Roll, Roll, Roll Your Root - SIGCOMM-Sponsored Events · Introduction •DNSSEC brings integrityto...

Roll, Roll, Roll Your RootA Comprehensive Analysis of the First Ever DNSSEC Root KSK RolloverInternet Measurement Conference 2019 – Amsterdam, 2019-10-21

Moritz Müller3,4, Matthew Thomas6, Duane Wessels6, Wes Hardaker5, Taejoong Chung2, Willem Toorop1, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij1,4

1NLnet Labs, 2Rochester Institute of Technology, 3SIDN Labs, 4University of Twente, 5USC/Information Sciences Institute, 6Verisign

Introduction

• DNSSEC brings integrity to the DNS• Validators need the public key of the

Root and configure it as trust-anchor• In 2018, the trust-anchor was replaced

(or “rolled”) for the first time

• The old key: KSK-2010• The new key: KSK-2017

Recursive Resolver

What are the name servers of

Introduction

Recursive Resolver

a.gtld-servers.net.b.gtld-servers.net.

Introduction

Recursive Resolver

Introduction

Recursive Resolver

Introduction

Recursive Resolver

Why is rolling hard?

• No key à No validation à No DNS responses • Every validator needs to have KSK-2017, but:

• Validators use hard-coded keys• Containers challenge key update• People tend to forget about DNS

Photo by Icons8 team on Unsplash

Timeline

IV V VII STOP

ICANN resumes rollover process18 Sep 2018

KSK-2017 published in Root Zone11 Jul 2017

Revocation of KSK-201011 Jan 2019

The Rollover11 Oct 2018

KSK-2010 removed from Root Zone22 Mar 2019

ICANN halts rollover process27 Sep 2017

II III

IV V VII STOP

ICANN resumes rollover process18 Sep 2018

KSK-2017 published in Root Zone11 Jul 2017

ICANN halts rollover process27 Sep 2017

Before the Rollover

II III

Resolver Telemetry: RFC 8145

• The goal: estimating how many validators had KSK-2017• The solution: resolvers signal to the root

which keys they trust

• Data from ICANN from A, B, and J root• Signals from up to 100,000 validators daily

IV V VII STOP

Uptake of KSK-2017

RFC 5011add

hold−down

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct

KSK−2010

KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

Uptake of KSK-2017

RFC 5011add

hold−down

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct

KSK−2010

KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

8% of resolvers don’t have KSK-2017

IV V VII STOP

Photo by John Matychuk on Unsplash13

Zooming in on resolvers that only have KSK-2010

• Lots of RFC 8145 sources sent only one signal• Many sent only a few queries

IV V VII STOP

Query Count_ta-4a5c 15,447. 9,182VPN domain 3,156VPN alternate domain 415_sip._udp.otherdomain 86

Domains, queried by resolvers

Feb '18 Apr '18 Jun '18 Aug '18 Oct '18 Dec '18

8145 s

ignalle

IV V VII STOP

Feb '18 Apr '18 Jun '18 Aug '18 Oct '18 Dec '18

8145 s

ignalle

IV V VII STOP

Takeaways from before the Rollover

• Most validators correctly picked up KSK-2017• But one single application can influence the trust-anchor signal• Validation in applications might become more common

à Influence on telemetry

IV V VII STOP

The Rollover11 Oct 2018

During the Rollover

II III

The User’s Perspective: RIPE Atlas

• The goal: measuring how users perceive the rollover • The approach: Measuring with all RIPE Atlas probes

once per houra) If they have cached KSK-2017b) If they validate correctly

• We observed 35,719 resolver addresses in 3,141 ASesand correlated failing resolvers with DNSKEY queries with DITL data

IV V VII STOP

Activating KSK-20171

Oct 11−16:00h

Oct 12−00:00h

Oct 12−08:00h

Oct 12−16:00h

Oct 13−00:00h

Oct 13−08:00h

Oct 13−16:00h

Oct 14−00:00h

Oct 14−08:00h

Oct 14−16:00h

KSK−2010KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

Activating KSK-20171

Oct 11−16:00h

Oct 12−00:00h

Oct 12−08:00h

Oct 12−16:00h

Oct 13−00:00h

Oct 13−08:00h

Oct 13−16:00h

Oct 14−00:00h

Oct 14−08:00h

Oct 14−16:00h

KSK−2010KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

Large resolvers start validating with KSK-2017

Reaction to Validation Failures

218 138 3

35,719 unique resolver sources in RIPE Atlas

970 747

sending excessDNSKEY queries519

fixed within 1h fixed after 1h never fixed

secure before, insecure after rollover

secure before, bogus after rollover

sending 1.5x more DNSKEY queries after rollover

970secure before, bogus after rollover

34,002always secure or always insecure

IV V VII STOP

218 138 3

970 747

IV V VII STOP

218 138 3

970 747

IV V VII STOP

218 138 3

970 747

IV V VII STOP

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/broadband-restored-to-eir-customers-after-outage-1.3663004

IV V VII STOP

EIR Outage - Was it DNS(SEC)?

100000

125000

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

Massive increase after the rollover

EIR Outage - Was it DNS(SEC)?

100000

125000

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

Mysterious bump after removal of KSK-2010

Takeaways from during the Rollover

• Few resolvers had serious problems• The ones that had problems recovered fast• Less than 0.01% of the resolvers we monitored experienced problems

IV V VII STOP

Revocation of KSK-201011 Jan 2019

KSK-2010 removed from Root Zone22 Mar 2019

After the Rollover

II III

Increase in DNSKEY queries

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●1 ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●2

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●3

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●40 M

1 000 M

1 250 M

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●1 ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●2

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●3

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●40 M

1 000 M

1 250 M

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

Partially expected increase

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●1 ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●2

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●3

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●40 M

1 000 M

1 250 M

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

Very unexpected increase

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●1 ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●2

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●3

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●40 M

1 000 M

1 250 M

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

7% of total query load 34

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●1 ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●2

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●3

●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●40 M

1 000 M

1 250 M

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18

Nov '18Dec '18

Jan '19Feb '19

Mar '19

Apr '19

IV V VII STOP

Return to load after rollover

357% of total query load

Who’s behind the query floods?

• DNS CHAOS queries to sources reveal mostly older versions of BIND• Outreach• A large French cloud hosting provider

confirmed a source running BIND 9.8.2 on CentOS• Large midwestern university confirmed DNS

lab exercise and provided BIND config

IV V VII STOP

Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash

Reproducing Key Floods with BIND

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Experiment

• Conditions for reproducing DNSKEY floods with BIND:• DNSSEC managed keys contains KSK-2010, but not KSK-2017• The dnssec-enable flag was set to false• The dnssec-validation flag was unset, leaving it in its default state of “yes.”

IV V VII STOP

Reproducing Key Floods with BIND

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Experiment

• Conditions for reproducing DNSKEY floods with BIND:• DNSSEC managed keys contains KSK-2010, but not KSK-2017• The dnssec-enable flag was set to false• The dnssec-validation flag was unset, leaving it in its default state of “yes.”

IV V VII STOP

Bursts occur only occasionally

Resolver Telemetry: The return of KSK-2010

Oct 2018 Jan 2019 Apr 2019 Jul 2019

rs KSK−2010

KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

Takeaways from after the Rollover

• No one expected the massive flood of DNSKEY queries• Trust anchor management comes in different shapes and colors• Shipping trust anchors with software has long-lasting effects

IV V VII STOP

Discussion

Do we need to improve telemetry?• RFC 8145 and RFC 8509 are useful but should be

improved• Allowing to identify the true source of a signal• Provide an estimate for how many users a signal

representsPhoto by Chunlea Ju on Unsplash

Do we need to improve telemetry?• RFC 8145 and RFC 8509 are useful but should be

improved• Allowing to identify the true source of a signal• Provide an estimate for how many users a signal

represents

Do we need to change trust anchor management?E.g. shipping TAs centrally in OSes?

Photo by Chunlea Ju on Unsplash

Conclusions and broader Lessons

• The rollover was a success• Independent analysis and measurements on the internet are valuable• Telemetry must be kept in mind at an early stage of protocol development• Trust anchors should be managed centrally

Conclusions and broader Lessons

• The rollover was a success• Independent analysis and measurements on the internet are valuable• Telemetry must be kept in mind at an early stage of protocol development• Trust anchors should be managed centrally

Questions, suggestions, comments?Data available at

https://github.com/SIDN/RollRollRollYourRootContact

Moritz Müller | moritz.muller@sidn.nl | sidnlabs.nl

Bonus Slides

Increase in DNSKEY queries after revocation

ZSKrollover

RFC 5011hold−down

for revocation

KSK−2010revoked

Jan '19 Feb '19 Mar '19

ction o

AA*BCDEFHIJJ*KLM

IV V VII STOP

Most root servers see the increase

Increase in DNSKEY queries after revocation

ZSKrollover

RFC 5011hold−down

for revocation

KSK−2010revoked

Jan '19 Feb '19 Mar '19

ction o

AA*BCDEFHIJJ*KLM

IV V VII STOP

Most root servers see the increase

But not all of them

Resolver Telemetry: RFC 8509 “Root Sentinel”

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18Nov '18

Dec '18Jan '19

Feb '19Mar '1

9Apr '1

9May '19

Jun '19Jul '1

9Aug '19

KSK−2010

KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

Resolver Telemetry: RFC 8509 “Root Sentinel”

Aug '18Sep '18

Oct '18Nov '18

Dec '18Jan '19

Feb '19Mar '1

9Apr '1

9May '19

Jun '19Jul '1

9Aug '19

KSK−2010

KSK−2017

IV V VII STOP

The return of KSK-2010

Failure Modes

0204060

0100020003000

Oct 11 − 00:00

Oct 11 − 08:00

Oct 11 − 16:00

Oct 12 − 00:00

Oct 12 − 08:00

Oct 12 − 16:00

Oct 13 − 00:00

Oct 13 − 08:00

Oct 13 − 16:00

Oct 14 − 00:00

Oct 14 − 08:00

Oct 14 − 16:00

IV V VII STOP

Failing and then Insecure

Failing and Recover

Failure and Bogus

Validation Failure Modes

0204060

0100020003000

Oct 11 − 00:00

Oct 11 − 08:00

Oct 11 − 16:00

Oct 12 − 00:00

Oct 12 − 08:00

Oct 12 − 16:00

Oct 13 − 00:00

Oct 13 − 08:00

Oct 13 − 16:00

Oct 14 − 00:00

Oct 14 − 08:00

Oct 14 − 16:00

IV V VII STOP

Failing and then Recover

Failure and Bogus

Validation Failure Modes

0204060

0100020003000

Oct 11 − 00:00

Oct 11 − 08:00

Oct 11 − 16:00

Oct 12 − 00:00

Oct 12 − 08:00

Oct 12 − 16:00

Oct 13 − 00:00

Oct 13 − 08:00

Oct 13 − 16:00

Oct 14 − 00:00

Oct 14 − 08:00

Oct 14 − 16:00

IV V VII STOP

Failing and then Recover

Failing and then Bogus

Roll, Roll, Roll Your Root - SIGCOMM-Sponsored Events · Introduction •DNSSEC brings integrityto...

Documents

Transcript of Roll, Roll, Roll Your Root - SIGCOMM-Sponsored Events · Introduction •DNSSEC brings integrityto...

ITL Bank Note Validators UNIDESA - EUROPEA 24/02/10.

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ASP.NET Event Handlers Database -> Browser ->Shopping Basket Validators.

Distributed Ledgers and Blockchains Opportunities for ... · following core concepts: – distributed ledger – blockchain technology – consensus algorithm – network validators

Custom Validators Training

root N4e8G6Vb9Te7C2J root 7EnKeF24379018k root …docshare01.docshare.tips/files/14769/147698491.pdf · root N4e8G6Vb9Te7C2J root 5p33d|-|05t@123

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ROOT Tutorial. ROOT Webpage ROOT User’s guide .

Roots, Root System, Root Structure, Root Cap & Root Development

openxpki 23C3 paper - events.ccc.de · Activitiesareonlyavailableifcertainconditionsaremet. Inputdataforaworkflowactivitycan bevalidatedusingso-called»validators«. Eachworkflowhasitsowncontext,whichiswhereit

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Luna Staking eng - terra.money · and delegating LUNA to validators. DOWNLOAD Pick a validator Go to the Staking tab to see all validators ranked by voting power. The higher the voting

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Bristol Standard Training for Mentors and Validators Standard Training for Mentors and Validators Thursday 2nd November 2017 (plus attendance at a validation day) 9.15 for coffee 9.30am

· Veggie Roll California Roll Black Dragon Roll Spicy Tuna Roll Tempura Fried Shrimp Roll Hamachi Crunch Roll Godzilla Roll Lemon Drop Roll ... ASSIETTE FROMAGE cheeses supplied

Types of email validators

Copyright © 2007 Knowbility, Inc. Accessibility Testing 1 ► Code Validators – XHTML & CSS ► Accessibility Validators – Page by Page ► Listening to Your.