Post on 01-Apr-2021
RISK ASSESSMENT
STUDY REPORT
For
Aarti Drugs Limited
Plot No 211/213
Rev 0
June 2014
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0
CONTENTS
REPORT APPROVAL FORM I
ABBREVIATIONS II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY III
1 INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1 GENERAL 1-1
1.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY 1-1
1.3 WEATHER CONDITIONS 1-1
1.4 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT 1-3
2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 2-1
2.1 ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS 2-1
2.2 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES 2-2
3 RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS 3-1
3.1 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS 3-1
3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA 3-1
3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS 3-6
4 RISK ANALYSIS 4-1
4.1 INDIVIDUAL RISK 4-1
4.2 SOCIETAL RISK 4-5
5 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 5-9
6 REFERENCE 6-1
APPENDIX A – ASSUMPTIONS A-1
Contours
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: Major Accident Events 2-1
Table 3-1: Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation 3-3
Table 3-2: Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity 3-4
Table 3-3: Damage Due To Overpressures 3-5
Table 4-1: Individual Risk Contribution from various Release Scenarios 4-1
Table 4-2: Societal Risk Contribution for various Release Scenarios 4-5
Table 5-1: Conclusion for IR/SR 5-9
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4-1 : F-N Curve for the Facility 4-5
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SAWALI
CONSULTANCY REPORT APPROVAL FORM Job No.: J015
Client: AARTI DRUGS LIMITED
Report Title: Risk Assessment Study
Rev No. 0 SIGNATURE DATE
Prepared by: Kavita Patwardhan 11/06/2014
Checked by: Sunanda Rahurkar 12/06/2014
Approved by: Sunanda Rahurkar 12/06/2014
Revisions
Rev Revision By Checked Approved Date
Client Approval Of Report:
Rev
No. Signature Date
0
This document is confidential and has been produced for the purpose of the above mentioned study and is
only suitable for use in connection therewith.
Any liability arising out of use of this document by the above mentioned client or third party, for purposes not
wholly connected with the above mentioned study, shall be the responsibility of the above mentioned client
who shall indemnify Sawali Consultancy against all claims, damages and losses arising out of such use.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ADL Aarti Drugs Limited
IR Individual Risk
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LP Low Pressure
MAE Major Accident Event
NR Not Reached
PLL Potential Loss of Life
RA Risk Assessment
SR Societal Risk
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Aarti Drugs Limited, Metformin Hydrochloride manufacturing plant is located at Sarigam,
GIDC in Gujarat.
Aarti Drugs Limited has engaged Sawali Consultancy, for carrying out Risk Assessment
(RA) for the operating facility at Sarigam. The present report is the RA Study report for
the facilities based on the design & operating information and suitable conservative
assumptions. Based on the RA study, the following conclusions and recommendations
emerge:
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the QRA results, the Individual Risk as well as Societal Risk falls in below
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region
The summary of consequence analysis has been presented in the summary table
Based on this study, the following conclusions have been reached:
Conclusion for IR/SR
1
Individual Risk (IR)
The IR value for the Aarti Drugs Limited is estimated at 2.47E-06 per year, which is
in ALARP region.
2
Expected Number of Fatalities (PLL)
The estimated overall Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for the plant population is
estimated at 0.82 E-06 per year.
3
Societal Risk (F-N Curve)
The F-N curves show that societal risk for the overall population considered falls
below the ALARP region (10-3 to 10-5) i.e. in the acceptable region.
In the majority of failure scenarios considered, damage to adjacent equipment or tank is
likely in event of fire/ explosion. Radiation received by surrounding equipment or tanks
could be sufficient to cause overheating/ explosion of the equipment or tank.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Use of mechanical equipment and tools that can generate sparks in operation should
be avoided within the process areas.
Ensure strict implementation of ‘NO SMOKING’ and ‘NO MOBILE’ at the facility to
minimize ignition chances. The vehicles entering inside the plant should be ensured
to be fitted with flame arrestors.
During unloading of various solvents, proper grounding of the road tankers to be
ensured.
Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness to be
achieved.
As in case of a fire at the terminal, escape and evacuation routes are expected get
impaired due to high radiation levels (>6.3kW/m2), therefore, EERA shall be done for
the terminal.
Small leaks could occur frequently in routine operations like pump seal failure,
sample point valve or drain valve left open, flange leak etc. They should be attended
to immediately as they could escalate.
In case of any leakage, evacuate staffs at the leakage affected area and guide them
to a safe place; prevent entry of unnecessary personnel into the affected area; and
isolate ignition source. Personnel for emergency treatment should stop leakage in a
safe manner.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 GENERAL
Aarti Drugs Limited has engaged Sawali Consultancy, for carrying out Risk Assessment
(RA) for the operating facility at Sarigam. The present report is the RA Study report for
the facilities based on the design & operating information and suitable conservative
assumptions. Based on the RA study, the following conclusions and recommendations
emerge:
1.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY
Aarti Drugs Limited, Metformin Hydrochloride manufacturing plant is located at plot no.
211 & 213, Sarigam, GIDC in Gujarat
The present factory premises have occupied 4213.31 M2 out of 8662 M2. Non-polluting
and are not in the manufacture of pesticides, antibiotics or steroids. The GIDC supplies
filtered potable water, which is basically river water. The electricity is supplied by the
Gujarat Electricity Board and supply line is 750 KV.
1.3 WEATHER CONDITIONS
The consequences arising out of the release of chemicals are dependent among other
things on the prevailing meteorological conditions. This section describes the influence
of these conditions.
1.3.1 Stability Class
Dispersion of gases or vapours largely depends upon the Stability Class. Various
stability classes that are defined as Pasquill classes are:
- A Very Unstable
- B Unstable
- C Slightly Unstable
- D Neutral
- E Stable
- F Very Stable
The stability class for a particular location is generally dependent upon:
- Time of the Day (Day or Night)
- Cloud Cover
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- Season
- Wind Speed
Six stability classes from A to F are defined while wind speed can take any one of
numerous values. It may thus appear that a large number of outcome cases can be
formulated by considering each one of very many resulting stability class-wind speed
combinations. However, in fact the number of stability class - wind speed combinations
that needs to be considered for formulating outcome cases in any analysis is very
limited. This is because, in nature, only certain combinations of stability class and wind
speed occur. Thus, for instance combinations such as A-3 m/s or B-5 m/s or F-4 m/s do
not occur in nature. As a result only one or two stability class - wind speed combinations
need to be considered to ensure reasonable completeness of Quantitative Risk
assessment study. Furthermore, though wind speeds less than 1 m/s may occur in
practice, none of the available dispe8rsion models, including state-of-art ones, can
handle wind speeds below 1 m/s. Fortunately, wind speed does not influence
consequences as much as stability class and for a given stability class, the influence of
wind speed is relatively less. On the other hand, consequences vary considerably with
stability class for the same speed.
Except during the monsoon months little or no cloud cover along with the prevailing low
wind velocities results in unstable conditions during the day (C or D) and highly stable
conditions (E or F) at night. During the three months of monsoons, the wind velocities
are generally higher and cloud cover generally present. This results in stability class of D
during the day and E or F during the night. The stability class distribution over the year
roughly works out as below:
A - B - C 17%
D 50%
E or F 33%
The following wind velocity/ stability class combinations & frequencies are used for Risk
Assessment.
D – 3 m/s
F – 1.5 m/s
Annual mean air temperature is taken as 33oC, while annual mean humidity is taken as
65% based on weather conditions.
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1.4 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT
The initial efforts for the study involved site visit and collection of site information. This
also included discussions on Process and Hazards with Aarti Drugs Limited personnel.
The information required provided familiarity with the project to the team carrying out the
Risk Assessment study. The next part of the study comprised of the Risk Analysis
calculations based on the collected data. These essentially involved release rate and
source strength calculations, dispersion modelling and consequence modelling for the
selected scenarios followed by release probability calculations. Based on RA
calculations, conclusions and recommendations have been stated in section 4 of this
report.
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2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
2.1 ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS
Effective management of a Risk Assessment study requires enumeration and selection
of incidents or scenarios. Enumeration attempts to ensure that no significant incidents
are overlooked; selection tries to reduce the incident outcome cases studied to a
manageable number.
These incidents can be classified under, either of the two categories:
Loss of containment of material, or
Loss of containment of energy.
Unfortunately, there are infinite ways (incidents) by which loss of containment can occur
in either category. For example, leaks of process materials can be of any size, from a
pinhole up to a severed pipeline or ruptured vessel. An explosion can occur in either a
small container or a large container and, in each case, can range from a small "puff" to a
catastrophic detonation.
A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks
and major releases from fractures of all process pipelines and vessels. This compilation
should include all pipe work and vessels in direct communication, as these may share a
significant inventory that cannot be isolated in an emergency. The data generated is as
shown below:
Vessel number, description, and dimensions
Materials present
Vessel conditions (phase, temperature, pressure)
Inventory and connecting piping and piping dimensions
The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases, to be studied
to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through overlooking
significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident selection is to
construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial list that has been
generated by the enumeration process. An appropriate set of incidents is the minimum
number of incidents needed to satisfy the requirements of the study and adequately
represent the spectrum of incidents enumerated.
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2.2 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES
Accidental release of flammable or toxic materials can result in severe consequences.
Delayed ignition of flammable vapours can result in blast overpressures covering large
areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may cover yet
larger distances due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in case of
explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized
consequences. In most of the cases, fires can be put out or contained, but there are very
few mitigating actions that one can take once a vapour cloud has released.
In facilities, like the ones in question, the main hazard arises due to the possibility of
leakage of flammable and toxic materials. To formulate a structured approach to
identification of hazards, an understanding of contributory factors is essential.
2.2.1 Operating Parameters
Operating parameters (Temperature, Pressure & Phase) may vary subject to the
processing, storage, handling, loading/ unloading and transportation conditions.
Potential vapour release of the materials handled depends significantly on these
conditions. Temperature and pressure conditions provided by ADL have been used for
Consequence Analysis.
2.2.2 Inventory
Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short
listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role with regard to the potential
hazard. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential
leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and vessels containing sizable
inventories. The potential vapour release (source strength) depends upon the quantity of
liquid release, the properties of the materials and the operating conditions (pressure,
temperature).
2.2.3 Loss of Containment
Inventory can be discharged into the environment due to Loss of Containment. Various
causes and modes for such an eventuality have been described. Certain features of
materials to be handled at the facility need to be clearly understood to firstly list out all
significant release cases and then to short list release scenarios for a detailed
examination.
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Inventory release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a vessel leading
to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a major crack that
practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very short time. The
more likely event is the case of inventory release from a hole in a pipe connected to the
vessel. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on the pressure in
front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such pressure is dependent on the pressure in the
system.
For a liquid release, the vapourization of released liquid depends on the vapour pressure
and weather conditions. Such consideration and others have been kept in mind while
performing calculations.
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2.2.4 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
Following is a generalized event tree which has been used in the current QRA study
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2.2.5 Hazardous Scenarios
Based on the methodology discussed above a set of appropriate scenarios (MAEs) were
generated to carry out Quantitative Risk assessment calculations, as listed below:
Table 2-1: Major Accident Events
S.No Major Accident Events
1. Leak of Xylene tank
2. Rupture of xylene tank
3. Leak of Methanol tank
4. Rupture of Methanol tank
5. Leak of Toluene tank
6. Rupture of Toluene tank
7. Leak of Xylene tanker
8. Rupture of xylene tanker
9. Leak of Methanol tanker
10. Rupture of Methanol tanker
11. Leak of Toluene tanker
12. Rupture of Toluene tanker
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3 RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
3.1 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH FLAMMABLE MATERIALS
ADL handles a number of hazardous materials like Xylene, methanol and Toluene. The
major hazards from these types of materials may be fire radiation and explosion. Fire
and explosion hazards depend on the range of flammable concentrations of the material
in air among all common gaseous fuels. Any spillage or loss of containment of heavier
hydrocarbons may create a highly flammable pool of liquid around the source of release.
High entrainment of gas phase in the liquid phase can lead to jet fires. If released at
temperatures higher than the normal boiling point they can flash significantly.
3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA
In consequence, analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the
physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage
(lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can roughly be
divided in three major groups:
a) Determination of the source strength parameters;
b) Determination of the consequential effects;
c) Determination of the damage or damage distances
The basic physical effect models consist of the following:
3.2.1 Source Strength Parameters
Calculation of the outflow of liquid out of equipment or tank or pipe, in case of
rupture.
Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evapouration and of
the dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.
Calculation of the evapouration rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool
dimensions and wind velocity.
Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases of pump discharge line
ruptures for catastrophic cases.
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3.2.2 Consequential effects
Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength,
relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the
surrounding area.
Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/m2] due to a fire, as a function of the distance to the
source.
Energy of vapour cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the
distance of the exploding cloud.
Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of
evapourated chemical. The latter can be either explosive.
It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study
strongly depend upon the type of material involved:
Gas, vapour, liquid, solid?
Inflammable, explosive,
Stored at high/ low temperatures or pressure?
Controlled outflow (pump Inventory) or catastrophic failure?
3.2.3 Selection of Damage Criteria
The damage criterion gives the relation between extent of the physical effects
(exposure) and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to those
effects. The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the
exposure. For instance, a lot is known about the damage caused by heat radiation, than
about the damage due to toxic exposure, and for these toxic effects, the knowledge
differs strongly between different materials. In Consequence Analysis studies, in
principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished:
1. Heat radiation, from a jet, pool fire or flash fire.
2. Explosion
3. Heat Radiation
The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation are function of:
The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];
The exposure duration [sec];
The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).
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The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for
second-degree burns are given in the table below:
Table 3-1: Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation
Exposure
Duration
Radiation energy
(1% lethality,
kW/m2
Radiation energy
for 2nd degree
burns, kW/m2
Radiation energy
for first degree
burns, kW/m2
10 Sec 21.2 16 12.5
30 Sec 9.3 7.0 4.0
Since in practical situations, only the people outside will be exposed to heat radiation. In
case of a fire, it is reasonable to assume the protection by clothing. It can be assumed
that people would be able to find a cover or a shield against thermal radiation in 10-sec.
time. Furthermore, 100% lethality may be assumed for all people suffering from direct
contact with flames, such as the pool fire, a flash fire or a jet flame. The effects due to
relatively lesser incident radiation intensity are given below:
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Table 3-2: Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity
Radiation Intensity
(kW/m2)
Casualty Threshold
0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation
1.6 No discomfort for long exposure
4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin
(first degree burns are likely)
9.33 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. Second degree burns
after 20 sec. 1% lethality.
12.7 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,
melting plastic tubing etc. 10% lethality
18.47 50% lethality
36.56 99% lethality
The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the
models arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and
others. Upon ignition, a spilled liquid would burn in the form of a large turbulent diffusion
flame. The size of the flame would depend upon the spill surface and the thermo-
chemical properties of the spilled liquid. In particular, the diameter of the fire (if not
confined to a dyke), the visible height of the flame, the tilt and drag of the flame due to
wind can be correlated to the burning velocity of the liquid. The radiative output of the
flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the flame
temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water
vapour in the intervening atmosphere. In addition, large pool fires produce thick smoke,
which can significantly obscure flame radiation. Finally the incident flux at an observer
location would depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance
from the flame surface, the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry.
Estimation of the thermal radiation hazards from pool/ jet fires essentially involves 3
steps; characterization of flame geometry, approximation of the radiative properties of
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the fire and calculation of safe separation distances to specified levels of thermal
radiation.
Explosion
In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:
flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;
A blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source.
As explained above, 100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the
cloud proper.
For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:
Peak overpressure of 0.1 bars will cause serious damage to 10% of the
housing/structures.
Falling fragments will kill one of each eight persons in the destroyed buildings.
The following damage criteria may be distinguished with respect to the peak
overpressures resulting from a blast wave:
Table 3-3: Damage Due To Overpressures
Peak Overpressure, bar Damage Type
0.83 Total destruction
0.30 Heavy damage, nearly complete destruction of houses
0.27 Cladding of light industrial building ruptures
0.2 Steel frame buildings distorted and pulled from
foundations
0.16 Lower limit of serious structural damage
0.14 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
0.027 Limited minor structural damage
0.01 Typical pressure of glass breakage
From this it may be concluded that p = 0.17 E+5 pa corresponds approximately with 1%
lethality. Furthermore it is assumed that everyone inside an area in which the peak
overpressure is greater than 0.17 E+5 pa will be wounded by mechanical damage. For
the gas cloud explosion this will be inside a circle with the ignition source as its centre.
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3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
This section documents the consequence-distance calculations. A Maximum Credible
Accident (MCA) can be characterized as the worst credible accident. Another aspect, in
which the pessimistic approach of MCA studies appears, is the atmospheric condition
that is used for dispersion calculations. In general, a very stable atmosphere (Pasquill
class F) and a low wind speed (1.5 m/s) are assumed. These conditions result in the
lowest dispersion velocity & consequently in the highest vapour concentrations and the
largest damage distances. Less pessimistic assumptions (e.g. neutral weather, wind
speed 3 m/s), which are generally the more average conditions, result in smaller
damage distances.
In Risk Assessment studies contributions from low frequency - high outcome effect as
well as high frequency - low outcome events are distinguished. The objective of the
study is making the facility safer and have better emergency planning, hence only
holistic & conservative assumptions are used for obvious reasons. Hence though the
outcomes may look pessimistic, the planning for emergency concept should be borne in
mind whilst interpreting the results. The Consequence Analysis has been done for
selected scenarios for weather conditions D-3 m/sec and F-1.5 m/sec.
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CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
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Sc # 1 Small leak from Xylene tank - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 kL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 4.3 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool Fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 31.9 33.8
1 9.33 22.2 25.2
10 12.70 18.8 21.9
50 18.47 14.5 16.4
99 36.56 9.4 9.8
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
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Sc # 2 Small leak from Xylene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 kL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
70000 4.0 4.3
11000 6.2 6.9
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 19.2 10 20.1 10
0.1379 12.4 10 12.6 10
0.2068 11.8 10 12.0 10
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
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Sc # 3 Rupture of Xylene tank - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 kL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 4.3 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 31.8 33.7
1 9.33 22.1 25.2
10 12.70 18.7 21.8
50 18.47 14.4 16.4
99 36.46 9.4 9.7
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
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Sc # 4 Rupture of Xylen tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 kL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
70000 4.0 4.3
11000 6.2 6.9
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 19.2 10 20.0 10
0.1379 12.4 10 12.6 10
0.2068 11.8 10 12.0 10
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
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Sc # 5 Small leak from Methanol tank -Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 39.6 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool Fire Model
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 77.8 80.5
1 9.33 105.7 105.4
10 12.70 68.8 72.2
50 18.47 57.1 61.1
99 36.46 45.6 44.9
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-17
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-18
Sc # 6 Small leak from Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25KL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
360000 75.7 43.3
73000 38.9 24.2
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 207.4 70 95.5 40
0.1379 105.6 70 54.4 40
0.2068 97.5 70 51.1 40
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-19
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-20
Sc # 7 Rupture of Methanol tank - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25KL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 114.8 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool Fire Model
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 142.6 144.6
1 9.33 104.9 106.2
10 12.70 66.7 71.2
50 18.47 54.6 59.6
99 36.46 76.1 79.9
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-21
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-22
Sc # 8 Rupture of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25KL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
360000 121.6 130.4
73000 749.6 483.7
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 168.0 90 151.6 30
0.1379 108.3 90 57.4 30
0.2068 104.2 90 53.1 30
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-23
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-24
Sc # 9 Small leak from Toluene tank - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 2.1 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 21.8 22.8
1 9.33 15.7 17.2
10 12.70 13.6 15.4
50 18.47 11.1 12.8
99 36.46 6.7 7.3
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/ tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-25
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-26
Sc # 10 Leak from toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 KL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
71000 0.76 0.77
12000 0.05 0.3
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 44.4 20 25.3 10
0.1379 26.3 20 13.9 10
0.2068 24.9 20 13.0 10
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/ tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-27
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-28
Sc # 11 Rupture of toluene tank -Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 19.4 20.5
1 9.33 13.3 14.9
10 12.70 11.2 13.1
50 18.47 8.6 10.4
99 36.46 4.3 4.9
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-29
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-30
Sc # 12 Rupture of Toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 25 KL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
71000 3.5 3.55
12000 15.1 15.6
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 107.9 10 104.1 10
0.1379 39.8 10 35.8 10
0.2068 35.3 10 32.2 10
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-06 per year/ tank
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-06 * 0.3 per year/ tank
= 1.5E-06 per year/tank
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-31
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-32
Sc # 13 Small leak from Xylene tanker - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 20 MT
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 25.02 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 65.7 74.4
1 9.33 34.8 37.7
10 12.70 30.1 30.3
50 18.47 30.1 30.3
99 36.46 Not Reached Not Reached
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-07 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-07 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 1.5E-07 per year/ tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-33
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-34
Sc # 14 Small leak from Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 20 MT
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
70000 4.4 4.0
11000 21.5 18.1
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 82.7 30 81.6 30
0.1379 43.7 30 43.4 30
0.2068 40.6 30 40.4 30
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-07 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-07 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 1.5E-07 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-35
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-36
Sc # 15 Rupture of Xylene tanker - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 20 MT
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 25.0 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 65.6 74.4
1 9.33 34.8 37.7
10 12.70 30.1 30.3
50 18.47 30.1 30.3
99 36.46 Not Reached Not Reached
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-37
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-38
Sc # 16 Rupture of Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 20 MT
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
70000 4.4 4.0
11000 21.5 18.0
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 82.7 30 81.6 30
0.1379 43.7 30 43.4 30
0.2068 40.6 30 40.3 30
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-39
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-40
Sc # 17 Small leak from Methanol tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
360000 4.8 4.9
73000 31.5 23.9
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 146.7 60 87.5 40
0.1379 82.4 60 52.3 40
0.2068 77.4 60 49.5 40
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-07 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-07 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 1.5E-07 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-41
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-42
Sc # 18 Rupture of Methanol tanker - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 24.2 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 69.2 69.7
1 9.33 50.7 53.3
10 12.70 44.5 47.6
50 18.47 36.2 38.9
99 36.46 29.9 29.7
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/ tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-43
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-44
Sc # 19 Rupture of Methanol tanker - Flash Fire/VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 kL
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
360000 4.8 4.8
73000 31.4 23.9
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 146.7 60 87.5 40
0.1379 82.5 60 52.3 40
0.2068 77.4 60 49.5 40
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-45
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-46
Sc # 20 Small leak from Toluene tanker - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 24.7 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 65.4 74.2
1 9.33 34.4 37.3
10 12.70 29.7 29.8
50 18.47 29.6 29.7
99 36.46 Not Reached Not Reached
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-07 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-07 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 1.5E-07 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-47
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-48
Sc # 21 Leak from Toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
71000 5.9 6.2
12000 46.5 31.4
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 191.7 50 105.9 40
0.1379 86.7 50 57.1 40
0.2068 78.4 50 53.2 40
Probability
Base Frequency - 5E-07 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 5E-07 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 1.5E-07 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-49
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-50
Sc # 22 Rupture of Toluene tanker - Pool fire
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Heat Radiation Model
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Effective Radius of the pool - 24.7 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage distances are
as follows:
Pool fire Model
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kW/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
First Degree Burns 4.0 65.4 74.2
1 9.33 34.4 37.3
10 12.70 29.6 29.8
50 18.47 29.7 29.7
99 36.46 Not Reached Not Reached
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-51
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-52
Sc # 23 Rupture of Toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
Parameters
Temperature - Atmospheric
Pressure - Atmospheric
Capacity - 10 MT
Flash Fire Model
Concentration (ppm)
Distance (m)
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
71000 5.9 6.2
12000 46.5 31.3
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage
Type
F (1.5 m/s) D (3 m/s)
Effect
Distance(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
Effect Distance
(m)
Ignition Centre
(m)
0.02068 191.7 50 105.9 40
0.1379 86.7 50 57.1 40
0.2068 78.4 50 53.2 40
Probability
Base Frequency - 1E-05 per year/ tanker
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1E-05 * 0.3 per year/ tanker
= 3E-06 per year/tanker
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 3-53
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-1
4 RISK ANALYSIS
4.1 INDIVIDUAL RISK
The IR value for the Aarti drugs limited comes out to be 2.47 E-06 per year which falls
under acceptable region of risk acceptance criteria. The IR acceptance criteria are those
adapted by UK HSE and presented below as risk triangle.
Given below are the Individual risk levels and contributions of various release scenarios
as calculated from the risk analysis.
Table 4-1: Individual Risk Contribution from various Release Scenarios
Scenario
Individual Risk
% Contribution
Leakage of Xylene tank - Pool fire 4.255%
Leakage of Xylene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Rupture of Xylene tank - Pool fire 4.255%
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-2
Scenario
Individual Risk
% Contribution
Rupture of Xylene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Leakage of Methanol tank -Pool fire 4.355%
Leakage of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Rupture of Methanol tank - Pool fire 4.255%
Rupture of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Leakage of toluene tank - Pool fire 4.255%
Leakage of toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Rupture of toluene tank -Pool fire 4.255%
Rupture of toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Leakage of Xylene tanker - Pool fire 4.255%
Leakage of Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 4.255%
Rupture of Xylene tanker - Pool fire 4.255%
Rupture of Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.426%
Leakage of Methanol tanker - Pool fire 0.426%
Leakage of methanol tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 8.511%
Rupture of Methanol tanker - Pool fire 8.511%
Rupture of methanol tanker – Flash Fire/VCE 0.426%
Leakage of Toluene tanker - Pool fire 0.426%
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-3
Scenario
Individual Risk
% Contribution
Leakage of toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 8.511%
Rupture of Toluene tanker - Pool fire 8.511%
Rupture of Toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.426%
Total 100 %
The individual Risk contributors in the form of pie chart are given below
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-4
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-5
4.2 SOCIETAL RISK
Societal risk is the risk experienced by the group of personnel exposed in a given time
period. Societal risk is generally used to describe multiple injury accidents/fatalities, or to
describe risks to “unnamed” individuals, which include the public and is usually
described by F-N Curves. Based on Risk Analysis calculations for ADL facility, the
societal/ group risk is found to be 2.69 E-07 per year. Societal risk results have been
presented in the following FN curve
Figure 4-1 : F-N Curve for the Facility
Given below are the societal risk levels and contributions of various release scenarios as
calculated from the Risk Analysis
Table 4-2: Societal Risk Contribution for various Release Scenarios
Scenario
Societal Risk
% Contribution
Leakage of Xylene tank - Pool fire 0.42%
Leakage of Xylene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.22%
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-6
Scenario
Societal Risk
% Contribution
Rupture of Xylene tank - Pool fire 0.42%
Rupture of Xylene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.22%
Leakage of Methanol tank -Pool fire 5.94%
Leakage of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 14.60%
Rupture of Methanol tank - Pool fire 5.67%
Rupture of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 16.64%
Leakage of toluene tank - Pool fire 0.25%
Leakage of toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.95%
Rupture of toluene tank -Pool fire 0.17%
Rupture of toluene tank - Flash Fire/ VCE 1.92%
Leakage of Xylene tanker - Pool fire 1.42%
Leakage of Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 2.53%
Rupture of Xylene tanker - Pool fire 1.42%
Rupture of Xylene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.25%
Leakage of Methanol tanker - Pool fire 0.24%
Leakage of methanol tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 18.38%
Rupture of Methanol tanker - Pool fire 4.71%
Rupture of methanol tanker – Flash Fire/VCE 0.92%
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-7
Scenario
Societal Risk
% Contribution
Leakage of Toluene tanker - Pool fire 0.14%
Leakage of toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 18.89%
Rupture of Toluene tanker - Pool fire 2.73%
Rupture of Toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE 0.94%
Total 100 %
Based on the above, the major risk contributors to societal risk are:
1. Leakage of toluene tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
2. Leakage of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
3. Leakage of methanol tanker - Flash Fire/ VCE
4. Rupture of Methanol tank - Flash Fire/ VCE
The Group Risk contributors in the form of pie chart are given below:
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 4-8
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 5-9
5 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the QRA results, the Individual Risk as well as Societal Risk falls in below
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region
The summary of consequence analysis has been presented in the summary table
Based on this study, the following conclusions have been reached:
Table 5-1: Conclusion for IR/SR
1
Individual Risk (IR)
The IR value for the Aarti Drugs Limited is estimated at 2.47E-06 per year, which is
in ALARP region.
2
Expected Number of Fatalities (PLL)
The estimated overall Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for the plant population is
estimated at 0.82 E-06 per year.
3
Societal Risk (F-N Curve)
The F-N curves show that societal risk for the overall population considered falls
below the ALARP region (10-3 to 10-5) i.e. in the acceptable region.
In the majority of failure scenarios considered, damage to adjacent equipment or tank is
likely in event of fire/ explosion. Radiation received by surrounding equipment or tanks
could be sufficient to cause overheating/ explosion of the equipment or tank.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Use of mechanical equipment and tools that can generate sparks in operation should
be avoided within the process areas.
Ensure strict implementation of ‘NO SMOKING’ and ‘NO MOBILE’ at the facility to
minimize ignition chances. The vehicles entering inside the plant should be ensured
to be fitted with flame arrestors.
During unloading of various solvents, proper grounding of the road tankers to be
ensured.
Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness to be
achieved.
As in case of a fire at the terminal, escape and evacuation routes are expected get
impaired due to high radiation levels (>6.3kW/m2), therefore, EERA shall be done for
QRA Study Report for ADL
J015 QRA Sarigam Aarti Drugs Rev0 5-10
the terminal.
Small leaks could occur frequently in routine operations like pump seal failure,
sample point valve or drain valve left open, flange leak etc. They should be attended
to immediately as they could escalate.
In case of any leakage, evacuate staffs at the leakage affected area and guide them
to a safe place; prevent entry of unnecessary personnel into the affected area; and
isolate ignition source. Personnel for emergency treatment should stop leakage in a
safe manner.
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6 REFERENCE
1. TNO Purple Book (CPR 18E) – Guideline For Quantitative Risk Assessment
2. TNO Green Book (CPR16E) - Methods For The Determination Of Possible
Damage
3. International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)- Risk Assessment Data
Directory – Ignition Probabilities.
4. Phast & Risk Manual provided By DNV.
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APPENDIX A – ASSUMPTIONS
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1 PROCESS HAZARDS ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 0 Date: 10/06/2014
1.1 Process Release Hole Sizes
Description of Assumption:
Following leak sizes have been considered for MAEs mentioned in the report:
Table 1.1 Specified Release Hole Sizes
Category Specified Release Hole Size (mm)
Large Leak 80% of maximum line size
Note: Catastrophic Rupture is considered additionally
Comments:
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2 WEATHER DATA ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 0 Date: 10/062014
Description of Assumption:
The following weather conditions has been assumed for consequence calculations:
D-3 m/sec
F-1.5 m/sec
The average ambient temperature is taken as 33oC and relative humidity as 65%.
Comments: The weather data is referred from Climatological Tables, India Meteorological Department.
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3 SAFETY SYSTEMS AND EMERGENCY. RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS
Rev: 0 Date: 10/06/2014
3.1 Effect of Thermal Radiation
Description of Assumption:
Effect of Thermal radiation levels are listed in the table below.
Table 3.1 Effects due to Incident Radiation Intensity
INCIDENT RADIATION – kW/m2 TYPE OF DAMAGE
0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation
1.6 No discomfort for long exposure
4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering
of skin (first degree burns are likely)
9.3 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. Second
degree burns after 20 sec. 1% lethality.
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of
wood, melting plastic tubing etc. 10% lethality.
18.47 50% lethality.
36.56 99% lethality.
Comments: The effects of thermal radiation has been obtained from TNO Green Book
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3 SAFETY SYSTEMS AND EMERGENCY. RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS
Rev: 0 Date: 10/06/2014
3.2 Explosion Overpressure Effect Criteria
Description of Assumption:
The explosion overpressure effect criteria are listed in following table:
Table 3.2 Damage due to Explosion Overpressure
Peak Overpressure, bar Damage Type
0.83 Total destruction
0.30 Heavy damage, nearly complete destruction of houses
0.27 Cladding of light industrial building ruptures
0.2 Steel frame buildings distorted and pulled from
foundations
0.16 Lower limit of serious structural damage
0.14 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
0.027 Limited minor structural damage
0.01 Typical pressure of glass breakage
Comments: The effects of overpressure has been obtained from TNO Green Book
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3 RISK CALCULATION ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 0 Date: 10/06/2014
3.1 Vulnerabilities used for the Polysilicon Facility
Description of Assumption:
Table 3.2 Vulnerability values
Hazard Impact Level Outdoor Indoor
Pool Fire Radiation 0.7 0.2
Flash Fire LFL 1 0.1
Overpressure
Light Explosion (up to 100 mbar) 0 0.16
Heavy Explosion (> 100 mbar) 0.1 1
.
Comments:
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3 RISK CALCULATION ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 0 Date: 10/06/2014
3.2 Risk Analysis Criteria
Description of Assumption:
Following Criteria have been used for the risk analysis:
Comments:
CONTOURS
Legends:
Fire due to release of toluene
Explosion due to release of toluene
Fire due to release of xylene
Explosion due to release of xylene
Fire due to release of methanol
Explosion due to release of methanol