Post on 08-Aug-2020
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System of systems architecture:Attraction Basins and Stability in
Multi-stakeholder Preference SpaceNirav Shah
September 25, 2008
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Agenda
• Comments on SoS literature• Maier’s Heuristic of stable intermediate
forms• A network abstraction of SoS structure• Example model of network formation• Attraction basins as stable forms• An SoS decision hierarchy• Mechanism design as the “knobs”
available to the SoS architect
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Existing state of SoS literature• Dominated by case and experience based
discussion of prior and current SoS– Generated many useful heuristics and guidance for
practitioners but lacks rigor and consistency (Maier1999, Krygiel 1999, Sage 2001, Keating 2003)
• Modeling of SoS is an emerging field– How can models be used to understanding the limits
of these heuristics -- especially in cases whereexisting case literature is lacking? (DeLaurentis 2006)
Maier MW (1999) “Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems” Systems EngineeringKrygiel AJ (1999) Behind the Wizard’s Curtain: An Integration Environment for Systems of SystemsSage AP; Cuppan CD (2001) “On the Systems Engineering and Management of Systems of Systems and
Federations of Systems” Information Knowledge System ManagementKeating C; Rogers R; et al. (2003) “Systems of Systems Engineering” Engineering Management JournalDeLaurentis, D (2006) “Modeling and Simulation: Spanning the Life Cycle of a System of Systems” Methods
for Designing, Planning and Operating Systems of Systems Workshop at Purdue University
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Maier’s Heuristic
• Rechtin and Maier propose this heuristicfor SoS architecture
• What does it mean?• How can it be exploited?
“Complex systems will develop and evolve within anoverall architecture much more rapidly if there arestable intermediate forms than if there are not.”
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What are stable intermediaries?
Technically: The intermediate form operatesEconomically: The SoS could generate value
for its stakeholders to justify said operationPolitically: The SoS has a stable governance
structure that supports implementation
Stable intermediate form:Intermediate state of SoS construction thatis technically, economically, and politicallyself-supporting
Maier 1999
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Problem Statement
• Mostly focused on the staged deploymentfor flexibility aspect– Silver and DeWeck (2007) propose a
framework for choosing optimal pathsbetween different sequences of intermediaries
• In collaborative SoS, the choice of pathdecision is distributed amongst theconstituents
What are the path dynamics that occur when thechoice of path is distributed?
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Network abstraction
t=0 t=1 t=2
• View the SoS as network of independentconstituents that, through interfaces, createbehavior that they could not achieve otherwise
• Network structure and the set of constituentschanges over time
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A network formation model
Key decision modeled is theformation / destruction of links
Woodard (2006) “Efficiency and Stability in Complex Value Networks”in Architectural Strategy and Design Evolution in Complex EngineeredSystems PhD. Thesis Harvard University
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Collaborative decision loop
• SoS is a network of linked constituents• In each round, constituents choose which links to
operate• Awarded payoffs depending on the network state
Woodard 2006
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Link Formation
1. Observe prior states incoming links2. Choose outgoing links that maximize
payoff given observed incoming links3. All constituents simultaneously change
links based on choice in step 2
Woodard 2006
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Similar Real World Examples
Simplified routing: Observe incomingtraffic, choose which outgoing routes togive priority
Supply networks: Firms payoffs depend onwho offers to buy their finished goods andfrom whom they choose to purchasesupplies (note that links in this caserepresent monetary flows, goods wouldflow in the opposite direction)
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A small example run
Initial State
Converged State #1
Converged State #2
N = 4 firmsK = 2 outgoing links per firmSimultaneous movesNo bargainingNo global incentives
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Time traces of total payoff
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Convergence
• Configuration converges either to a– Fixed point: Nash Equilibrium– Limit Cycle: Preference top cycle -- not
equilibrium• For small N, K can map entire space of
possible network states and determinewhich connection decision will be made foreach state
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N = 4; K = 2 State Space
• For a given N, K, institutions andpayoff structure…
• Each network configuration mapsto an integer, one bit per link
• An arrow connecting two statesmeans that if the network is in thetail state, it will transition to thehead state in the following round
This structure provides an overall map of thecollective preference space of all constituents
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Attraction Basins
• State space divided into several basins ofattraction
• If the network state is in one of the basins,it will never leave, and will converge to thelimit set of the basin (similar to Kauffman’s(1993) Random Binary Networks)
• Limit sets are the stable intermediaries incollaborative decision space (i.e. politicalstability as Maier puts it)
Kauffman, SA (1993) The Origins of Order: Self-organization and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University Press.
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Implications
• Once the system is in an attraction basin, itcannot get out
• SoS stakeholders can use the limit sets asstable forms, providing incentive to move fromone attraction basin to another– This is management of the SoS when incentive
availability is uncertain– If an external SoS stakeholder wishes to keep the
system in some desired state, they must encourageincentivize creation such that the preferred state is theequilibrium point under the implied payoff structure
seari.mit.edu © 2008 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 18Side-payments and
info exchange
Network abstraction
Constituent Agents (CAs)control constituent systems
and form interfaces withother constituents
t=0 t=1 t=2
CAs make decisions basedupon perceived valuestreams mediated by side-payments and SoS incentives
Incentives
SoS Agents provide incentives toCAs to encourage beneficialformation interfaces and changesin constituents behavior thatwould not occur otherwise
SoS Agents value thebehavior of the SoS as a
whole. They directly controlsome sub-systems of theSoS and/or constituents
Interactions over timelead to varying SoSstructure and behaviorS2S1
Competing SAs provide alternate incentives
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SoS architecture asmechanism design
Principal-Agent problem: A game in which one player’s(the principal) payoff is determined by the action ofanother player (the agent) who also has preferences onthose actions. The principal cannot take the actiondirectly and must rely upon the agent in order to receivetheir payoff.
Mechanism design: “Mechanism design is the subfield ofmicroeconomics and game theory that considers how toimplement good system-wide solutions to problems thatinvolve multiple self-interested agents, each with privateinformation about their preferences.”
DC Parks (1993) Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and ComputationalEfficiency. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Pennsylvania
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Potential Mechanisms for SoSExamples from the InternetApproach
New TCP standardChange the institutions underwhich the constituents interact andthe system is operated
Vertical integration of tier I and tierII network operators
Redefine the relationships betweenthe constituents throughintegration or reallocation
Publishing blacklists of spammersChange decisions by providingadditional information
Bundling of services at a discountChange the payoffs throughincentives or penalties
Under managerial independence, mechanism such asthese are the real “knobs” available to the SoS architect
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Limitations
• Accounting for delays and other temporal phenomena• Computational / modeling complexity
– Mega-models are often intractable– Can still be used to understand the mechanisms behind
heuristics– May be able to build “flight simulators” so that architects can be
sensitized to these issues
• Only one piece of the puzzle– Relies upon other work in systems modeling and design to
provide inputs to the decision problems– Assumes that agents are rational and that their preferences can
be characterized– Not all systems reach stable forms
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On-going work
• On-going work– Mathematical formulation of the mechanism design
problem tailored for SoS– Transportation system model in progress
• Thesis with the formulation and examples ofeach of the four mechanism
nbshah@mit.edu
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Decision making hierarchy
Institutional
Connective
Operational
Standards, protocols, high level norms
Connections between components to form SoS
Management, maintenance and operation of SoS
Which connections are possible/allowed?
How does the SoS operate to create SoS value?
Which connections are made?
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Example 1: IntermodalTransport
• Interconnection oftransportation networks ofdifferent modalities– Rail-Road-Water-Air
• Interconnection points areports
• Each mode maybecontrolled by anindependent authority
• The ports can also beindependent
www.cartoonstock.com
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Example 1: IntermodalTransport
Rail/Road/Ship container standardsRegulations for Bills of Lading
Port construction
Port operation, route planning
Institutional
Connective
Operational
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Examples
• Construction: Building a shoppingcomplex one wing at a time
• Space systems: Staged deployment ofconstellation
• Air Defense: Multi-capability systems thathave fallback states in the event of failureof part of the SoS