Post on 06-Jan-2017
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Splunk Enterprise for Information Security
Hands-On
Presenter: Rene Aguero
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Security Hands-on: Find the first letter of *last* nameA – 1B – 1C – 1D – 2E – 2F – 2G – 3H – 3I – 3
J – 4K – 4L – 4M – 5N – 5O – 5P – 6Q – 6R – 6
S – 7T – 7U – 7V – 8W – 8X – 9Y – 9Z – 9? – 10
SSID: attwifi Code: Splunk2016https://od-sl-charlotte0#.splunkoxygen.com/ Username: splunklive
Password: security
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Intro
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Agenda
Intro
Web Attacks
Lateral Movement
DNS Exfiltration
Wrap-up / Q&A
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Security Hands-on: Find the first letter of *last* nameA – 1B – 1C – 1D – 2E – 2F – 2G – 3H – 3I – 3
J – 4K – 4L – 4M – 5N – 5O – 5P – 6Q – 6R – 6
S – 7T – 7U – 7V – 8W – 8X – 9Y – 9Z – 9? – 10
SSID: attwifi Code: Splunk2016https://od-sl-charlotte0#.splunkoxygen.com/ Username: splunklive
Password: security
Machine data contains a definitive record of all interactions
Splunk is a very effective platform to collect, store, and analyze all of that data
Human Machine
Machine Machine
Platform for Operational Intelligence
The Splunk Portfolio
Rich Ecosystem ofApps & Add-Ons
Splunk PremiumSolutions
MainframeData
RelationalDatabasesMobileForwarders Syslog/TCP IoT
DevicesNetworkWire Data
Hadoop
https://od-sl-charlotte10.splunkoxygen.com/
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Rapid Ascent in the Gartner SIEM Magic Quadrant*
*Gartner, Inc., SIEM Magic Quadrant 2011-2015. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publication and not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, express or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
2015 Leader and the only vendor to improve its visionary position
2014 Leader
2013 Leader
2012 Challenger
2011 Niche Player
2015
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Security Hands-on: Find the first letter of *last* nameA – 1B – 1C – 1D – 2E – 2F – 2G – 3H – 3I – 3
J – 4K – 4L – 4M – 5N – 5O – 5P – 6Q – 6R – 6
S – 7T – 7U – 7V – 8W – 8X – 9Y – 9Z – 9? – 10
SSID: attwifi Code: Splunk2016https://od-sl-charlotte0#.splunkoxygen.com/ Username: splunklive
Password: security
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Web Attacks
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OWASP 2013 Top 10 [10] Unvalidated redirects and forwards [9] Using components with known vulnerabilities [8] Cross-site request forgery [7] Missing function level access control [6] Sensitive data exposure [5] Security misconfiguration [4] Insecure direct object reference [3] Cross-site scripting (XSS) [2] Broken authentication and session management
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[1] InjectionSQL injectionCode injectionOS commandingLDAP injectionXML injectionXPath injectionSSI injectionIMAP/SMTP injectionBuffer overflow
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Our focusSQL injectionCode injectionOS commandingLDAP injectionXML injectionXPath injectionSSI injectionIMAP/SMTP injectionBuffer overflow
SQL injection is a massive headache for all companies who have a database and a
web interface.
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The anatomy of a SQL injection attack
SELECT * FROM users WHERE email='xxx@xxx.com' OR 1 = 1 -- ' AND password='xxx';
xxx@xxx.xxx' OR 1 = 1 -- '
xxx
admin@admin.sys
1234
An attacker might supply:
https://od-sl-charlotte10.splunkoxygen.com/
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Simple SQL Injection
index=web_vuln password select
(Starting with a simple, full-text search)
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Simple SQL Injection
index=web_vuln password select (administrator OR root OR system OR sa) | iplocation clientip | search Country=Ukraine
(Furthermore, search for a privileged user and isolate the traffic from a specific country)
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https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1528/
Search for possible SQL injection in your events: looks for patterns in URI query field to see if
anyone has injected them with SQL statements
use standard deviations that are 2.5 times greater than the average length of your URI query field
Macros used• sqlinjection_pattern(sourcetype, uri query field)• sqlinjection_stats(sourcetype, uri query field)
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Advanced SQL Injection
index=web_vuln …
TIP: To decode URIs you can use: | eval u = urldecode(field)
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Advanced SQL Injection
index=web_vuln | rex field=uri `sqlinjection_rex`| search injection=*| stats count by clientip status
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Summary: Web attacks/SQL injectionSQL injection provide attackers with easy access to dataDetecting advanced SQL injection is hard – use an app!Augment your WAF with enterprise-wide Splunk searches
Other scenarios? Come see us at the Security Answers Booth
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Lateral Movement
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Poking around
An attacker hacks a non-privileged user system.
So what?
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Lateral Movement
Lateral Movement is the expansion of systems controlled, and data accessed.
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Most famous Lateral Movement attack?(excluding password re-use)
Pass the Hash!
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Detecting Legacy PtHLook for Windows Events:
Event ID: 4624 or 4625Logon type: 3Auth package: NTLMUser account is not a domain logon, or Anonymous Logon
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LM Detection: Pass the Hash
source=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Authentication_Package=NTLM Type=Information
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Then it got harder• Pass the Hash tools have improved • Tracking of jitter, other metrics• So let’s detect lateral movement differently
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Network traffic provides source of truthI usually talk to 10 hostsThen one day I talk to 10,000 hostsALARM!
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LM Detection: Network Destinations
sourcetype="pan:traffic" | stats count dc(dest) sparkline(dc(dest)) by src_ip
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Consistently large
Inconsistent!
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LM Detection: Network Destinations
sourcetype="pan:traffic" | bucket _time span=1d | stats count dc(dest) as NumDests by src_ip _time | stats avg(NumDests) as avg stdev(NumDests) as stdev latest(NumDests) as latest by src_ip | where latest > 2 * stdev + avg
Find daily average, standard deviation, and most recent
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LM Detection: Network Destinations – Bonus
… | stats avg( eval( if(_time < relative_time(now(), “-1d@d”), NumDests, null))) as avg ….
If you are fancy, use stats, eval and the relative_time functions to ignore our recent spike.
With a valid avg and stdev, yesterday’s value becomes 28 standard deviations away from normal!
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iz so hard… u haz magic?
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Summary: Lateral MovementAttacker success defines scope of a breachHigh difficulty, high importanceWorth doing in SplunkEasy with UBA
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
DNS Exfiltration
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DNS exfiltration
domain=corp;user=dave;password=12345
encrypt
DNS Query:ZG9tYWluPWNvcnA7dXNlcj1kYXZlO3Bhc3N3b3JkPTEyMzQ1DQoNCg==.attack.com
ZG9tYWluPWNvcnA7dXNlcj1kYXZlO3Bhc3N3b3JkPTEyMzQ1DQoNCg==
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DNS exfil tends to be overlooked within an ocean of DNS data.
Let’s fix that!
DNS exfiltration
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FrameworkPOS: a card-stealing program that exfiltrates data from the target’s network by transmitting it as domain name system (DNS) traffic
But the big difference is the way how stolen data is exfiltrated: the malware used DNS requests!
https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23942-new-frameworkpos-variant-exfiltrates-data-via-dns-requests
“”
… few organizations actually keep detailed logs or records of the DNS traffic traversing their networks — making it an ideal way to siphon data from a hacked network.
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/05/deconstructing-the-2014-sally-beauty-breach/#
more-30872
“”
DNS exfiltration
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https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/
DNS exfil detection – tricks of the trade parse URLs & complicated TLDs (Top Level Domain) calculate Shannon Entropy
List of provided lookups• ut_parse_simple(url)• ut_parse(url, list) or ut_parse_extended(url, list) • ut_shannon(word)• ut_countset(word, set)• ut_suites(word, sets)• ut_meaning(word)• ut_bayesian(word)• ut_levenshtein(word1, word2)
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Examples• The domain aaaaa.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 1.8 (very low)• The domain google.com has a Shannon Entropy score of 2.6 (rather low)• A00wlkj—(-a.aslkn-C.a.2.sk.esasdfasf1111)-890209uC.4.com has a
Shannon Entropy score of 3 (rather high)
Layman’s definition: a score reflecting the randomness or measure of uncertainty of a string
Shannon Entropy
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Detecting Data Exfiltration
index=bro sourcetype=bro_dns| `ut_parse(query)` | `ut_shannon(ut_subdomain)` | eval sublen = length(ut_subdomain) | table ut_domain ut_subdomain ut_shannon sublen
TIPS Leverage our Bro DNS data Calculate Shannon Entropy scores Calculate subdomain length Display Details
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Detecting Data Exfiltration
… | stats count avg(ut_shannon) as avg_sha avg(sublen) as avg_sublen stdev(sublen) as stdev_sublen by ut_domain | search avg_sha>3 avg_sublen>20 stdev_sublen<2
TIPS Leverage our Bro DNS data Calculate Shannon Entropy scores Calculate subdomain length Display count, scores, lengths,
deviations
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Detecting Data Exfiltration
RESULTS• Exfiltrating data requires many DNS requests – look for high counts• DNS exfiltration to mooo.com and chickenkiller.com
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Summary: DNS exfiltrationExfiltration by DNS and ICMP is a very common techniqueMany organizations do not analyze DNS activity – do not be like them!No DNS logs? No Splunk Stream? Look at FW byte counts
Copyright © 2016 Splunk Inc.
Wrap-up / Q&A
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SummaryMultiple phases to modern attacksDeploy detection across all phasesAlso consider adaptive response!Stay abreast of modern advancements
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Northern Cal Tech Talks!Monthly WebEx Sessions
– Ted Talk style presentation– Q&A chat forum
So what’s next on the agenda?– April 20th @ 10AM PST
Top 5 most useful search commands
http://live.splunk.com/NorCalTechTalks
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