Profession) violates the
following provisions of the
Constitution:
(i) Whether or not the
continued
implementation of said
law violates the
constitutional
requirements that
taxation shall be
uniform and equitable.
(i) The plea to
have the law
declared
unconstitutional
fails because the
concept of equal
protection
merely requires
that all subjects
or objects of
(i) Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as:
(1) The standards that are used
therefore are substantial and not
arbitrary.
(2) The categorization is germane to
achieve the legislative purpose.
(3) The law applies, all things being
equal, to both present and future
conditions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
(1) Art.VI, Sec.26(1)
(2) Art.VI, Sec.28(1)
(3) Art.III, Sec.1
taxation be
treated alike
both in privileges
and limitations.
(4) The classification applies equally
well to all those belonging to the same
class. (Pepsi Cola v. City of Butuan)
Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance
G.R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the
existing tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its
administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
R.A. No. 7716 is the results of
Conference Committee Bill entitled
“AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE‐ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING IT TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTR.A.TION
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES”. This results from
the consolidation of Senate Bill No.
1630 (submitted in substitution of
S.B. 1129 taking into consideration
P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.1197)
and House Bill no. 1197.
Procedural Issues:
(i) Does R.A. No. 7716
violate Art.VI, Sec.4 of
the Constitution?
(ii) Does S. No.1630
violate Art.VI, Sec.26(2)
of the Constitution
because it did not pass
three readings on
separate days?
Procedural Issues
(i) It does not
unconstitutional
because the
Constitution
simply means
that the initiative
for filing
revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills
authorizing an
increase of the
public debt must
come from the
HOR.
(ii) The fact that
2nd and 3
rd
readings were
done on the
same day is valid
because it was
certified by the
President as
urgent, and the
Senate accepted
Procedural Issues
(i) It is not the law itself, but the
revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively
from the House of Representatives. To
insist that a revenue statute and not
only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the H.B.
would be to deny the Senate’s power
not only to concur with amendments
but also propose amendments. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt from the
House, so long as the action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
(ii) Upon certification of the bill by the
President, the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance
G.R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the
existing tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its
administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
R.A. No. 7716 is the results of
Conference Committee Bill entitled
“AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE‐ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING IT TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTR.A.TION
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES”. This results from
the consolidation of Senate Bill No.
1630 (submitted in substitution of
S.B. 1129 taking into consideration
P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.1197)
and House Bill no. 1197.
Procedural Issues:
(i) Does R.A. No. 7716
violate Art.VI, Sec.4 of
the Constitution?
(ii) Does S. No.1630
violate Art.VI, Sec.26(2)
of the Constitution
because it did not pass
three readings on
separate days?
(iii) What is the extent
of the power of the
Bicameral Conference
Committee?
Procedural Issues
(i) It does not
unconstitutional
because the
Constitution
simply means
that the initiative
for filing
revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills
authorizing an
increase of the
public debt must
come from the
HOR.
(ii) The fact that
2nd and 3
rd
readings were
done on the
same day is valid
because it was
certified by the
President as
urgent, and the
Senate accepted
the President’s
certification.
(iii) The
allegation that
the included
provisions not
found in either
the House or
Senate bill were
surreptitiously
Procedural Issues
(i) It is not the law itself, but the
revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively
from the House of Representatives. To
insist that a revenue statute and not
only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the H.B.
would be to deny the Senate’s power
not only to concur with amendments
but also propose amendments. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt from the
House, so long as the action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
(ii) Upon certification of the bill by the
President, the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
(iii) It is within the power of a
conference committee to include it its
report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the house bill or in
the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of
one or two provisions, there is no
reason why it cannot propose several
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 27.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two‐thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two‐thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting
for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v.
Court of Tax Appeals
185 SCR.A. 329 (1990)
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
Commissioner of internal Revenue v.
Manila Hotel Corporation, et al. (G.R.
No. 83250), the Supreme Court
overruled a decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals which declared the
collection of caterer’s tax under
Section 191‐A of R.A. No. 6110 illegal
because Section 42 of H.B. No. 17839
which carries that proviso was
vetoed by then President Marcos,
and the congress did not take steps
to override the veto.
CTA argues that the President has no
power to veto part of an item in a
bill; either he vetoes an entire
section or approves it but not a
fraction thereof.
(i) Whether the
presidential veto
referred to the entire
section or merely to the
imposition of 20% tax
on gross receipts of
operators or proprietors
of restaurants,
refreshments, parlors,
bars and other eating
places which are
maintained within the
premises or compound
of a hotel, motel or
resthouses.
(i) The
presidential veto
only referred to
“hotels, motels,
and resthouses”
in the 20%
caterer’s tax
bracket, but not
to the whole
section.
(i) To construe the word “item” as
referring to the whole section would tie
the President’s hand in choosing either
to approve the whole section at the
expense of also approving a provision
therein which he deems unacceptable
or veto the entire section at the espsen
of foregoing the collection of the kind
of tax altogether.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Manila Golf and Country Club Inc.,
claims it should have been exempt
from payment of privilege taxes were
it not for the last paragraph of
Section 191‐A of R.A. No. 6110.
Petitioner denied the club’s protest
maintaining that Section 42 was not
entirely vetoed but merely the words
“hotels, motels, resthouses” on the
ground that it might restrain
development of hotels which is
essential to the tourism industry.
Gonzales v. Macaraig
G.R. No. 87636
November 19, 1990
Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J.
December 16, 1988 Congress
passed House Bill No. 19186 or the
General Approprations Bill for the
Fiscal Year of 1989.
December 29, 1988 President
signed the bill into law (R.A. No.
6688). Seven (7) Special Provisions
and Section 55 a “General Provision”
were vetoed.
A substantially similar provision as
the vetoed Section 55 appears in the
Appropriations Act of 1990,
particularly Section 16.
(i) Whether or not the
veto by the President of
Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill
(Section 55 FY’89) and
subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16
of the 1990
Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY’90) is
unconstitutional and
without effect
(i) The veto is
upheld because
the sections are
considered as
items and not
some general
provision of law,
which is within
the veto power
of the President
under Article VI,
Section 27 of the
1987
Constitution.
(i) “Item” in a bill refers to the
particulars the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the bill.
> The restrictive interpretation urged
by petitioners that the President may
not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be subject
of a separate veto but also overlooks
the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein.
> Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90
are not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term, as inferred from
Section 25(2) of 1987 Constitution: The
provision should relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(ii) Whether or not the
exercise of the veto
power by the President
partakes of the nature
of legislative powers
(ii) The exercise
of veto power by
the President
was not in the
nature of
legislative
powers as there
are constitutional
laws that allow
for the
augmentation
from savings.
(1) The vetoed provisions do not relate
to any particular or distinctive
appropriation, they apply to generally
all the items.
(2) The disapproved or reduced items
are nowhere to be found on the fact of
the Bill.
(3) The vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of the Congressional policy
in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation.
(ii) There is a rule that the Executive is
not allowed to veto a condition or
proviso of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to
stand. However, for the rule to apply,
restrictions should be such in the real
sense of the term, not some matters
which are more properly dealt with in a
separate legislation. Section 55 FY’89
and Section 16 FY’90 partake more of a
curtailment on the power to augment
from savings.
> The power to augment from savings
lies dormant until authorized by law
(Article VI Section 25(5)), and it has
been so authorized by law through
Section 12 of the General
Appropriations Act of 1989.
> The doctrine of separation of powers
is not way endangered because the
transfer is made within a department
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 28.
(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non‐profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Gonzales v. Macaraig
G.R. No. 87636
November 19, 1990
Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J.
December 16, 1988 Congress
passed House Bill No. 19186 or the
General Approprations Bill for the
Fiscal Year of 1989.
December 29, 1988 President
signed the bill into law (R.A. No.
6688). Seven (7) Special Provisions
and Section 55 a “General Provision”
were vetoed.
A substantially similar provision as
the vetoed Section 55 appears in the
Appropriations Act of 1990,
particularly Section 16.
(i) Whether or not the
veto by the President of
Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill
(Section 55 FY’89) and
subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16
of the 1990
Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY’90) is
unconstitutional and
without effect
(ii) Whether or not the
exercise of the veto
power by the President
partakes of the nature
of legislative powers
(i) The veto is
upheld because
the sections are
considered as
items and not
some general
provision of law,
which is within
the veto power
of the President
under Article VI,
Section 27 of the
1987
Constitution.
(ii) The exercise
of veto power by
the President
was not in the
nature of
legislative
powers as there
are constitutional
(i) “Item” in a bill refers to the
particulars the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the bill.
> The restrictive interpretation urged
by petitioners that the President may
not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be subject
of a separate veto but also overlooks
the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein.
> Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90
are not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term, as inferred from
Section 25(2) of 1987 Constitution: The
provision should relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein.
(1) The vetoed provisions do not relate
to any particular or distinctive
appropriation, they apply to generally
all the items.
(2) The disapproved or reduced items
are nowhere to be found on the fact of
the Bill.
(3) The vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of the Congressional policy
in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation.
(ii) There is a rule that the Executive is
not allowed to veto a condition or
proviso of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to
stand. However, for the rule to apply,
restrictions should be such in the real
sense of the term, not some matters
which are more properly dealt with in a
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Gerochi v. Department
of Energy
G.R. No. 159796
July 17, 2007
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petitioners come before court to
praying for Section 34 of R.A. 9136
otherwise known as the “Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001”
(EPIR.A.) imposing the Universal
Charge (UC) and Rule 18 of the Rules
and Regulations (IRR) to be declared
unconstitutional.
It is assailed to be unconstitutional
on the following grounds:
1. The UC is a tax. The power to
tax is strictly a legislative
function. The assailed
provision clearly provides
that the UC is to be
(i) Whether or not the
UC imposed under
Section 34 of the
EPIR.A. is a tax.
(i) No, because
the tax is merely
incidental of the
state’s exercise
of police power
in regulating
electricity to
ensure the
viability of the
country’s electric
power industry.
(i) Taxation Power v. Police Power
> The theory behind taxation power
emanates from the necessity to help
the government fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and
well‐being of the people.
> Police Power is the power of the state
to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property. The power to
regulate means the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve and control
with due regard for the interests, first
and foremost of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.
> If the generation of revenue is the
primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, it is a tax. BUT if
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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determined, fixed and
approved by the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERC),
hence leaving to the latter
complete discretionary
legislative authority.
2. The ERC is also empowered
to approve and determine
where the funds collected
should be used.
3. The imposition of the UC on
all end‐users is oppressive
and confiscatory and
amounts to taxation without
representation as the
consumers were not given a
chance to be heard and
represented.
regulation if the primary purposes, the
fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.
Garcia v. Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 101273
July 3, 1992
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
November 27, 1990 E.O. No. 438
which imposed an additional duty of
5% on all imported articles (e.g.
crude oil and other oil products).
January 3, 1991 E.O. No. 443
increased duty from 5% to 9%.
August 15, 1991 E.O. No. 475
reduced rate of additional duty from
9% to 5% except in cases of crude oil
and other oil products which
continued to be subject to additional
duty of 9%.
(i) Whether or not E.O.
Nos. 475 and 478 are
violative of Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
(i) The
enactment of
bills
appropriation,
revenue and
tariff bills are
Legislative
functions, but it
doesn’t mean
that the EOs in
question are
unconstitutional
and prohibited.
(i) Section 28(2) of the 1987
Constitution provides constitutional
permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject to such limitations
and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose” to fix “within specific limits
tariff rates…and other duties or
imposts…”
> President invoked Sections 104 and
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines in promulgating the EO
in question.
> There is nothing in the Code that
suggests that the President is limited to
act under the Code only when
protecting local industries. The levying
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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August 16, 1991 Upon completion
of public hearings, The Tariff
Commission submitted to the
President a “Report on special duty
on Crude Oil and Oil Products”.
August 23, 1991 E.O. No. 478
added (besides the 9% duty) a duty
of P0.95/liter or P151.05/barrel of
imported crude oil and P1.00/liter of
imported oil products.
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus were made
of customs duties on imported goods
may have in some measure the effect
of protecting local industries.
> Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code establishes general standards
with which the exercise of authority
delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: it must
be exercised in the interest of national
economy, general welfare and/or
national security. The protection of
consumers is part of the provision.
Systems Plus Computer
College v. Caloocan
City
G.R. No. 146382
August 7, 2003
SPCC is a non‐stock and non‐profit
educational institution organized,
and as such enjoys property tax
exemption from LGU on its buildings,
but not the parcel of land which it
rents for P5,000/month from its
sister companies Consolidated
Assembly Inc. (CAI) and Pair
Management and Development
Corporation (PMDC).
January 8, 1998 SPCC requested
the City of Caloocan, through
Mamerto Manahan (City Assessor
and Administrator) to extend tax
exemption since it was actually,
directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes pursuant to
Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987
(i) Petition for certiorari
imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the party
of the trial court when
it ruled:
(1) Mandamus does not
lie against the public
respondents.
(2) That petitioner
failed to exhaust
available administrative
remedies
(i) Petition for
certiorari
DISMISSED as
petitioner is
taking an
unwarranted
shortcut.
(i) Mandamus is defined as a writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office or which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Where administrative
remedies are available, a petition for
mandamus does not lie.
> Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, the
remedy of appeal to the local Board of
Assessment appeals is available from an
adverse ruling or action of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Constitution.
February 5, 1998 SPCC’s request
was denied on the ground that the
land was owned by CAI and PMDC
which derived income through the
rents paid by SPCC.
February 15, 1999 CAI and PMDC
entered into separate agreements
with SPCC which converted the land
into donations.
February 19, 1999 SPCC seeks
reconsideration informing the City
Assessor of the new agreements.
July 21, 1999 Application for tax
exemption denied because:
(1) SPCC is an agency for CAI and
PMDC to evade payment of Real
Property Tax.
(2) Grant of exemption rests on the
theory that the exemption will
benefit the body of people, not just
one individual or corporate entity.
(3) There is not showing that land are
actually, directly, and exclusively
used either for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes.
Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the RTC of Caloocan
City, but it was dismissed for being
provincial, city or municipal assessor in
the assessment of property.
> Mandamus does not lie against the
respondent City Assessor in the
exercise of his function of assessing
properties for taxation purposes.
Mandamus may not be availed of to
direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way, or to
retract or reverse an action already
taken in the exercise of either.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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premature.
Central Mindanao
University (CMU) v.
Department of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 100091
October 22, 1992
Note: This case is added simply
because of its interpretation of the
meaning of “directly, actually, and
exclusively”
Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.
This is a petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to nullify the proceedings
and decisions of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DAR.A.B), and to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
[affirming DAR.A.B’s decision] which
ordered the segragation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of CMU land for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries
of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Porgram (CARP) on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The questioned decision is hinged on
the alleged fact that CMU land is “not
directly, actually and exclusively used
for school sites, because the same
was leased to Philippine Packing
Corporation (no Del Monte
Philippines)”. In addition, there is not
definite and concrete showing that
said lands are essentially
indispensable for educational
(i) Whether or not CMU
land is exclusively used
and indispensable to
educational purposes
and thus covered by
CARP.
(i) No, because
CMU is a school
established to
promote
agriculture and
industry. The
need for a vast
tract of
agricultural land
for future
programs of
expansion is
obvious.
(i) President Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 476, withdrawing from sale or
settlement and reserving for Mindanao
Agricultural College (forerunner of the
CMU) a land reservation of 3,080
hectares as its future campus. It was set
up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of
Mindanao in order that it can have
enough resources and wide open
spaces to grow as an agricultural
educational institution, to develop and
train future farmers of Mindanao and
help attract settlers to that part of the
country.
> As to determination of when and
what lands are found to be necessary
for use by the CMU, the school is in the
best position to resolve and answer the
question. Neither the DARB nor the
Court of Appeals has the right to
substitute its judgment or discretion on
this matter, unless the evidentiary facts
are so manifest as to show that the
CMU has no real need for the land.
> It is exempt from coverage under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because
the lands are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations
for educational purposes, and for
establishing seed and seedling research
and pilot production centers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Central Mindanao
University (CMU) v.
Department of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 100091
October 22, 1992
Note: This case is added simply
because of its interpretation of the
meaning of “directly, actually, and
exclusively”
Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.
This is a petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to nullify the proceedings
and decisions of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DAR.A.B), and to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
[affirming DAR.A.B’s decision] which
ordered the segragation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of CMU land for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries
of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Porgram (CARP) on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The questioned decision is hinged on
the alleged fact that CMU land is “not
directly, actually and exclusively used
for school sites, because the same
was leased to Philippine Packing
Corporation (no Del Monte
Philippines)”. In addition, there is not
definite and concrete showing that
said lands are essentially
indispensable for educational
purposes.
(i) Whether or not CMU
land is exclusively used
and indispensable to
educational purposes
and thus covered by
CARP.
(i) No, because
CMU is a school
established to
promote
agriculture and
industry. The
need for a vast
tract of
agricultural land
for future
programs of
expansion is
obvious.
(i) President Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 476, withdrawing from sale or
settlement and reserving for Mindanao
Agricultural College (forerunner of the
CMU) a land reservation of 3,080
hectares as its future campus. It was set
up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of
Mindanao in order that it can have
enough resources and wide open
spaces to grow as an agricultural
educational institution, to develop and
train future farmers of Mindanao and
help attract settlers to that part of the
country.
> As to determination of when and
what lands are found to be necessary
for use by the CMU, the school is in the
best position to resolve and answer the
question. Neither the DARB nor the
Court of Appeals has the right to
substitute its judgment or discretion on
this matter, unless the evidentiary facts
are so manifest as to show that the
CMU has no real need for the land.
> It is exempt from coverage under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because
the lands are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations
for educational purposes, and for
establishing seed and seedling research
and pilot production centers.
Commissioner of BIR v.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124043
October 14, 1998
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Young Men’s Christian Association of
the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) is a non‐
stock, non‐profit institution which
conducts various programs in
pursuant to its religious, educational
(i) Is the income derived
from rentals of real
property owned by the
YMCA subject to
income tax under the
National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC)
(i) Yes, because
the said
exemption only
refers to
property taxes
real estate such
as lands,
(i) Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the
1987 Constitution exempts charitable
institutions from the payment not only
of property taxes but also of income tax
from any source. According to Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., “... what is exempted
is not the institution itself.” Fr. Bernas
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v.
Santos
G.R. No. 119252
August 18, 1997
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.
The trial judge declared a law
inoperative and without force on
account of it’s allegedly oppressive
and confiscatory nature of the
jewelry sector.
(i) Whether or not
Regional Trial Courts’
can declare a law
inoperative and without
force and effect or
otherwise
unconstitutional. If it
can, under what
circumstances?
(i) No. (i) The trial judge declared the laws to
be inoperative and without force and
effect insofar as the private
respondents are concerned. But,
respondent judge, in the body of his
decision, unequivocally but wrongly
declared the said provisions of law to
be violative of Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution.
> In advocating the abolition of local tax
and duty on jewelry simply because
other countries have adopted such
policies, the respondent judge
overlooked the fact that such matters
are not for him to decide.
John Hay Peoples
Alternative Coalition v.
Victor Lim
G.R. No. 119775
October 24, 2003
Ponente: Carpio‐Morales, J.
Petition for prohibition and
mandamus and declaratory relief
with prayer for a temporary
retraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injuction, petitioners
assail, in the main, the
constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994
“CREATING AND DESIGNATING A
PORTION OF THE AREA COVERD BY
THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS
THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7227.”
March 13, 1992 R.A. 7227
otherwise known as the Bases
(i) Whether or not
Proclamation No. 420 is
constitutional by
providing for national
and local tax exemption
within and granting
other economic
incentives to the John
Hay Special Economic
Zone; and
(i) The grant of
tax exemption is
void and violative
of the
Constitution.
(i) It is clear that under Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ
which was granted by Congress with tax
exemption, investment incentives and
the like. There is no express extension
of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs
still to be created at the time via
presidential proclamation.
> The incentives under R.A. No. 7227
are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ,
hence, the extension of the same to the
John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.
Neither does the same grant of
privileges to the John Hay SEZ find
support in the other laws specified
under Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420, which laws were already extant
before the issuance of the proclamation
or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 29.
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Conversion and Development Act of
1992 set out the policity to
accelerate the sound and balanced
conversions into alternative
productive uses of the former
military bases. It created the Bases
Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA), vesting it with
powers pertaining to the multifarious
aspects of carrying out the ultimate
objective of utilizing the base areas in
accordance with the declared
government policy.
(ii) Whether or not
Proclamation No. 420 is
constitutional for
limiting or interfering
with the local autonomy
of Baguio City.
(ii) No, because
under R.A. 7227,
the BCDA is given
the power and
purposes to fulfill
its mandate.
> The challenged grant of tax
exemption would circumvent the
Constitution’s imposition that a law
granting any tax exemption must have
the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress. In the same vein,
the other kinds of privileges extended
to the John Jay SEZ are by tradition and
usage for Congress to legislate upon.
(ii) With such broad rights of ownership
and administration vested in BCDA over
Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has
control over it, subject to certain
limitations provided for by the law. By
designating BCDA as the governing
agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law
merely emphasizes or reiterates the
statutory role or functions it has been
granted.
> The delineation and declaration of a
portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the
powers of the President to do so by
means of a proclamation. The requisite
prior concurrence by the Baguio City
government to such proclamation
appears to have been given in the form
of a duly enacted resolution by the
sanggunian.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for
which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Guingona, Jr. v.
Carague
G.R. No. 94571
April 22, 1991
Presidential Decree No. 81 entitled
“Amending Certain Provisions of R.A.
4860 as amended (Re: Foreign
Borwwoing Act)” authorized the
automatic appropriation for debt
service.
P.D. No. 1177 entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society”
P.D. No. 1967 entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of
the Philippines and Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loancs by Approprating
Funds For The Purposes.”
(i) IS THE
APPROPRIATION OF P86
BILLION IN THE P233
BILLION 1990 BUDGET
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION
5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
(i) No.
(i) Mr. Ople pointed out that the
recognition by the Constitution of the
highest priority for public
schoolteachers, and by implication, for
all teachers, would ensure that the
President and Congress would be
strongly urged by a constitutional
mandate to grant to them such a level
of remuneration and other incentives
that would take teaching competitive
again and attractive to the best
available talents in the nation.
> It does not thereby follow that the
hands of the Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
> Congress is certainly not without any
power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of
which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of
honor and to protect the credit
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(ii) ARE PD NO. 81, PD
NO. 1177 AND PD NO.
1967 STILL OPER.A.TIVE
UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
(iii) III. ARE THEY
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION
29(1), ARTICLE VI OF
THE CONSTITUTION?
(ii) Yes.
(iii) No.
standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an
amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
(ii) Section 3, Article XVII of the
Constitution regcognizes that “All
existing laws, decrees, executive
orders…shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked” to
preserve the social order so that
legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws
are to remain in force and effect unless
they are inconsistent with the
Constitution or are otherwise amended,
repealed or revoked.
(iii) The Court finds that in this case the
questioned laws are complete in all
their essential terms and conditions
and sufficient standards are indicated
therein.
> Although the subject presidential
decrees do not state specific amounts
to be paid, necessitated by the very
nature of the problem being addressed,
the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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provided in the decrees.
> Debt service is not included in the
General Appropriation Act, since
authorization therefore already exists
under R.A. No. 4860 and 245, as
amended and P.D. No. 1967. Precisely
in the light of this subsisting
authorization as embodied in said
Republic Acts and PD for debt services,
Congress does not concern itself with
details for implementation by the
Executive, but largely with annual levels
and approval thereof upon due
deliberation as part of the whole
obligation program for the year.
Osmeña v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99886
March 31, 1993
Ponente: Navasa, C.J.
October 10, 1984 Pres. Ferdinand
Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a
Special Account in the General Fund
designated as the Oil Price
Stabilization fund (OPSF) – designed
to reimburse oil companies for costs
increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum producst resulting from
exchange rate adjustments and from
increases in the world market prices
of crude oil.
E.O. 1024 reclassified the OPSF into a
“trust liability account”
February 27, 1987 Pres. Corazon
Aquino amended P.D. 1956 through
(i) The invalidity of the
“TRUST ACCOUNT” in
the books of account of
the Ministry of Energy
(now the Office of
Energy Affairs) created
pursuant to § 8,
paragraph 1, of P.D. No
1956, as amended,
“said creation of a trust
fund being contrary to
Section 29 (3) Article VI
of the Constitution.”
(i) It is not
contrary to the
constitution.
(i) The OPSF was established precisely
to protect local consumers from the
adverse consequences that such
frequent oil price adjustments may
have upon the economy. Thus, the
OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into
which a portion of the purchases price
of oil and petroleum products paid by
consumers as well as some tax
revenues are inputted and from which
amounts are drawn from time to time
to reimburse oil companies, when
appropriate situations arise, for
increases in, as well as under recovery
of, costs of crude importation.
> It appears to the Court that the
establishment and maintenance of the
OPSF is well within that pervasive and
non‐waivable power and responsibility
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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E.O. No. 137 expanding the grounds
for reimbursement to oil companies
for possible cost under recovery
incurred as a result of the reduction
of domestic prices of petroleum
products.
(ii) The
unconstitutionality of §
8, paragraph 1(c) of
P.D. No. 1956 as
amended by Executive
Order No. 137 for
“being an undue and
invalid delegation of
legislative power to the
Energy Regulatory
Board;”
(ii) It is not an
undue delegation
of legislative
authority/power.
of the government to secure, the
physical and economic survival and
well‐being of the community.
> Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank
The tax collected is not in a
pure exercise of the taxing
power. It is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide
a means for the stabilization of
the sugar industry. The levy is
primarily in the exercise of the
police power of the State.
> Moreover, that the OPSF is a special
fund is plain from the special treatment
given it by E.O. No. 137. It is segregated
from the general fund; and while it is
placed in what the law refers to as a
“trust liability account,” the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA.
(ii) With regard to the alleged undue
delegation of legislative power, the
Court finds that § 8 P.D. 1956
conferring the authority upon the ERB
to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the
authority must be exercised. In addition
to the general policy of the law to
protect the local consumer by
stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 30.
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
September 16, 1998
Ponente: Regalado, J.
PROMOST Construction Development
Corporation president, Teresita
Fabian participated in the bidding for
government construction including
those under the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED) whose
incumbend District Engineer was
Nestor Desierto. Making use of his
official position, he began an affair
with Fabian and gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts.
When Fabian wanted to end the
relationship, Desierto refused and
went as far as employing harassment,
intimidation and threats.
January 31, 1996 Graft investigator
Eduardo Benitez – acting on the
complaint of Fabian regarding
Desierto’s violation of Section 19, R.A.
6770 and Section 36 of P.D. 807 –
issued a resolution finding Nestor
Desierto guilty of grave misconduct
(i) Whether or not R.A.
8770 is violative of
Section 20, Article VI of
the Constitution which
states that “no law shall
be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as
provided in this
Constitution without its
advice and consent.”
(i) No. (i) Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of
the Constitution authorizes this Court to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid
final judgment or orders “as the law of
the Rules of Court may provide,” said
Section 27 does not increase this Court’s
appellate jurisdiction since, by providing
that the mode of appeal shall be by
petition for certiorari under Rule 45,
then what may be raised therein are
only questions of law of which this Court
already has jurisdiction.
> Also, the very provision cited by
petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated
therein is to be exercised over “final
judgments and orders of lower courts,”
that is, the courts composing the
integrated judicial system. It does not
include the quasi‐judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the
legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi‐judicial agency
shall be reviewable by the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 31.
No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
Section 32.
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
and ordering his dismissal from
service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law.
Pursuant to the amendment of
Section 9, Batasang Pambansa Blg.
129 by R.A. 7902, all adjudications by
the Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of
Appeals, while those of the Office of
the Ombudsman are appealable to
the Supreme Court.
provision to that effect is included in the
law creating that quasi‐judiciary agency
and, for that matter, any special
statutory court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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ARTICLE VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Marcos v. Manglapus Ponente: Cortes, J.
This is a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order
respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of
the President’s decision to bar their
return in the Philippines
Background: Marcos was deposed
from presidency through people
power revolution, and Cory Aquino
replaced him. During Cory’s
presidency, the government
encountered a lot of threats from the
military (ex: Col. Gregory Honasan’s
failed coup), communist and
secessionist movement in Mindanao
(they set up a parallel gov’t), as well
as economic woes (rise in foreign
debt, poverty, and ill‐gotten wealth
of the Marcoses). In short, the gov’t
was in shambles and unstable hence,
the decision of not allowing Marcos
back in the country.
(i) Whether or not, in
the exercise of the
powers granted by the
Constitution, the
President may prohibit
the Marcoses from
returning to the
Philippines
(i) YES. The
President, in the
exercise of the
powers granted
by the
Constitution,
may prohibit the
Marcoses from
returning to the
Philippines
(i) The 1987 Constitution has fully
restored the separation of powers of
the 3 great branches of gov’t. For the
executive department, it didn’t really
define what executive power means
but Art. 7 touches on the exercise of
certain powers of the President found
in Art 7 Secs. 14‐23. Petitioners
advance the view that the President’s
powers are limited to those specifically
enumerated powers, and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied of her.
Although the 1987 Constitution gave
limitations to the power of the
President, it remains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the
scope of executive power. The powers
of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Also, it
has been advanced that whatever
power inherent in the gov’t that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
Looking at the case in hand, in making
any decisions as President of the
Philippines, the President has to
consider the ff principles: serve and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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protect the people, maintenance of
peace and order, protection of life,
liberty and property, promotion of
general welfare. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from
being an allocation of power is also a
social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign
powers to the State for the common
good. The case calls for the exercise of
the President’s powers as protector of
the peace, which is also a task that
tackles the day‐to‐day problems of
maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility. Lastly,
members of the Legislature also
recognizes the power of the President
to bar the Marcoses as they made a
resolution to appeal to her compassion.
Estrada v. Desierto President Estrada makes two
submissions: cases filed against him
before the Ombudsman should be
prohibited since he was not yet
convicted in the impeachment
proceedings and that he enjoys
immunity in civil and criminal suits.
(i) Whether or not the
petitioner enjoys
immunity from suit and
assuming he enjoys
immunity, up to what
extent is the immunity?
(i) NO. The
President does
not enjoy
immunity from
suit, even if there
is still no
conviction in the
impeachment
proceedings. The
extent of
immunity does
not cover liability
from unlawful
acts and
omissions.
(i) The Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, and if his plea is
granted, it would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non‐sitting president
who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can
be the object of a criminal prosecution.
Since his impeachment case has been
aborted and he lost the elections,
petitioner cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings based on
the ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez
– incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
Scope of immunity – the rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
One of the great themes of the
Constitution is that public office is a
public trust. Different constitutional
policies were made to adhere to this
theme (creation of Ombudsman,
Sandiganbayan, etc.) and asserting
petitioner’s claims will devaluate these
policies.
Soliven v. Makasiar President Aquino sued Beltran for
libel for having written that the
President hid under the bed during
the attempted coup.
Petitioner Beltran argues that “the
reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file
a suit.” This would be an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself
(i) Whether or not the
President of the
Philippines, under the
Constitution, may
initiate criminal
proceedings against the
petitioners through the
filing of a complaint‐
affidavit
(i) YES. The
President of the
Philippines,
under the
Constitution,
may initiate
criminal
proceedings
against the
petitioners
through the filing
of a complaint‐
affidavit
(i) Privilege of immunity may only be
invoked by the holder of the office (The
President in this case). Thus, the
accused in a criminal case of which the
President is a complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
There is nothing in our laws that can
stop the President from waiving her
presidential privilege. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
to possible contempt of court or
perjury
waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. No other person can
assume and waive it for him/her.
Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling
Tecson vs. COMELEC Three consolidated cases, all of which
raise the issue of whether
presidential candidate, Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is a natural‐born Filipino
citizen.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R.
No. 161824, in his petition for FPJ’s
disqualification alleged that he (FPJ)
made material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural‐born Filipino
citizen when his parents were
foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan F. Poe, was a Spanish national.
Granting that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother – first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez and second,
if no such prior marriage existed,
Allan F. Poe married Bessie Kelley
(i) Whether or not the
Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the
Cases.
(ii) Whether or not the
COMELEC erred in
dismissing the case filed
(i) The Court
dismissed the
separate
petitions filed by
Pet. Tecson and
Pet. Velez for
want of
jurisdiction.
(ii) The Court
may take
cognizance of the
(i) The petitioners invoked Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987
Constitution in challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The
provision states: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice‐President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The provision refers to contests in
reference to a post‐election scenario
where there is already a winner; the
petitions are not contemplative of such
scenario.
The provision speaks of the jurisdiction
of the Court over the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or
Vice‐President and not of candidates
for the respective positions.
(ii) The Court recognized Rule 64 in
connection to Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 7,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Petition was dismissed by the
COMELEC for lack of merit. Upon
filing of motion for reconsideration,
such was also dismissed. Thus, the
instant petition to the Court.
Two other petitions were filed to the
Court: Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. vs. COMELEC
and Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, and Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe. Both challenged the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7 of the
Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue.
by Victorino X. Fornier
for lack of merit and
ruling in favor of the
citizenship of FPJ.
petition for
(iii) The Court
Article IX of the Constitution, which
both state that in an action for
certiorari, the decisions of the
COMELEC may be reviewed by the
Court.
Section 1, Article VIII, of the
Constitution provides that judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power
“includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
The Court further stated that the
petition brought up by Fornier was
aptly elevated to, and could well be
taken cognizance of, by the Court, and,
that a contrary view would be a gross
denial to the people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy
the highest government post in the
land.
(iii) The Court in resolving whether
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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affirmed the
ruling of the
COMELEC.
COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion, found it necessary to look
into the issue on the citizenship of FPJ.
Considering the evidences presented by
both parties and their reservations as
to the veracity of some of the
documents presented. The ff. facts
were established:
a. The parents of FPJ were Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley;
b. FPJ was born to them on August
20, 1939;
c. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
d. The father of Allan F. Poe was
Lorenzo Poe, and;
e. At the time of his death on 11
September, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old.
The Court in resolving whether FPJ was
a natural‐born citizen deemed it fit to
determine whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of FPJ’s grandfather,
Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been
his place of residence before his death,
such that Lorenzo Poe would have
benefitted from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine bill
had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe) if
acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ.
However, since FPJ’s parents were
married only a year after he was born,
he was considered illegitimate and
thus, it was necessary to establish his
father’s acknowledgment of paternal
relation with him. Because Allan F. Poe
was already deceased, the recognition
by him (Allan F. Poe) of his paternal
relationship with FPJ was attested to
through a declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley
Poe.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 13. The President, Vice‐President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government‐owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government‐owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ was born,
confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
The totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural‐born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before
the Court.
The Court resolved to DISMISS petition.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Doromal v.
Sandiganbayan
(1989)
177 SCRA 354
pp. 398‐399
Participation
to Doromal
International
Trading
Corporation
P61‐M
equipment
supply to
DECS &NMYC
Ponente:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former
Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), for violation of the Anti‐Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),
Section 3(h), in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president
and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation
(DITC) which submitted bids to supply
P61 million worth of electronic,
electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (or DECS) and the National
Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC).
Section 13. xxx
Members of the
Cabinet, and their
deputies or
assistants shall not
xxx They shall not,
during said tenure,
directly or
indirectly, practice
any other
profession,
participate in any
business, xxx
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Doromal violated Article 7,
Section 13 of the Constitution.
The presence of a signed document bearing the
signature of Doromal as part of the application to
bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with
having participated in a business which act is
absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of
the Constitution because the DITC remained a
family corporation in which Doromal has at least an
indirect interest.
Civil Liberties
Union v. The
Executive
Secretary
GR 83896
FEB 22,1991
pp. 399‐407
EO 284
“unless
otherwise
provided in
this
Constitution”
Ponente:
July 25, 1987 Cory issued EO 284
allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold NOT MORE THAN 2
other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein.
In sum, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds
Section 13. The
President, Vice‐
President, the
Members of the
Cabinet, and their
deputies or
assistants shall not,
unless otherwise
provided in this
Constitution, hold
any other office or
employment during
their tenure. xxx
ISSUE 1: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in
the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice‐President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President
in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex‐officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be
constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners,
by virtue of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions
against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely:
(1) The Vice‐President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII
thereof; and
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex‐
officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.
respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National
Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo
R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo
Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices
or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government‐owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
WHEREFORE, xxx the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and
void xxx
Bitonio Jr. v.
COA
GR 147392
March 12,
2004
pp. 407‐ 412
DOLE
PEZA
Disallowance
Per diem
Ponente:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R.
Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
In a Letter dated May 11,
1995 addressed to Honorable Rizalino S.
Navarro, then Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry,
Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of
the Department of Labor and
Employment designated the petitioner
to be the DOLE representative to the
Board of Directors of PEZA.
Article VII
Prohibition
Section 13. The
President, Vice‐
President, the
Members of the
Cabinet, and their
deputies or
assistants shall not,
unless otherwise
provided in this
Constitution, hold
any other office or
employment during
their tenure. Xxx
Art IX‐B Civil
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the COA correctly
disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner
for his attendance in the PEZA Board Director’s
meetings as representative of the Secretary of
Labor.
It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in
the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of
Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was
no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited
from receiving compensation for his additional office
or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to
the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of
the Secretary of Labor.
Citing also the Civil Liberties Union case, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Such designation was in pursuance to
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916,
otherwise known as the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995, which
provides:
Section 11. The Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. – There is
hereby created a body corporate to
be known as the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA)…
As representative of the Secretary of
Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was
receiving a per diem for every board
meeting he attended during the years
1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZA’s
disbursement transactions, the COA
disallowed the payment of per diems to
the petitioner and thus issued 3 Notices
of Disallowance.
The COA issued Memorandum No. 97‐
038 which authorized the issuance of
the Notices of Disallowances for
the per diems received by the
petitioner. It states:
The Commission received a copy of
Senate Committee Report No. 509
urging “the Commission on Audit to
immediately cause the disallowance of
any payment of any form of additional
Service Commission
Section 7. No
elective official shall
be eligible for
appointment or
designation in any
capacity to any
public office or
position during his
tenure.
Unless otherwise
allowed by law or
by the primary
functions of his
position, no
appointive official
shall hold any other
office or
employment in the
Government or any
subdivision, agency
or instrumentality
thereof, including
Government‐owned
or controlled
corporations or
their subsidiaries.
Court explained thus:
“The ex‐officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious
that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex‐
officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of
his principal office in defining policy in monetary
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction
of his department. For such attendance, therefore,
he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation,
whether it be in the form of a per diem or
an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,
such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.”
xxx the petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to
receive a per diem for his attendance at board
meetings during his tenure as member of the Board
of Director of the PEZA.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
compensation or remuneration to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and
assistants, or their representatives in
violation of the rule on multiple
positions and to effect the refund of any
and all such additional compensation
given to and received by the officials
concerned, or their representatives,
from the time of the finality of the
Supreme Court ruling in Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary to the
present.” In the Civil Liberties Union
case, the Supreme Court ruled that
Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and
assistants may not hold any other office
or employment. It declared Executive
Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar
as it allows Cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants to hold other
offices in addition to their primary
office and to receive compensation
therefore. The said decision became
final and executory on August 19, 1991.
Public Interest
Center v. Elma
GR 138965
June 30, 2006
March 5, 2007
pp. 412‐413
Incompatible
offices
PCGG & CPLC
Respondent Elma was appointed as
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) on 30 October 1998.
Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but
waived any renumeration that he may
Article VII
Prohibition
Section 13. The
President, Vice‐
President, the
Members of the
Cabinet, and their
deputies or
assistants shall not,
unless otherwise
provided in this
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the position of the PCGG
Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the
prohibition against multiple offices.
The general rule contained in Article IX‐B is that a
government official occupying two government
offices is permitted as long as there is no
incompatibility between both.
The concurrent appointments of the respondent
as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional.
It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
receive as CPLC.
Constitution, hold
any other office or
employment during
their tenure. xxx
Art IX‐B Civil Service
Commission
Section 7. No
elective official shall
be eligible for
appointment or
designation in any
capacity to any
public office or
position during his
tenure.
Unless otherwise
allowed by law or
by the primary
functions of his
position, no
appointive official
shall hold any other
office or
employment in the
Government or any
subdivision, agency
or instrumentality
thereof, including
Government‐owned
or controlled
corporations or
their subsidiaries.
offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX‐B
of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include
giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and reviewing
investigations involving heads of executive
departments. Since the actions of the PCGG
Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are
subject to the review of the CPLC, such
appointments would be incompatible.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from
his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
In Re
Appointments
of Valenzuela
and Vallarta
AM No 98‐5‐
01‐SC
Nov 9, 1998
pp. 413‐416
Void
RTC
Judge
Appointments
Referred to the Court En Banc by the
Chief Justice are the appointments
signed by His Excellency the President
under the date of March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively.
May 7, 1998 The President through
a letter expressed the view that "the
election‐ban provision (Article VII,
Section 15) *** applies only
to executive appointments or
appointments in the executive branch
of government," the whole article
being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed
that further proof of his theory "is the
fact that appointments to the
judiciary have special, specific
provisions applicable to them" (citing
Article VIII, Section 4 [1] and Article
SEC 15. Two months
immediately before
the next presidential
elections and up to
the end of his term,
a President or Acting
President shall not
make appointments,
xxx will prejudice
public service or
endanger public
safety”
ISSUE: 1 Whether or not during the period of the
ban on appointments imposed by Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article
VIII.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not he can make
appointments to the judiciary during the period of
the ban in the interest of public service.
Surely, the prevention of vote‐buying and similar
evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of
some cases.
It is this Court's view that, as a general
proposition, in case of conflict, the former (Sec
15) should yield to the latter (Sec 4).
To the contention that may perhaps be asserted,
that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII should
prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they
may be considered later expressions of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he
"firmly and respectfully reiterate(d)
*** (his) request for the Judicial and
Bar Council to transmit *** the final
list of nominees for the lone Supreme
Court vacancy."
The Chief Justice replied to the letter
the following day, May 8, 1998. Since
the Chief Justice's letter explains the
issue quite plainly, xxx
As you can see, Your Excellency,
Section 15 of Article VII imposes a
direct prohibition on the
President: he "shall not make
appointments" within the period
mentioned, and since there is no
specification of which appointments
are proscribed, the same may be
considered as applying to all
appointments of any kind and
nature. xxx As the exception makes
reference only to "executive"
positions, it would seem that
"judicial" positions are covered by the
general rule.
xxx Section 4 (1) of Article VIII,
requires that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court "shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence
thereof." Unlike Section 15, Article
VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is
Article 8‐Judicial
Dept.
"SEC 4 (1) The
Supreme Court shall
be composed of a
Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate
Justices. ***. Any
vacancy shall be
filled within ninety
days from the
occurrence thereof."
Article 8‐ Judicial
Dept
"SEC 9 The Members
of the Supreme
Court and judges in
lower courts shall be
appointed by the
President from the
list of at least three
nominees prepared
by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every
vacancy. xxx
people when they adopted the Constitution, it
suffices to point out that the Constitution must be
construed in its entirety as one, single,
instrument.
The exception allows only the making
of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of
the President during the period of the ban.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and
Vallarta xxx were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. Consequently, they come
within the operation of the first prohibition
relating to appointments which are considered to
be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing
the election (under Omnibus Election Code)…
xxx the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 xxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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not specifically imposed on the
President; hence, it may be inferred
that it is a duty shared by the Judicial
and Bar council and the President.
The reason for said prohibition,
according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an
authority on Constitutional Law and
himself a member of the
Constitutional Commission, is "(I)n
order not to tie the hands of the
incoming President through midnight
appointments."
Should the Court rule that the
President is indeed prohibited to
make appointments in a presidential
election year, then any appointment
attempted within the proscribed
period would be void anyway. If the
Court should adjudge that the ban has
no application to appointments to the
Supreme Court, the JBC may submit
nominations and the President may
make the appointment forthwith
upon such adjudgment.
DE LA RAMA V.
Court of
Appeals
GR 131136
FEB 28, 2001
Misinterpretation
of section 15 by
De La Rama
14 appointed
Municipal
employees
Upon his assumption to the position
of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote
a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), seeking the
recall of the appointments of fourteen
(14) municipal employees…
Section 15. Two
months immediately
before the next
presidential
elections and up to
the end of his term,
a President or Acting
President shall not
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the so‐called “midnight”
appointments by former Mayor Abeja were
unconstitutional. NO
It has been held that upon the issuance of an
appointment and the appointee’s assumption of
the position in the civil service, “he acquires a
legal right which cannot be taken away either by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
pp. 417‐418 Misinterpretation
of section 15 by
De La Rama
14 appointed
Municipal
employees
Petitioner de Rama justified his recall
request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees
were “midnight” appointments of the
former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja,
done in violation of Article VII, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution…
The CSC upheld the validity of the
appointments on the ground that
they had already been approved by
the Head of the CSC Field Office in
Lucena City, and for petitioner’s
failure to present evidence that would
warrant the revocation or recall of the
said appointments.
On November 21, 1996, the CSC
denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The CSC reiterated
its ruling that:
In the absence of any showing that
these alleged midnight appointments
were defective in form and in
substance, nor is there evidence
presented to show that subject
appointments were issued in
contravention of law or rules, these
appointments are deemed valid and
in effect.
xxx, the Court of Appeals denied for
lack of merit the petition for review.
make appointments
xxx
revocation of the appointment or by removal
except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing.” Moreover, it is well‐settled that the
person assuming a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment acquires a legal,
not just an equitable, right to the position. This
right is protected not only by statute, but by the
Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken
away by either revocation of the appointment, or
by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so,
provided that there is previous notice and
hearing.
The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the
constitutional prohibition on so‐called “midnight
appointments,” specifically those made within
two (2) months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President.
In truth and in fact, there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue
of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who
made the appointments.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the
appellate court erred in upholding the
CSC’s resolutions despite the
following defects:
I. No screening process and no
criteria were adopted by the
Personnel Selection Board in
nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous
public places of notice of vacancy as
required by the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements
were not observed by the selection
board and by the appointing authority
as required by the Civil Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to
recall the appointments of
respondents.
In a Resolution dated October 20,
1997, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Mendoza, J., dissents: What the majority overlooks is that Article VII Section15 is simply an application of a
broader principle xxx This rule binds all, including mayors, who are vested with the power of appointment, and it
flows from the principle that a public office is a public trust. xxx
It is clear, however, that the Civil Service Commission did not find anything wrong or irregular in the appointments
of respondents because it failed to appreciate the fact that “Midnight appointments” – whether made by the
President or by a mayor – are bad, because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation and careful
consideration of the needs of the office and the qualifications of the appointees, and by an appointing authority on
the eve of his departure from office. “Midnight appointments” are bad because, as the Aytona v. Castillo decision
puts it, they offend principles of “fairness, justice and righteousness.” They cannot be less bad because they are
made at the local level, by mayors and other local executives.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
Gov’t v. Milton
Springer
50 Phil. 259
(1927)
pp. 418‐419
ISSUE 1: Is the power of appointment
executive? YES.
In Concepcion v. Paredes, supra, xxx
Following the lead of Kentucky, it was
announced that “Appointment to office is
intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion”
OSCAR BERMUDEZ
V. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
GR 131429
AUG 4, 1999
pp. 419‐421
Revised
Administrative
Code of 1987
Provincial
Prosecutor
appointment
Missing
recommendation
The occurrence of a vacancy in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Tarlac impelled the main
contestants in this case, petitioner
Oscar Bermudez and respondent
Conrado Quiaoit, to take
contrasting views on the proper
interpretation of a provision in the
1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Bermudez, the First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer‐In‐Charge of the Office of
Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (Book IV,
Title III, Chapter II,
Section 9)—
All provincial and
city prosecutors and
their assistants shall be
appointed by the
President upon the
recommendation of the
Secretary.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the absence of a
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
to the President Fidel Ramos can be held fatal
to the appointment of respondent Conrado
Quiaoit to the post of Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac. NO.
The recommendation is here nothing
really more than advisory in nature.
xxx the President has the power to assume
directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
the Provincial Prosecutor, was a
recommendee of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for
the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other
hand, would appear to have had
the support of then Representative
Jose Yap of the Second Legislative
District of Tarlac.
On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit emerged
the victor when he was appointed
by President Ramos to the coveted
office.
Petitioners contend that an
appointment of a provincial
prosecutor mandatorily requires a
prior recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice endorsing the
intended appointment citing, by
analogy, the case of San Juan
vs. CSC where the Court held:
. . . The DBM may appoint only from
the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none
is qualified, he must return the list
of nominees to the Governor
explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
Executive Order No.
112 —
Section 1. All budget
officers of provinces,
cities and municipalities
shall be appointed
henceforth by the
Minister of Budget and
Management upon
recommendation of the
local chief executive
concerned. . . .
Note: EO 112 is just
tangential but not
necessarily apt to this
issue. The appointment
in the case of San Juan
has distinctively given
stress in obeying the
constitutional mandate
of the local autonomy.
accordingly be inferred therefrom that the
President can interfere in the exercise of
discretion of officials under him or altogether
ignore their recommendations.
In the instant case, the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice and the
appointment of the President are acts of the
Executive Department itself, and there is no
sharing of power to speak of, the latter being
deemed for all intents and purposes as being
merely an extension of the personality of the
President.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
FLORES V. DRILON
& GORDON
GR 104732
JUNE 22, 1993
pp. 421‐423
Gordon’s
prohibited
appointment to
SBMA
Invalid proviso of
RA 7227
Violation of S16
Article IX‐B
The constitutionality of Section 13,
par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City
was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in this original petition
with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order "to
prevent useless and unnecessary
expenditures of public funds by way
of salaries and other operational
expenses attached to the office…”
Petitioners, xxx maintain that
the proviso in par. (d) of Section 13
infringes section 16 of Article VII
because the City Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public
offices, section 7 of Article IX‐B
since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor
to the subject posts, and, (c)
Section 261, par. (g), of the
Omnibus Election Code for the
reason that the appointment of
respondent Gordon to the subject
RA 7227, Par.(d) ‐‐
Chairman
administrator — The
President shall appoint
a professional manager
as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a
compensation to be
determined by the
Board subject to the
approval of the
Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall
serve as the chief
executive officer of the
Subic
Authority: Provided,
however, That for the
first year of its
operations from the
effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be
appointed as the
chairman and chief
executive officer of the
Subic
Authority (emphasis
supplied).
Section 16 of Article VII
"[t]he President shall . .
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the proviso in
Section 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the
constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts. YES.
Section 7 of Art IX‐B expresses the policy
against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public
officer or employee may serve full‐time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the
delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full‐time job. ALSO, its
basic idea really is to prevent a situation
where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
The proviso is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent,
it needs no stretching of the imagination to
conclude that the proviso contravenes
Section 7, first par., Article IX‐B, of the
Constitution. Futhermore, no legislative act
can prevail over the fundamental law of the
land.
The exemption allowed to appointive
officials in the second paragraph of Section 7
cannot be extended to elective officials who
are governed by the first paragraph.
While it may be viewed that
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posts made by respondent
Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992
was within the prohibited 45‐day
period prior to the 11 May 1992
Elections.
. . appoint all other
officers of the
Government whose
appointments are not
otherwise provided for
by law, and those
whom he may be
authorized by law to
appoint"
Note: the appointment
is invalid and therefore,
not authorized by the
fundamental law of the
land.
Section 7, first par., of
Article IX‐B "[n]o
elective official shall be
eligible for appointment
or designation in any
capacity to any public
officer or position
during his tenure,"
the proviso merely sets the qualifications of
the officer during the first year of operations
of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other,
can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the
President is a perfectly valid legislative act,
the proviso limiting his choice to one is
certainly an encroachment on his
prerogative.
The proviso in par. (d), Section 13, of R.A.
7227,xxx is declared unconstitutional;
Consequently, the appointment pursuant
thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID,
hence NULL and VOID. However, all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments
received by respondent Gordon, xxx are
hereby UPHELD.
ULPIANO
SARMIENTO
(lawyer, taxpayer,
IBP member) V.
MISON (Customs
Commissioner)
156 SCRA 549
1987
pp. 423‐433
Appointment to
bureau heads
w/o CA’s
consent
2nd, 3rd, 4th
group
Petitioners assailed that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality
of respondent Mison's appointment
Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
says:
The President shall
nominate and, with the
consent of the
Commission on
Appointments, appoint
the heads of the
ISSUE 1: The second, third and fourth groups
of officers are the present bone of
contention. Whether or not they may be
appointed by the President without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? YES.
xxx the framers of the 1987 Constitution
and the people adopting it, struck a "middle
ground" by requiring the consent
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without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
This case assumes added
significance because, at bottom
line, it involves a conflict between
two (2) great departments of
government, the Executive and
Legislative Departments. It also
occurs early in the life of the 1987
Constitution.
It is readily apparent that under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time,
are:
First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by
law;
executive departments,
ambassadors, other
public ministers and
consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other
officers whose
appointments are
vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other
officers of the
Government whose
appointments are not
otherwise provided for
by law, and those
whom he may be
authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the
appointment of other
officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in
the courts, or in the
heads of the
departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.
The President shall have
the power to make
appointments during
the recess of the
Congress, whether
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment
of other officers, i.e., those in the second and
third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
Mr. Monsod: On Section 16, I would like to
suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department
heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but
not to the levels of bureau heads and
colonels.
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed
amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26
which is to delete the words "and
bureaus,"xxx
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is
actually quite low in the executive
department, and to require further
confirmation of presidential appointment of
heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's
proposed amendment by deletion also
includes regional directors xxx
It is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the
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Third, those whom the President
may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
voluntary or
compulsory, but such
appointments shall be
effective only until
disapproval by the
Commission on
Appointments or until
the next adjournment
of the Congress.
first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments
is required. Thus, the appointment of
Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs is upheld.
Cruz, J., dissents: xxx
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be confirmed under the first sentence of Section
16, but that is not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence we must understand for a
proper resolution of the issues now before us.
xxx
One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not need confirmation, it was still
felt necessary to provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other officers lower in rank will also
not need confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The third sentence
would appear to be superfluous, too, again in view of the first sentence.
xxx
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers
of the Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship.
xxx
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the Idea expressed in the first sentence
and simply mentions the other officers appointed by the President who are also subject to confirmation. The
second sentence is the later expression of the will of the framers and so must be interpreted as complementing
the rule embodied in the first sentence or, if necessary, reversing the original intention to exempt bureau
directors from confirmation. Xxx At any rate, this view is more consistent with the general purpose of Article
VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the Presidency.
xxx
The rule re‐ established by the new Constitution is that the power requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line with the system of checks and balances. I submit it
is the exception to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
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In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies, who
are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice‐President when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and
(3) "other officers lower in rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. It is
clear that this enumeration does not include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered
by the first sentence of Section 16, comes under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is
also subject to confirmation.
I vote to grant the petition
QUINTOS‐DELES et
al v. CA
177 SCRA 259
(1989)
pp. 433‐438
Sectoral Reps
requires CA
confirmation
This is a special civil action xxx
seeking to compel respondent
Commission on Appointments to
allow petitioner Teresita Quintos‐
Deles to perform and discharge her
duties as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the
Women's Sector and to restrain
respondents from subjecting peti‐
tioner's appointment to the
confirmation process.
On April 18, 1988, the petitioner
and 3 other sectoral repre‐
sentatives appointed by Pres.
Corazon Aquino were scheduled to
take their oaths before Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session
Hall of Congress after the Order of
Business. However, they were not
able to take their oaths and
discharge their duties as members
of Congress due to the opposition
of some congressmen‐members of
Under Section 7, Article
18 of the Constitution:
"SEC. 7. Until a law is
passed, the President
may fill by appointment
from a list of nominees
by the respective
sectors the seats
reserved for
sectoral representation
in paragraph (1),
Section 5 of Article VI of
this Constitution."
Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution:
"SEC. 16. x x x
The President shall have
the power to make
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Constitution
requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. YES
Since the seats reserved
for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Article VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express
provision of Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, it is indubitable
that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other
officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution," referred to
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
o Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2,
Section 16, Article VII as authority for the
appointment of petitioner is, the
recognition by the President as
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the Commission on Appointments,
who insisted
that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the
respondent Commission before
they could take their oaths and/or
assume office as members of the
House of Representatives.
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the
Committee of the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices of the
Commission on Appointments,
chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara,
the Committee ruled against the
position of petitioner Deles.
Petitioner Teresita Quintos‐Deles
contends that her appointment
as Sectoral Representative for
Women by the President pursuant
to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, does not require
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments to qualify her to take
her seat in the House of
Representatives.
appointments during
the recess of the
Congress, whether
voluntary or
compulsory, but such
appointments shall be
effective only until
disapproval by the
Commission on
Appointments or until
the next adjournment
of the Congress."
appointing authority that petitioner's
appointment requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Thus, appointments by the President of
sectoral representatives require the consent
of the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with the first sentence of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. More to
the point, petitioner Deles’ appointment was
issued not by virtue of Executive Order No.
198 but pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of
the Constitution which require submission to
the confirmation process.
Calderon v. Carale
as Chairman of
the National Labor
Relations
Commission
GR 91636
RA 6715
amending art.
215 of Labor
Code
NLRC Chair
under 3rd
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715),
President Aquino appointed the
Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC representing the public,
workers and employers sectors. The
appointments stated that the
appointees may qualify and enter
The second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII
refers to all other
officers of the
government whose
appointments are not
otherwise provided for
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Congress may, by
law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of appointments extended
by the president to government officers
additional to those expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution whose appointments
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Apr 23, 1992
pp. 438‐444
groups upon the performance of the duties
of the office. After said
appointments, then Labor Secretary
Franklin Drilon issued
Administrative Order No. 161,
series of 1989, designating the
places of assignment of the newly
appointed commissioners.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory
compliance with RA 6715 which has
in its favor the presumption of
validity. RA 6715 is not, according
to petitioner, an encroachment on
the appointing power of the
executive contained in Section 16,
Article VII, of the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers
appointed by the President
additional to those mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioner claims that
the Mison and Bautista rulings are
not decisive of the issue in this case
for in the case at bar, the President
issued permanent appointments to
the respondents without submitting
them to the CA for
confirmation despite passage of a
by law and those whom
the President may be
authorized by law to
appoint.
require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. NO.
Ulpiano v. Mison In the course of the
debates on the text of Section 16, there were
two (2) major changes proposed and
approved by the Commission:
(1) the exclusion of the appointments of
heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
(2) the exclusion of appointments made
under the second sentence of the section
from the same requirement.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, more specifically under the
"third groups" of appointees referred to
in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint. xxx not
among the officers mentioned xxx whose
appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is
unconstitutional because:
1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
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law (RA 6715) which requires the
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of such
appointments.
by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and
2) It amends by legislation the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments on
appointments, which are otherwise entrusted
only with the President.
The deliberate limitation on the power of
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential
appointments, embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution has
undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and
disapproval of members of Congress. The
solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a
problem, is not judicial or legislative but
constitutional. A future constitutional
convention or Congress sitting as a
constituent (constitutional) assembly may
then consider either a return to the 1935
Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a
hybrid system between the 1935 or 1987
constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the
duty of the Court to apply the 1987
Constitution in accordance with what it says
and not in accordance with how the
legislature or the executive would want it
interpreted.
Cruz, J., dissents:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be re‐examined instead of
being automatically re‐affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not believe we should persist in
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error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
Ma. Aangelina
Matibag v. Alfredo
Benipayo
GR 149036
April 2, 2002
pp. 444‐456
Comelec ad
interim
appointments
Article IX‐C
Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G.
Matibag questions the
constitutionality of the
appointment and the right to hold
office of the following: (1) Alfredo L.
Benipayo as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections; and (2)
Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as
COMELEC Commissioners.
Petitioner also questions the
legality of the appointment of
Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the
COMELEC’s Education and
Information Department.
In the meantime, on September 6,
2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
renewed once again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Borra and
Tuason as Commissioners,
respectively, for a term of seven
years expiring on February 2,
2008.They all took their oaths of
office anew.
Petitioner posits the view that
an ad interim appointment can be
withdrawn or revoked by the
President at her pleasure, and can
even be disapproved or simply by‐
passed by the Commission on
Section 1 (2), Article IX‐
C of the Constitution,
which provides as
follows:
"The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be
appointed by the
President with the
consent of the
Commission on
Appointments for a
term of seven years
without reappointment.
Of those first
appointed, three
Members shall hold
office for seven years,
two Members for five
years, and the last
Members for three
years, without
reappointment.
Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In
no case shall any
Member be appointed
or designated in a
temporary or acting
capacity."
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued
by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX‐C of the Constitution. NO
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent
character.xxx
Thus, as provided by Section 16, the ad
interim appointment remains effective
until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn
or revoked by the President. The fear that the
President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.
An ad interim appointment can be
terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution. The first cause is the
disapproval of his ad interim appointment by
the Commission on Appointments. The
second cause is the adjournment of Congress
without the Commission on Appointments
acting on his appointment. These two causes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Appointments. For this reason,
petitioner claims that an ad
interim appointment is temporary
in character and consequently
prohibited by the last sentence of
Section 1 (2), Article IX‐C of the
Constitution.
Based on petitioner’s theory, there
can be no ad interim appointment
to the COMELEC or to the other two
constitutional commissions, namely
the Civil Service Commission and
the Commission on Audit. The last
sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX‐
C of the Constitution is also found
in Article IX‐B and Article IX‐D
providing for the creation of the
Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit, respectively.
Petitioner interprets the last
sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article
IX‐C to mean that the ad interim
appointee cannot assume office
until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on
Appointments for only then does
his appointment become
permanent and no longer
temporary in character.
The second paragraph
of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution
provides as follows:
"The President shall
have the power to
make appointments
during the recess of the
Congress, whether
voluntary or
compulsory, but such
appointments shall
be effective only
until disapproval by the
Commission on
Appointments or until
the next adjournment
of the Congress."
are resolutory conditions expressly imposed
by the Constitution on all ad
interim appointments. Xxx
In the instant case, the President did in
fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity xxx
xxx The original intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to do away with ad
interim appointments because the plan was
for Congress to remain in session throughout
the year except for a brief 30‐day compulsory
recess. xxx
Clearly, the reinstatement in the present
Constitution of the ad interim appointing
power of the President (stated in the last
sentence of Section 16) was for the purpose
of avoiding interruptions in vital government
services that otherwise would result from
prolonged vacancies in government offices,
including the three constitutional
commissions. .
In the instant case, the Commission on
Appointments had long confirmed four of the
incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a
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majority, who could now be removed from
office only by impeachment. The special
constitutional safeguards that insure the
independence of the COMELEC remain in
place. The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy,
appoints its own officials and employees, and
promulgates its own rules on pleadings and
practice. Moreover, the salaries of COMELEC
members cannot be decreased during their
tenure.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim
appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively,
do not constitute temporary or acting
appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX‐C of the Constitution.
Rufino V. Endriga
GR 139565
JULY 21, 2006
pp. 456‐461
CCP Board of
Trustees
Section 6b
PD 15
Rufino Group vs
Endriga Group
June 25, 1966 then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30)
creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines as a trust governed by a
Board of Trustees of seven
members to preserve and promote
Philippine culture. The original
founding trustees, who were all
appointed by President Marcos,
were Imelda Romualdez‐Marcos,
Juan Ponce‐Enrile, Andres Soriano,
Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father
Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P.
Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
Section 6(b) of PD 15,
as amended, which
reads:
Board of Trustees. —
The governing powers
and authority of the
corporation shall be
vested in, and exercised
by, a Board of eleven
(11) Trustees who shall
serve without
compensation.
x x x x
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in
not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional considering that:
x x x [it] is an invalid delegation of
the President’s appointing power under the
Constitution;
x x x [it] effectively deprives the President
of his constitutional power of control and
supervision over the CCP
YES.
As Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint
the trustees of the CCP Board because the
trustees fall under the third group of officers.
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October 5 1972 or soon after the
declaration of Martial
Law, President Marcos issued PD
15, the CCP’s charter, which
converted the CCP under EO 30 into
a non‐municipal public corporation
free from the “pressure or influence
of politics.”
Eventually, during the term of
President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP
Board included Endriga, Lagdameo,
Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez,
Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”),
and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).
December 22, 1998 then
President Joseph E. Estrada
appointed seven new trustees
(Rufino group) to the CCP Board for
a term of four years to replace the
Endriga group as well as two other
incumbent trustees.
January 6 1999 the Endriga
group filed a petition for quo
warranto before this Court
questioning President Estrada’s
appointment of seven new
members to the CCP Board.
May 14, 1999 the Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision
under review granting the quo
(b) Vacancies in the
Board of Trustees due
to termination of term,
resignation, incapacity,
death or other cause as
may be provided in the
By‐laws, shall be filled
by election by a vote of
a majority of the
trustees held at the
next regular meeting
following occurrence of
such
vacancy. xxx Should for
any reason the Board
be left entirely vacant,
the same shall be filled
by the President of
the Philippines acting in
consultation with the
aforementioned ranking
officers of the
Center. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 16, Article VII of
the
1987 Constitution which
provides:
xxx He shall also
appoint all other
officers of the
The express language of the Constitution
and the clear intent of its framers point to
only one conclusion — the officers whom the
heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards may appoint must be
of lower rank than those vested by law with
the power to appoint.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers
the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to
elect their fellow trustees. On the other
hand, Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allows heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint only “officers lower in
rank” than such “heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.”
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which
authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the
President’s power of control under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Xxx
it makes the CCP a self‐perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the
President. Such a public office or board
cannot legally exist under the 1987
Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states
that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy
and operation x x x. This provision does not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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warranto petition. The Court of
Appeals declared the Endriga group
lawfully entitled to hold office as
CCP trustees. On the other hand,
the appellate court’s Decision
ousted the Rufino group from
the CCP Board.
Rufino group, seek to set aside the
Decision dated 14 May 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA‐G.R. SP No.
50272 as well as the Resolution
dated 3 August 1999 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered
1) Declaring petitioners [the
Endriga group] to have a clear right
to their respective offices to which
they were elected by the CCP Board
up to the expiration of their 4‐year
term,
2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino
group], except respondent Zenaida
R. Tantoco, from their respective
offices and excluding them
therefrom, and
3) Dismissing the case against
respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco. SO
ORDERED
Government whose
appointments are not
otherwise provided for
by law, and those
whom he may
be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the
appointment of other
officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in
the courts, or in the
heads of departments,
agencies, commissions,
or boards.
xxx
free the CCP from the President’s control, for
if it does, then it would be unconstitutional.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch.
xxx By stating that the “President shall have
control of all the executive x x x offices,” the
1987 Constitution empowers the
President not only to influence but even to
control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP. Control is far greater than,
and subsumes, influence.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in
G.R. No. 139554. We
declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and
(c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as
amended, insofar as it authorizes the
remaining trustees to fill by election
vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
Lacson‐
Magallanes
Co., Inc v. Pano
L‐27811
1967
pp. 461‐465
Executive
Secretary
Secretary of
Agriculture
and Natural
Resources
Director of
Lands
An order issued by the Director of
Lands, affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, was
reversed by the Executive Secretary
(ES).
Petitioner prays that: (1) the decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture has full
force, (2) The decision of the ES is
contrary to law and has no legal force,
(3) The decision of the ES constituted
undue delegation of power and (4) The
ES is on equal rank as any other
Secretary and thus is not authorized to
reverse decisions by department heads.
Lower courts ruled that ES did not act in
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, this petition
for review.
Sec 17, Art 7
constitution
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Executive Secretary has
the power to reverse decisions by other department
heads. YES.
It is not correct to say that the President may not
delegate to his Executive Secretary acts, which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in
person.
The president is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions.
The ES who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed duty to
affirm, modify or even reverse any order. Only the
president may rightfully say that the ES is not
authorized to do so.
Ang‐Angco v.
Castill
9 SCRA 619
(1963)
pp. 465‐466
Civil Service
Executive
Secretary
Power of
control
tenure
A civil service officer bypassed the
procedure prescribed by the Civil
Service Law.
Executive Secretary Castillo imposed
disciplinary actions against the said
officer.
Art IX‐B, Sec 4
No officer or
employee of the
civil service shall be
removed or
suspended except
for cause provided
by law.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President, acting
through the Executive Secretary, may take
disciplinary action against a Civil Service officer.
NO.
Despite the power of control given to the
President, Section 4, Article 12 of the Constitution
clearly provides that “No officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law”. The constitution gives
stability to the tenure of office of those who belong
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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to classified service.
To hold that civil service officials hold their office
at the will of the appointing power would
demoralize and undermine the whole civil service
system and structure.
Congress has provided, by law, for a procedure
for the removal of civil service officers. i.e. Civil
Service Act 1959
Namarco v.
Arca
29 SCRA 418
(1969)
pp. 466‐467
NAMARCO
GOCC’s
Presidential
power of
control
The NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissed Juan T. Arive from service.
President ordered the reinstatement of
Mr. Arive.
Petitioners contend that the
Presidential power of control does not
include government‐owned and
controlled corporations such as
NAMARCO. They assert that president
cannot order reinstatement.
Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President had authority
to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors.
YES.
Under our government set‐up, corporations
owned or controlled by the government, such as
NAMARCO, partake the nature of government
offices, which are under the power of the President.
The reinstatement order, therefore, falls within the
constitutional power of the president over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
De Leon v.
Carpio
178 SCRA 457
(1989)
pp. 467‐468
DOJ
CSC
NBI
Orders of reinstatement of Estavillo and
De Leon to their respective posts was
issued by the Civil Service Commission,
as referred by the Department of
Justice.
Director of National bureau of
Investigation refused to reinstate the
petitioners. Respondent argues that the
Commission does not have authority to
review dismissals made under the
Freedom Constitution
Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Director of NBI can
disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by
Secretary of Justice. NO.
The President’s power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department. In the
case at bar, there is no question that when he
directed the respondent to reinstate petitioners,
Secretary Ordonez was acting in the regular
discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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President. His acts should therefore have been
respected by the respondent Director of NBI.
E. Blaquera, et
al v. Alcasid
G.R. No.
109406 Sep 11,
1998
pp. 468
AO 29
Power of
Control
President issued Administrative order
29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits, enjoining heads of
government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without prior
approval from the President and
directing the refund of the excess over
the prescribed amount.
Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the issuance of AO 29 is
within the scope of the President’s power of control
over executive departments. YES
The President is the head of the government. His
power includes control over executive departments.
He can exercise this power motu propio without
need of any appeal from any party.
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander‐in‐Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty‐eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty‐four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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IBP vs. Zamora Law and
Order,
President
Estrada
A special civil action for certiorariand
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to
nullify on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding deployment of the
Philippine Marines to join the Philippin
National Police in visibility patrols
around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in
violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings,
the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
the PNP and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government were
tasked to execute and implement said
order.
Subsequently, the President confirmed
his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP and the PNP Chief.
The selected areas for deployment
under the Memo are: Monumento
Circle, North EDSA (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM
Megamall, Makati Commercial Center,
Section 18, Article
VII of the
Constitution
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Memo. NO.
What the IBP questions is the basis for calling of
the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to them, o emergency exists that would
justify the need for calling of the military to assist
the police force.
The Court ruled in the negative saying that the
power of the President involved may be no more
than the maintenance of peace and order and
promotion of the general welfare.
When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling
out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence
to support that the President acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
The Court cannot review the factual bases of the
calling of the armed forces.
o In so claiming, the Court found it prudent to
note the differences of calling out the armed
forces from the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation
of martial law, the latter two being subject to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
Domestic Airport.
On 17 January 2000, the IBP filed the
instant petition to annul the Memo and
to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void.
revocation by Congress and review by the court
while no such provision was provided for the
former. The Court elaborated on this by quoting
from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
o Fr. Bernas: …There is a graduated power of the
President as Commander‐in‐Chief. First, he can
call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary
to suppress lawless violence; then he can
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a
graduated sequence. When he judges that it is
necessary to impose martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it
subject to review by the Supreme Court and
subject to concurrence by the National
Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he
says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his
judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
The reason for the difference in the treatment
of the aforementioned powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway
and broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion
or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it.
These conditions are not required in the case of
the power to call out the armed forces. The only
criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.”
Further, the Court may not verify the factual
bases of such calling. Whereas, in contrast, the
President as Commander‐in‐Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information to
base his decision upon.
The determination of the necessity for the
calling out power subjected to unfettered judicial
scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for
disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary
restraining order every time it is exercised.
The President has already determined the
necessity and factual basis for calling the armed
forces. In his Memorandum, he identified them
as the following: violent crimes like bank/store
robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings,
continue to occur in Metro Manila.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the deployment of
Marines violates the civilian supremacy clause.
NO.
The IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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“militarized” in violation of Section 3, Article II of
the Constitution.
The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement.
It is noteworthy that the local police forces are
the one sin charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In
fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP‐Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols.
ISSUE 3: Whether or not the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP unmakes the civilian
character of the police force and amounts to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution. NO.
The real authority in these operations, as stated
in the Memo, is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Further, since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to a civilian position to
speak of.
The Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there
can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in
civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Lastly, since the institution of the joint visibility
patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has
complained that his political or civil rights have been
violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines.
The court dismissed the petitions.
Lacson vs.
Perez
State of
rebellion
May 1, 2001 President Macapagal‐
Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent
mob armed with explosives, firearms,
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
other deadly weapons” assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang,
issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring
that there was a state of rebellion in the
NCR. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to
suppress rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected.
The Petitions assail the declaration of a
state of rebellion by PGMA and the
warrantless arrests ellegedly effected
by virtue thereof, as having no basis in
fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6,
2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the
declaration in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have
been rendered moot and academic.
Petitioners claim that the proclamation
of a “state of rebellion” is being used by
the authorities to justify warrantless
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the proclamation of a
“state of rebellion” is being used by the authorities
to justify warrantless arrests, as alleged by
Petitioner. NO.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest
feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a “state of rebellion.”
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the declaration is an
encroachment on the domain of the judiciary and
therefore violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers. NO
The Court disagrees with the allegation of
Petitioner. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
expressly provides that “the President shall be the
Commander‐in‐Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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arrests.
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the
People’s Movement Against Poverty
(PMAP), for his part, argues that the
declaration of a “state of rebellion” is
violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the
domain of the judiciary which has the
constitutional prerogative to
“determine and interpret” what took
place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot be an exception to the general
rule on the allocation of the
governmental powers.
Substantiated by the ruling in IBP vs. Zamora:
…The factual necessity of calling out the
armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court
may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might
also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of
a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as
Commander‐in‐Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on‐the‐spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of poverty…
The Court dismissed the petitions.
Sanlakas vs.
Executive
Secretary
Oakwood
Mutiny, State
of rebellion
They came in the middle of the night.
Armed with high‐powered ammunitions
and explosives, some three hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in Makati City in
Section 18, Article
VII of the
Constitution,
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, declaring a “state of rebellion”
is unconstitutional. NO.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the
calling out power the Constitution (Section 18,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the wee hours of July 27, 2003.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded, among other
things, the resignation of the President,
the Secretary of Defense and the Chief
of the PNP.
In the wake of the Oakwood
occupation, the President issued later in
the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring “a
state of rebellion” and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the
Oakwood occupation had ended. After
hours‐long negotiations, the soldiers
agrred to return to barracks.
The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion and did so only on
August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435.
In the interim, several petitions were
filed before this Court challenging the
validity of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4.
Since the declaration was lifted,
petitions have become moot and
academic. However, in light of the fact
that once before, ruled on a like matter,
the Court treated the instant petitions
as exceptions in that they are capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Article VII) does not require the President to make a
declaration of a state of rebellion. In this regard, a
declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
superfluity. At most it only gives notice to the nation
that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. The Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance.
The declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
For the same reason, apprehensions that the
military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In
Lacson vs. Perez, the authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. The warrantless arrest feared is
not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.
In other words, a person may be subjected to a
warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether
or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid
warrantless arrest are present.
While the Court may examine whether the power
to call out the armed forces was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that
the President acted without factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law
and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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requirement is a leap of logic. There is no indication
that the military tribunals have replaced civil courts
in the “theater of war” or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of civil government.
There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or
political rights. There is no indication that the
President has exercised judicial and legislative
powers.
The Petitions were dismissed.
Randolf David
et al. vs. Ermita
pp. 1017 These seven consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing Proclamation No. 1017 (pp.
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O.
No. 5), PGMA committed grave abuse
of discretion.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
the said issuances.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation
celebrated the 20th anniversary of the
EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo
issued pp. 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency.
On the same day, pursuant to pp. 1017,
PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 which calls
upon the AFP and PNP to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.
Section 18, Article
VII of the
Constitution
Chapter 2, Book III
of EO 292
ISSUE 1: Whether the Court can review the factual
bases of pp. 1017.
As a rule, judicial inquiry can go no further than
to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision
is correct, but that the President did not act
arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. In IBP vs. Zamora, the
Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by
way of proof, to support his assertion, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that PGMA exercising
of the call‐out power, by issuing pp.1017, is totally
bereft of factual basis.
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondents, filed
a Consolidated Comment and Memorandum that
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to
the issuance of pp. 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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On March 3, 2006, exactly one week
after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these
petitions had been filed, the President
lifted pp. 1017 through the issuance of
pp. 1021.
In their presentation of the factual
bases of pp. 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the NPA,
and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take‐over
the reigns of government as a clear and
present danger. It is noteworthy that
respondents fully substantiate these
claims with actual incidents and actual
reports from the military and various
sources.
Petitioners allege several violations
against constitutional rights including
arrests, suppression of freedom of
speech, etc.
17, Article XII of the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D‐Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and
the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing pp. 1017 calling for military aid.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not pp. 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are constitutional. No
2.1. Facial Challenge. Petitioners contend that pp.
1017 is void on its face because of overbreadth.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of pp.
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech‐related conduct.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not
intended for testing the validity of a law that
“reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
A facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine
will require the Court to examine pp. 1017 and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Constitution
Section 17 reads: In
times of national
emergency, when
public interest so
requires, the State
may, during the
emergency and
under reasonable
terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take
over or direct
operation of any
privately‐owned
public utility or
business affected
with public interest.
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its
actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Lastly, a facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be valid. The petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.
2.2. Constitutional Basis of pp. 1017
First Provision: Calling‐out Power
Some petitioners vehemently maintain that pp. 1017
is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so,
What defines the character of pp. 1017 are its
wordings. It is plain therein that what the President
invoked was her calling‐out power.
pp. 1017, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, is a valid exercise of the President’s
call‐out power.
Second Provision: Take Care Power
pp. 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in
Congress. They assail the clause “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The President, under Chapter 2, Book III of EO 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), may issue any of the
following: Executive Orders, Administrative Orders,
Proclamations, Memorandum Orders,
Memorandum Circulars, General and Special Orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees
similar to those issued by Former President Marcos.
Presidential Decrees are of the same category and
binding force as statutes because they were issued
by the President in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Law under the
1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that pp. 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the legislature.
Third Provision: Power to take Over
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House
of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in pp. 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislature’s emergency
powers.
President only has authority to declare a state of
national emergency. However, to exercise
emergency powers would need a delegation from
Congress. pp. 1017 does not authorize the President
during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct privately‐owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
2.3. As Applied Challenge
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Petitioners aver that pp. 1017 should be struck
down for violating constitutional rights in that it
allowed the police to conduct illegal arrest and
searches, and other such violations.
Petitioners David and Llamas alleged arrests without
warrants.
Petitioners Cacho‐Olivares and Tribune Publishing
Co., Inc. claimed that CIDG operatives “raided and
ransacked without warrant” their office.
Petitioners KMU and NAFLU‐KMU et al. alleged that
their members were “turned away and dispersed”
when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue
to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I.
The Court was guided by the question: “May this
Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional
on the ground that its implementor committed
illegal acts?” The answer is no. The criterion by
which validity of the statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
power and not a mere incidental result arising from
its exertion…
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
In re: Torres v.
Director of
Prison
Conditional
pardon
Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was
convicted of two counts of estafa by the
court of First Instance of Manila before
1979. These convictions were affirmed
by the court of appeals. He was granted
Section 64(i) of the
Revised
Administrative
Code:
the Chief Executive
ISSUE 1: Did the exercise of the President’s
prerogative under Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine, if any, any
breach of a condition of pardon in violation of the
pardonee’s act to due process and the constitutional
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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conditional pardon by the president of
the Philippines on April 18, 1979, the
condition being that he would not again
violate any penal laws of the
Philippines. He accepted and was
released from confinement.
May 21, 1986 the Board of Pardons
and Parole resolved to recommend to
the president to cancel Torres’ pardon
because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa and convicted
of sedition by the QC RTC. His
conditional pardon was canceled and
was arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa.
Torres’ wife and children pray for his
immediate release. This is an original
petition for habeas corpus.
is authorized to
order "the arrest
and re‐incarceration
of any such person
who, in his
judgment, shall fail
to comply with the
condition, or
conditions of his
pardon, parole, or
suspension of
sentence."
presumption of innocence constitute a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lace or excess of
jurisdiction? NO.
Courts have no authority to interfere with the
grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. Also, a conditional pardon is in nature a
contract between the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal. The determination of the
violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive.
Therefore, no final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is required in determining
whether there was a breach of the terms of the
conditional pardon.
Garcia v.
Commission on
Audit
Executive
clemency
Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a
Supervising Lineman in the Region IV
Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He
was summarily dismissed from servce
on the ground of dishonest for the loss
of several telegraph poles. A criminal
case for qualified theft was filed against
him with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon. Petitioner was acquitted on
the fact that petitioner was found
innocent and never having committed
the offense. Garcia sought
reinstatement to his former position
ISSUE 1: Is Garcia entitled to his back wages
pursuant to his reinstatement by grant of executive
clemency? YES.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to
government service entitles him to back wages. This
is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for
what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
but was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Hence petitioner
pleaded to the president for executive
clemency.
Petitioner was granted executive
clemency and was reinstated to his
former employment. He then claimed
payment for back wages but was denied
by the Commission on Audit saying that
since petitioner did not render any
service during the period before his
reinstatement, he is not entitled to back
wages. (No service, no pay)
Llamas v.
Orbos
Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the
incumbent Vice‐Governor of the
province of Tarlac.
March 1, 1991 he assumed, by
virtue of a decision of the Office of the
President, the governorship. Private
respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is
the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Tarlac and was suspended
from office for 90 days in violation of
the Anti‐Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Public respondent Oscar Orbos
(Executive Secretary) is being impleaded
herein in that official capacity for having
issued, by authority of the President,
executive clemency to Ocampo.
March 1, 1991 Petitioner took his
oath of office as acting governor. He
Sec 19, Art 7 ISSUE 1: Can the president grant executive clemency
in administrative cases? YES.
The president can grant executive clemency
based on Art 7, Sec 19 of the constitution. The
constitution does not distinguish between cases that
executive clemency may be applied to. If the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
ISSUE 2: Were petitioner’s constitutional rights to
due process violated? NO.
The petitioner’s constitutional rights to due
process were not violated because his being not
notified of the subject of pardon is because a pardon
is private, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended. Therefore, petitioner need not
be notified.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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had until May 31, 1991 as acting
governor under the administrative
suspension order. However, Ocampo
was granted executive clemency and
the reassumption ceremony was held
on May 21, 1991.
Petitioner contends that the president
has the power to grant executive
clemency in criminal cases and not in
administrative cases.
Drilon v. Court
of Appeals
Presidential
pardon
The DOJ has brought this suit to annul
the decision of the Court of Appeals
prohibiting the government from
pursuing criminal actions against the
private respondents for the death of
Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez
during early martial law.
Private respondents Raul Paredes and
Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with
double murder. Paredes was acquitted
while Ganzon was sentenced to life
imprisonment with hard labor. Ganzon
was made to serve sentence (for 6
years) until he was released and placed
under house arrest (but was apparently
free to move in and out of his
residence). Ganzon claims he was
extended absolute pardon by the
president (Marcos).
Petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of
ISSUE 1: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave
abuse of discretion in granting the prohibition?
NO.
Former deputy presidential executive assistant
Joaquin Venus, Jr. declared that Ganzon’s absolute
pardon was indeed signed by former president
Marcos. Also, former presidential executive assistant
Juan Tuvera testified that he was given by Venus the
Xerox copy of the presidential pardon.
If Ganzon was not actually extended absolute
pardon, then he should have remained incarcerated
or under house arrest until present time, which is
not the case. Also, it would seem that the president
commuted Ganzon’s imprisonment to 6 years, and
the house arrest being a condition. Therefore, he
has already served his full sentence and can no
longer be reinvestigated.
It is sufficient that Ganzon was voluntarily
released with terms or conditions. Commutation of
sentence need not be in a specific form.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
discretion in granting the prohibition
since Ganzon has not adequately
proved the fact of presidential pardon.
People v. Salle,
Jr.
Amnesty
(compare to
pardon)
Under Jones Law: pardon could be
granted any time after the commission
of the offense, either before or after
conviction
Under the 1973 constitution: pardon
could be granted only after final
conviction.
1981 amendments: removed limitation
of final conviction thereby bringing back
provision of Jones Law.
1987 constitution: pardon may be
granted only after conviction by final
judgment.
Judgment of conviction becomes final
when:
(1) no appeal is seasonably perfected
(2) accused commences to serve the
sentence
(3) right to appeal is expressly waived in
writing, except where the death penalty
was imposed by the trial court
(4) when accused applies for probation
Sec 19, Art 7 ISSUE 1: Is pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
conviction enforceable? NO.
Before an appellant may be validly granted
pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his
appeal. The ‘conviction by final judgment’ limitation
of the present constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court.
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Government or government‐owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two‐thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
LIM VS.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. NO.
151445
P. 540
Visiting
Forces
Agreement
Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.
Petition for certiorari praying that
respondents be restrained from
proceeding with the so‐called
“Balikatan 02‐1” and the deployment of
U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for
being illegal and in violation of the
Constitution.
January 2002 personnel from the
armed forces of the USA started arriving
in Mindanao to take part in the
Balikatan 02‐1
February 1, 2002 petitioners Arthur
D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
February 7, 2002 the Senate
conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan”
exercise wherein Vice‐President
TeofistoGuingona, Jr., concurrently
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented
the draft Terms of reference (TOR). Five
days later, he approved the TOR.
Sec. 25 Article XVIII
of the Constitution.
After the expiration
in 1991 of the
Agreement
between the
Republic of the
Philippines and the
United States of
America concerning
the Military Bases,
foreign military
bases, troops or
facilities shall not
be allowed in the
Philippines…
Section 5 (2) Article
VIII of the
Constitution.
Review, revise,
reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of
Court may provide,
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Balikatan 02‐1 is
covered by the VFA YES. The TOR of the Balikatan
fall within the context of the VFA.
Ratio 1:
o The ambiguity on whether the Balikatan falls
within the context of the VFA is couched on the
interpretation of the word “activities” by the
VFA.
o A review of pertinent sections of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that the cardinal rule of interpretation of
treaties must involve an examination of the
text, which is presumed to verbalize the
parties’ intentions.
o The Court ruled that the ambiguity stemming
from the word “activities” arose by accident. It
held that it was deliberately made that way to
give the parties ample leeway in negotiation.
o Under this interpretation, the VFA gives
legitimacy to the Balikatan 02‐1. It falls under
the allowable or sanctioned activities in the
context of the agreement.
ISSUE 2: May American troops actually engage in
combat in Philippine territory? NO. US forces are
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
final judgments and
order of lower
courts in:
(A) All cases in
which the
constitutionality or
validity of any
treaty, international
agreement, law…
prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
Ratio 2:
o Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
o Further, Article 2 (4) of the United Nations
Charter enjoins its countries party to it from the
use of force against the territorial integrity of
any state.
o The VFA and the MTD, as in all other treaties
and international agreements to which the
Philippines is a party must be read in the
context of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 2, 7,
and 8 of Article II of which are key provisions
useful in determining the extent to which
foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine
territory. It is notable that such provisions
prohibit offensive war by foreign countries on
Philippine territory.
Sec. 25 of Article XVIII seems to be in conflict with
our treaty obligations?
o Sec. 25 provides that foreign military bases,
troops or facilities after the expiration in 1991
of the agreement between the RP and the US
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the
senate…
o From the perspective of public international
law, a treaty is favored over municipal law. This
is not, however, the case in the Philippines. This
is evidenced by Section 5, Article VII of the
Constitution – the power of the Supreme Court
to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
judgments in all cases in which the
constitutionality of any treaty, law, decree, and
international agreement is in question, a notion
supported by the decision in Ichong vs.
Hernandez.
ISSUE 3: Are American troops actively engaged in
combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of
an alleged training and assistance exercise? The
Court may not rule on this matter.
Ratio 3:
o Such is a question of fact and is not a fit topic
for a special civil action for certiorari. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition‐in‐
intervention are hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in
form and substance in the proper Regional Trial
Court.
BAYAN V.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No.
159618
PP 547
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly
registered party‐list group established
to represent the marginalized sectors of
society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
On December 28, 2000, the RP,
through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A.
Manalo, signed the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court which, by
its terms, is “subject to ratification,
Section 21 states:
No treaty or
international
agreement shall be
valid and effective
unless concurred in
by at least two‐
thirds of all the
Members of the
Senate.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the agreement was
contracted validly, which resolves itself into the
question of whether or not respondents gravely
abused their discretion in concluding it. YES it is
valid and there’s no grave abuse of discretion.
The Constitution vests in the President the power
to enter into international agreements, subject, in
appropriate cases, to the required concurrence
votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated,
executive agreements may be validly entered into
without such concurrence.
In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru
E/N BFO‐028‐03, then President Gloria Macapagal‐
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states. Only 92 out of the 139
signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process. The Philippines is
not among the 92.
The RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied
under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with
the US government. In esse,
the Agreement aims to protect what it
refers to and defines as “persons” of
the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.
In response to a query of then Solicitor
General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the
status of the non‐surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his
letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes
constituted a legally binding agreement
under international law; and that, under
US law, the said agreement did not
require the advice and consent of the
US Senate.
Section 25, Article
18:
After the expiration
in 1991 of the
Agreement
between the
Republic of the
Philippines and the
United States of
America concerning
military bases,
foreign military
bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be
Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and
discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the
end of the day, the President––by ratifying, thru her
deputies, the non‐surrender agreement––did
nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty
and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her
office.
The rationale behind this principle is the
inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the
government.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not x x x AGREEMENT IS VALID,
BINDING AND EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE
CONCURRENCE BY AT LEAST TWO‐THIRDS (2/3) OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE x x x. YES.
One type of executive agreement is a treaty or a
treaty‐implementing executive agreement, which
necessarily would cover the same matters subject of
the underlying treaty.
In the instant case, it bears stressing that
the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome
Statute and not a State‐Party for lack of ratification
by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
the Rome Statute.
But over and above the foregoing considerations
is the fact that––save for the situation and matters
contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
allowed in the
Philippines except
under a treaty duly
concurred in by the
Senate and, when
the Congress so
requires, ratified by
a majority of the
votes cast by the
people in a national
referendum held for
that purpose, and
recognized as a
treaty by the other
contracting State.
Constitution]––when a treaty is required, the
Constitution does not classify any subject, like that
involving political issues, to be in the form of, and
ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely
prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of
the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete
the ratification process.
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as
reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the
obligatory effect of executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Senate:
o x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into
binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days
of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most
favored‐nation rights, patent rights, trademark
and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.
SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE VS.
JUDGE
LANTION
GR 139465
P. 564
Extradition Ponente: Puno, J.
On January 13, 1977 then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons
Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country".
On November 13, 1994 then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
P.D. 1069
Section 6. Issuance
of Summons;
Temporary Arrest;
Hearing; Service of
Notices.
(1) Immediately
upon receipt of the
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the private respondent is
entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process? NO. Respondent is bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Ratio 1:
o A review of Section 6(1)(2) of P.D. 1069 and the
RP‐US Extradition Treaty reveals that there is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP‐US Extradition
Treaty). The Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States for crimes
committed in the US.
On the same day, petitioner issued
Department Order No. 249 designating
and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1069. Upon technical
evaluation and assessment of the
extradition request, the panel found
irregularities must first be addressed.
Pending evaluation of the said
documents, respondent Jimenez wrote
to petitioner requesting a copy of the
extradition request from the US
government and that he be given ample
time to respond to the same. However,
request was denied by petitioner.
A petition was brought to the Regional
petition, the
presiding judge of
the court shall, as
soon as practicable,
summon the
accused to appear
and to answer the
petition on the day
and hour fixed in
the order…
(2) The order and
notice as well as a
copy of the warrant
of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly
served each upon
the accused and the
attorney having
charge of the case.
no provision in both which gives an extraditee
the right to demand from the Secretary of
Justice copies of the extradition request from
the US Government and its supporting
documents and to comment thereon while the
request is still undergoing evaluation. Thus, the
right of the subject to have access to the
evidence in the hands of the executive
department is only during the judicial phase
and not during the evaluation phase.
o The Court also ruled that treaties should be
interpreted only in the light of their intent.
Extradition treaties provide the assurance that
the punishment of these crimes will not be
frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
sovereignty. The intent of the treaty is to ensure
that the perpetrators of such crimes will not be
overprotected by any of the signatory states.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25
wherein respondent Hon. Judge
Lantion, granted the petition of now
respondent Jimenez.
Petitioner Secretary of Justice appealed
to the Supreme Court, such appeal was
granted on a vote of 9‐6.
Respondent timely filed motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the instant
case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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ARTICLE VIII: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
SANTIAGO
V. BAUTISTA
32 SCRA 188
(1970)
p. 568
Honor
ranking
disputes
In Sero Elementary School in Cotabato
City, the Committee on the Rating of
Students for Honor deliberated and
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Lingat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as
first, second and third honors
respectively for the school year 1964‐
1965.
The mother represented him while his
father served as their counsel. Reasons
alleged:
• The second placer Patricia had
never been a close rival except in
grade V
• The closest rival Socorro had been
so much benefited for being
coached and tutored by Mrs. Alpas,
their Grade VI English teacher and a
member of the selection committee
(honors)
• Some teachers giving Teodoro a
starting grade of 75% in Grade VI
with the intention to pull him to a
Section 1
xxx
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
to settle actual
controversies
involving rights
which are legally
demandable and
enforceable xxx
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the case at bar present a
justiciable controversy NO.
Actions questioned exercised neither judicial nor
quasi judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task.
It is necessary that there be a law that gives rise
to some specific rights of persons under which
adverse claims to such rights are made. The tribunal
board itself has the power to determine what law is
in the exercise of its functions.
In Felipe v. Leuterio, it was basically declared that
the judiciary would not interfere with the verdicts of
judges/referees in contests/tournaments/
competitions. Also, no rights to prizes may be
asserted by the contestants because theirs was
merely a privilege to compete for the prize. That
privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless and until they were proclaimed winners.
“damnum absque injuria.” If malice or fraud had
been proven, it would be a different proposition. But
then the action, if there was error, should be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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much lower rank
• Collusion among the teachers, etc.
The petitioner asked the court to set
aside the final list of honor students in
Grade VI and to enjoin the respondent
teachers from officially publishing and
proclaiming the said honor pupils in the
scheduled graduation exercises on May
21, 1965.
The injunction was denied by the lower
court the day before graduation for
restraining the exercises would shock
everybody. The graduation was held
with the same protested list of honor
students.
Appellant here assails the holding of the
lower court that his petition has no
cause of action.
directed to the guilty judge or judges but not against
other innocent judges. Besides, error is not
tantamount to a violation of a right.
MARCOS V.
MANGLAPUS
p. 570
The Extent of
Judicial
Review on
the forbidden
return of
Marcos
Feb 1986 Ferdinand Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the
non‐violent “people power” revolution
and forced into exile. In his stead,
Corazon Aquino was declared President
of the Republic under a Revolutionary
government.
The accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation of the nation
attributed to Marcos and his cronies left
the economy devastated.
Section 1
xxx
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
xxx to determine
whether or not
there has been a
grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to
review the case? NO.
General Rule: No, the issue constitutes a political
question. As such, the Court may not rule on it.
Exception: The Court's decision in this case would
undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Now, Mr. Marcos, at his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die.
However, Mrs. Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of
the government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stod firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Marcos and his
family.
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the Government
If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter, which by its nature
or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual
bases for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses
to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it
cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily
or that she has gravely abused her discretion in
deciding to bar their return.
We find that xxx there exist factual bases for the
President's decision…
LEO
ECHEGARAY V.
THE
SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE
G.R. 132601
January 19,
1999
pp. 571‐572
Finality of a
judgment in
relation to
jurisdiction of
the court
The instant motions concern matters
that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was
imposed on petitioner on automatic
review of his conviction by this Court.
The instant motions were filed in this
case, G.R. No. 132601, where the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177
(Lethal Injection Law) and its
implementing rules and regulations was
assailed by petitioner.
Petitioner contends:
(1) the stay order. . . is within the scope
of judicial power and duty and does not
trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives;
(2) the exercise by this Court of its
power to stay execution was
Section 1
xxx
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
xxx to determine
whether or not
there has been a
grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the Government
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the court lost jurisdiction
over the case after it had rendered final judgment.
NO.
The Court did NOT lost its jurisdiction over the
case at bar and thus can restrain the execution of
the petitioner.
The Decision was not altered a whit by this Court.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General,
the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this
Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the
same judgment.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the
well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: xxxxxxxxxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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reasonable;
(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to
address incidental matters involved or
arising from the petition;
(4) public respondents are estopped
from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and
(5) there is no certainty that the law on
capital punishment will not be repealed
or modified until Congress convenes
and considers all the various resolutions
and bills filed before it.
Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. xxx
There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. xxx
The power to control the execution of its decision
is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. xxx. It is because of these
unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts
have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make
them conformable to law and justice.
UNITED STATES
V. NIXON
p. 573
Judicial
review on
executive
privilege
Following indictment alleging violation
of federal statutes xxx the Special
Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c) for a subpoena
duces tecum for the production before
trial of certain tapes and documents
relating to precisely identified
conversations and meetings between
the President and others.
In support of his claim of absolute
privilege, the President's counsel urges
two grounds:
• the valid need for protection of
communications between high
Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the
performance of their manifold
US CONSTI
ARTICLE 3, SECTION
1.
The judicial power
of the United
States, shall be
vested in one
Supreme Court, and
in such inferior
courts as the
Congress may from
time to time ordain
and establish. The
judges, both of the
supreme and
inferior courts, shall
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Judiciary was without
authority to review an assertion of executive
privilege by the President. NO.
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker
v. Carr, the Court stated:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility
of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution."
Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor
the generalized need for confidentiality of high‐level
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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duties; the importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to
require further discussion
• the claim of absolute privilege rests
on the doctrine of separation of
powers
The court thereafter issued an order
for an in camera examination of the
subpoenaed material, having rejected
the President's contentions xxx that the
judiciary lacked authority to review the
President's assertion of executive
privilege.
hold their offices
during good
behaviour, and
shall, at stated
times, receive for
their services, a
compensation,
which shall not be
diminished during
their continuance in
office.
communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances. xxx and any absolute executive
privilege under Article II of the Constitution would
plainly conflict with the function of the courts under
the Constitution.
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified
privilege would place in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts under Article 3 xxx
but the separate powers were not intended to
operate with absolute independence.
[Because] the legitimate needs of the judicial
process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is
necessary to resolve those competing interests in a
manner that preserves the essential functions of
each branch.
INFOTECH
FOUNDATION,
ET AL V.
COMELEC
GR 159139
January 13,
2004
Pg 575
Invalid
automation
contract
Bidding
For the automation of the counting and
canvassing of the ballots in the 2004
elections, Comelec awarded the
Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium"
an entity that had not participated in
the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll
body signed the actual automation
Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc.," a company that joined the bidding
but had not met the eligibility
requirements.
Comelec awarded this billion‐peso
Section 1
xxx
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
xxx to determine
whether or not
there has been a
grave abuse of
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the instant petition is
premature. NO.
There is grave abuse of discretion:
(1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence or
(2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
In the present case, the Commission on Elections
approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the
subject Contract not only in clear violation of law
and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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undertaking with inexplicable haste,
without adequately checking and
observing mandatory financial,
technical and legal requirements. It also
accepted the preferred computer
hardware and software even if, at the
time of the award, they had undeniably
failed to pass eight critical requirements
designed to safeguard the integrity of
elections.
Respondents claim that petitioners
acted prematurely, since they had not
first utilized the protest mechanism
available to them under RA 9184, the
Government Procurement Reform Act,
for the settlement of disputes
pertaining to procurement contracts.
discretion
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the Government
its own bidding rules and procedure.
In any event, the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the unconventional rendition of the
BAC Report and the precipitate awarding of the
Contract by the Comelec en banc ‐‐ plus the fact that
it was racing to have its Contract with MPC
implemented in time for the elections in May 2004
(barely four months away) ‐‐ have combined to bring
about the urgent need for judicial intervention, thus
prompting this Court to dispense with the
procedural exhaustion of administrative remedies in
this case.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
MALAGA V.
PENACHOS, JR.
Ponente: CRUZ, J
This controversy involves the extent and
applicability of P.D. No. 1818, which
prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the
government.
Section 1, P.D.
1818: No court
shall have
jurisdiction to issue
any restraining
order, preliminary
injunction, or
preliminary
infrastructure
ISSUE 1: Is ISCOF covered by P.D. 1818? NO.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial
scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies. Hence, the challenged restraining order
WAS NOT IMPROPERLY ISSUED by the respondent
judge and the writ of preliminary injunction SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The Iloilo State College of Fisheries
(ISCOF) through its Pre‐qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
published an invitation to bid for the
construction of a micro laboratory
building.
Petitioners submitted their
prequalification documents (PRE‐C1)
but were not allowed to participate
since the said documents were
submitted late. Petitioners filed a
complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
PBAC members and chairman, claiming
that they submitted their PRE‐C1 on
time.
Judge Lodrigio Lebaquin issued a
restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding
project. Defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that
the court was prohibited from issuing
restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions by P.D. 1818.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion saying
that ISCOF was a state college BUT it
had its own charter and separate
existence and was not part of the
national government or of any local
political subdivision.
The trial court lifted the restraining
project or a mining,
fishery, forest or
other natural
resource
development
project of the
government, or any
public utility
operated by the
government,
including among
others public
utilities for the
transport of the
goods and
commodities,
stevedoring and
arrastre contracts,
to prohibit any
person or persons,
entity or
government official
from proceeding
with, or continuing
the execution or
implementation of
any such project, or
the operation of
such public utility,
or pursuing any
lawful activity
necessary for such
execution,
implementation or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction.
operation.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s Issue & Ratio
RADIOWEALTH
, INC. V.
AGREGADO
(AUDITOR
GENERAL)
In 1949, Radiowealth installed speaker
phones in the office of the Chief Justice
and the total expenditure amounted to
P585.
The clerk of the SC issued a certification
that the purchase of the gadgets were
valid and due to an emergency.
However, the chairman of the Property
Requisition Committee (PRC) refused to
issue disbursement therefore.
Auditor General Agregado affirmed
PRC’s ruling that the purchase of the
speaker phones are against E.O. 302
which states that the government
adopts a policy discontinuing open
market purchases.
ISSUE 1: Can the auditor general disallow such
expenditure by the SC? NO.
No one denies the auditor general the power to
audit, in accordance with law and administrative
regulations, expenditures of funds or property by
government. However, the auditor general’s
authority to audit and disapprove the court’s
expenditures has to be limited to the conditions
prescribed by the constitution which is TO NOT
INVADE THE COURT’S INDEPENDENCE. The auditor
general may not question the court’s expenditures
except when they are ‘irregular, unnecessary,
excessive and extravagant.’
BENGZON V.
DRILON
The petitioners are retired justices of
the SC and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving monthly pensions
under R.A. 910 as amended by R.A.
1797. Section 3A which authorizes the
said pensions was repealed by President
Marcos. The legislature then re‐enacted
the said RAs to restore the privileges to
ISSUE 1: Does the questioned veto impair the Fiscal
Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary? YES.
Section 3, Article 8 of the Constitution provides
for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of
the specific provisions by the president is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
the retired justices. However, President
Aquino vetoed certain portions of it.
to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice
to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds
appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of
the judiciary is withheld. The Judiciary must enjoy
freedom and must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where it is needed.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division
of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
FORTICH
(Provincial
Governor Of
Bukidnon) V.
CORONA
(Deputy Exec.
Sec.)
In their respective motions for
reconsideration, both respondents and
intervenors pray that this case be
referred to this court en banc.
The contend that the required number
of votes (three) was not met as the
motions for reconsideration were
ISSUE 1: Did the court’s resolution, wherein they
voted two‐two on the separate motions for
reconsideration, as a result of which the decision
was deemed affirmed, effectively resolve the said
motions? YES.
A careful reading of the above constitutional
provision, however, reveals that cases are decided,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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resolved by a vote of two‐two.
and matters (including motions) are resolved. With
that said, only cases are referred to the Court en
banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. If there is a tie in the voting,
there is no decision. On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure
of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie
in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still a decision which must stand in view of
the failure of the members of the division to muster
the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
Therefore, if there is a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is
therefore deemed affirmed.
PEOPLE V. DY Accused‐appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy
and Giovan Bernardino filed separate
motions for reconsideration xxx finding
them guilty of rape and acts of
lasciviousness.
In his motion, accused‐appellant Dy
submits that our decision should have
been merely recommendatory, in view
of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5
(2) (d) of the Constitution which
provides that the Supreme Court
sitting en banc has jurisdiction over
“[a]ll criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.” He contends that Supreme
Court Circular No. 2‐89 which provides
that death penalty cases shall be within
the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is
Section 4. (1) The
Supreme Court xxx
It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in
division of three,
five, or seven
Members.xxx
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the SC Circular is
incongruous to Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of the
Constitution? No.
The contention is misleading because this one is
actually covered by Article 8 Section 4 (1).
At present, it is made up of three
divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme
Court are not to be considered as separate and
distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these
divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in
effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not
to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but
as divisions of one and the same court
Only the Court sitting en banc can reverse the
decision of the Court in division.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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incongruous and incompatible with the
aforementioned constitutional
provision.
PEOPLE V. EBIO
Court en
banc re‐
deliberation
on rape case
of 11‐year
old daughter
Decision affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping his
eleven‐year old daughter, and
sentencing him to death.
In his motion for reconsideration, the
accused calls the attention of the Court
to the fact that only seven out of the
fourteen Justices sitting in the Court
signed the Decision. The other seven
Justices were on official leave at the
time.
(2) All cases
involving the
constitutionality of
a treaty,
international or
executive
agreement, or law,
which shall be
heard by the
Supreme Court en
banc, and all other
cases which under
the Rules of Court
are required to be
heard en banc,
including those
involving the
constitutionality,
application, or
operation of
presidential
decrees,
proclamations,
orders, instructions,
ordinances, and
other regulations,
shall be decided
with the
concurrence of a
majority of the
Members who
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the votes of only seven
Justices of the Court sitting en banc can validly
impose the death penalty and whether there is a
need for a quorum when it sits en banc? No
The term "quorum"' has been defined as "that
number of members of the body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the
body to transact its proper business, or, in other
words, that number that makes a lawful body and
gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any
other valid corporate act."
The second paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the
number of Justices required to be present to
constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent
on what constitutes a quorum when the Court is
composed of only fourteen members. In case of
doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death
penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused. Thus, in this case, considering
that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it
wise to resubmit the case to the Court en banc for
re‐deliberation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
actually took part
in the deliberations
on the issues in the
case and voted
thereon.
(3) Cases or matters
heard by a division
shall be decided or
resolved with the
concurrence of a
majority of the
Members who
actually took part in
the deliberations on
the issues in the
case and voted
thereon, and in no
case, without the
concurrence of at
least three of such
Members. xxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under‐privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi‐judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
MARBURY VS
MADISON
p. 587
Judicial Power Ponente: Marshall, C.J.
On his last day in office, President John
Adams named forty‐two justices of the
peace and sixteen new circuit court
justices for the District of Columbia
under the Organic Act. The Organic Act
was an attempt by the Federalists to
take control of the federal judiciary
before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by
President Adams and sealed by acting
Secretary of State John Marshall (who
later became Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and author of this
opinion), but they were not delivered
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the
authority to review acts of Congress and determine
its constitutionality and being voidYES. The
Supreme Court has authority to review acts of
Congress.
Ratio 1:
o The powers of the Legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is
written.
o An act of the legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, is void.
o It is the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. If a law be
in opposition to the Constitution, if both the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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before the expiration of Adams’s term
as president. Thomas Jefferson refused
to honor the commissions, claiming
that they were invalid because they had
not been delivered by the end of
Adams’s term.
Petitioner William Marbury was an
intended recipient of an appointment
as justice of the peace. Marbury applied
directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of mandamus
to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of
State, Defendant James Madison, to
deliver the commissions. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus “…to any courts
appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United
States.”
law and the Constitution apply to a particular
case, the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules govern the case. This is the
very essence of judicial duty.
o Those who controvert the principle that the
Constitution is the paramount law are reduced
to the necessity of maintaining that courts
must close their eyes on the Constitution, and
see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very
foundation of all written Constitutions. To say
that an act, which is entirely void for being
contrary to the Constitution, is yet, in practice,
completely obligatory. It would declare that,
however forbidden, any act of the legislature,
shall be effectual. It would be giving the
legislature practical and real omnipotence. It is
prescribing limits, and declaring that those
may be passed at pleasure.
ANGARA VS
ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
63 Phil. 139
(1936)
p. 589
Electoral
Commission
Ponente: Laurel, J.
December 3, 1935 National Assembly
by Resolution No. 8 confirmed the
election of petitioner to the said body.
December 9, 1935 Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
It is contended by the petitioner that
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the caseYES. The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction.
Ratio 1:
o Upon principle, reason, and authority, the
Court clearly is of the opinion that it has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the commission’s power
as the sole judge of contests relating to the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the resolution of the National Assembly
has the effect of cutting of the power of
the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly submitted after
December 3, 1935.
election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
o The constitution itself granted the duty to
determine the nature, scope and extent of the
powers of government to the judiciary. When
it mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert superiority over
the other departments.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW:
o The power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very
lismota presented.
o The judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
o The courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments.
TOLENTINO VS
SECRETARY OF
FINANCE
G.R. No.
115455,
August 25,
1994
p. 590
VAT Ponente: Mendoza, J.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the
existing tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration
by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.
R.A. No. 7716 is the results of
Conference Committee Bill entitled “AN
ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE‐
ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING
IT TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE
Article VIII, Sec. 1
(2). Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
to settle actual
controversies
involving rights
which are legally
demandable and
enforceable, and to
determine whether
or not there has
been a grave abuse
of discretion…
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court may
take cognizance of the caseYES. The Supreme
Court may take cognizance of the case.
Ratio 1:
o Although the case at bar is not ripe for
adjudication, the constitutionally vested duty
of judicial review mandates the Court to look
behind the barriers set by the principle of
separation of powers.
o The Court may invoke this duty (judicial
review) to justify its intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for
adjudication.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES”. This results from the
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1630
(submitted in substitution of S.B. 1129
taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and H.B. No.1197) and House Bill
no. 1197.
Article VIII, Sec. 5
(2). Review, revise,
reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal…
TAN VS
MACAPAGAL
43 SCRA 678
(1972)
p. 591
Constitutional
Convention
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Petitioner filed petition in the court
seeking declaratory relief and declaring
the authority of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention (CC) void.
Petitioner contends that the CC is
without authority to discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the
present Constitution through the
adoption of a form of government
other than the form outlined in the
present Constitution.
The Court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration was filed.
Petitioner Gonzales however, waited
until R.A. 4913, act submitting to the
electorate of certain proposed
amendments to the Constitution, was
enacted. It was only then that the
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court should
take cognizance of the caseNO.
Ratio 1:
o It is a prerequisite that something had been
accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may invoke its power of judicial
review.
o The autonomy of the CC must be respected. It
is a coordinate agency and its powers are
transcendent, since it may radically alter the
organization and functions of all three
departments including the courts.
o The rule of non‐interference should be
adhered to until there is an actual case or
controversy. As long as any proposal to amend
the Constitution is not acted upon yet, there is
no room for interposition of judicial oversight.
Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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matter was ripe for adjudication.
PACU VS
SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION
97 Phil. 806
(1955)
p. 592
Private
Schools,
Secretary of
Education
Ponente: Bengzon, J.
Petitioning colleges and universities
question the constitutionality of Act
No. 2706.
The law provides that before anyone
may operate a school, a permit from
the Secretary of Education must first be
obtained.
Petitioners claim that this constitutes a
deprivation of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
Respondent contends that the matter
constitutes no justiciable controversy
exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional questions
and that petitioners suffered no wrong
from the enactment of the questioned
Act.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court should
take cognizance of the caseNO.
Ratio 1:
o The Act has been in existence for 37 years. The
Secretary of Education has supervised and
regulated the private schools in this country
without audible protest and with the approval
of the general public. The law has long been
treated as constitutional and important rights
have been dependent on it. Hence, the Court
may refuse to consider an attack on its validity.
o The petitioners suffered no wrong from the
Act. The petitioners even have permits to
operate and are actually operating by virtue of
their permits. This Court will not pass upon
validity where the assailant is one who availed
of its benefits.
o There is not even a threat by the Secretary that
he will revoke the permits of petitioners.
o The Court does not adjudicate mere scholarly
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually solid the problem may be.
JOYA V. PCGG
GR 96541
August 24,
1993
pp 593‐596
The 35 petitioners in this special civil
action for prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order seek to enjoin
the PCGG from proceeding with the
auction sale scheduled Jan. 11, 1991 by
Christie’s of New York and of the Old
Masters Paintings and 18th and 19
th
century silverware seized from
ISSUE 1: Do the petitioners have legal standing to
file the instant petition? NO
“Legal standing” means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Petitioners themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different
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Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and placed in the
custody of the Central Bank.
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, and not to the
petitioners or to the public. Therefore, they do not
possess any clear legal right in this case.
ISSUE 1: Has this case become moot and academic?
YES
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition
is to enjoin the respondent public officials from
holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date which is long past, the issues raised
in the petition have become moot and academic.
However, there is a need to emphasize that the
court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an
actual case or legal standing when paramount
public interest in involved. In this case though,
there is no such justification.
Macasiano v.
National
Housing
Authority
Petitioner seeks to have sections 28 and
44 of RA # 7279 (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992) declared
unconstitutional. He claims locus standi
on his being a consultant of the DPWH
and as being a taxpayer. He alleges that
sections 28 and 44 ‘contain the seeds of
a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback’ to his ‘tasks and duties
regarding demolition of illegal
structures’ and that because of the said
sections, he ‘is unable to continue the
ISSUE 1: Does the petitioner have locus standi?
NO.
As a consultant of the DPWH, he is not vested
with any authority to demolish obstructions and
encroachments on properties of the public domain,
much less on private lands. His consultancy is
limited to certain duties which do not include the
above mentioned.
Nor is the petitioner an owner of an urban
property whose enjoyment and use would be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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demolition of illegal structures which
he assiduously and faithfully carried out
in the past.’ As a taxpayer, he alleges
that ‘he has direct interest in seeing
that the public funds are properly and
lawfully disbursed.’
affected by the challenged provisions.
Although petitioner likewise anchors his locus
standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not
mean, however, that in each and every instance
where such a ground is invoked, this court is left
with no alternative except to hear the parties.
Mariano Jr. v.
COMELEC
Petitioners assail the constitutionality
of Section 51, Article X or RA # 7854
saying that it collides with Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
constitution. They stress that under
these provisions, elective officials,
including members of the House of
Representatives, have a term of 3 years
and are prohibited from serving for
more than 3 consecutive terms. They
argue that by providing that the new
city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of RA 7854
restarts the term of the present
municipal elective officials of Makati
and disregards the terms previously
served by them. They argue that
respondent Mayor Jejomar Binay can
still run for the same position and seek
another 3‐year consecutive term since
his previous 3‐year consecutive term as
municipal mayor would not be counted.
Sec 51. The present
elective officials of
the Municipality of
Makati shall
continue as the
officials of Makati
and shall exercise
their powers and
functions until such
time that a new
election is held and
the duly elected
officials shall have
already qualified
and assume their
offices: Provided,
The new city will
acquire a new
corporate
existence. The
appointive officials
and employees of
the city shall
likewise continue
exercising functions
and duties and they
ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? NO.
Petitioners are residents of Taguig (except for
Mariano) and therefore are not the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue. Also, petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events like Mayor Binay will run again in the coming
mayoralty elections, and that he would seek re‐
election for the same post in the 1998 elections.
These are merely hypothetical issues which have
yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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shall be
automatically
absorbed by the city
government of the
City of Makati.
Sec. 8 The term of
the office of
elective local
officials, except
barangay officials,
which shall be
determined by law,
shall be three years
and no such official
shall serve for more
that three
consecutive terms.
Xxx
Sec. 7 the members
of the House of
Representatives
shall be elected for
a term of three
years which shall
begin, unless
otherwise stated by
law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June
next following their
election. Xxx
Oposa v.
Factoran Jr.
Petitioners are minors represented by
their respective parents. They allege
that they are all citizens of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
ISSUE 1: Do the petitioners have locus standi?
YES
Petitioners assert that they represent their
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the
country’s virgin tropical rainforests.
They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Consequently,
it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered to (a) cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the
country (b) cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve nature.
Kilosbayan v.
Guingona Jr.
This is a special civil action for
prohibition and injunction, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction which
seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the ‘Contract of
Lease’ executed by the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation in connection with the
online ‘lotto’ system.
Petitioners oppose the setting up of the
online lotto system on the bases of
serious moral and ethical
considerations.
ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? YES
The court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues
raised. The court adopted the liberal policy on locus
standi to allow taxpayers, members of the congress,
and non‐profit civic organizations to initiate and
prosecute actions to question the validity or
constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings
of various government agencies or
instrumentalities.
Tatad v.
Secretary of the
Department of
Energy
G.R. Nos.
124360 and
Oil
Deregulation
Law
Non‐
delegability of
legislative
Ponente: Puno, J.
The petitioners at bar challenge the
constitutionality of RA 8180: “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes,”
which ends 26 years of government
Art VI, Sec. 1. The
legislative power
shall be vested in
the Congress xxx
except to the extent
reserved to the
people by the
CONNECTION TO ARTICLE VIII:
Although this case was placed in Art. VI (Legislative
Department), this case may be connected to the
Judicial Department because it speaks of locus
standi. The petitioners have locus standi, meaning
that they qualify to challenge the legality of official
acts done by the government. In this case, it was to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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127867
November 5,
1997
pp. 65‐68
power
Locus Standi
regulation of the downstream oil
industry.
The deregulation phase has 2 phases:
1. The transition and
2. The full deregulation phase.
The first phase was commenced on
August 12, 1996. The second phase
implemented the full deregulation of
the Downstream Oil Industry through
EO 372 on February 8, 1997.
EO 372, on the other hand, speaks how
President Ramos implemented the full
deregulation phase. Petitioners
basically target Section 15 of RA 8180
for it assigns legislative power to the
president and the Department of
Energy.
(EO 372 is about how RA 7638
(“Department of Energy Act of 1992”)
provides that at the end of 4 years from
its December 1992 approval, the
president will institute programs and
timetable the deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and
activities of the energy sector, as sworn
to by President Fidel Ramos with the
powers vested in him by law to declare
the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.)
provision on
initiative and
referendum.
Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1).
Exercise original
jurisdiction over
cases affecting xxx
and over petitions
for certiorari
prohibition,
mandamus, quo
warranto, and
habeas corpus.
assail the constitutionality of RA 8180 due to the
depletion of the OPSF fund, a condition that wasn’t
found in such RA that would justify the President’s
act of fully deregulating the oil industry.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Section 15 of the RA 8180
is constitutional. NO. Section 15 of R.A. 8180 is
unconstitutional.
RATIO:
Administrative agencies may not issue
regulations that contravene law. The Court
invalidated EO 392 because in effecting the full
deregulation of the oil industry, President Ramos
added a standard, which did not appear in the
delegating law, RA 8180.
The standards set by the law were:
1. The time when the price of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market
were declining, and
2. When the exchange rate of the Peso to the
US Dollar was stable.
EO 392 considered the depletion of the OPSF as
the 3rd factor for ordering the early implementation
of full oil deregulation. The Court holds that the
Executive Department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA 8180 when it considered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.
Such consideration amounts to a rewriting of the
standards set forth in the RA 8180.
On the basis of the text of EO 392, it is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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In another case (GR 127867),
petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,
Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tañada, the
Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., the
Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and
Sanlakas, also contest the
constitutionality of Section 15 of RA
8180 and EO 392, the latter because
implementing the full deregulation of
downstream oil industry is
unreasonable because it was made due
to the depletion of the OPSF (Oil Price
Stabilization Fund), a condition that
wasn’t found in RA 8180.
impossible to determine the weight given by the
Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF
fund. It could well be the principal consideration
for the early deregulation. The Court rules that the
early deregulation under EO 392 constitutes a
misapplication of RA 8180.
Kilosbayan v.
Morato
GR 118910
July 17, 1995
pp 605‐613
Petition to
invalidate ELA
dismissed
Rule on locus
standi vs. Rule
on real parties
in interest
The Kilosbayan, Inc. is an organization
described in its petition as "composed
of civic‐spirited citizens, pastors,
priests, nuns and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth,
justice, and national renewal."
On January 25, 1995, the parties signed
an Equipment Lease Agreement
(hereafter called ELA) whereby the
PGMC leased on‐line lottery equipment
and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental equivalent to
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales
derived by the PCSO from the operation
of the lottery which in no case shall be
less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial
operation.
On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed
seeking to declare the ELA invalid on
Rule 3, §2 of the
Rules of Court:
"Every action must
be prosecuted and
defended in the
name of the real
party in interest."
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have claim
on the case? NO.
Petitioners have neither standing to bring this
suit nor substantial interest to make them real
parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3 §2.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial
interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring
this suit. Denying to them the right to intervene will
not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in
the execution of government contracts. Questions
as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the
necessity for a public bidding before they may be
made can be raised in an appropriate case before
the Commission on Audit or before the
Ombudsman.
A determination of the petitioners' right to bring
this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision
in the prior case between the parties.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the ground that it is substantially the
same as the Contract of Lease nullified
in the first case.
Respondents question the right of
petitioners to bring this suit on the
ground that, not being parties to the
contract of lease which they seek to
nullify, they have no personal and
substantial interest likely to be injured
by the enforcement of the contract.
Petitioners on the other hand contend
that the ruling in the previous case
sustaining their standing to challenge
the validity of the first contract for the
operation of lottery is now the "law of
the case" and therefore the question of
their standing can no longer be
reopened.
The ELA, which petitioners seek to declare
invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different
from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the
PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in
the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that petitioners
had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993
Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude
determination of their standing in the present suit.
SEE also RATIO in Gonzales v. Narvasa…
J. REGALADO DISSENTING:
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the
adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to
perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be
straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.
Indeed, if the majority would have its way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or
excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue.
The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they
cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit
would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the
assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman?
I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on substantive considerations, not on dubious
technicalities intended to prevent an inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to
the benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondents deserve the opportunity xxx
To pay unqualified obeisance to the beguiling locus standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would
not only be an abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification. This is a
contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant
within a just regime of law still in posse.
Telebap v.
COMELEC
GR 132922
April 21, 1998
Pp 614‐615
B.P. BLG. 881
GMA
Petitioner Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting
companies. They are suing as citizens,
taxpayers, and registered voters.
The other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., operates radio and television
broadcasting stations throughout the
Philippines under a franchise granted
by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92
on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without
just compensation; (2) that it denies
radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the
laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or
information during the period of
election.
Doctrine:
A citizen will be
allowed to raise
a constitutional
question only
when he can
show that he
has personally
suffered some
actual or
threatened
injury as a
result of the
allegedly illegal
conduct of the
government;
the injury fairly
is fairly
traceable to the
challenged
action; and the
injury is likely to
be redressed by
a favorable
action.
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT TELEBAP has a legal
standing? NO.
Members of petitioner have not shown that they
have suffered harm as a result of the operation of
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an
interest as registered voters since this case does not
concern their right of suffrage. A party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically show that he has a
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute.
TELEBAP have NO standing to assert the rights of
radio and television broadcasting companies. The
mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in
the broadcast industry does not entitle them to
bring this suit in their name as representatives of
the affected companies.
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT GMA has a legal
standing? YES
GMA operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio
and television broadcast companies to provide free
air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and
the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to
suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will
suffer losses again because it is required to provide
free air time is sufficient to give it standing to
question the validity of §92.
Gonzalez v.
Narvasa
EO 43‐ PCCR Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of
the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants.
Respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa,
impleaded in his capacity as Chairman
of the PCCR.
The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in
order “to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions
to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the same.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality
of the PCCR on two grounds:
it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a
Doctrine/s:
An action is
considered
“moot” when it
no longer
presents a
justiciable
controversy
because the
issues involved
have become
academic or
dead.
A citizen
acquires
standing only if
he can establish
that he has
suffered some
actual or
threatened
injury as a
result of the
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner has a
standing as a citizen and taxpayer? NO.
In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, we denied
standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease
agreement between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation, stating that,
… in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was
denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form
of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid
because, as the Court held,
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer,
taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But
nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that
his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have
been directly and personally injured by the
operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. xxx He must
be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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law
creating such a body the President
is intervening in a process from
which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution – the amendment of
the fundamental charter
It is alleged by respondents that, with
respect to the PCCR, this case has
become moot and academic.
In addition to the mootness of the
issue, petitioner’s lack of standing
constitutes another obstacle to the
successful invocation of judicial power
insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
allegedly illegal
conduct of the
government;
the injury is
fairly traceable
to the
challenged
action; and the
injury is likely to
be redressed by
a favorable
action.
A taxpayer is
deemed to have
the standing to
raise a
constitutional
issue when it is
established that
public funds
have been
disbursed in
alleged
contravention
of the law or
the
Constitution.
thereby in some indefinite way xxx
We apprehend no difference between the
petitioner in Valmonte and the present
petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what
particularized interest they have for bringing this
suit. xxx
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained
or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR.
DEL MAR, ET.
AL. V. PAGCOR
GR 138298
Nov. 29, 2000
PP 616‐619
PAGCOR’s Jai
Alai
These two consolidated petitions
concern the issue of whether the
franchise granted to the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) includes the right to manage
and operate jai‐alai.
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Doctrine:
Taxpayers are
allowed to sue
where there is a
claim of illegal
disbursement of
public funds, that
ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? YES.
Petitioners complain that the operation of jai‐
alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. To
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Corporation is a government‐owned
and controlled corporation organized
and existing under Presidential Decree
No. 1869 which was enacted on July 11,
1983.
PAGCOR entered into
an Agreement with private respondents
Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment
Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME)
wherein it was agreed that BELLE will
make available to PAGCOR the required
infrastructure facilities including the
main fronton, as well as provide the
needed funding for jai‐alai operations
with no financial outlay from PAGCOR,
while PAGCOR handles the actual
management and operation of jai‐alai.
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S.
Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and
intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing
as taxpayers and in their capacity as
members of the House of
Representatives representing the First
District of Cebu City, the Lone
Congressional District of Malabon‐
Navotas, the Third Congressional
District of Quezon City, and the Third
Congressional District of Bukidnon,
respectively.
Respondents allege that petitioners
have no legal standing to file a
taxpayer’s suit because the operation
of jai‐alai does not involve the
public money is
being deflected to
any improper
purpose,or where
petitioners seek to
restrain respondent
from wasting public
funds through the
enforcement of an
invalid or
unconstitutional
law.
A member of the
House of
Representatives has
standing to
maintain inviolate
the prerogatives,
powers and
privileges vested by
the Constitution in
his office.
office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution, so petitioners
contend.
As presciently stressed in the case of Kilosbayan,
Inc., viz:
“We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The
issues it raised are of paramount public interest and
of a category even higher than those involved in
many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of
such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well‐being of the people even
in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter‐productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on‐line lottery system are as staggering
as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The
legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition x x x.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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disbursement of public funds.
MATIBAG V.
BENIPAYO
GR 149036
April 2, 2002
COMELEC Ad‐
interim
appointments
Reassignment
of Matibag to
law
department
Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag
questions the constitutionality of the
appointment and the right to hold
office of Alfredo L. Benipayo as
Chairman of the Commission on
Elections et al
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a
term of seven years and all expiring on
February 2, 2008.
Further renewals of appointments for
same term of seven years were made
on June 1, 2001, June 8, 2001, and
September 6, 2008 because of the
failure of CA to act on it before
Congress adjourns.
Petitioner was removed as Director IV
of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department by Benipayo.
Doctrine:
COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300
does not require
that every transfer
or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel
should carry the
concurrence of the
COMELEC as a
collegial body.
The COMELEC
Chairman is the
official expressly
authorized by law
to transfer or
reassign COMELEC
personnel.
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner has a
locus standi? YES.
Petitioner has a personal and substantial stake in
the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s
assumption of office.
If Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman
because he assumed office not in accordance with
the Constitution, then petitioner’s reassignment is
illegal and she has a cause to complain provided the
reassignment is not in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of
paramount importance to the public. The legality of
the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC
in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national
elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved.
Petition dismissed. Reassignment authorized.
Tatad v.
Secretary of the
Department of
Energy
G.R. Nos.
124360 and
127867
November 5,
1997
Oil
Deregulation
Law
Non‐
delegability of
legislative
power
Locus Standi
Ponente: Puno, J.
The petitioners at bar challenge the
constitutionality of RA 8180: “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes,”
which ends 26 years of government
regulation of the downstream oil
industry.
The deregulation phase has 2 phases:
Art VI, Sec. 1. The
legislative power
shall be vested in
the Congress xxx
except to the extent
reserved to the
people by the
provision on
initiative and
referendum.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have Locus
Standi YES.
The petitioners have locus standi, meaning that
they qualify to challenge the legality of official acts
done by the government. In this case, it was to
assail the constitutionality of RA 8180 due to the
depletion of the OPSF fund, a condition that wasn’t
found in such RA that would justify the President’s
act of fully deregulating the oil industry.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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pp. 65‐68
3. The transition and
4. The full deregulation phase.
The first phase was commenced on
August 12, 1996. The second phase
implemented the full deregulation of
the Downstream Oil Industry through
EO 372 on February 8, 1997.
EO 372, on the other hand, speaks how
President Ramos implemented the full
deregulation phase. Petitioners
basically target Section 15 of RA 8180
for it assigns legislative power to the
president and the Department of
Energy.
(EO 372 is about how RA 7638
(“Department of Energy Act of 1992”)
provides that at the end of 4 years from
its December 1992 approval, the
president will institute programs and
timetable the deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and
activities of the energy sector, as sworn
to by President Fidel Ramos with the
powers vested in him by law to declare
the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.)
In another case (GR 127867),
petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,
Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tañada, the
Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., the
Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1).
Exercise original
jurisdiction over
cases affecting xxx
and over petitions
for certiorari
prohibition,
mandamus, quo
warranto, and
habeas corpus.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and
Sanlakas, also contest the
constitutionality of Section 15 of RA
8180 and EO 392, the latter because
implementing the full deregulation of
downstream oil industry is
unreasonable because it was made due
to the depletion of the OPSF (Oil Price
Stabilization Fund), a condition that
wasn’t found in RA 8180.
Bayan v.
Executive
Secretary
GR 138570
October 10,
2000
pp. 547‐564
Ponente: Buena, J.
March 14, 1947 PH and the US
forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the
use of installations in the Philippine
territory by US military personnel.
August 30, 1951 To further
strengthen their defense and security
relationship, both countries entered
into a Mutual Defense Treaty.
In view of the expiration of the RP‐US
Military Bases Agreement both
countries negotiated for its possible
extension.
September 16, 1991 The PH Senate
rejected the extension of the US
military bases, which was now called
the RP‐US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security.
Art VIII, Sec. 1 (2).
Judicial power
includes the power
xxx to determine
whether or not
there has been a
grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the government.
CONNECTION TO ARTICLE VIII:
Although this case was placed in Art. VII (Executive
Department), this case may be connected to the
Judicial Department because it speaks of alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government, pursuant to
Section 1 of Article VIII.
In the case at bar, the petitioners allege that the
President committed grave abuse of discretion by
entering into international agreements without the
required concurrence votes of the Senate. However,
the Court ruled that the Constitution vests in the
President the power to enter into executive
agreements without such concurrence from the
Senate. The President was merely exercising a given
right. Furthermore, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. It has no
power to look into what it thinks is an apparent
error.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the VFA is governed by the
provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21, or Art. 18, Sec. 25, of
the 1987 Constitution. Article 18, Section 25
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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During the term of Pres. Ramos, he
approved the Visiting Forces
Agreement, which was the result of a
negotiation on “the complementing
strategic interests of the US and the
Philippines in the Asia‐Pacific region”.
It provides for the mechanism for
regulating the circumstances and
conditions under which the US Armed
Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the PH.
October 5, 1998 Pres. Joseph
Estrada, through respondent Secretary
of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon,
ratified the VFA.
The Instrument of Ratification, the
letter of the President and the VFA
were then transmitted to the Philippine
Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The necessary 2/3 votes of the
members of the Senate were gathered
thus concurring with the ratification of
the VFA under Resolution No. 18.
June 1, 1999 VFA officially entered
into force after the Exchange of Notes
between Siazon and the Us
Ambassador, Hubbard.
Petitioners argue that the VFA is
(Art VII, Sec. 21:
No treaty or
international
agreement shall be
valid and effective
unless concurred in
by at least two‐
thirds of all the
Members of the
Senate.)
(Relevant: Article
XVIII, Sec. 25. After
the expiration in
1991 of the
Agreement
between the RP and
the US concerning
military bases,
foreign military
bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be
allowed in the PH
should apply.
RATIO 1:
Art. 18, Sec. 25, should apply to this case
because it is a special provision that specifically
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.
This section disallows for foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the ff: had
been sufficiently met:
1. It must be under a treaty
2. The treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate, and when so required by Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum
3. Recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The VFA possesses the first two requisites with
regards to the proscription of the VFA.
Although the Court ruled that Art. 18, Sec. 25
would prevail in this case, Art. 7, Sec. 21, may also
be applied, but it will be in a limited sense, for it will
address only the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate. In effect, even though
Art. 18, Sec. 25 was the law applicable to the case
at bar, its “concurrence requirement” was subject to
the provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21.
o It was held that the Agreement was still valid,
binding, and effective, without the concurrence
by at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate,
pursuant to Art. 7, Sec. 21.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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governed by the provision of Article 18,
Sec. 25 of the 1987 Constitution,
considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military
troops in the Philippines.
Respondents maintain that Article 7,
Sec. 21, should apply because the VFA
is not a basing arrangement but an
agreement which involves merely the
temporary visits of US personnel
engaged in joint military exercises.
except under a
treaty duly
concurred in by the
Senate and, when
the Congress so
requires, ratified by
a majority of the
votes cast by the
people in a national
referendum held for
that purpose, and
recognized as a
treaty by the other
contracting State.)
o One type of executive agreement is a treaty or a
treaty‐implementing executive
agreement, which necessarily would cover the
same matters subject of the underlying treaty.
o What the Constitution merely prescribes is that
treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a
vote defined therein to complete the ratification
process. The Court has in Eastern Sea Trading,
as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the
obligatory effect of executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Senate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the agreement was
contracted validly, meaning Whether or not the
respondents gravely abused their discretion in
concluding it, pursuant to Art. 7, Sec. 21. YES.
RATIO 2:
Yes, it is valid. There was no grave abuse of
discretion.
The Constitution vests in the President the
power to enter into international agreements,
subject, in appropriate cases, to the required
concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier
indicated, executive agreements may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
It is the Court’s considered view that the
President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the
same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within
he confines and limits of the powers vested in him
by the Constitution. He honestly believed that the
VFA fell within the ambit of Art. 7, Sec. 21, referring
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the VFA for the concurrence of the Senate, when he
should have been adhering to Art. 18, Sec. 25
instead. Certainly, no abuse of discretion was made
because there was no act that was committed that
showed an abuse of patent, gross, and capricious
manner.
The rationale behind this principle is the
inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
the government.
IBP v. Zamora
GR 141284
August 15,
2000
pp. 474‐482
President
Estrada
TRO
Marines
PNP
Locus standi
Judicial
Review
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
At bar is a special civil action for
certionari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify
on constitutional grounds the order of
President Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines
to join the Philippine National Police in
visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Art. VII, Sec. 18.
The President shall
be Commander‐in‐
Chief of all the AFT
and whenever it
becomes necessary,
he may call out such
armed forces to
prevent or suppress
lawless violence,
invasion, or
rebellion. xxx
Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (2).
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
to settle actual
controversies
involving rights
which are legally
demandable and
CONNECTION TO ARTICLE VIII:
Although this case was placed in Art. VII (Executive
Department), this case may be connected to the
Judicial Department because it speaks of locus
standi and the power of judicial review. The
petitioners did not have locus standi, meaning that
they did not qualify to challenge the legality of
official acts done by the government, but in this
case, the Court relaxed its ruling because the issue
was of transcendental importance. This case also
speaks about political questions and justiciable
issues.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have locus
standi. NO.
RATIO: No. The power of judicial review imposes
the following requisites:
1. Existence of an actual and appropriate case
2. A personal and substantial interest of the
party (locus standi) raising the
constitutional question
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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enforceable, and to
determine whether
or not there has
been a grave abuse
of discretion
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the government.
Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1)
Exercise original
jurisdiction over
cases affecting xxx
and over petitions
for certiorari
prohibition,
mandamus, quo
warranto, and
habeas corpus.
3. Case must be filed at the earliest
opportunity
4. The constitutional question is unavoidable
or is the very lis mota of the case.
The petitioners (The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines) had no legal standing, but the Court,
through its discretion, relaxed its ruling in order to
arrive at a resolution, since the issue was of
transcendental importance.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not President Estrada was
justified in invoking his “calling out power” YES.
RATIO 2: Yes. The issue was a political question
that involved the wisdom, and not the legality of
the act. If the Court exercised its power of judicial
review over the case, it would be violating the
principle of the separation of powers. The Court
has no jurisdiction over the President’s use of his
discretionary power to decide to use his “calling out
power.”
ISSUE 3: Whether or not the act of deploying the
Marines to join the PNP is a violation of the
supremacy of civilian authority in the country NO
RATIO 3: No. The deployment of the Marines in
joining the PNP does not violation civilian
supremacy since it is only a joint and mutual
cooperation between the two. There has been
multifarious activities wherein military aid has
rendered exemplifying activities that bring both
civilian and military together in a relationship of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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communication. Such activities include elections,
administration of the Philippine National Red Cross,
conservation of natural resources, enforcement of
customs laws, sanitary inspections, anti‐drug
enforcement activities, etc.
Macalintal v.
Comelec
GR 157013
July 10, 2003
pp. 618‐619
Locus standi
(taxpayer’s
suit)
Overseas
Absentee
Voting Act
Justiciable
controversies
Ponente: Austria‐Martinez, J.
Before the Court is a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
PH Bar, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of RA 9189 (“The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003”).
This is a taxpayer’s suit, for the
petitioner claims that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject
matter in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated.
The petitioner claims that the assailed
RA misappropriates funds under its
Section 29, in that it provides a
supplemental budget in the General
Appropriates Act of the year.
Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1)
Exercise original
jurisdiction over
cases affecting xxx
and over petitions
for certiorari
prohibition,
mandamus, quo
warranto, and
habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal possesses locus
standi NO.
RATIO: No, BUT the Court relaxed its ruling through
its own discretion.
The rule on suing as a taxpayer involves that
there must first be an alleged disbursement of
public funds, bringing forth such taxpayer’s right to
restrain officials from what he would deem an
unconstitutional act, which would result in the
misapplication of public funds.
When an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed on the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right, but in
fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the
justiciable controversy.
Considering the transcendental importance to
the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with
the Court’s duty of seeing to it that other branches
of the government stay within the limits of the
discretionary powers granted them under the 1987
Constitution, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. The question of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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propriety of the instant petition was also filed when
there were no other ongoing proceedings.
The Court decided to disregard the constitutional
issues raised before it, reasoning that it has been
more than 15 years since the ratification of 1987
Constitution, which required Congress to provide a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy made
the Court decide to resolve the instant petition to
determine whether or not the Congress acted
within the limits of the Constitution or if it had
gravely abused the discretion granted to it.
White Light
Corporation v.
City of Manila
GR 122846
January 20,
2009
pp. 619‐620
Admission
Rates in
Hotels,
Motels, etc.
Manila City
Ordinance
Equal
protection
rights
Ponente: Tinga, J.
This petition seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals,
challenging the validity of Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774: “An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short‐Time Admission,
Short‐Time Admission Rates, and
Wash‐Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in
the City of Manila.”
(December 15, 1992 The Malate
Tourist and Development Corpotation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or TRO
with the RTC of Manila‐Branch 9,
impleading as defendant, the City of
Manila, represented by Mayor Lim.)
Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1)
Exercise original
jurisdiction over
cases affecting xxx
and over petitions
for certiorari
prohibition,
mandamus, quo
warranto, and
habeas corpus.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners can
represent 3rd parties as intervenors.
(Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments
offering “wash up’ rates, their business is being
unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance.
Moreover, the equal protection rights of their
clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the
issue is Whether or not these establishments have
the requisite standing to plead for protection of
their clients’ equal protection rights.) YES.
RATIO 1: Yes. The petitioners have the right to
assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
patronize their establishments for a “wash‐rate”
time frame.
The doctrine of locus standi is built on the
principle of the separation of powers. The judicial
branch may not interfere with the actions rendered
by its co‐equal branches of government. A “direct
and personal interest” presents the most obvious
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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The MTDC basically prayed that the
Ordinance (mentioned above), insofar
as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
(December 21, 1992 The petitioners,
along with Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), filed
a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint‐in‐intervention.)
The petitioners basically filed an
intervention based on the ground that
the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive‐
in hotels and motels in Manila.
December 23, 1992 RTC granted the
petitioner’s motion to intervene.
cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’
standing.
The three constitutional standing requirements
are:
1. Injury
2. Causation
3. Redressability.
However, these general rules have exceptions,
too, namely:
1. Overbreadth doctrine
2. Taxpayer suits
3. Third party standing (especially in the PH)
4. The doctrine of transcendental importance.
The case at bar applies the overbreadth doctrine
and third party standing as exceptions to
constitutional standing. The petitioners (WLC) here
have a close relation to the third parties (TC and
STDC), and that there is also a hindrance to the
third party’s ability to protect his/her own interests.
In overbreadth doctrine analysis, the challengers
to government action are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties when a statute needlessly
restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Here, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance
interferes with the right to liberty of their clients.
Based on the allegations, the Ordinance suffers
from overbreadth. The petitioners may represent
3rd parties as intervenors.
MARCOS V.
MANGLAPUS
SEE SECTION 1 CASE B
DAZA V. The manner Raul Daza was a member of the Article VIII, Section ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction?
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
SINGSON
180 SCR.A. 496
(1989)
of removing
Daza is not a
political
question
Comission of Appointments (CA),
representing LP. LDP reorganized itself
and 24 members of the LP resigned to
join LDP. The House withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza and gave this to the
newly‐ formed LDP. (Chavit Singson).
Daza filed a petition to challenge his
removal from the CA. Singson
countered by saying that what is
involved is a political question. He
argues that nowhere in the Constitution
is it required that the political party be
registered to be entitled to
proportional representation at the CA.
1, of the
Constitution, which
includes the
authority to
determine whether
grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to
excess or lack of
jurisdiction has
been committed by
any branch or
instrumentality of
the government
YES.
What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of the House in removing Daza
from the CA. It is not a political question. It is a
legal question on the manner of filling the CA, as
prescribed in the Constitution. Even assuming that
it were a political question, the Courts still have the
expanded power to check whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction has been committed.
SANTIAGO V.
GUINGONA
Minority
leadership
dispute
between
Tatad &
Guingona
There was an election for Senate
President. There were 2 contenders,
Senator Fernan and Senator Tatad. By a
vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as Senate
President. (The 2 who voted for Tatad
were Miriam and Tatad, himself!)
The majority leader informed the body
chat he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP
senators stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority
leader and formally recognized it.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main
that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and
The present
Constitution now
fortifies the
authority of the
courts to determine
in an appropriate
action the validity
of the acts of the
political
departments.
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
xxx to determine
whether or not
there has been a
grave abuse of
discretion
ISSUE 1: Does the court have jurisdiction over the
case? YES.
It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full
discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the
Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.
amounting to lack
or excess of
jurisdiction on the
part of any branch
or instrumentality
of the Government.
determine the issue.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring
Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this
Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . .
so as to establish in this country the judicial
supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only
in justiceable but political questions as well."
DAVIDE
IMPEACHMENT
(Francisco v.
House of
Representatives
(HOR))
GR 160261
On Nov. 28, 2001, the 12th congress of
the HOR adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, which superseded the
previous one approved by the 11th
congress.
On July 22, 2002, the HOR adopted a
resolution which directed the
Committee on Justice to ‘conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
SC of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
On June 2, 2003, then President Erap
filed an impeachment complaint against
CJ Hilario Davide and seven associate
justices of the SC for ‘culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes.’ The
House Committee on Justice ruled that
the said complaint was sufficient in
Sec 5, Art XI: ‘no
impeachment
proceedings shall be
initiated against the
same official more
than once within a
period of one year.’
Doctrine:
“Political question
xxx, under the
Constitution, are to
be decided by the
people in their
sovereign capacity,
or in regard to
which full
discretionary
authority has been
delegated to the
Legislature or
ISSUE 1: Is the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Davide constitutional? NO.
The filing of the second impeachment complaint
clearly violates Sec 5, Art XI of the constitution.
ISSUE 2: Is the resolution thereof a political
question? NO.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not
eliminate the fact that truly political questions are
beyond the pale of judicial power. (ConComm)
It is clear that judicial power is not only a power;
it is a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine.
By virtue of Sec. 1, Art. 8, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define
what are justiciable political questions and non‐
justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
form, but insufficient in substance and
so voted to dismiss it.
A day after the dismissal (4 months, 3
weeks after filing of complaint), a
second complaint was filed by HOR
(Gibo Teodoro et al) against CJ Davide,
which was signed by at least 1/3 of all
the HOR members.
Various petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates Sec 5 of Art XI of the
constitution.
executive branch of
the Government.”
(CJ Roberto
Concepcion in
Tanada v. Cuenco)
Lis mota
The cause of
the suit or action.
Lis mota of the
case:
(1) whether
Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the
House
Impeachment Rules
adopted by the
12th Congress are
unconstitutional for
violating the
provisions of
Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution;
and
(2) whether, as a
result thereof, the
second
impeachment
questions may be problematic.
From the cases decided by the Supreme Court,
parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court
in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
The Court found the existence in full of all the
requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land.
This issue is of a genuine constitutional material
which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate…
This Court in the present petitions subjected to
judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
complaint is barred
under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the
Constitution.
main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one‐year
time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. xxx
BUSTOS V.
LUCERO
Substantive
law
Substantive
rights
Procedural
law
In this decision to be reconsidered, it
was cited that ‘the constitutional rights
of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings; nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination
be an infringement of his right to
confront witness. As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused
under the due process clause to a fair
trial.’
Section 11, Rule 108
of the Rules of
Court:
After the arrest of
the defendant and
his delivery to
court, he shall be
informed of the
complaint or
information filed
against him. He
shall also be
informed of the
substance of the
testimony and
evidence presented
against him, and if
he desires to testify
or to present
witnesses or
evidence in his
favor, he may be
allowed to do so.
Doctrine/s:
Substantive law –
creates substantive
rights; in criminal
ISSUE 1: Does Sec 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
infringe section 5(5) of article VIII of the
constitution and does it deal with substantive
matters and impair substantive rights? NO
Section 11, Rule 108 is an adjective law and not
a substantive law or a substantive right. As a rule of
evidence, it is also procedural.
The curtailment of the right of an accused in a
preliminary investigation to cross‐examine the
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is
of such importance as to offend against the
constitutional inhibition. Preliminary investigation is
not an essential part of due process of law and may
be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder cannot be held to fall within the
constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies defendant the
right to cross examine witnesses in a preliminary
investigation, his right to present his witnesses
remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to
be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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law, it declares
what acts are
crimes and
prescribes
punishment for
them.
Substantive rights –
rights which one
enjoys under the
legal system prior to
the disturbance of
normal relations.
Procedural law –
provides or
regulates the steps
by which one who
commits a crime is
to be punished.
IN RE
CUNANAN
Bar Flunkers
Act
Believing themselves to be fully
qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the SC, and
feeling that they have been
discriminated against, unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentages lower than those
admitted to the bar went to congress
and secured Senate Bill # 12. The bill
substantially became law.
RA 972 has for its object to admit to the
Bar those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparations. It is
contrary to public interest since it
qualifies law graduates who had
RA 972 (Bar
Flunkers Act):
‘An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for
Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to
and including 1955’
Section 1 provided
the following
passing marks: 70%
for 1946 to 1951
71% for 1952, 72%
for 1953, 73% for
1954 and 74% for
1955. Provided that
the examinee shall
ISSUE 1: Is RA 972 constitutional? NO
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to
the fatal defects of it not being embraced in the
title. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. It
was also struck down for allowing partial passing.
As to section 1, the portion for 1946 to 1951 was
declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and in effect. This was
because the law itself admits that the candidates
for 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due
World War II. The law is in effect revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates. It is an encroachment on the court’s
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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inadequate preparation for the practice
of law profession, as evidenced in their
failed exams.
have no grade
lower than 50%.
Section 2 provided
that a bar candidate
who obtained a
grade of 75% in any
subject shall be
deemed to have
already passed that
subject and the
grade/grades shall
be included in the
computation of the
general average in
subsequent bar
examinations.
primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the Rules of Court.
As to the portion in force and in effect, it may
rationally fall within the power of congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.
JAVELLANA V.
DILG
GR 102549
August 10,
1992
pp. 625‐626
Rule‐making
power
City Councilor
was also a
practicing
lawyer
Local
Government
Code
Ponente: Griño,‐Aquino, J.
This petition for review on certiorari
involves the right of a public official to
engage in the practice of his profession
while employed in the Government.
Petitioner is Atty. Erwin Javellana, an
elected City Councilor of Bago City,
Negros Occidental.
October 5, 1989 City Engineer
Ernesto Divinagracia filed Admin Case
C‐10‐90 against Javellana, basically
alleging that said Javellana (an
incumbent City Councilor and a lawyer
Article 8, Sec. 5(5).
Promulgate rules
concerning the
protection and
enforcement of
constitutional
rights, pleading,
practice, and
procedure in all
courts, the
admission to the
practice of law, the
integrated bar, and
legal assistance to
the under‐
privileged. Such
rules shall provide a
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the DLG Memorandum
Circular violate Article 8, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution? NO
The petitioner’s contention was COMPLETELY off
tangent, meaning it had no relation to the said
provision whatsoever. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches upon the SC’s power and authority
to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC
and DLG Memorandum Circular 90‐81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of
their public duties and private practice of their
professions when the laws allow it.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Note: Amendment of rules by Statute.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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DLG
Memorandum
Circular
by profession) has continuously been
working as a lawyer without securing
the required permit from the Regional
Director, Dept. of Local Government, as
required by DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 80‐38.
Javellana responded through this
petition, praying that such DLG
Memorandum Circular (80‐38, with the
addition of 90‐91 and Section 90 of the
new Local Government Code (LGC)
/RA7160) be declared unconstitutional
and null and void because they violate
Article 8, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution.
simplified and
inexpensive
procedure for the
speedy disposition
of cases, shall be
uniform for all
courts of the same
grade, and shall not
diminish, increase,
or modify
substantive rights.
Rules of procedure
of special courts
and quasi‐judicial
bodies shall remain
effective unless
disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
Republic v. Judge Guinguyon
(GR 166429, February 1, 2006)
Sec. 4 of RA 8974 on expropriation (the
dispossession of someone’s property by the State)
for public infrastructure basically says that
whenever it is necessary to acquire resal property
for any government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate agency shall conduct
the proceedings before the proper court with the
following guidelines:
Upon filing of the complaint and notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property 100% of
the value of the property based on the BIR’s current
relevant zonal valuation
The value of the improvements/structues as
determined under Section 7 of this RA hereof.
This runs counter of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
which requires only partial deport before entry.
May a statute amend a Rule of Court?
Substantive matters may be embodied in a rule of
procedure, and in this case, Rule 67 contains
matters of substance, BUT the absorption of the
substantive point into a procedural rule does not
prevent the substantive right from being
superseded or amended by a statute.
This is because the creation of property rights is a
matter that is acted upon by the legislature, and not
for the courts to decide upon. Otherwise, it can
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
lead to the absurd situation of the judiciary
shielding laws by making them irrepealable,
absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of
procedure.
The judiciary has the sole prerogative/right to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and it should be understood that such
rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and
not points of substantive law. This privilege was
restored to the judicial department by the 1987
Constitution.
PEOPLE V.
MATEO
GR 147678‐87
July 7, 2004
pp. 626‐627
Review of
death penalty
Life
imprisonment
and afflictive
penalties
Fundamental
Law
Mandatory v.
Intermediate
review
Court of
Appeals
Procedural
matters
(There was no mention of the case here.
This was merely a discussion on the
review of the death penalty, which cited
relevant laws, procedures, and
provisions.)
The SC has assumed direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment (or
lower penalties but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion,
which gave rise such afflictive penalties
including life imprisonment). This
practice is justified in Article 8, Sec.
5(2)(d).
While the Fundamental Law (FL)
requires a mandatory review of such
cases involving those penalties
mentioned above, such FL does not
require an intermediate review.
Art. 8, Sec. 5(2)(d):
(2) Review, revise,
reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of
Court may provide,
final judgments and
orders of lower
courts in:
(d) All criminal cases
in which the penalty
imposed is reclusión
perpetua or higher.
Note: Reclusión perpetua.
Garcia v. People
(GR 106531, November 18, 1999)
It is only in cases where the death penalty is
actually imposed that the trial court must forward
the records of the case to the SC (now CA) for
automatic review of the conviction. This right
cannot be waived.
However, in cases imposing reclusión perpetua, the
right to appeal may be waived by the petitioner:
Filing a notice of appeal, or
Indicating a desire to appeal from the decision.
In the absence of these, the decision becomes final
and unappealable.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Remember:
Death penalty – Death itself by lethal injection
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
The SC requires that the Court of
Appeals (CA) review these cases before
they are sent to the SC because where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused must be
determined. The SC overemphasizes
the evaluation of facts, and a prior
determination by the CA (particularly
on the factual issues) is paramount to
minimizing the possibility of an error in
judgment.
Statistics show that since the
reimposition of the death penalty law in
1993 until June 2004, the cases where
the judgment of death penalty had
either been modified or vacated was
71.77%, the total number of death
penalty cases directly elevated before
the Court on automatic review. With
the final disposition resting on the SC,
651 out of 907 appellants were saved
from lethal injection.
Under Article 8, Sec. 5, the SC has the
power to amend rules of procedure,
since procedural matters fall within the
law‐making privilege of the SC, instead
of the law‐making power of the
Congress.
Procedural matter The additional
Life imprisonment – This applies to Special Laws.
Life imprisonment has no specific extent of
punishment, but one may have parole any time.
Reclusion perpetua – (20‐40 years, applying to
crimes in the RPC). This is translated from Spanish
as “life imprisonment,” too, but here, one has the
possibility of pardon/exec clemency after serving
one’s sentence for 30 years.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
rule allowing immediate review by the
CA (an appellate court) before the case
is elevated to the SC on automatic
review.
IN RE: PETITION
TO DISQUALIFY
ATTY. DE VERA
AC 6052
December 11,
2003
pp. 628‐629
Bar
integration
IBP
IBP By‐Laws
Bar
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Petitioners:
Atty. Oliver Garcia VP of the
Bukidnon IBP Chapter
Atty. Emmanuel Ravanera Past
president of the Misamis Oriental IBP
Chapter
Atty. Tony Velez Incumbent
president of the Misamis Oriental IBP
Chapter
These petitioners mainly seek the
disqualification of respondent Atty.
Leonard De Vera “from being elected
Governor of Eastern Mindanao” in the
16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Regional Governors’ elections.
June 9, 2003 respondent filed a
Respectful Comment on the petition
after seeking a leave of court.
Respondent argues that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the controversy,
saying that the election of the Officers
of the IBP, including the determination
of the qualification of those who want
to serve the organization, is purely an
internal matter, governed by the IBP
Art. 8, Sec. 5(5) of
the 1987
Constitution.
Promulgate rules
concerning the
protection and
enforcement of
constitutional
rights, pleading,
practice, and
procedure in all
courts, the
admission to the
practice of law, the
integrated bar xxx
and shall not
diminish, increase,
or modify
substantive rights.
Rules of procedure
of special courts
and quasi‐judicial
bodies shall remain
effective unless
disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
Art. 8, Sec. 13 of
the 1935
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over
the internal matters of the IBP? YES
Yes, pursuant to Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the 1987
Constitution, which confers on the SC the power to
promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in this
constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the
activities of the IBP, including the election of its
officers. This authority over the IBP originates from
the 1935 Constitution, particularly in Art. 8, Sec. 13.
Ironically, the IBP By‐Laws document invoked by
the respondent in asserting IBP independence from
the SC, recognizes the full range of the power of
supervision of the SC over the IBP.
Section 77 of the IBP By‐Laws gives the SC power
to amend, modify, or repeal the IBP By‐Laws
through:
Motu proprio (“On his own impulse”)
Upon recommendation of the Board of
Governors of the IBP.
Section 15 of the IBP By‐Laws also authorizes the
SC to send observes in the IBP elections, whether
local or national.
Section 44 of the IBP By‐Laws empowers the SC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
By‐Laws exclusive regulated and
administered by the IBP.
Constitution.
The Supreme Court
shall have the
power to
promulgate rules
concerning
pleading, practice,
and procedure in all
courts, and the
admission to the
practice of law. Said
rules shall be
uniform for all
courts of the same
grade and shall not
diminish, increase,
or modify
substantive rights.
The existing laws on
pleading, practice,
and procedure are
hereby repealed as
statutes, and are
declared Rules of
Courts, subject to
the power of the
Supreme Court to
alter and modify the
same. The Congress
of the Philippines
shall have the
power to repeal,
alter, or
to have the final decision on the removal of the
members of the Board of Governors.
Thus, the SC has jurisdiction over this issue.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Supplementary information
The term, “Bar” refers to the “collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys”.
October 5, 1970 The Court initiated the
integration of the PH Bar by creating the
Commission on Bar Integration whose task was to
ascertain the advisability of unifying the PH Bar.
RA 6397 was enacted, confirming the power of the
SC to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
January 1, 1973 “In the Matter of the Integration
of the Bar to the Philippines” was a per curiam
Resolution of the Court which ordained the
Integration of the PH Bar in accordance with Rule
139‐A of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the Court’s
rule‐making power under the 1935 Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
supplement the
rules concerning
pleading, practice,
and procedure, and
the admission to
the practice of law
in the Philippines.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
MACEDA VS.
VASQUEZ
G.R. No.
102781,
April 22, 1993
p. 629
Ombudsman
FALSIFIED
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
Ponente: Nocon, J.
Petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the
Public Attorney’s Office, in his affidavit‐
complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman, alleged that petitioner
Maceda had falsified his Certificate of
Service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases submitted for decision
have been determined and decided
when in fact some were still pending.
Petitioner Maceda counters the
allegation by saying that he had been
granted by the Court an extension of 90
days to decide the aforementioned
cases.
Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
Article VIII, Section
6 of the 1987
Constitution. The
Supreme Court shall
have Administrative
supervision over all
courts and
personnel thereof.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint
for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification
submitted to the Supreme Court. NO. The Office
of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.
RATIO:
o Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel.
No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul the doctrine of
separation of powers.
o The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation
of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification runs counter
the Constitution and the independence of the
judiciary.
o Thus the Ombudsman should first refer the
matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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the complaint since the offenses
charged arose from the judge’s
performance of his official duties which
is under the supervision and control of
the Supreme Court.
this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his
pending case load.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED.
PEOPLE VS
GACOTT, JR.
G.R. No.
116049,
July 13, 1995
p. 630
Reprimand Ponente: Regalado, J.
Rebuffed by the Court through the
annulment of his order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a
quo, complemented with a reprimand
and a fine of P10,000.oo for gross
ignorance of the law, respondent Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a
motion for reconsideration and a
supplemental motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent judge questions the
competence of the Second Division of
the Supreme Court to administratively
discipline him. Respondent judge
anchors his argument on the wording of
Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution where he alleged that only
the en banc/full court may decide on his
administrative liability.
(1) Article VIII,
Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.
The Supreme Court
en banc shall have
the power to
discipline judges of
lower courts, or
order their
dismissal by a vote
of a majority of the
Members who
actually took part in
the deliberations…
(2) Court En Banc
Resolution “Bar
Matter No. 209. In
the Matter of the
Amendment and/or
Clarification of
various Supreme
Courts Rules and
Regulations”. Cases
where the penalty
to be imposed is the
dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee
of the Judiciary,
disbarment…
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the decision of the en banc
and not just of the Second Division of the Court is
needed for the decision to hold respondent
administratively liable. NO. The decision of the
Second Division of the Court is the decision of the
Court. Petitioner misconstrued Article VIII, Sec. 11
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ratio 1:
o On the misconstrual of Article VIII, Sec. 11:
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a
member of the committee on the Judiciary of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, had the
opportunity to take up the precise matter with
the committee chairman, retired Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion. Both were in concurrence
that the qualification (en banc) was not intended
to make a difference, as a reference to the Court
by itself necessarily means the Court en banc and
that where the reference is to the Court acting
through its divisions, it would necessarily be so
specified.
o Per the Court En Banc Resolution, entitled “Bar
Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment
and/or Clarifications of various Supreme Court
Rules and Resolutions”, cases involving
reprimand and a fine of P10, 000.00 are not
decided en banc.
o To require the entire Court to deliberate upon
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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(3) Circular No. 2‐
89. 2. A decision or
resolution of a
Division of the
Court, when
concurred in by a
majority of its
members who
actually took part in
the deliberations on
the issues… is a
decision or
resolution of the
Supreme Court.
and participate in all administrative matters or
cases would result in a congested docket.
o Per Circular No. 2‐89 pursuant to Section 4(3),
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, a decision or
resolution of a Division, when concurred in by a
majority, and in no case without concurrence of
at least 3 members, is a decision or resolution of
the Supreme Court.
JUDGE
CAOIBES, JR.
VS.
OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No.
132177,
July 19, 2001
p. 632
OFFICE
FURNITURE
The present case involves two members
of the judiciary who were entangled in a
fight within court premises over a piece
of office furniture.
Article VIII, Section
6 of the 1987
Constitution. The
Supreme Court shall
have Administrative
supervision over all
courts and
personnel thereof.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative
cases involving members of the judiciary.NO. The
Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.
RATIO:
o Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel. In view of this, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether
a criminal complaint against a judge, or court
employee, involves an administrative matter.
o Ombudsman must give due recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court. It cannot
dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that
a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so would be to
deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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under itself a power not constitutionally
sanctioned. This impinges on judicial
independence.
o The ruling in Maceda prevails, to allow the
Ombudsman to oversee judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take
administrative action against them is to violate
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Section 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines.cralaw
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of
the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.cralaw
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
IN RE JBC V.
JUDGE QUITAIN
JBC NO. 013
August 22, 2007
p. 633
RTC JUDGE
Failure to
disclose past
Administrative
Order of
dismissal is a
grave
misconduct
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was
appointed Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.
Subsequent thereto, xxx
administrative and criminal charges
were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional
Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), xxx Davao City, as a
result of which he was dismissed from
the service xxx
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to
(3) A Member of
the Judiciary must
be a person of
proven
competence,
integrity, probity,
and independence.
W/N Judge Quitain failed to meet the
qualifications required of appointees to the
Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution? YES
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE
JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct
which would have warranted his dismissal from
the service had he not resigned during the
pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the
penalty of a fine of P40,000.00.
It appearing that he has yet to apply for his
retirement benefits and other privileges, if any,
the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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disclose that he was administratively
charged and dismissed from the
service for grave misconduct per A.O.
No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no
less than the former President of
the Philippines.
xxx it can not be denied that at the
time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC
judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.
No. 183 dismissing him from
government service. xxx the OCA
(Office of the Court Administrator)
maintained its recommendation that
Judge Quitain be dismissed from the
service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the
government xxx
benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge
Quitain may be entitled to, and he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reinstatement and appointment to any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government‐owned and/or controlled
corporations.
KILOSBAYAN V.
ERMITA & ONG
GR 177721
July 3, 2007
Ong’s
citizenship
Petitioners are people and/or non‐
governmental organizations engaged
in public and civic causes aimed at
protecting the people’s rights to self‐
governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is
the head of the Office of the President
and is in charge of releasing
presidential appointments including
those of Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is
allegedly the party whose
appointment would fill up the vacancy
Section 7 (1) of
Article VIII provides
that “No person
shall be appointed
Member of the
Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate
court unless he is a
natural‐born citizen
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Gregory S. Ong is a
natural‐born Filipino Citizen? YES
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of
this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen.
The series of events and long string of alleged
changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s
ancestors, by various births, marriages and
deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to
be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so
as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to
show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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in this Court.
Petitioners claim that respondent
Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact
is plain and incontestable, and that his
own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. The birth
certificate, petitioners add, reveals
that at the time of respondent Ong’s
birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also
Chinese.
Respondent Executive Secretary
added that the President appointed
respondent Ong from among the list
of nominees who were duly screened
by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC
created under Article VIII, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Said respondent
further stated: “The appointment,
however, was not released, but
instead, referred to the JBC for
validation of respondent Ong’s
citizenship.”
of the Philippines.”
Sec. 2 of Art. IV
defines “natural‐
born citizens as
those who are
citizens of
the Philippines from
birth without having
to perform any act
to acquire or
perfect their
Philippine
Citizenship.”
still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in
court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time‐line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as
that would be a violation of the Constitution.
History:
o As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces
his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of
Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25,
1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who
married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that
these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in
1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of
which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino
citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was
a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also
became a Filipino citizen; that respondent
Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the
daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy
Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were
married in 1927; that, therefore,
respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at
birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a
Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,
thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that
when respondent Ong was eleven years old
his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers
and sisters, and his mother were included in
the naturalization.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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Section 8.
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide
in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
NITAFAN V.
COMMISSION
Withholding
tax deduction
Petitioners are RTC Judges in Manila. Section 10. xxx
During their
ISSUE 1: Whether or not withholding taxes should
be deducted to the salaries of all judiciary
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
152 SCRA 284
(1987)
pp. 635‐639
of Judiciary
members
They seek to prohibit CIR and Financial
Officer of the SC from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries.
They submit that any tax withheld from
their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease
of their salaries, contrary to section 10,
Art. 8.
June 4, 1987 Court en banc released
a decision RE: QUESTION OF
EXEMPTION FROM INCOME TAXATION
that the Finance Office of the Court to
continue the deduction of the
withholding taxes from salaries of all
the members of the Judiciary.
continuance in
office, their salary
shall not be
decreased.
It also means that
Congress may pass
a law fixing another
rate of
compensation but
such rate must be
higher than that
which they are
receiving, or if
lower, it would be
applicable only to
those appointed
after its approval.
members? YES.
The payment of such income tax by Justices and
Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries during
the continuance of their office.
The true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution was to make the salaries of the
members of the Judiciary taxable.
Commissioner Rigos: to give substance to
equality among the three branches of government
Fr. Bernas: So, we put a period (.) after
‘DECREASED’ on the understanding that the salary of
justices is subject to tax
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy
years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
Vargas v.
Rilloraza
80 Phil. 297
(1948)
Security of
tenure
Section 14 of
the People’s
Court Act
Disqualification
Ponente: Hidalgo, J.
Such question of unconstitutionality or
repugnancy to the Constitution arises
in relation to the disqualification of
certain members of the Supreme Court
provided for in Section 14 of the
People’s Court Act.
People’s Court Act,
Sec. 14. Any justice
of the SC who held
any office or
position under the
Philippine Executive
Commission (PEC)
or under the
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Congress had the
power to add to the pre‐existing grounds of
disqualification of a Justice of the SC, provided for
in Section 14. No.
RATIO 1:
The ground for disqualification added by Section
14 of Commonwealth Act 682 to those already
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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of justices government of the
RP may not sit and
vote in any case
brought to that
Court under section
13 hereof in which
the accused is a
person who held
any office or
position under
either or both the
PEC and the RP or
any branch,
instrumentality, or
agency thereof.
If, on account of
such
disqualification, or
because of any of
the grounds or
disqualification of
judges, in Rule 126,
section 1 of the
Rules of Court, or
on account of
illness, absence of
temporary disability
the requisite
number of Justices
necessary to
constitute a
quorum or to
render judgment in
existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and continued by it is not only
arbitrary and irrational but also positively violative
of Organic Law.
A law repugnant to the Constitution is void. For
repugnancy to result, there is no requirement of
actual removal of the disqualified judges.
Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of the SC in cases can
only be exercised by those justices who are
appointed by the President. The deprivation of
his/her judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of this court. It is
also repugnant that the justices in the lower courts
do not have the same qualifications as those with
the justices of the SC.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not a person may act as a
Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed
by the President and confirmed by the CA pursuant
to the Constitution, even only as a “designee”.
No
RATIO 2:
Such designation authorized in Section 14 of the
People’s Court Act cannot possibly be a compliance
with the provision requiring that appointment.
Additional disqualifying circumstances of the
“designee” are the lack of confirmation by or
consent of the Commission on Appointments. This
is another point of repugnancy between the
challenged section and the Constitution. It is in fact
saying that the composition of the Court is
temporary, when it is not. This Tribunal,
established under the Organic Law, is one of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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any case is not
present, the
President may
designate such
number of Judges of
First Instance,
Judges‐at‐large of
First Instance, or
Cadastral Judges,
having none of the
disqualifications set
forth in said section
one hereof, as may
be necessary to sit
temporarily as
Justice of said
Court, in order to
form a quorum or
until a judgment in
said case is reached.
Article 8, Sec. 4.
(1) The Supreme
Court shall be
composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices.
xxx
Article 8, Sec. 5.
Discusses the
powers of the SC
and where they
have original
permanent institutions of the government.
ISSUE 3: Whether or not by the method of
“designation” created by the aforecited Section 14
of a Judge of First Instance, Judge‐at‐Large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the
President under the same section can
constitutionally “sit temporarily as Justice” of the
SC by virtue thereof. No.
RATIO 3:
A temporary member of the Court would be
misnomer, implying a position not contemplated by
the constitution. Pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of
Article 8, the framers intended the SC to function
through the members who are therein defined, and
by section 6, they determined who may be
appointed by such members. Hence, we do not see
why “designees” in such a case can constitutionally
“sit temporarily as Justices” of the SC.
Therefore, Section 14 of the People’s Court Act is
unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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jurisdiction.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi‐
judicial or administrative functions.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation
before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained
from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
AIR FRANCE V.
CARRASCOSO
18 SCRA 155
(1956)
First class
seat
White man
Ponente: Sanchez, J.
The case is now before us for review on
certiorari.
Essential facts
Carrascoso was one of the 28 Filipino
pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes,
France. Air France, through the
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued a “first
class” round trip ticket to Carrascoso
from Manila to Rome. However, during
the Manila to Bangkok flight, Carrascoso
was forced by the Air France Manager
to vacate his “first class” seat.
Now, the relief petitioner (Air France)
seeks that the Court review “all the
findings of the Court of Appeals (CA),”
saying that respondent court failed to
Article 8, Sec. 12 of
the 1935
Constitution. No
decision shall be
rendered by any
court of record
without expressing
therein clearly and
distinctly the facts
and the law on
which it is based.
Section 1, Rule 36,
Rules of Court,
which basically
states, “a judgment
determining the
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the CA failed to make
findings of fact on all issues laid before it by
Carrasco. NO.
The law solely insists that a decision state that
the “essential ultimate facts” upon which the court’s
conclusion is drawn. So long as the decision of the
CA contains the necessary facts to warrant its
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
“any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense. The legal presumptions
are that official duty has been regularly performed
and that all the matters within an issue in a case
were laid down before the court and passed upon by
it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
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make complete finds of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it.
Additional facts
In the words of witness Ernesto Cuento,
there was a “white man,” who the Air
France Manager alleged had a “better
right” to the seat. When Carrascoso
was asked to vacate his seat, he
naturally refused, telling the Manager
that his seat would be taken over his
dead body.
A commotion ensued between
Carrascoso and the white man,
thereupon they all came across to
Carrasoco and pacified him to give his
seat to the white man. Plaintiff
reluctantly gave away his “first class”
seat in the plane.)
Note: The claim of W/N the ticket was
“first class” or not is immaterial because
the issue at hand is different.
merits of a case
shall state ‘clearly
and distinctly the
facts and the law on
which it is based.’”
Section 4, Rule 51,
Sec. 33(2), Judiciary
Act of 1948, as
amended, which
states, “Every
decision of the
Court of Appeals
shall contain
complete findings
of fact on all issues
properly raised
before it.”
VALDEZ V.
COURT OF
APPEALS
A three‐page decision of the trial court
contained in the first two pages a
statement of the allegations of the
pleadings of the parties and
enumerates the witnesses presented
and the exhibits marked during the trial.
The court statement in the decision that
a party has proven his case while the
other has not, is not the findings of facts
contemplated by the Constitution and
the rules to be clearly and distinctly
ISSUE 1: Did the decision of the Court of Appeals
state the finding of facts? NO
The said 3‐page decision which contained a
statement of allegations, pleadings of parties, and
enumeration of witnesses was not a clear and
distinct statement of facts in the basis of which the
decision is rendered. A mere conclusion of facts and
the law based on without stating the facts which
serve the basis is not sufficient.
This Court is not the trier of facts and it relies on
the facts found by the lower courts and appellate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
stated.
Unfortunately, the appellate court
overlooked this and adopted the
alleged findings of facts of the trial
court. Facts are stated by they are
hardly a substantial compliance with
the mandate.
courts. However, the Court had to wade through
records and make its own findings to avoid further
delay.
PEOPLE V.
LIZADA
The accused is alleged of committing 4
counts of rape and was convicted by the
trial court of the said crimes. However,
it merely summarized the testimonies
of the witnesses and failed to state in
the said decision the factual and legal
basis for the imposition of death
penalty on him.
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court comply with the
constitutional requirements? NO
Trial courts should not merely provide
testimonies of witnesses of both parties and just
come out with a conclusion based on those. The trial
court failed to specifically state the facts proven by
the prosecution based on their evidence, the issues
raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual
and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual
bases for convicting the accused‐appellant for the
crimes charged.
VELARDE
(Founder, El
Shaddai) V.
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (SJS)
This petition for review assails the
decision of the lower courts. The main
question is whether or not the act of a
religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the
candidacy of a candidate for elective
office or in urging or requiring the
members of his flock to vote for a
specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional
provisions.
The trial court decided that said acts
were unconstitutional, however it failed
ISSUE 1: Did the decision of the court fail to comply
with the requirements of the constitution in its
written decision? YES
The essential parts of a case are (1) statement of
the case (2) statement of facts (3) issues or
assignment of errors (4) court ruling (5) dispositive
portion. This case did not include (2) and (5). It
cannot simply say a judgment had been rendered
without any justification. Failure to comply with this
constitutional provision is a grave abuse of
discretion. It must be a nullity and must be struck
down as void.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
to provide a clear and complete
decision. It is alleged that the
questioned decision did not contain a
statement of facts and a dispositive
portion.
ISSUE 2: Are the acts of a religious leader in
endorsing a candidate violative of the constitution?
NO
The court deems this constitutional issue to be of
‐paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry for it
concerns the governance of our country and its
people. Therefore, despite the obvious procedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this
court still called for oral argument, so as not to leave
any doubt that there might be room to entertain
and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS however failed to convince the
Court that there are enough factual and legal bases
to resolve this paramount issue. The office of the
Sol. Gen. has sided with the petitioner insofar as
there are no facts supporting the SJS petition and
the assailed decision.
Section 15.
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty‐four months from date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated
Provision/s
Issue & Ratio
RE: PROBLEM OF
DELAYS IN CASES
BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. 00‐8‐
05‐SC
November 28,
2001
p. 657
Sandiganbayan A question is raised on whether or not
the Sandiganbayan functions as a
regular court and is therefore covered
by the reglementary period prescribed
in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Article VIII, Section
15(1) of the 1987
Constitution. All
cases or matters
filed after the
effectivity of this
Constitution must
be decided or
resolved within
twenty‐four months
from date of
submission to the
Supreme Court…
Article VIII, Section
15(2) of the 1987
Constitution. A case
or matter shall be
deemed submitted
for decision or
resolution upon the
filing of the last
pleading, brief…
P.D. No. 1606,
Section 6.
Maximum period
for termination of
cases – As far as
practicable, the trial
of cases before the
Sandiganbayan
once commenced
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the reglementary period
for the resolution of cases prescribed in Section 15
of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution applies to
the Sandiganbayan. NO. The prescribed
reglementary period does not apply to the
Sandiganbayan.
RATIO:
o The provision does not apply to the
Sandiganbayan, it refers to regular courts of
lower collegiate level that in present hierarchy
applies only to the Court of Appeals.
o The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the
same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice, with functions of a trial court.
o Court Administrator contradicted this view and
distinguished between cases which the
Sandiganbayan has cognizance of in its original
jurisdiction, and cases which fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He
posited that since in the first class of cases, the
Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then
for that classification of caes, the 3 month
reglementary period applies. For the second
class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the 12
month reglementary period for collegiate
courts. However, the Court disagreed with such
contention.
o Further, Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1606, the law that
created the Sandiganbayan, provided that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
shall be continuous
until terminated
and the judgment
shall be rendered
within three (3)
months…
cases, as far as practicable, must be resolved.
o Also, on September 18, 1984, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rule
affirming the 3‐month period prescribed in P.D.
No. 1606.
B. COURT
ADMINISTRATOR
VS. QUIÑANOLA
A.M. No. MTJ‐
9901216,
October 20, 1999
p. 658
Administrative
sanctions
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Respondent judge was charged with
violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for allegedly not deciding
matters pending before him within the
period fixed by law.
Cases must be
attended to within
the prescribed
period.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the respondent judge
violated the Code of Judicial ConductYES.
RATIO:
o The Code of judicial Conduct requires judges to
decide cases and matters pending before them
within the period fixed by law. A heavy case
load and a poor health may partially excuse
such lapses, only if the judges concerned
request reasonable extensions.
o Respondent judge made no effort to inform the
Court of his reasons for the delay, much less to
request any extension. Respondent even signed
certifications that all cases and motions
pending before him had been attended to
within the prescribed period.
o This court has always emphasized the need and
the imperative for judges to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously within the
constitutionally prescribed 90‐day period.
Failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants administrative sanctions.
Note: Taking into account the failing health and
the respondent’s having already compulsorily
retired, he should be fined in the amount of forty
thousand pesos (P40,000).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
ARTICLE(IX:(CONSTITUTIONAL(COMMISSIONS(
(
A.(COMMON(PROVISIONS(
(
SECTION(1.((((The(Constitutional(Commissions,(which(shall(be(independent,(are(the(Civil(Service(Commission,(the(Commission(on(Elections,(and(the(
Commission(on(Audit.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A. MACALINTAL((
V.(COMELEC(
G.R.$No.$157013$$
July$10,$2003$
Pp(659O660(
Joint(
Congressional(
Oversight(
Committee(
(
$
R.A.(No.(9189$
"An$Act$
Providing$for$
A$System$of$
Overseas$
Absentee$
Voting$by$
Qualified$
Citizens$of$the$
Philippines$
Abroad,$
Appropriating$
Funds$
Therefor,$and$
for$Other$
Purposes”$
Respondents’$profile:$COMMISSION$
ON$ELECTIONS,$HON.$ALBERTO$
ROMULO,$in$his$official$capacity$as$
Executive$Secretary,$and$HON.$
EMILIA$T.$BONCODIN,$Secretary$of$
the$Department$of$Budget$and$
Management.$
$
ROMULO$MACALINTAL,$IBP$member,$
submits(that(the(creation(of(the(Joint(
Congressional(Oversight(Committee$
with$the$power$to$review,$revise,$
amend$and$approve$the$
Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$
promulgated$by$the$COMELEC,$R.A.$
No.$9189$intrudes(into(the(
independence(of(the(COMELEC$
which,$as$a$constitutional$body,$is$not$
under$the$control$of$either$the$
executive$or$legislative$departments$
of$government;$that$only$the$
COMELEC$itself$can$promulgate$rules$
and$regulations$which$may$be$
changed$or$revised$only$by$the$
majority$of$its$members.$
R.A.$No.$9189$created$
the$JCOC,$as$follows:$
$
SEC.$25.$Joint&Congressional&Oversight&Committee.$–$xxx$Provided,$That,$of$the$seven$(7)$members$
to$be$designated$by$
each$House$of$
Congress,$four$(4)$
should$come$from$the$
majority$and$the$
remaining$three$(3)$
from$the$minority.$
(
The(Joint(
Congressional(
Oversight(Committee(
shall(have(the(power(
to(monitor(and(
evaluate(the(
implementation(of(this(
Act.(It(shall(review,(
revise,(amend(and(
I:$W/N$Sections$19$and$25$of$R.A.$No.$9189$
violate$Article$IXeA$(Common$Provisions)$$Section$
1$of$the$Constitution$
Held:$$YES$
• The$second$sentence$of$the$first$paragraph$of$
Section$19,$to$wit:$"The$Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$shall$be$submitted$to$the$Joint$Congressional$Oversight$Committee$created$by$virtue$of$this$Act$for$prior$approval;"$and$
• The$second$sentence$in$the$second$
paragraph$of$Section$25,$to$wit:$"It$shall$review,$revise,$amend$and$approve$the$Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$promulgated$by$the$Commission"$of$the$same$law;$
are$declared$UNCONSTITUTIONAL$&$VOID$for$
being$repugnant$to$Section$1,$Article$IXeA$of$the$
Constitution$mandating$the$independence$of$
constitutional$commission,$such$as$COMELEC.$
$
Ratio:$The$legislative$function$of$Congress$is$not$
to$approve,$review,$revise$and$amend$the$IRR$of$
the$COMELEC.$$
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
$
COMELEC$joins$the$petitioner$in$
asserting$that$as$an$independent$
constitutional$body,$it$may$not$be$
subject$to$interference$by$any$
government$instrumentality$and$that$
only$this$Court$may$review$COMELEC$
rules$and$only$in$cases$of$grave$abuse$
of$discretion.$
approve(the(
Implementing(Rules(
and(Regulations(
promulgated(by(the(
Commission.$(Emphasis$
supplied)$
$
$
SEC.$19.$Authority$of$
the$Commission$to$
Promulgate$Rules.$–$
The$Commission$shall$
issue$the$necessary$
rules$and$regulations$to$
effectively$implement$
the$provisions$of$this$
Act$within$sixty$(60)$
days$from$the$
effectivity$of$this$
Act.$The(Implementing(
Rules(and(Regulations(
shall(be(submitted(to(
the(Joint(Congressional(
Oversight(Committee(
created(by(virtue(of(
this(Act(for(prior(
approval.$
The$framers$of$the$Constitution$wanted$
COMELEC$to$be$independent$from$the$other$
departments$of$the$Government.$
$$
Congress,$in$both$provisions,$arrogates$unto$itself$
a$function$not$specifically$vested$by$the$
Constitution,$should$be$stricken$out$of$the$
subject$statute$for$constitutional$infirmity.$Both$
provisions$brazenly$violate$the$mandate$on$the$
independence$of$the$COMELEC.$
(
Section(2.(No(member(of(a(Constitutional(Commission(shall,(during(his(tenure,(hold(any(other(office(or(employment.(Neither(shall(he(engage(in(the(
practice(of(any(profession(or(in(the(active(management(or(control(of(any(business(which,(in(any(way,(may(be(affected(by(the(functions(of(his(office,(
nor(shall(he(be(financially(interested,(directly(or(indirectly,(in(any(contract(with,(or(in(any(franchise(or(privilege(granted(by(the(Government,(any(of(its(
subdivisions,(agencies,(or(instrumentalities,(including(governmentOowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(their(subsidiaries.(
(
Section.(3.(The(salary(of(the(Chairman(and(the(Commissioners(shall(be(fixed(by(law(and(shall(not(be(decreased(during(their(tenure.(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
(
Section(4.(The(Constitutional(Commissions(shall(appoint(their(officials(and(employees(in(accordance(with(law.(
(
Section(5.(The(Commission(shall(enjoy(fiscal(autonomy.(Their(approved(annual(appropriations(shall(be(automatically(and(regularly(released.(
(
Section(6.(Each(Commission(en(banc(may(promulgate(its(own(rules(concerning(pleadings(and(practice(before(it(or(before(any(of(its(offices.(Such(rules,(
however,(shall(not(diminish,(increase,(or(modify(substantive(rights.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
(
A. ARUELO,(
JR.(V.(CA(&(
Gatchalian(
$
G.R.$No.$
107852$
October$20,$
1993$
(
Pg(661(
COMELEC(
Rules(of(
Procedure(vs.(
Rules(of(
Court(
Aruelo$and$Gatchalian$were$rival$
candidates$in$the$May$11,$1992$
elections.$Gatchalian$won$over$Aruelo$
by$a$margin$of$four$votes,$such$that$on$
May$13,$1992,$the$Municipal$Board$of$
Canvassers$proclaimed$him$as$the$duly$
elected$ViceeMayor$of$Balagtas,$
Bulacan.$$
$
June$6,$1992!$COMELEC$denied$
Aruelo’s$petition$to$annul$Gatchalian’s$
proclamation$due$to$nonesubmission$of$
evidence$&$other$supporting$
documents.$
$
November$24,$1992!$the$Court$of$
Appeals$rendered$a$decision$denying$
Gatchalian's$petition,$but$declared,$at$
the$same$time,$that$Gatchalian's$
Answer$With$CountereProtest$and$
Counterclaim$was$timely$filed.$$
$
Hence,$This$petition$for$certiorari$and$
prohibition$to$set$aside$the$Decision$of$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
Section$2,$Rule$1,$
Part$I$provides:$
$
Sec.$2.$
Applicability$—$
These(rules,$except$
Part$VI,(shall(apply(
to(all(actions(and(
proceedings(
brought(before(the(
Commission.$Part$VI$
shall$apply$to$
election$contests$
$
I:$W/N$Aruelo$is$correct$in$asserting$the$COMELEC$
Rules$of$Procedure$in$the$filing$of$motions$to$
dismiss$and$bill$of$particulars$
$
Held:$NO,$petition$is$hereby$DISMISSED$
$
Ratio:$
Petitioner$filed$the$election$protest$(Civil$Case$No.$e
343eMe92)$with$the$Regional$Trial$Court,$whose$
proceedings$are$GOVERNED$by$the$REVISED$RULES$
OF$COURT$and$not$of$the$COMELEC$Rules$of$
Procedure.$$
$
"$See$also$the$applicability$of$COMELEC$Rules$of$
Procedure$according$to$rule$1$of$section$2.$
$
The$COMELEC$cannot$adopt$a$rule$prohibiting$the$
filing$of$certain$pleadings$in$the$regular$courts.$$
$
The$power$to$promulgate$rules$concerning$
pleadings,$practice$and$procedure$in$all$courts$is$
vested$on$the$Supreme$Court$(Constitution,$Art$VIII,$
Sec.$5$[5]).$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
the$Court$of$which$ruled$that$the$
answer$and$countereprotest$of$
respondent$Danilo$F.$Gatchalian$was$
filed$timely$and$ordered$the$Regional$
Trial$Court,$Branch$17,$Malolos,$Bulacan$
to$continue$with$the$protest$case$
proceedings$filed$by$petitioner$Gregorio$
N.$Aruelo,$Jr.$
$
Aruelo$asserts$“Rule$35,$Sec.$7”$and$
“Rule$13,$Sec.1”$of$the$COMELEC$Rules$
of$Procedure.$
and$quo&warranto$cases$cognizable$by$courts$
of$general$or$limited$
jurisdiction.$
(
B. ANTONIO(
V.(
COMELEC(
(
G.R.$135869$
September$22,$
1999$
(
Pg(661(
Filing(of(Brgy.(
Election(
Appeal(
COMELEC(5O
dayOperiod(
vs.(RA(
6697/OEC(10O
day(period(
This$is$a$petition$for$certiorari$seeking$to$annul$the$order$of$the$Second$
Division$of$the$COMELEC,$dismissing$the$
appeal$of$petitioner$Rustico$Antonio$for$
having$been$filed$out$of$time$pursuant$
to$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure,$and$
the$order$of$the$COMELEC$en$banc,$
denying$petitioner’s$motion$for$
reconsideration.$$
$
Antonio$filed$a$Notice$of$Appeal$with$
the$trial$court$nine$(9)$days$after$receipt$
thereof.$$
$
COMELEC$relied$on$Section$21,$Rule$35$
of$the$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure$in$
dismissing$the$appeal.$
$
Petitioner$contends$that$the$period$of$
appeal$from$decisions$of$the$Municipal$
Trial$Courts$or$Metropolitan$Trial$Courts$
involving$barangay$officials$is$governed$
COMELEC$“SEC.$
21.$$Appeal$–$xxx$the$aggrieved$party$
may$appeal$to$the$
Commission$on$
Elections$within(five(
(5)(days$after$the$
promulgation$of$the$
decision.”$
$
RA$6679$“SEC.$9.$$A$
sworn$petition$
contesting$the$
election$of$a$
barangay$official$
may$be$filed$with$
the$proper$
municipal$or$
metropolitan$trial$
court$by$any$
candidate$xxx$for$a$
barangay$office$
I:$W/N$the$10edayeperiod$as$provided$in$the$$
Republic$Act$6679$and$the$Omnibus$Election$Code$
should$be$followed$in$filing$an$appeal$involving$an$
election$protest$for$a$barangay$position$
$
Held:$NO,$the$COMELEC$is$the$proper$appellate$
court$clothed$with$jurisdiction$to$hear$the$appeal,$
which$appeal$must$be$filed$within$five$days$after$the$
promulgation$of$the$MTC’s$decision.$
$
Ratio:$Section$6,$Article$IXeA$grants$and$authorizes$
the$COMELEC$to$promulgate$its$own$rules$of$
procedure.$$The$1993$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure$
have$provided$a$uniform$five$(5)$day$period$for$
taking$an$appeal$consistent$with$the$expeditious$
resolution$of$electionerelated$cases.$$
$
To$adopt$a$contrary$view$would$defeat$the$laudable$
objective$of$providing$a$uniform$period$of$appeal$
and$defy$the$COMELEC’s$constitutional$mandate$to$
enact$rules$of$procedure$to$expedite$disposition$of$
election$cases.$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
by$Section$9$of$Republic$Act$6679$and$
Section$252$of$the$Omnibus$Election$
Code.(
within(ten((10)(days$
after$the$
proclamation$of$the$
results$of$the$
election.$$xxx$
$“SEC.$252.$$Election&contest&for&barangay&offices.$–$A$sworn$petition$
contesting$the$
election$of$a$
barangay$officer$
shall$be$filed$xxx$by$
any$candidate$who$
has$duly$filed$a$
certificate$of$
candidacy$and$has$
been$voted$for$the$
same$office$within(
ten(days$xxx$
(
Section(7.(Each(Commission(shall(decide(by(a(majority(vote(of(all(its(Members,(any(case(or(matter(brought(before(it(within(sixty(days(from(the(date(of(
its(submission(for(decision(or(resolution.(A(case(or(matter(is(deemed(submitted(for(decision(or(resolution(upon(the(filing(of(the(last(pleading,(brief,(or(
memorandum(required(by(the(rules(of(the(Commission(or(by(the(Commission(itself.(Unless(otherwise(provided(by(this(Constitution(or(by(law,(any(
decision,(order,(or(ruling(of(each(Commission(may(be(brought(to(the(Supreme(Court(on(certiorari(by(the(aggrieved(party(within(thirty(days(from(
receipt(of(a(copy(thereof.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A. CUA((V.(
COMELEC(
G.R.$No.$80519e
21$December$
2O1(
COMELEC(
decision(
QUORUM(
The$First$Division$of$the$COMELEC$
rendered$a$2e1$decision$favoring$the$
herein$petitioner$Cua$but$
nevertheless$suspended$his$
proclamation$as$winner$in$the$lone$
Section$5$of$COMELEC$
Resolution$No.$1669$reads$as$
follows:$
$
SEC.$5.$Quorum:$votes$
I:$W/N$the$2e1$decision$of$the$First$Division$of$
the$COMELEC$is$valid$
H:$YES,$it$was$a$valid$decision$under$Article$IXe
A,$Section$7$of$the$Constitution.$
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
17,1987$
Pg(662$
congressional$district$of$Quirino$due$
to$the$lack$of$the$unanimous$vote$
required$by$the$procedural$rules$in$
COMELEC$$
$
The$respondents$insist$that$no$
decision$was$reached$by$the$First$
Division$because$only$three$votes$
were$cast$in$favor$of$the$petitioner$
and$these$did$not$constitute$a$
majority$of$the$body.$
required;$substitution.$—$Two$
members$shall$constitute$a$
quorum$for$the$transaction$of$
the$official$business$of$the$
Division.$
R:$The$three$members$who$voted$constitute$a$
quorum$of$the$five$members$who$deliberated$
and$voted$thereon$en$banc$and$their$decision$
is$also$valid$under$the$aforecited$
constitutional$provision.$
B. MISON(
(Customs$
Commissio
ner)((V.(
COA(
G.R.$No.$91429$$
July$13,$1990$
Pg(662$
Japanese(
Vessel(
Acting(COA(
Chairman(
$
M/V$‘HyojinMaru’,$a$vessel$of$
Japanese$registry,$sank$while$in$the$
custody$of$the$Bureau$of$Customs,$
and$could$not$be$salvaged$due$to$
lack$of$funds.$
$
The$claimants$(Chan$Chiu$On$and$
Cheung$I)$then$filed$a$claim$against$
the$COA$for$the$payment$of$the$value$
of$the$vessel$amounting$to$US$
$50,000.00,$plus$the$amount$
corresponding$to$legal$interest.$$
$
Mr.$Espiritu$(Manager,$Technical$
Service$Office$of$the$COA),$‘by$
authority$of$the$Acting$Chairman’,$
denied$such$claim$of$the$claimants.$
SECTION$7.$$$$Each$
Commission$shall$decide$xxx$
within$sixty$days$from$the$
date$of$its$submission$for$
decision$or$resolution.$xxx$
(
I:$W/N$Mr.$Espiritu’s$denial$of$the$claim$valid?$$
H:$NO,$Mr.$Espiritu$had$no$power$whatsoever$
to$render$and$promulgate$a$decision$for$the$
COA,$him$being$‘manager$of$the$COA$
technical$service$office’.$$
R:$The(power(is(lodged(in(the(COA(composed(
of(a(Chairman(and(two(Commissioners.(In$
fact,$even$the$Chairman$alone$does$not$have$
that$power.$Jurisdiction$belongs$to$the$
Commission,$as(a(collegial(body.$$
(
Also,$any$adoption$or$ratification$of$the$
‘Espiritu$decision’$by$the$Acting$COA$
Chairman$was$inconsequential$as$the$decision$
was$void$ab&initio&it$being$made$without$
authority.&$
C. MATEO(V.(
CA(
G.R.$No.$
113219$August$
14,$1995$
MOWAD(
CSC(
A$dismissal$of$an$employee$of$
MOWAD$(Morong$Water$District),$
which$is$a$quasiepublic$corporation,$
was$filed$under$the$RTC$of$Rizal.$
Sec.$7.$Unless$otherwise$
provided$by$this$Constitution$
or$by$law,$any$decision,$order,$
or$ruling$of$each$Commission$
may$be$brought$to$the$
Supreme$Court$
I:$W/N$$RTC$had$jurisdiction$over$disciplinary$
actions$of$government$employees$which$is$
vested$exclusively$in$the$Civil$Service$
Commission$
$
Held:$NO,$hiring$and$firing$of$employees$in$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Pg(663( on$certiorari&by$the$party$within$thirty$days$from$
receipt$of$a$copy$thereof.(
the$GOCCs$are$governed$by$the$provisions$of$
the$Civil$Service$Law$and$Rules$and$
Regulations.$
$
R:$MOWAD$is$a$quasiepublic$corporation$
created$pursuant$to$PD$198$(Provincial$Water$
Utilities$Act$of$1973.$
(In$Davao&City&Water&District&v.&Civil&Service&Commissions,$the$Court$enbanc$ruled$that$employees$of$GOCCs$with$original$charter$fall$
under$the$jurisdiction$of$the$Civil$Service$
Commission.$
D. AMBIL(V.(
COMELEC$
$
G.R.$No.$
143398,$
October$25,$
2000$
$
$
Pg$664$
Guiani(
Resolution(
The$case$to$nullify$the$order$of$the$
Commission$on$Elections$(Comelec),$
First$Division,$giving$notice$to$the$
parties$of$the$promulgation$of$
the$resolution$on$the$case(entitled$
Jose$T.$Ramirez,$Protestee,$versus$
Ruperto$A.$Ambil,$Jr.,$and$to$prohibit$
the$respondent$Commission$on$
Election$from$promulgating$the$so$
called$“Guiani$ponencia.”&$
Petitioner$Ruperto$A.$Ambil,$Jr.$and$
respondent$Jose$T.$Ramirez$were$
candidates$for$the$position$of$
Governor,$Eastern$Samar,$during$the$
May$11,$1998$elections.$On$May$16,$
1998,$the$Provincial$Board$of$
Canvassers$proclaimed$Ruperto$A.$
Ambil,$Jr.$as$the$duly$elected$
Governor,$Eastern$Samar.$
$
June$4,$1998!$respondent$Ramirez$
“Section$7.$Each$commission$
shall$xxx$$
Unless$otherwise$provided$
by$this$constitution(or(by(law,$
any$decision,$order,$or$ruling$
of$each$commission(may$be$
brought$to$the$Supreme$
Court$on$certiorari$by$the$
aggrieved$party$within$thirty$
days$from$receipt$of$a$copy$
thereof.”$
$
ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$Guiani$resolution$
is$valid$and$may$be$promulgated$
$
Held:$NO.$The$resolution$is$void.$$Ratio:$
A$final$decision$or$resolution$becomes$
binding$only$after$it$is$promulgated$and$not$
before.$Accordingly,$one$who$is$no$longer$a$
member$of$the$Commission$at$the$time$the$
final$decision$or$resolution$is$promulgated$
cannot$validly$take$part$in$the$resolution$or$
decision.$Much$more$could$he$be$the$
ponente$of$the$resolution$or$decision.$The$
resolution$or$decision$of$the$Division$must$be$
signed$by$a$majority$of$its$members$and$duly$
promulgated.$
$
Commissioner$Guiani$might$have$signed$a$
draft$ponencia$prior$to$his$retirement$from$
office,$but$when$he$vacated$his$office$without$
the$final$decision$or$resolution$having$been$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
who$obtained$the$second$highest$
number$of$votes,$filed$with$the$
Comelec,$an$election$
protest$challenging$the$results.$
$
January$27,$2000!Commissioner$
Japal$M.$Guiani$prepared$and$signed$
a$proposed$resolution$in$the$case.$
$
February$15,$2000!$Commissioner$
Guiani$retired$from$the$service.$On$
March$3,$2000,$the$President$of$the$
Philippines$appointed$Commissioner$
Rufino$S.$Javier$to$the$seat$vacated$
by$Commissioner$Guiani.$
Commissioner$Javier$assumed$office$
on$April$4,$2000.$
$
February$24,$2000!$petitioner$Ambil$
and$respondent$Ramirez$received$a$
purported$resolution$promulgated$
on$February$14,$2000,$signed$by$
Commissioner$Guiani$and$Tancangco,$
with$Commissioner$Desamito$
dissenting$(Guiani$Resolution).$
promulgated,$his$vote$was$automatically$
invalidated.$
$
E. DUMAYAS,(
JR.(V.(
COMELEC(
&(BERNAL(
G.R.$Nos.$
141952e53$
April$20,$2001$
(
Pg(664(
(
(
Effect(of(
Retirement(
of(Gorospe(
and(Guiani(
$
$
$
History:$$Petitioner$Dumayas,$Jr.$and$
respondent$Bernal,$Jr.$were$rival$
candidates$for$the$position$of$mayor$
in$Carles,$Iloilo$last$11$May$1998$
synchronized$elections.$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
Section$7$
I:(W/N$the$resolution$is$valid$
Held:$YES.$The$resolution$remains$valid.$(
Ratio:$
In$Jamil&v.&COMELEC,$the$Court$held$that$a$decision$becomes$binding$only$after$its$
promulgation.$If$at$the$time$it$is$promulgated,$
a$judge$or$member$of$the$collegiate$court$
who$had$earlier$signed$or$registered$his$vote$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
( March$13,$2000!$Bernal,$Jr.$was$
proclaimed$by$the$newlyeconstituted$
Municipal$Board$of$Canvassers$as$the$
dulyeelected$Mayor$of$the$
Municipality$of$Carles,$thereby$
unseating$Dumayas.$
$
*$*$*$*$*$
In$view$of$the$retirement$of$
Commissioners$Gorospe$and$Guiani$
before$the$date$of$the$promulgation$
of$the$assailed$resolution$on$March$
2,$2000.$
$
$There$arose$the$question$on$
whether$the$said$resolution$should$
be$deemed$null$and$void$for$being$
violative$of$Article$IXeA,$Section$7$of$
the$1987$Constitution.$
$
has$vacated$office,$his$vote$on$the$decision$
must$automatically$be$withdrawn$or$
cancelled.$Accordingly,$the$votes$of$
Commissioners$Gorospe$and$Guiani$should$
merely$be$considered$as$withdrawn$for$the$
reason$that$their$retirement$preceded$the$
resolution’s$promulgation.$The$effect$of$their$
withdrawal$would$be$as$if$they$had$not$signed$
the$resolution$at$all$and$only$the$votes$would$
be$properly$considered$for$the$purpose$of$
deciding$the$controversy.$
However,$unless$the$withdrawal$of$the$votes$
would$materially$affect$the$result$insofar$as$
votes$for$or$against$a$party$is$concerned,$we$
find$no$reason$for$declaring$the$decision$a$
nullity.$$
The$defect$cited$by$petitioner$does$not$affect$
the$substance$or$validity$of$respondent$
Commission’s$disposition$of$the$controversy.$
The$nullification$of$the$challenged$resolution$
would$merely$prolong$the$proceedings$
unnecessarily.(
(
Section(8.(Each(Commission(shall(perform(such(other(functions(as(may(be(provided(by(law.(
(
(
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
ARTICLE(IX:(CONSTITUTIONAL(COMMISSIONS(
(
A.(CIVIL(SERVICE(COMMISSION(
(
Section(1.((
(1)(The(civil(service(shall(be(administered(by(the(Civil(Service(Commission(composed(of(a(Chairman(and(two(Commissioners(who(shall(be(naturalIborn(
citizens(of(the(Philippines(and,(at(the(time(of(their(appointment,(at(least(thirtyIfive(years(of(age,(with(proven(capacity(for(public(administration,(and(
must(not(have(been(candidates(for(any(elective(position(in(the(elections(immediately(preceding(their(appointment.(
(2)(The(Chairman(and(the(Commissioners(shall(be(appointed(by(the(President(with(the(consent(of(the(Commission(on(Appointments(for(a(term(of(
seven(years(without(reappointment.(Of(those(first(appointed,(the(Chairman(shall(hold(office(for(seven(years,(a(Commissioner(for(five(years,(and(
another(Commissioner(for(three(years,(without(reappointment.(Appointment(to(any(vacancy(shall(be(only(for(the(unexpired(term(of(the(predecessor.(
In(no(case(shall(any(Member(be(appointed(or(designated(in(a(temporary(or(acting(capacity.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A. GAMINDE(V.(
COA(
GR.$No.$140335$
December$13,$
2000$
$
$
Pg(665I669(
5IYEAR(TERM(
OF(GAMINDE(
AS(CSC(
COMMISSIONER(
June$11,$1993!$the$President$
appointed$Atty.$Thelma$P.$Gaminde$
Commissioner,$Civil$Service$
Commission,$for$a$term$
expiring$February$02,$1999.$This$
terminal$date$is$specified$in$her$
appointment$paper.$$$
$
September$07,$1993!$the$
Commission$on$Appointments$
confirmed$the$appointment.$$She$
accepted$the$appointment$and$
assumed$office$on$June$22,$1993$for$
a$term$expiring$on$February$02,$
1999.$$
$
February$24,$1998!$The$Chief$
Presidential$Legal$Counsel,$in$a$letter$
dated$April$07,$1998$opined$that$
The$term$of$office$of$
the$Chairman$and$
members$of$the$CSC:$
$
“Section$1$(2).$$xxx$$Of$
those$first$appointed,$
the$Chairman$shall$hold$
office$for$seven$years,$
a$Commissioner$for$
five(years,$and$another$
Commissioner$for$
three$years,(without(
reappointment.$$xxx$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$5TyearTterm$of$office$
of$Atty.$Thelma$P.$Gaminde,$as$Commissioner,$
Civil$Service$Commission,$expired$on$February$
02,$1999,$as$stated$in$the$appointment$paper,$
or$on$February$02,$2000,$as$claimed$by$her.$
$
HELD:$Her$term$expired$on$February(2,(1999$
but$still$entitled$to$receive$her$salary$and$other$
emoluments$for$actual$service$rendered$until$
February$2,$2000.$
$
RATIO:$$The$letter$dated$April$07,$1998,$of$
Deputy$Executive$Secretary$Renato$C.$
Corona$clarifying$that$her$term$would$expire$on$
February$02,$2000,$was$in$ERROR.$$What$was$
submitted$to$the$Commission$on$Appointments$
was$a$nomination$for$a$term$expiring$on$
February$02,$1999.$$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Gaminde’s$term$of$office$would$
expire$on$February$02,$2000,$not$on$
February$02,$1999.$
$
March$24,$1999!$CSC$Resident$
Auditor$Flovitas$U.$Felipe$issued$
notice$of$disallowance,$disallowing$in$
audit$the$salaries$and$emoluments$
of$Gaminde$effective$February$02,$
1999.$
(
Section(2.((
(1)(The(civil(service(embraces(all(branches,(subdivisions,(instrumentalities,(and(agencies(of(the(Government,(including(governmentIowned(or(
controlled(corporations(with(original(charters.(
(2)(Appointments(in(the(civil(service(shall(be(made(only(according(to(merit(and(fitness(to(be(determined,(as(far(as(practicable,(and,(except(to(positions(
which(are(policyIdetermining,(primarily(confidential,(or(highly(technical,(by(competitive(examination.(
(3)(No(officer(or(employee(of(the(civil(service(shall(be(removed(or(suspended(except(for(cause(provided(by(law.(
(4)(No(officer(or(employee(in(the(civil(service(shall(engage,(directly(or(indirectly,(in(any(electioneering(or(partisan(political(campaign.(
(5)(The(right(to(selfIorganization(shall(not(be(denied(to(government(employees.(
(6)(Temporary(employees(of(the(Government(shall(be(given(such(protection(as(may(be(provided(by(law.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A. EIIB(V.(CA(&(
CSC(
(
G.R.$No.$129133$
November$25,$1998$
(
Pg(670I671$
CSC(covers(
EIIB(
Petitioner$Jose$T.$Almonte,$as$
Commissioner$of$Economic$
Intelligence$and$Investigation$
Bureau$(EIIB),$failed$to$submit$all$
appointments$of$EIIB$as$required$by$
CSC.$
$
He$invoked$PD$No.$1458$and$LOI$No.$
71$exempting$the$EIIB$from$the$
coverage$of$civil$service$rules$and$
regulations$on$appointments$and$
$
SECTION$2.$$$$(1)$The$
civil$service$embraces$
all$branches,$
subdivisions,$
instrumentalities,$and$
agencies(of(the(
Government,$including$
governmentTowned$or$
controlled$corporations$
with$original$charters.$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$petitioner,$Economic$
Intelligence$Investigation$Bureau$(EIIB),$is$
embraced$by$the$Civil$Service.$
$
HELD:$Yes,$EIIB$is$a$government$agency$under$
the$Department$of$Finance,$which$is$within$the$
ambit$of$the$Civil$Service$Law$as$pursuant$to$
Sec.$2$(1),$Art.$IXTB$of$the$Constitution.$
$
RATIO:$The$PD$1458$and$LOI$No.$71$being$
invoked$by$the$petitioner$had$no$merit.$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
other$personnel$actions.$$
$
CSC$adjudge$Almonte$guilty$of$
indirect$contempt$with$penalty$of$
fine$P1,000.00$each$day$of$his$failure$
to$comply$with$the$CSC$Order$which$
shall$be$deducted$from$his$salary.$$
$
Dissatisfied$therewith,$petitioner$
went$to$the$Court$of$Appeals$but$his$
Petition$for$Certiorari$was$
dismissed.$$
$
$
$
LOI$No.$71,$$the$
Implementing$Rules$of$
P.D.$No.$1458,$reads:$
$
“10.$$It$is$further$
directed$that$personnel$
of$the$BII$shall$be$
exempt$from$OCPC$
and$Civil$Service$Rules$
and$
Regulations$relative$to$
appointments$and$
other$personnel$
actions;$xxx$"$
"$Such$provision$provide$for$the$exemption$of$
petitioner$EIIB$only$from(Civil(Service(Rules(and(
Regulations(relative(to(appointments(and(
other(personnel(actions,$but$not$from$the$Civil$
Service$Law$or$Civil$Service$Rules$and$
Regulations$relative$to$any$other$matter.$
$
“$...$[R]espondent$CSC’s$act$of$requiring$
petitioner$EIIB$to$submit$to$it$all$appointments$
in$the$Bureau,$for$appropriate$action,$is$part$of$
its$administrative$function$as$the$central$
personnel$agency$of$the$government.”$
B. CSC(&(PAGCOR(
v.(SALAS(
G.R.$No.$123708$
June$19,$1997$
PP(671I675$
(
CONFIDENTIAL(
EMPLOYEE(
$
Respondent$Salas$was$appointed$by$
the$PAGCOR$Chairman$as$Internal$
Security$Staff$(ISS)$member$but$was$
terminated$due$to$loss$of$
confidence$on$him$after$he$engaged$
in$proxy$betting.$Later$on,$
Petitioners$contended$that$
respondent$Salas$was$not$dismissed$
from$the$service$but,$instead,$his$
term$of$office$had$expired.$
$
The$Court$of$Appeals$rendered$its$
decision$that$herein$respondent$
Salas$is$not$a$confidential$employee;$
hence,$he$may$not$be$dismissed$on$
the$ground$of$loss$of$confidence.$It$
likewise$held$that$Section$16$of$
DOCTRINE/S:$
$
Confidential$Position$
Indicator$according$to$
Civil$Service$Act$of$
1959:$
$
1. when$the$
President$has$
declared$the$
position$to$be$
primarily$
confidential;$and,$$
$in$the$absence$of$such$
declaration,$when$by$
the$nature$of$the$
functions$of$the$office$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$$respondent$Salas$is$a$
confidential$employee$$
$
HELD:$NO,$taking$into$consideration$the$nature$
of$his$functions,$his$organizational$ranking$and$
his$compensation$level,$it$is$obviously$beyond$
debate$that$private$respondent$cannot$be$
considered$a$confidential$employee.$$
$
RATIO:$$
(1986$Constitutional$Commission$Delibaration)$
MR.$FOZ:$Which$department$of$government$
has$the$power$or$authority$to$determine$
whether$a$position$is$policyTdetermining$or$
primarily$confidential$or$highly$technical?$
$
FR.$BERNAS:$The$initial$decision$is$made$by$the$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Presidential$Decree$No.$1869$has$
been$superseded$and$repealed$by$
Section$2(1),$Article$IXTB$of$the$1987$
Constitution.$
$
Petitioners$seek$to$nullify$the$
decision$of$the$Court$of$Appeals$
ordering$the$reinstatement$of$
herein$private$respondent$Rafael$M.$
Salas$with$full$back$wages$for$having$
been$illegally$dismissed$by$the$
PAGCOR,$but$without$prejudice$to$
the$filing$of$administrative$charges$
against$him$if$warranted.$
there$exists$"close$
intimacy"$between$the$
appointee$and$
appointing$power$
which$insures$xxx$
freedom$from$
misgivings$of$betrayals$
of$personal$trust$$
$
In$other$words:$
FR.$BERNAS.$xxx$It$is$
not$enough$that$the$
law$calls$it$primarily$
confidential$to$make$it$
such;$it$is$the$nature$of$
the$duties$which$makes$
a$position$primarily$
confidential.$
legislative$body$or$by$the$executive$
department,$but$the$final(decision(is(done(by(
the(court.$The$Supreme$Court$has$constantly$
held$that$whether$or$not$a$position$is$policyT
determining,$primarily$confidential$or$highly$
technical,$it$is$determined$not$by$the$title$but$
by$the$nature$of$the$task$that$is$entrusted$to$it.$$
$
Several$factors$lead$to$the$conclusion$that$
private$respondent$does$not$enjoy$such$"close$
intimacy"$with$the$appointing$authority$of$
PAGCOR$such$as$having$routinary$security$staff$
functions,$being$lowest$in$the$chain$of$
command,$and$for$receiving$the$bottom$level$
salary$of$P2,200.00$a$month.$
C. CANONIZADO(
V.(AGUIRRE(
Pg(675I679(
NAPOLCOM(
reorganization(
The$NAPOLCOM$was$originally$
created$under$Republic$Act$No.$
6975.$It$was$later$amended$by$RA$
8551.$$
$
RA$8551$declared$that$the$terms$of$
the$current$Commissioners$were$
deemed$as$expired$upon$its$
effectivity$even$though$the$
petitioners’$terms$had$not$yet$
actually$expired.$$
$
Petitioners$argue$that$their$removal$
from$office$by$virtue$of$section$8$of$
RA$8551$violates$their$security$of$
tenure.$
Section$2$(3)$$$$No$
officer$or$employee$of$
the$civil$service$shall$be$
removed$or$suspended$
except$for$cause$
provided$by$law.$
$
Section$8$of$RA$8551:$
Upon$the$effectivity$of$
this$Act,$the$terms$of$
office$of$the$current$
Commissioners$are$
deemed$expired$which$
shall$constitute$a$bar$to$
their$reappointment$or$
an$extension$of$their$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$Republic(Act(No.(8551$
(RA(8551),$otherwise$known$as$the$"Philippine$
National$Police$Reform$and$Reorganization$Act$
of$1998$is$UNCONSTITUTIONAL$
$
HELD:$$YES,$but$only$to$the$extent$of$declaring$
section(8(of(RA(8551$unconstitutional$for$being$
in$violation$of$the$petitioners’$right$to$security$
of$tenure.$
$
RATIO:$It$is$exceedingly$apparent$to$this$Court$
that$RA(8551$effected$a$reorganization$of$the$
PNP,$not$of$the$NAPOLCOM.$They$are$two$
separate$and$distinct$bodies,$with$one$having$
supervision$and$control$over$the$other.$In$fact,$
the$basic$structure$of$the$NAPOLCOM$has$been$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
terms$in$the$
Commission$except$xxx$
$
preserved$by$the$amendatory$law.$$
$
No$bona$fide$reorganization$of$the$NAPOLCOM$
having$been$mandated$by$Congress,$RA$8551,$
insofar$as$it$declares$the$terms$of$office$of$the$
incumbent$Commissioners,$petitioners$herein,$
as$expired$and$resulting$in$their$removal$from$
office,$removes$civil$service$employees$from$
office$without$legal$cause$and$must$therefore$
be$struck$down$for$being$constitutionally$
infirm.$$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
D. SEC.(RICARDO(
GLORIA((DECS)(
V.(CA$
G.R.$No.$119903$
August$15,$2000$
Pg$679T680$
(
(
(
(
(
Prohibited(
indefinite(
Reassignment(
(
(
(
Security(of(
Tenure(
violation(
CA$granted$the$petition$of$Dr.$
Bienvenido$Icasiano$to$prohibit$the$
implementation$of$his$reassignment$
from$Schools$Division$
Superintendent,$Division$of$City$
Schools,$Quezon$City,$to$Vocational$
Schools$Superintendent$of$the$
Marikina$Institute$of$Science$and$
Technology$pursuant$to$the$
Memorandum$of$Secretary$Ricardo$
T.$Gloria$to$the$President$of$the$
Philippines$for$lack$of$indication$that$
it$is$only$temporary$and$thereby,$
violative$of$his$right$to$security$of$
tenure.$
$
Petitioners$contend$that$the$
doctrine$enunciated$in$Bentain$vs.$
Court$of$AppealsTT$that$"a$
reassignment$that$is$indefinite$and$
results$in$a$reduction$in$rank,$status$
and$salary,$is$in$effect,$a$
Bentain(doctrine:$
"Security$of$tenure$is$a$
fundamental$and$
constitutionally$
guaranteed$feature$of$
our$civil$service.$The$
mantle$of$its$
protection$extends$not$
only$to$employees$
removed$without$
cause$but$also$to$cases$
of$unconsented$
transfers$which$are$
tantamount$to$illegal$
removals$$
$
While$a$temporary$
transfer$or$assignment$
of$personnel$is$
permissible$even$
without$the$
employee’s$prior$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$reassignment$of$
private$respondent$from$School$Division$
Superintendent$of$Quezon$City$to$Vocational$
School$Superintendent$of$MIST$is$violative$of$
his$security$of$tenure?$YES$
$
RATIO:$
The$Court$upholds$the$finding$of$the$
respondent$court$that$the$reassignment$of$
petitioner$to$MIST$"appears$to$be$indefinite".$$$
$
Besides,$there$is$nothing$in$the$said$
Memorandum$to$show$that$the$reassignment$
of$private$respondent$is$temporary$or$would$
only$last$until$a$permanent$replacement$is$
found$as$no$period$is$specified$or$fixed.$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
constructive$removal$from$the$
service"$TT$does$not$apply$in$the$
present$case$for$the$reassignment$in$
question$was$merely$temporary,$
lasting$only$until$the$appointment$of$
a$new$Vocational$School$
Superintendent$of$MIST.$
consent,$it$cannot$be$
done$when$the$
transfer$is$a$
preliminary$step$
toward$his$removal,$or$
is$a$scheme$to$lure$him$
away$from$his$
permanent$position,$or$
designed$to$indirectly$
terminate$his$service,$
or$force$his$
resignation.$Such$a$
transfer$would$in$effect$
circumvent$the$
provision$which$
safeguards$the$tenure$
of$office$of$those$who$
are$in$the$Civil$Service”$
E. BUKLOD(NG(
KAWANING(
EIIB(V.(
EXECUTIVE(
SECRETARY(
ROLANDO(
ZAMORA(
GR(142801I802(
July(10,(2001(
Pg(680(
Valid(
Abolition(of(
EIIB(
Former$President$Corazon$C.$
Aquino,$issued$EO$No.$
127$establishing$the$Economic$
Intelligence$and$Investigation$
Bureau$(EIIB)$as$part$of$the$
structural$organization$of$the$
Ministry$of$Finance.$
$
11$years$after,$President$Joseph$
Estrada$issued$EO$No.$191$which$
ordered$the$deactivation$of$EIIB$and$
the$transfer$of$its$functions$to$the$
Bureau$of$Customs$and$the$National$
Bureau$of$Investigation.$
$
3$months$later,$$ERAP$issued$EO$No.$
Section$2$(3)$$$$No$
officer$or$employee$of$
the$civil$service$shall$be$
removed$or$suspended$
except$for$cause$
provided$by$law.$
ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$EO$Nos.$191$and$223$
should$be$annulled$as$they$are$unconstitutional$
for$being$violative$of$Section(2(3),(Article(IXIB$$
$
HELD:$NO,$there$is$no$such$thing$as$absolute$
right$to$hold$office$except$constitutional$offices$
with$special$immunity$
$
RATIO:$Justice$Sarmiento$in$Dario$v.$Mison:$
xxx$As$a$general$rule,$a$reorganization$is$carried$
out$in$“good$faith”$if$it$is$for$the$purpose$of$
economy$or$to$make$bureaucracy$more$
efficient.((In(that(event,(no(dismissal((in(case(of(
dismissal)(or(separation(actually(occurs(
because(the(position(itself(ceases(to(exist.((And$
in$that$case,$security$of$tenure$would$not$be$a$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
223$providing$that$all$EIIB$personnel$
occupying$positions$specified$
therein$shall$be$deemed$separated$
from$the$service$effective$April$30,$
2000,$pursuant$to$a$bona$
fide$reorganization$resulting$to$
abolition,$redundancy,$merger,$
division,$or$consolidation$of$
positions.$
$
Petition$to$nullify$Executive$Order$
No.$191$and$Executive$Order$No.$
223$on$the$ground$that$they$were$
issued$by$the$Office$of$the$President$
with$grave$abuse$of$discretion$and$
in$violation$of$their$constitutional$
right$to$security$of$tenure.$
Chinese$wall.$$Be$that$as$it$may,$if$the$
‘abolition,’$which$is$nothing$else$but$a$
separation$or$removal,$is$done$for$political$
reasons$or$purposely$to$defeat$security$of$
tenure,$otherwise$not$in$good$faith,$no$valid$
‘abolition’$takes$and$whatever$‘abolition’$is$
done,$is$void$ab$initio.$$There$is$an$invalid$
‘abolition’$as$where$there$is$merely$a$change$of$
nomenclature$of$positions,$or$where$claims$of$
economy$are$belied$by$the$existence$of$ample$
funds.$
$
F. DIMAYUGA(V.(
BENEDICTO(II(
(
PP(683I686(
Security(of(
Tenure(
Chona$Dimayuga$was$appointed$(by$
DPWH$Secretary$Jose$de$Jesus)$as$
Executive$Director$II$of$the$Toll$
Regulatory$Board$(TRB).$As$the$
highestTranking$working$official,$she$
had$powers$of$control$and$
supervision$over$3$divisions:$Finance$
and$Administrative,$Technical,$
Engineering.$She$also$oversaw$
projects$and$participated$in$
negotiations.$At$that$time,$however,$
such$position$was$still$not$part$of$
the$career$executive$service$(CES).$
Therefore,$she$occupied$the$position$
although$she$was$not$a$career$
executive$service$officer$(CESO).$
On$May$31,$1994,$the$Civil$Service$
CSC$Memorandum$
Circular$21.$Section$4:$
Incumbents$of$
positions$which$are$
declared$to$be$CES$
positions$for$the$first$
time$pursuant$to$this$
resolution$who$hold$
permanent$
appointment$thereto$
shall$remain$under$
permanent$status$in$
their$respective$
positions.$However,$
upon$promotion$or$
transfer$to$other$CES$
positions,$these$
ISSUE(1:$Can$Dimayuga$claim$security$of$
tenure?$!$NO$
$
RATIO:(Petitioner$was$appointed$in$a$
permanent$capacity$to$the$position$of$Executive$
Director$II$of$TRB$in$1992,$at$which$time$said$
position$was$not$included$in$the$CES.$The$
subsequent$inclusion$of$her$position$under$the$
CES$did$not$automatically$qualify$her$for$that$
position$as$she$lacked$eligibility$as$she$was$not$
a$CESO.$Without$the$required$eligibility$
required,$she$could$not$hold$on$to$her$office$
permanently.$She$could$only$occupy$said$
position$until$the$appointing$authority$replaced$
her$with$someone$eligible.$$
$
ISSUE(2:$Can$petitioner$claim$proprietary$right$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Commission$(CSC)$issued$
Memorandum$Circular$no.$21.$(see$
right$column)$
Petitioner$alleges$that$during$her$
tenure,$she$became$the$subject$of$
several$administrative$and$criminal$
complaints$designed$to$coerce$her$
removal.$Two$consecutive$90Tday$
suspension$orders$were$issued$upon$
petitioner,$first$by$DPWH$sec$Vigilar$
and$then$by$Exec$Sec$Aguirre.$
Petitioner$assumed$duties$after$
expiration$of$the$second$suspension.$
However,$on$the$following$day,$
Vigilar$issued$Department$Order$no$
85$which$put$petitioner$as$
‘temporarily$detailed’$at$the$Office$
of$the$Secretary$of$the$DPWH.$
Dimayuga$filed$a$leave$of$absence$as$
a$gesture$of$protest,$rather$than$
assume$a$position$which$she$
considered$as$a$demotion.$$
While$Dimayuga$was$on$leave,$
President$Estrada$appointed$
respondent$Benedicto$II$in$her$stead$
as$Executive$Director$II$of$the$Board.$
Petitioner$then$filed$a$petition$for$
quo$warranto$before$the$court$of$appeals.$Apellate$court$rendered$the$
assailed$decision$dismissing$the$
petitioner’s$suit.$$
incumbents$shall$be$
under$temporary$
status$in$said$positions$
until$they$qualify.$$
to$her$post$as$Executive$Director$II$of$TRB?$!$
NO.$
$
RATIO:(This$would$encroach$upon$the$executive$
powers$of$the$President$and$run$counter$to$the$
wide$latitude$given$to$the$appointing$authority$
or$to$the$President.$
G. MIRANDA(V.(
CARREON((
PP(686I690(
6Imonth(
period(
Mayor$Jose$Miranda$was$suspended$
from$office.$Vice$Mayor$Amelita$
Navarro$took$over$as$Acting$Mayor.$
( ISSUE:$Can$the$appointees$be$terminated$from$
service$on$the$ground$that$they$are$wanting$in$
their$performance$before$the$6$month$period?$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Acting$Mayor$Amelita$Navarro$then$
appointed$the$respondents$to$
various$city$government$positions$
(City$of$Santiago).$$Such$
appointments$were$with$permanent$
status$and$the$Civil$Service$
Commission$(CSC)$approved$the$
appointments.$Upon$reassumption$
of$office,$Miranda$formed$a$3Tman$
special$performance$audit$team$
(Bayaua,$Martinez,$Santos)$to$
conduct$a$personnel$evaluation$
audit$of$those$appointed$by$
Navarro.$Their$report$stated$that$the$
appointees$were$wanting$in$their$
performance.$Miranda$thereafter$
issued$an$order$for$their$dismissal$
on$the$ground$that$they$performed$
poorly$during$their$probation$
period.$Respondents$allege$that$
they$can$only$be$dismissed$after$the$
expiration$of$the$6Tmonth$period$for$
the$employees$under$probation$and$
that$their$rights$to$due$process$were$
violated$since$they$deny$that$an$
evaluation$on$their$performance$
was$conducted.$
!$NO$
$
RATIO:(The$Revised$Administrative$Code$states$
that$such$appointees$can$be$dismissed$before$
the$6Tmonth$period$on$two$grounds:$(1)$
unsatisfactory$conduct$or$(2)$want$of$capacity$
must$be$present.$BUT(IN(THIS(CASE,(the$mayor$
just$recently$reassumed$office$and$it$was$
improbable$the$he$can$accurately$gauge$the$
performance$of$the$employees$in$such$short$
time$(3$months).$Enough$time$must$be$given$to$
gauge$the$performance$of$an$employee.$
Also,$the$Mayor$has$no$standing$to$file$such$
petition$since$assuming$that$there$was$an$
evaluation$on$the$employees,$such$evaluation$
must$be$done$by$their$immediate$supervisors$
and$not$by$those$appointed$by$Miranda.$
Lastly,$assuming$that$there$was$an$evaluation,$
the$dismissal$of$the$employees$was$still$invalid$
since$they$were$not$informed$of$their$poor$
performance$before$their$termination,$which$
the$law$requires.$Due$notice$is$required$by$law$
not$later$than$the$4th$month$of$the$rating$
period.$Respondents$assert$that$they$did$not$
receive$any$due$notice$prior$to$their$dismissal$
and$so$such$dismissal$is$invalid.$
H. SEÑERES(V.(
COMELEC(&(
ROBLES(
PP(690(
(
Robles$was$elected$chairperson$of$
BUHAY,$a$partyTlist$group$registered$
with$COMELEC.$The$constitution$of$
BUHAY$provides$for$a$3Tyear$term$
for$all$its$party$officers,$without$reT
election.$BUHAY$participated$in$the$
2001$and$2004$elections$with$Robles$
( ISSUE:(Did$Robles$violate$the$constitutional$
prohibition$of$electioneering?$NO$
$
RATIO:(Electioneering$is$defined$as$an$act$
designed$to$promote$the$election$or$defeat$of$a$
particular$candidate/s$to$a$public$office$which$
includes:$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
as$president.$
On$March$2007,$Robles$signed$a$
certificate$of$nomination$for$2007,$
and$Hans$Señeres$(holding$that$he$is$
an$acting$president$and$secretary$
general$of$BUHAY)$also$filed$a$
certificate$of$nomination.$$
Señeres$contends$that$Robles,$being$
BUHAY$president$and$nominating$
officer$as$well$as$Administrator$of$
the$LRTA$(Light$Rail$Transit$
Authority),$was$engaging$in$
electioneering$or$partisan$political$
campaign,$which$the$constitution$
prohibits.$It$is$prohibited$in$the$
constitution$for$any$officer$or$
employee$in$the$CSC$to$directly$or$
indirectly$be$engaged$in$
electioneering$or$partisan$political$
campaign.$
forming$of$organizations$to$solicit$votes$
interviews$for$or$against$election$of$a$candidate$
publishing$to$support$a$candidate$
directly$or$indirectly$soliciting$votes$
If$the$foregoing$are$performed$only$to$enhance$
the$chances$of$aspirants$for$nominations$for$
candidacy$to$public$office$by$a$political$party,$
agreement$or$coalition,$it$is$not$electioneering.$
Also,$public$expression$or$opinions$in$a$
forthcoming$election$or$criticisms$against$
probable$candidates$nominated$shall$not$be$
part$of$electioneering.$
Robles’$act$did$not$fall$under$the$mentioned$
circumstances$and$even$if$it$did,$it$only$served$
to$enhance$the$chances$of$aspirants$for$
nominations$for$candidacy$to$a$public$office$by$
a$political$party.$Therefore,$it$is$not$considered$
electioneering.$
$
COMPETITIVE(AND(NONICOMPETITIVE(POSITIONS(
A. NASECO(V.(
NLRC(
Pg(692(
Original(
Charter(
The$coverage$by$the$civil$service$of$
governmentTowned$or$controlled$
corporations$varies$in$the$1987$
Constitution$and$1973$Constitution.$
1973$Constitution:$$“The$civil$service$
embraces$every$branch,$agency,$
subdivision,$and$instrumentality$of$
the$Government,$including$every$
governmentTowned$or$controlled$
corporation.”$
1987$Constitution:$“The$civil$service$
embraces$all$branches,$and$agencies$
of$the$government,$including$
( (
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
governmentTowned$or$controlled$
corporations$with$original$charter.”$The$purpose$“with$original$charter”$
is$to$indicate$that$government$
corporations$such$as$the$GSIS$and$
SSS,$which$have$original$charters,$
fall$within$the$ambit$of$the$civil$
service.$However,$corporations$
which$are$subsidiaries$of$these$
chartered$agencies$such$as$the$
Philippine$Airlines,$Manila$Hotel$and$
Hyatt$are$excluded$from$the$
coverage$of$the$civil$service.$$
The$term$“original$charters”$means$
they$were$created$by$law,$by$an$act$
of$Congress,$or$by$special$law$and$
NOT$under$the$general$law.$
The$NASECO$is$a$governmentT
owned$or$controlled$corporation$
without$original$charter$since$it$is$
the$1987$Constitution$that$governs$
the$instant$case.$
B. SAMSON(V.(CA(
PP(693(
Non(
competitive(
job$T$$
Then$Mayor$Marcial$Samson$issued$
Administrative$Order$No.$3,$
whereby$said$mayor$summarily$
terminated$the$services$of$the$
private$respondent$Feliciano$Talens$
who$then$held$the$position$of$
Assistant$Secretary$to$the$Mayor,$on$
the$ground$of$‘lack$and$loss$of$
confidence’.$He$then$appointed$
Hermogenes$Liwag,$a$coTpetitioner$
of$this$case,$in$place$of$Talens.$
Samson$cites$section$5$of$RA$2260,$
Section$5(f),$RA$#$2260$
(Civil$Service$Act$of$
1959)$
The$position$of$
secretaries$to$city$
mayors$is$declared$
nonTcompetitive.$
ISSUE:(Is$Administrative$Order$#$3$legal?$NO$
$
RATIO:(The$positions$Secretary$to$the$Mayor$
and$Assistant$Secretary$to$the$Mayor$are$two$
separate$and$distinct$positions.$One$is$of$higher$
category$and$rank.$The$Secretary$must$possess$
the$confidence$of$the$mayor,$however,$the$
Assistant$Secretary,$being$of$lower$rank,$need$
not$carry$such$requisite.$Also,$the$assistant$
secretary$differs$in$function$from$the$secretary.$
The$assistant$merely$‘aids’$with$the$duties$and$
responsibilities$of$the$secretary.$$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
which$he$interpreted$as$including$
assistant$secretaries$to$the$mayor,$
as$support.$Petitioner$argues$that$an$
assistant$secretary$is$also$a$
secretary$and$is$thus$comprised$
within$the$general$term$‘secretaries’$
in$the$mentioned$provision.$
C. HERNANDEZ(V.(
VILLEGAS(
14$SCRA$544$(1965)$
PP(693(
Term(of(office(
(
Law(of(Public(
Officers(
(
Removal(vs.(
Expiration(
The$termination$of$officials$and$
employees$of$their$position$can$be$
justified$on$the$ground$of$loss$of$
confidence.$
$
According$to$the$Law(of(Public(
Officers,$such$cessation$from$office$
involves$no(removal$from$office,$but$
merely$the$expiration$of$the$term$of$
office.$$These$are$two$different$
causes$for$the$termination$of$official$
relations.$
The$point$is$that$as$long$as$
confidence$in$such$officials$endures$
and$is$shown$not$to$have$been$lost,$
the$incumbent$is$entitled$to$
continue$in$office.$
Nothing$mentioned,$but$this$could$be$applicable:$$
Article(IX(B.(Sec.(2.(
(2)$Appointments$in$
the$civil$service$shall$be$
made$only$according$to$
merit$and$fitness$to$be$
determined,$as$far$as$
practicable,$and,$
except$as$to$positions$
which$are$policyT
determining,$primarily$
confidential,$or$highly$
technical,$by$
competitive$
examination.$
NOTE:((
$
These$positions$are$primarily$confidential:$
Provincial$attorney$
City$legal$officer$
$
The$positions$of$the$legal$staff$are$NOT$
primarily$confidential.$
D. ACHACOSO(V.(
MACARAIG(
(
G.R.$No.$93023$
March$13,$1991(
Permanent(vs.(
Temporary(
appointments(
$
A$permanent$appointment$can$be$
issued$only$to$a$person$who$is$
eligible$and$has$met$all$the$
requirements$for$such$position.$$
Petitioner$Achacoso$did$not.$$At$
best,$his$appointment$can$only$be$
regarded$as$temporary$and$
according$to$jurisprudence,$can$
Nothing$mentioned,$but$this$could$be$applicable:$$
Article(IX(B.(Sec.(2.(
(2)$Appointments$in$
the$civil$service$shall$be$
made$only$according$to$
merit$and$fitness$to$be$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$petitioner$Achacoso$can$
claim$to$have$been$permanently$appointed$and$
can$therefore$enjoy$security$of$tenure$as$a$
career$official.$
$
HELD:$No.$
$
RATIO:$
He$was$not$eligible$and$did$not$meet$all$the$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
therefore$be$withdrawn$at$a$
moment’s$notice.$
$
The$mere$fact$that$a$position$
belongs$to$the$Career$Service$does$
not$automatically$mean$he$can$
enjoy$security$of$tenure$even$if$he$
did$not$possess$the$required$
qualifications.$$$
$
A$person$who$does$not$have$such$
qualifications$for$the$position$
cannot$be$appointed$to$it$in$the$first$
place.$$As$an$exception,$he$could,$
but$only$to$the$extent$to$an$acting$
capacity$in$the$absence$of$those$
truly$qualified.$$Such$appointment$
cannot$be$regarded$as$permanent.$
$
The$purpose$of$an$acting$or$
temporary$appointment$is$to$
prevent$a$hiatus$in$the$discharge$of$
official$functions$by$authorizing$a$
person$to$do$such$while$pending$the$
selection$of$a$permanent$appointee.$$
Such$acting/temporary$appointment$
is$accepted$with$the$understanding$
that$he$may$be$called$to$surrender$
his$office$upon$the$order$of$the$
appointing$authority.$
determined,$as$far$as$
practicable,$and,$
except$as$to$positions$
which$are$policyT
determining,$primarily$
confidential,$or$highly$
technical,$by$
competitive$
examination.$
requirements$for$a$permanent$appointment.$$
At$best,$his$was$only$temporary.$
E. BRIONES(V.(
OSMENA(
104$Phil.$588$
(1988)(
Abolition(of(
positions(
(
(
This$is$an$action$for$mandamus$with$damages$to$declare$the$termination$
of$the$petitioners’$petitions$void$and$
to$order$respondent$City$Mayor$to$
Nothing$mentioned,$but$this$could$be$applicable:$$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$the$petitioners$may$
keep$their$offices$in$the$City$Mayor’s$Office$
and/or$the$Municipal$Board.(
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
City(Mayor(
(
(
Honorable(
civil(service(
employees(
should(not(be(
sacrificed(due(
to(political(
intrigues(
reinstate$them$to$their$former$
positions.$
$
February$14,$1956$!$The$Municipal(
Board$through$Resolution$No.$187$
approved$Ordinance$No.$192,$which$
abolished(a(total(of(32(positions$(15$
positions$in$the$City$Mayor’s$office$+$
17$positions$in$the$Office$of$the$
Municipal$Board).$$Among$the$
positions$abolished$were$those$
occupied$by$the$petitioners.$
$
February$23,$1956$!$Pursuant$to$
said$Ordiance,$the$City$Major$
notified$the$petitioners$of$such$
changes,$“effective$at$the$close$of$
business$hours$on$March$15,$1956.”$
$
In$reply$thereto,$the$petitioners$filed$
their$letters:$
Acknowledging$the$receipt$of$the$
City$Mayor’s$letters$of$separation$
Protesting$the$abolition$of$their$
offices$
Informing$him$that$they$will$not$
relinquish$their$positions$“unless$
otherwise$determined$by$higher$
competent$authorities$or$courts.”$
$
The$City$Mayor$persisted$in$such$
termination,$adding$that$the$City(
Treasurer(and(City(Auditor(refused$
to$pay$the$petitioners’$salaries.$
Article(IX(B.(Sec.(2.(
(3)$No$officer$or$
employee$of$the$civil$
service$shall$be$
removed$or$suspended$
except$for$cause$
provided$by$law.$
HELD:$Yes.$
$
RATIO:(
The$reasons$given$for$such$abolition$(“economy$
and$efficiency”)$are$untrue,$which$are$only$
pretenses$for$the$removal$without$cause$of$the$
said$appellees.$$Such$violated$the$Civil$Service$
tenures.$
$
Since$the$time$of$the$Commonwealth$and$
before$the$war,$the$appellees$have$shown$
efficiency$in$their$services,$attested$by$repeated$
increases$in$salary.$$One$of$the$petitioners$was$
even$recently$proclaimed$“Model$Employee”.$$
Before$this$issue,$the$appellees$had$created$for$
the$same$City$Major$35$new$positions,$calling$for$an$outlay$of$P68k$per$year.$$The$excuse$of$
promoting$efficiency$and$economy$is$
unimpressive.$
$
Respect$must$be$given$to$Civil$Service$
employees,$like$these$petitioners$who$have$
rendered$long$and$honorable$services,$and$
should$not$be$sacrificed$in$favor$of$nonTeligibles$
given$positions$of$recent$creation,$nor$should$
they$be$left$at$the$mercy$of$political$changes.$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
$
Petitioners$filed$petitions$for:$
Reinstatement$
Back$salaries$
Moral$damages$
Attorney’s$fees$
F. MAYOR(V.(
MACARAIG(
(
(
G.R.$No.$87211$
March$5,$1991(
RA(6715(
(
Abolition(of(
offices(
Petitioners$!$They$basically$contest$
the$constitutionality$of$RA(6715,$
which$declares(vacant$“all$such$
positions$under$the$present$National$
Labor$Relations$Commissions:$
Commissioners$
Executive$Labor$Arbiters$
Labor$Arbiters.$
$
Respondents$!$
Such$positions$are$considered$
effectively$separated$from$the$
service,$including$the$Commission’s:$
Executive$Director$and$
Deputy$Executive$Director.$
This$caused$the$appointment$of$
other$persons$to$new$positions$in$
the$National$Labor$Relations$
Commission,$specified$in$RA$6715:$
Chairman$
Commissioners$
Executive$Clerk$
Deputy$Executive$Clerk$
Labor$Arbiters$
The$respondents$justified$that$the$
old$positions$were$declared$vacant$
because$of$the$need$to$
professionalize$the$higher$levels$of$
Article(IX(B.(Sec.(2.(
$
(1)$The$civil$service$
embraces$all$branches,$
subdivisions,$
instrumentalities,$and$
agencies$of$the$
Government,$including$
governmentTowned$or$
controlled$corporations$
with$original$charters.$
$
(3)$No$officer$or$
employee$of$the$civil$
service$shall$be$
removed$or$suspended$
except$for$cause$
provided$by$law.$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$there$was$an$express$or$implied$abolition$in$RA$6715$of$the$petitioners’$petitions.(
$
HELD:$There$was$no$express$abolition.$$
RATIO:(
There$were$no$essential$inconsistencies$
observed$in$the$relevant$provisions$of$RA$6715$
upon$the$changes$effected$on$the$nature,$
compositions,$powers,$duties,$and$functions$of$
the$Commission$and$the$Commissioners,$the$
Executive$Director,$the$Deputy$Executive$
Director,$and$the$Labor$Arbiters$under$the$prior$
legislation.$
$
So,(if(justification(must(be(sought(for(such(
abolition,(it(must(be(an(implied(one(that(attests(to(the(irreconcilable(inconsistency(
between(the(nature,(duties,(and(functions(of(
the(petitioners’(offices(under(the(old(rules(and(
those(corresponding(thereto(under(the(new(
law.(
(
*$$$*$$$*$$$*$$$*$
$
Security$of$tenure$is$a$protected$right$under$the$
Constitution,$pursuant$to$Article(IX(B,(Sec.(2(3).$$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
officialdom$and$to$upgrade$their$
qualifications,$ranks$and$salaries,$or$
emoluments.$
$
Because$the$Constitution$(1)$does$
not$ordain$the$abolition$of$the$
petitioners’$positions,$(2)$their$
removal$from$their$offices,$(3)$and$
that$there$is$no$claim$that$the$
petitioners’$separation$from$the$
service$is$due$to$a$cause$other$than$
RA$6716$!$In(order(that(the(
petitioners’(removal(from(their(
positions(may(be(defended(or(
sustained,(the(issue(should(be(
Whether(or(not(RA(6715(has(
worked(on(such(an(abolition(of(the(
petitioners’(offices,(whether(
express(or(implied.$
$
The$petitioners,$then,$may$avail$of$this,$as$they$
fall$within$the$concept$of$“an$officer$or$
employee$in$the$civil$service,”$pursuant$to$
Article(IX(B,(Sec.((2)1.$$None$of$the$positions$
mentioned$could$be$deemed$to$be$serving$at$
the$pleasure$of$the$President$because$they$had$
a$right$to$remain$in$office$until$the$expiration$of$
the$terms$for$which$they$had$been$appointed.$
$
A$recognized$cause$for$removal$or$termination$
of$employment$of$a$Government$employee$is$
the$abolition(by(law$of$his$office,$which$may$be$
due$to:$
Reorganization$by$reason$of$economy$or$for$
removal$of$redundancy$
A$clear$and$explicit$constitutional$mandate.$
$
Abolition$of$an$office$is$not$the$same$as$the$
declaration$that$the$office$is$vacant.$$Such$
would$constitute$on$its$face,$an$infringement$of$
the$constitutional$guarantee$of$security$of$
tenure$as$provided$for$in$Article(IX(B,(Sec.(2(3).$
G. BINAMIRA(V.(
GARRUCHO(JR.(
$
$
$
G.R.$No.$92008$
July$30,$1990(
Appointment(
vs.(
Designation(
Petitioner$seeks$reinstatement$to$
the$office$of$General$Manager$(GM)$
of$the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority$
(PTA)$from$which$he$claims$to$have$
been$removed$without$just$cause$in$
violation$of$his$security$of$tenure.$
$
April$7,$1986$!$Jose(Gonzales,(the(
Minister(of(Tourism,$designated$
Petitioner$Binamira$as$GM$of$the$
PTA$through$a$Memorandum.$$
Petitioner$then$assumed$office$on$
$
$
$
$
$
$
Presidential$Decree$
564.$Sec.$23TA.$
$
General$Manager$–$Appointment$and$Tenure.$$The$General$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$Binamira’s$appointment$
was$valid$and$that$he$could$enjoy$security$of$
tenure$as$General$Manager$of$the$Philippine$
Tourism$Authority.(
$
HELD:$No.$
$
RATIO:(
The$petitioner$was$not$appointed$by$the$President$of$the$Philippines$but$was$only$
designated$by$the$Minister$of$Tourism.$
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
the$same$date.$
$
Binamira$claims$that$since$assuming$
office,$he$had$discharged$the$duties$
of$PTA$GM$and$Vice$Chair$of$its$
Board$of$Directors,$and$had$been$
acknowledged$as$such$by$various$
government$offices,$including$the$
Office$of$the$President.$
$
January$2,$1990$!$Binamira$
complained$that$his$resignation$was$
demanded$by$respondent$Garrucho$
as$the$new$Secretary(of(Tourism.$
$
January$4,$1990$!$President$
Corazon$Aquino$sent$a$
Memorandum$to$respondent$
Garrucho$saying$that$petitioner$
Binamira$(GM$of$the$PTA)$was$not$
designated$by$the$President$(as$
required$by$PD(564,$which$created$
the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority),$
but$only$by$the$Secretary$of$
Tourism.$$As$such,$Binamira’s$
designation$was$invalid.$$The$
President$then$designated$Garrucho$
as$GM$until$she$could$appoint$a$
person$to$hold$such$office$in$a$
permanent$capacity.$
$
Garrucho$then$took$over$Binamira’s$
postion$as$GM$of$the$PTA.$$Binamira$
then$filed$this$action$against$
Manager$shall$be$
appointed$by$the$
President$of$the$
Philippines$and$shall$
serve$for$a$term$of$six$
(6)$years$unless$sooner$
removed$for$cause;$
Provided,$That$upon$the$expiration$of$his$
term,$he$shall$serve$as$
such$until$his$successor$
shall$have$been$
appointed$and$
qualified.$(As$amended$
by$PD$1400.)$
Appointment$involves$the$exercise$of$
discretion,$and$this$cannot$be$delegated.$$
Legally$speaking,$it$was$impossible$for$Minister$
Gonzales$to$act$as$an$alter$ego$of$the$President,$even$if$Gonzales$happened$to$be$a$member$of$
the$President’s$Cabinet.$$The$power$to$appoint$
the$GM$of$the$PTA$rested$solely$on$the$
President$of$the$Philippines.$$At$best,$Binamira’s$
appointment$was$only$a$temporary$or$acting$
appointment$that$could$be$legally$withdrawn$at$
pleasure,$as$in$fact$it$was.$$Thus,$he$cannot$
claim$security$of$tenure.$
$
Moreover,$In$the$case$of$Villena$v.$Secretary$of$
Interior,$it$was$discussed$that$the$acts$of$the$
Department$Head$were$acts$of$the$President$of$
the$Philippines$when$“performed$and$
promulgated$in$the$regular$course$of$business,”$
which$was$true$of$the$designation$made$by$
Minister$Gonzales$of$Binamira.$$However,$such$
doctrine$also$adds$that$such$act$will$only$
remain$valid$“if$not$disapproved$or$reprobated$
by$the$Chief$Executive,”$as$what$happened$in$
this$case.$
$
*$$$*$$$*$$$*$$$*$
$
Appointment$!$Is$the$selection,$by$the$
authority$vested$with$power,$of$an$individual$
who$is$to$exercise$the$functions$of$a$given$
office.$$Such$completion$of$appointment$results$
in$security$of$tenure.$
$
Designation$!$The$imposition$by$law$of$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Garrucho$to$question$his$title.$$
Binamira$further$impleaded$a$
certain$Jose(Capistrano(as(an(
additional(respondent,$alleging$that$
on$April$6,$1990,$President$Aquino$
appointed$him$as$the$GM$of$the$
PTA.$
additional$duties$on$an$incumbent$official.$$
Such$appointee$serves$only$for$a$temporary$
capacity$and$may$be$replaced$at$will$by$the$
appointing$authority.$$There$is$no$security$of$
tenure.$
$
(Examples$of$designation$!$(1)$The$Secretary$of$Tourism$was$designated$Chairman$of$the$Board$of$Directors$of$the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority,$(2)$Three$justices$of$the$SC$may$be$enjoined$by$the$CJ$to$sit$in$the$Electoral$Tribunals$while$in$office.)$
H. LUEGO(V.(CSC(
(
143(SCRA(327((
(1986)(
(
(
p.(699(
(
Limits(of(CSC(
( Section$9(h)$of$Article$V$
of$the$Civil$Service$
Decree.$Approve$all$
appointments,$
whether$original$or$
promotional,$to$
positions$in$the$civil$
service…$
ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$CSC$is$authorized$
to$disapprove$a$permanent$appointment$on$the$
ground$that$another$person$is$better$qualified$
than$the$appointee$and$order$his$
replacement!NO.*It*was*not*for*the*CSC*to*reverse*him*and*call*the*appointment*temporary.$(
RATIO:$The$appointment$of$the$petitioner$is$not$
temporary$but$permanent$and$was$therefore$
protected$by$the$Constitution.$$
The$CSC$is$not$empowered$to$determine$the$
kind$or$nature$of$the$appointment$extended$by$
the$appointing$officer,$its$authority$being$
limited$to$approving$or$reviewing$the$
appointment$in$the$light$of$the$requirements$of$
the$Civil$Service$Law.$$
A$full$reading$of$Section$9(h)$of$the$Civil$Service$
Decree$will$make$it$clear$that$all$the$CSC$is$
actually$allowed$to$do$is$check$whether$or$not$
the$appointee$possesses$the$appropriate$civil$
service$eligibility$or$the$required$qualifications.(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
I. SANTIAGO(JR.(
V.(CSC(
178(SCRA(733(
(1989)(
(
p.(700(
Limits(of(CSC(
Petitioner,$Narciso$Y.$Santiago,$Jr.,$
with$the$rank$of$Collector$of$
Customs$I,$was$appointed$by$then$
Customs$Commissioner$
WigbertoTañada$as$Collector$of$
Customs$III.$However,$private$
respondent$Leonardo$A.$Jose,$with$
the$rank$of$Collector$of$Customs$II,$
filed$a$protest$before$the$Merit$
Systems$Promotion$Board$against$
Santiago’s$promotional$
appointment$on$the$ground$that$he$
was$next$in$rank$to$the$position$in$
question.$The$appointment$of$
Santiago$was$revoked$by$the$Merit$
Systems$Board$and$affirmed$by$the$
CSC.$
Hence,$the$instant$petition$for$
certiorari.$
Section$4,$CSC$
Resolution$No.$83T843.$
An$employee$who$
holds$a$nextTinTrank$
position$who$is$
deemed$the$most$
competent$and$
qualified…$However,$
the$appointing$
authority$may$promote$
an$employee$who$is$
not$nextTinTrank$but$
who$possesses$
superior$
qualifications…$
ISSUE(1:($Whether$or$not$the$CSC$is$authorized$
to$disapprove$a$permanent$appointment$on$the$
ground$that$there$is$another$nextTinTrank!NO.*The*CSC*does*not*have*authority.$(
RATIO:$One$who$is$nextTinTrank$is$entitled$to$
preferential$consideration$for$promotion$to$the$
higher$vacancy$but$it$does$not$necessarily$
follow$that$he$and$no$one$else$can$be$
appointed.$The$rule$neither$grants$a$vested$
right$to$the$holder$nor$imposes$a$ministerial$
duty$on$the$appointing$authority$to$promote$
such$person$to$the$next$higher$position.$As$
provided$for$in$Section$4$of$CSC$Resolution$No.$
83T843,$the$appointing$authority$has$the$power$
to$promote$an$employee$not$nextTinTrank.$$
The$power$to$appoint$is$a$matter$of$discretion.$
The$appointing$power$has$a$wide$latitude$of$
choice$as$to$who$is$best$qualified$for$the$
position.$To$apply$the$nextTinTrank$rule$
peremptorily$would$impose$a$rigid$formula$on$
the$appointing$power$contrary$to$the$policy$of$
the$law$that$among$those$qualified$and$eligible,$
the$appointing$authority$is$granted$discretion$
and$prerogative.$
J. ASTRAQUILLO(
ET.(AL.(V.(
MANGLAPUS(
$
G.R.(No.(88183,(
October(3,(1990(
(
(
p.(702(
NonIcareer(
Service(
(
Foreign(
Service(
The$decision$deals$with$five$cases.$
The$cases$have$been$consolidated$
and$jointly$considered$because$they$
all$turn$upon$a$common$legal$issue,$
i.e.,$the$validity$of$the$termination,$
by$authority$of$the$President$of$the$
Philippines,$of$the$petitioners’$
appointments$as$“political”$or$“nonT
career”$members$of$the$country’s$
$ ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$petitioners$were$
nonTcareer$officers$and$whose$service$as$
Philippine$diplomats$was$under$the$pleasure$of$
the$president.$
$
HELD:(YES.$Petitioners$were$nonTcareer$officers$
who$serve$at$the$pleasure$of$the$President.$
$
RATIO:$A$perusal$of$the$provisions$of$Section$5,$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Foreign$Service$–$whether$or$not$
their$service$as$Philippine$diplomats$
was$under$the$circumstances,$at$the$
pleasure$of$the$president,$
terminable$without$cause$or$need$of$
investigation.$
Astraquillo$was$appointed$by$the$
President$as$Ambassador$
Extraordinary$and$Plenipotentiary$
and$Chief$of$Mission$(II)$to$the$UAE.$
His$service$was$terminated$“by$
authority$of$the$President”$3$years$
later.$
Giang$was$appointed$as$Ambassador$
Extraodirnary$and$Plenipotentiary$
and$Chief$of$Mission$(Class$I)$to$
Kuwait.$His$service$was$terminated$
“by$authority$of$the$President”$also$
3$years$later.$
Melchor,$Jr.$was$appointed$as$
Ambassador$Extraordinary$and$
Plenipotentiary$and$whose$service$
was$also$terminated$after$3$years.$
$
P.D.$No.$807$shows$that$the$three$petitioners$
pertained$to$the$NonTCareer$Service.$Their$
appointments$to$the$Foreign$Service$were$
made$on”$bases$other$than$those$of$the$usual$
test$of$merit$and$fitness$utilized$for$the$career$
service;”$their$entrance$was$not$“based$on$
merit$and$fitness$determined$by$competitive$
examinations,$or$based$on$highly$technical$
qualifications.”$This$being$so,$their$“tenure$
(was)$coterminous$with$that$of$the$appointing$
authority$or$subject$to$his$pleasures.”$
K. SSS(V.(CA(
175(SCRA(686(
(1989)(
(
p.(704(
Strike(
An$issue$is$raised$on$whether$the$
Regional$Trial$Court$can$enjoin$the$
Social$Security$System$Employees$
Association$(SSSEA)$from$striking$
and$order$the$striking$employees$to$
return$to$work.$Collaterally,$it$is$
whether$or$not$employees$of$the$
SSS$have$the$right$to$strike.$
$ ISSUE(1:($Whether$or$not$the$SSS$employees$
have$the$right$to$strike!NO.*The*SSS,*like*all*government*employees,*are*prohibited*from*staging*strikes.$$
RATIO:$At$present,$in$the$absence$of$any$
legislation$allowing$government$employees$to$
strike,$recognizing$their$right$to$do$so,$or$
regulating$the$exercise$of$the$right,$they$are$
prohibited$from$striking,$by$express$provision$of$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Memorandum$Circular$No.$6$and$as$implied$in$
E.O.$No.$180.$$
Are(employees(of(the(SSS(covered(by(the(
prohibition(against(strikes?(
Considering$that$under$the$1987$Constitution$
the$civil$service$embraces$all$branches,$
subdivisions,$instrumentalities,$and$agencies$of$
the$Government,$including$governmentTowned$
or$controlled$corporations$with$original$
charters”$and$that$the$SSS$is$one$such$
governmentTcontrolled$corporation$with$an$
original$charter,$having$been$created$under$R.A.$
No.$1161,$its$employees$are$part$of$the$civil$
service.$
$
L. AQUINO(V.(CSC(
GR(92403(
April(22,(1992(
PP(706I707(
Security(of(
tenure(
CSC$revoked$the$appointment$of$
petitioner$Victor$A.$Aquino$as$Supply$
Officer$I$in$the$DECS$Division$of$San$
Pablo$City$as$it$found$private$
respondent$Leonarda$de$la$Paz$
better$qualified.$
$
In$assailing$the$revocation$of$his$
appointment,$petitioner$invoked$the$
ruling$of$the$Court$in$the$case$of$
Santiago$v.$Civil$Service$Commission$
and$Galura$v.$Civil$Service$
Commissionthat$the$CSC$has$no$
authority$to$revoke$an$appointment$
on$the$ground$that$another$person$
is$more$qualified$for$a$particular$
position$for$that$would$have$
constituted$an$encroachment$on$the$
discretion$vested$solely$in$the$
$ ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$CSC$committed$
grave$abuse$of$discretion$in$revoking$the$
appointment$of$petitioner!NO.*It*merely*restored*the*appointment*of*private*respondent*who*was*first*appointed*to*the*contested*position.*$(
RATIO:$Petitioner$reliance$in$the$rulings$in$the$
two$cases$did$not$hold$as$the$situation$is$
different$in$the$instant$case,$where$the$CSC$
revoked$the$appointment$of$petitioner$
principally$because$the$right$to$security$of$
tenure$of$the$prior$appointee,$private$
respondent,$to$the$contested$position$had$
already$attached.$CSC$did$not$direct$the$new$
appointment$of$a$substitute$of$its$choice.$It$
merely$restored$the$appointment$of$private$
respondent.$
It$is$wellTsettled$that$once$an$appointment$is$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
appointing$authority.$ issued$and$the$moment$the$appointee$assumes$
a$position$in$the$civil$service$under$a$completed$
appointment,$he$acquires$a$legal$a$legal$right$to$
the$position$which$is$not$only$protected$by$
statute$but$also$of$the$Constitution.$$
When$the$appointing$power$has$once$acted$and$
the$appointee$has$accepted$the$office$and$done$
what$is$required$of$him$upon$its$acceptance,$his$
title$to$the$office$becomes$complete,$and$he$
can$then$be$removed$only$in$the$regular$way.$(
M. PNOC(V.(NLRC(
GR(100947(
May(31,(1993(
PP(707I708(
Secc.(66(OEC:(
Ipso(Facto(
resignation(
Sept.$17,$1981!$Manuel$S.$Pineda$
was$employed$with$the$Philippine$
National$Oil$Co.TEnergy$
Development$Corp.$(PNOCTEDC)$as$
Geothermal$Construction$Secretary$
$
June$1988!$Pineda$took$his$oath$of$
office$in$as$councilorTelect$of$the$
Municipality$of$Kananga,$Leyte$and$
continued$working$for$PNOCTEDC.$
$
January$26,$1989!$the$PNOCTEDC,$
through$Marcelino$Tongco,$notified$
Manuel$S.$Pineda$in$writing$that$his$
employment$was$being$terminated$
pursuant$to$Section$66$of$the$
Omnibus$Election$Code,$effective$
upon$receipt$of$notice$
$
December$28,$1990!$Labor$Arbiter$
Araceli$H.$Maraya$rendered$a$
declaring$Manuel$S.$Pineda's$
dismissal$from$the$service$illegal,$
and$ordering$his$reinstatement$to$
Sec.$66.$Candidates$
holding$appointive$
office$or$position.$—$
Any$person$holding$a$
public$appointive$office$
or$position,$including$
active$members$of$the$
Armed$Forces$of$the$
Philippines,$and$
officers$and$employees$
in$governmentTowned$
or$controlled$
corporations,$shall$be$
considered$ipso$
facto$resigned$from$his$
office$upon$the$filing$of$
his$certificate$of$
candidacy.$
$
Section$2$(1),$Article$IX$
of$the$1987$
Constitution:$The$civil$
service$embraces$all$
branches,$subdivisions,$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not(Pineda(should$be$
considered$ipso$facto$resigned$upon$the$filing$of$his$Certificate$of$Candidacy$in$November,$
1987,$in$accordance$with$Section$66$of$the$
Omnibus$Election$Code?$
(
HELD:(YES,(OEC$applies$to$all$employees$of$
GOCCs.(
(
RATIO:$In$the$language$of$Section$2$(1),$Article$
IX$thereof,$is$the$proposition$that$governmentT
owned$or$controlled$corporations$without$
original$charter$do$not$fall$under$the$Civil$
Service$Law$but$under$the$Labor$Code.$
$
However,$Sec.$66$of$the$OEC$has$a$general$
application$to$all$the$employees$even$if$they$do$
not$fall$under$the$Civil$Service$Law.$$
$
In$other$words,$Section$66$constitutes$a$just$
cause$for$termination$of$employment$in$
addition$to$those$set$forth$in$the$Labor$Code.$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
his$former$position$without$loss$of$
seniority$rights$and$payment$of$full$
back$wages$corresponding$to$the$
period$from$his$illegal$dismissal$up$
to$the$time$of$actual$reinstatement.$$
instrumentalities,$and$
agencies$of$the$
Government,$including$
governmentTowned$or$
controlled$corporations$
with$original$charters.$
$
N. LAPINID(V.(CSC(
GR(96298(
May(14,1991(
PP(708I709$
Limits(of(CSC(
CSC$appointed$appellants$Juanito$
Junsay$and$Benjamin$Villegas$as$
Terminal$Supervisor$replacing$
Renato$Lapinid$and$Antonio$Dulfo$
because$the$former$acquired$higher$
grade$in$the$comparative$evaluation$
over$the$latter.$
Doctrine:$
CSC$is$actually$allowed$
to$do$is$check$whether$
or$not$the$appointee$
possesses$the$
appropriate$civil$
service$eligibility$or$the$
required$qualifications.$$
And$to$disapprove$only$
when$such$
requirements$are$not$
met.$$
ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$the$Civil$Service$
Commission$is$authorized$to$disapprove$a$
permanent$appointment$on$the$ground$that$
another$person$is$better$qualified$than$the$
appointee$and,$on$the$basis$of$this$finding,$
order$his$replacement$by$the$latter?$
$
Held:$NO,$the$Civil$Service$Commission$cannot$
disallow$an$appointment$because$it$believes$
another$person$is$better$qualified$and$much$
less$can$it$direct$the$appointment$of$its$own$
choice.(
(
Section(3.(The(Civil(Service(Commission,(as(the(central(personnel(agency(of(the(Government,(shall(establish(a(career(service(and(adopt(measures(to(
promote(morale,(efficiency,(integrity,(responsiveness,(progressiveness,(and(courtesy(in(the(civil(service.(It(shall(strengthen(the(merit(and(rewards(
system,(integrate(all(human(resources(development(programs(for(all(levels(and(ranks,(and(institutionalize(a(management(climate(conducive(to(public(
accountability.(It(shall(submit(to(the(President(and(the(Congress(an(annual(report(on(its(personnel(programs.(
(
Section(4.(All(public(officers(and(employees(shall(take(an(oath(or(affirmation(to(uphold(and(defend(this(Constitution.(
(
Section(5.(The(Congress(shall(provide(for(the(standardization(of(compensation(of(government(officials(and(employees,(including(those(in(governmentI
owned(or(controlled(corporations(with(original(charters,(taking(into(account(the(nature(of(the(responsibilities(pertaining(to,(and(the(qualifications(
required(for,(their(positions.(
(
Section(6.(No(candidate(who(has(lost(in(any(election(shall,(within(one(year(after(such(election,(be(appointed(to(any(office(in(the(Government(or(any(
GovernmentIowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(in(any(of(their(subsidiaries.(
(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Section(7.(No(elective(official(shall(be(eligible(for(appointment(or(designation(in(any(capacity(to(any(public(office(or(position(during(his(tenure.(
(
Unless(otherwise(allowed(by(law(or(by(the(primary(functions(of(his(position,(no(appointive(official(shall(hold(any(other(office(or(employment(in(the(
Government(or(any(subdivision,(agency(or(instrumentality(thereof,(including(GovernmentIowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(their(subsidiaries.(
(
Section(8.(No(elective(or(appointive(public(officer(or(employee(shall(receive(additional,(double,(or(indirect(compensation,(unless(specifically(
authorized(by(law,(nor(accept(without(the(consent(of(the(Congress,(any(present,(emolument,(office,(or(title(of(any(kind(from(any(foreign(government.(
(
Pensions(or(gratuities(shall(not(be(considered(as(additional,(double,(or(indirect(compensation.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
( $ $ $ $
(
(
(
$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
ARTICLE(IX:(CONSTITUTIONAL(COMMISSIONS(
(
D.(THE(COMMISSION(ON(AUDIT(
(
Section(2.((
(1)( The(Commission(on(Audit( shall( have( the(power,( authority,( and(duty( to( examine,( audit,( and( settle( all( accounts( pertaining( to( the( revenue( and(
receipts(of,(and(expenditures(or(uses(of(funds(and(property,(owned(or(held(in(trust(by,(or(pertaining(to,(the(Government,(or(any(of(its(subdivisions,(
agencies,( or( instrumentalities,( including( governmentOowned( or( controlled( corporations( with( original( charters,( and( on( a( postO( audit( basis:( (a)(
constitutional(bodies,(commissions(and(offices(that(have(been(granted(fiscal(autonomy(under(this(Constitution;((b)(autonomous(state(colleges(and(
universities;((c)(other(governmentOowned(or(controlled(corporations(and(their(subsidiaries;(and((d)(such(nonOgovernmental(entities(receiving(subsidy(
or(equity,(directly(or(indirectly,(from(or(through(the(Government,(which(are(required(by(law(or(the(granting(institution(to(submit(to(such(audit(as(a(
condition(of(subsidy(or(equity.(However,(where(the(internal(control(system(of(the(audited(agencies(is(inadequate,(the(Commission(may(adopt(such(
measures,(including(temporary(or(special(preOaudit,(as(are(necessary(and(appropriate(to(correct(the(deficiencies.(It(shall(keep(the(general(accounts(of(
the(Government(and,(for(such(period(as(may(be(provided(by(law,(preserve(the(vouchers(and(other(supporting(papers(pertaining(thereto.(
(
(2)(The(Commission(shall(have(exclusive(authority,(subject(to(the(limitations(in(this(Article,(to(define(the(scope(of(its(audit(and(examination,(establish(
the(techniques(and(methods(required(therefor,(and(promulgate(accounting(and(auditing(rules(and(regulations,(including(those(for(the(prevention(and(
disallowance(of(irregular,(unnecessary,(excessive,(extravagant,(or(unconscionable(expenditures(or(uses(of(government(funds(and(properties.(
(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A.DINGCONG(V.(
GUINGONA(JR.(
162(SCRA(782(
(1988)(
PP(761(
Power(to(
review(&(
evaluate(
contracts(
“pakyao”(
Petitioner,)Atty.)Praxedio)P.)Dingcong,)was)the)former)Acting)Regional)Director)of)Regional)Office)No.)VI)of)the)Bureau)of)Treasury)in)Iloilo)City)while)Guingona)was)the)Chairman)of)COA.)On)three)occasions,)petitioner,)after)public)bidding,)contracted,)admittedly)on)an)"emergency)labor)basis,")the)services)of)one)Rameses)Layson,)a)private)carpenter)and)electrician)on)"pakyao")basis)for)the)renovation)and)improvement)of)his)
Sec.)2.)(1))The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenue)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property,)owned)or)held)in)trust)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)
W/N)the)disallowance)is)a)usurpation)of)a)management)function)and)an)impairment)of)contract.)Held:)No,)it)is)a)valid)exercise)of)functions.)Ratio:)Not)only)is)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))vested)with)the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty,)to)examine,)audit)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)...)the)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)...)owned)...)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)In)the)exercise)of)its)jurisdiction,)it)determines)whether)or)not)the)fiscal)responsibility)that)rests)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
office)for)giving)the)lowest)bid.)COA)reduced)the)daily)rate)of)the)carpenter)from)P40)to)P25)for)being)excessive)and)so)Dingcong)was)not)reimbursed.)
Government,)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities,)including)governmentVowned)or)controlled)corporations)with)original)charters(
directly)with)the)head)of)the)government)agency)has)been)properly)and)effectively)discharged,)and)whether)or)not)there)has)been)loss)or)wastage)of)government)resources.)
B.(DANVILLE(
MARITIME,(INC.(
V.(COA(
175(SCRA(701(
(1989)(
PP(763O764(
Bidding(
Public(Auction(
In)the)petition)for)review)in)G.R.)No.)85285,)petitioner)seeks)to)set)aside)the)letterVdirective)of)the)respondent)Commission)on)Audit)(COA)for)brevity))disapproving)the)result)of)the)public)bidding)held)by)the)Philippine)National)Oil)Company)(PNOC)for)brevity))of)the)sale)of)its)tankerVvessel)"T/T)Andres)Bonifacio")on)the)ground)that)only)one)bidder)submitted)a)bid)and)to)direct)COA)to)approve)the)said)sale.)Petitioner's)argues)that)the)COA)was)in)grave)error)in)its)perception)that)when)there)is)only)one)actual)bid)submitted)there)is)consequently)no)competition)and)thus)there)is)a)"failure)of)bidding.")The)fact)that)it)was)only)petitioner)which)submitted)a)bid)does)not)affect)the)validity)of)the)bidding)conducted.))
The)phrase)"public)auction")or)"public)bidding")imports)a)sale)to)the)highest)bidder)with)absolute)freedom)for)competitive)bidding.)(Competitive)bidding)requires)that)there)be)at)least)two)(2))bidders)who)shall)compete)with)each)other)on)an)equal)footing)for)winning)the)award.)If)there)is)only)one)participating)bidder,)the)bidding)is)nonVcompetitive)and,)hence,)falls)short)of)the)requirement.))Jurisdiction:)RTC)court)has)no)jurisdiction)to)review)a)decision)of)the)COA)under)the)Constitution.)This)is)a)matter)within)the)exclusive)jurisdiction)of)
W/N))COA)committed)a)grave)abuse)of)discretion)when)it)ruled)that)there)was)a)failure)of)bidding)Held:)No,)the)agreement)shall)be)null)and)void.)Rather)than)condemn)the)COA)as)petitioner)proposes,)the)COA)should)be)commended)for)its)zeal)and)care)in)insuring)that)the)disposition)of)the)subject)vessel)would)be)in)a)manner)most)advantageous)to)the)government.)A)rebidding)removes)any)suspicion)that)may)arise)out)of)the)sale)of)the)vessel)to)petitioner)under)present)circumstances.)The)Court)holds)that)a)second)public)bidding)is)ordained)so)that)all)government)transactions)would)be)competitive)and)above)board.))
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
the)Supreme)Court.)(
C.(RAMOS(V.(
AQUINO(
39(SCRA(256(
(1971)(
PP(764O766(
Auditor(
General(in(
Criminal(
Prosecution(
Petitioner)filed)an)action)for)certiorari)and)prohibition)assailed)the)jurisdiction)of)Benjamin)Aquino,)then)Provincial)Fiscal)of)Rizal,)to)conduct)the)preliminary)investigation)of)the)alleged)commission)of)malversation)through)falsification)of)commercial)documents,)imputed)by)the)Auditor)General.)Arguments)of)Edilberto)Ramos:)the)ascertainment)of)whether)a)crime)committed)and)by)who)is)a)not)a)constitutional)power)vested)in)the)Auditor)General.))
(
W/N)there)is)an)encroachment)of)the)constitutional)prerogatives)of)Auditor)General)by)the)inquiry)of)the)fiscal)to)determine)w/n)criminal)liability)is)incurred)for)any)anomaly)discovered)in)the)course)of)his)audit?)Held:)YES,)it)is)included)in)the)task)of)the)Auditor)General)“to)bring)the)proper)administrative)officer)expenditures)of)funds)or)property)which,)in)his)opinion,)are)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)or)extravagant”)Ratio:)CJ)Concepcion:)“As)a)matter)of)general)rule,)the)writ)of)prohibition)will)not)issue)to)retrain)criminal)prosecution.”)Besides,)the)Auditor)General)will)not)participate)in)the)investigation)to)determine)w/n)criminal)prosecution)should)be)instituted.)
D.(MAMARIL(V.(
DOMINGO(
PP767(
Accountable(
officer(
Petitioner)contends)that)he)could)not)be)held)liable)on)the)audit)disallowances)because)he)was)not)an)accountable)officer)within)the)meaning)of)Sec.)101)of)PD)1445)since:)))1.)his)work)was)purely)clerical,))2.)he)did)not)come)into)possession)of)any)money)or)property)for)which)he)is)now)asked)to)pay,)and)3.)He)did)not)act)in)bad)faith)or)with)gross)negligence.)
(
W/N)petitioner)is)an)accountable)officer)in)relation)to)Sec.)2,)Art.)9VD)of)the)Constitution)and)thus)is)held)liable)on)the)audit)disallowances.)!)YES)Ratio:)YES.)State)audit)is)not)limited)to)the)auditing)of)the)accountable)officers)and)the)settlement)of)accounts,)but)includes)accounting)functions)and)the)adoption)in)the)audited)agencies)of)internal)controls)to)see)to)it,)among)other)matters,)that)the)correct)fees)and)penalties)due)to)the)government)are)collected.)
E.(SAMBELI(V.(
PROVINCE(OF(
Public)expenditure)of)
The)case)at)bar)speaks)of)the)validity)of)a)COA)ruling)denying)the)
Article)9D,)Sec.)2(1).)The)COA)is)vested)with)
ISSUE:)WON)the)ruling)of)the)COA)was)valid.)HELD:)Yes.)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
ISABELA(
(
GR(No.(92279(
June(18,(1992(
funds) petitioner’s)claim)that)said)Commission)should)authorize)the)payment)between)a)transaction)the)petitioners)made)with)the)Province)of)Isabela)concerning)a)contract)of)sale.))))Petitioners)contend)that)the)contract)of)sale)has)not)been)perfected)between)the)Province)of)Isabela)and)petitioner,)but)delivery)has)been)made)by)it)with)the)corresponding)partial)payment)by)the)Province)of)Isabela.))Thus,)petitioners)allege)that)it)is)the)duty)of)COA)to)authorize)the)payment)of)the)balance)because)to)act)otherwise)will)constitute)an)impairment)of)contract.)
the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)accounts)pertaining)to)xxx)the)expenditure)or)uses)of)funds)xxx)owned)by)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)Article)9D,)Sec.)2(2).)The)Commission)shall)have)exclusive)authority,)subject)to)the)limitations)in)this)Article,)to)define)the)scope)of)its)audit)and)examination,)establish)the)techniques)and)methods)required)therefor,)and)promulgate)accounting)and)auditing)rules)and)regulations,)including)those)for)the)prevention)and)disallowance)of)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant,)or)unconscionable)expenditures)or)uses)of)
RATIO:)Pursuant)to)Art.)9D,)Sec.)2(1V2),)the)COA)has)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)expenditure)or)use)of)funds)in)the)government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.))The)COA)is)vested)with)the)right)to)put)a)stop)to)improper)or)wasteful)spending)of)public)funds,)immoral)use)of)government)property)for)being)highly)irregular,)unnecessary,)or)scandalously)excessive)or)extravagant,)it)being)offensive)to)the)will)of)the)sovereign)people.)This)Commission)determines)whether)or)not)the)fiscal)responsibility)that)rests)with)the)head)of)the)government)agency)has)been)properly)and)effective)discharged.))It)is)also)empowered)to)review)and)evaluate)contracts,)and)after)an)audit)has)been)made,)its)auditors)issue)a)certificate)of)settlement)to)each)officer)whose)account)has)been)audited)and)settled)in)whole)or)in)part,)stating)the)balances)found)and)certified,)and)the)charges)or)differences)arising)from)the)settlement)by)reason)of)disallowances,)charges,)or)suspensions.)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
government)funds)and)properties.))
F.(OSMEÑA(V.(
COA(
(
GR(No.(98355(
March(2,(1994)
Abattoir(
Contract(
(
Compromise(
Agreement(
(
Auditing(Code(
of(the(
Philippines((PD(
1445)(
1985)!)The)City)of)Cebu)decided)to)construct)a)modern)abattoir)(slaughterhouse.))April)30,)1985)!)City)Treasurer,)Ricardo)Pestano,)issued)a)certificate)of)availability)of)funds)in)the)amount)of)P5.4M.))After)a)public)bidding,)H.)Franco)Construction)Company,)Inc.)(HFCCI))got)the)deal.))Thus,)the)City)of)Cebu,)through)its)Mayor,)Ronald)Duterte,)entered)intro)a)contract)with)HFCCI.)March)13,)1986)!)Sen.)John)Osmeña,)then)OfficerVInVCharge)of)the)City)of)Cebu,)ordered)the)suspension)of)the)project)and)review)of)the)contract)by)COA.))He)also)asked)that)HFCCI)account)for)the)value)of)their)progress,)for)which)they)said)that)P2.1M)was)the)value)of)they)work)they)had)accomplished)so)far.)May)21,)1987)!)After)HFCCI)was)unable)to)collect)the)amount)after)so)many)demands,)said)company)instituted)a)civil)action)against)the)City)of)Cebu)for)recovery)of)investment)and)damages.)June)5,)1987)!)The)City)of)Cebu)basically)said)that)the)contract)it)entered)with)HFCCI)was)null)and)
Art.)9VA,)Sec.)7.)Unless)otherwise)provided)by)this)Constitution)or)by)law,)any)decision,)order,)or)ruling)of)each)Commission)may)be)brought)to)the)Supreme)Court)on)certiorari)by)the)aggrieved)party)within)thirty)days)from)receipt)of)a)copy)thereof.))Article)9VD,)Sec.)2(1).)The)COA)is)vested)with)the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)accounts)pertaining)to)xxx)the)expenditure)or)uses)of)funds)xxx)owned)by)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)))
ISSUE:)WON)the)decision)of)COA)invalidating)the)contract)between)the)City)of)Cebu)and)HFCCI)was)void)because)the)contract)had)already)been)executed)and)fulfilled.)HELD:)No,)such)decision)is)valid.)RATIO:)The)COA)has)the)power)to)do)such)pursuant)to)Art.)9VD,)Sec.)2(1).)Moreover,)the)Auditing)Code)of)the)PH)also)states)that)no)contract)involving)the)expenditure)of)public)funds)shall)be)entered)into)unless:)There)is)an)appropriation,))The)proper)accounting)official)shall)have)certified)to)the)officer)entering)into)the)obligation)that)funds)have)been)duly)appropriated)for)the)purpose,)and)The)amount)necessary)to)cover)the)contract)for)the)current)year)is)available)for)expenditure.)The)contract)entered)into)by)former)City)of)Cebu)Mayor)Duterte)was)void)from)the)very)beginning)since)the)agreed)cost)for)the)project)(P8.37M))was)way)beyond)the)appropriated)amount)of)P5.4M,)as)certified)by)the)City)Treasurer.))Hence,)the)contract)was)properly)declared)void)and)unforceable)in)COA’s)2nd)Indorsement,)dated)September)4,)1986.))
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
void)as)declared)by)COA)in)its)2nd)Indorsement)dated)September)4,)1986.))Therefore,)the)officer/s)who)entered)into)the)contract)are)liable)for)whatever)amount)is)due)the)company.)December)15,)1988)!)The)City)Mayor,)now)Tomas)Osmeña,)entered)into)a)compromise)agreement)approved)by)the)court,)to)the)effect)that)as)a)full)and)final)settlement)for)HFCCI,)it)will)only)pay)the)company)P1.5)M.)March)3,)1989)!)Thus,)the)Provincial)Deputy)Sheriff,)RTC,)Branch)5,)of)Cebu)City,)was)ordered)to)serve)a)writ)of)execution)against)the)City)of)Cebu)through)its)Mayor.))The)amounts)of)P1.5)M)and)P15k,)as)lawul)fees,)were)garnished)from)the)City’s)funds)from)PNB.)May)2,)1989)!)The)COA)ruled)that)the)contract)for)the)construction)of)the)Cebu)City)Abattoir)was)declared)void)in)a)2nd)Indorsement.))Since)there)was)no)appeal,)the)decision)became)final.)Consequently,)if)a)compromise)is)based)upon)an)antecedent)claim,)which)is)illegal,)the)compromise)may)be)considered)invalid)on)the)ground)of)illegality)as)well)as)lack)of)consideration.))Besides,)pursuant)to)Art.)9VA,)Sec)7,)the)contract)is)a)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
circumvention)of)such)provision.))Petitioner’s)(Osmeña))request)for)reconsideration)was)denied)in)COA’s)5th)Indorsement.))Hence,)this)petition)with)the)ff:)grounds:)The)decision)in)the)2nd)Indorsement)is)null)and)void)for)having)been)made)without,)in)excess)of)jurisdiction)or)with)grave)abuse)of)discretion;)That)Public)Respondent’s)decision)has)never)become)final)for)the)abovementioned)reasons,)as)well.)
G.(BUSTAMANTE(
V.(COA(
(
GR(No.(103309(
(
November(27,(
1992(
Transportation)allowance))P1,250)
This)petition)seeks)to)set)aside)the)Decision)of)COA)which)denied)due)course)to)the)appeal)of)petitioner)Bustamante)from)the)disallowance)by)Regional)Auditor)Martha)Caburian)of)petitioner’s)claim)for)transportation)allowance)covering)the)month)of)January)1989)in)the)amount)of)P1,250.)Petitioner)Bustamante)is)the)Regional)Legal)Counsel)of)the)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC))for)the)Northern)Luzon)Region)Center)covering)the)provinces)of)Rizal)up)to)Batanes.))He)was)issued)a)government)vehicle.))Pursuant)to)NPC)Policy,)he)was)given)monthly)transportation)allowances)in)addition)to)the)use)of)the)government)vehicle.)On)May)1990,)the)petitioner)
Article)12VD,)Sec.)2(1),)1973)Constitution.)The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)following)powers)and)functions:))(1))Examine,)audit,)and)settle,)in)accordance)with)law)and)regulations,)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenues)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property,)owned)or)held)in)trust)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government,)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities,)including)governmentV
ISSUE:)WON)the)COA)committed)grave)abuse)of)discretion)amounting)to)lack)of)jurisdiction)when)COA)denied)due)course)to)the)appeal)of)the)petitioner)from)the)disallowance)of)his)transportation)allowance.)HELD:)No,)COA)did)not)commit)such)in)denying)the)appeal.)RATIO:)The)discretion)exercised)in)the)denial)of)the)appeal)is)within)the)power)o)the)COA,)pursuant)to)Art.)12VD,)Sec.)2(1))of)the)1973)Constitution)and)in)Circular)No.)75V6)(Sec.14,)PD)733))which)regulated)the)use)of)government)motor)vehicles,)aircrafts,)and)watercrafts.)The)petitioner)cannot)say)that)NPC)was)not)under)the)corporations/offices)covered)by)PD)733)because)it)is)clear)that)the)circular)is)addressed)to)managing)heads)of)GovernmentVowned)or)Controlled)Corporations,)the)NPC)being)held)under)such)categories.)The)petitioner’s)contention)that)the)COA)usurped)the)statutory)functions)of)the)NPC)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
received)an)Auditor’s)Notice)to)Person)Liable)from)respondent)Caburian)disallowing)the)P1,250)transportation)allowance.)The)petitioner)moved)for)reconsideration)by)way)of)letter)to)Caburian,)but)the)latter)denied)such)motion.))Petitioner)then)appealed)this)denial)to)the)COA)at)Quezon)City,)which)denied)it,)as)well.)Thus,)this)petition.)
owned)and)controlled)corporations;)keep)the)general)accounts)of)the)government)and,)for)such)period)as)may)be)provided)by)law,)preserve)the)vouchers)pertaining)thereto;)and)promulgate)accounting)and)auditing)rules)and)regulations)including)those)for)the)prevention)of)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)or)extravagant)expenditures)or)use)of)funds)and)property.)P.D.)733,)Sec.)14.))VI.)Prohibition)Against)Use)of)Government)Vehicles)by)Officials)provided)with)transportation)allowance.))“No)official)who)has)been)furnished)motor)transportation)allowance)by)any)government)corporations)or)other)office)shall)be)allowed)to)use)motor)vehicle)transportation)operated)and)
Board)of)Directors,)also)cannot)be)sustained)because)that)would)lead)to)the)absurd)conclusion)that)a)mere)Board)of)Directors)of)a)governmentVowned)and)controlled)corporation,)by)issuing)a)resolution,)can)contravene)a)constitutional)provision.))Doing)otherwise)would)be)rendering)useless)this)Constitutional)Body,)which)has)been)tasked)to)be)vigilant)and)conscientious)in)safeguarding)the)proper)use)of)the)government’s,)and)ultimately,)the)people’s)property.)The)use)of)government)motor)vehicle)and)the)claim)for)transportation)allowance)are)mutually)exclusive.))Therefore,)the)P1,250)transportation)allowance)was)disallowed.)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
maintained)from)funds)appropriated)in)the)aboveVcited)Decree.”)
H.(OROCIO(V.(
COA(
(
GR(No.(75959(
August(31,(1992(
Decisions)by)acting)chairmen)have)no)authority)=)void)ab#initio)
Under)the)1973)and)1987)Constitutions,)the)COA)is)a)collegial)body.))It)must)resolve)cases)presented)to)it)as)such.))Its)General)Counsel)cannot)act)for)the)Commission)for)he)is)not)even)a)Commissioner)thereof.))He)can)only)offer)legal)advice)or)render)an)opinion)in)order)to)aid)the)COA)in)the)resolution)of)a)case)or)a)legal)question.)
VV) ISSUE:)WON)Nepomuceno’s)5th)Indorsement)can)be)considered)as)a)decision)of)the)COA.)HELD:)No.)RATIO:)A)soVcalled)decision)by)authority)of)the)acting)chairman)is)“substantially)void)ab#initio,”)because)it)was)rendered)without)jurisdiction.))It)had)an)essential,)inherent)defect,)that)could)not)cured)or)waived.”)(See)Mison#v.#COA))(Instead,#what#Mr.#Nepomuceno#should#have#done#was#to#render#the#opinion#sought#for#in#the#preceding#4th#Indorsement#of#respondent#Ursal,#and#submit#the#same#to#the#Commission#for#the#latter’s#guidance#in#resolving#the#motion#for#reconsideration.))
I.(CALTEX(
PHILIPPINES(VS.(
COA(
G.R.(No.(92585,(
May(8,(1992(
p.(772(
(
Reimbursement(
This)is)a)petition)erroneously)brought)under)Rule)44)of)the)Rules)of)Court)questioning)the)authority)of)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))in)disallowing)petitioner’s)claims)for)reimbursement)from)the)Oil)Price)Stabilization)Fund)(OPSF))and)seeking)the)reversal)of)said)Commission’s)decision)denying)its)claims)for)recovery)of)financing)charges)from)the)Fund)and)reimbursement)of)under)recovery)arising)from)sales)to)the)National)Power)Corporation,)Atlas)Consolidated)Mining)and)Development)Corporation)(ATLAS))and)Marcopper)Mining)Corporation)
Par.)1,)Section)2,)Article)IX,)D)of)the)1987)Constitution.)The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenue)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property…)))
ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not)the)COA)has)the)authority)to)disallow)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant,)or)unconscionable)expenditures,)or)use)of)government)funds)and)properties)!YES.)!Ratio)1:))o The)audit)power)of)the)Auditor)General)
under)the)1935)Constitution)and)the)Commission)on)Audit)under)the)1973)Constitution)authorized)them)to)disallow)illegal)expenditures)of)funds)or)uses)of)funds)and)property.)Our)present)Constitution,)as)seen)in)Par.)1,)Section)2,)Article)IX,)D,)retained)that)same)power)and)authority)further)strengthened)by)the)definition)of)the)COA’s)general)jurisdiction)in)Section)26)of)the)Government)Auditing)Code)of)the)Philippines)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
(MARCOPPER),)preventing)it)from)exercising)the)right)to)offset)remittances)against)its)reimbursement)visVàVvis)the)OPSF)and)disallowing)its)claims)which)are)still)pending)resolution)before)the)Office)of)Energy)Affairs)(OEA))and)the)Department)of)Finance)(DOF).))Due)to)importance)of)the)issues)raised,)the)error)in)the)designation)of)the)remedy)pursued)was)excused.)
and)Administrative)Code)of)1987.)(o The)same)view)was)expressed)by)one)of)the)
Commissioners)of)the)1986)Constitutional)Commission,)Fr.)Joaquin)G.)Bernas.(
J.(POLLOSO(VS.(
GANGAN(&(COA(
G.R.(No.(140563,(
July(14,(2000(
p.(774(
Payment(of(
legal(services(
The)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC))entered)into)a)service)contract)with)Atty.)Benemerito)A.)Satorre.)Satorre)was)able)to)render)legal)services,)however,)on)12)January)1995,)Unit)Auditor)Alexander)A.)Tan,)NPCVVRC,)Cebu)City,)issued)Notice)of)Disallowance)for)the)payment)of)the)services)rendered)by)Atty.)Satorre)for)the)period)covering)March)to)December)1995)on)the)ground)that)it)violated)COA)Circular)No.)86V255.)Professional)fees)were)then)charged)to)officials)of)the)NPC,)including)herein)petitioner.))Petitioner)initially)filed)motions)for)reconsideration)to)the)Unit)Auditor)and)the)COA)Regional)Director.)However,)both)were)denied)and)the)prior)decision)holding)petitioner)liable)for)said)fees)was)affirmed.)Hence,)before)the)Court)is)a)petition)for)review)from)the)decision)of)the)
) ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not,)under)COA)Resolution)No.)86V255,)the)phrase)“handling)of)legal)cases”)should)be)construed)to)mean)as)conduct)of)cases)or)handling)of)court)cases)or)litigation)and)not)to)other)legal)matters,)such)as)legal)documentation,)negotiations,)counseling)or)right)of)way)matters)!NO#!Ratio)1:))o Contrary)to)view)espoused)by)petitioner,)the)
prohibition)covers)the)hiring)of)private)lawyers)to)render)and)form)of)legal)service.)It)makes)no)distinction)as)to)whether)or)not)the)legal)services)to)be)performed)involve)actual)legal)controversy)or)court)litigation.(
ISSUE(2:(Whether)or)not)the)petitioner)is)correct)in)saying)that)the)service)contract)in)question)falls)outside)the)ambit)of)the)circular)as)what)is)being)curtailed)is)the)payment)of)retainer)fees)and)not)the)payment)of)fees)for)legal)services)actually)rendered)!NO.#!Ratio)2:))o To)give)such)a)technical)interpretation)to)the)
term)“retainer)fees”)would)go)against)the)
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
Commission)on)Audit)(COA),)dated)28)September)1999)of)herein)petitioner)Dante)M.)Polloso,)from)the)disallowance)by)the)COA)Unit)Auditor)of)the)amount)of)P283,763.39)representing)payment)of)legal)services)rendered)by)Atty.)Benemerito)A.)Satorre)to)the)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC).))
purpose)of)the)circular)and)render)the)same)ineffectual.(
ISSUE(3:()Whether)or)not)the)Circular)is)unconstitutional)for)being)an)invalid)restriction)to)the)practice)of)the)law)profession!NO.#!Ratio)3:))o The)questioned)COA)circular)simply)sets)forth)
the)prerequisites)for)a)government)agency)instrumentality)ion)hiring)a)private)lawyer,)which)are)reasonable)safeguards)to)prevent)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant)or)unconscionable)expenditures)or)uses)of)government)funds)and)properties.(
THE(COURT(DISMISSED(THE(PETITION.(
K.(KBP(VS.(COA(
G.R.(No.(88435,(
January(16,(2002(
p.777(
Disallowance(
This)is)a)petition)for)review)on)certiorari)of)the)letterVdecision)of)the)Chairman)of)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))and)the)letterVdecision)of)the)COA)en)banc,)prohibiting)the)Development)Bank)of)the)Philippines)(DBP))from)hiring)a)private)external)auditor.)This)petition)raises)a)question)of)first)impression,)whether)or)not)the)constitutional)power)of)the)COA)to)examine)and)audit)the)DBP)is)exclusive)and)precludes)a)concurrent)audit)of)the)DBP)by)a)private)external)auditor.)
Sec.)2,)Article)IXVD)of)the)1987)Constitution.))(1))The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts…)(2))The)Commission)shall)have)exclusive)authority,)subject)to)the)limitations)in)this)Article,)to)define)the)scope)of)its)audit)and)examination,)establish)techniques…)Sec.)20,)Article)XII)of)the)1987)Constitution.)The)Congress)shall)establish)an)
ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not)COA)has)the)sole)and)exclusive)power)to)examine)and)audit)government)banks)so)as)to)prohibit)concurrent)audit)by)private)external)auditors)under)any)circumstance!NO.#!Ratio)1:))o A)perusal)of)the)records)of)the)1986)
Constitutional)Commission)would)reveal)that)the)framers)of)the)Constitution)intended)that)COA)be)not)granted)exclusive)jurisdiction)over)the)auditing)of)any)government)department,)agency,)or)instrumentality.)They)were)fully)aware)of)the)need)to)allow)independent)private)audit)of)certain)government)agencies)in)addition)to)the)COA)audit,)as)when)there)is)a)private)investment)in)a)governmentVcontrolled)corporation,)or)when)a)government)corporation)is)privatized)or)publicly)listed,)or(as(in(the(case(at(bar(when(the(government(borrows(money(from(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
independent)central)monetary)authority,)the)members)of)whose)governing)board)must)be)naturalVborn)Filipino)citizens,)of)known)probity,)integrity,)and)patriotism,)the)majority)of)whom)shall)come)from)the)private)sector…)
abroad.(
o There)is)another)constitutional)barrier)to)the)COA’s)insistence)of)exclusive)power)to)examine)and)audit)all)government)agencies.)The)COA’s)claim)clashes)directly)with)the)Central)Bank’s)constitutional)power)of)“supervision”)over)banks)under)Section)20,)Article)XII)of)the)Constitution.)The)COA)and)the)Central)Bank)have)concurrent)jurisdiction,)under)the)Constitution,)to)examine)and)audit)government)banks.)However,)despite)this)concurrent)jurisdiction,)the)COA’s)audit)still)prevails)over)that)of)the)Central)Bank.(
L.(PARREÑO(VS.(
COA(
G.R.(No.(162224,(
June(7,(2007(
p.(781(
Pension(
Salvador)Parreño)(petitioner))served)in)the)Armed)Forces)of)the)Philippines)(AFP))for)32)years.)On)5)January)1982,)petitioner)retired)from)the)Philippine)Constabulary)with)the)rank)of)2nd)Lieutenant.)Petitioner)availed,)and)received)payment,)of)a)lump)sum)pension)equivalent)to)three)years)pay.)In)1985,)petitioner)started)receiving)his)monthly)pension)amounting)to)P13,680.)Petitioner)migrated)to)Hawaii)and)became)a)naturalized)American)citizen.)In)January)2001,)the)AFP)stopped)petitioner’s)monthly)pension)in)accordance)with)Section)27)of)Presidential)Decree)No.)1638,)as)amended)by)Presidential)Decree)No.)1650.))
) ISSUE(1:()Whether)or)not)COA)has)jurisdiction)to)rule)on)the)constitutionality)of)Section)27)of)PD)1638)!NO.#!Ratio)1:))o Petitioner)filed)his)money)claim)before)the)
COA.)A)money)claim)is)“a)demand)for)payment)of)a)sum)of)money,)reimbursement)or)compensation)arising)from)law)or)contract)due)from)or)owing)to)a)government)agency.”)Under)Commonwealth)Act)No.)327,)as)amended)by)Presidential)Decree)No.)1445,)money)claims)against)the)government)shall)be)filed)before)the)COA.(
o The)jurisdiction)of)the)COA)over)money)claims)against)the)government)does)not)include)the)power)to)rule)on)the)constitutionality)or)validity)of)laws.)(
(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
PD)1638,)as)amended,)provides)that)a)retiree)who)loses)his)Filipino)citizenship)shall)be)removed)from)the)retired)list)and)his)retirement)benefits)terminated)upon)loss)of)Filipino)citizenship.)Petitioner)requested)for)reconsideration)but)the)Judge)Advocate)General)of)the)AFP)denied)the)request.)Petitioner)filed)a)claim)before)the)COA)for)the)continuance)of)his)monthly)pension.)COA)denied)petitioner’s)claim)for)lack)of)jurisdiction.)
(
(
!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
ARTICLE(X:(LOCAL(GOVERNMENT((Section(8.(The(term(of(office(of(elective(local(officials,(except(barangay(officials,(which(shall(be(determined(by(law,(shall(be(three(years(and(no(such(official(shall(serve(for(more(than(three(consecutive(terms.(Voluntary(renunciation(of(the(office(for(any(length(of(time(shall(not(be(considered(as(an(interruption(in(the(continuity(of(his(service(for(the(full(term(for(which(he(was(elected.((
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. BORJA(JR.(V.(COMELEC(&(CAPCO(
GR(133495(Sept.(3,(1998(PP((822W826(
Succession(is(not(counted(in(the(3Wterm(limit(of(mayors(
January'18,'1988,June'30,'1992'!'Term'of'''private'respondent'Jose'T.'Capco'as'vice,mayor'of'Pateros''September'2,'1989!'Capco'became'mayor,'by'operation'of'law,'upon'the'death'of'the'incumbent,'Cesar'Borja.'''May'11,'1992,'June'30,'1995'!'Capco'ran'and'was'elected'mayor.''May'8,'1995,'June'30,'1998!'Capco'was'reelected'mayor.''March'27,'1998!'Capco'filed'a'certificate'of'candidacy'for'mayor'of'Pateros'for'May'11,'1998'elections.''''Petitioner'Benjamin'U.'Borja,'Jr.,'who'was'also'a'candidate'for'mayor,'sought'Capco’s'disqualification.''COMELEC'disqualified'Capco'but'reversed'its'decision.''May'11,'1998'elections!'Capco'won'
SEC.'8.''The'term'of'office'of'elective'local'officials,'except'barangay'officials,'which'shall'be'determined'by'law,'shall'be'three'years'and'no'such'official'shall'serve'for'more'than'three'consecutive'terms.(
W/N(Capco’s(succession(to(the(office(of(mayor(by(operation(of(law(for(the(remainder(of(the(term(is(counted(in(the(threeWterm(limit?(Held&'Ratio:'No,'because'he'was'not'elected'to'the'office'of'the'mayor'in'the'first'term'but'simply'found'him'thrust'into'it'by'operation'of'law.''Neither'had'he'served'the'full'term'because'he'only'continued'the'service,'interrupted'by'the'death,'of'the'deceased'mayor.'Additional'Info:'Unlike'in'the'case'of'a'member'of'the'House'of'Representatives'who'succeeds'another,'the'vice,mayor'succeeds'to'the'mayor,ship'by'operation'of'law.'But'the'Representative'is'elected'to'fill'the'vacancy.''In'a'real'sense,'therefore,'such'Representative'serves'a'term'for'which'he'was'elected.''As'the'purpose'of'the'constitutional'provision'is'to'limit'the'right'to'be'elected'and'to'serve'in'Congress,'his'service'of'the'unexpired'term'is'rightly'counted'as'his'first'term.''Therefore,'the'theory'contention'of'the'petitioner'about'Sec.'8'is'applicable'to'HoR'members'and'not'to'a'vice,mayor'who'succeeds'the'mayor,'who'dies,'resigns,'becomes'incapacitated'or'removed'from'office.''
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
(Section(9.(Legislative(bodies(of(local(governments(shall(have(sectoral(representation(as(may(be(prescribed(by(law.((
so'Borja'now'prays'to'set'aside'the'reversal'of'COMELEC’'decision'to'let'Capco'run.(
B. DAVID(V.(COMELEC(
GR(127116(April(8,(1997(PP(827W828(
Determining(the(term(of(Barangay(Officials(
ALEX'L.'DAVID,'in'his'own'behalf'as'Barangay'Chairman'of'Barangay'77,'Zone'7,'Kalookan'City'and'as'President'of'the'LIGA'NG'MGA'BARANGAY'SA'PILIPINAS.'The'two'petitions'before'us'raise'a'common'question:'How'long'is'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'chairmen'and'other'barangay'officials'who'were'elected'to'their'respective'offices'on'the'second'Monday'of'May'1994?''Is'it'three'years,'as'provided'by'RA'7160'(the'Local'Government'Code)'or'five'years,'as'contained'in'RA'6679?''Contending'that'their'term'is'five'years,'petitioners'ask'this'Court'to'order'the'cancellation'of'the'scheduled'barangay'election'this'coming'May'12,'1997'and'to'reset'it'to'the'second'Monday'of'May,'1999.(
How'long'is'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'officials?'!'3'YEARS'as'provided'under'the'Local'Government'Code.'Under'Sec.'43,c'of'RA'7160,'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'officials'was'fixed'at'"three'(3)'years'which'shall'begin'after'the'regular'election'of'barangay'officials'on'the'second'Monday'of'May'1994."'This'provision'is'clearly'inconsistent'with'and'repugnant'to'Sec.'1'of'RA'6679'which'states'that'such'"term'shall'be'for'five'years."''The'rationale'is'simple:'a'later'law'repeals'an'earlier'one'because'it'is'the'later'legislative'will.'
W/N'the'3,year'term'is'repugnant'to'the'constitution?'Held'&'Ratio:'NO,'the'Constitution'did'not'expressly'prohibit'Congress'from'fixing'any'term'of'office'for'barangay'officials.'MR.'NOLLEDO.'One'clarificatory'question,'Madam'President.'What'will'the'term'of'the'office'of'barangay'officials'be'as'provided'for?'MR.'DAVIDE.'As'may'be'determined'by'law.'MR.'NOLLEDO.'As'provided'for'in'the'Local'Government'Code?'MR.'DAVIDE.'Yes'
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. SUPANGAN,(JR.(V.(
Validity(of(appointments(made(by(the(
Petitioner'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr.,'was'elected'KB'Provincial'Federation'President'of'the'province'of'
Section'9'Article'X'of'the'1973'Constitution'mandates'that'legislative'bodies'of'
W/N(the(designations/appointments(made(by(respondent(Secretary(is(unlawful(and(unconstitutional?(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
SANTOS(GR(84663(August(24,(1990(
Secretary(DLG(of(members/(sectoral(representatives('
Pangasinan'in'1985.'On'November'25,'1985,'petitioner'was'appointed'by'then'President'Marcos'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'of'the'province'of'Pangasinan'representing'the'youth'sector.''August'8,'1988!'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'presented'to'the'Presiding'Officer'a'letter'written'by'respondent'Secretary'Luis'T.'Santos'advising'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'that'respondent'"Marissa'Domantay'has'been'named'as'member'thereof'to'replace'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr."''Claiming'that'Sec.'Santos'has'no'legal'authority'to'designate'private'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'representing'the'youth'sector'because''(a)'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'has'never'been'elected'as'KB'Provincial'Federation'President'of'Pangasinan,'a'basic'qualification'for'appointment'as'member'representing'the'youth'sector,'and''(b)'respondent'Secretary'of'Dept.'of'Local'Government'has'no'legal'authority'in'issuing'his'letter'dated'August'3,'1988'because'the'term'of'office'of'petitioner'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr.'has'not'yet'expired'nor'
local'governments'shall'have'sectoral'representation'as'may'be'prescribed'by'law.''B.P.'Blg.'337'is'still'operative,'even'after'the'ratification'of'the'1987'Constitution—'Sec.'3.'All'existing'laws,'decrees,'executive'orders,'proclamations,'letters'of'instructions'and'other'executive'issuances'not'inconsistent'with'this'Constitution'shall'remain'operative'until'amended,'repealed'or'revoked.''
Under'the'Local'Government'Code'(BP'337),'the'power'to'appoint'sectoral'representatives'is'conferred'upon'the'President'of'the'Philippines.'But'the'Secretary'of'Local'Government'may,'by'authority'of'the'President'inform'the'sectoral'representatives'of'their'appointments.'Otherwise'stated,'it'is'actually'the'President'who'has'made'the'appointments'in'the'cases'involved'herein,'and'the'Secretary'of'Local'Government'is'only'the'transmitter'or'communicator'of'said'appointments.'HOWEVER,'there'cannot'be'any'appointment'without'enabling'law,'the(B.P.(337(particularly(secs.(146(and(173.'B.P.'Blg.'337'explicitly'requires'that'before'the'President'(or'the'Secretary'of'the'Department'of'Local'Government)'may'appoint'members'of'the'local'legislative'bodies'to'represent'the'Industrial'and'Agricultural'Labor'Sectors,'On'the'question'of'qualification'of'the'appointee,'We'ruled'in'the'cases'of(Ignacio(v.(Banate,(Jr.(and(Reyes(v.(Ferrer((supra)(that'the'appointee'to'the'Sanggunian'who'sits'there'as'a'representative'must'meet'the'qualifications'required'by'law'for'the'position.'As'to'representatives'of'the'youth'sector,'Association'of'Barangay'Councils'and'Kabataang'Barangay'Federation,'Sec.'3'par.'I'of'B.P.'Blg.'51'and'Sec.'173'par.'1'of'B.P.'Blg.'337'(both'earlier'quoted)'require'that'they'must'have'been'presidents'or'officers'of'said'sector'or'barangay.'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
(Section(10.(No(province,(city,(municipality,(or(barangay(may(be(created,(divided,(merged,(abolished,(or(its(boundary(substantially(altered,(except(in(accordance(with(the(criteria(established(in(the(local(government(code(and(subject(to(approval(by(a(majority(of(the(votes(cast( in(a(plebiscite(in(the(political(units(directly(affected.((
his'successor,'if'any,'been'elected/appointed'and'qualified.'Held:'(The'appointment'of'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'of'Pangasinan'representing'the'youth'sector'is'declared'null'and'void,'and'petitioner'Johnny'Supangan,'Jr.'is'ordered'reinstated.(
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. TAN(V.(COMELEC(
142(SCRA(727((July(11,(1986(PP(833W839(
(((Void(creation(of(New(Province(of(Negros(del(Norte((
December'3,'1985!'Batas'Pambansa'Blg.'885,An'Act'Creating'a'New'Province'in'the'Island'of'Negros'to'be'known'as'the'Province'of'Negros'del'Norte.''December'23,'1985!''TAN'and'other'residents'of'the'Province'of'Negros'Occidental'filed'a'case'for'Prohibition'for'the'purpose'of'stopping'the'respondent'Commission'on'Elections'from'conducting'the'plebiscite'which'was'scheduled'to'be'implemented'on'January'3,'1986.'
Local(Government(Code(((SEC.(197.(Requisites(for(Creation.'A'province'may'be'created'if'it'has'territory'of'at'3,'500'square'kilometers'population'of'at'least'500,000'persons'average'estimated'annual'income,'as'certified'by'the'Ministry'of'Finance,'of'not'less'than'10M'pesos'for'the'last'3'consecutive'years,'Its'creation'shall'not'reduce'the'population'and'income'of'the'mother'province'or'
W/N'Batas'Pambansa'Blg.'885'is'unconstitutional?'HELD:'YES,'therefore,'the'proclamation'of'the'new'province'of'Negros'del'Norte,'as'well'as'the'appointment'of'the'officials'thereof'is'also'declared'null'and'void.'With'constitutional'infirmity'attaching'to'the'subject'Batas'Pambansa'Big.'885'and'also'because'the'creation'of'the'new'province'of'Negros'del'Norte'is'not'in'accordance'with'the'criteria'established'in'the'Local'Government'Code,'the'factual'and'legal'basis'for'the'creation'of'such'new'province'which'should'justify'the'holding'of'another'plebiscite'does'not'exist.'"'This'created'province'does'not'even'satisfy'the'area'requirement'prescribed'in'Section'197'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
provinces'at'the'time'of'said'creation'to'less'than'the'minimum'requirements'under'this'section.'The'territory'need'not'be'contiguous'if'it'comprises'two'or'more'islands.'Xxx'Article(XI,(Section(3(of(the(Constitution:(SEC.'3.'No'province,'city,'municipality'or'barrio'may'be'created,'divided,'merged'abolished,'or'its'boundary'substantially'altered,'except'in'accordance'with'the'criteria'established'in'the'local'government'code,'and'subject'to'the'approval'by'a'majority'of'the'votes'in'a'plebiscite'in'the'unit'or'units'affected.'
of'the'Local'Government'Code.'
B. ROY(PADILLA(Jr.((Governor(of(Camarines(Norte)(V.(COMELEC((GR(
The(participants(in(a(plebiscite((
Subject:'The'Creation'of'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa'in'the'Province'of'Camarines'Norte'December'15,'1991!'Result'of'the'plebiscite'throughout'the'Municipality'of'Labo:'only'2,890'votes'favored'its'creation'while'3,439'voters'voted'against'the'creation'of'the'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa.''The'governor'of'Camarines'Norte'seeks'to'set'aside'the'plebiscite'conducted'and'prays'that'a'new'
Rationale(behind(the(deletion'of'the'phrase'"unit'or"'in'Section'10,'Article'X'of'the'1987'Constitution'Mr.'Davide:'I(would(object.(I(precisely(asked(for(the(deletion(of(the(words("unit(or"(because(in(the(plebiscite(to(be(conducted,(it(must(involve(all(the(units(affected.(If(it(is(the(creation(of(a(barangay(plebiscite(because(it(is(affected.'It(
W/N'the'petitioner'can'conduct'a'new'plebiscite?'Held:'NO.'Therefore,'COMELEC'did'not'commit'a'grave'abuse'of'discretion'for'declaring'the'result'of'the'plebiscite'valid.'It'stands'to'reason'that'when'the'law'states'that'the'plebiscite'shall'be'conducted'"in'the'political'units'directly'affected,"'it'means'that'residents'of'the'political'entity'who'would'be'economically'dislocated'by'the'separation'of'a'portion'thereof'have'a'right'to'vote'in'said'plebiscite.'Evidently,'what'is'contemplated'by'the'phase'"political'units'directly'affected,"'is'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
103328(October(19,(1992((839W842(
plebiscite'be'undertaken'as'provided'by'RA'7155'because'it'was'a'complete'failure.'Also,'the'results'obtained'were'invalid'and'illegal'because'the'plebiscite,'as'mandated'by'COMELEC'Resolution'No.'2312'should'have'been'conducted'only'in'the'political'unit'or'units'affected,'i.e.'the'12'barangays'comprising'the'new'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa.'Petitioner'stresses'that'the'plebiscite'should'not'have'included'the'remaining'area'of'the'mother'unit'of'the'Municipality'of'Labo,'Camarines'Norte.'
would(mean(a(loss(of(a(territory.((Emphasis'supplied)'(
the'plurality'of'political'units'which'would'participate'in'the'plebiscite.'Logically,'those'to'be'included'in'such'political'areas'are'the'inhabitants'of'the'12'barangays'of'the'proposed'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa'as'well'as'those'living'in'the'parent'Municipality'of'Labo,'Camarines'Norte'
C. LEAGUE(OF(CITIES(V.(COMELEC(
GR(176951(December(21,(2009(842W853(
(16(Cityhood(Laws(
Cases'filed'by'League'of'Cities'of'the'Philippines'(LCP),'City'of'Iloilo,'City'of'Calbayog,'and'Jerry'P.'Treñas,'assailing'the'constitutionality'of'the'sixteen'(16)'laws'each'converting'the'municipality'covered'thereby'into'a'component'city'(Cityhood'Laws).'Before'Senate'Bill'No.'2157,'now'R.A.'No.'9009,'was'introduced'by'Senator'Aquilino'Pimentel,'there'were'57'bills'filed'for'conversion'of'57'municipalities'into'component'cities.'''During'the'11th'Congress'(June'1998,June'2001),'33'of'these'bills'were'enacted'into'law,'while'24'remained'as'pending'bills.''Among'these'24'were'the'16'municipalities'
Intent'of'increasing'the'income'requirement:'The'purpose'of'the'enactment'of'R.A.'No'9009'was'merely'to'stop'the'“mad'rush'of'municipalities'wanting'to'be'converted'into'cities”'and'the'apprehension'that'before'long'the'country'will'be'a'country'of'cities'and'without'municipalities.''It'should'be'pointed'out'that'the'imposition'of'the'P100'million'average'annual'income'requirements'for'the'creation'of'component'cities'was'arbitrarily'made.'
W/N'the'cityhood'laws'violate'(1)'Sec.'10.'Art.'X'of'the'Constitution?'NO,'16'municipalities'are'exempted'from'the'amendments'in'the'LGC.'Congress'intended'that'those'with'pending'cityhood'bills'during'the'11th'Congress'would'not'be'covered'by'the'new'and'higher'income'requirement'of'P100'million'imposed'by'R.A.'No.'9009.''When'the'LGC'was'amended'by'R.A.'No.'9009,'the'amendment'carried'with'it'both'the'letter'and'the'intent'of'the'law,'and'such'were'incorporated'in'the'LGC'by'which'the'compliance'of'the'Cityhood'Laws'was'gauged.'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
Section(11.(The(Congress(may,(by(law,(create(special(metropolitan(political(subdivisions,(subject(to(a(plebiscite(as(set(forth(in(Section(10(hereof.(The(component(cities(and(municipalities(shall(retain(their(basic(autonomy(and(shall(be(entitled(to(their(own(local(executive(and(legislative(assemblies.(The(jurisdiction(of(the(metropolitan(authority(that(will(thereby(be(created(shall(be(limited(to(basic(services(requiring(coordination.((
that'were'converted'into'component'cities'through'the'Cityhood'Laws.'
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. MMDA(V.(BELWAIR(VILLAGE(ASSOC(
GR(135962((March(27,(2000(853W858(
LIMITS(OF(MMDA(
January'2,'1996!'Respondent'prayed'for'the'issuance'of'a'temporary'restraining'order'and'preliminary'injunction'enjoining'the'opening'of'Neptune'Street'and'prohibiting'the'demolition'of'the'perimeter'wall.'The'trial'court'issued'a'temporary'restraining'order'the'following'day.'January'23,'1996!'The'appellate'court'conducted'an'ocular'inspection'of'Neptune'Street]'and'on'February'13,'1996,'it'issued'a'writ'of'preliminary'injunction'enjoining'the'implementation'of'the'MMDA’s'proposed'action.''January'28,'1997!the'appellate'court'rendered'a'Decision'on'the'merits'of'the'case'finding'that'the'MMDA'has'no'authority'to'order'the'opening'of'Neptune'Street,'a'private'subdivision'road'and'cause'the'demolition'of'its'perimeter'walls.'It'held'that'the'authority'is'lodged'in'the'City'Council'of'Makati'by'
"Section(11.'xxx'The'jurisdiction'of'the'metropolitan'authority'that'will'thereby'be'created'shall'be'limited'to'basic'services'requiring'coordination."(
HAS'THE'METROPOLITAN'MANILA'DEVELOPMENT'AUTHORITY'(MMDA)'THE'MANDATE'TO'OPEN'NEPTUNE'STREET'TO'PUBLIC'TRAFFIC'PURSUANT'TO'ITS'REGULATORY'AND'POLICE'POWERS?'Held:'NO,'MMDA'is'not'a'local'government'unit'or'a'public'corporation'endowed'with'legislative'power.'Under'the'1987'Constitution,'the'local'government'units'became'primarily'responsible'for'the'governance'of'their'respective'political'subdivisions.''The'MMA’s'jurisdiction'was'limited'to'addressing'common'problems'involving'basic'services'that'transcended'local'boundaries.'It'did'not'have'legislative'power.'Its'power'was'merely'to'provide'the'local'government'units'technical'assistance'in'the'preparation'of'local'development'plans.'Any'semblance'of'legislative'power'it'had'was'confined'to'a'"review'[of]'legislation'proposed'by'the'local'legislative'assemblies'to'ensure'consistency'among'local'governments'and'with'the'comprehensive'development'plan'of'Metro'Manila,"'and'to'"advise'the'local'governments'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
(Section( 12.( Cities( that( are( highly( urbanized,( as( determined( by( law,( and( component( cities( whose( charters( prohibit( their( voters( from( voting( for(provincial(elective(officials,(shall(be(independent(of(the(province.(The(voters(of(component(cities(within(a(province,(whose(charters(contain(no(such(prohibition,(shall(not(be(deprived(of(their(right(to(vote(for(elective(provincial(officials.((
ordinance.''Petitioner'MMDA'claims'that'it'has'the'authority'to'open'Neptune'Street'to'public'traffic'because'it'is'an'agent'of'the'state'endowed'with'police'power'in'the'delivery'of'basic'services'in'Metro'Manila.'One'of'these'basic'services'is'traffic'management'which'involves'the'regulation'of'the'use'of'thoroughfares'to'insure'the'safety,'convenience'and'welfare'of'the'general'public.'
accordingly.'
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. ABELLA(V.(COMELEC(
GR(100710(September(3,(1991(858W860(
Interpretation(of(Section(12((
A'case'to'detremine'who'is'the'rightful'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte''1)'petitioner'Adelina'Larrazabal'(G.R.'No.'100739)'who'obtained'the'highest'number'of'votes'in'the'local'elections'of'February'1,'1988'and'was'proclaimed'as'the'duly'elected'governor'but'who'was'later'declared'by'the'Commission'on'Elections'(COMELEC)'"...'to'lack'both'residence'and'registration'qualifications'for'the'position'of'
Sec.'12.'Cities'that'are'highly'urbanized,'as'determined'by'law,'and'component'cities'whose'charters'prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials,'shall'be'independent'of'the'province.'The'voters'of'component'cities'within'a'province,'whose'charters'contain'no'such'prohibition,'shall'not'be'deprived'of'their'right'to'vote'for'elective'
1. The'fact'that'the'candidate'who'obtained'the'highest'number'of'votes'is'later'declared'to'be'disqualified'or'not'eligible'for'the'office'to'which'he'was'elected'does'not'necessarily'entitle'the'candidate'who'obtained'the'second'highest'number'of'votes'to'be'declared'the'winner'of'the'elective'office.'!'Because'he'was'not'the'choice'of'the'people''
2. Section'12,'Article'X'of'the'Constitution'is'explicit'that'aside'from'highly,urbanized'cities,'component'cities'whose'charters'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
Governor'of'Leyte'as'provided'by'Art.'X,'Section'12,'Philippine'Constitution'and'is'hereby'disqualified'as'such'Governor";''2)'petitioner'Benjamin'Abella'(G.R.'No.'100710),'who'obtained'the'second'highest'number'of'votes'for'the'position'of'governor'but'was'not'allowed'by'the'COMELEC'to'be'proclaimed'as'governor'after'the'disqualification'of'Larrazabal;'or''3)'Leopoldo'E.'Petilla,'the'vice,governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'The'position'of'petitioners'was'that'respondent'Larrazabal'is'neither'a'resident'nor'a'registered'voter'of'Kananga,'Leyte'as'she'claimed'but'a'resident'and'registered'voter'of'Ormoc'City,'a'component'city'of'the'province'of'Leyte'but'independent'of'the'province'pursuant'to'Section'12,'Article'X'of'the'Constitution'thereby'disqualifying'her'for'the'position'of'governor'of'Leyte.''Larrazabal'poses'an'alternative'position'that'her'being'a'registered'voter'in'Ormoc'City'was'no'impediment'to'her'candidacy'for'the'position'of'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'COMELEC'found'that'petitioner'Larrazabal'was'neither'a'resident'of'Kananga,'Leyte'nor'a'registered'voter'thereat.'With'these'findings,'
provincial'officials.'''Section'89'of'Republic'Act'No.'179'creating'the'City'of'Ormoc'provides:'Election'of'provincial'governor'and'members'of'the'Provincial'Board'of'the'members'of'the'Provincial'Board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte'—'The'qualified'voters'of'Ormoc'City'shall'not'be'qualified'and'entitled'to'vote'in'the'election'of'the'provincial'governor'and'the'members'of'the'provincial'board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte.''
prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials'are'independent'of'the'province.'Necessarily,'component'cities'like'Ormoc'City'whose'charters'prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials'are'treated'like'highly'urbanized'cities'which'are'outside'the'supervisory'power'of'the'province'to'which'they'are'geographically'attached.'This'independence'from'the'province'carries'with'it'the'prohibition'or'mandate'directed'to'their'registered'voters'not'to'vote'and'be'voted'for'the'provincial'elective'offices.''
'3. Section'89'of'Republic'Act'179,'
independent'of'the'constitutional'provision,'prohibits'registered'voters'of'Ormoc'City'from'voting'and'being'voted'for'elective'offices'in'the'province'of'Leyte.'We'agree'with'the'COMELECen'banc'that'"the'phrase''shall'not'be'qualified'and'entitled'to'vote'in'the'election'of'the'provincial'governor'and'the'members'of'the'provincial'board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte''connotes'two'prohibitions'—'one,'from'running'for'and'the'second,'from'voting'for'any'provincial'elective'official."'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
AUTONOMOUS(REGIONS((
Section(18.(The(Congress(shall(enact(an(organic(act( for(each(autonomous(region(with( the(assistance(and(participation(of( the(regional(consultative(commission(composed(of(representatives(appointed(by(the(President(from(a(list(of(nominees(from(multiWsectoral(bodies.(The(organic(act(shall(define(the(basic(structure(of(government(for(the(region(consisting(of(the(executive(department(and(legislative(assembly,(both(of(which(shall(be(elective(and(representative(of( the( constituent(political(units.( The(organic(acts( shall( likewise(provide( for( special( courts(with(personal,( family,( and(property( law(jurisdiction(consistent(with(the(provisions(of(this(Constitution(and(national(laws.((The(creation(of(the(autonomous(region(shall(be(effective(when(approved(by(majority(of(the(votes(cast(by(the(constituent(units(in(a(plebiscite(called(for(the(purpose,(provided(that(only(provinces,(cities,(and(geographic(areas(voting(favorably( in(such(plebiscite(shall(be( included(in(the(autonomous(region.((
the'COMELEC'disqualified'the'petitioner'as'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. ABBAS(V.(COMELEC(
179(SCRA(287((1989)(861W866(
( ( ( (
B. CORDILLERA(REGIONAL(ASSEMBLY(V.(COMELEC(
GR(93054(
( ( ( (
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
(Section(20.(Within(its(territorial(jurisdiction(and(subject(to(the(provisions(of(this(Constitution(and(national(laws,(the(organic(act(of(autonomous(regions(shall(provide(for(legislative(powers(over:((((1)(Administrative(organization;(((2)(Creation(of(sources(of(revenues;(((3)(Ancestral(domain(and(natural(resources;(((4)(Personal,(family,(and(property(relations;(((5)(Regional(urban(and(rural(planning(development;(((6)(Economic,(social,(and(tourism(development;(((7)(Educational(policies;(((8)(Preservation(and(development(of(the(cultural(heritage;(and(((9)(Such(other(matters(as(may(be(authorized(by(law(for(the(promotion(of(the(general(welfare(of(the(people(of(the(region.((
December(4,(1990(866W867(C. LEONOR(
V.(CORDILLERA(BODONG(ADMIN(
GR(92649(February(14,(1991(867W868(
( ( ( (
Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(
A. PANDI(V.(CA(((GR(
( ( ( (
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
(
116850(April(11,(2002((869(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
ARTICLE(XI:(ACCOUNTABILITY(OF(PUBLIC(OFFICERS(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(Hipolito'v.'Mergas''AM'No.'P3903412''March'11,'1991'
A'deputy'sheriff'may'be'punished'for'moonlighting'
A'deputy'sheriff'may'be'properly'punished'by'this'tribunal'for'an'action'committed'in'violation'of'the'Rules'of'Court,'and'which'impedes'and'detracts'form'a'fair'and'just'administration'of'justice.'(Bareno'v.'Cabauatan'151'SCRA'293,'1987)''A'deputy'sheriff'is'an'officer'of'the'court'whose'duties'form'an'integral'part'in'the'administration'of'justice.''Such'penalty'imposed'on'him'may'be'short'of'dismissal'or'suspension'from'office.''While'“moonlighting”'is'not'normally'considered'a'serious'misconduct,'it'amounts'to'a'wrongdoing'in'office.''By'virtue'of'one’s'office,'one'is'bound'to'the'discharge'of'his'duties,'observing'prudence,'caution,'and'attention.'(Peñalosa'v.'Viscara,'Jr.'84'SCRA'298,'1978)''Public'service'requires'utmost'integrity'and'discipline,'observing'the'highest'sense'of'honesty'and'integrity.''Such'standards'are'found'in'both'the'1973'(Art.'13,'Sec.'5)'and'the'1987'(Art.'11,'Sec.'1)'Constitutions.'
Art.'13,'Sec.'1'of'the'1973'Constitution.'Public'office'is'a'public'trust.''Public'officers'and'employees'shall'serve'with'the'highest'degree'of'responsibility,'integrity,'loyalty,'efficiency,'and'shall'remain'accountable'to'the'people.''(This&was&reiterated&emphatically&in&Art.&11,&Sec.&1&of&the&1987&Constitution,&with&the&addition&of&another&clause&about&acting&with&patriotism&and&justice,&and&leading&modest&lives.)''Art.'11,'Sec.'1'of'the'1987'Constitution.'Public'office'is'a'public'trust.''Public'officers'and'employees'must'at'all'times'be'accountable'to'the'people,'serve'them'with'utmost'responsibility,'integrity,'loyalty,'and'efficiency,'act&with&patriotism&and&justice,&and&lead&modest&lives.'
33'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**Romulo'v.'Yñiguez''141'SCRA'263'(1986)'
The'Court'may'not'review'the'Batasan’s'decisions'
Does'the'Court'have'jurisdiction'to'order'the'Committee'on'Justice,'Human'Rights,'and'Good'Government'(CJHRGG)'to'recall'from'the'Archives'and'report'out'the'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment?'Assuming'such'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment'are'recalled'from'the'archives,'can'the'Court'order'the'Batasan'to'conduct'a'trial'on'the'charges'contained'in'said'documents?'
33' ISSUE:'WON'the'Court'has'jurisdiction'for'such'recall'of'documents'on'impeachment,'and'if'such'were'granted,'may'order'the'Batasan'to'conduct'a'trial'based'on'such'information.''HELD:'No.''RATIO:'When'the'Batasan'denied'the'motion'of'a'certain'MP'Ramon'Mitra'for'the'recall'from'the'Archives'of'Resolution'No.'644'and'the'complaint'for'impeachment,'it'therefore'confirmed'the'action'of'the'CJHRGG.''A'dismissal'by'the'Batasan'itself'as'a'body'of'the'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment'renders'irrelevant'under'what'authority'the'CJHRGG'had'acted.''The'dismissal'of'a'majority'of'the'members'of'the'Batasan'of'the'impeachment'proceedings'is'an'act'of'the'Batasan'as'a'body'in'the'exercise'of'such'powers'given'to'it'by'the'Constitution,'which'is'beyond'the'power'of'this'Court'to'review.''This'Court'cannot'compel'the'Batasan'to'conduct'such'trial'prayed'for'by'the'petitioners.'
In'Re'Gonzales''160'SCRA'771'(1988)'
2'Principles'of'Constitutional'Law''
Important'principles'of'constitutional'law:'A'public'officer'who'under'the'Constitution'is'required'to'be'a'
All&from&the&1987&Consti.''Art.'8,'Sec.'1(2).'xxx''no'person'may'be'appointed'
(Secondary&case&mentioned&in&this&case&in&applicatio&of&such&Principles&of&Constitutional&Law&mentioned)&'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
Officers'who'are'members'of'the'PH'Bar'as'a'qualification'for'their'office'may'not'be'charged'with'disbarment'during'their'incumbency,'nor'be'criminally'charged'that'would'result'in'removal'from'office'
Member'of'the'PH'Bar'as'a'qualification'for'the'office'held'by'him'and'who'may'removed'form'office'only'by'impeachment'cannot'be'charged'with'disbarment'during'his'incumbency.'During'the'incumbency'of'such'public'officer'cannot'be'criminally'charged'before'the'Sandiganbayan'or'any'other'court'with'any'offense'or'penalty'service,'which'would'result'in'his'removal'from'office.'
judge'thereof'unless'he'is'a'citizen'of'the'Philippines'and'a'member'of'the'Philippine'Bar.'''Art.'11(2).'xxx'the'Ombudsman'may'be'removed'from'office'on'impeachment'for,'and'conviction'of,'culpable'violation'of'the'Constitution,'treason,'bribery,'graft'and'corruption,'other'high'crimes,'or'betrayal'of'public'trust.'xxx''Art.'11(8).'The'Ombudsman'and'his'Deputies'xxx'members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'xxx''Art.'93C(131).'There'shall'be'a'Commission'on'Elections'composed'of'a'Chairman'and'six'Commissioners'xxx''a'majority'thereof,'including'the'Chairman,'shall'be'members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'who'have'been'engaged'in'the'practice'of'law'for'at'least'ten'years.''Art.'93D(131).'There'shall'be'a'Commission'on'Audit'composed'of'a'Chairman'and'two'Commissioners,'xxx'
ISSUE:'WON'the'complaint'for'disbarment'should'be'dismissed.''HELD:'Yes.''HELD:'Members'of'the'SC'must'be'members'of'the'PH'Bar'and'may'be'removed'from'office'only'by'impeachment,'pursuant'to'Art.'8,'Sec.'1(2).''To'grant'such'complaint'for'disbarment'would'be'to'circumvent'this'constitutional'mandate,'and'also'that'of'Art.'11(2),'which'lists'down'certain'offenses'for'which'such'officers'may'be'convicted'of.''The'same'situation'exists'with'the'ff.'who'are'all'constitutionally'required'to'be'members'of'the'PH'Bar:'The'Ombudsman'and'his'deputies''Art.'11(8)'in'relation'to'Art.'11(2)'A'majority'of'the'members'of'the'COMELEC'Art.'93C'in'relation'to'Art.'11(2)'Members'of'the'COA'who'are'not'certified'public'accountants'Art.'93D'''
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'who'have'been'engaged'in'the'practice'of'law'for'at'least'ten'years'xxx'
Francisco,'et'al.'v.'House'Speaker,'et.'al.''GR'No.'160261''November'10,'2003'
' ' ' '
Nuñez'v.'Sandiganbayan''111'SCRA'433'(1982)'
The'existence'of'a'special'Court'
In'categorical'and'explicit'language,'the'Constitution'provided'for'but'did'not'create'a'special'Court.'See'Article'13,'Sec.'5'of'the'1973'Constitution.''Such'special'Court'came'into'existence'with'the'issuance'in'1978'of'a'Presidential'Decree.'
Art.'13,'Sec.'5'of'the'1973'Constitution.''The'Batasang'Pambansa'shall'create'a'special'court,'to'be'known'as'Sandiganbayan,'which'shall'have'jurisdiction'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices'and'such'other'offenses'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees,'including'those'in'government3owned'or'controlled'corporations,'in'relation'to'their'office'as'may'be'determined'by'law.''
33'
MAYOR'LECAROZ'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'128'SCRA'324'(1984)'p.'888''
Grave'coercion'
Ponente:'Reolva,'J.'October'21,'1980!Petitioner'was'charged'with'the'crime'of'grave'coercion'in'an'information'filed'before'the'respondent'court.''Petitioner''filed'a'motion'to'quash'the'information.'Respondent'court'denied'
Section'5,'Article'XIII'of'the'1973'Constitution.''The'National'Assembly'shall'create'a'special'court,'to'be'known'as'Sandiganbayan,'which'shall'have'jurisdiction'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'
ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'offense'for'which'he'was'charged'is'not'related'to'his'office'as'mayor'!NO.$He$could$not$have$accomplished$the$crimes$for$which$he$was$charged$were$it$not$for$his$position$as$mayor.'!Ratio'1:''
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
such'motion.'Thus,'the'present'petition'for'certiorari.''
graft'and'corrupt'practices'and'such'other'offenses'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees…'''
o If'petitioner'were'not'the'mayor'he'would'not'have'allegedly'directed'the'policemen'and'the'latter'would'not'have'followed'his'orders'and'instructions'to'sell'Pedro'Par’s'gasoline'and'padlock'the'station.'The'fact'that'he'was'mayor'did'not'vest'him'with'the'legal'authority'to'take'over'the'operations'and'control'of'complainant’s'gasoline'station.'
ISSUE(2:('Whether'the'Sandiganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'his'case'!YES.$As$clearly$stated$in$Sec.$5,$Article$XIII$of$the$1973$Constitution.$'!Ratio'2:'o It'is'clear'form'Sec.'5,'Article'XIII'of'
the'1973'Constitution'that'respondent'court'has'jurisdictional'competence'not'only'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees'but'also'over'other'crimes'committed'by'them'in'relation'to'their'office,'though'not'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices,'as'may'be'determined'by'law.''
ISSUE(3:(Whether'Section'4(c)of'PD'1486'as'amended,'is'violative'of'the'provision'of'Section'5,'Article'XIII'of'the'1973'Constitution'because'it'enlarges'what'the'latter'limited'!NO.$It$is$duly$authorized$by$the$
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
Constitutional$provision$itself.'!Ratio'3:'o The'said'constitutional'provision'
delegates'to'the'lawmaking'body'the'determination'of'such'“other'offenses”'committed'by'public'officers'over'which'the'Sandiganbayan'shall'have'jurisdiction.'Accordingly,'PD'1846,'which'provides'that'“other'crimes'or'offenses'committed'by'public'officees'or'employees,'including'those'employed'in'government3owened'or'controlled'corporation,'in'relation'to'their'office,”''was'enacted'while'the'President'was'exercising'legislative'powers.'The'Court'will'not'review'questions'of'legislative'policy.'
'ZALDIVAR'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'160'SCRA'843'(1988)'p.'890'
Tanodbayan' PER'CURIAM'In'a'petition'for'certiorari,'prohibition,'and'mandamus,'petitioner'Enrique'A.'Zaldivar,'governor'of'the'province'of'Antique,'sought'to'restrain'the'Sandiganbayan'and'Tanodbayan'Raul'Gonzalez'from'proceeding'with'the'prosecution'and'hearing'of'criminal'cases'filed'against'him'on'the'ground'that'said'cases'were'filed'by'said'Tanodbayan'without'legal'and'constitutional'authority,'since'under'the'1987'Constitution'which'took'effect'on'February'2,'1987,'it'is'only'
Sec.'7,'Article'XI'of'the'1987'Constitution.'The'existing'Tanodbayan'shall'hereafter'be'known'as'the'Office'of'the'Special'Prosecutor.'It'shall'continue'to'function'and'exercise'its'powers'as'now'or'hereafter'may'be'provided'by'law,'except'those'conferred'on'the'Office'of'the'Ombudsman'created'under'this'Consitution.'''
ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'Tanodbayan'is'without'authority'to'file'the'case'against'petitioner'Zaldivar'and'other'similar'cases'!YES.$The$Tanodbayan$does$not$have$authority.'!Ratio'1:''o Under'the'1987'Constitution,'the'
Ombudsman'(as'distinguished'from'the'incumbent'Tanodbayan)'is'charged'with'the'duty'to:'“investigate'on'its'own,'or'on'complaint'by'any'person,'any'act'or'omission'of'any'public'official,'employee,'office'or'agency,'when'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
the'Ombudsman'(not'the'present'or'incumbent'Tanodbayan)'who'has'the'authority'to'file'cases'with'the'Sandiganbayan.''
such'act'or'omission'appears'to'be'illegal,'unjust,'improper,'or'inefficient.”'And'under'Sec.'7,'Article'XI'of'the'1987'Constitution,'the'incumbent'Tanodbayan'(called'Special'Prosecutor'under'the'1987'Constitution'and'who'is'supposed'to'retain'powers'and'duties'NOT'GIVEN'to'the'Ombudsman)'is'clearly'without'authority'to'conduct'preliminary'investigation'and'to'direct'the'filing'of'criminal'cases'with'the'Sandiganbayan,'except'upon'orders'of'the'Ombudsman.'
BIR'VS'OMBUDSMAN'G.R.'No.'115103,'April'11,'2002'p.'890'
Pending'action'
Ponente:'De'Leon,'Jr.,'J.'Petitioner'BIR'insists'that'the'investigative'power'of'the'Ombudsman'is'not'unbridled.'Particularly'on'the'issue'of'tax'refunds,'the'BIR'maintains'that'the'Ombudsman'could'not'validly'exercise'its'power'to'investigate'only'when'there'exists'an'appropriate'case'and'subject'to'the'limitations'provided'by'law.'''
' ISSUE(1:(Whether'or'not'the'Ombudsman'is'precluded'from'conducting'its'own'investigation'without'a'pending'action.'!NO.$As$may$be$seen$in$the$1987$Constitution,$there$is$no$such$prohibition.'!Ratio'1:''o No'less'than'the'1987'Constitution'
enjoins'that'the'“Ombudsman'and'his'Deputies,'as'protectors'of'the'people,'shall'act'promptly'on'complaints'filed'in'any'form'or'manner'against'public'officials'or'employees'of'the'government,'or'any'subdivision,'agency'or'instrumentality'thereof,'including'government3owned'or'controlled'corporations,'and'shall,'in'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
appropriate'case,'notify'the'complainants'of'the'action'taken'and'the'result'thereof.'(
o Clearly,'there'is'no'requirement'of'a'pending'action'before'the'Ombudsman'could'wield'it'investigative'power.'The'Ombudsman'could'resort'toits'investigative'prerogative'on'its'own'or'upon'complaint'filed'in'any'form'or'manner.'(
LAUREL'VS.'DESIERTO'G.R.'No.'145368,'April'12,'2002'p.'891'
National'Centennial'Celebrations'
Petitioner,'as'Chairman'of'the'Commission'for'the'National'Centennial'Celebration,'assails'the'jurisdiction'of'the'Ombudsman'on'the'ground'that'he'isnot'a'public'officer.'Neither'the'Constitution'nor'the'Ombudsman'Act'of'1989'defines'who'public'officers'are.'A'definition'of'public'officers'cited'in'jurisprudence'is'that'provided'by'Mechem,'a'recognized'authority'on'the'subject.'The'characteristics'of'a'public'office,'according'to'him,'include'the'delegation'of'sovereign'functions,'its'creation'by'law'and'not'by'contract,'an'oath,'salary,'continuance'of'the'position,'scope'of'duties,'and'the'designation'of'the'position'as'an'office.'''
' ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'petitioner,'as'Chairman'of'the'Committee'for'the'National'Centennial'Celebrations'is'a'public'officer'!YES.$The$position$of$Chairman$of$the$NCC$is$a$public$office.'!Ratio'1:''o Petitioner'submits'that'some'of'
the'characteristics,'as'provided'by'Mechem’s'definition,'are'not'present'in'the'position'of'NCC'Chair,'namely:'(1)'the'delegation'of'sovereign'functions;'(2)'salary,'since'he'purportedly'did'not'receive'any'compensation;'and'(3)'continuance,'the'tenure'of'the'NCC'being'temporary.'The'Court'held'that'the'NCC'performs'executive'functions.'A'perusal'of'AO'225'and'EO'128'–'the'NCC’s'sources'of'its'mandate'and'functions'–'would'show'that'the'NCC'was'precisely'created'to'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
execute'and'carry'into'effect'policies'and'objectives'mentioned'in'the'two'executive'orders.'Furthermore,'the'NCC'was'not'without'a'role'in'the'country’s'economic'development,'especially'in'Central'Luzon.'Clearly,'the'NCC'performs'sovereign'functions.'
o That'petitioner'allegedly'did'not'receive'any'compensation'during'his'tenure'is'of'little'consequence.'The'salary'is'a'mere'incident'and'forms'no'part'of'the'office.'Where'a'salary'or'fees'is'annexed,'the'office'provided'for'it'is'a'naked'or'honorary'office,'and'is'supposed'to'be'accepted'merely'for'the'public'good.'Hence,'the'office'of'petitioner'as'NCC'Chair'may'be'characterized'as'an'honorary'office.'It'is'a'public'office.''
AZARCON'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'G.R.'No.'116033,'February'26,'1997'p.'893'
Private'individual'
Ponente:'Panganiban,'J.'A'question'is'raised'on'whether'the'Sandiganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'a'private'individual'who'is'charged'with'malversation'of'public'funds'as'a'principal'after'the'said'individual'had'been'designated'by'the'Bureau'of'Internal'Revenue'as'a'custodian'of'detrained'property.'Did'such'accused'become'a'public'officer'and'therefore'subject'to'the'graft'court’s'jurisdiction'as'a'consequence'of'such'designation'by'the'BIR?'
' ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'Sanidganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'the'accused'private'individual'charged'as'principal'in'the'crime'of'malversation'of'public'funds!NO.$His$liability$as$principal$is$not$included$in$the$list$of$instances$where$the$Sandiganbayan$may$assume$jurisdiction$over$private$individuals.$'!Ratio'1:''o Only'when'the'private'individual'is'
charged'as'co3principal,'accomplice'or'accessory'of'a'public'
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
'
officer'or'employee'who'has'been'charged'with'a'crime'within'its'jurisdiction'may'the'Sandiganbayan'assume'authority'over'such'case.'(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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ARTICLE(XII:(NATIONAL(ECONOMY(AND(PATRIMONY(
(
Section(1.(The(goals(of( the(national(economy(are(a(more(equitable(distribution(of(opportunities,( income,(and(wealth;(a( sustained( increase( in( the(
amount(of(goods(and(services(produced(by(the(nation(for(the(benefit(of(the(people;(and(an(expanding(productivity(as(the(key(to(raising(the(quality(of(
life(for(all,(especially(the(underNprivileged.(
The(State(shall(promote(industrialization(and(full(employment(based(on(sound(agricultural(development(and(agrarian(reform,(through(industries(that(
make(full(and(efficient(use(of(human(and(natural(resources,(and(which(are(competitive( in(both(domestic(and(foreign(markets.(However,(the(State(
shall(protect(Filipino(enterprises(against(unfair(foreign(competition(and(trade(practices.(
(
In( the( pursuit( of( these( goals,( all( sectors( of( the( economy( and( all( regions( of( the( country( shall( be( given( optimum( opportunity( to( develop.( Private(
enterprises,(including(corporations,(cooperatives,(and(similar(collective(organizations,(shall(be(encouraged(to(broaden(the(base(of(their(ownership.(
(
(
Section(2.(All(lands(of(the(public(domain,(waters,(minerals,(coal,(petroleum,(and(other(mineral(oils,(all(forces(of(potential(energy,(fisheries,(forests(or(
timber,(wildlife,( flora( and( fauna,( and( other( natural( resources( are( owned( by( the( State.(With( the( exception( of( agricultural( lands,( all( other( natural(
resources(shall(not(be(alienated.(The(exploration,(development,(and(utilization(of(natural(resources(shall(be(under(the(full(control(and(supervision(of(
the(State.(The(State(may(directly(undertake(such(activities,(or(it(may(enter(into(coNproduction,(joint(venture,(or(productionNsharing(agreements(with(
Filipino(citizens,(or(corporations(or(associations(at(least(sixty(per(centum(of(whose(capital(is(owned(by(such(citizens.(Such(agreements(may(be(for(a(
period(not(exceeding(twentyNfive(years,(renewable(for(not(more(than(twentyNfive(years,(and(under(such(terms(and(conditions(as(may(be(provided(by(
law.(In(cases(of(water(rights(for(irrigation,(water(supply(fisheries,(or(industrial(uses(other(than(the(development(of(water(power,(beneficial(use(may(
be(the(measure(and(limit(of(the(grant.(
(
The(State(shall(protect( the(nation's(marine(wealth( in( its(archipelagic(waters,( territorial( sea,(and(exclusive(economic(zone,(and( reserve( its(use(and(
enjoyment(exclusively(to(Filipino(citizens.(
(
The(Congress(may,(by(law,(allow(smallNscale(utilization(of(natural(resources(by(Filipino(citizens,(as(well(as(cooperative(fish(farming,(with(priority(to(
subsistence(fishermen(and(fishN(workers(in(rivers,(lakes,(bays,(and(lagoons.(
(
The( President( may( enter( into( agreements( with( foreignNowned( corporations( involving( either( technical( or( financial( assistance( for( largeNscale(
exploration,(development,(and(utilization(of(minerals,(petroleum,(and(other(mineral(oils(according(to(the(general(terms(and(conditions(provided(by(
law,( based( on( real( contributions( to( the( economic( growth( and( general( welfare( of( the( country.( In( such( agreements,( the( State( shall( promote( the(
development(and(use(of(local(scientific(and(technical(resources.(
(
The(President(shall(notify(the(Congress(of(every(contract(entered(into(in(accordance(with(this(provision,(within(thirty(days(from(its(execution.(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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(
Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
A. MINERS(
ASSOCIATION(
V.(FACTORAN,(
Jr.(
(
GR(98332(
January(16,(1995(
!!!949N956(
Validity(of(AO’s(
57(&(82(
because(they(
were(germane(
to(EO’s(211(&(
279(
Petitioners!contest!the!validity!of!2!Administrative(Orders((57(&(82)!issued!by!the!Secretary!of!the!DENR!to!carry!out!the!provisions!by!the!President!in!the!lawful!exercise!of!legislative!powers.!!Such!controversy!started!with!the!changes!made!in!Art.(12,(Sec.(2,(of(the(1987!Constitution!on!(1)!the!system(of(exploration,(
development,(and(utilization(of(the(
country’s(natural(resources,!and!(2)!the!utilization(of(inalienable(lands(of(public(domain(through(“license,(
concession,(or(lease,”!the!practice!of!which!has!been!disallowed!in!the!1987!Constitution.!!July!1987!!!Former!President!Aquino,!in!the!exercise!of!her!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution,!promulgated!Executive(Order(211!(outlining!the!procedures!for!utilizing!mineral!resources!pursuant!to!the!1987!Constitution!in!order!to!ensure!the!continuity!of!mining!activities,!and!to!hasten!the!development!of!mineral!resources.)!and!Executive(Order(279!(giving!the!
Art.(12,(Sec.(2(of(the(
1987(Constitution:(
xxx!With!the!exception!of!agricultural!lands,!all!other!natural!resources!shall!not!be!alienated.!The(exploration,(
development,(and(
utilization(of(natural(
resources(shall(be(
under(the(full(control(
and(supervision(of(the(
State.(The(State(may(
directly(undertake(
such(activities,(or(it(
may(enter(into(coN
production,(joint(
venture,(or(
productionNsharing(
agreements(with(
Filipino(citizens,(or(
corporations(or(
associations(at(least(60(
per(centum(of(whose(
capital(is(owned(by(
such(citizens.(Such(
agreements(may(be(
for(a(period(not(
exceeding(twentyNfive(
years,(renewable(for(
not(more(than(twentyN
ISSUE:!Whether!or!not!Administrative!Orders!57!&!82!are!valid!and!do!not!contravene!Executive!Orders!211!and!279.!!HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(
(For%EO%211)%Presidential!Decree!463,!as!amended,!follows!the!old!mining!laws!on!“license,!concession,!or!lease,”!which!had!already!been!changed!in!Art.!12,!Sec.!2!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!As!such,!they!are!deemed!inoperative,!with!the!exception!of!parts,!which!are!still!consistent!with!EO!211,!namely!the!provisions!which!deal!with!all!other!areas!of!administration!and!management!of!mineral!lands.!!(For%EO%279)!There!is!no!clear!showing!that!the!Secretary!has!abused!his!legislative!power.!!EO!279!authorizes!said!Secretary!to!promulgate!such!supplementary!rules!and!regulations!as!may!be!needed!to!effectively!implement!the!provisions!of!such!EO.!!Also,!the!subject!sought!to!be!governed!and!regulated!by!the!questioned!AO’s!are!germane!to!EO279.!!In#conclusion,#the#questioned#Administrative#Orders#are#reasonably#directed#to#the#accomplishment#of#the#purposes#of#the#law#
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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Secretary!of!the!DENR!general!supervision!over!matters!related!to!the!production,!agreements!on!the!exploration,!development,!and!utilization!of!mineral!resources.).!!To#implement!such!acts,!the!Secretary!of!the!DENR!promulgated!such!AO’s!57!and!82,!the!validity!of!which!are!being!challenged!by!the!petitioners.!!Such!AO’s!issued!by!the!Secretary!in!the!exercise!of!his!ruleZmaking!power!are!said!to!be!tainted!with!invalidity!because!they!contradict!EO’s!211!and!279,!because!AO’s!57!and!83!repeal!or!abrogate!Presidential!Decree!463!and!other!mining!laws!already!acknowledged!as!the!principal!law!under!EO’s!211!and!279.#
five(years,(and(under(
such(terms(and(
conditions(as(may(
provided(by(law.!xxx!!The(President(may(
enter(into(agreements(
with(foreignNowned(
corporations(involving(
either(technical(or(
financial(assistance(for(
largeNscale(
exploration,(
development,(and(
utilization(of(minerals,(
petroleum,(and(other(
mineral(oils(according(
to(the(general(terms(
and(conditions(
provided(by(law,(
based(on(real(
contributions(to(the(
economic(growth(and(
general(welfare(of(the(
country.(In(such(
agreements,(the(State(
shall(promote(the(
development(and(use(
of(local(scientific(and(
technical(resources.(
!
under#which#they#were#issued#and#were#intended#to#secure#the#paramount#interest#of#the#public,#their#economic#growth,#and#welfare.#AO’s#57#and#82#must#be#sustained,#and#their#force#and#effect#upheld.#
B. REPUBLIC(V.(
ROSEMOOR(
(
QUARRY/(
MINING(
LICENSE(
!!Petitioners!Pascual,!De!La!Concha,!
Art.(18,(Sec.(3(of(the(
1987(Constitution.!!All!existing!laws,!decrees,!
ISSUE(1:!Whether!or!not!PD!463!is!valid?!(Petitioners#contend#that#LO#33#contravenes#Sec.#69#of#PD#463#because#it#exceeds#the#max#
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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(
(
GR(149927(
March(30,(2004(
(
(
(
(
956N960!
(
(
JURA(REGALIA(
De!La!Concha,!and!De!Guzman,!after!having!been!granted!permission!to!prospect!for!marble!deposits!in!BiakZnaZBato,!discovered!such!deposits!of!high!quality!and!commercial!quantity,!and!sought!a!license!to!exploit!said!marble!deposits!with!the!permission!of!the!Mines!and!Geosciences!Bureau.!!They!were!granted!License(No.(33((LO(33),!but!less!than!3!years!after!the!continuous!operation!of!the!LO!33,!which!had!the!validity!of!25!years,!such!LO!33!was!cancelled!by!DENR(Minister(Maceda!shortly!after!being!appointed!to!his!post!in!a!letter!to!the!respondent!Rosemoor.!!Summary!of!Rulings!by!the!Trial!Court!&!Court!of!Appeals!LO!33!conferred!a!property(right!which!must!be!protected!by!the!Constitution!Such!right!was!violated!when!the!license!was!cancelled(without(notice,!and!it!was!unjustified!because!LO!33!was!embraced!by!4!separate!applications,!which!did!not!exceed!the!limitation!imposed,!so!such!LO!must!be!valid.!(Note:!The!previous!limit!embodied!in!PD!463!said!that!a!quarry!license!should!not!
executive!orders,!proclamations,!letters!of!instructions,!and!other!executive!issuances!not!inconsistent!with!this!Constitution!shall!remain!operative!until!amended,!repealed,!or!revoked.!!!!!Note:!A!mining!lease!that!contravenes!a!manZmade!provision!of!the!law!under!which!it!is!granted!is!void.!!Being!a!mere!privilege,!a!license!does!not!vest!absolute!rights!in!the!holder.!!Thus,!without!offending!the!due!process!and!the!nonZimpairment!clauses!of!the!Constitution,!it!can!be!revoked!by!the!State!in!the!public!interest.!!!
area#that#may#be#granted,#but#respondents#argue#that#the#license#was#validly#granted#because#it#was#covered#by#4#separate#applications#for#areas#of#81#hectares#each.)#!HELD:!Yes!!RATIO:(The!language!of!Sec.!69!of!PD!463!is!clear!that!a!quarry!license!should!cover!a!maximum!of!100!hectares!in!any!given!province.!!It!provides!neither!an!exception!nor!reference!to!the!number!of!applications!for!a!license.!!Such!section!must!be!taken!to!mean!exactly!what!it!says.!!When!the!law!is!clear,!plain,!and!free!from!ambiguity,!it!must!be!given!its!literal!meaning!and!applied!without!attempted!interpretation.!!!ISSUE(2:!Whether!or!not!Proclamation!84!is!valid(!(Petitioners#argue#that#LO#33#was#validly#declared#a#nullity#through#DENR#Minister#Maceda’s#decision#because#it#violated#PD#463.##This#was#confirmed#by#Proclamation#84,#which#said#that#public#interest#would#be#served#by#returning#said#parcel#of#land#to#the#BiakUnaUBato#National#Park.####Respondents#argue#that#as#provided#for#PD#463,#their#right#to#due#process#was#violated#when#LO#33#was#cancelled#without#notice#and#hearing,#also#saying#that#Proclamation#84#is#
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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cover!more!than!100!hectares,!but!since!the!license!in!question!was!covered!by!4!separate!applications!indicating!81!hectares!each,!LO!33!did!not!violate!this!limitation.!!However,!it!must!be!noted!that!PD!43!was!appealed!by!RA!7942!(“The!Philippine!Mining!Act!of!1995”)!which!increased!the!mining!areas!allowed!in!PD!463).!!Proclamation(84,!which!cancelled!LO!33,!was!an!ex(post(facto(law,!violating!Art.!18,!Sec.!3!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!Under!the!clause!in!the!Constitution!dealing!with!the!nonNimpairment(of(
obligations(and(contracts,!the!respondents’!license!must!be!respected!by!the!State.!!Hence,!this!petition.!!
not#valid#because#It#violates#the#clause#on#nonUimpairment#of#contracts,#It#is#an#ex!post!facto#law#and/or#bill#of#attainder,#and#It#was#issued#by#the#President#after#the#effectivity#of#the#1987#Constitition.)#HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(
Granting!that!the!respondents’!license!was!valid,!it!can!still!be!validly!revoved!by!the!State!in!the!exercise!of!police!power!in!accord!with!jura#regalia,!which!reserves!to!the!State!ownership!of!all!natural!resources.!!Thus,!Proclamation!84!does!not!violate!the!clause!on!nonZimpairment!of!contracts.!!Proclamation!84!is!not!an!ex#post#facto!law!as!such!proclamation!does!not!fall!under!any!of!the!instances!which!would!make!it!such!a!law,!and!that!said!proclamation!is!not!penal!in!character,!and!thus!cannot!be!considered!as!an#ex#post#facto#law.!!It!is!also!not!a!bill!of!attainder.!When!President!Aquino!issued!Proclamation!84,!she!was!still!validly!exercising!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution!of!1986.!Hence,!her!issuance!of!said!proclamation!is!valid!as!it!was!recognized!and!provided!for!in!Art.!7,!Sec.!6,!of!the!1987!Constitution.!
C.(LA(BUGAL(
B’LAAN(TRIBAL(
ASSOC(V.(DENR(
Regalian(
Doctrine(
Prohibited(
The!petition!assails!the!constitutionality!of!Republic!Act!No.!7942,!otherwise!known!as!the!
!1. SEC.!2!
Paragraph!3!
Issue(1:(Whether(or(not(EO(279(is(valid?(
!Held:!Yes,!E.O.!No.!279!is!an!effective,!and!a!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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GR(127882(
JANUARY(27,(2004(
961N992(
Service(
Contract(
VOID(FTAA(
AGREEMENT(
(
PHILIPPINE!MINING!ACT!OF!1995,!and!of!the!Financial!and!Technical!Assistance!Agreement!(FTAA)!and!WMC!(Philippines),!Inc.!(WMCP),!a!corporation!organized!under!Philippine!laws.!!Also!impleaded!is!private!respondent!WMCP,!which!entered!into!the!assailed!FTAA!with!the!Philippine!Government.!WMCP!is!owned!by!WMC!Resources!International!Pty.,!Ltd.!(WMC),!"a!wholly!owned!subsidiary!of!Western!Mining!Corporation!Holdings!Limited,!a!publicly!listed!major!Australian!mining!and!exploration!company."!!Respondent!WMCP!subsequently!filed!a!Manifestation!dated!September!25,!2002!alleging!that!on!January!23,!2001,!WMC!sold!all!its!shares!in!WMCP!to!Sagittarius!Mines,!Inc.!(Sagittarius),!a!corporation!organized!under!Philippine!laws.!!Petitioners!contend!that!E.O.!No.!279!did!not!take!effect!because!the!supposed!date!of!its!effectivity!came!after!President!Aquino!had!already!lost!her!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution.!
!2. CONCOM!
discussion!on!the!Service!Contracts!dispute!!
!MR.!TADEO.!Xxx!Matapos!suriin!ang!kalagayan!ng!Pilipinas,!ang!saligang!suliranin,!pangunahin!ang!salitang!"imperyalismo."!Ang(ibig(sabihin(nito(ay(ang(
sistema(ng(lipunang(
pinaghaharian(ng(
iilang(monopolyong(
kapitalista(at(ang(
salitang(
"imperyalismo"(ay(
buhay(na(buhay(sa(
National(Economy(and(
Patrimony(na(nating(
ginawa.!xxx!Pangalawa,!naroroon!pa!rin!ang!parity!rights,!ang!service!contract,!ang!60Z40!equity!sa!natural!resources.!Habang!naghihirap!ang!sambayanang!Pilipino,!ginagalugad!naman!ng!mga!dayuhan!ang!ating!
validly!enacted,!statute.!!Ratio!1:!While!the!effectivity!clause!of!E.O.!No.!279!does!not!require!its!publication,!it!is!not!a!ground!for!its!invalidation!since!the!EO!200,!in!a!supplementary!manner,!provides!for!its!application.!!!At!the!time!President!Aquino!issued!E.O.!No.!279!on!July!25,!1987,!she!was!still!validly!exercising!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution.!!Issue(2:(Whether(or(not(WCMP(FTAA(is(
unconstitutional?(
!Held!2:!It!is!unconstitutional!and!void,!specifically:!(1)!The!following!provisions!of!Republic!Act!No.!7942:!The!proviso!in!Section!3!(aq);!Section!23;!Section!33!to!41;!Section!56;!2nd!&!3rd!paragraphs!of!Section!81;!and!Section!90.!(2)!All!provisions!of!Department!of!Environment!and!Natural!Resources!Administrative!Order!96Z40,!s.!1996!which!are!not!in!conformity!with!this!Decision,!and!(3)!The!Financial!and!Technical!Assistance!Agreement!between!the!Government!of!the!Republic!of!the!Philippines!and!WMC!Philippines,!Inc.!!Ratio!2:!Mr.!Tadeo’s!"!!The!idea!and!phrase!"service!contracts"!has!been!deleted!in!the!1987!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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!And!they!likewise!claim!that!the!WMC!FTAA,!which!was!entered!into!pursuant!to!E.O.!No.!279,!violates!Section!2,!Article!XII!of!the!Constitution!because,!among!other!reasons:!(1) It!allows!foreignZowned!
companies!xxx!in!the!exploitation,!development,!and!utilization!of!minerals,!petroleum,!and!other!mineral!oils,!and!even!permits!foreign!owned!companies!to!"operate!and!manage!mining!activities."!!
(2)!It!allows!foreignZowned!companies!to!extend!both!technical!and!financial!assistance,!instead!of!"either!technical!or!financial!assistance."!
likas!na!yaman.!xxx!Ang!solusyon!sa!suliranin!ng!bansa!ay!dalawa!lamang:!ang!pagpapatupad!ng!tunay!na!reporma!sa!lupa!at!ang!national!industrialization.!Ito!ang!tinatawag!naming!pagsikat!ng!araw!sa!Silangan.!Ngunit(ang(mga(landlords(and(big(
businessmen(at(ang(
mga(komprador(ay(
nagsasabi(na(ang(free(
trade(na(ito,(ang(
kahulugan(para(sa(
amin,(ay(ipinipilit(sa(
ating(sambayanan(na(
ang(araw(ay(sisikat(sa(
Kanluran.(Kailan(man(
hindi(puwedeng(
sumikat(ang(araw(sa(
Kanluran.!I!vote!no.(((
MR.!VILLEGAS.!Actually,!the!second(provision(about(the(
President(does(not(
permit(foreign(
investors(to(
participate.!It!is!only!technical!or!financial!assistance!–!they!do!
Constitution's!Article!on!National!Economy!and!Patrimony!INTENTIONALLY.!Therefore,!the!phrase!"agreements!.!.!.!involving!either!technical!or!financial!assistance"!does!not!include!"broad!number!of!possible!services"!as!contended!by!the!respondent.!!Mr.!Villegas’!"!The!constitutional!provision!allowing!the!President!to!enter!into!FTAAs!with!foreignZowned!corporations!is!an!exception!to!the!rule!that!participation!in!the!nation's!natural!resources!is!reserved!exclusively!to!Filipinos.!Accordingly,!such!provision!must!be!construed!strictly!against!their!enjoyment!by!nonZFilipinos.!!!Mr.!Davide’s!"!The!intent!of!this!provision,!as!well!as!other!provisions!on!foreign!investments,!is!to!prevent!the!practice!(prevalent!in!the!Marcos!government)!of!skirting!the!60/40!equation!using!the!cover!of!service!contracts.!!Since!service!contracts!are!antithetical,!TFTA!would!also!run!counter!to!the!constitutional!provision!on!nationalization!or!Filipinization,!of!the!exploitation!of!our!natural!resources.!!FTAA!contractor!warrants!that!it!"has!or!has!access!to!all!the!financing,!managerial,!and!technical!expertise.!.!.!."!!FTAA!contractor!is!bound!to!provide!some!management!assistance!!!assistance(that(has(been(eliminated(by(the(present(Constitution!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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not!own!anything!–!but!on!conditions!that(have(to(be(determined(
by(law(with(the(
concurrence(of(
Congress.!So,(it(is(very(restrictive.!!MR!DAVIDE:!It!is!not!for!them!to!enjoy!our!natural!resources.!Madam!President,!our!natural!resources!are!depleting;!our!population!is!increasing!by!leaps!and!bounds.!Fifty(years(from(now,(if(we(will(
allow(these(aliens(to(
exploit(our(natural(
resources,(there(will(
be(no(more(natural(
resources(for(the(next(
generations(of(
Filipinos.!It!may!last!long!if!we!will!begin!now.!
!This!Court!finds!that!R.A.!No.!7942!is!invalid!insofar!as!said!Act!authorizes!service!contracts.!Although!the!statute!employs!the!phrase!"financial!and!technical!agreements"!in!accordance!with!the!1987!Constitution,!it!actually!treats!these!agreements!as!service!contracts!that!grant!beneficial!ownership!to!foreign!contractors!contrary!to!the!fundamental!law.!
(
(
(
(
D.(
RECONSIDERATION((
GR(127882(
(
(
(
Meaning(of(Full(
Control(and(
Supervision(
(
January!27,!2004!!the!Court!en!banc!promulgated!its!Decision!declaring!the!unconstitutionality!of!certain!provisions!of!RA!7942,!DAO!96Z40,!as!well!as!of!the!entire!FTAA!executed!between!the!government!and!WMCP,!mainly!on!the!finding!
!“Sec.!2.!!x!x!x!The!exploration,!development!and!utilization!of!natural!resources!shall!be!under!the!full!control!
Issue!1:!Whether!or!not!the!alleged!invalidity!of!the!transfer!of!the!WMCP!shares!to!Sagittarius!violates!the!fourth!paragraph!of!Section(2(of(Article(XII(of(the(Constitution?(
(
Held!1:!NO,!it!is!clear!that!the!constitutional!principle!gives!preference!and!priority!to!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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December(1,(2004(
992N1017(
COURT(
REVERSED(
DECISIONS(
that!FTAAs(are(service(contracts(prohibited(by(the(1987(
Constitution.!!Subsequently,!respondents!filed!separate!Motions!for!Reconsideration.!!!Reasons:!o the!FTAA!is!to!be!implemented!
now!by!a!Filipino!corporation!(Sagittarius),!it!is!no!longer!possible!for!the!Court!to!declare!it!unconstitutional!
!o that!a!Filipino!corporation!is!not!
allowed!by!the!Constitution!to!enter!into!an!FTAA!with!the!government!
and!supervision!of!the!State.!!The!State!may!directly!undertake!such!activities,!or!it!may!enter!into!coZproduction,!joint!venture,!or!productionZsharing!agreements!with!Filipino!citizens,!or!corporations!or!associations!at!least!sixty!per!centum!of!whose!capital!is!owned!by!such!citizens.!x!x!x.”!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Filipinos!and!Filipino!corporations!in!the!development!of!our!natural!resources!Ratio!1:!"!Nowhere!in!the!provision!is!there!any!express!limitation!or!restriction!insofar!as!arrangements!other!than!the!three!aforementioned!contractual!schemes!are!concerned.!!Issue(2:(Whether(or(not(the(Court(Can(Still(
Decide(the(Case,(Even(Assuming(It(Is(Moot(
!Held!2:!YES,!the!Court!will!never!digress!from!or!abandon!its!sacred!duty!and!authority!to!uphold!the!Constitution!in!matters!that!involve!grave!abuse!of!discretion!brought!before!it!in!appropriate!cases,!committed!by!any!officer,!agency,!instrumentality!or!department!of!the!government!!Ratio!2:!Remember!the!Requisites!of!Judicial!review!in!Moot!cases!!o VIOLATION!OF!THE!CONSTITUTION:!Where!
an!action!of!the!legislative!branch!is!seriously!alleged!to!have!infringed!the!Constitution,!it!becomes!not!only!the!right!but!in!fact!the!duty!of!the!judiciary!to!settle!the!dispute!
o PARAMOUNT!PUBLIC!INTEREST!involved,!as!well!as!the!necessity!for!a!ruling!to!put!an!end!to!the!uncertainties!plaguing!the!mining!industry!
o CAPABLE!OF!REPETITION,!YET!EVADING!REVIEW!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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!!!!!!!!!!!!Definition!and!Application!!“FULL!CONTROL!AND!SUPERVISION”!as!utilized!in!Section!2!of!Article!XII!enables!the!State!to:!o direct,!restrain,!
regulate!and!govern!the!affairs!of!the!extractive!enterprises!
!o regulate!the!
conduct!of!affairs!in!various!enterprises!based!on!industry!standards!and!similar!measures!
!
o LIS!MOTA:!the!real!issue!in!this!case!is!whether!paragraph!4!of!Section!2!of!Article!XII!of!the!Constitution!is!contravened!by!RA!7942!and!DAO!96Z40,!not!whether!it!was!violated!by!specific!acts!implementing!RA!7942!and!DAO!96Z40!
!Issue(3:(The(Meaning(of(“Agreements(
Involving(
Either(Technical(or(Financial(Assistance”(
!Ratio!3:!The!intent!the!aboveZmentioned!provision!is!to!put!in!place!safeguards!that!would!eliminate!or!minimize!the!abuses!prevalent!during!the!martial!law!regime.!!In!brief,!they!were!going!to!permit!service!contracts!with!foreign!corporations!as!contractors,!but!with!safety!measures!to!prevent!abuses,!as!an!exception!to!the!general!norm!established!in!the!first!paragraph!of!Section!2!of!Article!XII,!which!reserves!or!limits!to!Filipino!citizens!and!corporations!at!least!60!percent!owned!by!such!citizens!the!exploration,!development!and!utilization!of!mineral!or!petroleum!resources.!!The!agreements(involving(either(technical(or(
financial(assistance!referred!to!in!paragraph!4!are!in!fact!service!contracts,!but!such!new!service(contracts(are(between(foreign(
corporations(acting(as(contractors(on!the!one!hand,!and!on!the!other!hand!government!as!principal!or!“owner”!(of!the!works),!whereby!the!foreign!contractor!provides!the!capital,!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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o restrain!activities!deemed!not!desirable!or!beneficial!to!the!economic!development!and!general!welfare!of!the!country!
!o conserve!the!
environment!!!o uplift!the!wellZ
being!of!the!local!affected!communities!
technology!and!technical!knowZhow,!and!managerial!expertise!in!the!creation!and!operation!of!the!largeZscale!mining/extractive!enterprise,!and!government(through(its(
agencies((DENR,(MGB)(actively(exercises(full(
control(and(supervision(over(the(entire(
enterprise.!(
Such!service!contracts!may!be!entered!into!only!with!respect!to!minerals,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils.!!The!grant!of!such!service!contracts!is!subject!to!several!safeguards,!among!them:!!(1)!That!the!service!contract!be!crafted!in!accordance!with!a!general!law!setting!standard!or!uniform!terms,!conditions!and!requirements;!!(2)!The!President!be!the!signatory!for!the!government;!and!!(3)!The!President!reports!the!executed!agreement!to!Congress!within!thirty!days.!!COURT(REVERSALS:(
!The(ff.(are(NOW(CONSTITUTIONAL(!(1) Republic(Act(No.(7942((the(Philippine(
Mining(Law),((
Ratio!1:!The!Section!3(aq)!of!RA!7942!is!not!unconstitutional!in!allowing!a!foreign!contractor!to!apply!for!and!hold!an!exploration!permit!.The!exploration!permit!issued!under!Sections!3(aq),!20!and!23!of!RA!7942,!which!allows!exploration!but!not!extraction,!serves!to!protect!the!interests!and!rights!of!the!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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exploration!permit!grantee!(and!wouldZbe!contractor),!foreign!or!local.!!!!!(2) (its(Implementing(Rules(and(Regulations(
contained(in(DENR(Administrative(Order(
(DAO)(No.(9640(NN(insofar(as(they(relate(to(
financial(and(technical(assistance(
agreements(referred(to(in(paragraph(4(of(
Section(2(of(Article(XII(of(the(Constitution;(
and((
Ratio:!DAO!96Z40!vest!in!government!more!than!a!sufficient!degree!of!control!and!supervision!over!the!conduct!of!mining!operations!!(3) the(Financial(and(Technical(Assistance(
Agreement((FTAA)(dated(March(30,(1995(
executed(by(the(government(and(Western(
Mining(Corporation(Philippines(Inc.(
(WMCP)(
Ratio!3:!The!WMCP!FTAA!clauses!vest!the!State!with!control!and!supervision!over!practically!all!aspects!of!the!operations!of!the!FTAA!contractor,!including!the!charging!of!preZoperating!and!operating!expenses,!and!the!disposition!of!mineral!products.!There!is!no!abdication!of!State!Control.!!EXCEPT!Sections!7.8!and!7.9!of!the!subject!FTAA!which!are!hereby!INVALIDATED!for!being!contrary!to!public!policy!and!for!being!grossly!disadvantageous!to!the!government.!
E.(PHILIPPINE( COMPROMISE( September!10,!1971!!the!National! ! Issue:(Whether(or(not(the(Compromise(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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GEOTHERMALV.(
NAPOCOR((
GR(144302(
May(27,(2004(
1017N1019(
AGREEMENT(
IS(
NOT(A(
BUSINESS(OF(
THE(COURT(
Power!Corporation!(NAPOCOR)!entered!into!a!service!contract!with!Philippine!Geothermal,!Inc.!(PGI),!a!corporation!organized!and!existing!under!the!laws!of!California,!United!States!of!America,!for!the!exploration!and!exploitation!of!geothermal!resources!covering!the!Tiwi!and!MakZBan!Geothermal!Fields.!Section!3.1!of!said!contract!which!provides!that!it!shall!be!renewed!for!another!25!years.!!NPC,!however,!was!doubtful!whether!a!renewal!would!be!constitutional!in!light!of!Section!2,!Article!XII!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!July!8,!1996!!PGI!requested!for!arbitration!with!the!International!Court!of!Arbitration!(ICA)!of!the!International!Chamber!of!Commerce!(ICC).!!March!6,!1997!!Quezon!City!RTC!denied!the!motion!for!reconsideration!of!the!PGI!to!dismiss!the!petition!of!the!NAPOCOR!on!the!ground!that!the!legality!or!constitutionality!of!the!renewal!of!the!service!contract!is!an!issue!which!only!a!regular!court!of!justice!may!resolve!or!settle!and!
!SECTION!2.!All!lands!of!the!public!domain,!waters,!minerals,!coal,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils,!all!forces!of!potential!energy,!fisheries,!forests!or!timber,!wildlife,!flora!and!fauna,!and!other!natural!resources!are!owned!by!the!state.!With!the!exception!of!agricultural!lands,!all!other!natural!resources!shall!not!be!alienated.!!The(exploration,(
development,(and(
utilization(of(natural(
resources(shall(be(
under(the(full(control(
and(supervision(of(the(
state.!!xxx!
Agreement(filed(by(PGI(and(NAPOCOR(is(a(
valid(settlement?(
(
Held:(Denied,(CA’s(Decision(to(Dismiss(
UPHELD(
(
Ratio:((
It!is!beyond!its!jurisdiction!to!pass!upon!and!approve!the!Compromise!Agreement!of!the!parties,!who!have,!as!therein!stated,!“agreed!to!terminate!the!service!contract!subject!of!the!dispute,!in!favor!of”!a!series!of!agreements!that!start!with!“Provisional,”!followed!by!“Interim,”!then!“Transition,”!and!finally!“Geothermal!Resources!Sales!Contract!(GRSC),”!the!forging!of!which!agreements!is!intended!to!“effectively!erase!any!doubt!as!to!the!legality!of!the!compromise.”!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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NOT!ICA.!!Hence,!this!petition!for!review!on!certiorari!seeking!to!set!aside!and!nullify!the!decision!of!the!RTC.!!AT!THE!SIDE!BAR:!Thus![PGI]!and![NPC]!have!agreed!to!terminate!the!Service!Contract!subject!matter!of!the!dispute,!in!favor!of!a!new!Geothermal!Sales!Contract!and!a!PD!1442!Geothermal!Service!Contract,!and!PGI!has!committed!to!form!a!Philippine!company!for!the!development!and!operation!of!the!Tiwi!and!MakZBan!steamfields!(Sec.!6.1!thereof)!on!a!goingZforward!basis,!thereby!effectively!erasing!any!doubt!as!to!the!legality!of!the!compromise.!!March!24,!2000!!Court!of!Appeals!dismissed!the!petition!of!PGI.!
(
Section(3.(Lands(of(the(public(domain(are(classified(into(agricultural,(forest(or(timber,(mineral(lands(and(national(parks.(Agricultural(lands(of(the(
public(domain(may(be(further(classified(by(law(according(to(the(uses(to(which(they(may(be(devoted.(Alienable(lands(of(the(public(domain(shall(be(
limited(to(agricultural(lands.(Private(corporations(or(associations(may(not(hold(such(alienable(lands(of(the(public(domain(except(by(lease,(for(a(period(
not(exceeding(twentyNfive(years,(renewable(for(not(more(than(twentyNfive(years,(and(not(to(exceed(one(thousand(hectares(in(area.(Citizens(of(the(
Philippines(may(lease(not(more(than(five(hundred(hectares,(or(acquire(not(more(than(twelve(hectares(thereof,(by(purchase,(homestead,(or(grant.(
(
Taking(into(account(the(requirements(of(conservation,(ecology,(and(development,(and(subject(to(the(requirements(of(agrarian(reform,(the(Congress(
shall(determine,(by(law,(the(size(of(lands(of(the(public(domain(which(may(be(acquired,(developed,(held,(or(leased(and(the(conditions(thereforE.(
(
(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(
Provision/s(
Issue(&(Ratio(
Republic(v.(CA(
(
160!SCRA!228!(1988)!!
The!Regalian!Doctrine!was!incorrectly!applied!in!the!cases!at!bar!
These!cases!arose!from!the!application!for!registration!of!a!parcel!of!land!filed!by!Jose!de!la!Rosa!on!his!own!behalf!and!on!behalf!of!his!three!children,!Victoria,!Benjamin!and!Eduardo.!The!land,!situated!in!the!Benguet!Province,!was!divided!into!9!lots.!!According!to!the!application,!Lots!1Z5!were!sold!to!Jose!de!la!Rosa!and!Lots!6Z9!to!his!children!by!Mamaya!Balbalio!and!Jaime!Alberto.!!The!application!was!separately!opposed!by:!
1. Benguet!Consolidated,!Inc.(
2. Atok!Big!Wedge!Corporation(
3. Republic(of(the(Philippines(
!In!support!of!the!application,!Balbalio!claimed!to!have!received!Lots!1Z5!from!her!father!shortly!after!the!Liberation.!She!testified!she!was!born!in!the!land,!which!was!possessed!by!her!parents!under!claim!of!ownership.!!Alberto!said!he!received!Lots!6Z9!1961!from!his!mother!who!declared!that!the!land!was!planted!by!Jaime!and!his!predecessorsZinZinterest.!!
Philippine(Bill(of(1902,(
Sec.(21.(
All!valuable!mineral!deposits!in!public!lands!in!the!philippine!Islands!both!surveyed!and!unsurveyed!are!hereby!declared!to!be!free!and!open!to!exploration,!occupation!and!purchase!and!the!land!in!which!they!are!found!to!occupation!and!purchase!by!the!citizens!of!the!United!States,!or!of!said!islands.!!Article(13,(Sec.(1.(
All!agricultural,!timber!and!mineral!lands!of!the!public!domain,!waters,!minerals,!coal,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils,!all!forces!of!potential!energy!and!other!natural!resources!of!the!Philipppines!belong!to!the!State,!and!their!disposition,!exploitation,!
ISSUE:!Whether!or!not!Benguet!and!Atok!have!exclusive!rights!to!the!property!in!question!by!virtue!of!their!respective!mining!claims.!!HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(
Yes,!because!such!property!rights!were!validly!acquired!before!the!Constitution!of!1935!prohibited!the!alienation!of!all!lands!of!the!public!domain!except!agricultural!lands,!subject!to!vested!rights!existing!at!the!time!of!its!adoption.!The!land!was!not!and!could!not!have!been!transferred!to!the!private!respondents!by!virtue!of!acquisitive!prescription,!nor!could!its!use!be!shared!simultaneously!by!them!and!the!mining!companies!for!agricultural!and!mineral!purposes.!!
*!!!*!!!*!!DEEPER(EXPLANATION(
The!subject!property!was!indeed!considered!forest!land!and!included!in!the!Central!Cordillera!Forest!Reserve,!but!this!did!not!impair!the!rights!already!vested!in!Benguet!and!Atok!at!that!time.!The!June!Bug!mineral!claim!of!Benguet!and!the!Fredia!and!Emma!mineral!claims!of!Atok!having!been!perfected!prior!to!the!approval!of!the!Constitution!of!the!Philippines!of!1935,!they!were!removed!from!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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She!was!corroborated!by!Felix!Marcos,!67!years!old!at!the!time,!who!recalled!the!earlier!possession!of!the!land!by!Alberto's!father.!!Both!presented!tax!declarations!and!tax!receipts!to!support!their!petitions.!!!!Benguet!opposed!on!the!ground!that!rom!the!date!of!its!purchase,!Benguet!had!been!in!actual,!continuous!and!exclusive!possession!of!the!land!in!concept!of!owner.!!Atok!alleged!the!lots!he!was!claiming!were!covered!by!the!Emma!and!Fredia!mineral!claims!located!by!Harrison!and!Reynolds!in!the!office!of!the!mining!recorder!of!Baguio.!These!claims!were!purchased!from!these!locators!by!Atok,!which!has!since!then!been!in!open,!continuous!and!exclusive!possession!of!the!said!lots.!(The!location!of!the!mineral!claims!was!made!in!accordance!with!Section(21(of(the(Philippine(Bill(of(1902.)!!The!Bureau(of(Forestry(Development(also!interposed!its!objection,!arguing!that!the!land!sought!to!be!registered!was!
development,!or!utilization!shall!be!limited!to!citizens!of!the!Philippines!or!to!corporations!or!associations!at!least!60%!of!the!capital!of!which!is!owned!by!such!citizens,!subject!to!any!existing!right,!grant,!lease!or!concession!at!the!time!of!the!inauguration!of!the!government!established!under!this!Constitution.!Natural!resources!with!the!exception!of!public!agricultural!lands,!shall!not!be!alienated,!and!no!license,!concession,!or!lease!for!the!exploitation,!development!or!utilization!of!any!of!the!natural!resources!shall!be!granted!for!a!period!exceeding!25!years,!except!as!to!water!rights!for!irrigation,!water!supply,!fisheries,!or!industrial!uses!other!than!the!development!of!water!power,!in!
the!public!domain!and!had!become!private!properties!of!Benguet!and!Atok.!!Such!rights!were!not!affected!either!by!the!restriction!in!the!Commonwealth(Constitution!according!to!Article(XIII,(Section(1,!thereof,!which!was!implemented!by!Act(No.(4268.!!The(perfection(of(the(mining(claim(converted(
the(property(to(mineral(land(and(under(the(
laws(then(in(force(removed(it(from(the(public(
domain.(As(the(land(had(become(the(private(
property(of(the(locators,(they(had(the(right(to(
transfer(the(same,(as(they(did,(to(Benguet(and(
Atok.(
!The!Court!of!Appeals!correctly!observed!that!such!private!property!was!subject!to!the!"vicissitudes!of!ownership,"!or!by!acquisitive(prescription.!!HOWEVER,!the!method!invoked!by!the!de!la!Rosas!is!not!available!in!the!case!at!bar,!for!two!reasons:!
1. The!trial!court!found!that!the!evidence!of!open,!continuous,!adverse!and!exclusive!possession!submitted!by!the!applicants!was!insufficient(to(support(their(claim(of(ownership.!
2. Even!if!it!were!assumed!that!the!predecessorsZinZinterest!of!the!de!la!Rosas!had!really!been!in!possession!of!the!subject!property,!their!possession!was!not!in!the!concept!of!owner!of!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
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covered!by!the!Central(Cordillera(Forest(Reserve(under!Proclamation(
No.(217.!Moreover,!by!reason!of!its!nature,!it!was!not!subject!to!alienation!under!the!Constitutions!of!1935!and!1973.!!THE(RTC’S(DECISION(
The!trial!court!denied!the!application,!holding!that!the!applicants!had!failed!to!prove!their!claim!of!possession!and!ownership!of!the!land!sought!to!be!registered.!!THE(CA’S(DECISION(
The!applicants!appealed!to!the!CA,!which!affirmed!the!surface!rights!of!the!de!la!Rosas!over!the!land!while!reserving!the!subZsurface!rights!of!Benguet!and!Atok!by!virtue!of!their!mining!claims.!!THE(SC(STEPS(IN(
Both!Benguet!and!Atok!have!appealed!to!this!Court,!invoking!their!superior!right!of!ownership.!The!Republic!has!also!appealed!and!reiterates!its!argument!that!neither!the!private!respondents!nor!the!two!mining!companies!have!any!valid!claim!to!the!land!because!it!is!not!alienable!and!registerable.!!!
which!case!beneficial!use!may!be!the!measure!and!the!limit!of!the!grant.!!Act(No.(4268.(
Any!provision!of!existing!laws,!executive!order,!proclamation!to!the!contrary!notwithstanding,!all!locations!of!mining!claim!made!prior!to!February!8,!1935!within!lands!set!apart!as!forest!reserve!under!Sec.!1826!of!the!Revised!Administrative!Code!which!would!be!valid!and!subsisting!location!except!to!the!existence!of!said!reserve!are!hereby!declared!to!be!valid!and!subsisting!locations!as!of!the!date!of!their!respective!locations.!!Commonwealth(Act(
No.(137:(
!Sec.(3.!All!mineral!lands!of!the!public!
the!mining#claim!but!of!the!property!as!agricultural#land,!which!it!was!not.!The(property(was(mineral(land,(and(
they(were(claiming(it(as(agricultural(
land.((
!The!Court!of!Appeals!justified!this!by!saying!there!is!"no!conflict!of!interest"!between!the!owners!of!the!surface!rights!and!the!owners!of!the!subZsurface!rights.!This!is!rather!doctrine,!for!it!is!a!wellZknown!principle!that!the!owner!of!piece!of!land!has!rights!not!only!to!its!surface!but!also!to!everything!underneath!and!the!airspace!above!it!up!to!a!reasonable!height.!!HOWEVER,(this(Court(feels(that(the(rights(
over(the(land(are(indivisible(and(that(the(land(
itself(cannot(be(half(agricultural(and(half(
mineral.(The(classification(must(be(
categorical;(the(land(must(be(either(
completely(mineral(or(completely(agricultural.(
As!long!as!mining!operations!were!being!undertaken!thereon,!or!underneath,!it!did!not!cease!to!be!so!and!become!agricultural,!even!if!only!partly!so,!because!it!was!enclosed!with!a!fence!and!was!cultivated!by!those!who!were!unlawfully!occupying!the!surface.!What!must!have!misled!the!respondent!court!is!Commonwealth(Act(No.(137.!!The(flaw(in(the(reasoning(of(the(CA(is(in(
supposing(that(the(rights(over(the(land(could(
be(used(for(both(mining(and(nonNmining(
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
! domain!and!minerals!belong!to!the!State,!and!their!disposition,!exploitation,!development!or!utilization,!shall!be!limited!to!citizens!of!the!Philippines,!or!to!corporations,!or!associations,!at!least!60%!of!the!capital!of!which!is!owned!by!such!citizens,!subject!to!any!existing!right,!grant,!lease!or!concession!at!the!time!of!the!inauguration!of!government!established!under!the!Constitution.!!Sec.(4.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!the!use!of!land!for!agricultural,!industrial,!commercial,!residential,!or!for!any!purpose!other!than!mining!does!not!include!the!ownership!of,!nor!the!right!to!extract!or!utilize,!the!minerals!which!may!be!found!on!or!under!the!
purposes(simultaneously.!!The!correct!interpretation!is!that!once!minerals!are!discovered!in!the!land,!whatever!the!use!to!which!it!is!being!devoted!at!the!time,!such!use!may!be!discontinued!by!the!State!to!enable!it!to!extract!the!minerals!therein!in!the!exercise!of!its!sovereign!prerogative.!The!land!is!thus!converted!to!mineral!land!and!may!not!be!used!by!any!private!party,!including!the!registered!owner!for!any!other!purpose!that!will!impede!the!mining!operations!to!be!undertaken.!!And(so,(the(decision(of(the(CA(! (SET(ASIDE(
and(that(of(the(RTC(! (REINSTATED.(
!*!!!*!!!*!
!Creek(Mining(Corp.(Case!!!For!all!physical!purposes!of!ownership,!the!owner!is!not!required!to!secure!a!patent!as!long!as!he!complies!with!the!provisions!of!the!mining!laws;!his!possessory!right,!for!all!practical!purposes!of!ownership,!is!as!good!as!though!secured!by!patent.!!
CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**
┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*
surface.!!Sec.(5.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!extract!and!utilize,!the!minerals!included!within!all!areas!for!which!public!agricultural!land!patents!are!granted!are!excluded!and!excepted!from!all!such!patents.!!Sec.(6.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!extract!and!utilize,!the!minerals!included!within!all!areas!for!which!Torrens!titles!are!granted!are!excluded!and!excepted!from!all!such!titles.!!
(