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Synthesis Report of the Joint WFP and UNHCR Impact Evaluations on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations
May 2013
table of contentsExecutive Summary ................................................................................................................................3
Background......................................................................................................................................3
Results.............................................................................................................................................3
FactorsInfluencingtheResults........................................................................................................4
ConclusionandRecommendations.................................................................................................5
Draft Decision .........................................................................................................................................5
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................6
GlobalPolicyandInstitutionalContext............................................................................................6
TheoryofChange.............................................................................................................................7
MethodologiesUsed........................................................................................................................8
Main Findings by Results Area ..............................................................................................................9
FoodSecurity...................................................................................................................................9
Nutrition..........................................................................................................................................10
Livelihoods.....................................................................................................................................12
ProtectionandGender...................................................................................................................14
EffectsofFoodAssistanceonRelationsbetweenRefugeesandHostPopulations.....................16
Factors that Explain and Influenced the Results ..............................................................................17
ExternalFactors.............................................................................................................................17
InternalFactors..............................................................................................................................18
Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................................21
Recommendations ...............................................................................................................................23
Annex: LogicModel–theImpactofFoodAidAssistanceonProtractedRefugeePopulations ..........26
Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................................28
Management Response .......................................................................................................................29
Note on the Side Event ........................................................................................................................35
1
executive summary
Background
Thisisasynthesisofthemainfindingsandcommonlessonsemergingfromaseriesofmixed-methodimpactevaluationsassessingthecontributionoffoodassistancetodurablesolutionsinprotractedrefugeesituations.Theevaluations,conductedjointlywiththeOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)through2011–2012inBangladesh,Chad,EthiopiaandRwanda,testedthevalidityofaninterventionlogicderivedfromUNHCRandWFPpoliciesandprogrammeguidance,whichpositedthatthetwoagencies’combinedworkwouldcontributetoincreasedself-relianceoverthreestagesfollowingrefugeearrival.
Results
Ü Food security and nutrition
Unacceptablyhighnumbersofrefugeehouseholdsremainedfood-insecure,especiallyinthesecondhalfoftheperiodbetweenfooddistributions.Womenweremorefood-insecurethanmen,oftenbecausetheyhadmoredependants.Ratesofchronicmalnutritionreachedorexceededthehighseveritythresholdinallfourcontexts,andanaemiaprevalencewashigh,butsimilartonationalrates.
Globalacutemalnutritionratesrangedfromacceptabletoserious,andwerehigherinBangladesh.Trendsweremixed,butrateswerebetteramongrefugeesthanamongthehostpopulationinallfourcontexts,suggestingthatfoodassistancehadapositiveimpact.Severeacutemalnutritionrateswerealsomixed.
Insomeprogrammes,fundingshortfalls,pipelinebreaksandirregularupdatingofrefugeeregistersresultedingeneralfooddistribution(GFD)rationsbeinglessthanthe2,100kcalperdaystandardanddeficientinproteinsandmicronutrients.
Ü Livelihoods
Livelihoodoptionsforrefugeeswereverylimitedandlivelihoodsupportwasgenerallyweak.Refugeesdidnothaveaccesstoformallabourmarkets,exceptinRwanda,oradequatelandforagriculture,exceptinChad.Asaresult,themostcommontypeofworkforrefugeeswasunskilleddaylabourinpoorconditions,competingwithlocalpopulations.
3
Themainsourceofrefugeeincomeandcollateralwasfoodrationsandnon-fooditems,whichweresoldandexchangedprimarilytomeetunmetbasicneeds,suchasclothing,andtopayformilling,healthservicesandschoolexpenses.Womenweregenerallythemanagersofhouseholdfoodsuppliesandboretheburdenandrisksofindebtedness.However,exceptinRwanda,women’sparticipationincampcommitteesremainedlimited.
Inallfourcontexts,women’slivelihoodactivitieswereespeciallyprecariousandoftenexposedthemtorisk.Manywomenandadolescentgirlsreliedonactivitiessuchascollectingfuelwood,begginganddomesticservice;transactionalandsurvivalsexwerecommon.
Ü Protection and gender
Refugeesgenerallyreportedfeelingsaferinsidecamps,butprotectionissueswerealsoreportedinsidethecampsinallfourcontexts.Womenweremorevulnerableinallcases,becauseofboththeirsearchforlivelihoodopportunitiesanddomesticviolence.Infood-insecurehouseholds,girlsweresometimesforcedintoearlymarriagesandwomenintounwantedmarriages.
Theevaluationsindicatedconsiderablevariationintheprovisionofprotectionsupport,withprotectioninterventionsagainstsexualandgender-basedviolence(SGBV)tendingtobereactiveandfailingtoaddresstherootcauses,asperceivedbyrefugeewomenandgirls.
Theevaluationspresentedamixedpictureofrelationsbetweenrefugeesandhostpopulations.Innocontextwastherelationshippurelyantagonisticorpurelyharmonious,althoughittendedtobebetterwheretherewasculturalaffinity.Thepresenceofrefugees–tradinginlocalmarketsanddrawinginadditionalinfrastructureandbasicservices–wasusuallywelcomed.Conflicttypicallyoccurredwhenfoodassistancetorefugeeswasperceivedasignoringtheneedsoflocalpoorpeopleand/orwhenrefugeescompetedwithlocalpeopleforlabourandscarcenaturalresources.UNHCR/WFPengagementwithhostcommunitieswasverylimitedandopportunitiesforsynergieswerebeingmissed.
Factors Influencing the Results
Twocommonkeycontextualfactorsstoodout:donorfundingpoliciesandhostgovernmentpolicies.Long-termsupportforprotractedrefugeesfitsuneasilywithconventionaldonorfundingmodalities,whichdifferentiatebetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentassistance.Thisresultedinseriousfundingshortfallsandinadequatesupportforprogresstowardsself-reliance.Mobilityandaccesstojobmarketsareessentialforprospectsforself-reliance.Inallfourcontexts,hostgovernmentsdidnotpermitformalintegrationofrefugees,insufficientlandwasmadeavailableandmobilitywasrestricted.
ThemostprominentfactorsinfluencingtheresultsthatarewithinWFP’scontrolwereinaccuraterefugeehouseholdrecordsandinfrequentrevalidation;insufficientlyfrequentandpoorlytimeddistributionsofnon-fooditems;inadequatemonitoringoffooddistributions;poorfollow-uptojointassessmentmissionsandweakjointplansofaction;andmissedopportunitiesforsynergieswithdevelopmentorlivelihoodsandsocialprotectionprogrammesamongthehostpopulation.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Theoverarchingconclusionfromthisseriesisthattheintendedevolutiontowardsself-reliancehasnotoccurred.Theinternationalcommunity’sresponsetorefugeesinprotractedcrisesisfailingtodeliver.Concertedactionisrequiredamongallactorstoresolvetheissuesblockingprogress,backedbythepoliticalandfinancialwilltoenablerefugeestomakeproductivecontributionstothecountrieswheretheylive,andtosupportotherlong-termdurablesolutionswhereappropriate.
RecognizingthatWFPandUNHCRcannotsolvethisfailurealone,thesynthesismakesfivestrategicrecommendationsforvariousparties:WFPandUNHCRshoulddevelopastrategyandmanagementmechanismsforthetransitiontoself-reliance,usingamoreholisticapproachandestablishingthepartnershipsnecessarytoachieveitatthecorporateandcountrylevels;theInter-AgencyStandingCommitteeshouldforgeanactionplantoenhancethearchitectureforaccountabilityinthissharedresponsibility;UnitedNationscountryteamsshouldengagelivelihoodsactorsandbuildpoliticalwillforanewapproach;anddonorsshouldovercomefundingbarriers.
decision of the WFP Executive Board*
The Board took note of “Synthesis Summary Report of the Joint UNHCR/WFP Impact Evaluations on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations” (WFP/EB.1/2013/6-C) and the management response in WFP/EB.1/2013/6-C/Add.1 and encouraged further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.
* The Executive Board is the Governing Body of the United Nations World Food Programme.
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introduction
Global Policy and Institutional Context
1. TheOfficeoftheUNHCRandWFPhavebeenworkingtogetherinsupportofrefugeessincebeforetheysignedtheirfirstMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)in1985.Inprotractedsituations,WFPprogrammeguidancecallsforamulti-yearstrategicplanforself-reliance,1inlinewithUNHCR’sHandbook for Self-Reliance.2Thisreflectstheshiftfromapolicyofcareandmaintenanceofrefugeesinprotracteddisplacementtooneofpromotingself-reliance.WFPhaspilotedandadoptednewapproachesandtoolsforfoodassistance,whichgobeyondin-kindfooddistributionandincludeimprovednutritioninterventions,innovationsinfoodprocurement,theuseofcashandvouchers,capacitydevelopment,andsupportforlivelihoodsandlongtermsolutions.UNHCRhasusedcashgrantsinrepatriationprogrammes,buthasonlyrecentlystartedtoconsiderusingtheminrefugeecamps.
2. Aseriesoffourjoint,mixed-methodimpactevaluationswascarriedoutduring2011and2012,exploringthecontributionoffoodassistanceinWFP-UNHCRoperationsinprotractedrefugeesituations.3Theevaluationsanalysedtheimpactoffoodassistanceon:
Ü MyanmarRohingyarefugeesinBangladesh,arrivingsincetheearly1990s;
Ü RefugeesfromtheCentralAfricanRepublic,arrivinginsouthernChadsince2002;
Ü EritreanandSomalirefugeesinEthiopia,manylivingincampsfortwodecades;
Ü CongoleserefugeeslivingincampsinRwandasince1994.
3. Theoverallobjectiveoftheevaluationserieswastoprovideevidenceandinspirationforfuturestrategiesforimprovingthecontributionoffoodassistancetoincreasedself-reliance,andpotentiallytodurablesolutions,forbothrefugeesandhostpopulationsinprotractedrefugeesituations.
4. Thissynthesisoftheseriesdrawsoutlessonsthatemergedacrossthefourevaluationsandprovidesevidencetoinformglobalandagency-specificchoicesonpoliciesandstrategiesconcerningappropriateformsandfocusesforfoodassistanceinprotractedrefugeesituations.Themainintendedaudiencesarepolicy-andstrategy-makerswithinWFPandUNHCR,governmentshostingrefugeesinprotractedsituations,donoragenciesandotherrelevantUnitedNationsagencies.
1 WFP Programme Guidance Manual (PGMWiki) on refugees.2 http://www.unhcr.org/44bf40cc2.html 3 The selection criteria were: i) Minimum seven years of operations and still ongoing in 2009; ii) More than 50,000 refugee
beneficiaries in 2009 and at least two of the four countries should have an average of more than 100,000 refugee beneficiaries per year from 2003 to 2009; iii) Camp/settlement situation; iv) Sample includes examples of all major modalities used in the last five years to address protracted situations; v) Sample broadly represents overall geographic profile of WFP and UNHCR portfolio; vi) Situation is evaluable, but not recently evaluated; vii) UNHCR and WFP country office and host government are interested in the evaluation being conducted.
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Theory of Change
5. Theseimpactevaluationstestedthevalidityofaninterventionlogic4derivedfromtheMOUbetweenUNHCRandWFPandthetwoagencies’respectivepoliciesandprogrammeguidance.Thislogicpositedthattheagencies’combinedactivitiesandinputscontributedtoincreasedrefugeeself-relianceoverthreestagesofevolution,startingfromtherefugees’situationonarrival.Althoughthislogicprovidedtherationaleforevaluatingfoodassistanceinthefourcontexts,itdidnothaveformalstatuswithineitheragency.Allfourevaluationstesteditsassumptionsandtheextenttowhichfoodassistancecontributedtooutcomelevelsovertime.AdiagramofthelogicmodelisprovidedintheAnnextothisreport.
6. Whileallfourevaluationreportsrefertotheinterventionlogic,itismostthoroughlydescribedandanalysedintheRwandaandEthiopiaevaluations.
Water point in Nayapara UNHCR camp. © UNHCR / C. Canteli
4 Referred to as the “theory of change” in some evaluation reports.
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Methodologies Used
7. Allfourstudiesusedasimilartheory-basedmixed-methodsapproachtoassesstheextenttowhichfoodassistancecontributedtoexpectedoutcomesandimpacts,andtounintendedeffects,andthechangesthatwouldbeneededtoimprovethiscontributiontotheattainmentofself-relianceanddurablesolutions.Themethodsincludeddeskreviews;interviewswithWFPandUNHCRstakeholders;reviewsofliteratureandsecondarydata;quantitativesurveys;transectwalks;andqualitativeinterviews,includingwithfocusgroupsofbeneficiariesandmembersoflocalrefugee-hostingcommunities.
8. Giventheimpossibilityofusingconventionalcounterfactuals,otherrelevantcomparisonswereselectedforeachcontext.InChad,expectationsthatencampedrefugeeswouldgrowtheirownfoodhadledtoaphasedreductiontohalfrationsinsomecamps.Whilethemainfocusoftheotherevaluationswasonencampedandofficiallyrecognizedrefugees,theBangladeshreportalsoanalysedsomeindicatorsforthelargenumberofpeoplejudgedbyUNHCRtoberefugeesaccordingtothecriteriaofthe1951RefugeeConvention,butnotacknowledgedassuchbytheGovernmentofBangladeshandthusofficiallydisqualifiedfromreceivinghumanitarianassistance.
9. Alltheevaluationsusedsecondarydatatoanalysetheevolutionofnutritionindicatorssuchasglobalacutemalnutrition(GAM),severeacutemalnutrition(SAM)andstuntingrates,throughouttheevaluationperiod,withtheexceptionofRwanda,whereonlydatafrom2008wereavailable.Householdfoodsecuritywasmeasuredusingthestandardindicatorsoffoodconsumptionscore(FCS),householddietarydiversityscore(HDDS)andcopingstrategyindex(CSI).AlthoughFCS,HDDS,CSI,andassetscorestomeasurehouseholdlevelsofwealthwerecalculatedfromsimilarmodulesofthequestionnairesusedbyevaluators,usingstandardorsimilartechniques,theywerenotalwaysdirectlycomparable.
10.Comparabilityamongtheevaluationswasfurthercomplicatedbyvariationsindefinitionsofconcepts,andcontextualandotherexternalfactorsinfluencingthelivesofrefugeesinprotractedsituations.
11.Inseveralcontextsavailabilityofpreviouslycollecteddatahadlimitations.TheteaminRwandalackedsystematicnutritiondatafromthecampsandsurroundingareas.TeamsinBangladesh,ChadandEthiopiafacedpoorhistoricalrecord-keepingandinaccuratecampdatabases.Enumeratorsoftenfoundthatparticularhouseholdswerenotwheretheyweresupposedtobeorwerenolongerinthecamp.
12.PossiblebiasesinquantitativesurveydataarosefromthetimingofsurveysinChadandRwanda,whichcouldhaveanimpactonaccessibility,respondentavailability,foodconsumptionanddietarydiversity,dependingontheseasonandthetimingofthelastGFD.Insomeoftheplacesvisitedmanymenwereaway,takingadvantageofearlyrainstoworkintheirfields.InBangladesh,thesamplewasredesignedseveraltimesbecauseman-headedhouseholdsweredifficulttoidentify.InRwandaandsomecampsinChad,responsesmayhavebeeninfluencedbyrefugees’resentmentatreducedrations,respondentinterviewfatigueandthehostcommunity’sexpectationsofassistance.
13.However,themainguarantorofthevalidityofthefindingsistheverybroadrangeofsourcesandmethodsusedtoassembleevidenceanditstriangulation.
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main findings by results area
Food Security
14.Unacceptablyhighnumbersofrefugeehouseholdswerenotfood-secure,especiallyinthesecondhalfoftheperiodbetweenfooddistributions.Womenwerefoundtobemorefood-insecurethanmen,oftenbecausetheyhadmoredependants.Seasonality,insufficientfundingandpipelinebreakswereamongthemainfactorsaffectingthefoodsecurityofrefugees.
15.Specificfindingsfromthedifferentevaluationsunderlinedthelimitedeffectsoffoodassistanceonfoodsecurityinthelongerterm.InRwandaandamongTigrayanrefugeesinEthiopia,anarrowmajority–fewerthan60percent–attainedacceptableFCS.InEthiopiatheremainingrefugeeshadborderlineorpoorFCS,withonlyathirdofSomalirefugeesreachingtheacceptablelevel.InChad,campsreceivingfullrationspresentedhigherpercentagesofhouseholdswithacceptableFCS(81.1percent)thancampsreceivinghalfornorations(about40percent)orthanneighbouringvillages(62.2percent).
16.Acombinationofinternalandexternalfactorsaffectedfoodconsumption.Insomeprogrammes,lackoffundingand/orpipelinebreaksresultedinWFPgeneralfoodrationsprovidingindividualswithlessthanthestandard2,100kcalsperday.InRwanda,refugeesneverreceivedtheintendedcompleterationpackage.Incontrast,inEthiopiathefullbasketoffoodcommoditieswasdeliveredtothecampsonscheduleinmostmonthsfrom2008.RationsweredeliveredontimeinBangladesh,butfamilysizesdidnotcoincidewithrationsizesbecausebeneficiaryfigureswerenotupdated,sofoodrationsweresharedwidelyanddidnotmeetfamilies’needs.InChad,rationsdidnotcoverneeds,particularlyforcereals,andreductiontohalfrationsledtodeteriorationoffoodsecurity.
17.Althoughusingslightlydifferentdefinitionsofhouseholdsheadedbywomen,alltheevaluationsfoundthatthesehouseholdstendedtosuffermorefromfoodinsecurity.However,inevaluationsthatincludedsurveysofnon-beneficiaryhouseholds–Bangladesh5andChad–itwasobservedthatthegapbetweenhouseholdsheadedbywomenandthoseheadedbymenwassmalleramongbeneficiaries.Thisfindingindicatesthatfoodassistancehadapositiveeffectonnarrowingthegendergapinfoodinsecurity.
18.Refugeewomen’sliveswereruledbythecycleofdistributions.Theyknewthevalueofeachkindoffoodornon-fooditem(NFI)receivedandmadecrucialdecisionsintheperiodofhungerleadingtothenextGFD.However,exceptforinRwanda,women’sparticipationincampfooddistributioncommitteesgenerallyremainedlimited,andinEthiopiapatriarchalnormswentunchallenged.Womenweregenerallythemanagersofhouseholdfoodsuppliesandboretheburdenandrisksofindebtedness,evenwhentheythemselvesdidnotholdrationcards.InRwanda,womenweregivencardsbutthishadtheunintendedeffectofincreasingindebtedness.
5 Comparisons were made with unregistered refugee women at makeshift sites in Bangladesh.
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Nutrition
19.Global acute malnutrition rates:AsFigure1shows,GAMratesintherefugeecampsinChadwereclosetothe“internationallyacceptable”levelof5percentandwerefairlystablefrom2008to2011.InEthiopia,thetrendwaspositivefrom2005,exceptforaspikein2009,butwasstillabovethe“acceptable”level.InRwanda,in2008–theyearforwhichstatisticallyvaliddatawereavailable–rateswerecloseto“serious”,buttherewasevidencethatthesituationhadimprovedsincethen.InBangladesh,thedatasuggestedaworseningtrend,from“serious”towards“critical”,butratesintherefugeecampsweresimilartoorlowerthanthoseinthehostpopulationandappearedtobemoreundercontrol–theyweresubstantiallybetterthanthoseinthemakeshiftsitesforunregisteredrefugees.
20.SevereacutemalnutritionratesinChadandEthiopiawerebroughtbelowthe1percentthreshold(seeFigure2),exceptforintheKunamaethnicgroupamongEritreanrefugeesinEthiopia.RatesinEthiopiaweresimilartoorconsiderablybetterthanthoseprevailingintheregionswherethecampswerelocated.Incontrast,inBangladesh,althoughtheyimproved,SAMratesinthecampsremainedabovetheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)thresholdforemergency(2percent).v
21.Allfourevaluationsfoundlowdietarydiversityamongrefugees,whosedietsweremonotonousandgenerallyinsufficient.Meat,eggs,fish,fruit,dairyproductsandgreenvegetableswerenotconsumedatallorwereconsumedlessthanonceperweek,andanaemiaratesremainedhigh.
22.Thehouseholddietarydiversityscoreseemedtodependonfooddistribution,asbasketitemsweresoldorexchangedforcomplementaryitems,soHDDSreachedhighervaluesonthedaysafteradistribution.
Figure 1: GAMRatesAmongSurveyedPopulationGroups
6 No trend data were available for Rwanda. In 2008, rates were acceptable in one camp, but at emergency levels in the other two.
Ethiopia:GAMratesbycamp Rwanda:GAMratesbycamp(2008only)
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Enumerator interviewing a refugee man in camp of Amboko (Community center) © UNHCR / C. Canteli
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23.Someevaluationsreporteddietarydeficienciesintherationsthemselves,whichmayreflectatrendacrossthefourcontexts,althoughthereweredifferencesintherationsprovided.InChad,rationswereoftendeficientinprotein,calciumandvitaminsB2andC.InBangladesh,theyweredeficientinproteinandmicronutrients.InRwanda,therationmetonly95percentofenergyrequirements,wasdeficientinvitaminA–providingonly54percentoftherequirement–iron(92percent),calcium(44percent)andriboflavin(73percent),andwascompletelylackinginvitaminC.
24.Allfourevaluationsrevealedhighstuntingratesandanaemiaprevalence.InRwanda,chronicmalnutritionratesexceededtheinternationalhumanitarianthresholdforcritical.InBangladeshandChad,rateswereabovethe30percenthigh-severitythreshold.InEthiopia,theyvariedbyethnicgroup,appearingtobenegligibleamongSomalirefugeesbutunacceptablyhighamongEritreanKunamarefugees.Culturalattitudestofood,foodpreparationandchildrearing,andvariationsinhowmuchofthefoodrationrefugeessoldandtheiraccesstoexternalsourcesofincomecouldleadtodifferentfood-relatedoutcomesamongrefugeeswithbroadlysimilarfooddistributionregimes.Inallcases,ratesweresimilartonationalrates.
Livelihoods
25.Livelihoodoptionsforrefugeesinallfourevaluationswerelimited;refugeeswereoftencutofffromskillsdevelopmentandhadverylimitedornoaccesstolabourmarkets.Manyrefugeesthereforesearchedforalternativelivelihoodopportunities,someofwhichinvolvednegativecopingstrategiessuchasworkthatexposedthemtoprotectionrisksandexploitation.SellingfooditemsorNFIswasanothercommoncopingmechanism.
26.Theonlyservicethatmostrefugeesinallfourcontextscouldofferwasunskilleddaylabour.ExceptionswerenotedinRwandaandamongrefugeesinBangladesh.Significantly,theBangladeshsurveyindicatedthatunregisteredrefugeeslivinginurbanareas,whodidnotbenefitfromfoodassistance,assimilatedbetterthanregisteredrefugeesandwereengagedinsimilarlabouractivitiestoequivalentquintilesinthelocalpopulation.Thefourevaluationsdemonstratedthatveryfewrefugeesownedbusinessesorengagedinpettytrade.Mostbusinessactivitiesinandaroundcampswereownedbylocalresidents.
Figure 2: SAMRatesAmongSurveyedPopulations
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27.Refugeeshavelimitedbargainingpower.AcommonaspectofthethreeAfricaevaluationswasthatlocalresidentsfrequentlyappearedtochargerefugeesabove-marketpricesformillingandelectricityorboughttheirrationsatpoortermsoftrade.InBangladesh,refugeesemployedindangeroustaskssuchasloadingandunloadingships,anddeep-seafishingwerepaidsignificantlylessthanlocalpeople,despitelabourlaws.Thisfueledtensionwithlocals,whowerethemselvesoftenfood-insecureandresentedregisteredrefugees’receiptofrations.
28.Commontoallevaluationswasthelimitedfocusonlivelihoodsinassistanceprovision.Thiswaspartlybecauseofshort-termfunding,asinEthiopia,orgovernment-imposedlimitations,asinBangladesh.TheRwandanreportmentionedthatmostrefugeesappearedmotivatedtoimprovetheirlivelihoods,butasassistanceconcentratedonensuringanacceptableleveloffoodsecurityandhealth,ratherthanonprotectingorbuildingassets,therewaslittlescopeforrefugeestoplanbeyondtheircurrentneeds.
29.Theevaluationsfoundthatlivelihoodssupport,whengiven,wasgenerallyweak,althoughtherewereconsiderabledifferencesinlevelsofsuchsupport.TheEthiopianevaluationnotedthatthereweretoomanysmall,unconnectedandlow-intensityactivitiestomakeadifferenceformostrefugees.Vocationaltrainingandmicrocreditsupportwerenon-existent,sporadic,verylow-scaleand/ordiscouragedbyhostgovernments.InRwanda,theevaluationnotedthatthequalityoftrainingandthematerialsupportprovidedforstart-upwereinsufficienttomakemostbeneficiariescompetitiveenoughtoearnalivelihoodontheopenmarket.
30.Accesstoadequatefarmingorgrazinglandwasessentialforself-reliance,butspatiallimitationsoncamps–especiallythoseindenselypopulatedareasofdenselypopulatedcountriessuchasRwandaandBangladesh–andgovernmentpoliciesrestrictedaccesstoland.InRwanda,refugeeswerebannedfromowninglivestock.InsouthernChad,theyweregivenaccesstounviablysmallparcelsofland,wheretheywereunabletopractisethecroprotationoflocalfarmersandsawsoilfertilitydeclineandpestdamageincrease.
31.Refugees’relationswithlocalcommunitieswereanotherfactorthatlimitedtheirlivelihoodopportunities,oftenbecauseofcompetingaccesstolocalresources–suchasriverfishing,fuelwoodorfarmland–orlabouropportunities,particularlyfordaylabour.TherewerereportsfromChadthatlocalpeopledroverefugeesfromthelandthatwasallocatedtothembytheChadianauthorities.
32.Theevaluationsalsoindicatedthatlivelihoodorincome-earningopportunitiesvariedsignificantlyacrosscamps,bysexandbyethnicitywithincamps.Womenheadsofhousehold,whogenerallyhadhighdependencyratiosandchild-rearingresponsibilities,wereparticularlyhamperedbylackofsustainablelivelihoodopportunitiesandexposedtoriskswhenforcedtoleavecampstolookforincomesources.Inallfourcontexts,manyhouseholdsheadedbywomenengagedinprecariousshort-termactivitiessuchasfuelwoodcollection,andtransactionalandsurvivalsex.
33.Inthegeneralabsenceofviablelivelihoodstrategies,theevaluationsreportedthatthemainsourcesofrefugeeincomeweredaylabourandthesaleoffoodrationsandNFIs.RationsandNFIsweresoldandexchangedforavarietyofreasons,butprimarilyforbasicneeds:topurchasecomplementaryfooditems,particularlycondiments,clothing,soapandfuel,ortopayforaccesstomills,healthservicesandschools.TheEthiopianreportestimatedthatuptohalfofallrationsweresold.InRwanda,thefoodrationconstitutedtherefugees’mainsourceofincomeandsecurity,eventhoughitwaslowerincalories,diversityandnutritionalqualitythaninearlieryears.InBangladesh,foodrationcards7weredepositedwithmoneylenderswhotookpartoftherationasinterestuntilthemoneywaspaidback.
7 Called “family books” in Bangladesh.
13
Protection and Gender
34.Theevaluationsindicatedconsiderablevariationintheprovisionofprotectionsupport.Refugeesgenerallyreportedfeelingsaferinsidecamps,oftennotingimprovementsinincampsecuritysincetheirarrival.However,inallevaluations,protectionissueswerereportedinsidethecamps.Women,especiallywidowsandwomenheadsofhousehold,weremorevulnerableinallcases,becauseofboththeirsearchforlivelihoodopportunitiesanddomesticviolence.
35.TheBangladeshevaluationexploredtherelationbetweenfoodassistanceandprotectionthroughcomparisonswithrefugeeswhodidnotreceivefoodassistance.Theevaluationidentifiedinformalprotectionmechanismsoperatingthroughouttheregion,whichwerelinkedtopatronagesystemsandprotectionfromcommunitygroupsandimamsandwereoftenusedinemergencysituationssuchashospitalization.However,thistypeofprotectionwasmorecommonamongtheunregisteredrefugeeslivinginmakeshiftsitesclosetoofficialcampsthanamongthosereceivingfoodassistance.
36.Refugeesreportedvulnerabilitytoviolenceandintimidationbycampauthoritiesandnon-elected,designatedrefugeeleaders.Localpatrons,thebusinesscommunityandlocalauthoritieswerealsolinkedtocasesofabuseandviolenceagainstrefugees.Refugeesdidnotusecomplaintmechanismsbecausetheyfearedretaliation.However,inBangladesh,abuse,sexworkandexploitationwereevenmorecommonamongunregisteredrefugeewomenlivinginmakeshiftsitesthanamongregisteredrefugeewomeninsidethecamps.
14
37.Inallfourcountries,womenandadolescentgirlswereexposedtoSGBVintheirsearchforincome.InBangladesh,ChadandEthiopiatherewerereportsthatgirlsinvulnerablefood-insecurerefugeehouseholdshadbeenforcedintoearlymarriages,oftenasco-wivesofprosperouslocals.Ifdivorced,womenhadbeenleftwithdependentchildrenwhomaynothavehadrightstorationsbecauseofpatrilinealdeterminationofcitizenshipandrefugeestatus.InEthiopia,therewerereportsofincreasedlevelsofpolygamyasacopingstrategy.
38.Therewasalsoevidencethatdomesticviolencemayhaveincreasedasaresultofprotracteddisplacement.Womencouldbeatriskfrommenwhofeltemasculatedbycamplifeandtheinabilitytoprovidefortheirfamilies.InBangladesh,frustrationsandlackofspaceprovokedhighlevelsoftensionwithinrefugeehouseholds.InChad,domesticviolenceincreasedafterdistributionsbecausemen,whomayhaverecentlyreturnedfromtheCentralAfricanRepublic,soughttocontroltheuseoffoodrations.
39.Incontrast,inRwanda,UNHCRprovidedstrongprotectionservicesvianongovernmentalorganization(NGO)partners.TheseservicesincludedprotectionfromSGBV,HIVpreventionandsupporttopeoplelivingwithHIV.AlthoughHIVremainedstigmatized,preventionservicesslowlyreducedthisstigmaandincreasedvoluntarytesting.RefugeesacknowledgedthatSGBVwouldhavebeenmuchworsewithoutthecommitmentofUNHCRandpartnerstoprotectingwomenandchildren.InBangladesh,therewerefewlegalmeasuresavailabletorefugees–registeredorunofficial–incasesofSGBV.InChad,thefocuswasusuallyonreconciliation,ratherthanonassistingwomentoregistercomplaints.InEthiopia,refugeewomenandgirlssuggestedthattherootcausesofprotectionissueswerenotaddressedandsotheseissuescontinued.InEthiopia,protectionserviceswereratedasmoreeffectiveincampsforSomalisthaninthoseforEritreans.
Rohingya children in Nayapara UNHCR camp. © UNHCR / C. Canteli
15
Effects of Food Assistance on Relations between Refugees and Host Populations40.Theevaluationspresentedamixedpicture,butrelationshipswerenevereitherpurelyantagonistic
orpurelyharmonious.Thepresenceofrefugees–receivingfoodandNFIsanddrawinginadditionalinfrastructureandbasicservices–wasusuallywelcomed.Exceptionstypicallyoccurredwhenfoodassistanceignoredtheneedsoflocalpoorpeopleorwhenrefugeesandlocalpopulationscompetedforscarcelocalresources.
41.HostandrefugeecommunitiesinRwandasharedalanguageandculture,andhadcordialrelations,includingmutualvisits,friendshipsandintermarriage.Therefugeepresencealsohadapositiveimpactonlocalmarketsandlabouravailability,andhostcommunitiesrealizedancillarybenefitsfromtheservicesprovidedtorefugees.SimilarrelationswerereportedintheothertwoAfricanevaluations.EthiopianhostcommunitiesaroundTigrayancampsappreciatedthefoodtheycouldacquirefromrefugeerations.Theyalsosoldgoodsandservicestorefugees,boostinglocalmarketactivity.IntheearlyyearsoftheChadprogramme,localsbenefitedfromprogrammesdistributingseedsandtools.Refugeeslenttheirhealthcardstolocalpeople,givingthemaccesstocamp-basedhealthserviceswithoutcharge.
42.Incontrast,inBangladesh,despiteahighdegreeofculturalaffinity,strongresentmentagainstrefugeesledtomanyincidentsofviolencebetweenthetwocommunitiesneartheofficialcamps.AninterestingfindingwasthatrelationsbetweenBangladeshisandunregisteredrefugeesweremorefavourablethanthosebetweenlocalsandencampedrefugees.Tensionsarosefromthemostvulnerablelocals’envyregardingthedistributionoffoodtorefugeesbutnottoneedylocalpoorpeople,whoweresometimesinequallyvulnerablesituations.
43.Overtime,andgiventhatallrefugeesinprotracteddisplacementsearchedforfuelwoodand/ormadecharcoalfortheirownconsumptionorsale,theevaluationreportsallshowedthatsomekindofconflictwashighlylikely,eveninamicablecontextssuchasinRwanda.ErosionanddeforestationaroundrefugeecampswereanissueinBangladesh,butweremostsevereinEthiopia,wheretheevaluationreportedatotaldepletionofenvironmentalresources.
16
factors that explain and influenced the results
External Factors8
44.Althoughdiversefactorsspecifictoindividualcontextsinfluencedthelivesofrefugeesinprotractedsituations,twofactorsdominatedallfourcontextsevaluatedandareechoedinliteratureonothercontexts:donorfundingandhostgovernmentpolicies.
45.Figure3illustrateshowWFPreceivedlessthantheexpectedlevelsofdonorsupport.Whenfundingwasshort,prioritywasgiventomaintainingbasicfoodsupport,ratherthantoplannedorongoingactivitiesfordevelopinggreaterself-relianceinthelongerterm.
46.Long-termsupportforprotractedrefugeesfitsuneasilyintoconventionaldonors’humanitariananddevelopmentassistancemodalities,whichcreatedachallengeforWFPandUNHCRinensuringfundingforprotractedsituations.Forexample,theUnitedStatesDepartmentofStateBureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigrationwasthelargestdonorforthefourprogrammes,butisprimarilyanemergencyhumanitarianagencyandisnotmandatedtoengageindevelopmentactivitiesinrefugeecamps.Otherdonorsweresimilarlyconstrained.
47.EvaluationsnotedthatWFPandUNHCRcountryoffices,ontheirpart,hadnotdevelopedjointfundingproposalstoattractdonorswhosemodalitiescouldbridgetheemergency–developmenttransition.InEthiopia,NGOimplementingpartnershadtoseektheirownfundingtoimplementimportantrecommendationsmadeinjointassessmentmission(JAM)reports.
48.Whilefundingshortfallswereafactorbehindthenon-achievementofself-relianceobjectives,theywerebynomeansthesoleexplanation.Hostgovernmentsallowrefugeestoenterandremainontheirterritory,andtheirpoliciesshaperefugees’pathwaystoself-reliance.Mobility,accesstojobmarketsandaccesstolandarefundamental.InRwanda,governmentpolicygaverefugeesfreedomofmovementandaccesstolocalschoolsandsomeformsofemployment.StrictregulationsrestrictedmovementsofSomalirefugeesinEthiopiaandRohingyarefugeesinBangladesh,particularlytheregisteredminority.InChad,manyrefugeesleftcampstotraveltotheCentralAfricanRepublicorelsewhereinChad.Inallfourcontexts,hostgovernmentsdidnotpermittheformalintegrationofrefugeesandsufficientlandwasnotmadeavailable(seeparagraphs25to33).UNHCRandWFPdidnotseemtohaveconsistentlyadvocatedforrefugees’economicrights,whilenationalrefugeeauthoritiesworkingwithWFPandUNHCRmayhavehadaninterestinpreservingthecareandmaintenancemodelasitentailstheinflowofhumanitarianassistanceonwhichtheseinstitutionsdependforsupportingtheirstaffandinfrastructure.
8 These are the contextual factors that are outside the control of WFP and UNHCR.
17
49.TheOfficeoftheUNHCRformallyrecognizestheimportanceofeducationforself-reliance.ThepoliciesofhostStatesstronglyinfluenceaccessandthereweresignificantdifferencesinthequalityanddurationofprovisionacrossprogrammes.Two-thirdsofallofficialrefugeehouseholdheadshadneverreceivededucationofanykind.
50.Accesstohealthservicesalsovariedbecauseoffundinglevelsandnationalpolicies.TheRwandaevaluationstatedthat“healthservicesareeffectiveandhealthsuppliesabovestandardinthethreecamps”.InEthiopia,“lowmortalityratesforadultsandchildrenintherefugeecampsreflecthouseholdaccesstoadequatehealthservices”.InChad,wheregovernmentcost-recoverypolicieswereappliedtorefugees,therewereconcernsaboutthelackofastrategyforaddressinganaemiaandtheworseningprovisionsforadultsandadolescentswithmalaria.
51.Therefugees’ownaspirationswereanotherimportantfactor.IntheShimelbacampinEthiopia,Eritreanrefugees–especiallyyoungmenandboys–werenotactivelyengagedinlocalincome-generatingactivitiesbecausetheirmainobjectivewasresettlementinathirdcountry.InChad,manyrefugeesprimarilysoughtthedurablesolutionofrepatriation.InBangladesh,theexperienceofunregisteredRohingyarefugeesshowedthatde factolocalintegration,albeitillegal,wasapathwaytowardsself-reliance.
Internal Factors
52.Accuratefoodtargetingandrationcardusereliesonaccuratehouseholdprofiles,butthesewereoftenunavailable.Revalidationisexpensiveandwasnotundertakenregularly.InChad,UNHCRcouldnotdeterminewhowasactuallypresentincamps.Theevaluationteamheardconfirmationofthephenomenon–mentionedinaJAM–ofChadiancitizensacquiringrefugeestatusandrationentitlements.CampdatabasesinEthiopiawerealsojudgedtobeinaccurate.
53.TheEthiopianevaluationfoundthatthefoodmonitoringcarriedoutbyWFPorUNHCRwasinsufficientlyintensive.InEthiopiaandRwanda,whereWFPdidnotmanagewarehousingin
9 These are the implementation factors that are within the control of WFP and UNHCR.
150
100
50
200
Figure 3: WFPFundingFiguresinSelectedProtractedSituations
0
Totalfunded
27.8(73%)
Bangladesh2002-2011
61.3(81%)
Chad06/2003-12/2011
118.7(57%)
Ethiopia07/2002-12/2010
58.5(63%)
Ruanda01/2007-12/2011
Source: WFP/UNHCRJointImpactEvaluationSeries.
FundingtoRwandaandthelastprotractedreliefandrecoveryoperation(PRRO)inChadincludeassistancetohostpopulations.PRROsinEthiopiaincludeSudaneserefugees,whowerenotconsideredintheevaluation.CostsperbeneficiarywerecomputedbasedonthelatestPRROoperationdocumentavailableattheWFPonlineoperationsdatabasewww.wfp.org/operations/list
Uncoveredrequests
18
thecamps,WFPlackedtheformalauthoritytorespondquicklytodistributionorwarehousingimproprieties.Refugeesinmanycontextsallegedthattherewerecasesofunder-scoopingandcriticizedUNHCRandWFPfornotspendingenoughtimeincamps.InBangladesh,refugeesassertedthatontherareoccasionsthatWFPstaffwerepresentatdistributions,thequalityofriceandpulsesimproved.TheybelievedthattheUnitedNationscoulddomoretocombatcorruptionandadministrativeabusesbycampofficials.
54.Millingcostseverywherewerebornebyrefugees,oftenobligingthemtohandoveraportionofthegraintheyreceivedtomilloperators.InRwanda,evaluatorsestimatedthatmillingcostsincurredthelossof20–30percentoftherationsreceived.ThisburdenonrefugeesandincentivetosellrationscontinueddespiteaJAMrecommendationtoassistrefugeesindevelopingcooperativelyrunmills.InEthiopia,WFPattemptedtocompensaterefugeesbyprovidingmoregrain,buttheadditionalgrain’svalueprovedtobelessthanthecostsofmilling.
55.WFPmayhavemissedopportunitiestoestablishlinksandsynergieswithitsotherprogrammes.InEthiopia,therewerenolinkstoWFPprogrammesservinglocalcommunitiesclosetothecamps.InChad,WFPrefugeeprogrammestaffseemedtolackinformationonaprogrammeontheothersideoftheborderwiththeCentralAfricanRepublic,providingfoodtointernallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).
56.TheRwandareportnotedthatUNHCRacknowledgeditsmandatedresponsibilitytoprovideNFIssuchassoap,clothing,sanitarypads,sleepingmats,blankets,mosquitonets,kitchenutensils,cookingstoves,housingmaterialsandjerrycans.SubstantialNFIs,suchassheltermaterialsormosquitonets,weregenerallysuppliedtorefugeesonarrival,butotherdistributionsofnon-perishableitemseitherdidnotoccuroroccurredinfrequentlyandweresometimesinappropriatelytimed,encouragingrefugeestoselltheitems.
57.Forexample,inRwanda,mosthouseholdswerefoundtolackblankets,sleepingmats,adequateclothingandjerrycans.InChad,wheremalariaratesamongchildrenunder5haveriseninrecentyears,theevaluationteamfoundevidencethatchallengedUNHCR’sstatisticof80percentofchildrensleepingundermosquitonets,suggestingthatmanyrefugeeshadsoldthenetstheyreceived.InEthiopia,refugeesreceivedmosquitonetsinthesecondhalfofthemalariaseason,andplasticsheetsoutsidetherainyseason.Therewasnomonitoringtodeterminewhetherornotrefugeesstillhadthem.RefugeehouseholdssometimesreplenishedtheirNFIsuppliesbysellingsomeoftheirrations,whichincreasedtheirfoodinsecurity.
58.TheRwandaevaluationdrewattentiontothedifficultyofdisentanglingtheeffectsofinadequatequantitiesofNFIsfromthoseofinadequatefoodassistance.Thetwowerelinkedinaviciouscircle,whichwasalsoapparentintheotherthreecontexts.Theevaluationreportexplained:“Refugeesarecompelledtoconvertanalreadyreducedfoodbaskettocashtocoverbasicneeds.Thisproducesacycleofdebtthatreducestheimpactoffoodassistanceonfoodsecurityandunderminesanypotentiallivelihoodgains...[the]majorityof[the]mostvulnerablehouseholdslackaccesstootherlivelihoodoptionsandsourcesofincomebeyondsellingtheirfoodrations.[…]TheinabilityofUNHCRtoprovideadequateNFIsandtheabsenceofviablelivelihoodactivitiesmeansinpracticethatWFP’sbarelyadequatefoodbasketissubsidizingbasicnon-foodrequirements.Thissituationforcesrefugeestoemploynegativecopingstrategies.”
59.TheEthiopianevaluationnotedanapparentfailuretomeetobligationscontainedintherevised2002MOUbetweenUNHCRandWFP,whichstatedthatjointplansofactionbasedonJAMrecommendationswouldbedeveloped,settingoutmutuallyagreedgoals,objectives,responsibilities,indicatorsandimplementationarrangements.However,followuponJAMswaspoor.ExceptforinBangladesh,thetwoagenciesdidnotattempttomakejointappealstodonorstoplugidentifiedgaps.JAMsoftenfocusedonminorissues,ratherthanmajorshiftsinprogrammestrategy.
60.ThePRROdurationoftwototwoandahalfyears,withprogrammeactivitiesplannedforthreetosixmonths,hasnotbeenconducivetofacilitatingdurablesolutions.Durablesolutionswouldrequirealonger-termplan,formulatedinaparticipatorywaywithrefugees.
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conclusions61.Althoughthedetailedfindingsofthefourevaluationswereverycontext-specific,thesynthesis
identifiedthefollowingcommonconclusionsandlessons.
62.Food assistance has had positive effects on the expected short-term outcomes of hunger mitigation immediately after refugee arrival and has contributed to the achievement of immediate food security when full rations were distributed. Somepositiveeffectsoncopingstrategieswerefound.GAMandSAMrateshaveimprovedinmostbutnotallcases.
63.As situations become protracted, unacceptably high numbers of refugee households – and disproportionately more households headed by women – have not been food-secure, particularly during the periods between food distributions.Levelsofchronicmalnutritionremainunacceptableandcriticallyfarfrominternationalstandards.Householdshaveaccumulatedfewassets,havehadverylimitedlivelihoodopportunitiesandhavefrequentlyresortedtonegativecopingstrategies.Intheabsenceoflivelihoodopportunities,foodrationsandNFIshavebeenwidelytreatedasincomeandsoldtomeetotherneedsaspartofcopingstrategies.
64.The desired evolution towards greater self-reliance for refugees through improved access to livelihood opportunities, while maintaining or increasing food security, has not occurred.Foodassistancehasnotbeenusedtoopenpathwaystoself-relianceanddurablesolutions.Testingoftheinterventionlogic/theoryofchangemakesitclearthatmajorassumptionsconcerningrefugees’useoffoodassistancehavenotheld,evensufficientlytoachieveintermediateoutcomes.
65.Protection, particularly against SGBV, has remained inadequately addressed in all four contexts.Despiteconsiderableprogressinsomecamps,SGBVremainsunderreported,manyperpetratorsenjoyimpunity,andtherearegapsinjudicialadvocacyandincounsellingforSGBVsurvivors.Thisisnotanewfinding.Theprotectionrisksfacingrefugeewomenhavebeenknownforalongtimeinmanydisplacementcontexts,includingthefourevaluated.Whererelationsbetweenrefugeesandlocalpopulationsaretense,protectionissueshavealsobeenreportedbyrefugeesmovingoutsidethecamps.RelevantobservationsandrecommendationsfromJAMshavenotbeenfollowedup.
66.A combination of contextual factors and factors within the control of WFP and UNHCR lie behind this sobering picture.Inallfoursituations,theexternalenvironmenthasnotbeenconducivetoimprovingself-relianceorfindingdurablesolutions,withhostgovernmentpoliciesandchronicfundingshortfallsforprotractedrefugeesituationslimitingtheapparentoptions.Inaddition,UNHCRandWFPhavenotusedorcreatedopportunities.Lessonlearninghasbeencomplicatedbythefailuretokeeprecordsofearlysiteplanningorprogramminginterventionsinresponsetotheneedsofrefugeecaseloads.Thecontextualandinternalfactorshaveinteractedtocreateaviciouscircle.
67.Bothagencieshavemadelong-standingformalcorporatecommitmentstofacilitatingthetransitiontoself-relianceanddurablesolutions,butthe assistance provided by WFP and UNHCR has remained dominated by a care and maintenance approach in camps, using GFD as basic support – appropriate for short-term situations, but not for those that are protracted or likely to become so.
21
68.Theambitiousnewcorporateobjectivesregardingself-relianceanddurablesolutionsagreedbetweenWFPandUNHCRhavenotbeentranslatedintoformalstrategiesandpracticesforfoodassistance.Especiallyatthecorporatelevel,therehasbeenlittlecontextualizedreviewoftheinterventionlogicoffoodassistance,toconsiderhowfoodassistancecouldbeusedtomakeameaningfulcontributiontoself-reliance,takingaccountofthenewtoolsavailable.Responsibilityfortakingtheinitiativeseemstohavebeenleftwithcountryoffices.
69.Toagreaterorlesserextent,the refugees in these protracted situations are economic and social actors in host communities.Hostpopulationsfacemanynutritionandlivelihoodsconstraints,buttherehasbeenlittlerecognitionoftheseconstraintsandlittleintegrationofinterventionsforrefugeesandtheirhosts,basedonacontextualizedanalysisofthescopeforalternativefoodassistancemodalitiesthatsuchintegrationwouldgive.Therehavebeeninsufficienteffortstocollaboratewithhostgovernmentsandtobringinotheractorswithhumanitarianand/ordevelopmentmandates.
70.Long-termGFD,combinedwiththelimitededucationalandeconomicopportunitiesinandaroundcamps,hascreatedasenseofdisempowermentamongrefugees.ItwassignificantthatinBangladesh,unregisteredrefugeeslivinginhostcommunitiesbutlackinglegalstatusappearedtohavebetterfoodsecurityandagreaterrangeofcopingstrategiesandtobeclosertoself-reliancethanrefugeesinthecamps.
71.Overall,inconclusion,the international community’s response to the plight of refugees in protracted crises is failing to deliver on agreed intentions.Nosinglegovernment–whetherhostcountry,countryoforiginordonor–orhumanitarianordevelopmentagencycanaloneresolvetheissuesbehindthisfailure:newstrategiesandpartnershipsarerequired.
72.Concerted action is required among all essential actors to create a collaborative strategy, backed by political and financial will, to enable refugees to make active and productive contributions to the countries where they are living while they are refugeesandtosupporttheirrepatriationwhereitisaviablelong-termdurablesolution.
Ethiopia / Refugee camp © UNHCR / S. Sutter
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recommendations73.Asthefourevaluationsincludedinthissynthesiswillbeusedatthecountrylevel,eachevaluation
madeanumberofrecommendationsspecifictothecountryconcerned.Theseincludeoperationalrecommendationsrelatedtoimprovingmonitoring,suchasofnutritionandchild-feedingpracticesandSGBV;revalidatingcamppopulations;increasingwomen’sinvolvementincampcommittees;scalinguplivelihoodinterventions,suchasvocationaltraining,microcreditandincome-generationprojects;andcombatingenvironmentaldegradation.
74.Inaddition,strategicrecommendationsweremadeinresponsetocommonpatterns.Theserecommendationshavebeendevelopedintoasetoffinalrecommendationsfortheseriesofimpactevaluations:
75. Recommendation 1:
Under the auspices of the WFP/UNHCR High-Level Meeting, a working group from both agencies should develop a joint corporate strategy and operational framework for refugees in protracted displacement and for the role that food assistance can play.Thestrategyshould:
a)recognizethatencampmentbringsriskstotheprospectsforself-relianceandthatthecurrentapproachtofoodassistanceisinsufficient;
b)outlineplausiblepathwaystoself-relianceanddurablesolutionsforrefugeesinprotracteddisplacement,andtherolethatfoodassistance–includingcomplementstoGFDsuchascash,vouchersorfoodforwork–canplay;
c)developamoreholisticapproachandthepartnershipsnecessarytoachieveit;
d)establishmanagementmechanismsforimplementingthestrategy,incorporatingmoresystematicuseofJAMs,bothinspecificcountriesandinsynthesisforcorporatelearning.
76.ForWFP,theapproachshouldreflectandbeembeddedinthenewStrategicPlan(2014–2017).
77.ThisprocessmightstartwiththeWFP/UNHCRHigh-LevelMeetingorganizingareflectiontodeepenanalysisofwhythetwoagenciesfinditsodifficulttoaddressthechallengesandimplementanapproachforbuildingself-relianceandofwhateachagencymayneedtochangetodevelopthenecessarypartnerships.
78. Recommendation 2:
All actors should recognize that improving the lives of refugees in protracted displacement is not the business of WFP and UNHCR alone but must involve coordinated change in the approaches currently followed by United Nations country teams, particularly development-oriented agencies, host States, donors and implementing partners, as well as UNHCR and WFP.TheInter-AgencyStandingCommitteeTaskForceonAccountabilitytoAffectedPopulationsshouldbeencouragedtotakealeadroleinbuildingthisrecognitionandtheresultingactions,notablybystrengtheningthearchitectureforaccountabilitytohelpbringforgottencrisestoanendandtofocustheinternationalcommunity’sattentiononitsresponsibilitiesunderthe1951ConventionrelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesandthe1967Protocol.
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79. Recommendation 3:
United Nations country teams should:
a)engageandadvocatewithhostgovernmentsforrefugees’rightstomobility,topractiselivelihoods,toprotectionandtosomeformofacknowledgedintegrationwhenrepatriationremainselusive;
b)engagewithhostgovernmentstoimprovetheselectionofcampsitesforthoseinorlikelytobeinprolongeddisplacement,withthegoalofenablingrefugeestomakeameaningfulcontributiontonationalandlocaleconomicdevelopmentwhileminimizingconflictovernaturalresourcesandtheaccompanyingnegativeimplicationsfortheenvironment,economyandprotection;
c)monitortheprospectsforrepatriationandseektoincreasespontaneousreturns;
d)encouragedonorstobemoreflexible(seerecommendation4);
e)insistongreaterinvolvementofUnitedNationsagenciesspecializedinprotection,developmentandgenderissues;
f)engagewithrefugees’hostandoriginalStatestoadvancepoliticalsolutionstoprotracteddisplacement.
Gihembe Refugee Camp, Congolese Refugees. © UNHCR / M. Read
24
80. Recommendation 4:
Donors should overcome or remove barriers to conventional funding restrictions based on dichotomies between emergency and development situations.
81. Recommendation 5:
WFP and UNHCR country teams should systematically develop consensual programme strategies for the transition to self-reliance, based on contextualized knowledge of refugees’ specific needs and prospects for long-term durable solutions – repatriation, local integration or resettlement.Thesestrategiesshouldtransformtheexistingplanningarchitecturebasedonjointplansofactiontoprovideastrategicmanagementtoolforthecountrylevel,which:
a)drawsinnewpartnershipsandfunding;and
b)providesareferencepointforoperationdesignandapproval.
82.AnnualprogressreportsshouldbemadetotheUnitedNationscountryteamandtotheUNHCR-WFPHigh-LevelMeeting.
83.Thestrategiesshouldbebasedonanalysisofinter-communitysocialandeconomicrelationsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitiesandamonggroupsofrefugeeswithincamps,andonmarketanalysisofthepotentialforcomplementingGFDwithalternativemodalities.Selectionofthefoodassistancemodalitiesshouldbebasedonanalysisandthedesiredobjectives,ratherthantheotherwayaround.ThisisapreconditionforaligningprogrammingwithcontextualrealitiesandforimprovedunderstandingofthesaleoffoodassistanceandNFIsandtherecoursetonegativecopingstrategies.Strategydevelopmentshouldinvolvenewpartnershipswithreliefanddevelopmentactorsactiveinthearea,thehostgovernmentandrefugeesthemselves.
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annex: logic model – the impact of food aid assistance on protracted refugee populations
Result Chain How? Whom? What (short and intermediate outcomes) Why? (impact)
Inputs/ Resources Assumptions Outputs/ Activities Participants/ Stakeholders1
Assumptions Reactions Short-term Assumptions Intermediate Long-term
Needs è R
esults logic over time
T0(before)
• Population movement from conflict, drought, insecurity
• Ethnic divisions
• Selling of assets
• Loss of assets
• Damage to agricultural crops
• Hunger
• Movement across borders
• Formal encampment
• Informal resettlement
• Displaced population
• Livelihoods broken
• Food insecurity
• Insecurity/conflict
• Separated families
T1(early)
• GFD (full ration)
• Stoves/pots/utensils
• Fuel
• Soap, water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• Therapeutic foods
• Latrines
Livelihoods are lost (refugees have no money), fully dependent on external assistance, registration
systems functioning, distribution system
s functioning, delivery systems functioning, local partners have
sufficient capacity, 2100kcal/day/person is sufficient, food basket is sufficient, internal targeting is too difficult
• 2100 kcal/day (general)
• NFIs
• Food basket for households
• Water supply
• Therapeutic feeding centres
• New arrival camp and non-camp populations
• New arrival PoC (separated children, victims of violence, special needs, etc.)
• Camp leaders/ food distribution staff
• Host communities
Food is taken home, grains can be m
illed, complem
ent of interventions provided (therapeutic feeding, NFIs, W
ASH, etc.), predictable food and NFI delivery schedules, local institutions exist (for service delivery, trading, etc.), host com
munities are receptive, services provided to PoC (OVC tracing, fam
ily reintegration, etc.), continued security and protection w
ithin camp and non-cam
p settings, natural environment is
suitable, intra-household distribution is equitable, targeting is effective, non-food assistance inputs are provided (schools, teachers, training, transportation, com
munication, etc.)
• Consumption of food equitably within household
• Use of NFIs by targeted households
• Acute and chronic malnourished accept and receive care
• Host communities cooperate
• Lives saved through hunger mediation
• Security and protection provided
Food is sold and consumed (m
ix), access to land (legal or illegal), legal status allows for em
ployment,
local institutions provide beneficial services (dispute resolution, family integration, com
munication,
transportation, etc.), cultural/linguistic barriers can be addressed, assets are not liabilities, remittances
can flow, educational opportunities are appropriate (language, culture, etc.)
• Reduction in mortality (crude mortality)
• Reduction in GAM
• Reduced vulnerability
• Reduction in reliance on external assistance
• Repatriation2
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Protection3
T2(yrs 2-3)
• GFD (partial ration)
• Stove/pots/utensils
• Fuel
• Soap
• Water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• Cash/vouchers
• Partial rations (general) (targeted)
• Complementary foods
• School feeding
• Cash/voucher schemes
• NFIs
• Water supply
• Existing camp and non-camp populations
• PoC
• Local organizations and volunteers providing delivery support
• Host communities
• Partial rations supplement purchased food
• Cash/vouchers utilized to improve food security
• Use of WASH and other complementary interventions
• Local organizations provide institutional support for integration and livelihoods
• Improved knowledge/access to water and sanitation
• Improved access to food basket
• Supplementary livelihood activities (cash income, agriculture, etc.)
• Security and protection provided
• Improved nutrition (acute malnutrition) (chronic malnutrition)
• Improved food basket (diet diversity score) (food consumption score)
• Improved neonatal and <5 outcomes (<5 anthropometric indicators)
• Repatriation
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Community development
T3(protracted)
• GFD (partial ration)
• Fuel
• Soap
• Water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• IGA supplementary training/supplies
• Cash/vouchers
• Partial rations (general) (targeted)
• Complementary foods
• School feeding
• Cash/voucher schemes
• Water supply
• IGA activities
• Existing camp and non-camp populations
• PoC
• Local markets & market actors
• Local support institutions
• Host communities
• Partial rations supplement purchased food
• Inputs used to supplement/complement livelihood strategies
• Local institutions (service delivery and markets) support refugee livelihoods
• Improved food security
• Improved access to livelihood opportunities
• Coping strategies are positive
• Asset building
• Improved schooling
• Improved nutrition
• Improved food basket
• Improved <5 outcomes
• HH with successful IGAs (cash income)
• HH with successful agricultural activities
• Family re-integration
• Improved education outcomes
• Repatriation
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Self-reliance4
1 These participants/stakeholders are not mutually exclusive.2 Repatriation, resettlement and local integration are the three UNHCR ‘durable solutions’.3 Protection, community development, and self-reliance are the phases toward local integration.4 Self-reliance is the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including
protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a programme approach, refers to developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance.
26
Result Chain How? Whom? What (short and intermediate outcomes) Why? (impact)
Inputs/ Resources Assumptions Outputs/ Activities Participants/ Stakeholders1
Assumptions Reactions Short-term Assumptions Intermediate Long-term
Needs è R
esults logic over time
T0(before)
• Population movement from conflict, drought, insecurity
• Ethnic divisions
• Selling of assets
• Loss of assets
• Damage to agricultural crops
• Hunger
• Movement across borders
• Formal encampment
• Informal resettlement
• Displaced population
• Livelihoods broken
• Food insecurity
• Insecurity/conflict
• Separated families
T1(early)
• GFD (full ration)
• Stoves/pots/utensils
• Fuel
• Soap, water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• Therapeutic foods
• Latrines
Livelihoods are lost (refugees have no money), fully dependent on external assistance, registration
systems functioning, distribution system
s functioning, delivery systems functioning, local partners have
sufficient capacity, 2100kcal/day/person is sufficient, food basket is sufficient, internal targeting is too difficult
• 2100 kcal/day (general)
• NFIs
• Food basket for households
• Water supply
• Therapeutic feeding centres
• New arrival camp and non-camp populations
• New arrival PoC (separated children, victims of violence, special needs, etc.)
• Camp leaders/ food distribution staff
• Host communities
Food is taken home, grains can be m
illed, complem
ent of interventions provided (therapeutic feeding, NFIs, W
ASH, etc.), predictable food and NFI delivery schedules, local institutions exist (for service delivery, trading, etc.), host com
munities are receptive, services provided to PoC (OVC tracing, fam
ily reintegration, etc.), continued security and protection w
ithin camp and non-cam
p settings, natural environment is
suitable, intra-household distribution is equitable, targeting is effective, non-food assistance inputs are provided (schools, teachers, training, transportation, com
munication, etc.)
• Consumption of food equitably within household
• Use of NFIs by targeted households
• Acute and chronic malnourished accept and receive care
• Host communities cooperate
• Lives saved through hunger mediation
• Security and protection provided
Food is sold and consumed (m
ix), access to land (legal or illegal), legal status allows for em
ployment,
local institutions provide beneficial services (dispute resolution, family integration, com
munication,
transportation, etc.), cultural/linguistic barriers can be addressed, assets are not liabilities, remittances
can flow, educational opportunities are appropriate (language, culture, etc.)
• Reduction in mortality (crude mortality)
• Reduction in GAM
• Reduced vulnerability
• Reduction in reliance on external assistance
• Repatriation2
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Protection3
T2(yrs 2-3)
• GFD (partial ration)
• Stove/pots/utensils
• Fuel
• Soap
• Water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• Cash/vouchers
• Partial rations (general) (targeted)
• Complementary foods
• School feeding
• Cash/voucher schemes
• NFIs
• Water supply
• Existing camp and non-camp populations
• PoC
• Local organizations and volunteers providing delivery support
• Host communities
• Partial rations supplement purchased food
• Cash/vouchers utilized to improve food security
• Use of WASH and other complementary interventions
• Local organizations provide institutional support for integration and livelihoods
• Improved knowledge/access to water and sanitation
• Improved access to food basket
• Supplementary livelihood activities (cash income, agriculture, etc.)
• Security and protection provided
• Improved nutrition (acute malnutrition) (chronic malnutrition)
• Improved food basket (diet diversity score) (food consumption score)
• Improved neonatal and <5 outcomes (<5 anthropometric indicators)
• Repatriation
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Community development
T3(protracted)
• GFD (partial ration)
• Fuel
• Soap
• Water
• Complementary foods
• Supplementary foods
• IGA supplementary training/supplies
• Cash/vouchers
• Partial rations (general) (targeted)
• Complementary foods
• School feeding
• Cash/voucher schemes
• Water supply
• IGA activities
• Existing camp and non-camp populations
• PoC
• Local markets & market actors
• Local support institutions
• Host communities
• Partial rations supplement purchased food
• Inputs used to supplement/complement livelihood strategies
• Local institutions (service delivery and markets) support refugee livelihoods
• Improved food security
• Improved access to livelihood opportunities
• Coping strategies are positive
• Asset building
• Improved schooling
• Improved nutrition
• Improved food basket
• Improved <5 outcomes
• HH with successful IGAs (cash income)
• HH with successful agricultural activities
• Family re-integration
• Improved education outcomes
• Repatriation
• Resettlement
• Local integration (camp) (out-of-camp)
• Self-reliance4
* All acronyms in this Annex can be found in the List of Acronyms (next page).
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ACRONYMSUSEDINTHEDOCUMENT
CSI copingstrategyindex
FCS foodconsumptionscore
GAM globalacutemalnutrition
GFD generalfooddistribution
HDDS householddietarydiversityscore
HH households
HLM high-levelmeeting
IASC Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee
IGA incomegenerationactivity
JAM jointassessmentmission
MOU MemorandumofUnderstanding
NFI non-fooditem
NGO non-governmentalorganization
OVC orphansandothervulnerablechildren
PoC pointofcontact
PRRO protractedreliefandrecoveryoperation
SAM severeacutemalnutrition
SGBV sexualandgender-basedviolence
UNCT UnitedNationscountryteam
UNHCR OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees
WASH water,sanitationandhygiene
acronyms
28
management response
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SYNTHESIS SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JOINT UNHCR/WFP IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD ASSISTANCE TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS
Background
1. Thisdocumentconstitutesajointmanagementresponsetotherecommendationsmadeinasynthesisoffourimpactevaluationsonfoodassistanceforrefugeesinprotractedsituations,commissionedbyWFP’sOfficeofEvaluationandtheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees’(UNHCR)PolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService.
2. Theevaluationswereundertakentoprovideanevidencebaseforfutureorganizationalstrategiesregardinghowfoodassistancecancontributetorefugeelivelihoodsandself-reliance,therebysupportingthewidersearchforsolutionstoprotractedrefugeesituations.
3. Thefollowingdefinitionsareusedinthisdocument:
a)Alivelihoodcomprisesthecapabilities,assets–includingsocialandphysicalassets–activitiesandopportunitiesrequiredforameansofliving.Alivelihoodissustainablewhenitcancopewithandrecoverfromstressandshocks,andmaintainorenhanceitscapabilitiesandassets.
b)Self-relianceistheabilityofpeople,householdsorcommunitiestomeettheirbasicneeds,includingfoodandnutrition,andenjoysocialandeconomicrightsinasustainableanddignifiedmanner.Self-relianceisapositivelivelihoodsoutcome.
c)Adurablesolutionforrefugeesisattainedwhenrefugeesareabletoavailthemselvesoftheprotectionofastatebymeansofvoluntaryrepatriationtotheircountryoforigin,localintegrationintheircountryofasylum,orresettlementinathirdcountrythathasagreedtoadmitthemonapermanentbasis.
4. AcoreaspectofthejointworkofWFPandUNHCRisensuringthatdurablesolutionsarecomplementedbysupportthatfacilitatesself-relianceandsustainablelivelihoods.
5. Atahigh-levelmeeting(HLM)betweenUNHCRandWFPheldon9January2013,managementwelcomedtheevaluationandagreedthatitprovidedcompellingevidenceoftheneedforallpartiestorenewtheircommitmenttosupportingtheattainmentofdurablesolutionsforrefugeesinprotractedsituations.TheHLMalsoreiteratedtheimportanceofplacingtherecommendationsandrelatedresponsesintohistoricalcontext,recognizingthatmanyoftheissuesraisedbythesynthesisevaluationhavebeenontheinternationalcommunity’sagendaformanyyears.
6. Thejointresponsestotherecommendationsarepresentedintheattachedmatrix.
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Recommendation 1:
UndertheauspicesoftheWFP/UNHCRHigh-LevelMeeting,aworkinggroupfrombothagenciesshoulddevelopajointcorporatestrategyandoperationalframeworkforrefugeesinprotracteddisplacementandfortherolethatfoodassistancecanplay.Thestrategyshould:
a)recognizethatencampmentbringsriskstotheprospectsforself-relianceandthatthecurrentapproachtofoodassistanceisinsufficient;
b)outlineplausiblepathwaystoself-relianceanddurablesolutionsforrefugeesinprotracteddisplacement,andtherolethatfoodassistance–includingcomplementstoGFDsuchascash,vouchersorfoodforwork–canplay;
c)developamoreholisticapproachandthepartnershipsnecessarytoachieveit;
d)establishmanagementmechanismsforimplementingthestrategy,incorporatingmoresystematicuseofjointassessmentmissions(JAMs),bothinspecificcountriesandinsynthesisforcorporatelearning.
ForWFP,theapproachshouldreflectandbeembeddedinthenewStrategicPlan(2014–2017).
ThisprocessmightstartwiththeWFP/UNHCRHigh-LevelMeetingorganizingareflectiontodeepenanalysisofwhythetwoagenciesfinditsodifficulttoaddressthechallengesandimplementanapproachforbuildingself-relianceandofwhateachagencymayneedtochangetodevelopthenecessarypartnerships.
Action by: WFPandUNHCRHeadquarters
Management response and action taken/to be takenAgreed.
Informulatingajointcorporatestrategy,WFPandUNHCRwilltakefullaccountoftheinternationalcommunity’slimitedsuccessafterstrivingformanyyearstopromoterefugeelivelihoodsandself-relianceandestablishmoreeffectivelinkagesbetweenhumanitarianaidandlonger-termdevelopmentprocessesinprotractedrefugeesituations.
Bothorganizationsrecognizethatthepromotionofself-relianceanddurablesolutionsinprotractedrefugeesituationsisoftenconstrainedbyhostgovernmentpolicies–regardingfreedomofmovement,accesstoland,therighttowork,etc.–andtheavailabilityofpredictableandmulti-yearfunding,whichenablesatransitionfromfoodaidandotherformsofreliefassistance.WFPandUNHCRwillcontinuetoadvocateontheseissueswithhostanddonorstates.
WFPandUNHCRwillusetheformulationofajointcorporatestrategyandoperationalframeworkasanopportunitytore-examinetheinternalconstraintsidentifiedinthesynthesisreportandtodeterminehowtoaddressthem.EntrypointsforfurtherjointengagementincludeUNHCR’songoingpreparationofarevisedpolicypositionregardingtheout-of-campsettlementofrefugees–asrefugeeswhoaresubjectedtoencampmentandassociatedrestrictionsontheireconomicactivitiesareoftenunabletoestablishsustainablelivelihoodsandattainself-reliance–anditseffortstodevelopalivelihoodstrategyandtopilotnewapproachesforplausiblepathwaystoself-relianceforpopulationsofconcerninbothruralandurbansettings.TheseeffortsarebeingundertakeninconsultationwiththeWorldBankandnon-traditionalpartnerssuchastheprivatesector,andseektobuildpracticalexperienceandalistofgoodpartners.
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WFPandUNHCRwillreviewprotractedrefugeesituationsandidentifythosewithgoodpotentialforpromotinglivelihoodsandself-reliance.StrategicplansbasedonthesefindingswillinvolveothermembersofUnitedNationscountryteams(UNCTs),engagewithbothhostanddonorstates,andemphasizetherolethatfoodassistancecanplayintheshiftfromcareandmaintenanceapproaches.
Tolearnlessonsfrompastexperience,UNHCRwillidentifysituationsinwhichrefugeeshavesuccessfullymovedfromfoodaidtowardsself-reliance,andwillidentifythekeyvariablesthatfacilitatesuchtransitions.WFPwillbekeptinformedofthisexerciseandwillbeinvitedtocontributeideasandinformation.
WFPandUNHCRwillensurethattheirgoverningbodiesarefullyinformedofactiontaken.Managementwilldisseminatethefindingsofthesynthesisreportinternallyandexternally.WFPandUNHCRwillprepareajointreportoninitialprogressinimplementingthisrecommendationforsubmissionduring2014.(Precisedatestobediscussedwithrespectivegoverningbodies.)
Implementation deadline: June2014
Recommendation 2:
AllactorsshouldrecognizethatimprovingthelivesofrefugeesinprotracteddisplacementisnotthebusinessofWFPandUNHCRalonebutmustinvolvecoordinatedchangeintheapproachescurrentlyfollowedbyUnitedNationscountryteams,particularlydevelopment-orientedagencies,hostStates,donorsandimplementingpartners,aswellasUNHCRandWFP.TheInter-AgencyStandingCommittee(IASC)TaskForceonAccountabilitytoAffectedPopulationsshouldbeencouragedtotakealeadroleinbuildingthisrecognitionandtheresultingactions,notablybystrengtheningthearchitectureforaccountabilitytohelpbringforgottencrisestoanendandtofocustheinternationalcommunity’sattentiononitsresponsibilitiesunderthe1951ConventionrelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesandthe1967Protocol.
Action by: WFPandUNHCRattheHeadquartersandcountrylevels
Management response and action taken/to be takenPartiallyagreed.
WFPandUNHCRagreethatthepromotionoflivelihoodsandself-relianceandthesearchfordurablesolutionsinprotractedrefugeesituationsrequirefullengagementwithUNCTs,developmentactorsandhostanddonorstates.Bothorganizationsagreeabouttheneedformoresystematicexplorationoftherolesthattheprivatesectorandcivilsocietymightplay,andwilltakestepstoensuresuchengagementattheglobal,regionalandcountrylevels.
However,theHLMrecognizedandreaffirmedUNHCR’smandatedroleinleadingandcoordinatinginternationalactionforrefugeeprotectionandsolutionsandagreedthattheIASCTaskForceonAccountabilitytoAffectedPopulationswasnotanappropriateentitytoleadthepromotionoflivelihoodsandself-relianceinprotractedrefugeesituations.WFPandUNHCRagreedthatamoreeffectiveapproachmightbetoensurethattheissueoffoodassistance,livelihoodsandself-relianceinprotractedrefugeesituationsisincludedintheinternationaldevelopmentagenda.
Implementation deadline: Ongoing
31
Recommendation 3:
UnitedNationscountryteamsshould:
a)engageandadvocatewithhostgovernmentsforrefugees’rightstomobility,topractiselivelihoods,toprotectionandtosomeformofacknowledgedintegrationwhenrepatriationremainselusive;
b)engagewithhostgovernmentstoimprovetheselectionofcampsitesforthoseinorlikelytobeinprolongeddisplacement,withthegoalofenablingrefugeestomakeameaningfulcontributiontonationalandlocaleconomicdevelopmentwhileminimizingconflictovernaturalresourcesandtheaccompanyingnegativeimplicationsfortheenvironment,economyandprotection;
c)monitortheprospectsforrepatriationandseektoincreasespontaneousreturns;
d)encouragedonorstobemoreflexible(seerecommendation4);
e)insistongreaterinvolvementofUnitedNationsagenciesspecializedinprotection,developmentandgenderissues;
f)engagewithrefugees’hostandoriginalStatestoadvancepoliticalsolutionstoprotracteddisplacement.
Action by: WFPandUNHCRattheHeadquartersandcountrylevels
Management response and action taken/to be takenPartiallyagreed.
WFPandUNHCRrecognizetheneedforUNCTstosupporteffortstoproviderefugeeswithprotection,solutions,livelihoodsandself-relianceopportunitiesinsituationsofprotracteddisplacement.Bothorganizationsalsoacknowledgethateffortstoidentifysitesforrefugeecampsandsettlementsandtomitigatetheimpactofrefugeeinfluxesontheenvironment–andhenceonrelationsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities–mustinvolvetheauthoritiesatboththecentralandlocallevels.EveryeffortwillbemadetoengagetheUNCTandthehostgovernments,notonlyinprotractedrefugeesituationsbutalsoinmorerecentrefugeeemergencies,sothatlivelihoodsandself-reliancecanbepromotedfromtheoutsetofarefugeesituation.
However,inlinewiththeresponsetorecommendation2,WFPacknowledgesUNHCR’sspecificmandateinrelationtorefugeeprotectionandsolutions.BothorganizationsmaintainthatanyeffortsbyaUNCTtomonitorprospectsforrepatriationandtoenhancespontaneousreturnshouldbeledbyUNHCR;organizedreturnmaybeapreferableapproachinsomerefugeesituationsandforcertaingroupsofrefugees.
WFPandUNHCRagreethattheUnitedNationssystemneedstoengagewithrefugees’hoststatesandcountriesoforigintoadvancepoliticalsolutionstoprotracteddisplacement.Sucheffortsmustbefullyconsistentwithinternationalrefugee,humanrightsandhumanitarianlaw,particularlytheprincipleofnon-refoulement,whichpreventsrefugeesfrombeingreturnedtoacountrywheretheirlivesorlibertywouldbeatrisk.
Implementation deadline: Ongoing
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Recommendation 4:
Donorsshouldovercomeorremovebarrierstoconventionalfundingrestrictionsbasedondichotomiesbetweenemergencyanddevelopmentsituations.
Action by: Donors
Management response and action taken/to be takenNoted.
WFPandUNHCRwillcontinuetoadvocatefortransitionalfundingfromdonorstates;thelimitedscaleandlateavailabilityofsuchfundinghasconsistentlyimpededeffortstolinkshort-termrefugeereliefwithlonger-termdevelopmentprocesses.
Bothorganizationsnotethatthisissuehasbeenontheinternationalcommunity’sagendaforalmost30years;theInternationalConferenceonAssistancetoRefugeesinAfrica(ICARA2)Conferenceof1984,jointlysponsoredbyUNHCRandtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,notedthatsuchassistanceshouldbe“development-orientedfromtheoutset”.WFPandUNHCRwillcontinuetoworkwithdonorstatesanddevelopmentactorstoascertainhowbarriersrelatedtoconventionalfundingrestrictionsmightbeovercomeorremoved.AninitialdiscussionofthisissuewithdonorstatesisscheduledforMarch2013inthecontextofUNHCR’sTransitionalSolutionsInitiative.
Implementation deadline: Ongoing
Recommendation 5:
WFPandUNHCRcountryteamsshouldsystematicallydevelopconsensualprogrammestrategiesforthetransitiontoself-reliance,basedoncontextualizedknowledgeofrefugees’specificneedsandprospectsforlong-termdurablesolutions–repatriation,localintegrationorresettlement.Thesestrategiesshouldtransformtheexistingplanningarchitecturebasedonjointplansofactiontoprovideastrategicmanagementtoolforthecountrylevel,which:
a)drawsinnewpartnershipsandfunding;and
b)providesareferencepointforoperationdesignandapproval.
AnnualprogressreportsshouldbemadetotheUnitedNationscountryteamandtotheUNHCR-WFPHigh-LevelMeeting.
Thestrategiesshouldbebasedonanalysisofinter-communitysocialandeconomicrelationsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitiesandamonggroupsofrefugeeswithincamps,andonmarketanalysisofthepotentialforcomplementingGFDwithalternativemodalities.Selectionofthefoodassistancemodalitiesshouldbebasedonanalysisandthedesiredobjectives,ratherthantheotherwayaround.Thisisapreconditionforaligningprogrammingwithcontextualrealitiesandforimprovedunderstandingofthesaleoffoodassistanceandnon-fooditems(NFIs)andtherecoursetonegativecopingstrategies.Strategydevelopmentshouldinvolvenewpartnershipswithreliefanddevelopmentactorsactiveinthearea,thehostgovernmentandrefugeesthemselves.
Action by: WFPandUNHCRcountryoffices
33
Management response and action taken/to be taken
Partiallyagreed.
WFPandUNHCRareinbroadagreementwiththisrecommendation,whileunderliningthatatransitiontoself-relianceisnotalwaysfeasibleinprotractedrefugeesituationsthatarestronglyaffectedbytheexternalconstraintsidentifiedinthesynthesisreport.
WFPandUNHCRfullyagreeontheneedforcontinuousassessmentoftheprospectsfordurablesolutions,andwillmakethemaximumuseofanyopportunitiesthatarise.However,thethreedurablesolutionsofvoluntaryrepatriation,localintegrationandresettlementareusuallycontingentonpoliticaldevelopments,whichhumanitariananddevelopmentactorscaninfluencebutnotcontrolordirect.
WFPandUNHCRwillstrivetoimproveunderstandingoflocalandregionalmarkets;remittancereceipts;interactionsamonggroupsofrefugeeswithincampsandamongencampedrefugees,out-of-camprefugeesandlocalhosts;andtherolethatlocalandcross-bordermobilityplaysinrefugees’effortstoestablishlivelihoodsandbecomeself-reliant.
Suchanalyseswillgobeyondtherelativelynarrowfocusofthecurrentjointassessmentmissions,toprovideabasisfortheformulationoflivelihoodandself-reliancestrategiesthatenableaphasedreductionofdirectfoodassistance,accordingtomutuallyagreedbenchmarksthatprotectthenutritionstatusofallrefugees,especiallythosewithspecificneeds,suchasolderpeople,peoplewithdisabilitiesandhouseholdsheadedbywomen.
Implementation deadline: Ongoing
34
Note on the Side Event to the 56th Meeting of the Standing Committee
Joint UNHCR-WFP evaluation of the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations: Presentation of synthesis report and management response
Tuesday 5 March 2013, 13:00-15:00hrs, Palais des Nations
In2011and2012,WFPandUNHCRjointlyundertookaseriesofevaluationsofthecontributionoffoodassistancetodurablesolutionsinprotractedrefugeesituations.Evaluationmissionstookplaceinfourcountries:Bangladesh,Chad,EthiopiaandRwanda.Followingcompletionoftheindividualevaluations,asynthesisreportwasproduced,whicharticulatedfiveoverarchingrecommendations.AmanagementresponsetothesynthesisreportwasformulatedataHighLevelMeetingbetweenthetwoagenciesinGenevaon9January2013.TheSynthesis of Mixed Method Impact Evaluations of the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations and the Management Response to the Synthesis Summary Report of the Series of Impact Evaluations of Food Assistance for Refugees in Protracted Situationswerepresentedatasideeventtothe56thMeetingoftheStandingCommitteeofUNHCRon5March2013,inordertostimulatediscussiononthejointevaluationseries.
ThesideeventwaschairedbyMr.StevenCorliss,DirectoroftheDivisionofProgrammeSupportandManagement,UNHCR.ThepanelmemberswereMs.HelenWedgwood,DirectoroftheOfficeofEvaluation,WFP,Mr.ChrisKaye,DirectorofthePerformanceManagementandMonitoringDivision,WFP,andMr.JeffCrisp,HeadofthePolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService,UNHCR.
TheDirectoroftheOfficeofEvaluation,WFP,providedanoverviewofthesynthesisreportofthejointevaluationseries.Sheexplainedthattheseweretheory-basedmixedmethodimpactevaluations,designedtotestwhetherfoodassistancetogetherwithUNHCRinputshadachievedtheintendedoutcomeofself-relianceanddurablesolutionsforrefugees.Theoverallresults,describedas“sobering”,indicatethattheintendedprogressiontowardsrefugeeself-reliancehasnotbeenachieved.Thiscanbeattributedtobothinternalinstitutionalfactorsandtoexternalfactors,notablyfundingshortfallsandhostcountrypolicies.Shenotedthatwhilethefindingsofthejointevaluationreflectpoorlyonthewholeinternationalhumanitariancommunity,thepricefortheseshortcomingsispaidbythemostpowerless.
TheDirectorofthePerformanceManagementandMonitoringDivision,WFP,notedthatthereportsfromthejointevaluationserieshadbeenformallyadoptedbytheWFPExecutiveBoard.Hethenprovidedanoverviewofthemanagementresponsetothejointevaluation,notingthatWFPandUNHCRstandtogetherinrecognizingtheneedforaparadigmshiftintheprovisionoffoodassistance.WFPandUNHCRwoulddevelopajointstrategyandoperationalframeworkwithaviewtoaddressinginternalconstraintsidentifiedbytheevaluations.WhilstaffirmingthecontinuedleadroleofUNHCRinaccordancewithitsmandate,bothagenciesrecognizedthatpromotingself-reliancerequirestheengagementofarangeofactors,includingUNCountryTeamsandhostgovernments.Theagenciesaffirmedtheneedformorereliableandsustainedtransitionalfunding,andcommittedtodevelopstrategiesforself-relianceinformedbyspecificcontextualanalysis,totheextentpossiblewithintheexternalconstraintsidentifiedbytheevaluations.
TheHeadofthePolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService,UNHCR,providedahistoricalperspectiveontheissueoffoodassistancetorefugeesinprotractedrefugeesituations.Previouseffortstopromoterefugeeself-reliancehaveachievedlimitedsuccessandencounteredanumberofcommonconstraints,includingrestrictedaccesstoland,labourmarketsandmobility,insufficientfunding,andthelateengagementofdevelopmentactors.Thequestionishowrelevantactorscan
35
learnfromthepast,aswellasthefindingsofthejointWFP-UNHCRevaluation,soastoensurethatrefugeesfacingprotracteddisplacementenjoyfoodsecurity,livelihoodsopportunities,self-relianceandthepotentialtofindlastingsolutions.
TheDirectoroftheDivisionofProgrammeSupportandManagement,UNHCR,concludedthatwhilethefindingsoftheevaluationseriesaresobering,theypresentanopportunitytore-energizeeffortstoadvancerefugeeself-relianceinthecontextofprotractedrefugeesituations.HehighlightedanumberofinitiativesthatwouldbetakenbyUNHCRinthisregard,suchastheTransitionalSolutionsInitiative,afocusoncash-basedinterventions,andpilotprojectsintwotothreecountrieswithenablingenvironmentstopromotelivelihoods.Ensuringthatfoodassistanceleadstoself-relianceisachallengethatUNHCRandWFParecommittedtoaddressing,butitwillrequireasustainedcommitmentfromabroadrangeofactors.
DelegatesexpressedtheirappreciationfortheevaluationseriesandwelcomedthecollaborationbetweenUNHCRandWFP.
Delegatesagreedthatmutualbenefitscouldbeachievedthroughstrengtheningcooperationbetweendevelopmentandhumanitarianactors.TheDirectorofthePerformanceManagementandMonitoringDivision,WFP,acknowledgedthevalueofengagingwithotheractors,particularlyingrapplingwiththeconceptofresilience.
Therelationshipbetweenself-relianceanddurablesolutionswasdiscussed,particularlywhetherself-reliancecanbeconsideredasolutioninitself.TheHeadofPolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService,UNHCR,notedthatadistinctioncanbemadebetweenself-relianceanddurablesolutions,withtheformeroccurringincountriesofasylumandpreparingrefugeestotakeadvantageofdurablesolutions,whicharenotgeographicallyconfined.Delegatesalsonotedthatdurablesolutionswerenotastrongfocusoftheevaluationseries.TheDirectoroftheOfficeofEvaluation,WFP,explainedveryfewdurablesolutionswereidentifiedinthefourcasestudiesandthatforthisreasontheywerenotstronglyreflectedinthereports.
Adelegateemphasizedtheneedforagendersensitiveapproachtofoodassistanceinthecontextofinvoluntarydisplacement.TheDirectorofthePerformanceManagementandMonitoringDivision,WFP,recognizedtheimportanceofcooperatingwithotheractorstoaddresstheissueofgender-basedviolence.
Onedelegatehighlightedthataclearaccountabilityframeworkwasrequiredforfollowupactionontherecommendationsoftheevaluations.ThedelegatenotedthatWFPwouldintegratetherecommendationsintoitsstrategicplanningframeworkandaskedhowtherecommendationswouldbeimplementedbyUNHCR.TheHeadofPolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService,UNHCR,statedthattheagencyhascommittedtoproducingamanagementresponsetoeveryevaluationandhasestablishedanInternalComplianceandAccountabilityCommitteetomonitortheimplementationofcriticalrecommendations.
Onedelegatequestionedwhetherself-relianceisachievableincasesofmassinflux.TheDirectoroftheOfficeofEvaluation,WFP,notedthatwhilesituationsofmassinfluxposeimportantchallenges,thefocusofthisparticularevaluationserieswasonprotractedrefugeesituations.
Delegatesrequestedclarificationontheroleofhostgovernmentsintheevaluationprocess.TheDirectoroftheOfficeofEvaluation,WFP,statedthatthetermsofreferenceofeachevaluationweresharedwithhostgovernmentsforcomments,andthatfindingsandrecommendationswerecommunicatedthroughfollowupworkshops.
WithspecificreferencetotheevaluationonBangladesh,onedelegatenotedthatthereportfocusedonassessingtheachievementsoffoodassistancetodate,andrequestedmoredetailedrecommendationsforalternatives.Delegatesalsostatedthatattemptstopromoterefugeelivelihoodsshouldbeconsistentwithhostgovernmentpoliciesandshouldnotshifttheburdenofrefugeeassistanceontohostcountries.Panelmembersunderscoredthattransitionalstrategiesshouldbedevelopedtogetherwithhostgovernmentsandagreedthatpromotingself-relianceanddurablesolutionsareasharedresponsibilityfortheinternationalcommunity.
36
PolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService
www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d28526.html
OfficeofEvaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation